Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
changeset 97:e45e864fda83
on to Prima Secundi
| author | ht |
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| date | Sat, 01 Nov 2014 15:26:17 +0000 |
| parents | 93e2f523304a |
| children | 7bb6c5b189fc |
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| diffstat | 4 files changed, 4322 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) [+] |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FS_i.html Sat Nov 01 15:26:17 2014 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,4318 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.i" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FS.i-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS.i.i">Q. . PROLOGUE</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q1">Q. 1. OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q2">Q. 2. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q3">Q. 3. WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q4">Q. 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q5">Q. 5. OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FS.i.i" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS.i.i-p0.1">Q. . PROLOGUE</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS.i.i-p1"> Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies + "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of + those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, + i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions. + </p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II pr."><a name="33404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33404] +Iª-IIae pr.</span></a> Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo +factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem +significatur <i>intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se +potestativum</i>; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de +Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius +voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de +homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi +liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.</p></div></div></div> +</div> + <div id="FS_Q1" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q1-p0.1">Q. 1. OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q1-p2"> In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance + towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end + of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness. + </p><p id="FS_Q1-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q1-p4"><a href="#FS_Q1_A1"> (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p5"><a href="#FS_Q1_A2"> (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p6"><a href="#FS_Q1_A3"> (3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p7"><a href="#FS_Q1_A4"> (4) Whether there is any last end of human life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p8"><a href="#FS_Q1_A5"> (5) Whether one man can have several last ends?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p9"><a href="#FS_Q1_A6"> (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p10"><a href="#FS_Q1_A7"> (7) Whether all men have the same last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p11"><a href="#FS_Q1_A8"> (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 pr."><a name="33405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33405] +Iª-IIae q. 1 pr.</span></a> Ubi primo considerandum occurrit +de ultimo fine humanae vitae; et deinde de his per quae homo ad +hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab eo deviare, ex fine enim +oportet accipere rationes eorum quae ordinantur ad finem. Et quia +ultimus finis humanae vitae ponitur esse beatitudo, oportet primo +considerare de ultimo fine in communi; deinde de beatitudine. Circa +primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum hominis sit agere propter +finem. Secundo, utrum hoc sit proprium rationalis naturae. Tertio, +utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem a fine. Quarto, utrum sit +aliquis ultimus finis humanae vitae. Quinto, utrum unius hominis +possint esse plures ultimi fines. Sexto, utrum homo ordinet omnia +in ultimum finem. Septimo, utrum idem sit finis ultimus omnium +hominum. Octavo, utrum in illo ultimo fine omnes aliae creaturae +conveniant.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q1_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A1-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 1. Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, + implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; + since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33406] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homini non conveniat agere propter +finem. Causa enim naturaliter prior est. Sed finis habet rationem +ultimi, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo finis non habet rationem causae. +Sed propter illud agit homo, quod est causa actionis, cum haec +praepositio propter designet habitudinem causae. Ergo homini non +convenit agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher + states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33407] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod est ultimus finis, non est propter finem. Sed in +quibusdam actiones sunt ultimus finis; ut patet per philosophum in +I Ethic. Ergo non omnia homo agit propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, + sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, + while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33408] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +tunc videtur homo agere propter finem, quando deliberat. Sed multa +homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil +cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum aliis intentus, +vel fricat barbam. Non ergo homo omnia agit propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations, + as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33409] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +omnia quae sunt in aliquo genere, derivantur a principio illius +generis. Sed finis est principium in operabilibus ab homine; ut +patet per philosophum in II Physic. Ergo homini convenit omnia +agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational + animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is + master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty + and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed + from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly + "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are + caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore + all human actions must be for an end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 co."><a name="33410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33410] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie +dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo. +Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod +est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur +proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus +suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et liberum arbitrium +esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones +proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. +Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem +hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis +inquantum est homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae +procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui +obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet +quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this + way that it is a cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33411] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen +primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem +causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is + voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it + is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will + to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is + color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible + object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action + be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, + is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action + in which the last end consists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33412] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, oportet eam +esse voluntariam, alias non esset humana, ut dictum est. Actio +autem aliqua dupliciter dicitur voluntaria, uno modo, quia +imperatur a voluntate, sicut ambulare vel loqui; alio modo, quia +elicitur a voluntate, sicut ipsum velle. Impossibile autem est quod +ipse actus a voluntate elicitus sit ultimus finis. Nam obiectum +voluntatis est finis, sicut obiectum visus est color, unde sicut +impossibile est quod primum visibile sit ipsum videre, quia omne +videre est alicuius obiecti visibilis; ita impossibile est quod +primum appetibile, quod est finis, sit ipsum velle. Unde +relinquitur quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, quod ipsa +sit imperata a voluntate. Et ita ibi aliqua actio hominis, ad minus +ipsum velle, est propter finem. Quidquid ergo homo faciat, verum +est dicere quod homo agit propter finem, etiam agendo actionem quae +est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the + proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33413] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non +procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est proprium principium +humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem +per rationem praestitutum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A2-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 2. Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, + never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they + are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as + irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33414] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod agere propter finem sit proprium +rationalis naturae. Homo enim, cuius est agere propter finem, +nunquam agit propter finem ignotum. Sed multa sunt quae non +cognoscunt finem, vel quia omnino carent cognitione, sicut +creaturae insensibiles; vel quia non apprehendunt rationem finis, +sicut bruta animalia. Videtur ergo proprium esse rationalis naturae +agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong + to things that lack reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33415] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +agere propter finem est ordinare suam actionem ad finem. Sed hoc +est rationis opus. Ergo non convenit his quae ratione carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to + act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33416] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas in ratione +est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo agere propter finem non est +nisi rationalis naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33417] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus probat in II Physic., quod <i>non solum +intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, + the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that + matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. + But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not + determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce + a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as + this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other + things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite." + </p><p id="FS_Q1_A2-p7"> Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, + moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end + through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, + move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the + "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by + another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything + to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument + to the principal agent, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 4; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">FP, + Q[103], A[1] + </a>, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the + end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend + the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 co."><a name="33418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33418] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem. +Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse +est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa +finalis. Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi +secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia +in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim +agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret +hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, +necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet +rationem finis. Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura +fit per rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis +fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. +Tamen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad +finem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo; +alio modo, sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit ad +determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam +actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa +movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum +arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quae +ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi +ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non cognoscant rationem +finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem +ab alio ordinantur. Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum +sicut instrumentum ad agens principale, ut supra habitum est. Et +ideo proprium est naturae rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se +agens vel ducens ad finem, naturae vero irrationalis, quasi ab alio +acta vel ducta, sive in finem apprehensum, sicut bruta animalia, +sive in finem non apprehensum, sicut ea quae omnino cognitione +carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he + acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. + And it is thus with irrational creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33419] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod homo, quando per seipsum agit propter finem, +cognoscit finem, sed quando ab alio agitur vel ducitur, puta cum +agit ad imperium alterius, vel cum movetur altero impellente, non +est necessarium quod cognoscat finem. Et ita est in creaturis +irrationalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that + which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33420] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ordinare in finem est eius quod seipsum agit in +finem. Eius vero quod ab alio in finem agitur, est ordinari in +finem. Quod potest esse irrationalis naturae, sed ab aliquo +rationem habente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack + reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, + determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor + of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular + departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some + rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33421] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali. +Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et +intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale, sed est in eis +appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum +particulare. Manifestum autem est quod particulares causae moventur +a causa universali, sicut rector civitatis, qui intendit bonum +commune, movet suo imperio omnia particularia officia civitatis. Et +ideo necesse est quod omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur in fines +particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se extendit in +bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A3-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 3. Whether human acts are specified by their end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified + by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33422] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humani non recipiant speciem a +fine. Finis enim est causa extrinseca. Sed unumquodque habet +speciem ab aliquo principio intrinseco. Ergo actus humani non +recipiunt speciem a fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore + a human act does not derive its species from the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33423] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod dat speciem, oportet esse prius. Sed finis est posterior +in esse. Ergo actus humanus non habet speciem a fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. + Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33424] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +idem non potest esse nisi in una specie. Sed eundem numero actum +contingit ordinari ad diversos fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem +actibus humanis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy + of blame or praise." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33425] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de moribus Ecclesiae et +Manichaeorum, <i>secundum quod finis est culpabilis vel laudabilis, +secundum hoc sunt opera nostra culpabilia vel laudabilia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p6"> I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed + of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper + movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an + act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the + terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while + heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. + And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For + human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q1_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the + end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is + their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of + the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. + super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral + acts are the same as human acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 co."><a name="33426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33426] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non +secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et +forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc +etiam considerandum est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus +quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum +ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium +agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus. Unde calefactio +actio nihil aliud est quam motio quaedam a calore procedens, +calefactio vero passio nihil aliud est quam motus ad calorem, +definitio autem manifestat rationem speciei. Et utroque modo actus +humani, sive considerentur per modum actionum, sive per modum +passionum, a fine speciem sortiuntur. Utroque enim modo possunt +considerari actus humani, eo quod homo movet seipsum, et movetur a +seipso. Dictum est autem supra quod actus dicuntur humani, +inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata. Obiectum autem +voluntatis est bonum et finis. Et ideo manifestum est quod +principium humanorum actuum, inquantum sunt humani, est finis. Et +similiter est terminus eorundem, nam id ad quod terminatur actus +humanus, est id quod voluntas intendit tanquam finem; sicut in +agentibus naturalibus forma generati est conformis formae +generantis. Et quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, <i>mores +proprie dicuntur humani</i>, actus morales proprie speciem +sortiuntur ex fine, nam idem sunt actus morales et actus +humani.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just + this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, + considered as passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33427] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu, +quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum +est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad +actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus + that it gives the species to the human or moral act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33428] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod finis secundum quod est prior in intentione, ut +dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat +speciem actui humano sive morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has + its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, + that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill + a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as + to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts + in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement + does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus. + Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality. + Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered + in their moral species, and conversely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33429] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab +agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet +speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus +est finis alterius. Possibile tamen est quod unus actus secundum +speciem naturae, ordinetur ad diversos fines voluntatis, sicut hoc +ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod est idem secundum speciem +naturae, potest ordinari sicut in finem ad conservationem +iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus +secundum speciem moris, quia uno modo erit actus virtutis, alio +modo erit actus vitii. Non enim motus recipit speciem ab eo quod +est terminus per accidens, sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per +se. Fines autem morales accidunt rei naturali; et e converso ratio +naturalis finis accidit morali. Et ideo nihil prohibet actus qui +sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse diversos secundum speciem +moris, et e converso.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A4-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 4. Whether there is one last end of human life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, + as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse + some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is + an indefinite series of ends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33430] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis ultimus finis humanae +vitae, sed procedatur in finibus in infinitum. Bonum enim, secundum +suam rationem, est diffusivum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. +de Div. Nom. Si ergo quod procedit ex bono, ipsum etiam est bonum, +oportet quod illud bonum diffundat aliud bonum, et sic processus +boni est in infinitum. Sed bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo in +finibus est processus in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the + same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire + of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33431] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt rationis, in infinitum multiplicari possunt, unde et +mathematicae quantitates in infinitum augentur. Species etiam +numerorum propter hoc sunt infinitae, quia, dato quolibet numero, +ratio alium maiorem excogitare potest. Sed desiderium finis +sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ergo videtur quod etiam in +finibus procedatur in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for + I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human + will, and there is no last end of the human will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33432] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas infinities +potest reflecti supra seipsam, possum enim velle aliquid, et velle +me velle illud, et sic in infinitum. Ergo in finibus humanae +voluntatis proceditur in infinitum, et non est aliquis ultimus +finis humanae voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good + is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore + it is necessary to fix one last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33433] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, II Metaphys., quod <i>qui infinitum +faciunt, auferunt naturam boni</i>. Sed bonum est quod habet +rationem finis. Ergo contra rationem finis est quod procedatur in +infinitum. Necesse est ergo ponere unum ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever + things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must + of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes + of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can + the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order + in ends---the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first. + For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you + remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein + operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention + is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, + on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any + action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are + ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely. + </p><p id="FS_Q1_A4-p7"> On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; + for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things + ordained to the end. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 co."><a name="33434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33434] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, per se loquendo, impossibile est in finibus +procedere in infinitum, ex quacumque parte. In omnibus enim quae +per se habent ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo, +removeantur ea quae sunt ad primum. Unde philosophus probat, in +VIII Physic., quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere +in infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo subtracto alia +movere non possunt, cum non moveant nisi per hoc quod moventur a +primo movente. In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet +ordo intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet +esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis +est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto principio, +appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in +executione, est unde incipit operatio, unde, isto principio +subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari. Principium autem +intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est +primum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile +est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil +appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret +intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad +finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur +consilium, sed in infinitum procederet. Ea vero quae non habent +ordinem per se, sed per accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil +prohibet infinitatem habere, causae enim per accidens +indeterminatae sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem +per accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good + has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that + from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And + this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is + infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its + effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the + First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely + but, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33435] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod de ratione boni est quod aliquid ab ipso effluat, non +tamen quod ipsum ab alio procedat. Et ideo, cum bonum habeat +rationem finis, et primum bonum sit ultimus finis, ratio ista non +probat quod non sit ultimus finis; sed quod a fine primo supposito +procedatur in infinitum inferius versus ea quae sunt ad finem. Et +hoc quidem competeret, si consideraretur sola virtus primi boni, +quae est infinita. Sed quia primum bonum habet diffusionem secundum +intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam certam formam profluere in +causata; aliquis certus modus adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo +bono, a quo omnia alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et +ideo diffusio bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur +Sap. XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore + the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process + of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally + connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is + accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing + hinders the reason from an indefinite process. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33436] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in his quae sunt per se, ratio incipit a principiis +naturaliter notis, et ad aliquem terminum progreditur. Unde +philosophus probat, in I Poster., quod in demonstrationibus non est +processus in infinitum, quia in demonstrationibus attenditur ordo +aliquorum per se ad invicem connexorum, et non per accidens. In his +autem quae per accidens connectuntur, nihil prohibet rationem in +infinitum procedere. Accidit autem quantitati aut numero +praeexistenti, inquantum huiusmodi, quod ei addatur quantitas aut +unitas. Unde in huiusmodi nihil prohibet rationem procedere in +infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact + that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33437] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa multiplicatio actuum voluntatis reflexae supra +seipsam, per accidens se habet ad ordinem finium. Quod patet ex +hoc, quod circa unum et eundem finem indifferenter semel vel +pluries supra seipsam voluntas reflectitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A5-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 5. Whether one man can have several last ends?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of + nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many + things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33438] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit voluntatem unius hominis +in plura ferri simul, sicut in ultimos fines. Dicit enim +Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod quidam ultimum hominis finem +posuerunt in quatuor, scilicet <i>in voluptate, in quiete, in +primis naturae, et in virtute</i>. Haec autem manifeste sunt plura. +Ergo unus homo potest constituere ultimum finem suae voluntatis in +multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition + to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33439] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae non opponuntur ad invicem, se invicem non excludunt. Sed +multa inveniuntur in rebus quae sibi invicem non opponuntur. Ergo +si unum ponatur ultimus finis voluntatis, non propter hoc alia +excluduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its + last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed + his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's + will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33440] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +voluntas per hoc quod constituit ultimum finem in aliquo, suam +liberam potentiam non amittit. Sed antequam constitueret ultimum +finem suum in illo, puta in voluptate, poterat constituere finem +suum ultimum in alio, puta in divitiis. Ergo etiam postquam +constituit aliquis ultimum finem suae voluntatis in voluptate, +potest simul constituere ultimum finem in divitiis. Ergo possibile +est voluntatem unius hominis simul ferri in diversa, sicut in +ultimos fines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life. + Hence of gluttons it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.19" target="asv">Phil. 3:19</a>): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv"> Mat. 6:24, </a> "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man + to have several last ends not ordained to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33441] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +illud in quo quiescit aliquis sicut in ultimo fine, hominis +affectui dominatur, quia ex eo totius vitae suae regulas accipit. +Unde de gulosis dicitur Philipp. III, <i>quorum Deus venter +est</i>, quia scilicet constituunt ultimum finem in deliciis +ventris. Sed sicut dicitur Matth. VI, <i>nemo potest duobus dominis +servire</i>, ad invicem scilicet non ordinatis. Ergo impossibile +est esse plures ultimos fines unius hominis ad invicem non +ordinatos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be + assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which + he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean + now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be + complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to + desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite + so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good. + </p><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p7"> The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in + the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must + needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last + end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one. + </p><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p8"> The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q1_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in + a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus, + the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; + and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the + whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally + one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 co."><a name="33442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33442] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se +habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos fines. Cuius ratio potest +triplex assignari. Prima est quia, cum unumquodque appetat suam +perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit, +ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus +dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod +consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit</i>. +Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis +appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse +non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur. +Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic tendat appetitus, ac si +utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius. Secunda ratio est quia, sicut +in processu rationis principium est id quod naturaliter +cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est +voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur. +Hoc autem oportet esse unum, quia natura non tendit nisi ad unum. +Principium autem in processu rationalis appetitus est ultimus +finis. Unde oportet id in quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi +finis, esse unum. Tertia ratio est quia, cum actiones voluntarie ex +fine speciem sortiantur, sicut supra habitum est, oportet quod a +fine ultimo, qui est communis, sortiantur rationem generis, sicut +et naturalia ponuntur in genere secundum formalem rationem +communem. Cum igitur omnia appetibilia voluntatis, inquantum +huiusmodi, sint unius generis, oportet ultimum finem esse unum. Et +praecipue quia in quolibet genere est unum primum principium, +ultimus autem finis habet rationem primi principii, ut dictum est. +Sicut autem se habet ultimus finis hominis simpliciter ad totum +humanum genus, ita se habet ultimus finis huius hominis ad hunc +hominem. Unde oportet quod, sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter +unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine +statuatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33443] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnia illa plura accipiebantur in ratione unius boni +perfecti ex his constituti, ab his qui in eis ultimum finem +ponebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's + perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33444] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi plura accipi possint quae ad invicem +oppositionem non habeant, tamen bono perfecto opponitur quod sit +aliquid de perfectione rei extra ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend + to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33445] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod potestas voluntatis non habet ut faciat opposita esse +simul. Quod contingeret, si tenderet in plura disparata sicut in +ultimos fines, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A6-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 6. Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are + said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains + not to the last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33446] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quaecumque homo vult, +propter ultimum finem velit. Ea enim quae ad finem ultimum +ordinantur, seriosa dicuntur, quasi utilia. Sed iocosa a seriis +distinguuntur. Ergo ea quae homo iocose agit, non ordinat in +ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. + Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, + for the last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33447] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in principio Metaphys., quod scientiae +speculativae propter seipsas quaeruntur. Nec tamen potest dici quod +quaelibet earum sit ultimus finis. Ergo non omnia quae homo +appetit, appetit propter ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all + that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33448] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque ordinat aliquid in finem aliquem, cogitat de illo fine. +Sed non semper homo cogitat de ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit +aut facit. Non ergo omnia homo appetit aut facit propter ultimum +finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we + love it for its own sake." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33449] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>illud est finis boni +nostri, propter quod amantur cetera, illud autem propter +seipsum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because + whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last + end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained + to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. + Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, + because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is + clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects + of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 co."><a name="33450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33450] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat +propter ultimum finem. Et hoc apparet duplici ratione. Primo +quidem, quia quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni. Quod +quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis, +necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper +inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet +tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et +ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem +consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem. Secundo, quia ultimus +finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in +aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae +secundae moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo +movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in +ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford + him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33451] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod actiones ludicrae non ordinantur ad aliquem finem +extrinsecum; sed tamen ordinantur ad bonum ipsius ludentis, prout +sunt delectantes vel requiem praestantes. Bonum autem consummatum +hominis est ultimus finis eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good, + which is the ultimate end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33452] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum ad secundum, de scientia speculativa; quae appetitur ut +bonum quoddam speculantis, quod comprehenditur sub bono completo et +perfecto, quod est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention, + which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts + be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every + step. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33453] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine, +quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae +intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet +appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non +cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet +passu cogitet de fine.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A7-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 7. Whether all men have the same last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end + of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33454] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium hominum sit unus finis +ultimus. Maxime enim videtur hominis ultimus finis esse +incommutabile bonum. Sed quidam avertuntur ab incommutabili bono, +peccando. Non ergo omnium hominum est unus ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not + have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33455] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum ultimum finem tota vita hominis regulatur. Si igitur esset +unus ultimus finis omnium hominum, sequeretur quod in hominibus non +essent diversa studia vivendi. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, + yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33456] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +finis est actionis terminus. Actiones autem sunt singularium. +Homines autem, etsi conveniant in natura speciei, tamen differunt +secundum ea quae ad individua pertinent. Non ergo omnium hominum +est unus ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33457] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., quod omnes homines +conveniunt in appetendo ultimum finem, qui est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing + in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since + all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q1_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But as to the thing in which this aspect is + realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; + others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to + others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in + which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed + affections desires for his last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 co."><a name="33458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33458] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de ultimo fine possumus loqui dupliciter, uno modo, +secundum rationem ultimi finis; alio modo, secundum id in quo finis +ultimi ratio invenitur. Quantum igitur ad rationem ultimi finis, +omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi, quia omnes appetunt suam +perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis, ut dictum est. +Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines +conveniunt in ultimo fine, nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam +consummatum bonum, quidam autem voluptatem, quidam vero quodcumque +aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile est dulce, sed quibusdam +maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini, quibusdam dulcedo mellis, aut +alicuius talium. Illud tamen dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius +delectabile, in quo maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et +similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam +ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the + last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33459] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere +invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis +intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33460] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod diversa studia vivendi contingunt in hominibus +propter diversas res in quibus quaeritur ratio summi boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q1_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33461] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi actiones sint singularium, tamen primum +principium agendi in eis est natura, quae tendit ad unum, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A8-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 8. Whether other creatures concur in that last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e. + God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33462] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in ultimo fine hominis etiam omnia +alia conveniant. Finis enim respondet principio. Sed illud quod est +principium hominum, scilicet Deus, est etiam principium omnium +aliorum. Ergo in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia communicant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's + last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things, + too, concur in man's last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33463] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus convertit +omnia ad seipsum, tanquam ad ultimum finem</i>. Sed ipse est etiam +ultimus finis hominis, quia solo ipso fruendum est, ut Augustinus +dicit. Ergo in fine ultimo hominis etiam alia conveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of + all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33464] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +finis ultimus hominis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed obiectum +voluntatis est bonum universale, quod est finis omnium. Ergo +necesse est quod in ultimo fine hominis omnia conveniant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible + for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33465] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ultimus finis hominum est beatitudo; quam omnes appetunt, +ut Augustinus dicit. <i>Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia +ut beata sint</i>, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium +quaest. Non ergo in ultimo fine hominis alia conveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself + in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of + a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money + as "thing," or possession of money as "use." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 co."><a name="33466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33466] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic. et in V +Metaphys., finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo, idest +ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius +rei. Sicut si dicamus quod motus corporis gravis finis est vel +locus inferior ut res, vel hoc quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut +usus, et finis avari est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniae +ut usus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p7"> If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, + since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of + the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their + last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in + so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam +rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia +conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum +rerum. Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad +consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant +creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae +consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non +competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum +participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel +vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p8"> Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 ad arg."><a name="33467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33467] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q2" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q2-p2"> We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.</p><p id="FS_Q2-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q2-p4"><a href="#FS_Q2_A1"> (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p5"><a href="#FS_Q2_A2"> (2) Whether in honor?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p6"><a href="#FS_Q2_A3"> (3) Whether in fame or glory?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p7"><a href="#FS_Q2_A4"> (4) Whether in power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p8"><a href="#FS_Q2_A5"> (5) Whether in any good of the body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p9"><a href="#FS_Q2_A6"> (6) Whether in pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p10"><a href="#FS_Q2_A7"> (7) Whether in any good of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p11"><a href="#FS_Q2_A8"> (8) Whether in any created good?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 pr."><a name="33468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33468] +Iª-IIae q. 2 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +beatitudine, nam beatitudo nominat adeptionem ultimi finis. Primo +quidem, in quibus sit; secundo, quid sit; tertio, qualiter eam +consequi possimus. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum +beatitudo consistat in divitiis. Secundo, utrum in honoribus. +Tertio, utrum in fama, sive in gloria. Quarto, utrum in potestate. +Quinto, utrum in aliquo corporis bono. Sexto, utrum in voluptate. +Septimo, utrum in aliquo bono animae. Octavo, utrum in aliquo bono +creato.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q2_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A1-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 1. Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which + has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv">Eccles. 10:19</a>): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33469] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in divitiis +consistat. Cum enim beatitudo sit ultimus finis hominis, in eo +consistit quod maxime in hominis affectu dominatur. Huiusmodi autem +sunt divitiae, dicitur enim Eccle. X, <i>pecuniae obediunt +omnia</i>. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo hominis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good + things." Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, + that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33470] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>beatitudo est status omnium +bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed in pecuniis omnia possideri +videntur, quia, ut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., ad hoc nummus est +inventus, ut sit quasi fideiussor habendi pro eo quodcumque homo +voluerit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more + than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.9" target="asv">Eccles. 5:9</a>). Therefore happiness consists in wealth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33471] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +desiderium summi boni, cum nunquam deficiat, videtur esse +infinitum. Sed hoc maxime in divitiis invenitur, quia <i>avarus non +implebitur pecunia</i>, ut dicitur Eccle. V. Ergo in divitiis +beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines + in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness + does not consist in wealth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33472] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +bonum hominis in retinendo beatitudinem magis consistit quam in +emittendo ipsam. Sed sicut Boetius in II de Consol. dicit, +<i>divitiae effundendo, magis quam coacervando, melius nitent, +siquidem avaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit</i>. Ergo +in divitiis beatitudo non consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), + viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, + clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, + but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things + salable. + </p><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of + something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man + as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet." + </p><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p8"> And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, + by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of + the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="33473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33473] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in divitiis +consistere. Sunt enim duplices divitiae, ut philosophus dicit in I +Polit., scilicet naturales, et artificiales. Naturales quidem +divitiae sunt, quibus homini subvenitur ad defectus naturales +tollendos, sicut cibus, potus, vestimenta, vehicula et habitacula, +et alia huiusmodi. Divitiae autem artificiales sunt, quibus +secundum se natura non iuvatur, ut denarii; sed ars humana eos +adinvenit propter facilitatem commutationis, ut sint quasi mensura +quaedam rerum venalium. Manifestum est autem quod in divitiis +naturalibus beatitudo hominis esse non potest. Quaeruntur enim +huiusmodi divitiae propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam +hominis, et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis +ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem. Unde in ordine naturae omnia +huiusmodi sunt infra hominem, et propter hominem facta; secundum +illud Psalmi VIII, <i>omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius</i>. +Divitiae autem artificiales non quaeruntur nisi propter naturales, +non enim quaererentur, nisi quia per eas emuntur res ad usum vitae +necessariae. Unde multo minus habent rationem ultimi finis. +Impossibile est igitur beatitudinem, quae est ultimus finis +hominis, in divitiis esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which + can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as + it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33474] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad +multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae +pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet +sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus, sicut et iudicium de saporibus +ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.16" target="asv">Prov. 17:16</a>): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33475] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod pecunia possunt haberi omnia venalia, non autem +spiritualia, quae vendi non possunt. Unde dicitur Proverb. XVII, +<i>quid prodest stulto divitias habere, cum sapientiam emere non +possit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial + wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear + (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly + the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things + despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is + the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason + of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, + and the sovereign good does not consist therein. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33476] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus, +quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus +divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit +concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per +philosophum in I Polit. Aliter tamen est infinitum desiderium +divitiarum, et desiderium summi boni. Nam summum bonum quanto +perfectius possidetur, tanto ipsummet magis amatur, et alia +contemnuntur, quia quanto magis habetur, magis cognoscitur. Et ideo +dicitur Eccli. XXIV, <i>qui edunt me, adhuc esurient</i>. Sed in +appetitu divitiarum, et quorumcumque temporalium bonorum, est e +converso, nam quando iam habentur, ipsa contemnuntur, et alia +appetuntur; secundum quod significatur Ioan. IV, cum dominus dicit, +qui bibit <i>ex hac aqua</i>, per quam temporalia significantur, +<i>sitiet iterum</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia eorum insufficientia magis +cognoscitur cum habentur. Et ideo hoc ipsum ostendit eorum +imperfectionem, et quod in eis summum bonum non consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A2-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 2. Whether man's happiness consists in honors?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33477] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in honoribus +consistat. Beatitudo enim, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis, +ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed honor maxime videtur esse id +quod est virtutis praemium, ut philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Ergo +in honore maxime consistit beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect + good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33478] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod convenit Deo et excellentissimis, maxime videtur esse +beatitudo, quae est bonum perfectum. Sed huiusmodi est honor, ut +philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Et etiam I Tim. I, dicit apostolus, +<i>soli Deo honor et gloria</i>. Ergo in honore consistit +beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers + loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33479] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod est maxime desideratum ab hominibus, est beatitudo. Sed +nihil videtur esse magis desiderabile ab hominibus quam honor, quia +homines patiuntur iacturam in omnibus aliis rebus ne patiantur +aliquod detrimentum sui honoris. Ergo in honore beatitudo +consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the + person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33480] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur, +sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut +philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Ergo in honore beatitudo non +consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and + consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, + especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share + of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot + principally consist therein. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="33481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33481] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem consistere in honore. +Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et +ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est +in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum +beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum; et secundum partes +eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis +participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, +sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive + honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness + itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33482] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, honor non est +praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt +honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, quasi a non habentibus aliquid +maius ad dandum. Verum autem praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo, +propter quam virtuosi operantur. Si autem propter honorem +operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that + honor makes them excellent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33483] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod honor debetur Deo et excellentissimis, in signum vel +testimonium excellentiae praeexistentis, non quod ipse honor faciat +eos excellentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated + above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or + happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33484] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex naturali desiderio beatitudinis, quam consequitur +honor, ut dictum est, contingit quod homines maxime honorem +desiderant. Unde quaerunt homines maxime honorari a sapientibus, +quorum iudicio credunt se esse excellentes vel felices.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A3-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 3. Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints + for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.18" target="asv">Rom. 8:18</a>): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore + happiness consists in glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33485] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in gloria. +In eo enim videtur beatitudo consistere, quod redditur sanctis pro +tribulationibus quas in mundo patiuntur. Huiusmodi autem est +gloria, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, <i>non sunt condignae +passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam, quae revelabitur in +nobis</i>. Ergo beatitudo consistit in gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge + of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory + consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33486] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum est diffusivum sui, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Sed per gloriam bonum hominis maxime diffunditur in notitiam +aliorum, quia gloria, ut Ambrosius dicit, nihil aliud est quam +clara cum laude notitia. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in +gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity + after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your + fame in future time." Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33487] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est stabilissimum bonorum. Hoc autem videtur esse fama +vel gloria, quia per hanc quodammodo homines aeternitatem +sortiuntur. Unde Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., <i>vos +immortalitatem vobis propagare videmini, cum futuri famam temporis +cogitatis</i>. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in fama seu +gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe + their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, + must needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33488] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +beatitudo est verum hominis bonum. Sed famam seu gloriam contingit +esse falsam, ut enim dicit Boetius, in libro III de Consol., +<i>plures magnum saepe nomen falsis vulgi opinionibus abstulerunt. +Quo quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur, +suis ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant</i>. Non ergo beatitudo +hominis consistit in fama seu gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [*Augustine, + Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for + human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection + of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human + knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness + itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends + on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.15" target="asv"> Ps. 90:15,16</a>: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with + length of days, and I will show him my salvation." + </p><p id="FS_Q2_A3-p7"> Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. + For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:18</a>): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="33489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33489] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in fama seu +gloria humana consistere. Nam gloria nihil aliud est quam clara +notitia cum laude, ut Ambrosius dicit. Res autem cognita aliter +comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem +divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina +cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum. Unde perfectio humani boni, +quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed +magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo +causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta. Et +ideo in fama vel in gloria non potest consistere hominis beatitudo. +Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et +ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut +ex causa sua, secundum illud Psalmi XC, <i>eripiam eum, et +glorificabo eum, longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam illi +salutare meum</i>. Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana +notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus +contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter +humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius +gloria semper vera est. Propter quod dicitur, II ad Cor. X, <i>ille +probatus est, quem Deus commendat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv">Mk. 8:38</a>): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv"> Mk. 8:38 </a>with + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.8" target="asv"> Lk. 12:8 </a>owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33490] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de gloria quae est ab +hominibus, sed de gloria quae est a Deo coram Angelis eius. Unde +dicitur Marc. VIII, <i>filius hominis confitebitur eum in gloria +patris sui, coram Angelis eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived + from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, + it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that + fame can nowise make man happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33491] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est +in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod +derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit +beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam. Si autem cognitio falsa sit, +non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama +celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere +hominem beatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But + happiness endures of itself, and for ever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33492] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de +facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per +accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A4-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 4. Whether man's happiness consists in power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first + beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture + they are called "gods" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness consists in power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33493] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in potestate. +Omnia enim appetunt assimilari Deo, tanquam ultimo fini et primo +principio. Sed homines qui in potestatibus sunt, propter +similitudinem potestatis, maxime videntur esse Deo conformes, unde +et in Scriptura dii vocantur, ut patet Exod. XXII, <i>diis non +detrahes</i>. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to + those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33494] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Sed perfectissimum est quod homo +etiam alios regere possit, quod convenit his qui in potestatibus +sunt constituti. Ergo beatitudo consistit in potestate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than + aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33495] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo, cum sit maxime appetibilis, opponitur ei quod maxime est +fugiendum. Sed homines maxime fugiunt servitutem, cui contraponitur +potestas. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man cannot + relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who + is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33496] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +beatitudo est perfectum bonum. Sed potestas est maxime imperfecta. +Ut enim dicit Boetius, III de Consol., <i>potestas humana +sollicitudinum morsus expellere, formidinum aculeos vitare nequit. +Et postea, potentem censes cui satellites latus ambiunt qui quos +terret, ipse plus metuit?</i> Non igitur beatitudo consistit in +potestate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, + as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good + and evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, + which is by virtue, rather than in power itself. + </p><p id="FS_Q2_A4-p7"> Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, + since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and + in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having + gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may + still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since + happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.12" target="asv">Eccles. 5:12</a>) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because + man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained + thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for + which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 co."><a name="33497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33497] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere, +propter duo. Primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii, +ut patet in V Metaphys. Beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi +finis. Secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum. +Beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum. Unde magis +posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est +per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate. Possunt autem quatuor +generales rationes induci ad ostendendum quod in nullo praemissorum +exteriorum bonorum beatitudo consistat. Quarum prima est quia, cum +beatitudo sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod +malum. Omnia autem praedicta possunt inveniri et in bonis et in +malis. Secunda ratio est quia, cum de ratione beatitudinis sit quod +sit per se sufficiens, ut patet in I Ethic., necesse est quod, +beatitudine adepta, nullum bonum homini necessarium desit. Adeptis +autem singulis praemissorum, possunt adhuc multa bona homini +necessaria deesse, puta sapientia, sanitas corporis, et huiusmodi. +Tertia, quia, cum beatitudo sit bonum perfectum, ex beatitudine non +potest aliquod malum alicui provenire. Quod non convenit +praemissis, dicitur enim Eccle. V, quod divitiae interdum +conservantur in malum domini sui; et simile patet in aliis tribus. +Quarta ratio est quia ad beatitudinem homo ordinatur per principia +interiora, cum ad ipsam naturaliter ordinetur. Praemissa autem +quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a +fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in +praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it + is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33498] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua +potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. +Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo +quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad +bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes + a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33499] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut optimum est quod aliquis utatur bene potestate +in regimine multorum, ita pessimum est si male utatur. Et ita +potestas se habet et ad bonum et ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme + good consists in power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33500] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod servitus est impedimentum boni usus potestatis, et +ideo naturaliter homines eam fugiunt, et non quasi in potestate +hominis sit summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A5-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 5. Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:16</a>): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore + it consists in the health of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33501] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in bonis +corporis. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, <i>non est census supra censum +salutis corporis</i>. Sed in eo quod est optimum, consistit +beatitudo. Ergo consistit in corporis salute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. + But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it + seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33502] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod esse est melius quam +vivere, et vivere melius quam alia quae consequuntur. Sed ad esse +et vivere hominis requiritur salus corporis. Cum ergo beatitudo sit +summum bonum hominis, videtur quod salus corporis maxime pertineat +ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the + greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so + the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into + all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that + which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the + health of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33503] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ab altiori principio dependet +quia quanto causa est superior, tanto eius virtus ad plura se +extendit. Sed sicut causalitas causae efficientis consideratur +secundum influentiam, ita causalitas finis attenditur secundum +appetitum. Ergo sicut prima causa efficiens est quae in omnia +influit, ita ultimus finis est quod ab omnibus desideratur. Sed +ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab omnibus. Ergo in his quae +pertinent ad esse hominis, sicut est salus corporis, maxime +consistit eius beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, + by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist + in goods of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33504] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +secundum beatitudinem homo excellit omnia alia animalia. Sed +secundum bona corporis, a multis animalibus superatur, sicut ab +elephante in diuturnitate vitae, a leone in fortitudine, a cervo in +cursu. Ergo beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a + thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain + does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as + its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer + its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14</a>: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to + something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation + of man's being. + </p><p id="FS_Q2_A5-p7"> Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could not be said + that the end of man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body + depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above ( + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q2_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts + them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the + soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 co."><a name="33505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33505] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in bonis +corporis consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia impossibile +est quod illius rei quae ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, ultimus +finis sit eiusdem conservatio in esse. Unde gubernator non +intendit, sicut ultimum finem, conservationem navis sibi commissae; +eo quod navis ad aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, scilicet ad +navigandum. Sicut autem navis committitur gubernatori ad +dirigendum, ita homo est suae voluntati et rationi commissus; +secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit +hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Manifestum est +autem quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem, non enim homo +est summum bonum. Unde impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis +et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse. Secundo quia, +dato quod finis rationis et voluntatis humanae esset conservatio +humani esse, non tamen posset dici quod finis hominis esset aliquod +corporis bonum. Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et +quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae +non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est; ipsumque corpus est +propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumenta +propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones exerceat. Unde omnia bona +corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde +impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae +est ultimus hominis finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it + is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good + of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33506] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut corpus ordinatur ad animam sicut ad finem, ita +bona exteriora ad ipsum corpus. Et ideo rationabiliter bonum +corporis praefertur bonis exterioribus, quae per censum +significantur, sicut et bonum animae praefertur omnibus bonis +corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes + all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which + does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident + that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. + Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than + living things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33507] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in +se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus +subsequentibus, sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia +subsequentia. Et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur +ipsum esse prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non +capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum, +sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum +esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius +ibidem dicit quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et +intelligentia viventibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom + every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living + being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33508] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia finis respondet principio, ex illa ratione +probatur quod ultimus finis est primum principium essendi, in quo +est omnis essendi perfectio, cuius similitudinem appetunt, secundum +suam proportionem, quaedam quidem secundum esse tantum, quaedam +secundum esse vivens, quaedam secundum esse vivens et intelligens +et beatum. Et hoc paucorum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A6-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 6. Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something + else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what + is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33509] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in voluptate +consistat. Beatitudo enim, cum sit ultimus finis, non appetitur +propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam. Sed hoc maxime convenit +delectationi, <i>ridiculum est enim ab aliquo quaerere propter quid +velit delectari</i>, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo beatitudo maxime +in voluptate et delectatione consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the + end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion + of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes + him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness, + consists principally in pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33510] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, causa prima vehementius imprimit quam secunda</i>, ut +dicitur in libro de causis. Influentia autem finis attenditur +secundum eius appetitum. Illud ergo videtur habere rationem finis +ultimi, quod maxime movet appetitum. Hoc autem est voluptas, cuius +signum est quod delectatio intantum absorbet hominis voluntatem et +rationem, quod alia bona contemnere facit. Ergo videtur quod +ultimus finis hominis, qui est beatitudo, maxime in voluptate +consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, + and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists + in pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33511] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cum appetitus sit boni, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse +optimum. Sed delectationem omnia appetunt, et sapientes et +insipientes, et etiam ratione carentia. Ergo delectatio est +optimum. Consistit ergo in voluptate beatitudo, quae est summum +bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had + a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy + too." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33512] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., <i>tristes exitus esse +voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget. +Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes +quoque beatae esse dicantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), + although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains + to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and + another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper + accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has + some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, + is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least + apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, + but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident. + </p><p id="FS_Q2_A6-p7"> But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, + which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, + cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which + is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul + which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form + is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. + Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, + which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite + number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through + being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.9" target="asv">Wis. 7:9</a>) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor + a proper accident of happiness. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 co."><a name="33513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33513] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, <i>quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae +sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum</i>, ut dicitur VII +Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus +tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit. Quia in unaquaque re +aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium +accidens ipsius, sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal +rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile. Est igitur +considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens +quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex +hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi +conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria. Bonum +autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis +beatitudo si autem sit imperfectum est quaedam beatitudinis +participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde +manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio quae consequitur bonum +perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis; sed quoddam consequens +ad ipsam sicut per se accidens. Voluptas autem corporalis non +potest etiam modo praedicto sequi bonum perfectum. Nam sequitur +bonum quod apprehendit sensus, qui est virtus animae corpore utens. +Bonum autem quod pertinet ad corpus, quod apprehenditur secundum +sensum, non potest esse perfectum hominis bonum. Cum enim anima +rationalis excedat proportionem materiae corporalis, pars animae +quae est ab organo corporeo absoluta, quandam habet infinitatem +respectu ipsius corporis et partium animae corpori concretarum, +sicut immaterialia sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium, +eo quod forma per materiam quodammodo contrahitur et finitur, unde +forma a materia absoluta est quodammodo infinita. Et ideo sensus, +qui est vis corporalis, cognoscit singulare, quod est determinatum +per materiam, intellectus vero, qui est vis a materia absoluta, +cognoscit universale, quod est abstractum a materia, et continet +sub se infinita singularia. Unde patet quod bonum conveniens +corpori, quod per apprehensionem sensus delectationem corporalem +causat, non est perfectum bonum hominis, sed est minimum quiddam in +comparatione ad bonum animae. Unde Sap. VII, dicitur quod <i>omne +aurum, in comparatione sapientiae, arena est exigua</i>. Sic igitur +neque voluptas corporalis est ipsa beatitudo, nec est per se +accidens beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus + it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as + good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the + final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight + is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, + and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33514] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod eiusdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod +appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus +in bono, sicut ex eadem virtute naturae est quod grave feratur +deorsum, et quod ibi quiescat. Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum +appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud +appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam +formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis +propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis +obiectum, et per consequens est principium eius, et dat ei formam, +ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono +desiderato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles + of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33515] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit +ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae +cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus +delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, + as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight + results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33516] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod eo modo omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et +appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem appetunt ratione boni, et +non e converso, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod delectatio +sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio +consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id +quod est per se et maximum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A7-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 7. Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: + external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of + the body, as shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q2_A4" id="FS_Q2_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33517] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in aliquo bono +animae. Beatitudo enim est quoddam hominis bonum. Hoc autem per +tria dividitur, quae sunt bona exteriora, bona corporis, et bona +animae. Sed beatitudo non consistit in bonis exterioribus, neque in +bonis corporis, sicut supra ostensum est. Ergo consistit in bonis +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom + we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself + more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all + else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, + however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33518] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud cui appetimus aliquod bonum, magis amamus quam bonum quod ei +appetimus, sicut magis amamus amicum cui appetimus pecuniam, quam +pecuniam. Sed unusquisque quodcumque bonum sibi appetit. Ergo +seipsum amat magis quam omnia alia bona. Sed beatitudo est quod +maxime amatur, quod patet ex hoc quod propter ipsam omnia alia +amantur et desiderantur. Ergo beatitudo consistit in aliquo bono +ipsius hominis. Sed non in bonis corporis. Ergo in bonis +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness + is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above + <a href="#FS_Q2_A5" id="FS_Q2_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33519] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +perfectio est aliquid eius quod perficitur. Sed beatitudo est +quaedam perfectio hominis. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid hominis. Sed +non est aliquid corporis, ut ostensum est. Ergo beatitudo est +aliquid animae. Et ita consistit in bonis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake." + But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists + in no good of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33520] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., <i>id in quo +constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est</i>. Sed homo +non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est +diligendum propter Deum. Ergo in nullo bono animae beatitudo +consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q2_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession + of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something + belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing + actually, from being potentially + knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its + fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last + end. + </p><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p7"> In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is + the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent + to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end. + </p><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p8"> But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself + desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness + through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; + but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something + belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 co."><a name="33521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33521] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur, +scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio +aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis +quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem, +impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel +aliquid eius. Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in +potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de +potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter +actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est +secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis. +Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius. +Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive +habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum +perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est +voluntas, est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens +ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens +particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus +finis hominis. Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad +ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei +quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid +hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem +consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo +beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit, sed huius rei adeptio +vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid +animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra +animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or + act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes + happiness is a good of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33522] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, secundum quod sub illa divisione comprehenduntur +omnia bona quae homini sunt appetibilia, sic bonum animae dicitur +non solum potentia aut habitus aut actus, sed etiam obiectum, quod +est extrinsecum. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere id in quo +beatitudo consistit, esse quoddam bonum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved + as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both + cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when + we treat of Charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33523] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum, quantum ad propositum pertinet, quod beatitudo maxime +amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui +concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est +eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiae aliquid +homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi cum de caritate +agetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, + viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33524] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam +animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod +scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A8-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 8. Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites + the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches + the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, + as stated in + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q2_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>, it seems that man's + happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33525] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo +bono creato. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod +divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum, ex +quo potest accipi quod summum inferioris naturae sit attingere +infimum naturae superioris. Sed summum hominis bonum est beatitudo. +Cum ergo Angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, ut in primo +habitum est; videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in hoc quod +aliquo modo attingit ad Angelum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for + its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. + viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33526] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ultimus finis cuiuslibet rei est in suo perfecto, unde pars est +propter totum, sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas +creaturarum, quae dicitur maior mundus, comparatur ad hominem, qui +in VIII Physic. dicitur minor mundus, sicut perfectum ad +imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in tota universitate +creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good + surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, + it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33527] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +per hoc homo efficitur beatus, quod eius naturale desiderium +quietat. Sed naturale desiderium hominis non extenditur ad maius +bonum quam quod ipse capere potest. Cum ergo homo non sit capax +boni quod excedit limites totius creaturae, videtur quod per +aliquod bonum creatum homo beatus fieri possit. Et ita beatitudo +hominis in aliquo bono creato consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it + is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv">Ps. 143:15</a>)." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33528] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>ut vita carnis anima +est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est; de quo dicitur, beatus +populus cuius dominus Deus eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite + altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of + man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that + naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any + creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will + of man, according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.5" target="asv"> Ps. 102:5</a>: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 co."><a name="33529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33529] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo +bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter +quietat appetitum, alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc +restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est +appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus +est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare +voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in +aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet +bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere +potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, <i>qui replet in bonis +desiderium tuum</i>. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis +consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as + in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the + blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33530] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod superius hominis attingit quidem infimum angelicae +naturae per quandam similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in +ultimo fine, sed procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fontem boni, +qui est universale obiectum beatitudinis omnium beatorum, tanquam +infinitum et perfectum bonum existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, + but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is + ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33531] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed +ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum +totum, sed aliquid aliud. Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam +comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed +ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non +est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is + less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an + angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33532] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est +capax ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis, est tamen minus quam bonum +cuius est capax ut obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod +participatur ab Angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum et +contractum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q3" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q3-p0.1">Q. 3. WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q3-p2"> We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.</p><p id="FS_Q3-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q3-p4"><a href="#FS_Q3_A1"> (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p5"><a href="#FS_Q3_A2"> (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p6"><a href="#FS_Q3_A3"> (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p7"><a href="#FS_Q3_A4"> (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p8"><a href="#FS_Q3_A5"> (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p9"><a href="#FS_Q3_A6"> (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p10"><a href="#FS_Q3_A7"> (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p11"><a href="#FS_Q3_A8"> (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 pr."><a name="33533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33533] +Iª-IIae q. 3 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quid sit +beatitudo; et quae requirantur ad ipsam. Circa primum quaeruntur +octo. Primo, utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Secundo, si est +aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio. Tertio, utrum sit operatio +sensitivae partis, an intellectivae tantum. Quarto, si est operatio +intellectivae partis, utrum sit operatio intellectus, an +voluntatis. Quinto, si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio +intellectus speculativi, aut practici. Sexto, si est operatio +intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat in speculatione +scientiarum speculativarum. Septimo, utrum consistat in +speculatione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet Angelorum. Octavo, +utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per essentiam videtur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q3_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A1-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 1. Whether happiness is something uncreated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God + is happiness itself." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33534] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Dicit +enim Boetius, in III de Consol., <i>Deum esse ipsam beatitudinem +necesse est confiteri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several + supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33535] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum +ergo non sint plura summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem +quod Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an + end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same + as God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33536] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter humana voluntas +tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam in finem tendere debet +nisi in Deum; quo solo fruendum est, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo +beatitudo est idem quod Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): + "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33537] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo hominis est aliquid +factum, quia secundum Augustinum, I de Doctr. Christ., <i>illis +rebus fruendum est, quae nos beatos faciunt</i>. Ergo beatitudo non +est aliquid increatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly + there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser + is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, + then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. + But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment + or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause + or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something + created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="33538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33538] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dicitur dupliciter. +Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis +pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut +fruitio eius rei quae desideratur, sicut si dicatur quod possessio +pecuniae est finis avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis +intemperati. Primo ergo modo, ultimus hominis finis est bonum +increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest +voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo, ultimus +finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est +aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem finis +vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum +ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum, si autem +consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est +aliquid creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. + On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by + participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33539] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per +adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed +per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem dicit +Boetius, per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem +dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo +dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33540] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum hominis bonum, quia est +adeptio vel fruitio summi boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33541] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus finis, per modum quo +adeptio finis dicitur finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A2-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 2. Whether happiness is an operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv">Rom. 6:22</a>): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being + of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33542] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo non sit operatio. Dicit enim +apostolus, Rom. VI, <i>habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem, +finem vero vitam aeternam</i>. Sed vita non est operatio, sed ipsum +esse viventium. Ergo ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo, non est +operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But + state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33543] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod <i>beatitudo est status +omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed status non nominat +operationem. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of + operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness + is not an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33544] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo significat aliquid in beato existens, cum sit ultima +perfectio hominis. Sed operatio non significat ut aliquid existens +in operante, sed magis ut ab ipso procedens. Ergo beatitudo non est +operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33545] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo permanet in beato. Operatio autem non permanet, sed +transit. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="33546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33546] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +unius hominis est una beatitudo. Operationes autem sunt multae. +Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, + or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="33547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33547] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo inest beato absque interruptione. Sed operatio humana +frequenter interrumpitur puta somno, vel aliqua alia occupatione, +vel quiete. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33548] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est +operatio secundum virtutem perfectam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness + is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. + Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore + the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has + a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, + too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an + operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="33549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33549] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum +in ipso existens necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit +operatio. Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque +autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine +actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu +hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus +actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a philosopho nominatur, in +II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans, +sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis +quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem, +ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis +operationem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown + ( + <a href="#FS_Q2_A5" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[2] , A[5]</a>) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that + His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is + made actual: thus we speak of active and + contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33550] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsum esse +viventis. Et sic beatitudo non est vita, ostensum est enim quod +esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, non est hominis beatitudo; +solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Alio modo dicitur vita +ipsa operatio viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum +reducitur, et sic nominamus vitam activam, vel contemplativam, vel +voluptuosam. Et hoc modo vita aeterna dicitur ultimus finis. Quod +patet per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut +cognoscant te, Deum verum unum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and + he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that + the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing + by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of + operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33551] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Boetius, definiendo beatitudinem, consideravit ipsam +communem beatitudinis rationem. Est enim communis ratio +beatitudinis quod sit bonum commune perfectum; et hoc significavit +cum dixit quod <i>est status omnium bonorum aggregatione +perfectus</i>, per quod nihil aliud significatur nisi quod beatus +est in statu boni perfecti. Sed Aristoteles expressit ipsam +essentiam beatitudinis, ostendens per quid homo sit in huiusmodi +statu, quia per operationem quandam. Et ideo in I Ethic. ipse etiam +ostendit quod beatitudo est bonum perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to + cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but + rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, + to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the + agent. And such an operation can be happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33552] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio. Una +quae procedit ab operante in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et +secare. Et talis operatio non potest esse beatitudo, nam talis +operatio non est actio et perfectio agentis, sed magis patientis, +ut ibidem dicitur. Alia est actio manens in ipso agente, ut +sentire, intelligere et velle, et huiusmodi actio est perfectio et +actus agentis. Et talis operatio potest esse beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees + of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His + very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect + of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this + operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection + is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, + is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect + happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), + says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised + us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33553] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum beatitudo dicat quandam ultimam perfectionem, +secundum quod diversae res beatitudinis capaces ad diversos gradus +perfectionis pertingere possunt, secundum hoc necesse est quod +diversimode beatitudo dicatur. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per +essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur +alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio +secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et +haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem, +secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum +operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec +continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia +operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu +praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest. +Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac +vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem +dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, +quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII. +Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam, cessat obiectio, quia +una et continua et sempiterna operatione in illo beatitudinis statu +mens hominis Deo coniungetur. Sed in praesenti vita, quantum +deficimus ab unitate et continuitate talis operationis, tantum +deficimus a beatitudinis perfectione. Est tamen aliqua participatio +beatitudinis, et tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis +continua et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa +occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita +contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum, idest circa veritatis +contemplationem. Et si aliquando homo actu non operetur huiusmodi +operationem, tamen quia in promptu habet eam semper operari; et +quia etiam ipsam cessationem, puta somni vel occupationis alicuius +naturalis, ad operationem praedictam ordinat; quasi videtur +operatio continua esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p14"> Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will + be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity + and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness: + and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, + which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the + contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn + to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the + latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="33554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33554] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Et per hoc +patet solutio ad quintum, et ad sextum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A3-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 3. Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man + than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive: + since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses + also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33555] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat etiam in +operatione sensus. Nulla enim operatio invenitur in homine nobilior +operatione sensitiva, nisi intellectiva. Sed operatio intellectiva +dependet in nobis ab operatione sensitiva, quia non possumus +intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo +beatitudo consistit etiam in operatione sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But + some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses + is needed for happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33556] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod <i>beatitudo est status +omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed quaedam bona sunt +sensibilia, quae attingimus per sensus operationem. Ergo videtur +quod operatio sensus requiratur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected + thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation + is required for happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33557] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est bonum perfectum, ut probatur in I Ethic., quod non +esset, nisi homo perficeretur per ipsam secundum omnes partes suas. +Sed per operationes sensitivas quaedam partes animae perficiuntur. +Ergo operatio sensitiva requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore + happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33558] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +in operatione sensitiva communicant nobiscum bruta animalia. Non +autem in beatitudine. Ergo beatitudo non consistit in operatione +sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of + sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated + Good, Which is his last end, as shown above + <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q[2], A[5]), + man's happiness + does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses. + </p><p id="FS_Q3_A3-p7"> Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect + of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation + of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very + happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a + certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of + the resurrection (SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="33559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33559] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ad beatitudinem potest aliquid pertinere tripliciter, +uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo, antecedenter; tertio modo, +consequenter. Essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio +sensus ad beatitudinem. Nam beatitudo hominis consistit +essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est +ultimus finis, ut supra ostensum est, cui homo coniungi non potest +per sensus operationem. Similiter etiam quia, sicut ostensum est, +in corporalibus bonis beatitudo hominis non consistit, quae tamen +sola per operationem sensus attingimus. Possunt autem operationes +sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter. +Antecedenter quidem, secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in +praesenti vita haberi potest, nam operatio intellectus praeexigit +operationem sensus. Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta +beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem, ex +ipsa beatitudine animae, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad +Dioscorum, <i>fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et in sensus +corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur</i>; ut infra +magis patebit, cum de resurrectione agetur. Non autem tunc operatio +qua mens humana Deo coniungetur, a sensu dependebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had + in this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33560] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod obiectio illa probat quod operatio sensus requiritur +antecedenter ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita haberi +potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source + of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods + that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33561] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod beatitudo perfecta, qualem Angeli habent, habet +congregationem omnium bonorum per coniunctionem ad universalem +fontem totius boni; non quod indigeat singulis particularibus +bonis. Sed in hac beatitudine imperfecta, requiritur congregatio +bonorum sufficientium ad perfectissimam operationem huius +vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in + the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection + of the higher part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33562] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in +inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori. In beatitudine autem +imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris +partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A4-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 4. Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness + consists in peace; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.3" target="asv">Ps. 147:3</a>): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in + the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33563] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu +voluntatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod beatitudo +hominis in pace consistit, unde in Psalmo CXLVII, qui posuit fines +tuos pacem. Sed pax ad voluntatem pertinet. Ergo beatitudo hominis +in voluntate consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation + of the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33564] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo +beatitudo in operatione voluntatis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of + the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, + as we shall state further on ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q3_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore happiness regards the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33565] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +primo moventi respondet ultimus finis, sicut ultimus finis totius +exercitus est victoria, quae est finis ducis, qui omnes movet. Sed +primum movens ad operandum est voluntas, quia movet alias vires, ut +infra dicetur. Ergo beatitudo ad voluntatem pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an + act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="33566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33566] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +si beatitudo est aliqua operatio, oportet quod sit nobilissima +operatio hominis. Sed nobilior operatio est dilectio Dei, quae est +actus voluntatis, quam cognitio, quae est operatio intellectus, ut +patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo videtur quod beatitudo +consistat in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And + a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, + and such a man already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="33567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33567] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod <i>beatus est qui habet +omnia quae vult, et nihil vult male</i>. Et post pauca subdit, +<i>propinquat beato qui bene vult quodcumque vult, bona enim beatum +faciunt, quorum bonorum iam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam +voluntatem</i>. Ergo beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A[2], + ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33568] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut +cognoscant te, Deum verum unum</i>. Vita autem aeterna est ultimus +finis, ut dictum est. Ergo beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei +consistit, quae est actus intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that + is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, + it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the + attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when + it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is + not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; + and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present + to + him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will. + </p><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p9"> This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the + covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains + it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible + end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to + us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained. + </p><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p10"> So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness + pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy + itself is the consummation of happiness. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="33569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33569] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ad beatitudinem, sicut supra dictum est, duo +requiruntur, unum quod est essentia beatitudinis; aliud quod est +quasi per se accidens eius, scilicet delectatio ei adiuncta. Dico +ergo quod, quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, +impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis. Manifestum est +enim ex praemissis quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi. +Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis. +Voluntas enim fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et +praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur. Manifestum est +autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est +motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod +finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit +praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid +aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens +volenti. Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim +consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a principio +cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando vult eam habere. Sed a +principio quidem est absens ei; consequitur autem ipsam per hoc +quod manu ipsam apprehendit, vel aliquo huiusmodi; et tunc iam +delectatur in pecunia habita. Sic igitur et circa intelligibilem +finem contingit. Nam a principio volumus consequi finem +intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens +nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit +in fine iam adepto. Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu +intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio +beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X +Confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate; quia scilicet +ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent + thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent + inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33570] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod pax pertinet ad ultimum hominis finem, non quasi +essentialiter sit ipsa beatitudo; sed quia antecedenter et +consequenter se habet ad ipsam. Antecedenter quidem, inquantum iam +sunt remota omnia perturbantia, et impedientia ab ultimo fine. +Consequenter vero, inquantum iam homo, adepto ultimo fine, remanet +pacatus, suo desiderio quietato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, + from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it + as its act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33571] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod primum obiectum voluntatis non est actus eius sicut +nec primum obiectum visus est visio, sed visibile. Unde ex hoc ipso +quod beatitudo pertinet ad voluntatem tanquam primum obiectum eius, +sequitur quod non pertineat ad ipsam tanquam actus ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the + will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33572] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas, +tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati +debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet +delectatio vel fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," + as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we + first attain a sensible end by an act of sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="33573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33573] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed +cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur +nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin. Et ideo +intelligibilem finem primo attingimus per actionem intellectus; +sicut et finem sensibilem primo attingimus per actionem sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the + act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will + is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement + is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus + "quality." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="33574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33574] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod ille qui habet omnia quae vult, ex hoc est beatus, +quod habet ea quae vult, quod quidem est per aliud quam per actum +voluntatis. Sed nihil male velle requiritur ad beatitudinem sicut +quaedam debita dispositio ad ipsam. Voluntas autem bona ponitur in +numero bonorum quae beatum faciunt, prout est inclinatio quaedam in +ipsa, sicut motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, ut alteratio ad +qualitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A5-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 5. Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming + like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative + intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect + rather than of the speculative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33575] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in operatione +intellectus practici. Finis enim ultimus cuiuslibet creaturae +consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed homo magis assimilatur Deo +per intellectum practicum, qui est causa rerum intellectarum, quam +per intellectum speculativum, cuius scientia accipitur a rebus. +Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus +practici quam speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative + intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, + but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding. + Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather + than of the speculative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33576] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est perfectum hominis bonum. Sed intellectus practicus +magis ordinatur ad bonum quam speculativus, qui ordinatur ad verum. +Unde et secundum perfectionem practici intellectus, dicimur boni, +non autem secundum perfectionem speculativi intellectus, sed +secundum eam dicimur scientes vel intelligentes. Ergo beatitudo +hominis magis consistit in actu intellectus practici quam +speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas + the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's + happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33577] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est quoddam bonum ipsius hominis. Sed speculativus +intellectus occupatur magis circa ea quae sunt extra hominem, +practicus autem intellectus occupatur circa ea quae sunt ipsius +hominis, scilicet circa operationes et passiones eius. Ergo +beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus +practici quam intellectus speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting + perfection of our joys." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33578] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod <i>contemplatio +promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio +gaudiorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. + First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is + that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is + the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative + intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And + since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation + is most proper to man and most delightful to him. + </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p7"> Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical + intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently + it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect. + </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p8"> Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above + him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other + animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly. + </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p9"> Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect + happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human + actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="33579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33579] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi +intellectus quam practici. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex +hoc quod, si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit +optima operatio hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quae est +optimae potentiae respectu optimi obiecti. Optima autem potentia +est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod +quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi. Unde +in tali operatione, scilicet in contemplatione divinorum, maxime +consistit beatitudo. <i>Et quia unusquisque videtur esse id quod +est optimum in eo</i>, ut dicitur in IX et X Ethic., ideo talis +operatio est maxime propria homini, et maxime delectabilis. Secundo +apparet idem ex hoc quod contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter +seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter +seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad +aliquem finem. Unde manifestum est quod ultimus finis non potest +consistere in vita activa, quae pertinet ad intellectum practicum. +Tertio idem apparet ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo +communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus +per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam +activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant, +licet imperfectae. Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae +expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione. +Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem +et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in +operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones +humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in + relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union + and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, + which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative + knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33580] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod similitudo praedicta intellectus practici ad Deum, +est secundum proportionalitatem; quia scilicet se habet ad suum +cognitum, sicut Deus ad suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus +speculativi ad Deum, est secundum unionem vel informationem; quae +est multo maior assimilatio. Et tamen dici potest quod, respectu +principalis cogniti, quod est sua essentia, non habet Deus +practicam cognitionem, sed speculativam tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. + the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the + practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33581] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est +extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso, +scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit +perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus, quod quidem +intellectus practicus non habet sed ad illud ordinat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and + passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by + an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect + rather than of the practical intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33582] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsemet homo esset ultimus +finis suus, tunc enim consideratio et ordinatio actuum et passionum +eius esset eius beatitudo. Sed quia ultimus hominis finis est +aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem +intellectus speculativi attingimus; ideo magis beatitudo hominis in +operatione intellectus speculativi consistit, quam in operatione +intellectus practici.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A6-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 6. Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. + i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than + three speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative + sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative + sciences. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33583] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in +consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Philosophus enim dicit, +in libro Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam +virtutem</i>. Et distinguens virtutes, non ponit speculativas nisi +tres, scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum; quae omnes pertinent ad +considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo ultima hominis +beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum +consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative + sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated + that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative + sciences. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33584] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud videtur esse ultima hominis beatitudo, quod naturaliter +desideratur ab omnibus propter seipsum. Sed huiusmodi est +consideratio speculativarum scientiarum, quia, ut dicitur in I +Metaphys., <i>omnes homines natura scire desiderant</i>; et post +pauca subditur quod speculativae scientiae propter seipsas +quaeruntur. Ergo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum +consistit beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to + act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the + consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33585] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem +perficitur secundum quod reducitur de potentia in actum. +Intellectus autem humanus reducitur in actum per considerationem +scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo videtur quod in huiusmodi +consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv">Jer. 9:23</a>): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final + happiness does not consist in the consideration of these. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33586] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, <i>non glorietur sapiens in sapientia +sua</i>; et loquitur de sapientia speculativarum scientiarum. Non +ergo consistit in harum consideratione ultima hominis +beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are + to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, + but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to + be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed + of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence. + </p><p id="FS_Q3_A6-p7"> Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we + must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: + since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received + through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at + the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther + than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge + of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher. + Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not + perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human + intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which + is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But + it has been shown ( + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q3_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[88], A[2]</a>), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of + separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the + consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, + so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="33587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33587] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis +beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem +intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram +beatitudinis rationem, beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non +attingit, sed participat quandam particularem beatitudinis +similitudinem. Sicut perfecta prudentia invenitur in homine, apud +quem est ratio rerum agibilium, imperfecta autem prudentia est in +quibusdam animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares +instinctus ad quaedam opera similia operibus prudentiae. Perfecta +igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum +essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se +extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in +principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima +autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta; +ut patet per philosophum in principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster. +Unde tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra +extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In cognitione +autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo, +quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab +aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua +participatio superioris. Manifestum est autem quod forma lapidis, +vel cuiuslibet rei sensibilis, est inferior homine. Unde per formam +lapidis non perficitur intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed +inquantum in ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est +supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel +aliquid huiusmodi. Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad id +quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per +cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum. +Ostensum est autem quod per sensibilia non potest deveniri in +cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quae sunt supra intellectum +humanum. Unde relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit +esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in +formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum +substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est +quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2], + ad 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33588] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod philosophus loquitur in libro Ethicorum de felicitate +imperfecta, qualiter in hac vita haberi potest, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33589] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo, +sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect + act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33590] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum +reducitur intellectus noster aliquo modo in actum, non autem in +ultimum et completum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A7-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 7. Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in + a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of + angels"; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore + it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33591] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in +cognitione substantiarum separatarum, idest Angelorum. Dicit enim +Gregorius, in quadam homilia, <i>nihil prodest interesse festis +hominum, si non contingat interesse festis Angelorum</i>; per quod +finalem beatitudinem designat. Sed festis Angelorum interesse +possumus per eorum contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod in +contemplatione Angelorum ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect + figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, + as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33592] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ultima perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est ut coniungatur suo +principio, unde et circulus dicitur esse figura perfecta, quia +habet idem principium et finem. Sed principium cognitionis humanae +est ab ipsis Angelis, per quos homines illuminantur, ut dicit +Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo perfectio humani intellectus +est in contemplatione Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to + the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection + of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33593] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +unaquaeque natura perfecta est, quando coniungitur superiori +naturae, sicut ultima perfectio corporis est ut coniungatur naturae +spirituali. Sed supra intellectum humanum, ordine naturae, sunt +Angeli. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani est ut coniungatur +per contemplationem ipsis Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.24" target="asv">Jer. 9:24</a>): "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's final glory or happiness + consists only in the knowledge of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33594] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, <i>in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur, +scire et nosse me</i>. Ergo ultima hominis gloria, vel beatitudo, +non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q3_A6" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so + by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of + that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has + participated truth, does not perfect the + intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); + whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone + is His Being His Essence, as shown in the + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain + imperfect happiness in the + contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="33595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33595] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta hominis beatitudo non +consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius +participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale. Manifestum +est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius +potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius +potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid +ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit +intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem eadem sit +dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, ut dicitur in II +Metaphys.; quaecumque sunt entia per participationem, sunt vera per +participationem. Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius +Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde +relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius +contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem +imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione Angelorum; et +etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum +speculativarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33596] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod festis Angelorum intererimus non solum contemplantes +Angelos, sed simul cum ipsis, Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should + consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as + stated in + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[3]</a>. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation + of the soul and of its + enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[2]</a>, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33597] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum illos qui ponunt animas humanas esse ab +Angelis creatas, satis conveniens videtur quod beatitudo hominis +sit in contemplatione Angelorum, quasi in coniunctione ad suum +principium. Sed hoc est erroneum, ut in primo dictum est. Unde +ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per coniunctionem ad Deum, +qui est primum principium et creationis animae et illuminationis +eius. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in primo habitum +est. Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem +perveniat, non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's + final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained + by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33598] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit +dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum potentiae participantis, et +sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad +contemplandum sicut Angeli contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum +attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet +potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui +obiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. + i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which + is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does + not consist in God being seen in His Essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33599] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione +ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. Myst. +Theol., quod per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo +coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam, +non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu +beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam +videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the + Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something + less. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33600] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio +divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima +perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra +subsistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33601] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, +et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A8-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points + must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, + that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing + is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the + intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of + some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect + cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause + is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire + to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning + of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, + and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease + until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause. + </p><p id="FS_Q3_A8-p6"> If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the + perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek + the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very + Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in + which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,7; Q[2], A[8]). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="33602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33602] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in +visione divinae essentiae. Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda +sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu +restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est, quod +uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui +obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest +essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit +perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei. +Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus, +per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur +de causa quid est; non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam +simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an +sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit +effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid +est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, +ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens +eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, +quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista +inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam +causae. Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam +alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum +perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet +ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est +perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod +intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic +perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in +quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33603] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in +via, tendentes ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the + end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, + according to their respective + habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than + that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33604] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi +dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam quae desideratur, et hoc +modo idem est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, immo omnium +rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem +huius rei, et sic diversus est finis superioris et inferioris +naturae, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur +altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis, +quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q4" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q4-p0.1">Q. 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q4-p2"> We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q4-p3"><a href="#FS_Q4_A1"> (1) Whether delight is required for happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p4"><a href="#FS_Q4_A2"> (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p5"><a href="#FS_Q4_A3"> (3) Whether comprehension is required?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p6"><a href="#FS_Q4_A4"> (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p7"><a href="#FS_Q4_A5"> (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p8"><a href="#FS_Q4_A6"> (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p9"><a href="#FS_Q4_A7"> (7) Whether any external goods are necessary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p10"><a href="#FS_Q4_A8"> (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 pr."><a name="33605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33605] +Iª-IIae q. 4 pr.</span></a> Deinde, considerandum est de his +quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. +Primo, utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem. Secundo, quid +sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum delectatio vel visio. +Tertio, utrum requiratur comprehensio. Quarto, utrum requiratur +rectitudo voluntatis. Quinto, utrum ad beatitudinem hominis +requiratur corpus. Sexto, utrum perfectio corporis. Septimo, utrum +aliqua exteriora bona. Octavo, utrum requiratur societas +amicorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q4_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A1-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 1. Whether delight is required for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward + of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing + besides vision is required for happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33606] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non requiratur ad +beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod <i>visio +est tota merces fidei</i>. Sed id quod est praemium vel merces +virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo +nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which + needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q4_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33607] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut philosophus dicit +I Ethic. Quod autem eget aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens. +Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut +ostensum est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur +delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of + the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33608] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non +impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed delectatio impedit actionem +intellectus corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in +VI Ethic. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33609] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod <i>beatitudo est +gaudium de veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary + for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from + without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat + is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is + caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of + the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="33610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33610] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo, +sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina +requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut +anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans +extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto +modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor +requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad +beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus +requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam +adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione +concomitante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. + Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33611] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas +merentis requiescit, quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione +mercedis redditae delectatio includitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33612] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille +qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in + Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is + extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we + are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to + one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is + contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33613] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus, non +impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur, in X Ethic., ea +enim quae delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius +operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quandoque +quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea +in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et dum uni vehementer +intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur. Quandoque +autem etiam ex contrarietate, sicut delectatio sensus contraria +rationi, impedit aestimationem prudentiae magis quam aestimationem +speculativi intellectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). + But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33614] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in +beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic., +est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili. +Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est +visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the + delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation + of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks + before the operation of the intellect, which is vision. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33615] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est potius. Sed +operationes appetuntur propter delectationem ipsarum, unde et +natura operationibus necessariis ad conservationem individui et +speciei, delectationem apposuit, ut huiusmodi operationes ab +animalibus non negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in +beatitudine quam operatio intellectus, quae est visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, + as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33616] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive fruitio, caritati. +Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit apostolus I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo +delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33617] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo +visio est potior quam delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, + the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of + the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. + If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness + of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, + which has been disproved above ( + <a href="#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2; + <a href="#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[3], A[4]</a>): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation + in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="33618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33618] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et +eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex +necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit +potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam +quietatione voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, +non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo +voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis +procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter +quietationem, sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est +contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione, +quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius +bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio +voluntatis in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. + Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own + species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33619] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, <i>delectatio +perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem</i>, qui est ad +iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio +concomitans visionem; non sicut perfectio faciens visionem esse in +sua specie perfectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And + consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But + the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed + to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the + Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things + not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33620] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem +rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est +delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in +animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed +intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius +consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum +quam delectationem. Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est +institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non +est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem +sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus +intellectivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good + gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made + present to charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33621] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod caritas non quaerit bonum dilectum propter +delectationem, sed hoc est ei consequens, ut delectetur in bono +adepto quod amat. Et sic delectatio non respondet ei ut finis, sed +magis visio, per quam primo finis fit ei praesens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A3-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 3. Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. + xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is + without comprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33622] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur +comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, +<i>attingere mente Deum magna est beatitudo, comprehendere autem +est impossibile</i>. Ergo sine comprehensione est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect + and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will + by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33623] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum intellectivam partem, in +qua non sunt aliae potentiae quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in +primo dictum est. Sed intellectus sufficienter perficitur per +visionem Dei, voluntas autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non +requiritur comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal + objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for + comprehension as a third. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33624] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes autem determinantur +secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum, +verum correspondet visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi. +Ergo non requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:24</a>): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.4.7" target="asv">2 Tim. 4:7,8</a>): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a + crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33625] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, <i>sic currite ut +comprehendatis</i>. Sed spiritualis cursus terminatur ad +beatitudinem, unde ipse dicit, II ad Tim. ult., <i>bonum certamen +certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo reposita est +mihi corona iustitiae</i>. Ergo comprehensio requiritur ad +beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the + way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly + through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: + through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, + by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is + present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it: + and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the + attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and + this + relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect + knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight + in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; + to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; + and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="33626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33626] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum beatitudo consistat in consecutione ultimi +finis, ea quae requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex +ipso ordine hominis ad finem. Ad finem autem intelligibilem +ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per +voluntatem. Per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu +praeexistit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem, +primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in +aliquid, secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum, +quae quidem potest esse triplex. Quandoque enim amatum est praesens +amanti, et tunc iam non quaeritur. Quandoque autem non est +praesens, sed impossibile est ipsum adipisci, et tunc etiam non +quaeritur. Quandoque autem possibile est ipsum adipisci, sed est +elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis, ita ut statim haberi non +possit, et haec est habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quae sola +habitudo facit finis inquisitionem. Et istis tribus respondent +aliqua in ipsa beatitudine. Nam perfecta cognitio finis respondet +imperfectae; praesentia vero ipsius finis respondet habitudini +spei; sed delectatio in fine iam praesenti consequitur dilectionem, +ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria +concurrere, scilicet visionem, quae est cognitio perfecta +intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae importat praesentiam +finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quae importat quietationem +rei amantis in amato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by + the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means + nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend + [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense + comprehension is necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33627] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, inclusio +comprehensi in comprehendente, et sic omne quod comprehenditur a +finito, est finitum. Unde hoc modo Deus non potest comprehendi ab +aliquo intellectu creato. Alio modo comprehensio nihil aliud +nominat quam tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae, +sicut aliquis consequens aliquem, dicitur eum comprehendere quando +tenet eum. Et hoc modo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while + not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes + therein. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33628] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut ad voluntatem pertinet spes et amor, quia +eiusdem est amare aliquid et tendere in illud non habitum; ita +etiam ad voluntatem pertinet et comprehensio et delectatio, quia +eiusdem est habere aliquid et quiescere in illo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision + itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33629] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod comprehensio non est aliqua operatio praeter +visionem, sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem iam habitum. Unde etiam +ipsa visio, vel res visa secundum quod praesentialiter adest, est +obiectum comprehensionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A4-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 4. Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation + of the intellect, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q4_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation + of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none + but the clean of + heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude + of the will is not necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33630] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectitudo voluntatis non requiratur ad +beatitudinem. Beatitudo enim essentialiter consistit in operatione +intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ad perfectam intellectus +operationem non requiritur rectitudo voluntatis, per quam homines +mundi dicuntur, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Retract., <i>non +approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus qui non nisi mundos verum scire +voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa +scire vera</i>. Ergo rectitudo voluntatis non requiritur ad +beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the + will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33631] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +prius non dependet a posteriori. Sed operatio intellectus est prior +quam operatio voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo, quae est perfecta +operatio intellectus, non dependet a rectitudine voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, + after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, + Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33632] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quod ordinatur ad aliquid tanquam ad finem, non est necessarium +adepto iam fine, sicut navis postquam pervenitur ad portum. Sed +rectitudo voluntatis, quae est per virtutem, ordinatur ad +beatitudinem tanquam ad finem. Ergo, adepta beatitudine, non est +necessaria rectitudo voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33633] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. V, <i>beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum +videbunt</i>. Et Heb. XII, <i>pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et +sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the + will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared + to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except + it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without + rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q4_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of + him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him + who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this + is precisely what makes the will + right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 co."><a name="33634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33634] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et +antecedenter et concomitanter. Antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo +voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum. Finis autem +comparatur ad id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad materiam. +Unde sicut materia non potest consequi formam, nisi sit debito modo +disposita ad ipsam, ita nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit debito +modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad beatitudinem +pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis. Concomitanter +autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo ultima consistit in +visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et ita +voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, +sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex +necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam +novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde +manifestum est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p7a"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b><!-- By HST, +missing in original--> +What's said by Augustine concerns cognition of a truth which is not + the very essence of happiness.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33635] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de cognitione veri quod non est +ipsa essentia bonitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the + intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of + the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33636] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu +intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis +actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum +intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis +praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad +percussionem signi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, + such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order + to the end is necessary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33637] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non omne quod ordinatur ad finem, cessat adveniente +fine, sed id tantum quod se habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut +motus. Unde instrumenta motus non sunt necessaria postquam +pervenitur ad finem, sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A5-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 5. Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection + of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of + nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore + the soul cannot be happy without the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33638] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur corpus. +Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae praesupponit perfectionem +naturae. Sed beatitudo est perfectio virtutis et gratiae. Anima +autem sine corpore non habet perfectionem naturae, cum sit pars +naturaliter humanae naturae, omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo +toto separata. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q4_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[2]</a>,5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, + therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate + from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33639] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est operatio quaedam perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed +operatio perfecta sequitur esse perfectum, quia nihil operatur nisi +secundum quod est ens in actu. Cum ergo anima non habeat esse +perfectum quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec aliqua pars +quando separata est a toto; videtur quod anima sine corpore non +possit esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in + the soul separated from the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33640] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima sine corpore non est +homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest esse in anima sine corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is + "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the + soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all + its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the + soul cannot be happy without the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="33641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33641] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum philosophum, in VII Ethic., felicitatis operatio, in qua +consistit beatitudo, est non impedita. Sed operatio animae +separatae est impedita, quia, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad +Litt., <i>inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi, +quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in +illud summum caelum</i>, idest in visionem essentiae divinae. Ergo +anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires + to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the + body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="33642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33642] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat desiderium. Sed hoc non +convenit animae separatae, quia adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut +Augustinus dicit. Ergo anima separata a corpore non est beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="33643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33643] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +homo in beatitudine est Angelis aequalis. Sed anima sine corpore +non aequatur Angelis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo non est beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.13" target="asv">Apoc. 14:13</a>): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33644] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Apoc. XIV, <i>beati mortui qui in domino +moriuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. + Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an + operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without + a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A6" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, + Q[84], AA[6] + </a>,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, + which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and + have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, + when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by + reason. By authority, since the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we + walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the + vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are + in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: + "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is + evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is + true Happiness. + </p><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p10"> Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, + wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A3" id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[3]</a>. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the + body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy. + </p><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p11"> We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence + thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body + and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection + of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the + more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, + Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead + separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either + for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 co."><a name="33645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33645] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae habetur in +hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in Dei visione consistit. +Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de +necessitate requiritur corpus. Est enim beatitudo huius vitae +operatio intellectus, vel speculativi vel practici. Operatio autem +intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non +est nisi in organo corporeo, ut in primo habitum est. Et sic +beatitudo quae in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex +corpore. Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quae in Dei visione +consistit, aliqui posuerunt quod non potest animae advenire sine +corpore existenti; dicentes quod animae sanctorum a corporibus +separatae, ad illam beatitudinem non perveniunt usque ad diem +iudicii, quando corpora resument. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum +et auctoritate, et ratione. Auctoritate quidem, quia apostolus +dicit, II ad Cor. V, <i>quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a +domino</i>; et quae sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens, +<i>per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem</i>. Ex quo apparet +quod quandiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per speciem, carens +visione divinae essentiae, nondum est Deo praesens. Animae autem +sanctorum a corporibus separatae, sunt Deo praesentes, unde +subditur, <i>audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus peregrinari +a corpore, et praesentes esse ad dominum</i>. Unde manifestum est +quod animae sanctorum separatae a corporibus, ambulant per speciem, +Dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo. Hoc etiam per +rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget +corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem +intelligibilem contuetur, ut in primo dictum est. Manifestum est +autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in +primo ostensum est. Unde, cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta +hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta +hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata. Sed +sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid +pertinet. Uno modo, ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut anima +requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad +perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse eius, sicut pulchritudo +corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis. +Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae +non pertineat, pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio +dependeat ex natura rei, quando anima perfectior erit in sua +natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua +felicitas consistit. Unde Augustinus, in XII super Gen. ad Litt., +cum quaesivisset, <i>utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus +possit summa illa beatitudo praeberi</i>, respondet quod <i>non sic +possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti Angeli vident; +sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia est in eis naturalis +quidam appetitus corpus administrandi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs + of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection + in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the + form of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33646] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio animae ex parte intellectus, +secundum quem anima transcendit corporis organa, non autem secundum +quod est forma naturalis corporis. Et ideo illa naturae perfectio +manet secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur, licet non maneat illa +naturae perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual + part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when + the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from + that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the + composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and + this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q4_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a + perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33647] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliae partes. Nam +esse totius non est alicuius suarum partium, unde vel pars omnino +desinit esse, destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo +animali; vel, si remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars +lineae habet aliud esse quam tota linea. Sed animae humanae remanet +esse compositi post corporis destructionem, et hoc ideo, quia idem +est esse formae et materia, et hoc est esse compositi. Anima autem +subsistit in suo esse, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur +quod post separationem a corpore perfectum esse habeat, unde et +perfectam operationem habere potest; licet non habeat perfectam +naturam speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. + Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33648] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod beatitudo est hominis secundum intellectum, et ideo, +remanente intellectu, potest inesse ei beatitudo. Sicut dentes +Aethiopis possunt esse albi, etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos +Aethiops dicitur albus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such + a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is + hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible + with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is + that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. + For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And + therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in + such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="33649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33649] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, per +modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris, et +tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per +modum cuiusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet +quidquid ad omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur, et tale +impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae +perfectioni ipsius. Et sic separatio a corpore dicitur animam +retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae essentiae. +Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur +ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile. Et ideo quandiu +ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo +quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum +corpus pertingere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices + its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that + it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="33650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33650] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex +parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui +sufficit. Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia +illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet. +Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed +extensive.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is + not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the + higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: + because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever + will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="33651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33651] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod id quod ibidem dicitur, quod <i>spiritus defunctorum +non sic vident Deum sicut Angeli</i>, non est intelligendum +secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis, quia etiam modo aliquae animae +beatorum sunt assumptae ad superiores ordines Angelorum, clarius +videntes Deum quam inferiores Angeli. Sed intelligitur secundum +inaequalitatem proportionis, quia Angeli, etiam infimi, habent +omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt habituri, non autem +animae separatae sanctorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A6-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 6. Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily + good. But it has been shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q2" id="FS_Q4_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[2])</a> that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33652] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio corporis non requiratur ad +beatitudinem hominis perfectam. Perfectio enim corporis est quoddam +corporale bonum. Sed supra ostensum est quod beatitudo non +consistit in corporalibus bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non +requiritur aliqua perfecta dispositio corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not + part in this operation, as shown above + <a href="#FS_Q4_A5" id="FS_Q4_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33653] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinae essentiae, ut +ostensum est. Sed ad hanc operationem nihil exhibet corpus, ut +dictum est. Ergo nulla dispositio corporis requiritur ad +beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in + the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, + in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33654] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a corpore, tanto perfectius +intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit in perfectissima operatione +intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus modis animam esse abstractam a +corpore. Nullo ergo modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad +beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy + God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.66.14" target="asv">Is. 66:14</a>): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of + the body is + necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33655] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +praemium virtutis est beatitudo, unde dicitur Ioan. XIII, <i>beati +eritis, si feceritis ea</i>. Sed sanctis repromittitur pro praemio +non solum visio Dei et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona +dispositio, dicitur enim Isaiae ult., <i>videbitis, et gaudebit cor +vestrum, et ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt</i>. Ergo bona +dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity + required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect + virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p7"> But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that + it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words + of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable. + For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the + soul to exclude its natural perfection. + </p><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p8"> Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that + Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, + that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the + mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no + longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile + was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this + too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that + from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 co."><a name="33656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33656] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac +vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate +requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo, +secundum philosophum, in operatione virtutis perfectae. Manifestum +est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione +virtutis homo impediri potest. Sed si loquamur de beatitudine +perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod non requiritur ad beatitudinem +aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad eam ut omnino anima +sit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus, XXII de Civ. Dei, +introducit verba Porphyrii dicentis quod <i>ad hoc quod beata sit +anima, omne corpus fugiendum est</i>. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Cum +enim naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod +perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat. Et ideo +dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam, +requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et antecedenter et +consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII +super Gen. ad Litt., <i>si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficilis et +gravis administratio, sicut caro quae corrumpitur et aggravat +animam, avertitur mens ab illa visione summi caeli</i>. Unde +concludit quod, <i>cum hoc corpus iam non erit animale, sed +spirituale, tunc Angelis adaequabitur, et erit ei ad gloriam, quod +sarcinae fuit</i>. Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae +fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur. +Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Dioscorum, <i>tam potenti +natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine +redundet in inferiorem naturam incorruptionis vigor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33657] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in +obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem +beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove + a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33658] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem +intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire. +Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem +mentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which + weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall + treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33659] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur +quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat +animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter +spiritui subiectum, de quo in tertia parte huius operis +dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A7-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 7. Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs + to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.30" target="asv">Lk. 22:30</a>): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.20" target="asv">Mat. 6:20</a>): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.34" target="asv">Mat. 25:34</a>): + "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33660] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requirantur etiam +exteriora bona. Quod enim in praemium sanctis promittitur, ad +beatitudinem pertinet. Sed sanctis repromittuntur exteriora bona, +sicut cibus et potus, divitiae et regnum, dicitur enim Luc. XXII, +<i>ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo</i>; et +Matth. VI, <i>thesaurizate vobis thesauros in caelo</i>; et Matth. +XXV, <i>venite, benedicti patris mei, possidete regnum</i>. Ergo ad +beatitudinem requiruntur exteriora bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." + But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore + they too are necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33661] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>beatitudo est status omnium +bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed exteriora sunt aliqua +hominis bona, licet minima, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo ipsa etiam +requiruntur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.12" target="asv">Mat. 5:12</a>): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place + is necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33662] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus, Matth. V, dicit, <i>merces vestra multa est in caelis</i>. +Sed esse in caelis significat esse in loco. Ergo saltem locus +exterior requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.25" target="asv">Ps. 72:25</a>): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"---"It + is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33663] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXII, <i>quid enim mihi est in caelo? +Et a te quid volui super terram?</i> Quasi dicat, nihil aliud volo +nisi hoc quod sequitur, <i>mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est</i>. Ergo +nihil aliud exterius ad beatitudinem requiritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of + happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. + For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation + of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to + perform its operations. + </p><p id="FS_Q4_A7-p7"> On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason + of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations + which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in + seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no + longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained + to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than + that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated + in Ethic. x, 8. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 co."><a name="33664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33664] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita +potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia +beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia +beatitudini, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I +Ethic. Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad +operationem virtutis contemplativae quam etiam ad operationem +virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus +exerceat opera activae virtutis. Sed ad beatitudinem perfectam, +quae in visione Dei consistit, nullo modo huiusmodi bona +requiruntur. Cuius ratio est quia omnia huiusmodi bona exteriora +vel requiruntur ad sustentationem animalis corporis; vel +requiruntur ad aliquas operationes quas per animale corpus +exercemus, quae humanae vitae conveniunt. Illa autem perfecta +beatitudo quae in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine +corpore; vel erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed +spirituali. Et ideo nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur +ad illam beatitudinem, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem. Et quia in +hac vita magis accedit ad similitudinem illius perfectae +beatitudinis felicitas contemplativa quam activa, utpote etiam Deo +similior, ut ex dictis patet; ideo minus indiget huiusmodi bonis +corporis, ut dicitur in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont + to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire + of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the + sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33665] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnes illae corporales promissiones quae in sacra +Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendae, secundum +quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari, +<i>ut ex his quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita +consurgamus</i>, sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Sicut per +cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias, +sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum, exaltatio +hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. + Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, + we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33666] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona ista deservientia animali vitae, non competunt +vitae spirituali in qua beatitudo perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit +in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni +invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, + but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed + to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33667] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis caelis, sed per +caelos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. Nihilominus +tamen locus corporeus, scilicet caelum Empyreum, aderit beatis, non +propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam +congruentiam et decorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A8-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 8. Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under + the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends + is necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33668] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii ad beatitudinem. +Futura enim beatitudo in Scripturis frequenter nomine gloriae +designatur. Sed gloria consistit in hoc quod bonum hominis ad +notitiam multorum deducitur. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur +societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius [*Seneca, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 6</a>] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary + for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33669] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius dicit quod <i>nullius boni sine consortio iucunda est +possessio</i>. Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo +etiam requiritur societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems + that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33670] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas se extendit ad +dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem +requiratur societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently + nothing else is necessary for Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33671] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. VII, <i>venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum +illa</i>, scilicet cum divina sapientia, quae consistit in +contemplatione Dei. Et sic ad beatitudinem nihil aliud +requiritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, + to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation + of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do + good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may + do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends. + </p><p id="FS_Q4_A8-p7"> But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential + to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being + of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to + happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from + without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 co."><a name="33672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33672] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut +philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem +propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter +delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in +operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis +benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam +ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene +operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in +operibus vitae contemplativae. Sed si loquamur de perfecta +beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum +de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem +suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit +societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., +quod <i>creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi +intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris. +Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo +adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in +Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33673] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod gloria quae est essentialis beatitudini, est quam +habet homo non apud hominem, sed apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question + under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33674] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod +habetur, non est plena sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non +potest, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore + if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor + to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect + Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33675] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini +quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem +proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non +habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur +dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter +se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q5" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q5-p0.1">Q. 5. OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q5-p2"> We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q5-p3"><a href="#FS_Q5_A1"> (1) Whether man can attain Happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p4"><a href="#FS_Q5_A2"> (2) Whether one man can be happier than another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p5"><a href="#FS_Q5_A3"> (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p6"><a href="#FS_Q5_A4"> (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p7"><a href="#FS_Q5_A5"> (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p8"><a href="#FS_Q5_A6"> (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p9"><a href="#FS_Q5_A7"> (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p10"><a href="#FS_Q5_A8"> (8) Whether every man desires Happiness?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 pr."><a name="33676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33676] +Iª-IIae q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ipsa +adeptione beatitudinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum +homo possit consequi beatitudinem. Secundo, utrum unus homo possit +esse alio beatior. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita +beatus. Quarto, utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti. Quinto, +utrum, homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem. Sexto, +utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius +superioris creaturae. Septimo, utrum requirantur opera hominis +aliqua ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Octavo, +utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q5_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A1-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 1. Whether man can attain happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual + is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have + the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature, + attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33677] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit. +Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem ita natura +intellectualis est supra rationalem ut patet per Dionysium in libro +de Div. Nom., in multis locis. Sed bruta animalia, quae habent +naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem +rationalis naturae. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturae, +potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturae, qui est +beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material + things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain + Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33678] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui est veritas pura. Sed +homini est connaturale ut veritatem intueatur in rebus +materialibus, unde species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus +intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non potest ad +beatitudinem pervenire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. + Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that + he cannot attain Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33679] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest +pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum +et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo +transcendere non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem +adipisci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.12" target="asv">Ps. 93:12</a>): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33680] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>beatus homo quem tu erudieris, +domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness. + Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect + good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that + man is capable of seeing God, as stated in + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A1" id="FS_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[1]</a>: in + which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="33681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33681] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque +ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. +Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et +eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum, +et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem +adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis +divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est; in qua quidem +visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds + the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, + whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the + same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth + which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A8" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can + attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained + it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after + a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33682] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam, et +aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura enim rationalis excedit +sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis obiectum, quia sensus nullo modo +potest cognoscere universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed +intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum +cognoscendi eandem intelligibilem veritatem, nam intellectualis +natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per +inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in primo +dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per +quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest +beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio +modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post +principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam +perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo +pertingere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this + state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a> ; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q89_A1" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33683] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est +connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per +phantasmata. Sed post huius vitae statum, habet alium modum +connaturalem, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation + of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained + it, he will be perfectly happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33684] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere Angelos gradu naturae, +ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior. Potest tamen eos +transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid +super Angelos esse, quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte +consequetur, perfecte beatus erit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A2-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 2. Whether one man can be happier than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.10" target="asv">Mat. 20:10</a>) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was equally + rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33685] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse +beatior. Beatitudo enim est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit +in I Ethic. Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces +redditur, dicitur enim Matth. XX, quod omnes qui operati sunt in +vinea, acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius, +<i>aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt</i>. Ergo +unus non erit alio beatior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed + by another's. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33686] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo non potest esse aliquid +maius. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia maior +beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire + is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater + good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33687] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, desiderium +hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum +deest quod suppleri possit. Si autem nihil deest quod suppleri +possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud maius bonum. Ergo vel homo +non est beatus, vel, si est beatus, non potest alia maior beatitudo +esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.2" target="asv">Jn. 14:2</a>): "In My Father's house there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify "the diverse + dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness + itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33688] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, <i>in domo patris mei mansiones multae +sunt</i>; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit, <i>diversae meritorum +dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna</i>. Dignitas autem vitae +aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt +diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis +beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of + that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, + since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or + enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, + that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And + in this sense one man can be happier than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="33689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33689] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in ratione beatitudinis duo +includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum; et +adeptio vel fruitio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod +est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo +alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus, +cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem +huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior, +quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit +autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius +dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest +aliquis alio beatior esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the + divers degrees of enjoyment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33690] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod unitas denarii significat unitatem beatitudinis ex +parte obiecti. Sed diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem +beatitudinis secundum diversum gradum fruitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33691] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum bonum, inquantum est +summi boni perfecta possessio sive fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good," + as Augustine says (Enarr. in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.134" target="asv">Ps. 134</a>). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other + goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the + happier for knowing them, but is happy for + knowing Thee alone." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33692] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum, cum +habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est bonum omnis boni, ut +Augustinus dicit. Sed dicitur aliquis alio beatior, ex diversa +eiusdem boni participatione. Additio autem aliorum bonorum non +auget beatitudinem, unde Augustinus dicit, in V Confess., <i>qui te +et alia novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum +beatus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A3-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 3. Whether one can be happy in this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.1" target="asv">Ps. 118:1</a>): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can + be happy in this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33693] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi. +Dicitur enim in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>beati immaculati in via, qui +ambulant in lege domini</i>. Hoc autem in hac vita contingit. Ergo +aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not + be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. + Therefore man can be happy in this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33694] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +imperfecta participatio summi boni non adimit rationem +beatitudinis, alioquin unus non esset alio beatior. Sed in hac vita +homines possunt participare summum bonum, cognoscendo et amando +Deum, licet imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse +beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature + does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv"> Ps. 143:15</a>: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy + in this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33695] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quod a pluribus dicitur, non potest totaliter falsum esse, videtur +enim esse naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter +deficit. Sed plures ponunt beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per +illud Psalmi CXLIII, <i>beatum dixerunt populum cui haec sunt</i>, +scilicet praesentis vitae bona. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest +esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.1" target="asv">Job 14:1</a>): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore + man cannot be happy in this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33696] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iob XIV, <i>homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens +tempore, repletur multis miseriis</i>. Sed beatitudo excludit +miseriam. Ergo homo in hac vita non potest esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. + This may be seen from a twofold consideration. + </p><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p7"> First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, + and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable + evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties + on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire + for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present + life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man + naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life. + </p><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p8"> Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot + obtain in this life, as was shown in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A11" id="FS_Q5_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="33697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33697] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliqualis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita +haberi potest, perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi +in hac vita. Et hoc quidem considerari potest dupliciter. Primo +quidem, ex ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione. Nam beatitudo, cum +sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne +desiderium implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum excludi. +Multis enim malis praesens vita subiacet, quae vitari non possunt, +et ignorantiae ex parte intellectus, et inordinatae affectioni ex +parte appetitus, et multiplicibus poenalitatibus ex parte corporis; +ut Augustinus diligenter prosequitur XIX de Civ. Dei. Similiter +etiam desiderium boni in hac vita satiari non potest. Naturaliter +enim homo desiderat permanentiam eius boni quod habet. Bona autem +praesentis vitae transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transeat, quam +naturaliter desideramus, et eam perpetuo permanere vellemus, quia +naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est quod in hac +vita vera beatitudo habeatur. Secundo, si consideretur id in quo +specialiter beatitudo consistit, scilicet visio divinae essentiae, +quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in primo ostensum +est. Ex quibus manifeste apparet quod non potest aliquis in hac +vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv"> Rom. 8:24</a>: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign + Good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33698] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem +beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura vita, secundum illud Rom. VIII, +<i>spe salvi facti sumus</i>, vel propter aliquam participationem +beatitudinis, secundum aliqualem summi boni fruitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which + is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be + on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, + in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not + destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q5_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33699] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta +dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius obiecti beatitudinis, quod +quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur. Et talis imperfectio +tollit rationem verae beatitudinis. Alio modo potest esse +imperfecta ex parte ipsius participantis, qui quidem ad ipsum +obiectum beatitudinis secundum seipsum attingit, scilicet Deum, sed +imperfecte, per respectum ad modum quo Deus seipso fruitur. Et +talis imperfectio non tollit veram rationem beatitudinis, quia, cum +beatitudo sit operatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est, vera ratio +beatitudinis, consideratur ex obiecto, quod dat speciem actui, non +autem ex subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. + And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33700] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homines reputant in hac vita esse aliquam +beatitudinem, propter aliquam similitudinem verae beatitudinis. Et +sic non ex toto in sua aestimatione deficiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A4-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 4. Whether happiness once had can be lost?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according + to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in + a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33701] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit amitti. Beatitudo +enim est perfectio quaedam. Sed omnis perfectio inest perfectibili +secundum modum ipsius. Cum igitur homo secundum suam naturam sit +mutabilis, videtur quod beatitudo mutabiliter ab homine +participetur. Et ita videtur quod homo beatitudinem possit +amittere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed + to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease + to be happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33702] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo consistit in actione intellectus, qui subiacet voluntati. +Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo videtur quod possit +desistere ab operatione qua homo beatificatur, et ita homo desinet +esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore + it seems that it has an end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33703] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +principio respondet finis. Sed beatitudo hominis habet principium, +quia homo non semper fuit beatus. Ergo videtur quod habeat +finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated + <a href="#FS_Q5_A2" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33704] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, de iustis, quod ibunt in vitam +aeternam; quae, ut dictum est, est beatitudo sanctorum. Quod autem +est aeternum, non deficit. Ergo beatitudo non potest amitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative + happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain + occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation. + </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p7"> This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act + that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like + happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains + an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this + life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state + (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change. + </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p8"> But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, + 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness. + </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p9"> This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the + "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to + hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of + losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that + man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never + will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is + the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly + happy, if evil be in him. + </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p10"> Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine + Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, + something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience + attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good + things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv">Ps. 16:15</a>): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any + inconvenience attached to it; because it is written + of the contemplation of wisdom ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake + Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since + the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that + sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the + will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q4_A4" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.5" shape="rect">Q[4], A[4]</a>). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things: + and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, + man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things + as are subject to time and + movement. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="33705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33705] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, qualis in hac +vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate +contemplativa, quae amittitur vel per oblivionem, puta cum +corrumpitur scientia ex aliqua aegritudine; vel etiam per aliquas +occupationes, quibus totaliter abstrahitur aliquis a +contemplatione. Patet etiam idem in felicitate activa, voluntas +enim hominis transmutari potest, ut in vitium degeneret a virtute, +in cuius actu principaliter consistit felicitas. Si autem virtus +remaneat integra, exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem +beatitudinem talem perturbare, inquantum impediunt multas +operationes virtutum, non tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre, quia +adhuc remanet operatio virtutis, dum ipsas adversitates homo +laudabiliter sustinet. Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest, +quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo philosophus +dicit, in I Ethic., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non +simpliciter, sed sicut homines quorum natura mutationi subiecta +est. Si vero loquamur de beatitudine perfecta quae expectatur post +hanc vitam, sciendum est quod Origenes posuit, quorundam +Platonicorum errorem sequens, quod post ultimam beatitudinem homo +potest fieri miser. Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum +dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis. Cum +enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod +desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat. Naturaliter +autem homo desiderat retinere bonum quod habet, et quod eius +retinendi securitatem obtineat, alioquin necesse est quod timore +amittendi, vel dolore de certitudine amissionis, affligatur. +Requiritur igitur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat +opinionem bonum quod habet, nunquam se amissurum. Quae quidem +opinio si vera sit, consequens est quod beatitudinem nunquam +amittet. Si autem falsa sit, hoc ipsum est quoddam malum, falsam +opinionem habere, nam falsum est malum intellectus, sicut verum est +bonum ipsius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non igitur iam vere erit +beatus, si aliquod malum ei inest. Secundo idem apparet, si +consideretur ratio beatitudinis in speciali. Ostensum est enim +supra quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinae essentiae +consistit. Est autem impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam +essentiam, velit eam non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis +carere vult, aut est insufficiens, et quaeritur aliquid +sufficientius loco eius, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum, +propter quod in fastidium venit. Visio autem divinae essentiae +replet animam omnibus bonis, cum coniungat fonti totius bonitatis, +unde dicitur in Psalmo XVI, <i>satiabor cum apparuerit gloria +tua</i>; et Sap. VII, dicitur, <i>venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter +cum illa</i>, scilicet cum contemplatione sapientiae. Similiter +etiam non habet aliquod incommodum adiunctum, quia de +contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, Sap. VIII, <i>non habet +amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus eius</i>. +Sic ergo patet quod propria voluntate beatus non potest +beatitudinem deserere. Similiter etiam non potest eam perdere, Deo +subtrahente. Quia, cum subtractio beatitudinis sit quaedam poena, +non potest talis subtractio a Deo, iusto iudice, provenire, nisi +pro aliqua culpa, in quam cadere non potest qui Dei essentiam +videt, cum ad hanc visionem ex necessitate sequatur rectitudo +voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec aliquod +aliud agens potest eam subtrahere. Quia mens Deo coniuncta super +omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab huiusmodi coniunctione nullum aliud +agens potest ipsam excludere. Unde inconveniens videtur quod per +quasdam alternationes temporum transeat homo de beatitudine ad +miseriam, et e converso, quia huiusmodi temporales alternationes +esse non possunt, nisi circa ea quae subiacent tempori et +motui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it + altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends + all change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33706] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quae omnem +defectum excludit a beato. Et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam +habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quae hominem sublevat in +participationem aeternitatis transcendentis omnem mutationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, + to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33707] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod voluntas ad opposita se habet in his quae ad finem +ordinantur, sed ad ultimum finem naturali necessitate ordinatur. +Quod patet ex hoc, quod homo non potest non velle esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the + good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from + another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33708] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod beatitudo habet principium ex conditione +participantis, sed caret fine, propter conditionem boni cuius +participatio facit beatum. Unde ab alio est initium beatitudinis; +et ab alio est quod caret fine.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A5-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 5. Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing + is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore + man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33709] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per sua naturalia possit +beatitudinem consequi. Natura enim non deficit in necessariis. Sed +nihil est homini tam necessarium quam id per quod finem ultimum +consequitur. Ergo hoc naturae humanae non deest. Potest igitur homo +per sua naturalia beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational + creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33710] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +homo, cum sit nobilior irrationalibus creaturis, videtur esse +sufficientior. Sed irrationales creaturae per sua naturalia possunt +consequi suos fines. Ergo multo magis homo per sua naturalia potest +beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing + belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning + in human operations, is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain + to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33711] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo est operatio perfecta, secundum philosophum. Eiusdem +autem est incipere rem, et perficere ipsam. Cum igitur operatio +imperfecta, quae est quasi principium in operationibus humanis, +subdatur naturali hominis potestati, qua suorum actuum est dominus; +videtur quod per naturalem potentiam possit pertingere ad +operationem perfectam, quae est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses + the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them + that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33712] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et +voluntatem. Sed ultima beatitudo sanctis praeparata, excedit +intellectum hominis et voluntatem, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. +II, <i>oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis +non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se</i>. Ergo homo +per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, + in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above + (Q[3], A[8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only + of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A4" id="FS_Q5_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], + A[4] + </a>. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence + (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its + substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine + Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain + final Happiness by his natural powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="33713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33713] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest, +potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus, +in cuius operatione consistit, de quo infra dicetur. Sed beatitudo +hominis perfecta, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in visione +divinae essentiae. Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra +naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturae, ut in primo +ostensum est. Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturae est +secundum modum substantiae eius, sicut de intelligentia dicitur in +libro de causis, quod <i>cognoscit ea quae sunt supra se, et ea +quae sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiae suae</i>. Omnis +autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit +a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem +substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest +consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided + other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did + it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. + But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him + happy. "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33714] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis, +quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus +quia dedit ei rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi +conquirere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non +daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc +enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit +converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. <i>Quae enim per amicos +possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus</i>, ut dicitur in III +Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition + than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in + order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect + health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, + without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs + the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this + good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33715] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nobilioris conditionis est natura quae potest +consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc +consequendum, quam natura quae non potest consequi perfectum bonum, +sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem +eius non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut philosophus dicit in II de +caelo. Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi +perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae; quam qui +solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem, sine medicinae +auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quae potest consequi +perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est +perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est +capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae +naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity, + if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. + Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation + which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its + object. Consequently the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33716] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quando imperfectum et perfectum sunt eiusdem +speciei, ab eadem virtute causari possunt. Non autem hoc est +necesse, si sunt alterius speciei, non enim quidquid potest causare +dispositionem materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre. +Imperfecta autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis +potestati, non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta +quae est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex +obiecto. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A6-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 6. Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe + a twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which + is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order + of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the + order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures + acting on the lower, as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FS_Q5_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[109], A[2]</a>: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, + through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33717] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit fieri beatus per actionem +alicuius superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli. Cum enim duplex +ordo inveniatur in rebus, unus partium universi ad invicem, alius +totius universi ad bonum quod est extra universum; primus ordo +ordinatur ad secundum sicut ad finem, ut dicitur XII Metaphys.; +sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius +exercitus ad ducem. Sed ordo partium universi ad invicem attenditur +secundum quod superiores creaturae agunt in inferiores, ut in primo +dictum est, beatitudo autem consistit in ordine hominis ad bonum +quod est extra universum, quod est Deus. Ergo per actionem +superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli, in hominem, homo beatus +efficitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially + hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually + happy by an angel who is actually happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33718] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quod est in potentia tale, potest reduci in actum per id quod est +actu tale, sicut quod est potentia calidum, fit actu calidum per id +quod est actu calidum. Sed homo est in potentia beatus. Ergo potest +fieri actu beatus per Angelum, qui est actu beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's + intellect as shown in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q5_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>. Therefore an angel can make a man happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33719] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +beatitudo consistit in operatione intellectus, ut supra dictum est. +Sed Angelus potest illuminare intellectum hominis, ut in primo +habitum est. Ergo Angelus potest facere hominem beatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.12" target="asv">Ps. 83:12</a>): "The Lord will give grace and glory." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33720] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>gratiam et gloriam dabit +dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which + surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above + nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now + it has been shown above + <a href="#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q5_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a> that Happiness is a good surpassing + created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man + made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as + of the virtue, in whose act it consists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="33721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33721] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum omnis creatura naturae legibus sit subiecta, +utpote habens limitatam virtutem et actionem; illud quod excedit +naturam creatam, non potest fieri virtute alicuius creaturae. Et +ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit +immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci, et +cetera huiusmodi. Ostensum est autem quod beatitudo est quoddam +bonum excedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod per +actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur, sed homo beatus fit solo +Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta. Si vero loquamur +de beatitudine imperfecta, sic eadem ratio est de ipsa et de +virtute, in cuius actu consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the + last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to + the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, + too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the + attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself + through the First Agent, which is God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33722] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod plerumque contingit in potentiis activis ordinatis, +quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam, +inferiores vero potentiae coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi +finis disponendo, sicut ad artem gubernativam, quae praeest +navifactivae, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit. Sic +igitur et in ordine universi, homo quidem adiuvatur ab Angelis ad +consequendum ultimum finem, secundum aliqua praecedentia, quibus +disponitur ad eius consecutionem, sed ipsum ultimum finem +consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance + a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle + whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; + nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something + else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is + in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently + no creature can communicate its Happiness to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33723] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quando aliqua forma actu existit in aliquo secundum +esse perfectum et naturale, potest esse principium actionis in +alterum; sicut calidum per calorem calefacit. Sed si forma existit +in aliquo imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest +esse principium communicationis sui ad alterum, sicut intentio +coloris quae est in pupilla, non potest facere album; neque etiam +omnia quae sunt illuminata aut calefacta, possunt alia calefacere +et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio at calefactio essent usque ad +infinitum. Lumen autem gloriae, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo +quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale, in qualibet autem +creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel +participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam +beatitudinem alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as + to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q5_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[106], A[1]</a>: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33724] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis, vel +etiam inferioris Angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum +operum non autem quantum ad visionem divinae essentiae, ut in primo +dictum est. Ad eam enim videndam, omnes immediate illuminantur a +Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A7-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 7. Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite + power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But + man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q5_A6" id="FS_Q5_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not + require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33725] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requirantur aliqua opera hominis +ad hoc ut beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Deus enim, cum sit agens +infinitae virtutis, non praeexigit in agendo materiam, aut +dispositionem materiae, sed statim potest totum producere. Sed +opera hominis, cum non requirantur ad beatitudinem eius sicut causa +efficiens, ut dictum est, non possunt requiri ad eam nisi sicut +dispositiones. Ergo Deus, qui dispositiones non praeexigit in +agendo, beatitudinem sine praecedentibus operibus confert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established + nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect + forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33726] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Deus est auctor beatitudinis immediate, ita et naturam +immediate instituit. Sed in prima institutione naturae, produxit +creaturas nulla dispositione praecedente vel actione creaturae; sed +statim fecit unumquodque perfectum in sua specie. Ergo videtur quod +beatitudinem conferat homini sine aliquibus operationibus +praecedentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.6" target="asv">Rom. 4:6</a>) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining + Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33727] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus +confert iustitiam sine operibus. Non ergo requiruntur aliqua opera +hominis ad beatitudinem consequendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33728] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, <i>si haec scitis, beati eritis si +feceritis ea</i>. Ergo per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right + order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, + in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make + a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as + sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should + not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one + has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs + to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not + to be + moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can + becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in + the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained + in the + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A5" id="FS_Q5_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[62], A[5]</a>; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. + Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 co."><a name="33729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33729] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, requiritur +ad beatitudinem, cum nihil aliud sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis +ad ultimum finem; quae ita exigitur ad consecutionem ultimi finis, +sicut debita dispositio materiae ad consecutionem formae. Sed ex +hoc non ostenditur quod aliqua operatio hominis debeat praecedere +eius beatitudinem, posset enim Deus simul facere voluntatem recte +tendentem in finem, et finem consequentem; sicut quandoque simul +materiam disponit, et inducit formam. Sed ordo divinae sapientiae +exigit ne hoc fiat, ut enim dicitur in II de caelo, <i>eorum quae +nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu, +aliquid uno motu, aliquid pluribus</i>. Habere autem perfectum +bonum sine motu, convenit ei quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere +autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei +proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam +operationem praecedentem. Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam +creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur +absque motu operationis, per quam tendit in ipsam. Sed Angelus, qui +est superior ordine naturae quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex +ordine divinae sapientiae, uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in +primo expositum est. Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis +motibus operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam, secundum +philosophum, beatitudo est praemium virtuosarum operationum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows + Happiness, but that the order in things be observed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33730] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod operatio hominis non praeexigitur ad consecutionem +beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinae virtutis +beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the + creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated + to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.10" target="asv"> Heb. 2:10, </a> "had brought many children into glory"; + therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But + this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits + of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33731] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod primas creaturas statim Deus perfectas produxit, +absque aliqua dispositione vel operatione creaturae praecedente, +quia sic instituit prima individua specierum, ut per ea natura +propagaretur ad posteros. Et similiter, quia per Christum, qui est +Deus et homo, beatitudo erat ad alios derivanda, secundum illud +apostoli ad Heb. II, <i>qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat</i>; +statim a principio suae conceptionis, absque aliqua operatione +meritoria praecedente, anima eius fuit beata. Sed hoc est singulare +in ipso, nam pueris baptizatis subvenit meritum Christi ad +beatitudinem consequendam, licet desint eis merita propria, eo quod +per Baptismum sunt Christi membra effecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account + of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends + towards Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33732] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei, quae habetur +per gratiam iustificantem, quae quidem non datur propter opera +praecedentia. Non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo, +sed magis est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A8-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 8. Whether every man desires happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object + of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some + in other things." Therefore not all desire Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33733] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes appetant beatitudinem. +Nullus enim potest appetere quod ignorat, cum bonum apprehensum sit +obiectum appetitus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed multi nesciunt +quid sit beatitudo, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIII de Trin., +patet ex hoc, quod <i>quidam posuerunt beatitudinem in voluptate +corporis, quidam in virtute animi, quidam in aliis rebus</i>. Non +ergo omnes beatitudinem appetunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q5_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not + desire Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33734] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +essentia beatitudinis est visio essentiae divinae, ut dictum est. +Sed aliqui opinantur hoc esse impossibile, quod Deus per essentiam +ab homine videatur, unde hoc non appetunt. Ergo non omnes homines +appetunt beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all + do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire + Happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33735] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin. quod <i>beatus est qui habet +omnia quae vult, et nihil male vult</i>. Sed non omnes hoc volunt, +quidam enim male aliqua volunt, et tamen volunt illa se velle. Non +ergo omnes volunt beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he + would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33736] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., <i>si minus dixisset, +omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis, dixisset aliquid +quod nullus in sua non cognosceret voluntate</i>. Quilibet ergo +vult esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every + man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q5_A3" id="FS_Q5_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently + to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be + satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which + it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; + because they know not in what thing the general notion of + happiness is found. + And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 co."><a name="33737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33737] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudo dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, +secundum communem rationem beatitudinis. Et sic necesse est quod +omnis homo beatitudinem velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis +est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit +obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter +eius voluntati satisfacit. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud +est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur. Quod quilibet vult. Alio +modo possumus loqui de beatitudine secundum specialem rationem, +quantum ad id in quo beatitudo consistit. Et sic non omnes +cognoscunt beatitudinem, quia nesciunt cui rei communis ratio +beatitudinis conveniat. Et per consequens, quantum ad hoc, non +omnes eam volunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p7a">Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33738] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction, + there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired + in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general + notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends + thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, + or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33739] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum voluntas sequatur apprehensionem intellectus seu +rationis, sicut contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, quod +tamen est diversum secundum rationis considerationem; ita contingit +quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, et tamen uno modo appetitur, +alio modo non appetitur. Beatitudo ergo potest considerari sub +ratione finalis boni et perfecti, quae est communis ratio +beatitudinis, et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas in +illud tendit, ut dictum est. Potest etiam considerari secundum +alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius operationis, +vel ex parte potentiae operativae, vel ex parte obiecti, et sic non +ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition of Happiness given by some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled" + is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of + all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing + satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if + we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to + Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such + things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that + are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to + include perfect Happiness---that he "desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, + that "happy is he who has all he desires." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33740] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ista definitio beatitudinis quam quidam posuerunt, +beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, vel, cui omnia optata +succedunt, quodam modo intellecta, est bona et sufficiens; alio +vero modo, est imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter de +omnibus quae vult homo naturali appetitu, sic verum est quod qui +habet omnia quae vult, est beatus, nihil enim satiat naturalem +hominis appetitum, nisi bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo. Si +vero intelligatur de his quae homo vult secundum apprehensionem +rationis, sic habere quaedam quae homo vult, non pertinet ad +beatitudinem, sed magis ad miseriam inquantum huiusmodi habita +impediunt hominem ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult, sicut +etiam ratio accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione +veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus addidit ad +perfectionem beatitudinis, quod nihil mali velit. Quamvis primum +posset sufficere, si recte intelligeretur, scilicet quod beatus est +qui habet omnia quae vult.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>
--- a/summa/bilingual/Makefile Sat Nov 01 15:13:40 2014 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/Makefile Sat Nov 01 15:26:17 2014 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -RAW=FP.ix -LATIN=../latin/sth1075.html\;../latin/sth1077.html\;../latin/sth1084.html\;../latin/sth1090.html +RAW=FS.i +LATIN=../latin/sth2000.html\;../latin/sth2001.html %.html: /home/ht/Documents/Aquinas/summa/english/%.html xproc --input source=`cygpath -w $<` merge.xpl lfs=$(LATIN) rawpart=$(RAW) > $@ 2>log
--- a/summa/bilingual/bi.xsl Sat Nov 01 15:13:40 2014 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/bi.xsl Sat Nov 01 15:26:17 2014 +0000 @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ <xsl:template match="x:h3"> <xsl:copy> <xsl:apply-templates select="@*"/> - <xsl:text>Q. </xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="substring-after(../@id,'FP_Q')"/><xsl:text>. </xsl:text> + <xsl:text>Q. </xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="substring-after(../@id,'FS_Q')"/><xsl:text>. </xsl:text> <xsl:apply-templates/> </xsl:copy> </xsl:template> @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ <xsl:template match="x:h4"> <xsl:copy> <xsl:apply-templates select="@*"/> - <xsl:text>Q. </xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="substring-after(../../@id,'FP_Q')"/><xsl:text>. A. </xsl:text> + <xsl:text>Q. </xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="substring-after(../../@id,'FS_Q')"/><xsl:text>. A. </xsl:text> <xsl:value-of select="substring-after(../@id,'_A')"/> <xsl:text>. </xsl:text> <xsl:apply-templates/>