Mercurial > hg > Aquinas


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            <h2 id="FS.i-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS.i.i">Q. . PROLOGUE</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q1">Q. 1. OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q2">Q. 2. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q3">Q. 3. WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q4">Q. 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q5">Q. 5. OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
            <div id="FS.i.i" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS.i.i-p0.1">Q. . PROLOGUE</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS.i.i-p1"> Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies
                  "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of
                  those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image,
                  i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
               </p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II pr."><a name="33404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33404]
Iª-IIae pr.</span></a> Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo
factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem
significatur <i>intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se
potestativum</i>; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de
Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius
voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de
homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi
liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.</p></div></div></div>
</div>
            <div id="FS_Q1" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q1-p0.1">Q. 1. OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q1-p2"> In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance
                  towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end
                  of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.
               </p><p id="FS_Q1-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q1-p4"><a href="#FS_Q1_A1"> (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p5"><a href="#FS_Q1_A2"> (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p6"><a href="#FS_Q1_A3"> (3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p7"><a href="#FS_Q1_A4"> (4) Whether there is any last end of human life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p8"><a href="#FS_Q1_A5"> (5) Whether one man can have several last ends?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p9"><a href="#FS_Q1_A6"> (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p10"><a href="#FS_Q1_A7"> (7) Whether all men have the same last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p11"><a href="#FS_Q1_A8"> (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 pr."><a name="33405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33405]
Iª-IIae q. 1 pr.</span></a> Ubi primo considerandum occurrit
de ultimo fine humanae vitae; et deinde de his per quae homo ad
hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab eo deviare, ex fine enim
oportet accipere rationes eorum quae ordinantur ad finem. Et quia
ultimus finis humanae vitae ponitur esse beatitudo, oportet primo
considerare de ultimo fine in communi; deinde de beatitudine. Circa
primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum hominis sit agere propter
finem. Secundo, utrum hoc sit proprium rationalis naturae. Tertio,
utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem a fine. Quarto, utrum sit
aliquis ultimus finis humanae vitae. Quinto, utrum unius hominis
possint esse plures ultimi fines. Sexto, utrum homo ordinet omnia
in ultimum finem. Septimo, utrum idem sit finis ultimus omnium
hominum. Octavo, utrum in illo ultimo fine omnes aliae creaturae
conveniant.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q1_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A1-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 1. Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
                     implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action;
                     since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33406] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod homini non conveniat agere propter
finem. Causa enim naturaliter prior est. Sed finis habet rationem
ultimi, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo finis non habet rationem causae.
Sed propter illud agit homo, quod est causa actionis, cum haec
praepositio propter designet habitudinem causae. Ergo homini non
convenit agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
                     states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33407] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
illud quod est ultimus finis, non est propter finem. Sed in
quibusdam actiones sunt ultimus finis; ut patet per philosophum in
I Ethic. Ergo non omnia homo agit propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
                     sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard,
                     while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33408] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
tunc videtur homo agere propter finem, quando deliberat. Sed multa
homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil
cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum aliis intentus,
vel fricat barbam. Non ergo homo omnia agit propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations,
                     as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33409] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
omnia quae sunt in aliquo genere, derivantur a principio illius
generis. Sed finis est principium in operabilibus ab homine; ut
patet per philosophum in II Physic. Ergo homini convenit omnia
agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational
                     animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is
                     master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty
                     and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed
                     from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly
                     "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are
                     caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore
                     all human actions must be for an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 co."><a name="33410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33410] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie
dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo.
Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod
est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur
proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus
suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et liberum arbitrium
esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones
proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt.
Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem
hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis
inquantum est homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae
procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui
obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet
quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this
                     way that it is a cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33411] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen
primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem
causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is
                     voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it
                     is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will
                     to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is
                     color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible
                     object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action
                     be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing,
                     is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action
                     in which the last end consists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33412] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, oportet eam
esse voluntariam, alias non esset humana, ut dictum est. Actio
autem aliqua dupliciter dicitur voluntaria, uno modo, quia
imperatur a voluntate, sicut ambulare vel loqui; alio modo, quia
elicitur a voluntate, sicut ipsum velle. Impossibile autem est quod
ipse actus a voluntate elicitus sit ultimus finis. Nam obiectum
voluntatis est finis, sicut obiectum visus est color, unde sicut
impossibile est quod primum visibile sit ipsum videre, quia omne
videre est alicuius obiecti visibilis; ita impossibile est quod
primum appetibile, quod est finis, sit ipsum velle. Unde
relinquitur quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, quod ipsa
sit imperata a voluntate. Et ita ibi aliqua actio hominis, ad minus
ipsum velle, est propter finem. Quidquid ergo homo faciat, verum
est dicere quod homo agit propter finem, etiam agendo actionem quae
est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
                     proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33413] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non
procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est proprium principium
humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem
per rationem praestitutum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A2-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 2. Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,
                     never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they
                     are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as
                     irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33414] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod agere propter finem sit proprium
rationalis naturae. Homo enim, cuius est agere propter finem,
nunquam agit propter finem ignotum. Sed multa sunt quae non
cognoscunt finem, vel quia omnino carent cognitione, sicut
creaturae insensibiles; vel quia non apprehendunt rationem finis,
sicut bruta animalia. Videtur ergo proprium esse rationalis naturae
agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong
                     to things that lack reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33415] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
agere propter finem est ordinare suam actionem ad finem. Sed hoc
est rationis opus. Ergo non convenit his quae ratione carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to
                     act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33416] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas in ratione
est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo agere propter finem non est
nisi rationalis naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33417] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus probat in II Physic., quod <i>non solum
intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed,
                     the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that
                     matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act.
                     But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not
                     determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce
                     a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as
                     this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other
                     things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."
                  </p><p id="FS_Q1_A2-p7"> Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing,
                     moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end
                     through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason,
                     move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
                     "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by
                     another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything
                     to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument
                     to the principal agent, as stated above (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 4;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">FP,
                        Q[103], A[1]
                     </a>, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the
                     end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend
                     the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 co."><a name="33418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33418] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem.
Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse
est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa
finalis. Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi
secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia
in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim
agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret
hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat,
necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet
rationem finis. Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura
fit per rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis
fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.
Tamen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad
finem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo;
alio modo, sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit ad
determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam
actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa
movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum
arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quae
ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi
ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non cognoscant rationem
finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem
ab alio ordinantur. Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum
sicut instrumentum ad agens principale, ut supra habitum est. Et
ideo proprium est naturae rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se
agens vel ducens ad finem, naturae vero irrationalis, quasi ab alio
acta vel ducta, sive in finem apprehensum, sicut bruta animalia,
sive in finem non apprehensum, sicut ea quae omnino cognitione
carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he
                     acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end.
                     And it is thus with irrational creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33419] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod homo, quando per seipsum agit propter finem,
cognoscit finem, sed quando ab alio agitur vel ducitur, puta cum
agit ad imperium alterius, vel cum movetur altero impellente, non
est necessarium quod cognoscat finem. Et ita est in creaturis
irrationalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that
                     which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33420] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ordinare in finem est eius quod seipsum agit in
finem. Eius vero quod ab alio in finem agitur, est ordinari in
finem. Quod potest esse irrationalis naturae, sed ab aliquo
rationem habente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
                     reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite,
                     determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor
                     of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular
                     departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some
                     rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33421] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali.
Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et
intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale, sed est in eis
appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum
particulare. Manifestum autem est quod particulares causae moventur
a causa universali, sicut rector civitatis, qui intendit bonum
commune, movet suo imperio omnia particularia officia civitatis. Et
ideo necesse est quod omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur in fines
particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se extendit in
bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A3-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 3. Whether human acts are specified by their end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified
                     by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33422] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humani non recipiant speciem a
fine. Finis enim est causa extrinseca. Sed unumquodque habet
speciem ab aliquo principio intrinseco. Ergo actus humani non
recipiunt speciem a fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore
                     a human act does not derive its species from the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33423] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
illud quod dat speciem, oportet esse prius. Sed finis est posterior
in esse. Ergo actus humanus non habet speciem a fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
                     Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33424] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
idem non potest esse nisi in una specie. Sed eundem numero actum
contingit ordinari ad diversos fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem
actibus humanis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy
                     of blame or praise."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33425] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de moribus Ecclesiae et
Manichaeorum, <i>secundum quod finis est culpabilis vel laudabilis,
secundum hoc sunt opera nostra culpabilia vel laudabilia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p6"> I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed
                     of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper
                     movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an
                     act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the
                     terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while
                     heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature.
                     And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For
                     human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above

                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q1_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the
                     end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is
                     their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of
                     the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog.
                     super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral
                     acts are the same as human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 co."><a name="33426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33426] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non
secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et
forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc
etiam considerandum est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus
quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum
ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium
agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus. Unde calefactio
actio nihil aliud est quam motio quaedam a calore procedens,
calefactio vero passio nihil aliud est quam motus ad calorem,
definitio autem manifestat rationem speciei. Et utroque modo actus
humani, sive considerentur per modum actionum, sive per modum
passionum, a fine speciem sortiuntur. Utroque enim modo possunt
considerari actus humani, eo quod homo movet seipsum, et movetur a
seipso. Dictum est autem supra quod actus dicuntur humani,
inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata. Obiectum autem
voluntatis est bonum et finis. Et ideo manifestum est quod
principium humanorum actuum, inquantum sunt humani, est finis. Et
similiter est terminus eorundem, nam id ad quod terminatur actus
humanus, est id quod voluntas intendit tanquam finem; sicut in
agentibus naturalibus forma generati est conformis formae
generantis. Et quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, <i>mores
proprie dicuntur humani</i>, actus morales proprie speciem
sortiuntur ex fine, nam idem sunt actus morales et actus
humani.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just
                     this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something,
                     considered as passion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33427] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu,
quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum
est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad
actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus
                     that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33428] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod finis secundum quod est prior in intentione, ut
dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat
speciem actui humano sive morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has
                     its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however,
                     that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill
                     a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as
                     to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts
                     in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement
                     does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus.
                     Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.
                     Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered
                     in their moral species, and conversely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33429] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab
agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet
speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus
est finis alterius. Possibile tamen est quod unus actus secundum
speciem naturae, ordinetur ad diversos fines voluntatis, sicut hoc
ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod est idem secundum speciem
naturae, potest ordinari sicut in finem ad conservationem
iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus
secundum speciem moris, quia uno modo erit actus virtutis, alio
modo erit actus vitii. Non enim motus recipit speciem ab eo quod
est terminus per accidens, sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per
se. Fines autem morales accidunt rei naturali; et e converso ratio
naturalis finis accidit morali. Et ideo nihil prohibet actus qui
sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse diversos secundum speciem
moris, et e converso.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A4-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 4. Whether there is one last end of human life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive,
                     as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse
                     some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is
                     an indefinite series of ends.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33430] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis ultimus finis humanae
vitae, sed procedatur in finibus in infinitum. Bonum enim, secundum
suam rationem, est diffusivum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap.
de Div. Nom. Si ergo quod procedit ex bono, ipsum etiam est bonum,
oportet quod illud bonum diffundat aliud bonum, et sic processus
boni est in infinitum. Sed bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo in
finibus est processus in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the
                     same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire
                     of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33431] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ea quae sunt rationis, in infinitum multiplicari possunt, unde et
mathematicae quantitates in infinitum augentur. Species etiam
numerorum propter hoc sunt infinitae, quia, dato quolibet numero,
ratio alium maiorem excogitare potest. Sed desiderium finis
sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ergo videtur quod etiam in
finibus procedatur in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for
                     I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human
                     will, and there is no last end of the human will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33432] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas infinities
potest reflecti supra seipsam, possum enim velle aliquid, et velle
me velle illud, et sic in infinitum. Ergo in finibus humanae
voluntatis proceditur in infinitum, et non est aliquis ultimus
finis humanae voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good
                     is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore
                     it is necessary to fix one last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33433] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, II Metaphys., quod <i>qui infinitum
faciunt, auferunt naturam boni</i>. Sed bonum est quod habet
rationem finis. Ergo contra rationem finis est quod procedatur in
infinitum. Necesse est ergo ponere unum ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever
                     things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must
                     of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes
                     of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
                     the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order
                     in ends---the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first.
                     For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you
                     remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein
                     operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention
                     is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently,
                     on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any
                     action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are
                     ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q1_A4-p7"> On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally;
                     for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things
                     ordained to the end.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 co."><a name="33434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33434] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, per se loquendo, impossibile est in finibus
procedere in infinitum, ex quacumque parte. In omnibus enim quae
per se habent ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo,
removeantur ea quae sunt ad primum. Unde philosophus probat, in
VIII Physic., quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere
in infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo subtracto alia
movere non possunt, cum non moveant nisi per hoc quod moventur a
primo movente. In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet
ordo intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet
esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis
est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto principio,
appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in
executione, est unde incipit operatio, unde, isto principio
subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari. Principium autem
intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est
primum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile
est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil
appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret
intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad
finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur
consilium, sed in infinitum procederet. Ea vero quae non habent
ordinem per se, sed per accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil
prohibet infinitatem habere, causae enim per accidens
indeterminatae sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem
per accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good
                     has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that
                     from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And
                     this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is
                     infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its
                     effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the
                     First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely
                     but, as it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33435] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod de ratione boni est quod aliquid ab ipso effluat, non
tamen quod ipsum ab alio procedat. Et ideo, cum bonum habeat
rationem finis, et primum bonum sit ultimus finis, ratio ista non
probat quod non sit ultimus finis; sed quod a fine primo supposito
procedatur in infinitum inferius versus ea quae sunt ad finem. Et
hoc quidem competeret, si consideraretur sola virtus primi boni,
quae est infinita. Sed quia primum bonum habet diffusionem secundum
intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam certam formam profluere in
causata; aliquis certus modus adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo
bono, a quo omnia alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et
ideo diffusio bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur
Sap. XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore
                     the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process
                     of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally
                     connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is
                     accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing
                     hinders the reason from an indefinite process.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33436] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in his quae sunt per se, ratio incipit a principiis
naturaliter notis, et ad aliquem terminum progreditur. Unde
philosophus probat, in I Poster., quod in demonstrationibus non est
processus in infinitum, quia in demonstrationibus attenditur ordo
aliquorum per se ad invicem connexorum, et non per accidens. In his
autem quae per accidens connectuntur, nihil prohibet rationem in
infinitum procedere. Accidit autem quantitati aut numero
praeexistenti, inquantum huiusmodi, quod ei addatur quantitas aut
unitas. Unde in huiusmodi nihil prohibet rationem procedere in
infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact
                     that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33437] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illa multiplicatio actuum voluntatis reflexae supra
seipsam, per accidens se habet ad ordinem finium. Quod patet ex
hoc, quod circa unum et eundem finem indifferenter semel vel
pluries supra seipsam voluntas reflectitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A5-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 5. Whether one man can have several last ends?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine
                     says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of
                     nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many
                     things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33438] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit voluntatem unius hominis
in plura ferri simul, sicut in ultimos fines. Dicit enim
Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod quidam ultimum hominis finem
posuerunt in quatuor, scilicet <i>in voluptate, in quiete, in
primis naturae, et in virtute</i>. Haec autem manifeste sunt plura.
Ergo unus homo potest constituere ultimum finem suae voluntatis in
multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition
                     to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33439] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ea quae non opponuntur ad invicem, se invicem non excludunt. Sed
multa inveniuntur in rebus quae sibi invicem non opponuntur. Ergo
si unum ponatur ultimus finis voluntatis, non propter hoc alia
excluduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its
                     last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed
                     his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's
                     will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33440] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas per hoc quod constituit ultimum finem in aliquo, suam
liberam potentiam non amittit. Sed antequam constitueret ultimum
finem suum in illo, puta in voluptate, poterat constituere finem
suum ultimum in alio, puta in divitiis. Ergo etiam postquam
constituit aliquis ultimum finem suae voluntatis in voluptate,
potest simul constituere ultimum finem in divitiis. Ergo possibile
est voluntatem unius hominis simul ferri in diversa, sicut in
ultimos fines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life.
                     Hence of gluttons it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.19" target="asv">Phil. 3:19</a>): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv"> Mat. 6:24, </a> "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man
                     to have several last ends not ordained to one another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33441] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
illud in quo quiescit aliquis sicut in ultimo fine, hominis
affectui dominatur, quia ex eo totius vitae suae regulas accipit.
Unde de gulosis dicitur Philipp. III, <i>quorum Deus venter
est</i>, quia scilicet constituunt ultimum finem in deliciis
ventris. Sed sicut dicitur Matth. VI, <i>nemo potest duobus dominis
servire</i>, ad invicem scilicet non ordinatis. Ergo impossibile
est esse plures ultimos fines unius hominis ad invicem non
ordinatos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be
                     assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which
                     he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean
                     now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be
                     complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to
                     desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite
                     so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p7"> The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in
                     the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must
                     needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last
                     end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p8"> The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q1_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in
                     a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus,
                     the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle;
                     and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the
                     whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally
                     one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 co."><a name="33442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33442] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se
habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos fines. Cuius ratio potest
triplex assignari. Prima est quia, cum unumquodque appetat suam
perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit,
ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus
dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod
consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit</i>.
Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis
appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse
non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur.
Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic tendat appetitus, ac si
utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius. Secunda ratio est quia, sicut
in processu rationis principium est id quod naturaliter
cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est
voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur.
Hoc autem oportet esse unum, quia natura non tendit nisi ad unum.
Principium autem in processu rationalis appetitus est ultimus
finis. Unde oportet id in quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi
finis, esse unum. Tertia ratio est quia, cum actiones voluntarie ex
fine speciem sortiantur, sicut supra habitum est, oportet quod a
fine ultimo, qui est communis, sortiantur rationem generis, sicut
et naturalia ponuntur in genere secundum formalem rationem
communem. Cum igitur omnia appetibilia voluntatis, inquantum
huiusmodi, sint unius generis, oportet ultimum finem esse unum. Et
praecipue quia in quolibet genere est unum primum principium,
ultimus autem finis habet rationem primi principii, ut dictum est.
Sicut autem se habet ultimus finis hominis simpliciter ad totum
humanum genus, ita se habet ultimus finis huius hominis ad hunc
hominem. Unde oportet quod, sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter
unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine
statuatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33443] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod omnia illa plura accipiebantur in ratione unius boni
perfecti ex his constituti, ab his qui in eis ultimum finem
ponebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's
                     perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33444] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, etsi plura accipi possint quae ad invicem
oppositionem non habeant, tamen bono perfecto opponitur quod sit
aliquid de perfectione rei extra ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend
                     to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33445] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod potestas voluntatis non habet ut faciat opposita esse
simul. Quod contingeret, si tenderet in plura disparata sicut in
ultimos fines, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A6-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 6. Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are
                     said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains
                     not to the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33446] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quaecumque homo vult,
propter ultimum finem velit. Ea enim quae ad finem ultimum
ordinantur, seriosa dicuntur, quasi utilia. Sed iocosa a seriis
distinguuntur. Ergo ea quae homo iocose agit, non ordinat in
ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
                     Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires,
                     for the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33447] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in principio Metaphys., quod scientiae
speculativae propter seipsas quaeruntur. Nec tamen potest dici quod
quaelibet earum sit ultimus finis. Ergo non omnia quae homo
appetit, appetit propter ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all
                     that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33448] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quicumque ordinat aliquid in finem aliquem, cogitat de illo fine.
Sed non semper homo cogitat de ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit
aut facit. Non ergo omnia homo appetit aut facit propter ultimum
finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we
                     love it for its own sake."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33449] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicit Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>illud est finis boni
nostri, propter quod amantur cetera, illud autem propter
seipsum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because
                     whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last
                     end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained
                     to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art.
                     Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly,
                     because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is
                     clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects
                     of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 co."><a name="33450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33450] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat
propter ultimum finem. Et hoc apparet duplici ratione. Primo
quidem, quia quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni. Quod
quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis,
necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper
inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet
tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et
ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem
consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem. Secundo, quia ultimus
finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in
aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae
secundae moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo
movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in
ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford
                     him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33451] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod actiones ludicrae non ordinantur ad aliquem finem
extrinsecum; sed tamen ordinantur ad bonum ipsius ludentis, prout
sunt delectantes vel requiem praestantes. Bonum autem consummatum
hominis est ultimus finis eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good,
                     which is the ultimate end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33452] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
dicendum ad secundum, de scientia speculativa; quae appetitur ut
bonum quoddam speculantis, quod comprehenditur sub bono completo et
perfecto, quod est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention,
                     which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts
                     be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every
                     step.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33453] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine,
quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae
intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet
appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non
cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet
passu cogitet de fine.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A7-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 7. Whether all men have the same last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end
                     of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33454] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium hominum sit unus finis
ultimus. Maxime enim videtur hominis ultimus finis esse
incommutabile bonum. Sed quidam avertuntur ab incommutabili bono,
peccando. Non ergo omnium hominum est unus ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not
                     have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33455] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum ultimum finem tota vita hominis regulatur. Si igitur esset
unus ultimus finis omnium hominum, sequeretur quod in hominibus non
essent diversa studia vivendi. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature,
                     yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33456] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
finis est actionis terminus. Actiones autem sunt singularium.
Homines autem, etsi conveniant in natura speciei, tamen differunt
secundum ea quae ad individua pertinent. Non ergo omnium hominum
est unus ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33457] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., quod omnes homines
conveniunt in appetendo ultimum finem, qui est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing
                     in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since
                     all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated
                     above
                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q1_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But as to the thing in which this aspect is
                     realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure;
                     others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to
                     others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in
                     which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed
                     affections desires for his last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 co."><a name="33458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33458] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod de ultimo fine possumus loqui dupliciter, uno modo,
secundum rationem ultimi finis; alio modo, secundum id in quo finis
ultimi ratio invenitur. Quantum igitur ad rationem ultimi finis,
omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi, quia omnes appetunt suam
perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis, ut dictum est.
Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines
conveniunt in ultimo fine, nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam
consummatum bonum, quidam autem voluptatem, quidam vero quodcumque
aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile est dulce, sed quibusdam
maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini, quibusdam dulcedo mellis, aut
alicuius talium. Illud tamen dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius
delectabile, in quo maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et
similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam
ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the
                     last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33459] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere
invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis
intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33460] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod diversa studia vivendi contingunt in hominibus
propter diversas res in quibus quaeritur ratio summi boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above

                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q1_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33461] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, etsi actiones sint singularium, tamen primum
principium agendi in eis est natura, quae tendit ad unum, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A8-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 8. Whether other creatures concur in that last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e.
                     God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33462] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod in ultimo fine hominis etiam omnia
alia conveniant. Finis enim respondet principio. Sed illud quod est
principium hominum, scilicet Deus, est etiam principium omnium
aliorum. Ergo in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia communicant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's
                     last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things,
                     too, concur in man's last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33463] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus convertit
omnia ad seipsum, tanquam ad ultimum finem</i>. Sed ipse est etiam
ultimus finis hominis, quia solo ipso fruendum est, ut Augustinus
dicit. Ergo in fine ultimo hominis etiam alia conveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of
                     all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33464] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
finis ultimus hominis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed obiectum
voluntatis est bonum universale, quod est finis omnium. Ergo
necesse est quod in ultimo fine hominis omnia conveniant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible
                     for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33465] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod ultimus finis hominum est beatitudo; quam omnes appetunt,
ut Augustinus dicit. <i>Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia
ut beata sint</i>, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium
quaest. Non ergo in ultimo fine hominis alia conveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself
                     in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of
                     a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money
                     as "thing," or possession of money as "use."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 co."><a name="33466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33466] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic. et in V
Metaphys., finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo, idest
ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius
rei. Sicut si dicamus quod motus corporis gravis finis est vel
locus inferior ut res, vel hoc quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut
usus, et finis avari est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniae
ut usus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p7"> If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end,
                     since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of
                     the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their
                     last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in
                     so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam
rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia
conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum
rerum. Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad
consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant
creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae
consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non
competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum
participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel
vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p8"> Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 ad arg."><a name="33467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33467] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q2" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q2-p2"> We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.</p><p id="FS_Q2-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q2-p4"><a href="#FS_Q2_A1"> (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p5"><a href="#FS_Q2_A2"> (2) Whether in honor?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p6"><a href="#FS_Q2_A3"> (3) Whether in fame or glory?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p7"><a href="#FS_Q2_A4"> (4) Whether in power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p8"><a href="#FS_Q2_A5"> (5) Whether in any good of the body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p9"><a href="#FS_Q2_A6"> (6) Whether in pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p10"><a href="#FS_Q2_A7"> (7) Whether in any good of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p11"><a href="#FS_Q2_A8"> (8) Whether in any created good?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 pr."><a name="33468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33468]
Iª-IIae q. 2 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
beatitudine, nam beatitudo nominat adeptionem ultimi finis. Primo
quidem, in quibus sit; secundo, quid sit; tertio, qualiter eam
consequi possimus. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum
beatitudo consistat in divitiis. Secundo, utrum in honoribus.
Tertio, utrum in fama, sive in gloria. Quarto, utrum in potestate.
Quinto, utrum in aliquo corporis bono. Sexto, utrum in voluptate.
Septimo, utrum in aliquo bono animae. Octavo, utrum in aliquo bono
creato.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q2_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A1-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 1. Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which
                     has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv">Eccles. 10:19</a>): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33469] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in divitiis
consistat. Cum enim beatitudo sit ultimus finis hominis, in eo
consistit quod maxime in hominis affectu dominatur. Huiusmodi autem
sunt divitiae, dicitur enim Eccle. X, <i>pecuniae obediunt
omnia</i>. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo hominis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good
                     things." Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented,
                     that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33470] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>beatitudo est status omnium
bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed in pecuniis omnia possideri
videntur, quia, ut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., ad hoc nummus est
inventus, ut sit quasi fideiussor habendi pro eo quodcumque homo
voluerit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more
                     than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.9" target="asv">Eccles. 5:9</a>). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33471] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
desiderium summi boni, cum nunquam deficiat, videtur esse
infinitum. Sed hoc maxime in divitiis invenitur, quia <i>avarus non
implebitur pecunia</i>, ut dicitur Eccle. V. Ergo in divitiis
beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines
                     in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness
                     does not consist in wealth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33472] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
bonum hominis in retinendo beatitudinem magis consistit quam in
emittendo ipsam. Sed sicut Boetius in II de Consol. dicit,
<i>divitiae effundendo, magis quam coacervando, melius nitent,
siquidem avaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit</i>. Ergo
in divitiis beatitudo non consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),
                     viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink,
                     clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money,
                     but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things
                     salable.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of
                     something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man
                     as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."
                  </p><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p8"> And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because,
                     by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of
                     the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="33473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33473] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in divitiis
consistere. Sunt enim duplices divitiae, ut philosophus dicit in I
Polit., scilicet naturales, et artificiales. Naturales quidem
divitiae sunt, quibus homini subvenitur ad defectus naturales
tollendos, sicut cibus, potus, vestimenta, vehicula et habitacula,
et alia huiusmodi. Divitiae autem artificiales sunt, quibus
secundum se natura non iuvatur, ut denarii; sed ars humana eos
adinvenit propter facilitatem commutationis, ut sint quasi mensura
quaedam rerum venalium. Manifestum est autem quod in divitiis
naturalibus beatitudo hominis esse non potest. Quaeruntur enim
huiusmodi divitiae propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam
hominis, et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis
ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem. Unde in ordine naturae omnia
huiusmodi sunt infra hominem, et propter hominem facta; secundum
illud Psalmi VIII, <i>omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius</i>.
Divitiae autem artificiales non quaeruntur nisi propter naturales,
non enim quaererentur, nisi quia per eas emuntur res ad usum vitae
necessariae. Unde multo minus habent rationem ultimi finis.
Impossibile est igitur beatitudinem, quae est ultimus finis
hominis, in divitiis esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which
                     can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as
                     it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33474] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad
multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae
pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet
sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus, sicut et iudicium de saporibus
ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.16" target="asv">Prov. 17:16</a>): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33475] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod pecunia possunt haberi omnia venalia, non autem
spiritualia, quae vendi non possunt. Unde dicitur Proverb. XVII,
<i>quid prodest stulto divitias habere, cum sapientiam emere non
possit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial
                     wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear
                     (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly
                     the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things
                     despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is
                     the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason
                     of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect,
                     and the sovereign good does not consist therein.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33476] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus,
quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus
divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit
concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per
philosophum in I Polit. Aliter tamen est infinitum desiderium
divitiarum, et desiderium summi boni. Nam summum bonum quanto
perfectius possidetur, tanto ipsummet magis amatur, et alia
contemnuntur, quia quanto magis habetur, magis cognoscitur. Et ideo
dicitur Eccli. XXIV, <i>qui edunt me, adhuc esurient</i>. Sed in
appetitu divitiarum, et quorumcumque temporalium bonorum, est e
converso, nam quando iam habentur, ipsa contemnuntur, et alia
appetuntur; secundum quod significatur Ioan. IV, cum dominus dicit,
qui bibit <i>ex hac aqua</i>, per quam temporalia significantur,
<i>sitiet iterum</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia eorum insufficientia magis
cognoscitur cum habentur. Et ideo hoc ipsum ostendit eorum
imperfectionem, et quod in eis summum bonum non consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A2-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 2. Whether man's happiness consists in honors?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says
                     (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33477] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in honoribus
consistat. Beatitudo enim, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis,
ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed honor maxime videtur esse id
quod est virtutis praemium, ut philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Ergo
in honore maxime consistit beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect
                     good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33478] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
illud quod convenit Deo et excellentissimis, maxime videtur esse
beatitudo, quae est bonum perfectum. Sed huiusmodi est honor, ut
philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Et etiam I Tim. I, dicit apostolus,
<i>soli Deo honor et gloria</i>. Ergo in honore consistit
beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers
                     loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33479] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
illud quod est maxime desideratum ab hominibus, est beatitudo. Sed
nihil videtur esse magis desiderabile ab hominibus quam honor, quia
homines patiuntur iacturam in omnibus aliis rebus ne patiantur
aliquod detrimentum sui honoris. Ergo in honore beatitudo
consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the
                     person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33480] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur,
sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut
philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Ergo in honore beatitudo non
consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
                     consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion,
                     especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share
                     of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot
                     principally consist therein.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="33481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33481] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem consistere in honore.
Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et
ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est
in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum
beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum; et secundum partes
eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis
participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem,
sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive
                     honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness
                     itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33482] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, honor non est
praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt
honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, quasi a non habentibus aliquid
maius ad dandum. Verum autem praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo,
propter quam virtuosi operantur. Si autem propter honorem
operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that
                     honor makes them excellent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33483] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod honor debetur Deo et excellentissimis, in signum vel
testimonium excellentiae praeexistentis, non quod ipse honor faciat
eos excellentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated
                     above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or
                     happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33484] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ex naturali desiderio beatitudinis, quam consequitur
honor, ut dictum est, contingit quod homines maxime honorem
desiderant. Unde quaerunt homines maxime honorari a sapientibus,
quorum iudicio credunt se esse excellentes vel felices.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A3-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 3. Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints
                     for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.18" target="asv">Rom. 8:18</a>): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore
                     happiness consists in glory.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33485] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in gloria.
In eo enim videtur beatitudo consistere, quod redditur sanctis pro
tribulationibus quas in mundo patiuntur. Huiusmodi autem est
gloria, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, <i>non sunt condignae
passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam, quae revelabitur in
nobis</i>. Ergo beatitudo consistit in gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge
                     of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory
                     consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33486] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum est diffusivum sui, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div.
Nom. Sed per gloriam bonum hominis maxime diffunditur in notitiam
aliorum, quia gloria, ut Ambrosius dicit, nihil aliud est quam
clara cum laude notitia. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in
gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity
                     after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your
                     fame in future time." Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33487] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est stabilissimum bonorum. Hoc autem videtur esse fama
vel gloria, quia per hanc quodammodo homines aeternitatem
sortiuntur. Unde Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., <i>vos
immortalitatem vobis propagare videmini, cum futuri famam temporis
cogitatis</i>. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in fama seu
gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe
                     their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame,
                     must needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33488] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
beatitudo est verum hominis bonum. Sed famam seu gloriam contingit
esse falsam, ut enim dicit Boetius, in libro III de Consol.,
<i>plures magnum saepe nomen falsis vulgi opinionibus abstulerunt.
Quo quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur,
suis ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant</i>. Non ergo beatitudo
hominis consistit in fama seu gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [*Augustine,
                     Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for
                     human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection
                     of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human
                     knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness
                     itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends
                     on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God;
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.15" target="asv"> Ps. 90:15,16</a>: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with
                     length of days, and I will show him my salvation."
                  </p><p id="FS_Q2_A3-p7"> Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts.
                     For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it
                     is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:18</a>): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="33489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33489] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in fama seu
gloria humana consistere. Nam gloria nihil aliud est quam clara
notitia cum laude, ut Ambrosius dicit. Res autem cognita aliter
comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem
divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina
cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum. Unde perfectio humani boni,
quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed
magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo
causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta. Et
ideo in fama vel in gloria non potest consistere hominis beatitudo.
Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et
ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut
ex causa sua, secundum illud Psalmi XC, <i>eripiam eum, et
glorificabo eum, longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam illi
salutare meum</i>. Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana
notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus
contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter
humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius
gloria semper vera est. Propter quod dicitur, II ad Cor. X, <i>ille
probatus est, quem Deus commendat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv">Mk. 8:38</a>): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv"> Mk. 8:38 </a>with
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.8" target="asv"> Lk. 12:8 </a>owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory].
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33490] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de gloria quae est ab
hominibus, sed de gloria quae est a Deo coram Angelis eius. Unde
dicitur Marc. VIII, <i>filius hominis confitebitur eum in gloria
patris sui, coram Angelis eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived
                     from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false,
                     it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that
                     fame can nowise make man happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33491] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est
in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod
derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit
beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam. Si autem cognitio falsa sit,
non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama
celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere
hominem beatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But
                     happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33492] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de
facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per
accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A4-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 4. Whether man's happiness consists in power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first
                     beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture
                     they are called "gods" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness consists in power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33493] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in potestate.
Omnia enim appetunt assimilari Deo, tanquam ultimo fini et primo
principio. Sed homines qui in potestatibus sunt, propter
similitudinem potestatis, maxime videntur esse Deo conformes, unde
et in Scriptura dii vocantur, ut patet Exod. XXII, <i>diis non
detrahes</i>. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to
                     those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33494] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Sed perfectissimum est quod homo
etiam alios regere possit, quod convenit his qui in potestatibus
sunt constituti. Ergo beatitudo consistit in potestate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than
                     aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33495] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo, cum sit maxime appetibilis, opponitur ei quod maxime est
fugiendum. Sed homines maxime fugiunt servitutem, cui contraponitur
potestas. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man cannot
                     relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who
                     is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?"
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33496] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
beatitudo est perfectum bonum. Sed potestas est maxime imperfecta.
Ut enim dicit Boetius, III de Consol., <i>potestas humana
sollicitudinum morsus expellere, formidinum aculeos vitare nequit.
Et postea, potentem censes cui satellites latus ambiunt qui quos
terret, ipse plus metuit?</i> Non igitur beatitudo consistit in
potestate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle,
                     as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good
                     and evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power,
                     which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q2_A4-p7"> Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because,
                     since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and
                     in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having
                     gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may
                     still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since
                     happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.12" target="asv">Eccles. 5:12</a>) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because
                     man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained
                     thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for
                     which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 co."><a name="33497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33497] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere,
propter duo. Primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii,
ut patet in V Metaphys. Beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi
finis. Secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum.
Beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum. Unde magis
posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est
per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate. Possunt autem quatuor
generales rationes induci ad ostendendum quod in nullo praemissorum
exteriorum bonorum beatitudo consistat. Quarum prima est quia, cum
beatitudo sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod
malum. Omnia autem praedicta possunt inveniri et in bonis et in
malis. Secunda ratio est quia, cum de ratione beatitudinis sit quod
sit per se sufficiens, ut patet in I Ethic., necesse est quod,
beatitudine adepta, nullum bonum homini necessarium desit. Adeptis
autem singulis praemissorum, possunt adhuc multa bona homini
necessaria deesse, puta sapientia, sanitas corporis, et huiusmodi.
Tertia, quia, cum beatitudo sit bonum perfectum, ex beatitudine non
potest aliquod malum alicui provenire. Quod non convenit
praemissis, dicitur enim Eccle. V, quod divitiae interdum
conservantur in malum domini sui; et simile patet in aliis tribus.
Quarta ratio est quia ad beatitudinem homo ordinatur per principia
interiora, cum ad ipsam naturaliter ordinetur. Praemissa autem
quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a
fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in
praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it
                     is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33498] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua
potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur.
Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo
quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad
bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes
                     a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33499] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut optimum est quod aliquis utatur bene potestate
in regimine multorum, ita pessimum est si male utatur. Et ita
potestas se habet et ad bonum et ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme
                     good consists in power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33500] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod servitus est impedimentum boni usus potestatis, et
ideo naturaliter homines eam fugiunt, et non quasi in potestate
hominis sit summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A5-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 5. Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:16</a>): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore
                     it consists in the health of the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33501] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in bonis
corporis. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, <i>non est census supra censum
salutis corporis</i>. Sed in eo quod est optimum, consistit
beatitudo. Ergo consistit in corporis salute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows.
                     But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it
                     seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33502] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Dionysius dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod esse est melius quam
vivere, et vivere melius quam alia quae consequuntur. Sed ad esse
et vivere hominis requiritur salus corporis. Cum ergo beatitudo sit
summum bonum hominis, videtur quod salus corporis maxime pertineat
ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the
                     greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so
                     the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into
                     all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that
                     which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the
                     health of the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33503] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ab altiori principio dependet
quia quanto causa est superior, tanto eius virtus ad plura se
extendit. Sed sicut causalitas causae efficientis consideratur
secundum influentiam, ita causalitas finis attenditur secundum
appetitum. Ergo sicut prima causa efficiens est quae in omnia
influit, ita ultimus finis est quod ab omnibus desideratur. Sed
ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab omnibus. Ergo in his quae
pertinent ad esse hominis, sicut est salus corporis, maxime
consistit eius beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance,
                     by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist
                     in goods of the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33504] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
secundum beatitudinem homo excellit omnia alia animalia. Sed
secundum bona corporis, a multis animalibus superatur, sicut ab
elephante in diuturnitate vitae, a leone in fortitudine, a cervo in
cursu. Ergo beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a
                     thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain
                     does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as
                     its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer
                     its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14</a>: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to
                     something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation
                     of man's being.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q2_A5-p7"> Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could not be said
                     that the end of man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body
                     depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q2_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts
                     them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the
                     soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 co."><a name="33505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33505] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in bonis
corporis consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia impossibile
est quod illius rei quae ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, ultimus
finis sit eiusdem conservatio in esse. Unde gubernator non
intendit, sicut ultimum finem, conservationem navis sibi commissae;
eo quod navis ad aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, scilicet ad
navigandum. Sicut autem navis committitur gubernatori ad
dirigendum, ita homo est suae voluntati et rationi commissus;
secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit
hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Manifestum est
autem quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem, non enim homo
est summum bonum. Unde impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis
et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse. Secundo quia,
dato quod finis rationis et voluntatis humanae esset conservatio
humani esse, non tamen posset dici quod finis hominis esset aliquod
corporis bonum. Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et
quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae
non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est; ipsumque corpus est
propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumenta
propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones exerceat. Unde omnia bona
corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde
impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae
est ultimus hominis finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it
                     is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good
                     of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33506] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut corpus ordinatur ad animam sicut ad finem, ita
bona exteriora ad ipsum corpus. Et ideo rationabiliter bonum
corporis praefertur bonis exterioribus, quae per censum
significantur, sicut et bonum animae praefertur omnibus bonis
corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes
                     all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which
                     does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident
                     that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent.
                     Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than
                     living things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33507] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in
se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus
subsequentibus, sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia
subsequentia. Et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur
ipsum esse prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non
capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum,
sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum
esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius
ibidem dicit quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et
intelligentia viventibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom
                     every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living
                     being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33508] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quia finis respondet principio, ex illa ratione
probatur quod ultimus finis est primum principium essendi, in quo
est omnis essendi perfectio, cuius similitudinem appetunt, secundum
suam proportionem, quaedam quidem secundum esse tantum, quaedam
secundum esse vivens, quaedam secundum esse vivens et intelligens
et beatum. Et hoc paucorum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A6-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 6. Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something
                     else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what
                     is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33509] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in voluptate
consistat. Beatitudo enim, cum sit ultimus finis, non appetitur
propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam. Sed hoc maxime convenit
delectationi, <i>ridiculum est enim ab aliquo quaerere propter quid
velit delectari</i>, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo beatitudo maxime
in voluptate et delectatione consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the
                     end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion
                     of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes
                     him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness,
                     consists principally in pleasure.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33510] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a>
<i>Praeterea, causa prima vehementius imprimit quam secunda</i>, ut
dicitur in libro de causis. Influentia autem finis attenditur
secundum eius appetitum. Illud ergo videtur habere rationem finis
ultimi, quod maxime movet appetitum. Hoc autem est voluptas, cuius
signum est quod delectatio intantum absorbet hominis voluntatem et
rationem, quod alia bona contemnere facit. Ergo videtur quod
ultimus finis hominis, qui est beatitudo, maxime in voluptate
consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish,
                     and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists
                     in pleasure.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33511] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
cum appetitus sit boni, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse
optimum. Sed delectationem omnia appetunt, et sapientes et
insipientes, et etiam ratione carentia. Ergo delectatio est
optimum. Consistit ergo in voluptate beatitudo, quae est summum
bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had
                     a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy
                     too."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33512] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., <i>tristes exitus esse
voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget.
Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes
quoque beatae esse dicantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13),
                     although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains
                     to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and
                     another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper
                     accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has
                     some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good,
                     is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least
                     apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness,
                     but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q2_A6-p7"> But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense,
                     which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense,
                     cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which
                     is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul
                     which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form
                     is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite.
                     Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect,
                     which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite
                     number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through
                     being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.9" target="asv">Wis. 7:9</a>) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor
                     a proper accident of happiness.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 co."><a name="33513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33513] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, <i>quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae
sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum</i>, ut dicitur VII
Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus
tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit. Quia in unaquaque re
aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium
accidens ipsius, sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal
rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile. Est igitur
considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens
quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex
hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi
conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria. Bonum
autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis
beatitudo si autem sit imperfectum est quaedam beatitudinis
participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde
manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio quae consequitur bonum
perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis; sed quoddam consequens
ad ipsam sicut per se accidens. Voluptas autem corporalis non
potest etiam modo praedicto sequi bonum perfectum. Nam sequitur
bonum quod apprehendit sensus, qui est virtus animae corpore utens.
Bonum autem quod pertinet ad corpus, quod apprehenditur secundum
sensum, non potest esse perfectum hominis bonum. Cum enim anima
rationalis excedat proportionem materiae corporalis, pars animae
quae est ab organo corporeo absoluta, quandam habet infinitatem
respectu ipsius corporis et partium animae corpori concretarum,
sicut immaterialia sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium,
eo quod forma per materiam quodammodo contrahitur et finitur, unde
forma a materia absoluta est quodammodo infinita. Et ideo sensus,
qui est vis corporalis, cognoscit singulare, quod est determinatum
per materiam, intellectus vero, qui est vis a materia absoluta,
cognoscit universale, quod est abstractum a materia, et continet
sub se infinita singularia. Unde patet quod bonum conveniens
corpori, quod per apprehensionem sensus delectationem corporalem
causat, non est perfectum bonum hominis, sed est minimum quiddam in
comparatione ad bonum animae. Unde Sap. VII, dicitur quod <i>omne
aurum, in comparatione sapientiae, arena est exigua</i>. Sic igitur
neque voluptas corporalis est ipsa beatitudo, nec est per se
accidens beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus
                     it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as
                     good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the
                     final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight
                     is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle,
                     and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33514] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod eiusdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod
appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus
in bono, sicut ex eadem virtute naturae est quod grave feratur
deorsum, et quod ibi quiescat. Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum
appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud
appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam
formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis
propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis
obiectum, et per consequens est principium eius, et dat ei formam,
ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono
desiderato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles
                     of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33515] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit
ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae
cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus
delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely,
                     as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight
                     results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33516] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod eo modo omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et
appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem appetunt ratione boni, et
non e converso, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod delectatio
sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio
consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id
quod est per se et maximum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A7-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 7. Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold:
                     external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of
                     the body, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q2_A4" id="FS_Q2_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33517] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in aliquo bono
animae. Beatitudo enim est quoddam hominis bonum. Hoc autem per
tria dividitur, quae sunt bona exteriora, bona corporis, et bona
animae. Sed beatitudo non consistit in bonis exterioribus, neque in
bonis corporis, sicut supra ostensum est. Ergo consistit in bonis
animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom
                     we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself
                     more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all
                     else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not,
                     however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33518] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
illud cui appetimus aliquod bonum, magis amamus quam bonum quod ei
appetimus, sicut magis amamus amicum cui appetimus pecuniam, quam
pecuniam. Sed unusquisque quodcumque bonum sibi appetit. Ergo
seipsum amat magis quam omnia alia bona. Sed beatitudo est quod
maxime amatur, quod patet ex hoc quod propter ipsam omnia alia
amantur et desiderantur. Ergo beatitudo consistit in aliquo bono
ipsius hominis. Sed non in bonis corporis. Ergo in bonis
animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness
                     is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above
                     <a href="#FS_Q2_A5" id="FS_Q2_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33519] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
perfectio est aliquid eius quod perficitur. Sed beatitudo est
quaedam perfectio hominis. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid hominis. Sed
non est aliquid corporis, ut ostensum est. Ergo beatitudo est
aliquid animae. Et ita consistit in bonis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake."
                     But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists
                     in no good of the soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33520] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., <i>id in quo
constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est</i>. Sed homo
non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est
diligendum propter Deum. Ergo in nullo bono animae beatitudo
consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q2_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession
                     of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something
                     belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing
                     actually, from being potentially
                     knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its
                     fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last
                     end.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p7"> In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is
                     the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent
                     to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p8"> But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself
                     desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness
                     through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy;
                     but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something
                     belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 co."><a name="33521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33521] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur,
scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio
aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis
quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem,
impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel
aliquid eius. Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in
potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de
potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter
actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est
secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis.
Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius.
Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive
habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum
perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est
voluntas, est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens
ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens
particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus
finis hominis. Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad
ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei
quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid
hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem
consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo
beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit, sed huius rei adeptio
vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid
animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra
animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or
                     act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes
                     happiness is a good of the soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33522] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, secundum quod sub illa divisione comprehenduntur
omnia bona quae homini sunt appetibilia, sic bonum animae dicitur
non solum potentia aut habitus aut actus, sed etiam obiectum, quod
est extrinsecum. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere id in quo
beatitudo consistit, esse quoddam bonum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved
                     as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both
                     cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when
                     we treat of Charity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33523] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum, quantum ad propositum pertinet, quod beatitudo maxime
amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui
concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est
eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiae aliquid
homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi cum de caritate
agetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness,
                     viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33524] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam
animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod
scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A8-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 8. Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites
                     the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches
                     the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature,
                     as stated in
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q2_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>, it seems that man's
                     happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33525] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo
bono creato. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod
divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum, ex
quo potest accipi quod summum inferioris naturae sit attingere
infimum naturae superioris. Sed summum hominis bonum est beatitudo.
Cum ergo Angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, ut in primo
habitum est; videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in hoc quod
aliquo modo attingit ad Angelum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for
                     its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys.
                     viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33526] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ultimus finis cuiuslibet rei est in suo perfecto, unde pars est
propter totum, sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas
creaturarum, quae dicitur maior mundus, comparatur ad hominem, qui
in VIII Physic. dicitur minor mundus, sicut perfectum ad
imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in tota universitate
creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good
                     surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation,
                     it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33527] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
per hoc homo efficitur beatus, quod eius naturale desiderium
quietat. Sed naturale desiderium hominis non extenditur ad maius
bonum quam quod ipse capere potest. Cum ergo homo non sit capax
boni quod excedit limites totius creaturae, videtur quod per
aliquod bonum creatum homo beatus fieri possit. Et ita beatitudo
hominis in aliquo bono creato consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it
                     is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv">Ps. 143:15</a>)."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33528] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>ut vita carnis anima
est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est; de quo dicitur, beatus
populus cuius dominus Deus eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite
                     altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of
                     man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that
                     naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any
                     creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will
                     of man, according to the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.5" target="asv"> Ps. 102:5</a>: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 co."><a name="33529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33529] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo
bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter
quietat appetitum, alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc
restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est
appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus
est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare
voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in
aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet
bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere
potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, <i>qui replet in bonis
desiderium tuum</i>. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis
consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as
                     in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the
                     blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33530] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod superius hominis attingit quidem infimum angelicae
naturae per quandam similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in
ultimo fine, sed procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fontem boni,
qui est universale obiectum beatitudinis omnium beatorum, tanquam
infinitum et perfectum bonum existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself,
                     but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is
                     ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33531] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed
ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum
totum, sed aliquid aliud. Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam
comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed
ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non
est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is
                     less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an
                     angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33532] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est
capax ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis, est tamen minus quam bonum
cuius est capax ut obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod
participatur ab Angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum et
contractum.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q3" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q3-p0.1">Q. 3. WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q3-p2"> We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.</p><p id="FS_Q3-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q3-p4"><a href="#FS_Q3_A1"> (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p5"><a href="#FS_Q3_A2"> (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p6"><a href="#FS_Q3_A3"> (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p7"><a href="#FS_Q3_A4"> (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p8"><a href="#FS_Q3_A5"> (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p9"><a href="#FS_Q3_A6"> (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p10"><a href="#FS_Q3_A7"> (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p11"><a href="#FS_Q3_A8"> (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 pr."><a name="33533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33533]
Iª-IIae q. 3 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quid sit
beatitudo; et quae requirantur ad ipsam. Circa primum quaeruntur
octo. Primo, utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Secundo, si est
aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio. Tertio, utrum sit operatio
sensitivae partis, an intellectivae tantum. Quarto, si est operatio
intellectivae partis, utrum sit operatio intellectus, an
voluntatis. Quinto, si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio
intellectus speculativi, aut practici. Sexto, si est operatio
intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat in speculatione
scientiarum speculativarum. Septimo, utrum consistat in
speculatione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet Angelorum. Octavo,
utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per essentiam videtur.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q3_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A1-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 1. Whether happiness is something uncreated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God
                     is happiness itself."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33534] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Dicit
enim Boetius, in III de Consol., <i>Deum esse ipsam beatitudinem
necesse est confiteri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several
                     supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33535] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum
ergo non sint plura summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem
quod Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an
                     end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same
                     as God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33536] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter humana voluntas
tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam in finem tendere debet
nisi in Deum; quo solo fruendum est, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo
beatitudo est idem quod Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3):
                     "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33537] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo hominis est aliquid
factum, quia secundum Augustinum, I de Doctr. Christ., <i>illis
rebus fruendum est, quae nos beatos faciunt</i>. Ergo beatitudo non
est aliquid increatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
                     <a href="#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly
                     there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser
                     is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense,
                     then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will.
                     But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment
                     or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause
                     or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something
                     created.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="33538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33538] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dicitur dupliciter.
Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis
pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut
fruitio eius rei quae desideratur, sicut si dicatur quod possessio
pecuniae est finis avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis
intemperati. Primo ergo modo, ultimus hominis finis est bonum
increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest
voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo, ultimus
finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est
aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem finis
vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum
ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum, si autem
consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est
aliquid creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence.
                     On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by
                     participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33539] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per
adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed
per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem dicit
Boetius, per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem
dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo
dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33540] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum hominis bonum, quia est
adeptio vel fruitio summi boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33541] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus finis, per modum quo
adeptio finis dicitur finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A2-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 2. Whether happiness is an operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv">Rom. 6:22</a>): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being
                     of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33542] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo non sit operatio. Dicit enim
apostolus, Rom. VI, <i>habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem,
finem vero vitam aeternam</i>. Sed vita non est operatio, sed ipsum
esse viventium. Ergo ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo, non est
operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But
                     state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33543] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod <i>beatitudo est status
omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed status non nominat
operationem. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of
                     operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness
                     is not an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33544] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo significat aliquid in beato existens, cum sit ultima
perfectio hominis. Sed operatio non significat ut aliquid existens
in operante, sed magis ut ab ipso procedens. Ergo beatitudo non est
operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33545] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo permanet in beato. Operatio autem non permanet, sed
transit. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="33546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33546] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
unius hominis est una beatitudo. Operationes autem sunt multae.
Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep,
                     or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="33547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33547] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo inest beato absque interruptione. Sed operatio humana
frequenter interrumpitur puta somno, vel aliqua alia occupatione,
vel quiete. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33548] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est
operatio secundum virtutem perfectam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness
                     is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
                     Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore
                     the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has
                     a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things,
                     too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an
                     operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="33549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33549] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum
in ipso existens necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit
operatio. Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque
autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine
actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu
hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus
actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a philosopho nominatur, in
II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans,
sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis
quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem,
ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis
operationem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown
                     (
                     <a href="#FS_Q2_A5" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[2] , A[5]</a>) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that
                     His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is
                     made actual: thus we speak of active and
                     contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33550] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsum esse
viventis. Et sic beatitudo non est vita, ostensum est enim quod
esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, non est hominis beatitudo;
solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Alio modo dicitur vita
ipsa operatio viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum
reducitur, et sic nominamus vitam activam, vel contemplativam, vel
voluptuosam. Et hoc modo vita aeterna dicitur ultimus finis. Quod
patet per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut
cognoscant te, Deum verum unum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and
                     he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that
                     the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing
                     by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of
                     operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33551] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Boetius, definiendo beatitudinem, consideravit ipsam
communem beatitudinis rationem. Est enim communis ratio
beatitudinis quod sit bonum commune perfectum; et hoc significavit
cum dixit quod <i>est status omnium bonorum aggregatione
perfectus</i>, per quod nihil aliud significatur nisi quod beatus
est in statu boni perfecti. Sed Aristoteles expressit ipsam
essentiam beatitudinis, ostendens per quid homo sit in huiusmodi
statu, quia per operationem quandam. Et ideo in I Ethic. ipse etiam
ostendit quod beatitudo est bonum perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to
                     cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but
                     rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel,
                     to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the
                     agent. And such an operation can be happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33552] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio. Una
quae procedit ab operante in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et
secare. Et talis operatio non potest esse beatitudo, nam talis
operatio non est actio et perfectio agentis, sed magis patientis,
ut ibidem dicitur. Alia est actio manens in ipso agente, ut
sentire, intelligere et velle, et huiusmodi actio est perfectio et
actus agentis. Et talis operatio potest esse beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees
                     of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His
                     very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect
                     of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this
                     operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection
                     is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently,
                     is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect
                     happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10),
                     says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised
                     us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33553] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, cum beatitudo dicat quandam ultimam perfectionem,
secundum quod diversae res beatitudinis capaces ad diversos gradus
perfectionis pertingere possunt, secundum hoc necesse est quod
diversimode beatitudo dicatur. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per
essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur
alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio
secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et
haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem,
secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum
operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec
continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia
operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu
praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest.
Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac
vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem
dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta,
quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII.
Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam, cessat obiectio, quia
una et continua et sempiterna operatione in illo beatitudinis statu
mens hominis Deo coniungetur. Sed in praesenti vita, quantum
deficimus ab unitate et continuitate talis operationis, tantum
deficimus a beatitudinis perfectione. Est tamen aliqua participatio
beatitudinis, et tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis
continua et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa
occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita
contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum, idest circa veritatis
contemplationem. Et si aliquando homo actu non operetur huiusmodi
operationem, tamen quia in promptu habet eam semper operari; et
quia etiam ipsam cessationem, puta somni vel occupationis alicuius
naturalis, ad operationem praedictam ordinat; quasi videtur
operatio continua esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p14"> Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will
                     be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity
                     and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness:
                     and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,
                     which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the
                     contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn
                     to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the
                     latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="33554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33554] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Et per hoc
patet solutio ad quintum, et ad sextum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A3-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 3. Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man
                     than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive:
                     since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses
                     also.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33555] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat etiam in
operatione sensus. Nulla enim operatio invenitur in homine nobilior
operatione sensitiva, nisi intellectiva. Sed operatio intellectiva
dependet in nobis ab operatione sensitiva, quia non possumus
intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo
beatitudo consistit etiam in operatione sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But
                     some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses
                     is needed for happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33556] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod <i>beatitudo est status
omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed quaedam bona sunt
sensibilia, quae attingimus per sensus operationem. Ergo videtur
quod operatio sensus requiratur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected
                     thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation
                     is required for happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33557] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est bonum perfectum, ut probatur in I Ethic., quod non
esset, nisi homo perficeretur per ipsam secundum omnes partes suas.
Sed per operationes sensitivas quaedam partes animae perficiuntur.
Ergo operatio sensitiva requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore
                     happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33558] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
in operatione sensitiva communicant nobiscum bruta animalia. Non
autem in beatitudine. Ergo beatitudo non consistit in operatione
sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
                     sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated
                     Good, Which is his last end, as shown above
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q[2], A[5]),
                     man's happiness
                     does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q3_A3-p7"> Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect
                     of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation
                     of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very
                     happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a
                     certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of
                     the resurrection (SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="33559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33559] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod ad beatitudinem potest aliquid pertinere tripliciter,
uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo, antecedenter; tertio modo,
consequenter. Essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio
sensus ad beatitudinem. Nam beatitudo hominis consistit
essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est
ultimus finis, ut supra ostensum est, cui homo coniungi non potest
per sensus operationem. Similiter etiam quia, sicut ostensum est,
in corporalibus bonis beatitudo hominis non consistit, quae tamen
sola per operationem sensus attingimus. Possunt autem operationes
sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter.
Antecedenter quidem, secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in
praesenti vita haberi potest, nam operatio intellectus praeexigit
operationem sensus. Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta
beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem, ex
ipsa beatitudine animae, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad
Dioscorum, <i>fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et in sensus
corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur</i>; ut infra
magis patebit, cum de resurrectione agetur. Non autem tunc operatio
qua mens humana Deo coniungetur, a sensu dependebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had
                     in this life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33560] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod obiectio illa probat quod operatio sensus requiritur
antecedenter ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita haberi
potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source
                     of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods
                     that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33561] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod beatitudo perfecta, qualem Angeli habent, habet
congregationem omnium bonorum per coniunctionem ad universalem
fontem totius boni; non quod indigeat singulis particularibus
bonis. Sed in hac beatitudine imperfecta, requiritur congregatio
bonorum sufficientium ad perfectissimam operationem huius
vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in
                     the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection
                     of the higher part.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33562] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in
inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori. In beatitudine autem
imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris
partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A4-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 4. Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness
                     consists in peace; wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.3" target="asv">Ps. 147:3</a>): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in
                     the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33563] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu
voluntatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod beatitudo
hominis in pace consistit, unde in Psalmo CXLVII, qui posuit fines
tuos pacem. Sed pax ad voluntatem pertinet. Ergo beatitudo hominis
in voluntate consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation
                     of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33564] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo
beatitudo in operatione voluntatis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of
                     the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers,
                     as we shall state further on (
                     <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q3_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33565] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
primo moventi respondet ultimus finis, sicut ultimus finis totius
exercitus est victoria, quae est finis ducis, qui omnes movet. Sed
primum movens ad operandum est voluntas, quia movet alias vires, ut
infra dicetur. Ergo beatitudo ad voluntatem pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an
                     act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="33566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33566] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
si beatitudo est aliqua operatio, oportet quod sit nobilissima
operatio hominis. Sed nobilior operatio est dilectio Dei, quae est
actus voluntatis, quam cognitio, quae est operatio intellectus, ut
patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo videtur quod beatitudo
consistat in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And
                     a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy,
                     and such a man already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="33567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33567] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod <i>beatus est qui habet
omnia quae vult, et nihil vult male</i>. Et post pauca subdit,
<i>propinquat beato qui bene vult quodcumque vult, bona enim beatum
faciunt, quorum bonorum iam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam
voluntatem</i>. Ergo beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A[2],
                     ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33568] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut
cognoscant te, Deum verum unum</i>. Vita autem aeterna est ultimus
finis, ut dictum est. Ergo beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei
consistit, quae est actus intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that
                     is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness,
                     it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the
                     attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when
                     it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is
                     not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present;
                     and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present
                     to
                     him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p9"> This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the
                     covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains
                     it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible
                     end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to
                     us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p10"> So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness
                     pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy
                     itself is the consummation of happiness.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="33569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33569] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod ad beatitudinem, sicut supra dictum est, duo
requiruntur, unum quod est essentia beatitudinis; aliud quod est
quasi per se accidens eius, scilicet delectatio ei adiuncta. Dico
ergo quod, quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo,
impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis. Manifestum est
enim ex praemissis quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi.
Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis.
Voluntas enim fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et
praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur. Manifestum est
autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est
motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod
finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit
praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid
aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens
volenti. Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim
consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a principio
cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando vult eam habere. Sed a
principio quidem est absens ei; consequitur autem ipsam per hoc
quod manu ipsam apprehendit, vel aliquo huiusmodi; et tunc iam
delectatur in pecunia habita. Sic igitur et circa intelligibilem
finem contingit. Nam a principio volumus consequi finem
intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens
nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit
in fine iam adepto. Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu
intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio
beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X
Confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate; quia scilicet
ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent
                     thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent
                     inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33570] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod pax pertinet ad ultimum hominis finem, non quasi
essentialiter sit ipsa beatitudo; sed quia antecedenter et
consequenter se habet ad ipsam. Antecedenter quidem, inquantum iam
sunt remota omnia perturbantia, et impedientia ab ultimo fine.
Consequenter vero, inquantum iam homo, adepto ultimo fine, remanet
pacatus, suo desiderio quietato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore,
                     from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it
                     as its act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33571] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod primum obiectum voluntatis non est actus eius sicut
nec primum obiectum visus est visio, sed visibile. Unde ex hoc ipso
quod beatitudo pertinet ad voluntatem tanquam primum obiectum eius,
sequitur quod non pertineat ad ipsam tanquam actus ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the
                     will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33572] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas,
tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati
debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet
delectatio vel fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known,"
                     as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we
                     first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="33573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33573] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed
cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur
nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin. Et ideo
intelligibilem finem primo attingimus per actionem intellectus;
sicut et finem sensibilem primo attingimus per actionem sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the
                     act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will
                     is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement
                     is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus
                     "quality."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="33574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33574] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod ille qui habet omnia quae vult, ex hoc est beatus,
quod habet ea quae vult, quod quidem est per aliud quam per actum
voluntatis. Sed nihil male velle requiritur ad beatitudinem sicut
quaedam debita dispositio ad ipsam. Voluntas autem bona ponitur in
numero bonorum quae beatum faciunt, prout est inclinatio quaedam in
ipsa, sicut motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, ut alteratio ad
qualitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A5-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 5. Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming
                     like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative
                     intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect
                     rather than of the speculative.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33575] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in operatione
intellectus practici. Finis enim ultimus cuiuslibet creaturae
consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed homo magis assimilatur Deo
per intellectum practicum, qui est causa rerum intellectarum, quam
per intellectum speculativum, cuius scientia accipitur a rebus.
Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus
practici quam speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
                     intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect,
                     but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding.
                     Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather
                     than of the speculative.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33576] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est perfectum hominis bonum. Sed intellectus practicus
magis ordinatur ad bonum quam speculativus, qui ordinatur ad verum.
Unde et secundum perfectionem practici intellectus, dicimur boni,
non autem secundum perfectionem speculativi intellectus, sed
secundum eam dicimur scientes vel intelligentes. Ergo beatitudo
hominis magis consistit in actu intellectus practici quam
speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas
                     the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's
                     happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33577] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est quoddam bonum ipsius hominis. Sed speculativus
intellectus occupatur magis circa ea quae sunt extra hominem,
practicus autem intellectus occupatur circa ea quae sunt ipsius
hominis, scilicet circa operationes et passiones eius. Ergo
beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus
practici quam intellectus speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
                     perfection of our joys."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33578] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod <i>contemplatio
promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio
gaudiorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons.
                     First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is
                     that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is
                     the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative
                     intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And
                     since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation
                     is most proper to man and most delightful to him.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p7"> Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical
                     intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently
                     it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p8"> Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above
                     him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other
                     animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p9"> Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect
                     happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human
                     actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="33579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33579] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi
intellectus quam practici. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex
hoc quod, si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit
optima operatio hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quae est
optimae potentiae respectu optimi obiecti. Optima autem potentia
est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod
quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi. Unde
in tali operatione, scilicet in contemplatione divinorum, maxime
consistit beatitudo. <i>Et quia unusquisque videtur esse id quod
est optimum in eo</i>, ut dicitur in IX et X Ethic., ideo talis
operatio est maxime propria homini, et maxime delectabilis. Secundo
apparet idem ex hoc quod contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter
seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter
seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad
aliquem finem. Unde manifestum est quod ultimus finis non potest
consistere in vita activa, quae pertinet ad intellectum practicum.
Tertio idem apparet ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo
communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus
per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam
activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant,
licet imperfectae. Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae
expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione.
Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem
et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in
operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones
humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in
                     relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union
                     and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known,
                     which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative
                     knowledge.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33580] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod similitudo praedicta intellectus practici ad Deum,
est secundum proportionalitatem; quia scilicet se habet ad suum
cognitum, sicut Deus ad suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus
speculativi ad Deum, est secundum unionem vel informationem; quae
est multo maior assimilatio. Et tamen dici potest quod, respectu
principalis cogniti, quod est sua essentia, non habet Deus
practicam cognitionem, sed speculativam tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz.
                     the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the
                     practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33581] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est
extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso,
scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit
perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus, quod quidem
intellectus practicus non habet sed ad illud ordinat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and
                     passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by
                     an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect
                     rather than of the practical intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33582] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsemet homo esset ultimus
finis suus, tunc enim consideratio et ordinatio actuum et passionum
eius esset eius beatitudo. Sed quia ultimus hominis finis est
aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem
intellectus speculativi attingimus; ideo magis beatitudo hominis in
operatione intellectus speculativi consistit, quam in operatione
intellectus practici.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A6-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 6. Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
                     i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than
                     three speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative
                     sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
                     sciences.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33583] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in
consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Philosophus enim dicit,
in libro Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam
virtutem</i>. Et distinguens virtutes, non ponit speculativas nisi
tres, scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum; quae omnes pertinent ad
considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo ultima hominis
beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
                     sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated
                     that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
                     sciences.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33584] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
illud videtur esse ultima hominis beatitudo, quod naturaliter
desideratur ab omnibus propter seipsum. Sed huiusmodi est
consideratio speculativarum scientiarum, quia, ut dicitur in I
Metaphys., <i>omnes homines natura scire desiderant</i>; et post
pauca subditur quod speculativae scientiae propter seipsas
quaeruntur. Ergo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
consistit beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to
                     act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the
                     consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33585] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem
perficitur secundum quod reducitur de potentia in actum.
Intellectus autem humanus reducitur in actum per considerationem
scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo videtur quod in huiusmodi
consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv">Jer. 9:23</a>): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final
                     happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33586] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, <i>non glorietur sapiens in sapientia
sua</i>; et loquitur de sapientia speculativarum scientiarum. Non
ergo consistit in harum consideratione ultima hominis
beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are
                     to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto,
                     but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to
                     be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed
                     of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q3_A6-p7"> Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we
                     must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science:
                     since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received
                     through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at
                     the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther
                     than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge
                     of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.
                     Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not
                     perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human
                     intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which
                     is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But
                     it has been shown (
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q3_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[88], A[2]</a>), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of
                     separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
                     consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances,
                     so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="33587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33587] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis
beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem
intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram
beatitudinis rationem, beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non
attingit, sed participat quandam particularem beatitudinis
similitudinem. Sicut perfecta prudentia invenitur in homine, apud
quem est ratio rerum agibilium, imperfecta autem prudentia est in
quibusdam animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares
instinctus ad quaedam opera similia operibus prudentiae. Perfecta
igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se
extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in
principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima
autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta;
ut patet per philosophum in principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster.
Unde tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra
extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In cognitione
autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo,
quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab
aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua
participatio superioris. Manifestum est autem quod forma lapidis,
vel cuiuslibet rei sensibilis, est inferior homine. Unde per formam
lapidis non perficitur intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed
inquantum in ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est
supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel
aliquid huiusmodi. Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad id
quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per
cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum.
Ostensum est autem quod per sensibilia non potest deveniri in
cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quae sunt supra intellectum
humanum. Unde relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit
esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in
formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum
substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est
quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2],
                     ad 4).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33588] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod philosophus loquitur in libro Ethicorum de felicitate
imperfecta, qualiter in hac vita haberi potest, ut supra dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33589] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo,
sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect
                     act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33590] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum
reducitur intellectus noster aliquo modo in actum, non autem in
ultimum et completum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A7-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 7. Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in
                     a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of
                     angels"; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore
                     it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33591] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in
cognitione substantiarum separatarum, idest Angelorum. Dicit enim
Gregorius, in quadam homilia, <i>nihil prodest interesse festis
hominum, si non contingat interesse festis Angelorum</i>; per quod
finalem beatitudinem designat. Sed festis Angelorum interesse
possumus per eorum contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod in
contemplatione Angelorum ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
                     figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened,
                     as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33592] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ultima perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est ut coniungatur suo
principio, unde et circulus dicitur esse figura perfecta, quia
habet idem principium et finem. Sed principium cognitionis humanae
est ab ipsis Angelis, per quos homines illuminantur, ut dicit
Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo perfectio humani intellectus
est in contemplatione Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to
                     the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection
                     of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33593] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
unaquaeque natura perfecta est, quando coniungitur superiori
naturae, sicut ultima perfectio corporis est ut coniungatur naturae
spirituali. Sed supra intellectum humanum, ordine naturae, sunt
Angeli. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani est ut coniungatur
per contemplationem ipsis Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.24" target="asv">Jer. 9:24</a>): "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's final glory or happiness
                     consists only in the knowledge of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33594] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, <i>in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur,
scire et nosse me</i>. Ergo ultima hominis gloria, vel beatitudo,
non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A6" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so
                     by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of
                     that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has
                     participated truth, does not perfect the
                     intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1);
                     whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone
                     is His Being His Essence, as shown in the
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain
                     imperfect happiness in the
                     contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="33595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33595] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta hominis beatitudo non
consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius
participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale. Manifestum
est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius
potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius
potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid
ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit
intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem eadem sit
dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, ut dicitur in II
Metaphys.; quaecumque sunt entia per participationem, sunt vera per
participationem. Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius
Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde
relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius
contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem
imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione Angelorum; et
etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum
speculativarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33596] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod festis Angelorum intererimus non solum contemplantes
Angelos, sed simul cum ipsis, Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should
                     consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as
                     stated in
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[3]</a>. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation
                     of the soul and of its
                     enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[2]</a>, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33597] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, secundum illos qui ponunt animas humanas esse ab
Angelis creatas, satis conveniens videtur quod beatitudo hominis
sit in contemplatione Angelorum, quasi in coniunctione ad suum
principium. Sed hoc est erroneum, ut in primo dictum est. Unde
ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per coniunctionem ad Deum,
qui est primum principium et creationis animae et illuminationis
eius. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in primo habitum
est. Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem
perveniat, non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's
                     final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained
                     by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33598] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit
dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum potentiae participantis, et
sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad
contemplandum sicut Angeli contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum
attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet
potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui
obiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol.
                     i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which
                     is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does
                     not consist in God being seen in His Essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33599] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione
ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. Myst.
Theol., quod per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo
coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam,
non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu
beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam
videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
                     Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something
                     less.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33600] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio
divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima
perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra
subsistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33601] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus,
et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A8-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
                     must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly,
                     that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing
                     is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the
                     intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of
                     some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect
                     cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause
                     is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire
                     to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning
                     of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause,
                     and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease
                     until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q3_A8-p6"> If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the
                     perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek
                     the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very
                     Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
                     which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,7; Q[2], A[8]).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="33602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33602] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in
visione divinae essentiae. Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda
sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu
restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est, quod
uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui
obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest
essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit
perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei.
Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus,
per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur
de causa quid est; non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam
simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an
sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit
effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid
est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem,
ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens
eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua,
quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista
inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam
causae. Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam
alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum
perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet
ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est
perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod
intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic
perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in
quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33603] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in
via, tendentes ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the
                     end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower,
                     according to their respective
                     habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
                     that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33604] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi
dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam quae desideratur, et hoc
modo idem est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, immo omnium
rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem
huius rei, et sic diversus est finis superioris et inferioris
naturae, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur
altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis,
quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q4" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q4-p0.1">Q. 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q4-p2"> We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q4-p3"><a href="#FS_Q4_A1"> (1) Whether delight is required for happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p4"><a href="#FS_Q4_A2"> (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p5"><a href="#FS_Q4_A3"> (3) Whether comprehension is required?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p6"><a href="#FS_Q4_A4"> (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p7"><a href="#FS_Q4_A5"> (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p8"><a href="#FS_Q4_A6"> (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p9"><a href="#FS_Q4_A7"> (7) Whether any external goods are necessary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p10"><a href="#FS_Q4_A8"> (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 pr."><a name="33605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33605]
Iª-IIae q. 4 pr.</span></a> Deinde, considerandum est de his
quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo.
Primo, utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem. Secundo, quid
sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum delectatio vel visio.
Tertio, utrum requiratur comprehensio. Quarto, utrum requiratur
rectitudo voluntatis. Quinto, utrum ad beatitudinem hominis
requiratur corpus. Sexto, utrum perfectio corporis. Septimo, utrum
aliqua exteriora bona. Octavo, utrum requiratur societas
amicorum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q4_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A1-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 1. Whether delight is required for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward
                     of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing
                     besides vision is required for happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33606] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non requiratur ad
beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod <i>visio
est tota merces fidei</i>. Sed id quod est praemium vel merces
virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo
nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which
                     needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q4_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33607] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut philosophus dicit
I Ethic. Quod autem eget aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens.
Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut
ostensum est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur
delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of
                     the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33608] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non
impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed delectatio impedit actionem
intellectus corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in
VI Ethic. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33609] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod <i>beatitudo est
gaudium de veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary
                     for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
                     without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat
                     is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is
                     caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of
                     the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="33610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33610] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo,
sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina
requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut
anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans
extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto
modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor
requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad
beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus
requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam
adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione
concomitante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight.
                     Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33611] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas
merentis requiescit, quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione
mercedis redditae delectatio includitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33612] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille
qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in
                     Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is
                     extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we
                     are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to
                     one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is
                     contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33613] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus, non
impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur, in X Ethic., ea
enim quae delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius
operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quandoque
quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea
in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et dum uni vehementer
intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur. Quandoque
autem etiam ex contrarietate, sicut delectatio sensus contraria
rationi, impedit aestimationem prudentiae magis quam aestimationem
speculativi intellectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4).
                     But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33614] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in
beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic.,
est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili.
Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est
visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the
                     delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation
                     of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks
                     before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33615] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est potius. Sed
operationes appetuntur propter delectationem ipsarum, unde et
natura operationibus necessariis ad conservationem individui et
speciei, delectationem apposuit, ut huiusmodi operationes ab
animalibus non negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in
beatitudine quam operatio intellectus, quae est visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith,
                     as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33616] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive fruitio, caritati.
Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit apostolus I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo
delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33617] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo
visio est potior quam delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully,
                     the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of
                     the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes.
                     If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness
                     of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end,
                     which has been disproved above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2;
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[3], A[4]</a>): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation
                     in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="33618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33618] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et
eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex
necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit
potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam
quietatione voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur,
non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo
voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis
procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter
quietationem, sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est
contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione,
quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius
bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio
voluntatis in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth.
                     Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own
                     species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33619] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, <i>delectatio
perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem</i>, qui est ad
iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio
concomitans visionem; non sicut perfectio faciens visionem esse in
sua specie perfectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And
                     consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But
                     the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed
                     to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
                     Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things
                     not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33620] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem
rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est
delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in
animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed
intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius
consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum
quam delectationem. Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est
institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non
est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem
sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus
intellectivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good
                     gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made
                     present to charity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33621] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod caritas non quaerit bonum dilectum propter
delectationem, sed hoc est ei consequens, ut delectetur in bono
adepto quod amat. Et sic delectatio non respondet ei ut finis, sed
magis visio, per quam primo finis fit ei praesens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A3-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 3. Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm.
                     xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is
                     without comprehension.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33622] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur
comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Paulinam de videndo Deum,
<i>attingere mente Deum magna est beatitudo, comprehendere autem
est impossibile</i>. Ergo sine comprehensione est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
                     and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will
                     by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33623] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum intellectivam partem, in
qua non sunt aliae potentiae quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in
primo dictum est. Sed intellectus sufficienter perficitur per
visionem Dei, voluntas autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non
requiritur comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
                     objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
                     comprehension as a third.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33624] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes autem determinantur
secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum,
verum correspondet visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi.
Ergo non requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:24</a>): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.4.7" target="asv">2 Tim. 4:7,8</a>): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a
                     crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33625] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, <i>sic currite ut
comprehendatis</i>. Sed spiritualis cursus terminatur ad
beatitudinem, unde ipse dicit, II ad Tim. ult., <i>bonum certamen
certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo reposita est
mihi corona iustitiae</i>. Ergo comprehensio requiritur ad
beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the
                     way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly
                     through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect:
                     through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly,
                     by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is
                     present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it:
                     and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the
                     attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and
                     this
                     relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect
                     knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight
                     in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness;
                     to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end;
                     and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="33626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33626] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, cum beatitudo consistat in consecutione ultimi
finis, ea quae requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex
ipso ordine hominis ad finem. Ad finem autem intelligibilem
ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per
voluntatem. Per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu
praeexistit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem,
primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in
aliquid, secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum,
quae quidem potest esse triplex. Quandoque enim amatum est praesens
amanti, et tunc iam non quaeritur. Quandoque autem non est
praesens, sed impossibile est ipsum adipisci, et tunc etiam non
quaeritur. Quandoque autem possibile est ipsum adipisci, sed est
elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis, ita ut statim haberi non
possit, et haec est habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quae sola
habitudo facit finis inquisitionem. Et istis tribus respondent
aliqua in ipsa beatitudine. Nam perfecta cognitio finis respondet
imperfectae; praesentia vero ipsius finis respondet habitudini
spei; sed delectatio in fine iam praesenti consequitur dilectionem,
ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria
concurrere, scilicet visionem, quae est cognitio perfecta
intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae importat praesentiam
finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quae importat quietationem
rei amantis in amato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
                     the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means
                     nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend
                     [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense
                     comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33627] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, inclusio
comprehensi in comprehendente, et sic omne quod comprehenditur a
finito, est finitum. Unde hoc modo Deus non potest comprehendi ab
aliquo intellectu creato. Alio modo comprehensio nihil aliud
nominat quam tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae,
sicut aliquis consequens aliquem, dicitur eum comprehendere quando
tenet eum. Et hoc modo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while
                     not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
                     therein.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33628] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut ad voluntatem pertinet spes et amor, quia
eiusdem est amare aliquid et tendere in illud non habitum; ita
etiam ad voluntatem pertinet et comprehensio et delectatio, quia
eiusdem est habere aliquid et quiescere in illo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision
                     itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33629] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod comprehensio non est aliqua operatio praeter
visionem, sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem iam habitum. Unde etiam
ipsa visio, vel res visa secundum quod praesentialiter adest, est
obiectum comprehensionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A4-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 4. Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation
                     of the intellect, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q4_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation
                     of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none
                     but the clean of
                     heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude
                     of the will is not necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33630] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectitudo voluntatis non requiratur ad
beatitudinem. Beatitudo enim essentialiter consistit in operatione
intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ad perfectam intellectus
operationem non requiritur rectitudo voluntatis, per quam homines
mundi dicuntur, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Retract., <i>non
approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus qui non nisi mundos verum scire
voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa
scire vera</i>. Ergo rectitudo voluntatis non requiritur ad
beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the
                     will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33631] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
prius non dependet a posteriori. Sed operatio intellectus est prior
quam operatio voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo, quae est perfecta
operatio intellectus, non dependet a rectitudine voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,
                     after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore,
                     Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33632] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quod ordinatur ad aliquid tanquam ad finem, non est necessarium
adepto iam fine, sicut navis postquam pervenitur ad portum. Sed
rectitudo voluntatis, quae est per virtutem, ordinatur ad
beatitudinem tanquam ad finem. Ergo, adepta beatitudine, non est
necessaria rectitudo voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33633] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Matth. V, <i>beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum
videbunt</i>. Et Heb. XII, <i>pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et
sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
                     will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared
                     to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except
                     it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without
                     rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q4_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of
                     him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him
                     who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this
                     is precisely what makes the will
                     right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 co."><a name="33634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33634] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et
antecedenter et concomitanter. Antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo
voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum. Finis autem
comparatur ad id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad materiam.
Unde sicut materia non potest consequi formam, nisi sit debito modo
disposita ad ipsam, ita nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit debito
modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad beatitudinem
pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis. Concomitanter
autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo ultima consistit in
visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et ita
voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat,
sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex
necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam
novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde
manifestum est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta
voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p7a"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b><!-- By HST,
missing in original-->
What's said by Augustine concerns cognition of a truth which is not
	the very essence of happiness.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33635] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de cognitione veri quod non est
ipsa essentia bonitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the
                     intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of
                     the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33636] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu
intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis
actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum
intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis
praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad
percussionem signi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection,
                     such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order
                     to the end is necessary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33637] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non omne quod ordinatur ad finem, cessat adveniente
fine, sed id tantum quod se habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut
motus. Unde instrumenta motus non sunt necessaria postquam
pervenitur ad finem, sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A5-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 5. Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection
                     of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of
                     nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore
                     the soul cannot be happy without the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33638] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur corpus.
Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae praesupponit perfectionem
naturae. Sed beatitudo est perfectio virtutis et gratiae. Anima
autem sine corpore non habet perfectionem naturae, cum sit pars
naturaliter humanae naturae, omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo
toto separata. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q4_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[2]</a>,5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since,
                     therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate
                     from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33639] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est operatio quaedam perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed
operatio perfecta sequitur esse perfectum, quia nihil operatur nisi
secundum quod est ens in actu. Cum ergo anima non habeat esse
perfectum quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec aliqua pars
quando separata est a toto; videtur quod anima sine corpore non
possit esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in
                     the soul separated from the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33640] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima sine corpore non est
homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest esse in anima sine corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is
                     "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the
                     soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all
                     its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the
                     soul cannot be happy without the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="33641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33641] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum philosophum, in VII Ethic., felicitatis operatio, in qua
consistit beatitudo, est non impedita. Sed operatio animae
separatae est impedita, quia, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad
Litt., <i>inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi,
quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in
illud summum caelum</i>, idest in visionem essentiae divinae. Ergo
anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires
                     to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the
                     body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="33642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33642] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat desiderium. Sed hoc non
convenit animae separatae, quia adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut
Augustinus dicit. Ergo anima separata a corpore non est beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine
                     says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="33643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33643] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
homo in beatitudine est Angelis aequalis. Sed anima sine corpore
non aequatur Angelis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo non est beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.13" target="asv">Apoc. 14:13</a>): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33644] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Apoc. XIV, <i>beati mortui qui in domino
moriuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God.
                     Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an
                     operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without
                     a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A6" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">FP,
                        Q[84], AA[6]
                     </a>,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness,
                     which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and
                     have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment,
                     when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by
                     reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we
                     walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the
                     vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are
                     in God's presence; wherefore the text continues:
                     "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is
                     evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is
                     true Happiness.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p10"> Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms,
                     wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A3" id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[3]</a>. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the
                     body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p11"> We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence
                     thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body
                     and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection
                     of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the
                     more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence,
                     Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead
                     separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either
                     for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 co."><a name="33645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33645] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae habetur in
hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in Dei visione consistit.
Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de
necessitate requiritur corpus. Est enim beatitudo huius vitae
operatio intellectus, vel speculativi vel practici. Operatio autem
intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non
est nisi in organo corporeo, ut in primo habitum est. Et sic
beatitudo quae in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex
corpore. Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quae in Dei visione
consistit, aliqui posuerunt quod non potest animae advenire sine
corpore existenti; dicentes quod animae sanctorum a corporibus
separatae, ad illam beatitudinem non perveniunt usque ad diem
iudicii, quando corpora resument. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum
et auctoritate, et ratione. Auctoritate quidem, quia apostolus
dicit, II ad Cor. V, <i>quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a
domino</i>; et quae sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens,
<i>per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem</i>. Ex quo apparet
quod quandiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per speciem, carens
visione divinae essentiae, nondum est Deo praesens. Animae autem
sanctorum a corporibus separatae, sunt Deo praesentes, unde
subditur, <i>audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus peregrinari
a corpore, et praesentes esse ad dominum</i>. Unde manifestum est
quod animae sanctorum separatae a corporibus, ambulant per speciem,
Dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo. Hoc etiam per
rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget
corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem
intelligibilem contuetur, ut in primo dictum est. Manifestum est
autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in
primo ostensum est. Unde, cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta
hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta
hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata. Sed
sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid
pertinet. Uno modo, ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut anima
requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad
perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse eius, sicut pulchritudo
corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis.
Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae
non pertineat, pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio
dependeat ex natura rei, quando anima perfectior erit in sua
natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua
felicitas consistit. Unde Augustinus, in XII super Gen. ad Litt.,
cum quaesivisset, <i>utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus
possit summa illa beatitudo praeberi</i>, respondet quod <i>non sic
possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti Angeli vident;
sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia est in eis naturalis
quidam appetitus corpus administrandi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs
                     of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection
                     in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the
                     form of the body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33646] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio animae ex parte intellectus,
secundum quem anima transcendit corporis organa, non autem secundum
quod est forma naturalis corporis. Et ideo illa naturae perfectio
manet secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur, licet non maneat illa
naturae perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual
                     part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when
                     the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from
                     that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the
                     composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and
                     this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q4_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a
                     perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33647] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliae partes. Nam
esse totius non est alicuius suarum partium, unde vel pars omnino
desinit esse, destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo
animali; vel, si remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars
lineae habet aliud esse quam tota linea. Sed animae humanae remanet
esse compositi post corporis destructionem, et hoc ideo, quia idem
est esse formae et materia, et hoc est esse compositi. Anima autem
subsistit in suo esse, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur
quod post separationem a corpore perfectum esse habeat, unde et
perfectam operationem habere potest; licet non habeat perfectam
naturam speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness.
                     Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33648] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod beatitudo est hominis secundum intellectum, et ideo,
remanente intellectu, potest inesse ei beatitudo. Sicut dentes
Aethiopis possunt esse albi, etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos
Aethiops dicitur albus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such
                     a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is
                     hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible
                     with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is
                     that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence.
                     For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And
                     therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in
                     such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="33649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33649] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, per
modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris, et
tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per
modum cuiusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet
quidquid ad omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur, et tale
impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae
perfectioni ipsius. Et sic separatio a corpore dicitur animam
retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae essentiae.
Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur
ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile. Et ideo quandiu
ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo
quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum
corpus pertingere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices
                     its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that
                     it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="33650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33650] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex
parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui
sufficit. Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia
illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet.
Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed
extensive.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is
                     not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the
                     higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion:
                     because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever
                     will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="33651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33651] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum
dicendum quod id quod ibidem dicitur, quod <i>spiritus defunctorum
non sic vident Deum sicut Angeli</i>, non est intelligendum
secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis, quia etiam modo aliquae animae
beatorum sunt assumptae ad superiores ordines Angelorum, clarius
videntes Deum quam inferiores Angeli. Sed intelligitur secundum
inaequalitatem proportionis, quia Angeli, etiam infimi, habent
omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt habituri, non autem
animae separatae sanctorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A6-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 6. Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily
                     good. But it has been shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q2" id="FS_Q4_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[2])</a> that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33652] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio corporis non requiratur ad
beatitudinem hominis perfectam. Perfectio enim corporis est quoddam
corporale bonum. Sed supra ostensum est quod beatitudo non
consistit in corporalibus bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non
requiritur aliqua perfecta dispositio corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not
                     part in this operation, as shown above
                     <a href="#FS_Q4_A5" id="FS_Q4_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33653] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinae essentiae, ut
ostensum est. Sed ad hanc operationem nihil exhibet corpus, ut
dictum est. Ergo nulla dispositio corporis requiritur ad
beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in
                     the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore,
                     in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33654] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a corpore, tanto perfectius
intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit in perfectissima operatione
intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus modis animam esse abstractam a
corpore. Nullo ergo modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad
beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
                     God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.66.14" target="asv">Is. 66:14</a>): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of
                     the body is
                     necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33655] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
praemium virtutis est beatitudo, unde dicitur Ioan. XIII, <i>beati
eritis, si feceritis ea</i>. Sed sanctis repromittitur pro praemio
non solum visio Dei et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona
dispositio, dicitur enim Isaiae ult., <i>videbitis, et gaudebit cor
vestrum, et ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt</i>. Ergo bona
dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
                     required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect
                     virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p7"> But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that
                     it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words
                     of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable.
                     For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the
                     soul to exclude its natural perfection.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p8"> Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that
                     Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such,
                     that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the
                     mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no
                     longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile
                     was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this
                     too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that
                     from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 co."><a name="33656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33656] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac
vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate
requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo,
secundum philosophum, in operatione virtutis perfectae. Manifestum
est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione
virtutis homo impediri potest. Sed si loquamur de beatitudine
perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod non requiritur ad beatitudinem
aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad eam ut omnino anima
sit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus, XXII de Civ. Dei,
introducit verba Porphyrii dicentis quod <i>ad hoc quod beata sit
anima, omne corpus fugiendum est</i>. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Cum
enim naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod
perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat. Et ideo
dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam,
requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et antecedenter et
consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII
super Gen. ad Litt., <i>si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficilis et
gravis administratio, sicut caro quae corrumpitur et aggravat
animam, avertitur mens ab illa visione summi caeli</i>. Unde
concludit quod, <i>cum hoc corpus iam non erit animale, sed
spirituale, tunc Angelis adaequabitur, et erit ei ad gloriam, quod
sarcinae fuit</i>. Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae
fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur.
Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Dioscorum, <i>tam potenti
natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine
redundet in inferiorem naturam incorruptionis vigor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33657] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod in corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in
obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem
beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove
                     a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33658] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem
intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire.
Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem
mentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which
                     weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall
                     treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33659] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur
quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat
animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter
spiritui subiectum, de quo in tertia parte huius operis
dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A7-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 7. Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs
                     to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.30" target="asv">Lk. 22:30</a>): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.20" target="asv">Mat. 6:20</a>): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.34" target="asv">Mat. 25:34</a>):
                     "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33660] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requirantur etiam
exteriora bona. Quod enim in praemium sanctis promittitur, ad
beatitudinem pertinet. Sed sanctis repromittuntur exteriora bona,
sicut cibus et potus, divitiae et regnum, dicitur enim Luc. XXII,
<i>ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo</i>; et
Matth. VI, <i>thesaurizate vobis thesauros in caelo</i>; et Matth.
XXV, <i>venite, benedicti patris mei, possidete regnum</i>. Ergo ad
beatitudinem requiruntur exteriora bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things."
                     But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore
                     they too are necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33661] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>beatitudo est status omnium
bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed exteriora sunt aliqua
hominis bona, licet minima, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo ipsa etiam
requiruntur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.12" target="asv">Mat. 5:12</a>): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place
                     is necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33662] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
dominus, Matth. V, dicit, <i>merces vestra multa est in caelis</i>.
Sed esse in caelis significat esse in loco. Ergo saltem locus
exterior requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.25" target="asv">Ps. 72:25</a>): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"---"It
                     is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33663] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXII, <i>quid enim mihi est in caelo?
Et a te quid volui super terram?</i> Quasi dicat, nihil aliud volo
nisi hoc quod sequitur, <i>mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est</i>. Ergo
nihil aliud exterius ad beatitudinem requiritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
                     happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
                     For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation
                     of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to
                     perform its operations.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q4_A7-p7"> On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason
                     of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations
                     which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in
                     seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no
                     longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained
                     to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than
                     that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated
                     in Ethic. x, 8.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 co."><a name="33664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33664] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita
potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia
beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia
beatitudini, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I
Ethic. Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad
operationem virtutis contemplativae quam etiam ad operationem
virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus
exerceat opera activae virtutis. Sed ad beatitudinem perfectam,
quae in visione Dei consistit, nullo modo huiusmodi bona
requiruntur. Cuius ratio est quia omnia huiusmodi bona exteriora
vel requiruntur ad sustentationem animalis corporis; vel
requiruntur ad aliquas operationes quas per animale corpus
exercemus, quae humanae vitae conveniunt. Illa autem perfecta
beatitudo quae in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine
corpore; vel erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed
spirituali. Et ideo nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur
ad illam beatitudinem, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem. Et quia in
hac vita magis accedit ad similitudinem illius perfectae
beatitudinis felicitas contemplativa quam activa, utpote etiam Deo
similior, ut ex dictis patet; ideo minus indiget huiusmodi bonis
corporis, ut dicitur in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont
                     to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire
                     of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the
                     sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of
                     God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33665] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod omnes illae corporales promissiones quae in sacra
Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendae, secundum
quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari,
<i>ut ex his quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita
consurgamus</i>, sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Sicut per
cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias,
sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum, exaltatio
hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists.
                     Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things,
                     we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33666] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod bona ista deservientia animali vitae, non competunt
vitae spirituali in qua beatitudo perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit
in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni
invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints,
                     but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed
                     to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33667] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte,
merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis caelis, sed per
caelos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. Nihilominus
tamen locus corporeus, scilicet caelum Empyreum, aderit beatis, non
propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam
congruentiam et decorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A8-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 8. Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under
                     the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends
                     is necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33668] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii ad beatitudinem.
Futura enim beatitudo in Scripturis frequenter nomine gloriae
designatur. Sed gloria consistit in hoc quod bonum hominis ad
notitiam multorum deducitur. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur
societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius [*Seneca,
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 6</a>] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary
                     for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33669] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Boetius dicit quod <i>nullius boni sine consortio iucunda est
possessio</i>. Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo
etiam requiritur societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems
                     that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33670] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas se extendit ad
dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem
requiratur societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently
                     nothing else is necessary for Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33671] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Sap. VII, <i>venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum
illa</i>, scilicet cum divina sapientia, quae consistit in
contemplatione Dei. Et sic ad beatitudinem nihil aliud
requiritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed,
                     to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation
                     of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do
                     good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may
                     do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q4_A8-p7"> But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential
                     to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being
                     of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to
                     happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
                     without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 co."><a name="33672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33672] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut
philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem
propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter
delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in
operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis
benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam
ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene
operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in
operibus vitae contemplativae. Sed si loquamur de perfecta
beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum
de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem
suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit
societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt.,
quod <i>creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi
intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris.
Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo
adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in
Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33673] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod gloria quae est essentialis beatitudini, est quam
habet homo non apud hominem, sed apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question
                     under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33674] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod
habetur, non est plena sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non
potest, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore
                     if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor
                     to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect
                     Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33675] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini
quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem
proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non
habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur
dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter
se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q5" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q5-p0.1">Q. 5. OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q5-p2"> We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q5-p3"><a href="#FS_Q5_A1"> (1) Whether man can attain Happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p4"><a href="#FS_Q5_A2"> (2) Whether one man can be happier than another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p5"><a href="#FS_Q5_A3"> (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p6"><a href="#FS_Q5_A4"> (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p7"><a href="#FS_Q5_A5"> (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p8"><a href="#FS_Q5_A6"> (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p9"><a href="#FS_Q5_A7"> (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p10"><a href="#FS_Q5_A8"> (8) Whether every man desires Happiness?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 pr."><a name="33676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33676]
Iª-IIae q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ipsa
adeptione beatitudinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum
homo possit consequi beatitudinem. Secundo, utrum unus homo possit
esse alio beatior. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita
beatus. Quarto, utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti. Quinto,
utrum, homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem. Sexto,
utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius
superioris creaturae. Septimo, utrum requirantur opera hominis
aliqua ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Octavo,
utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q5_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A1-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 1. Whether man can attain happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual
                     is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have
                     the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature,
                     attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33677] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit.
Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem ita natura
intellectualis est supra rationalem ut patet per Dionysium in libro
de Div. Nom., in multis locis. Sed bruta animalia, quae habent
naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem
rationalis naturae. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturae,
potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturae, qui est
beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material
                     things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain
                     Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33678] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui est veritas pura. Sed
homini est connaturale ut veritatem intueatur in rebus
materialibus, unde species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus
intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non potest ad
beatitudinem pervenire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle.
                     Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that
                     he cannot attain Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33679] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest
pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum
et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo
transcendere non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem
adipisci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.12" target="asv">Ps. 93:12</a>): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33680] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>beatus homo quem tu erudieris,
domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness.
                     Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect
                     good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that
                     man is capable of seeing God, as stated in
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A1" id="FS_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[1]</a>: in
                     which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="33681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33681] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque
ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire.
Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et
eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum,
et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem
adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis
divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est; in qua quidem
visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds
                     the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal,
                     whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the
                     same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth
                     which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A8" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can
                     attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained
                     it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after
                     a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33682] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam, et
aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura enim rationalis excedit
sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis obiectum, quia sensus nullo modo
potest cognoscere universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed
intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum
cognoscendi eandem intelligibilem veritatem, nam intellectualis
natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per
inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in primo
dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per
quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest
beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio
modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post
principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam
perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo
pertingere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this
                     state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a> ;
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q89_A1" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33683] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est
connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per
phantasmata. Sed post huius vitae statum, habet alium modum
connaturalem, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation
                     of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained
                     it, he will be perfectly happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33684] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere Angelos gradu naturae,
ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior. Potest tamen eos
transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid
super Angelos esse, quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte
consequetur, perfecte beatus erit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A2-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 2. Whether one man can be happier than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
                     (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.10" target="asv">Mat. 20:10</a>) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was equally
                     rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier than another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33685] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse
beatior. Beatitudo enim est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit
in I Ethic. Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces
redditur, dicitur enim Matth. XX, quod omnes qui operati sunt in
vinea, acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius,
<i>aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt</i>. Ergo
unus non erit alio beatior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed
                     by another's.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33686] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo non potest esse aliquid
maius. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia maior
beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire
                     is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater
                     good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33687] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, desiderium
hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum
deest quod suppleri possit. Si autem nihil deest quod suppleri
possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud maius bonum. Ergo vel homo
non est beatus, vel, si est beatus, non potest alia maior beatitudo
esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.2" target="asv">Jn. 14:2</a>): "In My Father's house there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify "the diverse
                     dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness
                     itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33688] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, <i>in domo patris mei mansiones multae
sunt</i>; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit, <i>diversae meritorum
dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna</i>. Dignitas autem vitae
aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt
diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis
beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
                     <a href="#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of
                     that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another,
                     since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or
                     enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now,
                     that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And
                     in this sense one man can be happier than another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="33689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33689] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in ratione beatitudinis duo
includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum; et
adeptio vel fruitio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod
est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo
alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus,
cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem
huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior,
quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit
autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius
dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest
aliquis alio beatior esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
                     divers degrees of enjoyment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33690] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod unitas denarii significat unitatem beatitudinis ex
parte obiecti. Sed diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem
beatitudinis secundum diversum gradum fruitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33691] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum bonum, inquantum est
summi boni perfecta possessio sive fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good,"
                     as Augustine says (Enarr. in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.134" target="asv">Ps. 134</a>). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other
                     goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the
                     happier for knowing them, but is happy for
                     knowing Thee alone."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33692] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum, cum
habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est bonum omnis boni, ut
Augustinus dicit. Sed dicitur aliquis alio beatior, ex diversa
eiusdem boni participatione. Additio autem aliorum bonorum non
auget beatitudinem, unde Augustinus dicit, in V Confess., <i>qui te
et alia novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum
beatus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A3-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 3. Whether one can be happy in this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.1" target="asv">Ps. 118:1</a>): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can
                     be happy in this life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33693] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi.
Dicitur enim in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>beati immaculati in via, qui
ambulant in lege domini</i>. Hoc autem in hac vita contingit. Ergo
aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not
                     be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly.
                     Therefore man can be happy in this life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33694] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
imperfecta participatio summi boni non adimit rationem
beatitudinis, alioquin unus non esset alio beatior. Sed in hac vita
homines possunt participare summum bonum, cognoscendo et amando
Deum, licet imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse
beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature
                     does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv"> Ps. 143:15</a>: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy
                     in this life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33695] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quod a pluribus dicitur, non potest totaliter falsum esse, videtur
enim esse naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter
deficit. Sed plures ponunt beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per
illud Psalmi CXLIII, <i>beatum dixerunt populum cui haec sunt</i>,
scilicet praesentis vitae bona. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest
esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.1" target="asv">Job 14:1</a>): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore
                     man cannot be happy in this life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33696] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Iob XIV, <i>homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens
tempore, repletur multis miseriis</i>. Sed beatitudo excludit
miseriam. Ergo homo in hac vita non potest esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life.
                     This may be seen from a twofold consideration.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p7"> First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil,
                     and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable
                     evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties
                     on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire
                     for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present
                     life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man
                     naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p8"> Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot
                     obtain in this life, as was shown in the
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A11" id="FS_Q5_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="33697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33697] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod aliqualis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita
haberi potest, perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi
in hac vita. Et hoc quidem considerari potest dupliciter. Primo
quidem, ex ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione. Nam beatitudo, cum
sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne
desiderium implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum excludi.
Multis enim malis praesens vita subiacet, quae vitari non possunt,
et ignorantiae ex parte intellectus, et inordinatae affectioni ex
parte appetitus, et multiplicibus poenalitatibus ex parte corporis;
ut Augustinus diligenter prosequitur XIX de Civ. Dei. Similiter
etiam desiderium boni in hac vita satiari non potest. Naturaliter
enim homo desiderat permanentiam eius boni quod habet. Bona autem
praesentis vitae transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transeat, quam
naturaliter desideramus, et eam perpetuo permanere vellemus, quia
naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est quod in hac
vita vera beatitudo habeatur. Secundo, si consideretur id in quo
specialiter beatitudo consistit, scilicet visio divinae essentiae,
quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in primo ostensum
est. Ex quibus manifeste apparet quod non potest aliquis in hac
vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv"> Rom. 8:24</a>: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign
                     Good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33698] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem
beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura vita, secundum illud Rom. VIII,
<i>spe salvi facti sumus</i>, vel propter aliquam participationem
beatitudinis, secundum aliqualem summi boni fruitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which
                     is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be
                     on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however,
                     in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not
                     destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q5_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33699] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta
dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius obiecti beatitudinis, quod
quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur. Et talis imperfectio
tollit rationem verae beatitudinis. Alio modo potest esse
imperfecta ex parte ipsius participantis, qui quidem ad ipsum
obiectum beatitudinis secundum seipsum attingit, scilicet Deum, sed
imperfecte, per respectum ad modum quo Deus seipso fruitur. Et
talis imperfectio non tollit veram rationem beatitudinis, quia, cum
beatitudo sit operatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est, vera ratio
beatitudinis, consideratur ex obiecto, quod dat speciem actui, non
autem ex subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness.
                     And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33700] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod homines reputant in hac vita esse aliquam
beatitudinem, propter aliquam similitudinem verae beatitudinis. Et
sic non ex toto in sua aestimatione deficiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A4-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 4. Whether happiness once had can be lost?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
                     to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in
                     a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33701] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit amitti. Beatitudo
enim est perfectio quaedam. Sed omnis perfectio inest perfectibili
secundum modum ipsius. Cum igitur homo secundum suam naturam sit
mutabilis, videtur quod beatitudo mutabiliter ab homine
participetur. Et ita videtur quod homo beatitudinem possit
amittere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
                     to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease
                     to be happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33702] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo consistit in actione intellectus, qui subiacet voluntati.
Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo videtur quod possit
desistere ab operatione qua homo beatificatur, et ita homo desinet
esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore
                     it seems that it has an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33703] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
principio respondet finis. Sed beatitudo hominis habet principium,
quia homo non semper fuit beatus. Ergo videtur quod habeat
finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
                     <a href="#FS_Q5_A2" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33704] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, de iustis, quod ibunt in vitam
aeternam; quae, ut dictum est, est beatitudo sanctorum. Quod autem
est aeternum, non deficit. Ergo beatitudo non potest amitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative
                     happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
                     occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p7"> This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act
                     that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like
                     happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains
                     an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this
                     life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state
                     (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p8"> But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii,
                     3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p9"> This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the
                     "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to
                     hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of
                     losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that
                     man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never
                     will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is
                     the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly
                     happy, if evil be in him.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p10"> Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine
                     Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient,
                     something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience
                     attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good
                     things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv">Ps. 16:15</a>): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any
                     inconvenience attached to it; because it is written
                     of the contemplation of wisdom (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake
                     Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since
                     the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that
                     sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
                     will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q4_A4" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.5" shape="rect">Q[4], A[4]</a>). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things:
                     and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on,
                     man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things
                     as are subject to time and
                     movement.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="33705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33705] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, qualis in hac
vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate
contemplativa, quae amittitur vel per oblivionem, puta cum
corrumpitur scientia ex aliqua aegritudine; vel etiam per aliquas
occupationes, quibus totaliter abstrahitur aliquis a
contemplatione. Patet etiam idem in felicitate activa, voluntas
enim hominis transmutari potest, ut in vitium degeneret a virtute,
in cuius actu principaliter consistit felicitas. Si autem virtus
remaneat integra, exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem
beatitudinem talem perturbare, inquantum impediunt multas
operationes virtutum, non tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre, quia
adhuc remanet operatio virtutis, dum ipsas adversitates homo
laudabiliter sustinet. Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest,
quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo philosophus
dicit, in I Ethic., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non
simpliciter, sed sicut homines quorum natura mutationi subiecta
est. Si vero loquamur de beatitudine perfecta quae expectatur post
hanc vitam, sciendum est quod Origenes posuit, quorundam
Platonicorum errorem sequens, quod post ultimam beatitudinem homo
potest fieri miser. Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum
dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis. Cum
enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod
desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat. Naturaliter
autem homo desiderat retinere bonum quod habet, et quod eius
retinendi securitatem obtineat, alioquin necesse est quod timore
amittendi, vel dolore de certitudine amissionis, affligatur.
Requiritur igitur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat
opinionem bonum quod habet, nunquam se amissurum. Quae quidem
opinio si vera sit, consequens est quod beatitudinem nunquam
amittet. Si autem falsa sit, hoc ipsum est quoddam malum, falsam
opinionem habere, nam falsum est malum intellectus, sicut verum est
bonum ipsius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non igitur iam vere erit
beatus, si aliquod malum ei inest. Secundo idem apparet, si
consideretur ratio beatitudinis in speciali. Ostensum est enim
supra quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinae essentiae
consistit. Est autem impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam
essentiam, velit eam non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis
carere vult, aut est insufficiens, et quaeritur aliquid
sufficientius loco eius, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum,
propter quod in fastidium venit. Visio autem divinae essentiae
replet animam omnibus bonis, cum coniungat fonti totius bonitatis,
unde dicitur in Psalmo XVI, <i>satiabor cum apparuerit gloria
tua</i>; et Sap. VII, dicitur, <i>venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter
cum illa</i>, scilicet cum contemplatione sapientiae. Similiter
etiam non habet aliquod incommodum adiunctum, quia de
contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, Sap. VIII, <i>non habet
amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus eius</i>.
Sic ergo patet quod propria voluntate beatus non potest
beatitudinem deserere. Similiter etiam non potest eam perdere, Deo
subtrahente. Quia, cum subtractio beatitudinis sit quaedam poena,
non potest talis subtractio a Deo, iusto iudice, provenire, nisi
pro aliqua culpa, in quam cadere non potest qui Dei essentiam
videt, cum ad hanc visionem ex necessitate sequatur rectitudo
voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec aliquod
aliud agens potest eam subtrahere. Quia mens Deo coniuncta super
omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab huiusmodi coniunctione nullum aliud
agens potest ipsam excludere. Unde inconveniens videtur quod per
quasdam alternationes temporum transeat homo de beatitudine ad
miseriam, et e converso, quia huiusmodi temporales alternationes
esse non possunt, nisi circa ea quae subiacent tempori et
motui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it
                     altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends
                     all change.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33706] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quae omnem
defectum excludit a beato. Et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam
habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quae hominem sublevat in
participationem aeternitatis transcendentis omnem mutationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity,
                     to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33707] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas ad opposita se habet in his quae ad finem
ordinantur, sed ad ultimum finem naturali necessitate ordinatur.
Quod patet ex hoc, quod homo non potest non velle esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the
                     good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
                     another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33708] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod beatitudo habet principium ex conditione
participantis, sed caret fine, propter conditionem boni cuius
participatio facit beatum. Unde ab alio est initium beatitudinis;
et ab alio est quod caret fine.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A5-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 5. Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing
                     is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore
                     man can attain Happiness by his natural powers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33709] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per sua naturalia possit
beatitudinem consequi. Natura enim non deficit in necessariis. Sed
nihil est homini tam necessarium quam id per quod finem ultimum
consequitur. Ergo hoc naturae humanae non deest. Potest igitur homo
per sua naturalia beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational
                     creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33710] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
homo, cum sit nobilior irrationalibus creaturis, videtur esse
sufficientior. Sed irrationales creaturae per sua naturalia possunt
consequi suos fines. Ergo multo magis homo per sua naturalia potest
beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing
                     belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning
                     in human operations, is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain
                     to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33711] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est operatio perfecta, secundum philosophum. Eiusdem
autem est incipere rem, et perficere ipsam. Cum igitur operatio
imperfecta, quae est quasi principium in operationibus humanis,
subdatur naturali hominis potestati, qua suorum actuum est dominus;
videtur quod per naturalem potentiam possit pertingere ad
operationem perfectam, quae est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses
                     the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them
                     that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33712] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et
voluntatem. Sed ultima beatitudo sanctis praeparata, excedit
intellectum hominis et voluntatem, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor.
II, <i>oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis
non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se</i>. Ergo homo
per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue,
                     in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above
                     (Q[3], A[8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only
                     of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A4" id="FS_Q5_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12],
                        A[4]
                     </a>. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence
                     (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its
                     substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine
                     Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain
                     final Happiness by his natural powers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="33713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33713] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest,
potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus,
in cuius operatione consistit, de quo infra dicetur. Sed beatitudo
hominis perfecta, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in visione
divinae essentiae. Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra
naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturae, ut in primo
ostensum est. Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturae est
secundum modum substantiae eius, sicut de intelligentia dicitur in
libro de causis, quod <i>cognoscit ea quae sunt supra se, et ea
quae sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiae suae</i>. Omnis
autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit
a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem
substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest
consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided
                     other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did
                     it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do.
                     But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him
                     happy. "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33714] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis,
quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus
quia dedit ei rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi
conquirere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non
daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc
enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit
converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. <i>Quae enim per amicos
possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus</i>, ut dicitur in III
Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition
                     than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in
                     order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect
                     health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health,
                     without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs
                     the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this
                     good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33715] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod nobilioris conditionis est natura quae potest
consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc
consequendum, quam natura quae non potest consequi perfectum bonum,
sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem
eius non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut philosophus dicit in II de
caelo. Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi
perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae; quam qui
solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem, sine medicinae
auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quae potest consequi
perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est
perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est
capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae
naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity,
                     if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
                     Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation
                     which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its
                     object. Consequently the argument does not prove.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33716] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quando imperfectum et perfectum sunt eiusdem
speciei, ab eadem virtute causari possunt. Non autem hoc est
necesse, si sunt alterius speciei, non enim quidquid potest causare
dispositionem materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre.
Imperfecta autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis
potestati, non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta
quae est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex
obiecto. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A6-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 6. Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe
                     a twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which
                     is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order
                     of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
                     order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures
                     acting on the lower, as stated in the
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FS_Q5_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[109], A[2]</a>: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy,
                     through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33717] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit fieri beatus per actionem
alicuius superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli. Cum enim duplex
ordo inveniatur in rebus, unus partium universi ad invicem, alius
totius universi ad bonum quod est extra universum; primus ordo
ordinatur ad secundum sicut ad finem, ut dicitur XII Metaphys.;
sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius
exercitus ad ducem. Sed ordo partium universi ad invicem attenditur
secundum quod superiores creaturae agunt in inferiores, ut in primo
dictum est, beatitudo autem consistit in ordine hominis ad bonum
quod est extra universum, quod est Deus. Ergo per actionem
superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli, in hominem, homo beatus
efficitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially
                     hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually
                     happy by an angel who is actually happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33718] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quod est in potentia tale, potest reduci in actum per id quod est
actu tale, sicut quod est potentia calidum, fit actu calidum per id
quod est actu calidum. Sed homo est in potentia beatus. Ergo potest
fieri actu beatus per Angelum, qui est actu beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's
                     intellect as shown in the
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q5_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>. Therefore an angel can make a man happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33719] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo consistit in operatione intellectus, ut supra dictum est.
Sed Angelus potest illuminare intellectum hominis, ut in primo
habitum est. Ergo Angelus potest facere hominem beatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.12" target="asv">Ps. 83:12</a>): "The Lord will give grace and glory."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33720] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>gratiam et gloriam dabit
dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
                     surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above
                     nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now
                     it has been shown above
                     <a href="#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q5_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a> that Happiness is a good surpassing
                     created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man
                     made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as
                     of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="33721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33721] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, cum omnis creatura naturae legibus sit subiecta,
utpote habens limitatam virtutem et actionem; illud quod excedit
naturam creatam, non potest fieri virtute alicuius creaturae. Et
ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit
immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci, et
cetera huiusmodi. Ostensum est autem quod beatitudo est quoddam
bonum excedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod per
actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur, sed homo beatus fit solo
Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta. Si vero loquamur
de beatitudine imperfecta, sic eadem ratio est de ipsa et de
virtute, in cuius actu consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the
                     last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to
                     the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus,
                     too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the
                     attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself
                     through the First Agent, which is God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33722] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod plerumque contingit in potentiis activis ordinatis,
quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam,
inferiores vero potentiae coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi
finis disponendo, sicut ad artem gubernativam, quae praeest
navifactivae, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit. Sic
igitur et in ordine universi, homo quidem adiuvatur ab Angelis ad
consequendum ultimum finem, secundum aliqua praecedentia, quibus
disponitur ad eius consecutionem, sed ipsum ultimum finem
consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance
                     a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle
                     whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white;
                     nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something
                     else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is
                     in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently
                     no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33723] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quando aliqua forma actu existit in aliquo secundum
esse perfectum et naturale, potest esse principium actionis in
alterum; sicut calidum per calorem calefacit. Sed si forma existit
in aliquo imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest
esse principium communicationis sui ad alterum, sicut intentio
coloris quae est in pupilla, non potest facere album; neque etiam
omnia quae sunt illuminata aut calefacta, possunt alia calefacere
et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio at calefactio essent usque ad
infinitum. Lumen autem gloriae, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo
quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale, in qualibet autem
creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel
participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam
beatitudinem alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as
                     to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q5_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[106], A[1]</a>: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33724] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis, vel
etiam inferioris Angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum
operum non autem quantum ad visionem divinae essentiae, ut in primo
dictum est. Ad eam enim videndam, omnes immediate illuminantur a
Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A7-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 7. Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite
                     power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But
                     man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q5_A6" id="FS_Q5_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not
                     require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33725] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requirantur aliqua opera hominis
ad hoc ut beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Deus enim, cum sit agens
infinitae virtutis, non praeexigit in agendo materiam, aut
dispositionem materiae, sed statim potest totum producere. Sed
opera hominis, cum non requirantur ad beatitudinem eius sicut causa
efficiens, ut dictum est, non possunt requiri ad eam nisi sicut
dispositiones. Ergo Deus, qui dispositiones non praeexigit in
agendo, beatitudinem sine praecedentibus operibus confert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established
                     nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect
                     forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33726] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut Deus est auctor beatitudinis immediate, ita et naturam
immediate instituit. Sed in prima institutione naturae, produxit
creaturas nulla dispositione praecedente vel actione creaturae; sed
statim fecit unumquodque perfectum in sua specie. Ergo videtur quod
beatitudinem conferat homini sine aliquibus operationibus
praecedentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.6" target="asv">Rom. 4:6</a>) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining
                     Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33727] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus
confert iustitiam sine operibus. Non ergo requiruntur aliqua opera
hominis ad beatitudinem consequendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33728] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, <i>si haec scitis, beati eritis si
feceritis ea</i>. Ergo per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right
                     order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter,
                     in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make
                     a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as
                     sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should
                     not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one
                     has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs
                     to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not
                     to be
                     moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
                     becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in
                     the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained
                     in the
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A5" id="FS_Q5_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[62], A[5]</a>; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits.
                     Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 co."><a name="33729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33729] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, requiritur
ad beatitudinem, cum nihil aliud sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis
ad ultimum finem; quae ita exigitur ad consecutionem ultimi finis,
sicut debita dispositio materiae ad consecutionem formae. Sed ex
hoc non ostenditur quod aliqua operatio hominis debeat praecedere
eius beatitudinem, posset enim Deus simul facere voluntatem recte
tendentem in finem, et finem consequentem; sicut quandoque simul
materiam disponit, et inducit formam. Sed ordo divinae sapientiae
exigit ne hoc fiat, ut enim dicitur in II de caelo, <i>eorum quae
nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu,
aliquid uno motu, aliquid pluribus</i>. Habere autem perfectum
bonum sine motu, convenit ei quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere
autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei
proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam
operationem praecedentem. Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam
creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur
absque motu operationis, per quam tendit in ipsam. Sed Angelus, qui
est superior ordine naturae quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex
ordine divinae sapientiae, uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in
primo expositum est. Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis
motibus operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam, secundum
philosophum, beatitudo est praemium virtuosarum operationum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows
                     Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33730] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod operatio hominis non praeexigitur ad consecutionem
beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinae virtutis
beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the
                     creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated
                     to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who,"
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.10" target="asv"> Heb. 2:10, </a> "had brought many children into glory";
                     therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But
                     this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits
                     of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33731] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod primas creaturas statim Deus perfectas produxit,
absque aliqua dispositione vel operatione creaturae praecedente,
quia sic instituit prima individua specierum, ut per ea natura
propagaretur ad posteros. Et similiter, quia per Christum, qui est
Deus et homo, beatitudo erat ad alios derivanda, secundum illud
apostoli ad Heb. II, <i>qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat</i>;
statim a principio suae conceptionis, absque aliqua operatione
meritoria praecedente, anima eius fuit beata. Sed hoc est singulare
in ipso, nam pueris baptizatis subvenit meritum Christi ad
beatitudinem consequendam, licet desint eis merita propria, eo quod
per Baptismum sunt Christi membra effecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account
                     of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends
                     towards Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33732] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei, quae habetur
per gratiam iustificantem, quae quidem non datur propter opera
praecedentia. Non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo,
sed magis est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A8-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 8. Whether every man desires happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
                     of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine
                     says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some
                     in other things." Therefore not all desire Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33733] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes appetant beatitudinem.
Nullus enim potest appetere quod ignorat, cum bonum apprehensum sit
obiectum appetitus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed multi nesciunt
quid sit beatitudo, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIII de Trin.,
patet ex hoc, quod <i>quidam posuerunt beatitudinem in voluptate
corporis, quidam in virtute animi, quidam in aliis rebus</i>. Non
ergo omnes beatitudinem appetunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q5_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not
                     desire Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33734] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
essentia beatitudinis est visio essentiae divinae, ut dictum est.
Sed aliqui opinantur hoc esse impossibile, quod Deus per essentiam
ab homine videatur, unde hoc non appetunt. Ergo non omnes homines
appetunt beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all
                     do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire
                     Happiness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33735] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin. quod <i>beatus est qui habet
omnia quae vult, et nihil male vult</i>. Sed non omnes hoc volunt,
quidam enim male aliqua volunt, et tamen volunt illa se velle. Non
ergo omnes volunt beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he
                     would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33736] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., <i>si minus dixisset,
omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis, dixisset aliquid
quod nullus in sua non cognosceret voluntate</i>. Quilibet ergo
vult esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every
                     man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q5_A3" id="FS_Q5_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently
                     to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be
                     satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which
                     it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness;
	because they know not in what thing the general notion of
	happiness is found.
                     And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 co."><a name="33737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33737] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod beatitudo dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo,
secundum communem rationem beatitudinis. Et sic necesse est quod
omnis homo beatitudinem velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis
est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit
obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter
eius voluntati satisfacit. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud
est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur. Quod quilibet vult. Alio
modo possumus loqui de beatitudine secundum specialem rationem,
quantum ad id in quo beatitudo consistit. Et sic non omnes
cognoscunt beatitudinem, quia nesciunt cui rei communis ratio
beatitudinis conveniat. Et per consequens, quantum ad hoc, non
omnes eam volunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p7a">Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33738] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet
responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction,
                     there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired
                     in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general
                     notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
                     thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself,
                     or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33739] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum voluntas sequatur apprehensionem intellectus seu
rationis, sicut contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, quod
tamen est diversum secundum rationis considerationem; ita contingit
quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, et tamen uno modo appetitur,
alio modo non appetitur. Beatitudo ergo potest considerari sub
ratione finalis boni et perfecti, quae est communis ratio
beatitudinis, et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas in
illud tendit, ut dictum est. Potest etiam considerari secundum
alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius operationis,
vel ex parte potentiae operativae, vel ex parte obiecti, et sic non
ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition of Happiness given by some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled"
                     is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of
                     all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing
                     satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if
                     we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to
                     Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such
                     things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that
                     are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to
                     include perfect Happiness---that he "desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit,
                     that "happy is he who has all he desires."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33740] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ista definitio beatitudinis quam quidam posuerunt,
beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, vel, cui omnia optata
succedunt, quodam modo intellecta, est bona et sufficiens; alio
vero modo, est imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter de
omnibus quae vult homo naturali appetitu, sic verum est quod qui
habet omnia quae vult, est beatus, nihil enim satiat naturalem
hominis appetitum, nisi bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo. Si
vero intelligatur de his quae homo vult secundum apprehensionem
rationis, sic habere quaedam quae homo vult, non pertinet ad
beatitudinem, sed magis ad miseriam inquantum huiusmodi habita
impediunt hominem ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult, sicut
etiam ratio accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione
veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus addidit ad
perfectionem beatitudinis, quod nihil mali velit. Quamvis primum
posset sufficere, si recte intelligeretur, scilicet quod beatus est
qui habet omnia quae vult.</p></div></div></div></div>


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