Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies + "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of + those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, + i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions. +
+[33404] +Iª-IIae pr. Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo +factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem +significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se +potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de +Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius +voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de +homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi +liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.
In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance + towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end + of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness. +
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?
(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?
(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?
(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?
(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?
(7) Whether all men have the same last end?
(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
+[33405] +Iª-IIae q. 1 pr. Ubi primo considerandum occurrit +de ultimo fine humanae vitae; et deinde de his per quae homo ad +hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab eo deviare, ex fine enim +oportet accipere rationes eorum quae ordinantur ad finem. Et quia +ultimus finis humanae vitae ponitur esse beatitudo, oportet primo +considerare de ultimo fine in communi; deinde de beatitudine. Circa +primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum hominis sit agere propter +finem. Secundo, utrum hoc sit proprium rationalis naturae. Tertio, +utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem a fine. Quarto, utrum sit +aliquis ultimus finis humanae vitae. Quinto, utrum unius hominis +possint esse plures ultimi fines. Sexto, utrum homo ordinet omnia +in ultimum finem. Septimo, utrum idem sit finis ultimus omnium +hominum. Octavo, utrum in illo ultimo fine omnes aliae creaturae +conveniant.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, + implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; + since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end. +
[33406] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homini non conveniat agere propter +finem. Causa enim naturaliter prior est. Sed finis habet rationem +ultimi, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo finis non habet rationem causae. +Sed propter illud agit homo, quod est causa actionis, cum haec +praepositio propter designet habitudinem causae. Ergo homini non +convenit agere propter finem.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher + states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end. +
[33407] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod est ultimus finis, non est propter finem. Sed in +quibusdam actiones sunt ultimus finis; ut patet per philosophum in +I Ethic. Ergo non omnia homo agit propter finem.
+ Objection 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, + sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, + while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end. +
[33408] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +tunc videtur homo agere propter finem, quando deliberat. Sed multa +homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil +cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum aliis intentus, +vel fricat barbam. Non ergo homo omnia agit propter finem.
+ On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations, + as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end. +
[33409] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +omnia quae sunt in aliquo genere, derivantur a principio illius +generis. Sed finis est principium in operabilibus ab homine; ut +patet per philosophum in II Physic. Ergo homini convenit omnia +agere propter finem.
+ I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational + animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is + master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty + and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed + from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly + "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are + caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore + all human actions must be for an end. +
[33410] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie +dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo. +Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod +est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur +proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus +suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et liberum arbitrium +esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones +proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt. +Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem +hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis +inquantum est homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae +procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui +obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet +quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this + way that it is a cause. +
[33411] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen +primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem +causae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is + voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it + is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will + to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is + color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible + object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action + be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, + is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action + in which the last end consists. +
[33412] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, oportet eam +esse voluntariam, alias non esset humana, ut dictum est. Actio +autem aliqua dupliciter dicitur voluntaria, uno modo, quia +imperatur a voluntate, sicut ambulare vel loqui; alio modo, quia +elicitur a voluntate, sicut ipsum velle. Impossibile autem est quod +ipse actus a voluntate elicitus sit ultimus finis. Nam obiectum +voluntatis est finis, sicut obiectum visus est color, unde sicut +impossibile est quod primum visibile sit ipsum videre, quia omne +videre est alicuius obiecti visibilis; ita impossibile est quod +primum appetibile, quod est finis, sit ipsum velle. Unde +relinquitur quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, quod ipsa +sit imperata a voluntate. Et ita ibi aliqua actio hominis, ad minus +ipsum velle, est propter finem. Quidquid ergo homo faciat, verum +est dicere quod homo agit propter finem, etiam agendo actionem quae +est ultimus finis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the + proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason. +
[33413] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non +procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est proprium principium +humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem +per rationem praestitutum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, + never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they + are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as + irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end. +
[33414] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod agere propter finem sit proprium +rationalis naturae. Homo enim, cuius est agere propter finem, +nunquam agit propter finem ignotum. Sed multa sunt quae non +cognoscunt finem, vel quia omnino carent cognitione, sicut +creaturae insensibiles; vel quia non apprehendunt rationem finis, +sicut bruta animalia. Videtur ergo proprium esse rationalis naturae +agere propter finem.
+ Objection 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong + to things that lack reason. +
[33415] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +agere propter finem est ordinare suam actionem ad finem. Sed hoc +est rationis opus. Ergo non convenit his quae ratione carent.
+ Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to + act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature. +
[33416] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas in ratione +est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo agere propter finem non est +nisi rationalis naturae.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end." +
[33417] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus probat in II Physic., quod non solum +intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem.
+ I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, + the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that + matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. + But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not + determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce + a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as + this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other + things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite." +
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, + moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end + through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, + move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the + "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by + another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything + to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument + to the principal agent, as stated above ( + FP, Q[22], A[2], ad 4; + FP, + Q[103], A[1] + , ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the + end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend + the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge. +
[33418] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem. +Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse +est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa +finalis. Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi +secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia +in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim +agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret +hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, +necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet +rationem finis. Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura +fit per rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis +fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. +Tamen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad +finem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo; +alio modo, sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit ad +determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam +actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa +movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum +arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quae +ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi +ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non cognoscant rationem +finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem +ab alio ordinantur. Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum +sicut instrumentum ad agens principale, ut supra habitum est. Et +ideo proprium est naturae rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se +agens vel ducens ad finem, naturae vero irrationalis, quasi ab alio +acta vel ducta, sive in finem apprehensum, sicut bruta animalia, +sive in finem non apprehensum, sicut ea quae omnino cognitione +carent.
+ Reply to Objection 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he + acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. + And it is thus with irrational creatures. +
[33419] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod homo, quando per seipsum agit propter finem, +cognoscit finem, sed quando ab alio agitur vel ducitur, puta cum +agit ad imperium alterius, vel cum movetur altero impellente, non +est necessarium quod cognoscat finem. Et ita est in creaturis +irrationalibus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that + which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason. +
[33420] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ordinare in finem est eius quod seipsum agit in +finem. Eius vero quod ab alio in finem agitur, est ordinari in +finem. Quod potest esse irrationalis naturae, sed ab aliquo +rationem habente.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack + reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, + determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor + of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular + departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some + rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will. +
[33421] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali. +Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et +intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale, sed est in eis +appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum +particulare. Manifestum autem est quod particulares causae moventur +a causa universali, sicut rector civitatis, qui intendit bonum +commune, movet suo imperio omnia particularia officia civitatis. Et +ideo necesse est quod omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur in fines +particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se extendit in +bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified + by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end. +
[33422] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humani non recipiant speciem a +fine. Finis enim est causa extrinseca. Sed unumquodque habet +speciem ab aliquo principio intrinseco. Ergo actus humani non +recipiunt speciem a fine.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore + a human act does not derive its species from the end. +
[33423] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod dat speciem, oportet esse prius. Sed finis est posterior +in esse. Ergo actus humanus non habet speciem a fine.
+ Objection 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. + Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts. +
[33424] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +idem non potest esse nisi in una specie. Sed eundem numero actum +contingit ordinari ad diversos fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem +actibus humanis.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy + of blame or praise." +
[33425] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de moribus Ecclesiae et +Manichaeorum, secundum quod finis est culpabilis vel laudabilis, +secundum hoc sunt opera nostra culpabilia vel laudabilia.
I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed + of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper + movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an + act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the + terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while + heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. + And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For + human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above + + (A[1]) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the + end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is + their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of + the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. + super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral + acts are the same as human acts. +
[33426] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non +secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et +forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc +etiam considerandum est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus +quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum +ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium +agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus. Unde calefactio +actio nihil aliud est quam motio quaedam a calore procedens, +calefactio vero passio nihil aliud est quam motus ad calorem, +definitio autem manifestat rationem speciei. Et utroque modo actus +humani, sive considerentur per modum actionum, sive per modum +passionum, a fine speciem sortiuntur. Utroque enim modo possunt +considerari actus humani, eo quod homo movet seipsum, et movetur a +seipso. Dictum est autem supra quod actus dicuntur humani, +inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata. Obiectum autem +voluntatis est bonum et finis. Et ideo manifestum est quod +principium humanorum actuum, inquantum sunt humani, est finis. Et +similiter est terminus eorundem, nam id ad quod terminatur actus +humanus, est id quod voluntas intendit tanquam finem; sicut in +agentibus naturalibus forma generati est conformis formae +generantis. Et quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, mores +proprie dicuntur humani, actus morales proprie speciem +sortiuntur ex fine, nam idem sunt actus morales et actus +humani.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just + this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, + considered as passion. +
[33427] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu, +quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum +est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad +actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus + that it gives the species to the human or moral act. +
[33428] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod finis secundum quod est prior in intentione, ut +dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat +speciem actui humano sive morali.
+ Reply to Objection 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has + its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, + that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill + a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as + to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts + in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement + does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus. + Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality. + Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered + in their moral species, and conversely. +
[33429] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab +agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet +speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus +est finis alterius. Possibile tamen est quod unus actus secundum +speciem naturae, ordinetur ad diversos fines voluntatis, sicut hoc +ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod est idem secundum speciem +naturae, potest ordinari sicut in finem ad conservationem +iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus +secundum speciem moris, quia uno modo erit actus virtutis, alio +modo erit actus vitii. Non enim motus recipit speciem ab eo quod +est terminus per accidens, sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per +se. Fines autem morales accidunt rei naturali; et e converso ratio +naturalis finis accidit morali. Et ideo nihil prohibet actus qui +sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse diversos secundum speciem +moris, et e converso.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, + as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse + some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is + an indefinite series of ends. +
[33430] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis ultimus finis humanae +vitae, sed procedatur in finibus in infinitum. Bonum enim, secundum +suam rationem, est diffusivum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. +de Div. Nom. Si ergo quod procedit ex bono, ipsum etiam est bonum, +oportet quod illud bonum diffundat aliud bonum, et sic processus +boni est in infinitum. Sed bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo in +finibus est processus in infinitum.
+ Objection 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the + same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire + of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends. +
[33431] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae sunt rationis, in infinitum multiplicari possunt, unde et +mathematicae quantitates in infinitum augentur. Species etiam +numerorum propter hoc sunt infinitae, quia, dato quolibet numero, +ratio alium maiorem excogitare potest. Sed desiderium finis +sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ergo videtur quod etiam in +finibus procedatur in infinitum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for + I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human + will, and there is no last end of the human will. +
[33432] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas infinities +potest reflecti supra seipsam, possum enim velle aliquid, et velle +me velle illud, et sic in infinitum. Ergo in finibus humanae +voluntatis proceditur in infinitum, et non est aliquis ultimus +finis humanae voluntatis.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good + is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore + it is necessary to fix one last end. +
[33433] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, II Metaphys., quod qui infinitum +faciunt, auferunt naturam boni. Sed bonum est quod habet +rationem finis. Ergo contra rationem finis est quod procedatur in +infinitum. Necesse est ergo ponere unum ultimum finem.
+ I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever + things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must + of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes + of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can + the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order + in ends---the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first. + For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you + remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein + operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention + is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, + on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any + action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are + ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely. +
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; + for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things + ordained to the end. +
[33434] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, per se loquendo, impossibile est in finibus +procedere in infinitum, ex quacumque parte. In omnibus enim quae +per se habent ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo, +removeantur ea quae sunt ad primum. Unde philosophus probat, in +VIII Physic., quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere +in infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo subtracto alia +movere non possunt, cum non moveant nisi per hoc quod moventur a +primo movente. In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet +ordo intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet +esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis +est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto principio, +appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in +executione, est unde incipit operatio, unde, isto principio +subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari. Principium autem +intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est +primum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile +est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil +appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret +intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad +finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur +consilium, sed in infinitum procederet. Ea vero quae non habent +ordinem per se, sed per accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil +prohibet infinitatem habere, causae enim per accidens +indeterminatae sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem +per accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good + has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that + from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And + this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is + infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its + effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the + First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely + but, as it is written ( + Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure." +
[33435] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod de ratione boni est quod aliquid ab ipso effluat, non +tamen quod ipsum ab alio procedat. Et ideo, cum bonum habeat +rationem finis, et primum bonum sit ultimus finis, ratio ista non +probat quod non sit ultimus finis; sed quod a fine primo supposito +procedatur in infinitum inferius versus ea quae sunt ad finem. Et +hoc quidem competeret, si consideraretur sola virtus primi boni, +quae est infinita. Sed quia primum bonum habet diffusionem secundum +intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam certam formam profluere in +causata; aliquis certus modus adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo +bono, a quo omnia alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et +ideo diffusio bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur +Sap. XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.
+ Reply to Objection 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore + the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process + of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally + connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is + accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing + hinders the reason from an indefinite process. +
[33436] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod in his quae sunt per se, ratio incipit a principiis +naturaliter notis, et ad aliquem terminum progreditur. Unde +philosophus probat, in I Poster., quod in demonstrationibus non est +processus in infinitum, quia in demonstrationibus attenditur ordo +aliquorum per se ad invicem connexorum, et non per accidens. In his +autem quae per accidens connectuntur, nihil prohibet rationem in +infinitum procedere. Accidit autem quantitati aut numero +praeexistenti, inquantum huiusmodi, quod ei addatur quantitas aut +unitas. Unde in huiusmodi nihil prohibet rationem procedere in +infinitum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact + that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times. +
[33437] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa multiplicatio actuum voluntatis reflexae supra +seipsam, per accidens se habet ad ordinem finium. Quod patet ex +hoc, quod circa unum et eundem finem indifferenter semel vel +pluries supra seipsam voluntas reflectitur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of + nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many + things. +
[33438] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit voluntatem unius hominis +in plura ferri simul, sicut in ultimos fines. Dicit enim +Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod quidam ultimum hominis finem +posuerunt in quatuor, scilicet in voluptate, in quiete, in +primis naturae, et in virtute. Haec autem manifeste sunt plura. +Ergo unus homo potest constituere ultimum finem suae voluntatis in +multis.
+ Objection 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition + to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others. +
[33439] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ea quae non opponuntur ad invicem, se invicem non excludunt. Sed +multa inveniuntur in rebus quae sibi invicem non opponuntur. Ergo +si unum ponatur ultimus finis voluntatis, non propter hoc alia +excluduntur.
+ Objection 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its + last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed + his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's + will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. +
[33440] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +voluntas per hoc quod constituit ultimum finem in aliquo, suam +liberam potentiam non amittit. Sed antequam constitueret ultimum +finem suum in illo, puta in voluptate, poterat constituere finem +suum ultimum in alio, puta in divitiis. Ergo etiam postquam +constituit aliquis ultimum finem suae voluntatis in voluptate, +potest simul constituere ultimum finem in divitiis. Ergo possibile +est voluntatem unius hominis simul ferri in diversa, sicut in +ultimos fines.
+ On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life. + Hence of gluttons it is written ( + Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to + Mat. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man + to have several last ends not ordained to one another. +
[33441] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, +illud in quo quiescit aliquis sicut in ultimo fine, hominis +affectui dominatur, quia ex eo totius vitae suae regulas accipit. +Unde de gulosis dicitur Philipp. III, quorum Deus venter +est, quia scilicet constituunt ultimum finem in deliciis +ventris. Sed sicut dicitur Matth. VI, nemo potest duobus dominis +servire, ad invicem scilicet non ordinatis. Ergo impossibile +est esse plures ultimos fines unius hominis ad invicem non +ordinatos.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be + assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which + he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean + now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be + complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to + desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite + so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good. +
The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in + the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must + needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last + end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one. +
The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above + (A[3]), they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in + a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus, + the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; + and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the + whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally + one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end. +
[33442] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se +habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos fines. Cuius ratio potest +triplex assignari. Prima est quia, cum unumquodque appetat suam +perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit, +ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus +dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod +consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit. +Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis +appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse +non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur. +Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic tendat appetitus, ac si +utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius. Secunda ratio est quia, sicut +in processu rationis principium est id quod naturaliter +cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est +voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur. +Hoc autem oportet esse unum, quia natura non tendit nisi ad unum. +Principium autem in processu rationalis appetitus est ultimus +finis. Unde oportet id in quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi +finis, esse unum. Tertia ratio est quia, cum actiones voluntarie ex +fine speciem sortiantur, sicut supra habitum est, oportet quod a +fine ultimo, qui est communis, sortiantur rationem generis, sicut +et naturalia ponuntur in genere secundum formalem rationem +communem. Cum igitur omnia appetibilia voluntatis, inquantum +huiusmodi, sint unius generis, oportet ultimum finem esse unum. Et +praecipue quia in quolibet genere est unum primum principium, +ultimus autem finis habet rationem primi principii, ut dictum est. +Sicut autem se habet ultimus finis hominis simpliciter ad totum +humanum genus, ita se habet ultimus finis huius hominis ad hunc +hominem. Unde oportet quod, sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter +unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine +statuatur.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end. +
[33443] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnia illa plura accipiebantur in ratione unius boni +perfecti ex his constituti, ab his qui in eis ultimum finem +ponebant.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's + perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection. +
[33444] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi plura accipi possint quae ad invicem +oppositionem non habeant, tamen bono perfecto opponitur quod sit +aliquid de perfectione rei extra ipsum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend + to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2). +
[33445] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod potestas voluntatis non habet ut faciat opposita esse +simul. Quod contingeret, si tenderet in plura disparata sicut in +ultimos fines, ut ex dictis patet.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are + said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains + not to the last end. +
[33446] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quaecumque homo vult, +propter ultimum finem velit. Ea enim quae ad finem ultimum +ordinantur, seriosa dicuntur, quasi utilia. Sed iocosa a seriis +distinguuntur. Ergo ea quae homo iocose agit, non ordinat in +ultimum finem.
+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. + Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, + for the last end. +
[33447] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in principio Metaphys., quod scientiae +speculativae propter seipsas quaeruntur. Nec tamen potest dici quod +quaelibet earum sit ultimus finis. Ergo non omnia quae homo +appetit, appetit propter ultimum finem.
+ Objection 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all + that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end. +
[33448] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quicumque ordinat aliquid in finem aliquem, cogitat de illo fine. +Sed non semper homo cogitat de ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit +aut facit. Non ergo omnia homo appetit aut facit propter ultimum +finem.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we + love it for its own sake." +
[33449] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, illud est finis boni +nostri, propter quod amantur cetera, illud autem propter +seipsum.
+ I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because + whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last + end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained + to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. + Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, + because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is + clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects + of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end. +
[33450] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat +propter ultimum finem. Et hoc apparet duplici ratione. Primo +quidem, quia quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni. Quod +quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis, +necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper +inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet +tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et +ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem +consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem. Secundo, quia ultimus +finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in +aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae +secundae moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo +movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in +ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford + him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end. +
[33451] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod actiones ludicrae non ordinantur ad aliquem finem +extrinsecum; sed tamen ordinantur ad bonum ipsius ludentis, prout +sunt delectantes vel requiem praestantes. Bonum autem consummatum +hominis est ultimus finis eius.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good, + which is the ultimate end. +
[33452] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 2 Et similiter +dicendum ad secundum, de scientia speculativa; quae appetitur ut +bonum quoddam speculantis, quod comprehenditur sub bono completo et +perfecto, quod est ultimus finis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention, + which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts + be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every + step. +
[33453] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine, +quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae +intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet +appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non +cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet +passu cogitet de fine.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end + of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end. +
[33454] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium hominum sit unus finis +ultimus. Maxime enim videtur hominis ultimus finis esse +incommutabile bonum. Sed quidam avertuntur ab incommutabili bono, +peccando. Non ergo omnium hominum est unus ultimus finis.
+ Objection 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not + have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false. +
[33455] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +secundum ultimum finem tota vita hominis regulatur. Si igitur esset +unus ultimus finis omnium hominum, sequeretur quod in hominibus non +essent diversa studia vivendi. Quod patet esse falsum.
+ Objection 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, + yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end. +
[33456] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +finis est actionis terminus. Actiones autem sunt singularium. +Homines autem, etsi conveniant in natura speciei, tamen differunt +secundum ea quae ad individua pertinent. Non ergo omnium hominum +est unus ultimus finis.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness. +
[33457] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., quod omnes homines +conveniunt in appetendo ultimum finem, qui est beatitudo.
+ I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing + in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since + all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated + above + (A[5]). But as to the thing in which this aspect is + realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; + others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to + others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in + which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed + affections desires for his last end. +
[33458] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod de ultimo fine possumus loqui dupliciter, uno modo, +secundum rationem ultimi finis; alio modo, secundum id in quo finis +ultimi ratio invenitur. Quantum igitur ad rationem ultimi finis, +omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi, quia omnes appetunt suam +perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis, ut dictum est. +Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines +conveniunt in ultimo fine, nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam +consummatum bonum, quidam autem voluptatem, quidam vero quodcumque +aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile est dulce, sed quibusdam +maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini, quibusdam dulcedo mellis, aut +alicuius talium. Illud tamen dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius +delectabile, in quo maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et +similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam +ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the + last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things. +
[33459] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere +invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis +intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end. +
[33460] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod diversa studia vivendi contingunt in hominibus +propter diversas res in quibus quaeritur ratio summi boni.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above + + (A[5]). +
[33461] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi actiones sint singularium, tamen primum +principium agendi in eis est natura, quae tendit ad unum, ut dictum +est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e. + God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end. +
[33462] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in ultimo fine hominis etiam omnia +alia conveniant. Finis enim respondet principio. Sed illud quod est +principium hominum, scilicet Deus, est etiam principium omnium +aliorum. Ergo in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia communicant.
+ Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's + last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things, + too, concur in man's last end. +
[33463] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom., quod Deus convertit +omnia ad seipsum, tanquam ad ultimum finem. Sed ipse est etiam +ultimus finis hominis, quia solo ipso fruendum est, ut Augustinus +dicit. Ergo in fine ultimo hominis etiam alia conveniunt.
+ Objection 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of + all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end. +
[33464] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +finis ultimus hominis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed obiectum +voluntatis est bonum universale, quod est finis omnium. Ergo +necesse est quod in ultimo fine hominis omnia conveniant.
+ On the contrary, man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible + for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end. +
[33465] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod ultimus finis hominum est beatitudo; quam omnes appetunt, +ut Augustinus dicit. Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia +ut beata sint, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium +quaest. Non ergo in ultimo fine hominis alia conveniunt.
+ I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself + in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of + a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money + as "thing," or possession of money as "use." +
[33466] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic. et in V +Metaphys., finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo, idest +ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius +rei. Sicut si dicamus quod motus corporis gravis finis est vel +locus inferior ut res, vel hoc quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut +usus, et finis avari est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniae +ut usus.
If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, + since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of + the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their + last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in + so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know. +
Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam +rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia +conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum +rerum. Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad +consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant +creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae +consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non +competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum +participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel +vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.
Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.
[33467] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.
We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?
(5) Whether in any good of the body?
+[33468] +Iª-IIae q. 2 pr. Deinde considerandum est de +beatitudine, nam beatitudo nominat adeptionem ultimi finis. Primo +quidem, in quibus sit; secundo, quid sit; tertio, qualiter eam +consequi possimus. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum +beatitudo consistat in divitiis. Secundo, utrum in honoribus. +Tertio, utrum in fama, sive in gloria. Quarto, utrum in potestate. +Quinto, utrum in aliquo corporis bono. Sexto, utrum in voluptate. +Septimo, utrum in aliquo bono animae. Octavo, utrum in aliquo bono +creato.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which + has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written ( + Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth. +
[33469] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in divitiis +consistat. Cum enim beatitudo sit ultimus finis hominis, in eo +consistit quod maxime in hominis affectu dominatur. Huiusmodi autem +sunt divitiae, dicitur enim Eccle. X, pecuniae obediunt +omnia. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo hominis consistit.
+ Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good + things." Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, + that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth. +
[33470] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., beatitudo est status omnium +bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed in pecuniis omnia possideri +videntur, quia, ut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., ad hoc nummus est +inventus, ut sit quasi fideiussor habendi pro eo quodcumque homo +voluerit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.
+ Objection 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more + than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" ( + Eccles. 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth. +
[33471] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +desiderium summi boni, cum nunquam deficiat, videtur esse +infinitum. Sed hoc maxime in divitiis invenitur, quia avarus non +implebitur pecunia, ut dicitur Eccle. V. Ergo in divitiis +beatitudo consistit.
+ On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines + in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness + does not consist in wealth. +
[33472] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +bonum hominis in retinendo beatitudinem magis consistit quam in +emittendo ipsam. Sed sicut Boetius in II de Consol. dicit, +divitiae effundendo, magis quam coacervando, melius nitent, +siquidem avaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit. Ergo +in divitiis beatitudo non consistit.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), + viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, + clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, + but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things + salable. +
Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of + something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man + as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to + Ps. 8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet." +
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, + by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of + the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth. +
[33473] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in divitiis +consistere. Sunt enim duplices divitiae, ut philosophus dicit in I +Polit., scilicet naturales, et artificiales. Naturales quidem +divitiae sunt, quibus homini subvenitur ad defectus naturales +tollendos, sicut cibus, potus, vestimenta, vehicula et habitacula, +et alia huiusmodi. Divitiae autem artificiales sunt, quibus +secundum se natura non iuvatur, ut denarii; sed ars humana eos +adinvenit propter facilitatem commutationis, ut sint quasi mensura +quaedam rerum venalium. Manifestum est autem quod in divitiis +naturalibus beatitudo hominis esse non potest. Quaeruntur enim +huiusmodi divitiae propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam +hominis, et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis +ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem. Unde in ordine naturae omnia +huiusmodi sunt infra hominem, et propter hominem facta; secundum +illud Psalmi VIII, omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius. +Divitiae autem artificiales non quaeruntur nisi propter naturales, +non enim quaererentur, nisi quia per eas emuntur res ad usum vitae +necessariae. Unde multo minus habent rationem ultimi finis. +Impossibile est igitur beatitudinem, quae est ultimus finis +hominis, in divitiis esse.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which + can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as + it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable. +
[33474] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad +multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae +pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet +sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus, sicut et iudicium de saporibus +ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written ( + Prov. 17:16): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom." +
[33475] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod pecunia possunt haberi omnia venalia, non autem +spiritualia, quae vendi non possunt. Unde dicitur Proverb. XVII, +quid prodest stulto divitias habere, cum sapientiam emere non +possit?
+ Reply to Objection 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial + wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear + (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly + the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things + despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written ( + Ecclus. 24:29): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is + the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words ( + Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason + of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, + and the sovereign good does not consist therein. +
[33476] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus, +quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus +divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit +concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per +philosophum in I Polit. Aliter tamen est infinitum desiderium +divitiarum, et desiderium summi boni. Nam summum bonum quanto +perfectius possidetur, tanto ipsummet magis amatur, et alia +contemnuntur, quia quanto magis habetur, magis cognoscitur. Et ideo +dicitur Eccli. XXIV, qui edunt me, adhuc esurient. Sed in +appetitu divitiarum, et quorumcumque temporalium bonorum, est e +converso, nam quando iam habentur, ipsa contemnuntur, et alia +appetuntur; secundum quod significatur Ioan. IV, cum dominus dicit, +qui bibit ex hac aqua, per quam temporalia significantur, +sitiet iterum. Et hoc ideo, quia eorum insufficientia magis +cognoscitur cum habentur. Et ideo hoc ipsum ostendit eorum +imperfectionem, et quod in eis summum bonum non consistit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor. +
[33477] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in honoribus +consistat. Beatitudo enim, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis, +ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed honor maxime videtur esse id +quod est virtutis praemium, ut philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Ergo +in honore maxime consistit beatitudo.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect + good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says ( + 1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor. +
[33478] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud quod convenit Deo et excellentissimis, maxime videtur esse +beatitudo, quae est bonum perfectum. Sed huiusmodi est honor, ut +philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Et etiam I Tim. I, dicit apostolus, +soli Deo honor et gloria. Ergo in honore consistit +beatitudo.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers + loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor. +
[33479] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +illud quod est maxime desideratum ab hominibus, est beatitudo. Sed +nihil videtur esse magis desiderabile ab hominibus quam honor, quia +homines patiuntur iacturam in omnibus aliis rebus ne patiantur +aliquod detrimentum sui honoris. Ergo in honore beatitudo +consistit.
+ On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the + person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor. +
[33480] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur, +sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut +philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Ergo in honore beatitudo non +consistit.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and + consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, + especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share + of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot + principally consist therein. +
[33481] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem consistere in honore. +Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et +ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est +in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum +beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum; et secundum partes +eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis +participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, +sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive + honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness + itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition. +
[33482] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, honor non est +praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt +honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, quasi a non habentibus aliquid +maius ad dandum. Verum autem praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo, +propter quam virtuosi operantur. Si autem propter honorem +operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that + honor makes them excellent. +
[33483] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod honor debetur Deo et excellentissimis, in signum vel +testimonium excellentiae praeexistentis, non quod ipse honor faciat +eos excellentes.
+ Reply to Objection 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated + above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or + happy. +
[33484] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex naturali desiderio beatitudinis, quam consequitur +honor, ut dictum est, contingit quod homines maxime honorem +desiderant. Unde quaerunt homines maxime honorari a sapientibus, +quorum iudicio credunt se esse excellentes vel felices.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints + for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says ( + Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore + happiness consists in glory. +
[33485] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in gloria. +In eo enim videtur beatitudo consistere, quod redditur sanctis pro +tribulationibus quas in mundo patiuntur. Huiusmodi autem est +gloria, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, non sunt condignae +passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam, quae revelabitur in +nobis. Ergo beatitudo consistit in gloria.
+ Objection 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge + of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory + consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory. +
[33486] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +bonum est diffusivum sui, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Sed per gloriam bonum hominis maxime diffunditur in notitiam +aliorum, quia gloria, ut Ambrosius dicit, nihil aliud est quam +clara cum laude notitia. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in +gloria.
+ Objection 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity + after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your + fame in future time." Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory. +
[33487] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo est stabilissimum bonorum. Hoc autem videtur esse fama +vel gloria, quia per hanc quodammodo homines aeternitatem +sortiuntur. Unde Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., vos +immortalitatem vobis propagare videmini, cum futuri famam temporis +cogitatis. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in fama seu +gloria.
+ On the contrary, Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe + their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, + must needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory. +
[33488] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +beatitudo est verum hominis bonum. Sed famam seu gloriam contingit +esse falsam, ut enim dicit Boetius, in libro III de Consol., +plures magnum saepe nomen falsis vulgi opinionibus abstulerunt. +Quo quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur, +suis ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant. Non ergo beatitudo +hominis consistit in fama seu gloria.
+ I answer that, Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [*Augustine, + Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for + human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection + of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human + knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness + itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends + on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; + according to + Ps. 90:15,16: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with + length of days, and I will show him my salvation." +
Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. + For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it + is written ( + 2 Cor. 10:18): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth." +
[33489] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in fama seu +gloria humana consistere. Nam gloria nihil aliud est quam clara +notitia cum laude, ut Ambrosius dicit. Res autem cognita aliter +comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem +divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina +cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum. Unde perfectio humani boni, +quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed +magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo +causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta. Et +ideo in fama vel in gloria non potest consistere hominis beatitudo. +Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et +ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut +ex causa sua, secundum illud Psalmi XC, eripiam eum, et +glorificabo eum, longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam illi +salutare meum. Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana +notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus +contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter +humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius +gloria semper vera est. Propter quod dicitur, II ad Cor. X, ille +probatus est, quem Deus commendat.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence + it is written ( + Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins + Mk. 8:38 with + Lk. 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory]. +
[33490] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de gloria quae est ab +hominibus, sed de gloria quae est a Deo coram Angelis eius. Unde +dicitur Marc. VIII, filius hominis confitebitur eum in gloria +patris sui, coram Angelis eius.
+ Reply to Objection 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived + from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, + it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that + fame can nowise make man happy. +
[33491] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est +in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod +derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit +beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam. Si autem cognitio falsa sit, +non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama +celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere +hominem beatum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But + happiness endures of itself, and for ever. +
[33492] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de +facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per +accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first + beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture + they are called "gods" ( + Ex. 22:28), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness consists in power. +
[33493] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in potestate. +Omnia enim appetunt assimilari Deo, tanquam ultimo fini et primo +principio. Sed homines qui in potestatibus sunt, propter +similitudinem potestatis, maxime videntur esse Deo conformes, unde +et in Scriptura dii vocantur, ut patet Exod. XXII, diis non +detrahes. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.
+ Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to + those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power. +
[33494] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Sed perfectissimum est quod homo +etiam alios regere possit, quod convenit his qui in potestatibus +sunt constituti. Ergo beatitudo consistit in potestate.
+ Objection 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than + aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power. +
[33495] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo, cum sit maxime appetibilis, opponitur ei quod maxime est +fugiendum. Sed homines maxime fugiunt servitutem, cui contraponitur +potestas. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.
+ On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man cannot + relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who + is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?" +
[33496] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, +beatitudo est perfectum bonum. Sed potestas est maxime imperfecta. +Ut enim dicit Boetius, III de Consol., potestas humana +sollicitudinum morsus expellere, formidinum aculeos vitare nequit. +Et postea, potentem censes cui satellites latus ambiunt qui quos +terret, ipse plus metuit? Non igitur beatitudo consistit in +potestate.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, + as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good + and evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, + which is by virtue, rather than in power itself. +
Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, + since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and + in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having + gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may + still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since + happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written + ( + Eccles. 5:12) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because + man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained + thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for + which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing. +
[33497] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere, +propter duo. Primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii, +ut patet in V Metaphys. Beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi +finis. Secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum. +Beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum. Unde magis +posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est +per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate. Possunt autem quatuor +generales rationes induci ad ostendendum quod in nullo praemissorum +exteriorum bonorum beatitudo consistat. Quarum prima est quia, cum +beatitudo sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod +malum. Omnia autem praedicta possunt inveniri et in bonis et in +malis. Secunda ratio est quia, cum de ratione beatitudinis sit quod +sit per se sufficiens, ut patet in I Ethic., necesse est quod, +beatitudine adepta, nullum bonum homini necessarium desit. Adeptis +autem singulis praemissorum, possunt adhuc multa bona homini +necessaria deesse, puta sapientia, sanitas corporis, et huiusmodi. +Tertia, quia, cum beatitudo sit bonum perfectum, ex beatitudine non +potest aliquod malum alicui provenire. Quod non convenit +praemissis, dicitur enim Eccle. V, quod divitiae interdum +conservantur in malum domini sui; et simile patet in aliis tribus. +Quarta ratio est quia ad beatitudinem homo ordinatur per principia +interiora, cum ad ipsam naturaliter ordinetur. Praemissa autem +quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a +fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in +praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it + is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also. +
[33498] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua +potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. +Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo +quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad +bonitatem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes + a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil. +
[33499] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut optimum est quod aliquis utatur bene potestate +in regimine multorum, ita pessimum est si male utatur. Et ita +potestas se habet et ad bonum et ad malum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme + good consists in power. +
[33500] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod servitus est impedimentum boni usus potestatis, et +ideo naturaliter homines eam fugiunt, et non quasi in potestate +hominis sit summum bonum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written ( + Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore + it consists in the health of the body. +
[33501] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in bonis +corporis. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, non est census supra censum +salutis corporis. Sed in eo quod est optimum, consistit +beatitudo. Ergo consistit in corporis salute.
+ Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. + But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it + seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness. +
[33502] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod esse est melius quam +vivere, et vivere melius quam alia quae consequuntur. Sed ad esse +et vivere hominis requiritur salus corporis. Cum ergo beatitudo sit +summum bonum hominis, videtur quod salus corporis maxime pertineat +ad beatitudinem.
+ Objection 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the + greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so + the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into + all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that + which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the + health of the body. +
[33503] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ab altiori principio dependet +quia quanto causa est superior, tanto eius virtus ad plura se +extendit. Sed sicut causalitas causae efficientis consideratur +secundum influentiam, ita causalitas finis attenditur secundum +appetitum. Ergo sicut prima causa efficiens est quae in omnia +influit, ita ultimus finis est quod ab omnibus desideratur. Sed +ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab omnibus. Ergo in his quae +pertinent ad esse hominis, sicut est salus corporis, maxime +consistit eius beatitudo.
+ On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, + by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist + in goods of the body. +
[33504] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, +secundum beatitudinem homo excellit omnia alia animalia. Sed +secundum bona corporis, a multis animalibus superatur, sicut ab +elephante in diuturnitate vitae, a leone in fortitudine, a cervo in +cursu. Ergo beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a + thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain + does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as + its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer + its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to + Ecclus. 15:14: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to + something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation + of man's being. +
Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could not be said + that the end of man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body + depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above ( + FP, Q[75], A[2]); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts + them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the + soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body. +
[33505] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in bonis +corporis consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia impossibile +est quod illius rei quae ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, ultimus +finis sit eiusdem conservatio in esse. Unde gubernator non +intendit, sicut ultimum finem, conservationem navis sibi commissae; +eo quod navis ad aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, scilicet ad +navigandum. Sicut autem navis committitur gubernatori ad +dirigendum, ita homo est suae voluntati et rationi commissus; +secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XV, Deus ab initio constituit +hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Manifestum est +autem quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem, non enim homo +est summum bonum. Unde impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis +et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse. Secundo quia, +dato quod finis rationis et voluntatis humanae esset conservatio +humani esse, non tamen posset dici quod finis hominis esset aliquod +corporis bonum. Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et +quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae +non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est; ipsumque corpus est +propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumenta +propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones exerceat. Unde omnia bona +corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde +impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae +est ultimus hominis finis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it + is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good + of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods. +
[33506] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut corpus ordinatur ad animam sicut ad finem, ita +bona exteriora ad ipsum corpus. Et ideo rationabiliter bonum +corporis praefertur bonis exterioribus, quae per censum +significantur, sicut et bonum animae praefertur omnibus bonis +corporis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes + all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which + does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident + that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. + Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than + living things. +
[33507] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in +se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus +subsequentibus, sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia +subsequentia. Et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur +ipsum esse prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non +capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum, +sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum +esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius +ibidem dicit quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et +intelligentia viventibus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom + every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living + being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few. +
[33508] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia finis respondet principio, ex illa ratione +probatur quod ultimus finis est primum principium essendi, in quo +est omnis essendi perfectio, cuius similitudinem appetunt, secundum +suam proportionem, quaedam quidem secundum esse tantum, quaedam +secundum esse vivens, quaedam secundum esse vivens et intelligens +et beatum. Et hoc paucorum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something + else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what + is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight. +
[33509] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in voluptate +consistat. Beatitudo enim, cum sit ultimus finis, non appetitur +propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam. Sed hoc maxime convenit +delectationi, ridiculum est enim ab aliquo quaerere propter quid +velit delectari, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo beatitudo maxime +in voluptate et delectatione consistit.
+ Objection 2: Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the + end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion + of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes + him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness, + consists principally in pleasure. +
[33510] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2 +Praeterea, causa prima vehementius imprimit quam secunda, ut +dicitur in libro de causis. Influentia autem finis attenditur +secundum eius appetitum. Illud ergo videtur habere rationem finis +ultimi, quod maxime movet appetitum. Hoc autem est voluptas, cuius +signum est quod delectatio intantum absorbet hominis voluntatem et +rationem, quod alia bona contemnere facit. Ergo videtur quod +ultimus finis hominis, qui est beatitudo, maxime in voluptate +consistat.
+ Objection 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, + and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists + in pleasure. +
[33511] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +cum appetitus sit boni, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse +optimum. Sed delectationem omnia appetunt, et sapientes et +insipientes, et etiam ratione carentia. Ergo delectatio est +optimum. Consistit ergo in voluptate beatitudo, quae est summum +bonum.
+ On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had + a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy + too." +
[33512] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., tristes exitus esse +voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget. +Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes +quoque beatae esse dicantur.
+ I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), + although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains + to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and + another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper + accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has + some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, + is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least + apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, + but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident. +
But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, + which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, + cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which + is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul + which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form + is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. + Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, + which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite + number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through + being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence + it is written ( + Wis. 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor + a proper accident of happiness. +
[33513] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae +sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum, ut dicitur VII +Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus +tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit. Quia in unaquaque re +aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium +accidens ipsius, sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal +rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile. Est igitur +considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens +quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex +hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi +conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria. Bonum +autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis +beatitudo si autem sit imperfectum est quaedam beatitudinis +participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde +manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio quae consequitur bonum +perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis; sed quoddam consequens +ad ipsam sicut per se accidens. Voluptas autem corporalis non +potest etiam modo praedicto sequi bonum perfectum. Nam sequitur +bonum quod apprehendit sensus, qui est virtus animae corpore utens. +Bonum autem quod pertinet ad corpus, quod apprehenditur secundum +sensum, non potest esse perfectum hominis bonum. Cum enim anima +rationalis excedat proportionem materiae corporalis, pars animae +quae est ab organo corporeo absoluta, quandam habet infinitatem +respectu ipsius corporis et partium animae corpori concretarum, +sicut immaterialia sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium, +eo quod forma per materiam quodammodo contrahitur et finitur, unde +forma a materia absoluta est quodammodo infinita. Et ideo sensus, +qui est vis corporalis, cognoscit singulare, quod est determinatum +per materiam, intellectus vero, qui est vis a materia absoluta, +cognoscit universale, quod est abstractum a materia, et continet +sub se infinita singularia. Unde patet quod bonum conveniens +corpori, quod per apprehensionem sensus delectationem corporalem +causat, non est perfectum bonum hominis, sed est minimum quiddam in +comparatione ad bonum animae. Unde Sap. VII, dicitur quod omne +aurum, in comparatione sapientiae, arena est exigua. Sic igitur +neque voluptas corporalis est ipsa beatitudo, nec est per se +accidens beatitudinis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus + it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as + good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the + final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight + is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, + and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired. +
[33514] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod eiusdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod +appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus +in bono, sicut ex eadem virtute naturae est quod grave feratur +deorsum, et quod ibi quiescat. Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum +appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud +appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam +formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis +propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis +obiectum, et per consequens est principium eius, et dat ei formam, +ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono +desiderato.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles + of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority. +
[33515] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit +ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae +cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus +delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, + as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight + results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good. +
[33516] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod eo modo omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et +appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem appetunt ratione boni, et +non e converso, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod delectatio +sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio +consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id +quod est per se et maximum bonum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: + external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of + the body, as shown above ( + AA[4],5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul. +
[33517] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in aliquo bono +animae. Beatitudo enim est quoddam hominis bonum. Hoc autem per +tria dividitur, quae sunt bona exteriora, bona corporis, et bona +animae. Sed beatitudo non consistit in bonis exterioribus, neque in +bonis corporis, sicut supra ostensum est. Ergo consistit in bonis +animae.
+ Objection 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom + we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself + more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all + else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, + however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul. +
[33518] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud cui appetimus aliquod bonum, magis amamus quam bonum quod ei +appetimus, sicut magis amamus amicum cui appetimus pecuniam, quam +pecuniam. Sed unusquisque quodcumque bonum sibi appetit. Ergo +seipsum amat magis quam omnia alia bona. Sed beatitudo est quod +maxime amatur, quod patet ex hoc quod propter ipsam omnia alia +amantur et desiderantur. Ergo beatitudo consistit in aliquo bono +ipsius hominis. Sed non in bonis corporis. Ergo in bonis +animae.
+ Objection 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness + is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above + (A[5]). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul. +
[33519] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +perfectio est aliquid eius quod perficitur. Sed beatitudo est +quaedam perfectio hominis. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid hominis. Sed +non est aliquid corporis, ut ostensum est. Ergo beatitudo est +aliquid animae. Et ita consistit in bonis animae.
+ On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake." + But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists + in no good of the soul. +
[33520] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra, +sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., id in quo +constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est. Sed homo +non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est +diligendum propter Deum. Ergo in nullo bono animae beatitudo +consistit.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[1], A[8]), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession + of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something + belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing + actually, from being potentially + knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its + fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last + end. +
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is + the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent + to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end. +
But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself + desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness + through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; + but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something + belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul. +
[33521] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur, +scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio +aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis +quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem, +impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel +aliquid eius. Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in +potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de +potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter +actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est +secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis. +Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius. +Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive +habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum +perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est +voluntas, est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens +ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens +particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus +finis hominis. Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad +ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei +quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid +hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem +consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo +beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit, sed huius rei adeptio +vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid +animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra +animam.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or + act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes + happiness is a good of the soul. +
[33522] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, secundum quod sub illa divisione comprehenduntur +omnia bona quae homini sunt appetibilia, sic bonum animae dicitur +non solum potentia aut habitus aut actus, sed etiam obiectum, quod +est extrinsecum. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere id in quo +beatitudo consistit, esse quoddam bonum animae.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved + as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both + cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when + we treat of Charity. +
[33523] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum, quantum ad propositum pertinet, quod beatitudo maxime +amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui +concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est +eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiae aliquid +homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi cum de caritate +agetur.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, + viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above. +
[33524] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam +animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod +scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut dictum est.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites + the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches + the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, + as stated in + FP, Q[111], A[1], it seems that man's + happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel. +
[33525] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo +bono creato. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod +divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum, ex +quo potest accipi quod summum inferioris naturae sit attingere +infimum naturae superioris. Sed summum hominis bonum est beatitudo. +Cum ergo Angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, ut in primo +habitum est; videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in hoc quod +aliquo modo attingit ad Angelum.
+ Objection 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for + its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. + viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures. +
[33526] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ultimus finis cuiuslibet rei est in suo perfecto, unde pars est +propter totum, sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas +creaturarum, quae dicitur maior mundus, comparatur ad hominem, qui +in VIII Physic. dicitur minor mundus, sicut perfectum ad +imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in tota universitate +creaturarum.
+ Objection 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good + surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, + it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness. +
[33527] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +per hoc homo efficitur beatus, quod eius naturale desiderium +quietat. Sed naturale desiderium hominis non extenditur ad maius +bonum quam quod ipse capere potest. Cum ergo homo non sit capax +boni quod excedit limites totius creaturae, videtur quod per +aliquod bonum creatum homo beatus fieri possit. Et ita beatitudo +hominis in aliquo bono creato consistit.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it + is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' ( + Ps. 143:15)." +
[33528] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, ut vita carnis anima +est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est; de quo dicitur, beatus +populus cuius dominus Deus eius.
+ I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite + altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of + man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that + naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any + creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will + of man, according to the words of + Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness. +
[33529] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo +bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter +quietat appetitum, alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc +restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est +appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus +est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare +voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in +aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet +bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere +potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, qui replet in bonis +desiderium tuum. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis +consistit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as + in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the + blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good. +
[33530] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod superius hominis attingit quidem infimum angelicae +naturae per quandam similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in +ultimo fine, sed procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fontem boni, +qui est universale obiectum beatitudinis omnium beatorum, tanquam +infinitum et perfectum bonum existens.
+ Reply to Objection 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, + but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is + ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself. +
[33531] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed +ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum +totum, sed aliquid aliud. Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam +comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed +ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non +est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is + less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an + angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good. +
[33532] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est +capax ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis, est tamen minus quam bonum +cuius est capax ut obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod +participatur ab Angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum et +contractum.
We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?
(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?
(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?
(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?
(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?
+[33533] +Iª-IIae q. 3 pr. Deinde considerandum est quid sit +beatitudo; et quae requirantur ad ipsam. Circa primum quaeruntur +octo. Primo, utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Secundo, si est +aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio. Tertio, utrum sit operatio +sensitivae partis, an intellectivae tantum. Quarto, si est operatio +intellectivae partis, utrum sit operatio intellectus, an +voluntatis. Quinto, si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio +intellectus speculativi, aut practici. Sexto, si est operatio +intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat in speculatione +scientiarum speculativarum. Septimo, utrum consistat in +speculatione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet Angelorum. Octavo, +utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per essentiam videtur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God + is happiness itself." +
[33534] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Dicit +enim Boetius, in III de Consol., Deum esse ipsam beatitudinem +necesse est confiteri.
+ Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several + supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God. +
[33535] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum +ergo non sint plura summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem +quod Deus.
+ Objection 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an + end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same + as God. +
[33536] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter humana voluntas +tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam in finem tendere debet +nisi in Deum; quo solo fruendum est, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo +beatitudo est idem quod Deus.
+ On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): + "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated. +
[33537] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, +nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo hominis est aliquid +factum, quia secundum Augustinum, I de Doctr. Christ., illis +rebus fruendum est, quae nos beatos faciunt. Ergo beatitudo non +est aliquid increatum.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[1], A[8]; + Q[2], A[7]), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly + there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser + is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, + then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. + But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment + or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause + or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something + created. +
[33538] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dicitur dupliciter. +Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis +pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut +fruitio eius rei quae desideratur, sicut si dicatur quod possessio +pecuniae est finis avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis +intemperati. Primo ergo modo, ultimus hominis finis est bonum +increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest +voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo, ultimus +finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est +aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem finis +vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum +ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum, si autem +consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est +aliquid creatum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. + On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by + participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created. +
[33539] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per +adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed +per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem dicit +Boetius, per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem +dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo +dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good. +
[33540] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum hominis bonum, quia est +adeptio vel fruitio summi boni.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end. +
[33541] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus finis, per modum quo +adeptio finis dicitur finis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says ( + Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being + of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation. +
[33542] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo non sit operatio. Dicit enim +apostolus, Rom. VI, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem, +finem vero vitam aeternam. Sed vita non est operatio, sed ipsum +esse viventium. Ergo ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo, non est +operatio.
+ Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But + state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. +
[33543] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod beatitudo est status +omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed status non nominat +operationem. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.
+ Objection 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of + operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness + is not an operation. +
[33544] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo significat aliquid in beato existens, cum sit ultima +perfectio hominis. Sed operatio non significat ut aliquid existens +in operante, sed magis ut ab ipso procedens. Ergo beatitudo non est +operatio.
+ Objection 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation. +
[33545] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +beatitudo permanet in beato. Operatio autem non permanet, sed +transit. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.
+ Objection 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation. +
[33546] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, +unius hominis est una beatitudo. Operationes autem sunt multae. +Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.
+ Objection 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, + or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. +
[33547] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6 Praeterea, +beatitudo inest beato absque interruptione. Sed operatio humana +frequenter interrumpitur puta somno, vel aliqua alia occupatione, +vel quiete. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.
+ On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." +
[33548] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod felicitas est +operatio secundum virtutem perfectam.
+ I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness + is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. + Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore + the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has + a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, + too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an + operation. +
[33549] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum +in ipso existens necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit +operatio. Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque +autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine +actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu +hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus +actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a philosopho nominatur, in +II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans, +sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis +quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem, +ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis +operationem esse.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown + ( + Q[2] , A[5]) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that + His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is + made actual: thus we speak of active and + contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from + Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." +
[33550] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsum esse +viventis. Et sic beatitudo non est vita, ostensum est enim quod +esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, non est hominis beatitudo; +solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Alio modo dicitur vita +ipsa operatio viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum +reducitur, et sic nominamus vitam activam, vel contemplativam, vel +voluptuosam. Et hoc modo vita aeterna dicitur ultimus finis. Quod +patet per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut +cognoscant te, Deum verum unum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and + he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that + the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing + by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of + operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7). +
[33551] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod Boetius, definiendo beatitudinem, consideravit ipsam +communem beatitudinis rationem. Est enim communis ratio +beatitudinis quod sit bonum commune perfectum; et hoc significavit +cum dixit quod est status omnium bonorum aggregatione +perfectus, per quod nihil aliud significatur nisi quod beatus +est in statu boni perfecti. Sed Aristoteles expressit ipsam +essentiam beatitudinis, ostendens per quid homo sit in huiusmodi +statu, quia per operationem quandam. Et ideo in I Ethic. ipse etiam +ostendit quod beatitudo est bonum perfectum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to + cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but + rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, + to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the + agent. And such an operation can be happiness. +
[33552] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio. Una +quae procedit ab operante in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et +secare. Et talis operatio non potest esse beatitudo, nam talis +operatio non est actio et perfectio agentis, sed magis patientis, +ut ibidem dicitur. Alia est actio manens in ipso agente, ut +sentire, intelligere et velle, et huiusmodi actio est perfectio et +actus agentis. Et talis operatio potest esse beatitudo.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees + of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His + very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect + of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this + operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection + is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, + is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect + happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), + says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised + us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" ( + Mat. 22:30). +
[33553] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum beatitudo dicat quandam ultimam perfectionem, +secundum quod diversae res beatitudinis capaces ad diversos gradus +perfectionis pertingere possunt, secundum hoc necesse est quod +diversimode beatitudo dicatur. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per +essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur +alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio +secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et +haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem, +secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum +operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec +continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia +operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu +praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest. +Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac +vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem +dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, +quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII. +Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam, cessat obiectio, quia +una et continua et sempiterna operatione in illo beatitudinis statu +mens hominis Deo coniungetur. Sed in praesenti vita, quantum +deficimus ab unitate et continuitate talis operationis, tantum +deficimus a beatitudinis perfectione. Est tamen aliqua participatio +beatitudinis, et tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis +continua et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa +occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita +contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum, idest circa veritatis +contemplationem. Et si aliquando homo actu non operetur huiusmodi +operationem, tamen quia in promptu habet eam semper operari; et +quia etiam ipsam cessationem, puta somni vel occupationis alicuius +naturalis, ad operationem praedictam ordinat; quasi videtur +operatio continua esse.
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will + be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity + and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness: + and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, + which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the + contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn + to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the + latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident. +
[33554] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 5 Et per hoc +patet solutio ad quintum, et ad sextum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man + than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive: + since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses + also. +
[33555] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat etiam in +operatione sensus. Nulla enim operatio invenitur in homine nobilior +operatione sensitiva, nisi intellectiva. Sed operatio intellectiva +dependet in nobis ab operatione sensitiva, quia non possumus +intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo +beatitudo consistit etiam in operatione sensitiva.
+ Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But + some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses + is needed for happiness. +
[33556] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod beatitudo est status +omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed quaedam bona sunt +sensibilia, quae attingimus per sensus operationem. Ergo videtur +quod operatio sensus requiratur ad beatitudinem.
+ Objection 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected + thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation + is required for happiness. +
[33557] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo est bonum perfectum, ut probatur in I Ethic., quod non +esset, nisi homo perficeretur per ipsam secundum omnes partes suas. +Sed per operationes sensitivas quaedam partes animae perficiuntur. +Ergo operatio sensitiva requiritur ad beatitudinem.
+ On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore + happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation. +
[33558] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, +in operatione sensitiva communicant nobiscum bruta animalia. Non +autem in beatitudine. Ergo beatitudo non consistit in operatione +sensitiva.
+ I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of + sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated + Good, Which is his last end, as shown above + (A[1]): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q[2], A[5]), + man's happiness + does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses. +
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect + of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation + of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very + happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a + certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of + the resurrection (SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. +
[33559] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ad beatitudinem potest aliquid pertinere tripliciter, +uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo, antecedenter; tertio modo, +consequenter. Essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio +sensus ad beatitudinem. Nam beatitudo hominis consistit +essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est +ultimus finis, ut supra ostensum est, cui homo coniungi non potest +per sensus operationem. Similiter etiam quia, sicut ostensum est, +in corporalibus bonis beatitudo hominis non consistit, quae tamen +sola per operationem sensus attingimus. Possunt autem operationes +sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter. +Antecedenter quidem, secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in +praesenti vita haberi potest, nam operatio intellectus praeexigit +operationem sensus. Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta +beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem, ex +ipsa beatitudine animae, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad +Dioscorum, fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et in sensus +corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur; ut infra +magis patebit, cum de resurrectione agetur. Non autem tunc operatio +qua mens humana Deo coniungetur, a sensu dependebit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had + in this life. +
[33560] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod obiectio illa probat quod operatio sensus requiritur +antecedenter ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita haberi +potest.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source + of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods + that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life. +
[33561] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod beatitudo perfecta, qualem Angeli habent, habet +congregationem omnium bonorum per coniunctionem ad universalem +fontem totius boni; non quod indigeat singulis particularibus +bonis. Sed in hac beatitudine imperfecta, requiritur congregatio +bonorum sufficientium ad perfectissimam operationem huius +vitae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in + the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection + of the higher part. +
[33562] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in +inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori. In beatitudine autem +imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris +partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness + consists in peace; wherefore it is written ( + Ps. 147:3): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in + the will. +
[33563] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu +voluntatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod beatitudo +hominis in pace consistit, unde in Psalmo CXLVII, qui posuit fines +tuos pacem. Sed pax ad voluntatem pertinet. Ergo beatitudo hominis +in voluntate consistit.
+ Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation + of the will. +
[33564] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo +beatitudo in operatione voluntatis consistit.
+ Objection 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of + the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, + as we shall state further on ( + Q[9], AA[1],3). Therefore happiness regards the will. +
[33565] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +primo moventi respondet ultimus finis, sicut ultimus finis totius +exercitus est victoria, quae est finis ducis, qui omnes movet. Sed +primum movens ad operandum est voluntas, quia movet alias vires, ut +infra dicetur. Ergo beatitudo ad voluntatem pertinet.
+ Objection 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an + act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares + ( + 1 Cor. 13). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will. +
[33566] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, +si beatitudo est aliqua operatio, oportet quod sit nobilissima +operatio hominis. Sed nobilior operatio est dilectio Dei, quae est +actus voluntatis, quam cognitio, quae est operatio intellectus, ut +patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo videtur quod beatitudo +consistat in actu voluntatis.
+ Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And + a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, + and such a man already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will. +
[33567] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod beatus est qui habet +omnia quae vult, et nihil vult male. Et post pauca subdit, +propinquat beato qui bene vult quodcumque vult, bona enim beatum +faciunt, quorum bonorum iam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam +voluntatem. Ergo beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistit.
+ On the contrary, Our Lord said ( + Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A[2], + ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect. +
[33568] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut +cognoscant te, Deum verum unum. Vita autem aeterna est ultimus +finis, ut dictum est. Ergo beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei +consistit, quae est actus intellectus.
+ I answer that, As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that + is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, + it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said ( + AA[1],2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the + attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when + it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is + not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; + and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present + to + him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will. +
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the + covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains + it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible + end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to + us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained. +
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness + pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy + itself is the consummation of happiness. +
[33569] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ad beatitudinem, sicut supra dictum est, duo +requiruntur, unum quod est essentia beatitudinis; aliud quod est +quasi per se accidens eius, scilicet delectatio ei adiuncta. Dico +ergo quod, quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, +impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis. Manifestum est +enim ex praemissis quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi. +Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis. +Voluntas enim fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et +praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur. Manifestum est +autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est +motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod +finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit +praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid +aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens +volenti. Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim +consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a principio +cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando vult eam habere. Sed a +principio quidem est absens ei; consequitur autem ipsam per hoc +quod manu ipsam apprehendit, vel aliquo huiusmodi; et tunc iam +delectatur in pecunia habita. Sic igitur et circa intelligibilem +finem contingit. Nam a principio volumus consequi finem +intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens +nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit +in fine iam adepto. Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu +intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio +beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X +Confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate; quia scilicet +ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent + thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent + inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest. +
[33570] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod pax pertinet ad ultimum hominis finem, non quasi +essentialiter sit ipsa beatitudo; sed quia antecedenter et +consequenter se habet ad ipsam. Antecedenter quidem, inquantum iam +sunt remota omnia perturbantia, et impedientia ab ultimo fine. +Consequenter vero, inquantum iam homo, adepto ultimo fine, remanet +pacatus, suo desiderio quietato.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, + from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it + as its act. +
[33571] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod primum obiectum voluntatis non est actus eius sicut +nec primum obiectum visus est visio, sed visibile. Unde ex hoc ipso +quod beatitudo pertinet ad voluntatem tanquam primum obiectum eius, +sequitur quod non pertineat ad ipsam tanquam actus ipsius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the + will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment. +
[33572] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas, +tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati +debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet +delectatio vel fruitio.
+ Reply to Objection 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," + as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we + first attain a sensible end by an act of sense. +
[33573] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed +cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur +nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin. Et ideo +intelligibilem finem primo attingimus per actionem intellectus; +sicut et finem sensibilem primo attingimus per actionem sensus.
+ Reply to Objection 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the + act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will + is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement + is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus + "quality." +
[33574] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod ille qui habet omnia quae vult, ex hoc est beatus, +quod habet ea quae vult, quod quidem est per aliud quam per actum +voluntatis. Sed nihil male velle requiritur ad beatitudinem sicut +quaedam debita dispositio ad ipsam. Voluntas autem bona ponitur in +numero bonorum quae beatum faciunt, prout est inclinatio quaedam in +ipsa, sicut motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, ut alteratio ad +qualitatem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming + like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative + intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect + rather than of the speculative. +
[33575] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in operatione +intellectus practici. Finis enim ultimus cuiuslibet creaturae +consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed homo magis assimilatur Deo +per intellectum practicum, qui est causa rerum intellectarum, quam +per intellectum speculativum, cuius scientia accipitur a rebus. +Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus +practici quam speculativi.
+ Objection 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative + intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, + but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding. + Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather + than of the speculative. +
[33576] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est perfectum hominis bonum. Sed intellectus practicus +magis ordinatur ad bonum quam speculativus, qui ordinatur ad verum. +Unde et secundum perfectionem practici intellectus, dicimur boni, +non autem secundum perfectionem speculativi intellectus, sed +secundum eam dicimur scientes vel intelligentes. Ergo beatitudo +hominis magis consistit in actu intellectus practici quam +speculativi.
+ Objection 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas + the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's + happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative. +
[33577] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo est quoddam bonum ipsius hominis. Sed speculativus +intellectus occupatur magis circa ea quae sunt extra hominem, +practicus autem intellectus occupatur circa ea quae sunt ipsius +hominis, scilicet circa operationes et passiones eius. Ergo +beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus +practici quam intellectus speculativi.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting + perfection of our joys." +
[33578] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod contemplatio +promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio +gaudiorum.
+ I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. + First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is + that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is + the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative + intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And + since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation + is most proper to man and most delightful to him. +
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical + intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently + it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect. +
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above + him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other + animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly. +
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect + happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human + actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8. +
[33579] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi +intellectus quam practici. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex +hoc quod, si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit +optima operatio hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quae est +optimae potentiae respectu optimi obiecti. Optima autem potentia +est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod +quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi. Unde +in tali operatione, scilicet in contemplatione divinorum, maxime +consistit beatitudo. Et quia unusquisque videtur esse id quod +est optimum in eo, ut dicitur in IX et X Ethic., ideo talis +operatio est maxime propria homini, et maxime delectabilis. Secundo +apparet idem ex hoc quod contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter +seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter +seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad +aliquem finem. Unde manifestum est quod ultimus finis non potest +consistere in vita activa, quae pertinet ad intellectum practicum. +Tertio idem apparet ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo +communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus +per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam +activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant, +licet imperfectae. Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae +expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione. +Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem +et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in +operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones +humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in + relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union + and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, + which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative + knowledge. +
[33580] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod similitudo praedicta intellectus practici ad Deum, +est secundum proportionalitatem; quia scilicet se habet ad suum +cognitum, sicut Deus ad suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus +speculativi ad Deum, est secundum unionem vel informationem; quae +est multo maior assimilatio. Et tamen dici potest quod, respectu +principalis cogniti, quod est sua essentia, non habet Deus +practicam cognitionem, sed speculativam tantum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. + the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the + practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto. +
[33581] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est +extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso, +scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit +perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus, quod quidem +intellectus practicus non habet sed ad illud ordinat.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and + passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by + an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect + rather than of the practical intellect. +
[33582] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsemet homo esset ultimus +finis suus, tunc enim consideratio et ordinatio actuum et passionum +eius esset eius beatitudo. Sed quia ultimus hominis finis est +aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem +intellectus speculativi attingimus; ideo magis beatitudo hominis in +operatione intellectus speculativi consistit, quam in operatione +intellectus practici.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. + i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than + three speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative + sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative + sciences. +
[33583] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in +consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Philosophus enim dicit, +in libro Ethic., quod felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam +virtutem. Et distinguens virtutes, non ponit speculativas nisi +tres, scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum; quae omnes pertinent ad +considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo ultima hominis +beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum +consistit.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative + sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated + that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative + sciences. +
[33584] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud videtur esse ultima hominis beatitudo, quod naturaliter +desideratur ab omnibus propter seipsum. Sed huiusmodi est +consideratio speculativarum scientiarum, quia, ut dicitur in I +Metaphys., omnes homines natura scire desiderant; et post +pauca subditur quod speculativae scientiae propter seipsas +quaeruntur. Ergo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum +consistit beatitudo.
+ Objection 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to + act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the + consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists. +
[33585] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem +perficitur secundum quod reducitur de potentia in actum. +Intellectus autem humanus reducitur in actum per considerationem +scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo videtur quod in huiusmodi +consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final + happiness does not consist in the consideration of these. +
[33586] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, non glorietur sapiens in sapientia +sua; et loquitur de sapientia speculativarum scientiarum. Non +ergo consistit in harum consideratione ultima hominis +beatitudo.
+ I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are + to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, + but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to + be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed + of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence. +
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we + must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: + since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received + through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at + the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther + than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge + of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher. + Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not + perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human + intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which + is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But + it has been shown ( + FP, Q[88], A[2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of + separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the + consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, + so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness. +
[33587] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis +beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem +intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram +beatitudinis rationem, beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non +attingit, sed participat quandam particularem beatitudinis +similitudinem. Sicut perfecta prudentia invenitur in homine, apud +quem est ratio rerum agibilium, imperfecta autem prudentia est in +quibusdam animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares +instinctus ad quaedam opera similia operibus prudentiae. Perfecta +igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum +essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se +extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in +principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima +autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta; +ut patet per philosophum in principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster. +Unde tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra +extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In cognitione +autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo, +quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab +aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua +participatio superioris. Manifestum est autem quod forma lapidis, +vel cuiuslibet rei sensibilis, est inferior homine. Unde per formam +lapidis non perficitur intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed +inquantum in ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est +supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel +aliquid huiusmodi. Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad id +quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per +cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum. +Ostensum est autem quod per sensibilia non potest deveniri in +cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quae sunt supra intellectum +humanum. Unde relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit +esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in +formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum +substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est +quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.
+ Reply to Objection 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2], + ad 4). +
[33588] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod philosophus loquitur in libro Ethicorum de felicitate +imperfecta, qualiter in hac vita haberi potest, ut supra dictum +est.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof. +
[33589] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo, +sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect + act. +
[33590] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum +reducitur intellectus noster aliquo modo in actum, non autem in +ultimum et completum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in + a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of + angels"; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore + it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels. +
[33591] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in +cognitione substantiarum separatarum, idest Angelorum. Dicit enim +Gregorius, in quadam homilia, nihil prodest interesse festis +hominum, si non contingat interesse festis Angelorum; per quod +finalem beatitudinem designat. Sed festis Angelorum interesse +possumus per eorum contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod in +contemplatione Angelorum ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.
+ Objection 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect + figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, + as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels. +
[33592] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +ultima perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est ut coniungatur suo +principio, unde et circulus dicitur esse figura perfecta, quia +habet idem principium et finem. Sed principium cognitionis humanae +est ab ipsis Angelis, per quos homines illuminantur, ut dicit +Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo perfectio humani intellectus +est in contemplatione Angelorum.
+ Objection 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to + the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection + of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation. +
[33593] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +unaquaeque natura perfecta est, quando coniungitur superiori +naturae, sicut ultima perfectio corporis est ut coniungatur naturae +spirituali. Sed supra intellectum humanum, ordine naturae, sunt +Angeli. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani est ut coniungatur +per contemplationem ipsis Angelis.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's final glory or happiness + consists only in the knowledge of God. +
[33594] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur, +scire et nosse me. Ergo ultima hominis gloria, vel beatitudo, +non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei.
+ I answer that, As stated above + (A[6]), man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so + by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of + that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has + participated truth, does not perfect the + intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); + whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone + is His Being His Essence, as shown in the + FP, Q[44], A[1]. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain + imperfect happiness in the + contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science. +
[33595] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta hominis beatitudo non +consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius +participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale. Manifestum +est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius +potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius +potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid +ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit +intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem eadem sit +dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, ut dicitur in II +Metaphys.; quaecumque sunt entia per participationem, sunt vera per +participationem. Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius +Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde +relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius +contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem +imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione Angelorum; et +etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum +speculativarum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself. +
[33596] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod festis Angelorum intererimus non solum contemplantes +Angelos, sed simul cum ipsis, Deum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should + consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as + stated in + FP, Q[90], A[3]. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation + of the soul and of its + enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the + FP, Q[111], A[2], ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness. +
[33597] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum illos qui ponunt animas humanas esse ab +Angelis creatas, satis conveniens videtur quod beatitudo hominis +sit in contemplatione Angelorum, quasi in coniunctione ad suum +principium. Sed hoc est erroneum, ut in primo dictum est. Unde +ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per coniunctionem ad Deum, +qui est primum principium et creationis animae et illuminationis +eius. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in primo habitum +est. Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem +perveniat, non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's + final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained + by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object. +
[33598] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit +dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum potentiae participantis, et +sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad +contemplandum sicut Angeli contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum +attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet +potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui +obiecti.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. + i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which + is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does + not consist in God being seen in His Essence. +
[33599] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione +ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. Myst. +Theol., quod per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo +coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam, +non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu +beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam +videtur.
+ Objection 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the + Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something + less. +
[33600] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio +divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima +perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra +subsistit.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + 1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is." +
[33601] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, +et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est.
+ I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points + must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, + that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing + is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the + intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of + some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect + cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause + is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire + to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning + of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, + and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease + until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause. +
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the + perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek + the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very + Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in + which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above ( + AA[1],7; Q[2], A[8]). +
[33602] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in +visione divinae essentiae. Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda +sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu +restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est, quod +uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui +obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest +essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit +perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei. +Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus, +per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur +de causa quid est; non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam +simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an +sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit +effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid +est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, +ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens +eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, +quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista +inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam +causae. Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam +alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum +perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet +ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est +perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod +intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic +perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in +quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness. +
[33603] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in +via, tendentes ad beatitudinem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ( + Q[1], A[8]), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the + end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ( + Q[1], A[8]). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, + according to their respective + habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than + that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not. +
[33604] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi +dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam quae desideratur, et hoc +modo idem est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, immo omnium +rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem +huius rei, et sic diversus est finis superioris et inferioris +naturae, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur +altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis, +quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.
We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?
(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?
(3) Whether comprehension is required?
(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?
(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?
+[33605] +Iª-IIae q. 4 pr. Deinde, considerandum est de his +quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. +Primo, utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem. Secundo, quid +sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum delectatio vel visio. +Tertio, utrum requiratur comprehensio. Quarto, utrum requiratur +rectitudo voluntatis. Quinto, utrum ad beatitudinem hominis +requiratur corpus. Sexto, utrum perfectio corporis. Septimo, utrum +aliqua exteriora bona. Octavo, utrum requiratur societas +amicorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward + of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing + besides vision is required for happiness. +
[33606] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non requiratur ad +beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod visio +est tota merces fidei. Sed id quod est praemium vel merces +virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo +nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio.
+ Objection 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which + needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ( + Q[3], A[8]); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness. +
[33607] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut philosophus dicit +I Ethic. Quod autem eget aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens. +Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut +ostensum est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur +delectatio.
+ Objection 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of + the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness. +
[33608] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non +impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed delectatio impedit actionem +intellectus corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in +VI Ethic. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth." +
[33609] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod beatitudo est +gaudium de veritate.
+ I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary + for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from + without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat + is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is + caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of + the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight. +
[33610] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo, +sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina +requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut +anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans +extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto +modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor +requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad +beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus +requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam +adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione +concomitante.
+ Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. + Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward. +
[33611] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas +merentis requiescit, quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione +mercedis redditae delectatio includitur.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight. +
[33612] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille +qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in + Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is + extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we + are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to + one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is + contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect. +
[33613] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus, non +impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur, in X Ethic., ea +enim quae delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius +operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quandoque +quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea +in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et dum uni vehementer +intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur. Quandoque +autem etiam ex contrarietate, sicut delectatio sensus contraria +rationi, impedit aestimationem prudentiae magis quam aestimationem +speculativi intellectus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). + But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision. +
[33614] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in +beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic., +est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili. +Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est +visio.
+ Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the + delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation + of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks + before the operation of the intellect, which is vision. +
[33615] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est potius. Sed +operationes appetuntur propter delectationem ipsarum, unde et +natura operationibus necessariis ad conservationem individui et +speciei, delectationem apposuit, ut huiusmodi operationes ab +animalibus non negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in +beatitudine quam operatio intellectus, quae est visio.
+ Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, + as the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision. +
[33616] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive fruitio, caritati. +Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit apostolus I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo +delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione.
+ On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight. +
[33617] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, +causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo +visio est potior quam delectatio.
+ I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, + the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of + the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. + If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness + of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, + which has been disproved above ( + Q[1], A[1], ad 2; + Q[3], A[4]): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation + in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein. +
[33618] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et +eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex +necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit +potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam +quietatione voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, +non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo +voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis +procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter +quietationem, sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est +contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione, +quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius +bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio +voluntatis in ipso.
+ Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. + Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own + species. +
[33619] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, delectatio +perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem, qui est ad +iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio +concomitans visionem; non sicut perfectio faciens visionem esse in +sua specie perfectam.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And + consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But + the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed + to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the + Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things + not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite. +
[33620] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem +rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est +delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in +animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed +intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius +consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum +quam delectationem. Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est +institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non +est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem +sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus +intellectivi.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good + gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made + present to charity. +
[33621] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod caritas non quaerit bonum dilectum propter +delectationem, sed hoc est ei consequens, ut delectetur in bono +adepto quod amat. Et sic delectatio non respondet ei ut finis, sed +magis visio, per quam primo finis fit ei praesens.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. + xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is + without comprehension. +
[33622] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur +comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, +attingere mente Deum magna est beatitudo, comprehendere autem +est impossibile. Ergo sine comprehensione est beatitudo.
+ Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect + and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will + by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. +
[33623] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum intellectivam partem, in +qua non sunt aliae potentiae quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in +primo dictum est. Sed intellectus sufficienter perficitur per +visionem Dei, voluntas autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non +requiritur comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium.
+ Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal + objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for + comprehension as a third. +
[33624] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes autem determinantur +secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum, +verum correspondet visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi. +Ergo non requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium.
+ On the contrary, The Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says ( + 2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a + crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness. +
[33625] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, sic currite ut +comprehendatis. Sed spiritualis cursus terminatur ad +beatitudinem, unde ipse dicit, II ad Tim. ult., bonum certamen +certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo reposita est +mihi corona iustitiae. Ergo comprehensio requiritur ad +beatitudinem.
+ I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the + way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly + through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: + through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, + by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is + present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it: + and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the + attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and + this + relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect + knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight + in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; + to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; + and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved. +
[33626] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum beatitudo consistat in consecutione ultimi +finis, ea quae requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex +ipso ordine hominis ad finem. Ad finem autem intelligibilem +ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per +voluntatem. Per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu +praeexistit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem, +primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in +aliquid, secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum, +quae quidem potest esse triplex. Quandoque enim amatum est praesens +amanti, et tunc iam non quaeritur. Quandoque autem non est +praesens, sed impossibile est ipsum adipisci, et tunc etiam non +quaeritur. Quandoque autem possibile est ipsum adipisci, sed est +elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis, ita ut statim haberi non +possit, et haec est habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quae sola +habitudo facit finis inquisitionem. Et istis tribus respondent +aliqua in ipsa beatitudine. Nam perfecta cognitio finis respondet +imperfectae; praesentia vero ipsius finis respondet habitudini +spei; sed delectatio in fine iam praesenti consequitur dilectionem, +ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria +concurrere, scilicet visionem, quae est cognitio perfecta +intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae importat praesentiam +finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quae importat quietationem +rei amantis in amato.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by + the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means + nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend + [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense + comprehension is necessary for Happiness. +
[33627] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, inclusio +comprehensi in comprehendente, et sic omne quod comprehenditur a +finito, est finitum. Unde hoc modo Deus non potest comprehendi ab +aliquo intellectu creato. Alio modo comprehensio nihil aliud +nominat quam tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae, +sicut aliquis consequens aliquem, dicitur eum comprehendere quando +tenet eum. Et hoc modo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while + not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes + therein. +
[33628] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut ad voluntatem pertinet spes et amor, quia +eiusdem est amare aliquid et tendere in illud non habitum; ita +etiam ad voluntatem pertinet et comprehensio et delectatio, quia +eiusdem est habere aliquid et quiescere in illo.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision + itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension. +
[33629] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod comprehensio non est aliqua operatio praeter +visionem, sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem iam habitum. Unde etiam +ipsa visio, vel res visa secundum quod praesentialiter adest, est +obiectum comprehensionis.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation + of the intellect, as stated above ( + Q[3], A[4]). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation + of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none + but the clean of + heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude + of the will is not necessary for Happiness. +
[33630] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectitudo voluntatis non requiratur ad +beatitudinem. Beatitudo enim essentialiter consistit in operatione +intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ad perfectam intellectus +operationem non requiritur rectitudo voluntatis, per quam homines +mundi dicuntur, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Retract., non +approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus qui non nisi mundos verum scire +voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa +scire vera. Ergo rectitudo voluntatis non requiritur ad +beatitudinem.
+ Objection 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the + will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will. +
[33631] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +prius non dependet a posteriori. Sed operatio intellectus est prior +quam operatio voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo, quae est perfecta +operatio intellectus, non dependet a rectitudine voluntatis.
+ Objection 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, + after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, + Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary. +
[33632] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quod ordinatur ad aliquid tanquam ad finem, non est necessarium +adepto iam fine, sicut navis postquam pervenitur ad portum. Sed +rectitudo voluntatis, quae est per virtutem, ordinatur ad +beatitudinem tanquam ad finem. Ergo, adepta beatitudine, non est +necessaria rectitudo voluntatis.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and ( + Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God." +
[33633] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum +videbunt. Et Heb. XII, pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et +sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum.
+ I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the + will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared + to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except + it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without + rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above ( + Q[3], A[8]), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of + him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him + who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this + is precisely what makes the will + right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will. +
[33634] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et +antecedenter et concomitanter. Antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo +voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum. Finis autem +comparatur ad id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad materiam. +Unde sicut materia non potest consequi formam, nisi sit debito modo +disposita ad ipsam, ita nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit debito +modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad beatitudinem +pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis. Concomitanter +autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo ultima consistit in +visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et ita +voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, +sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex +necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam +novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde +manifestum est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta +voluntate.
Reply to Objection 1: +What's said by Augustine concerns cognition of a truth which is not + the very essence of happiness.
[33635] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de cognitione veri quod non est +ipsa essentia bonitatis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the + intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of + the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target. +
[33636] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu +intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis +actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum +intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis +praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad +percussionem signi.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, + such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order + to the end is necessary. +
[33637] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod non omne quod ordinatur ad finem, cessat adveniente +fine, sed id tantum quod se habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut +motus. Unde instrumenta motus non sunt necessaria postquam +pervenitur ad finem, sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection + of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of + nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore + the soul cannot be happy without the body. +
[33638] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur corpus. +Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae praesupponit perfectionem +naturae. Sed beatitudo est perfectio virtutis et gratiae. Anima +autem sine corpore non habet perfectionem naturae, cum sit pars +naturaliter humanae naturae, omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo +toto separata. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.
+ Objection 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above ( + Q[3], AA[2],5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, + therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate + from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body. +
[33639] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est operatio quaedam perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed +operatio perfecta sequitur esse perfectum, quia nihil operatur nisi +secundum quod est ens in actu. Cum ergo anima non habeat esse +perfectum quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec aliqua pars +quando separata est a toto; videtur quod anima sine corpore non +possit esse beata.
+ Objection 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in + the soul separated from the body. +
[33640] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima sine corpore non est +homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest esse in anima sine corpore.
+ Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is + "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the + soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all + its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the + soul cannot be happy without the body. +
[33641] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, +secundum philosophum, in VII Ethic., felicitatis operatio, in qua +consistit beatitudo, est non impedita. Sed operatio animae +separatae est impedita, quia, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad +Litt., inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi, +quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in +illud summum caelum, idest in visionem essentiae divinae. Ergo +anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.
+ Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires + to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the + body. +
[33642] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, +beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat desiderium. Sed hoc non +convenit animae separatae, quia adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut +Augustinus dicit. Ergo anima separata a corpore non est beata.
+ Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy. +
[33643] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6 Praeterea, +homo in beatitudine est Angelis aequalis. Sed anima sine corpore +non aequatur Angelis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo non est beata.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord." +
[33644] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Apoc. XIV, beati mortui qui in domino +moriuntur.
+ I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. + Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an + operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without + a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the + FP, + Q[84], AA[6] + ,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, + which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and + have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, + when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by + reason. By authority, since the Apostle says ( + 2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we + walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the + vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are + in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: + "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is + evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is + true Happiness. +
Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, + wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the + FP, Q[84], A[7]. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the + FP, Q[12], A[3]. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the + body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy. +
We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence + thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body + and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection + of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the + more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, + Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead + separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either + for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body." +
[33645] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae habetur in +hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in Dei visione consistit. +Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de +necessitate requiritur corpus. Est enim beatitudo huius vitae +operatio intellectus, vel speculativi vel practici. Operatio autem +intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non +est nisi in organo corporeo, ut in primo habitum est. Et sic +beatitudo quae in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex +corpore. Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quae in Dei visione +consistit, aliqui posuerunt quod non potest animae advenire sine +corpore existenti; dicentes quod animae sanctorum a corporibus +separatae, ad illam beatitudinem non perveniunt usque ad diem +iudicii, quando corpora resument. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum +et auctoritate, et ratione. Auctoritate quidem, quia apostolus +dicit, II ad Cor. V, quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a +domino; et quae sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens, +per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Ex quo apparet +quod quandiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per speciem, carens +visione divinae essentiae, nondum est Deo praesens. Animae autem +sanctorum a corporibus separatae, sunt Deo praesentes, unde +subditur, audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus peregrinari +a corpore, et praesentes esse ad dominum. Unde manifestum est +quod animae sanctorum separatae a corporibus, ambulant per speciem, +Dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo. Hoc etiam per +rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget +corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem +intelligibilem contuetur, ut in primo dictum est. Manifestum est +autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in +primo ostensum est. Unde, cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta +hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta +hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata. Sed +sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid +pertinet. Uno modo, ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut anima +requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad +perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse eius, sicut pulchritudo +corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis. +Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae +non pertineat, pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio +dependeat ex natura rei, quando anima perfectior erit in sua +natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua +felicitas consistit. Unde Augustinus, in XII super Gen. ad Litt., +cum quaesivisset, utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus +possit summa illa beatitudo praeberi, respondet quod non sic +possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti Angeli vident; +sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia est in eis naturalis +quidam appetitus corpus administrandi.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs + of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection + in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the + form of the body. +
[33646] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio animae ex parte intellectus, +secundum quem anima transcendit corporis organa, non autem secundum +quod est forma naturalis corporis. Et ideo illa naturae perfectio +manet secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur, licet non maneat illa +naturae perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual + part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when + the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from + that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the + composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and + this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the + FP, Q[75], A[2]. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a + perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature. +
[33647] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliae partes. Nam +esse totius non est alicuius suarum partium, unde vel pars omnino +desinit esse, destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo +animali; vel, si remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars +lineae habet aliud esse quam tota linea. Sed animae humanae remanet +esse compositi post corporis destructionem, et hoc ideo, quia idem +est esse formae et materia, et hoc est esse compositi. Anima autem +subsistit in suo esse, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur +quod post separationem a corpore perfectum esse habeat, unde et +perfectam operationem habere potest; licet non habeat perfectam +naturam speciei.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. + Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction. +
[33648] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod beatitudo est hominis secundum intellectum, et ideo, +remanente intellectu, potest inesse ei beatitudo. Sicut dentes +Aethiopis possunt esse albi, etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos +Aethiops dicitur albus.
+ Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such + a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is + hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible + with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is + that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. + For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And + therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in + such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share. +
[33649] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, per +modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris, et +tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per +modum cuiusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet +quidquid ad omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur, et tale +impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae +perfectioni ipsius. Et sic separatio a corpore dicitur animam +retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae essentiae. +Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur +ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile. Et ideo quandiu +ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo +quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum +corpus pertingere.
+ Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices + its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that + it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent. +
[33650] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex +parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui +sufficit. Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia +illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet. +Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed +extensive.
+ Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is + not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the + higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: + because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever + will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not. +
[33651] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 6 Ad sextum +dicendum quod id quod ibidem dicitur, quod spiritus defunctorum +non sic vident Deum sicut Angeli, non est intelligendum +secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis, quia etiam modo aliquae animae +beatorum sunt assumptae ad superiores ordines Angelorum, clarius +videntes Deum quam inferiores Angeli. Sed intelligitur secundum +inaequalitatem proportionis, quia Angeli, etiam infimi, habent +omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt habituri, non autem +animae separatae sanctorum.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily + good. But it has been shown above ( + Q[2]) that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness. +
[33652] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio corporis non requiratur ad +beatitudinem hominis perfectam. Perfectio enim corporis est quoddam +corporale bonum. Sed supra ostensum est quod beatitudo non +consistit in corporalibus bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non +requiritur aliqua perfecta dispositio corporis.
+ Objection 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not + part in this operation, as shown above + (A[5]). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness. +
[33653] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinae essentiae, ut +ostensum est. Sed ad hanc operationem nihil exhibet corpus, ut +dictum est. Ergo nulla dispositio corporis requiritur ad +beatitudinem.
+ Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in + the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, + in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness. +
[33654] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a corpore, tanto perfectius +intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit in perfectissima operatione +intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus modis animam esse abstractam a +corpore. Nullo ergo modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad +beatitudinem.
+ On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written ( + Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy + God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written ( + Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of + the body is + necessary for Happiness. +
[33655] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, +praemium virtutis est beatitudo, unde dicitur Ioan. XIII, beati +eritis, si feceritis ea. Sed sanctis repromittitur pro praemio +non solum visio Dei et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona +dispositio, dicitur enim Isaiae ult., videbitis, et gaudebit cor +vestrum, et ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt. Ergo bona +dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.
+ I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity + required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect + virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue. +
But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that + it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words + of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable. + For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the + soul to exclude its natural perfection. +
Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that + Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, + that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the + mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no + longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile + was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this + too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that + from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature." +
[33656] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac +vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate +requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo, +secundum philosophum, in operatione virtutis perfectae. Manifestum +est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione +virtutis homo impediri potest. Sed si loquamur de beatitudine +perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod non requiritur ad beatitudinem +aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad eam ut omnino anima +sit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus, XXII de Civ. Dei, +introducit verba Porphyrii dicentis quod ad hoc quod beata sit +anima, omne corpus fugiendum est. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Cum +enim naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod +perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat. Et ideo +dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam, +requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et antecedenter et +consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII +super Gen. ad Litt., si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficilis et +gravis administratio, sicut caro quae corrumpitur et aggravat +animam, avertitur mens ab illa visione summi caeli. Unde +concludit quod, cum hoc corpus iam non erit animale, sed +spirituale, tunc Angelis adaequabitur, et erit ei ad gloriam, quod +sarcinae fuit. Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae +fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur. +Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Dioscorum, tam potenti +natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine +redundet in inferiorem naturam incorruptionis vigor.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness. +
[33657] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in +obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem +beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove + a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up. +
[33658] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem +intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire. +Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem +mentis.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which + weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall + treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.). +
[33659] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur +quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat +animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter +spiritui subiectum, de quo in tertia parte huius operis +dicetur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs + to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said + ( + Lk. 22:30): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and ( + Mat. 6:20): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and ( + Mat. 25:34): + "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness. +
[33660] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requirantur etiam +exteriora bona. Quod enim in praemium sanctis promittitur, ad +beatitudinem pertinet. Sed sanctis repromittuntur exteriora bona, +sicut cibus et potus, divitiae et regnum, dicitur enim Luc. XXII, +ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo; et +Matth. VI, thesaurizate vobis thesauros in caelo; et Matth. +XXV, venite, benedicti patris mei, possidete regnum. Ergo ad +beatitudinem requiruntur exteriora bona.
+ Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." + But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore + they too are necessary for Happiness. +
[33661] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., beatitudo est status omnium +bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed exteriora sunt aliqua +hominis bona, licet minima, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo ipsa etiam +requiruntur ad beatitudinem.
+ Objection 3: Further, Our Lord said ( + Mat. 5:12): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place + is necessary for Happiness. +
[33662] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +dominus, Matth. V, dicit, merces vestra multa est in caelis. +Sed esse in caelis significat esse in loco. Ergo saltem locus +exterior requiritur ad beatitudinem.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"---"It + is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness. +
[33663] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXII, quid enim mihi est in caelo? +Et a te quid volui super terram? Quasi dicat, nihil aliud volo +nisi hoc quod sequitur, mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est. Ergo +nihil aliud exterius ad beatitudinem requiritur.
+ I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of + happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. + For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation + of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to + perform its operations. +
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason + of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations + which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in + seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no + longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained + to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than + that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated + in Ethic. x, 8. +
[33664] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita +potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia +beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia +beatitudini, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I +Ethic. Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad +operationem virtutis contemplativae quam etiam ad operationem +virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus +exerceat opera activae virtutis. Sed ad beatitudinem perfectam, +quae in visione Dei consistit, nullo modo huiusmodi bona +requiruntur. Cuius ratio est quia omnia huiusmodi bona exteriora +vel requiruntur ad sustentationem animalis corporis; vel +requiruntur ad aliquas operationes quas per animale corpus +exercemus, quae humanae vitae conveniunt. Illa autem perfecta +beatitudo quae in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine +corpore; vel erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed +spirituali. Et ideo nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur +ad illam beatitudinem, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem. Et quia in +hac vita magis accedit ad similitudinem illius perfectae +beatitudinis felicitas contemplativa quam activa, utpote etiam Deo +similior, ut ex dictis patet; ideo minus indiget huiusmodi bonis +corporis, ut dicitur in X Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 1: All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont + to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire + of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the + sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of + God. +
[33665] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnes illae corporales promissiones quae in sacra +Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendae, secundum +quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari, +ut ex his quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita +consurgamus, sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Sicut per +cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias, +sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum, exaltatio +hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo.
+ Reply to Objection 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. + Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, + we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness. +
[33666] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona ista deservientia animali vitae, non competunt +vitae spirituali in qua beatitudo perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit +in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni +invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.
+ Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, + but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed + to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment. +
[33667] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis caelis, sed per +caelos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. Nihilominus +tamen locus corporeus, scilicet caelum Empyreum, aderit beatis, non +propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam +congruentiam et decorem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under + the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends + is necessary for Happiness. +
[33668] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii ad beatitudinem. +Futura enim beatitudo in Scripturis frequenter nomine gloriae +designatur. Sed gloria consistit in hoc quod bonum hominis ad +notitiam multorum deducitur. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur +societas amicorum.
+ Objection 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, + Ep. 6] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary + for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary. +
[33669] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Boetius dicit quod nullius boni sine consortio iucunda est +possessio. Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo +etiam requiritur societas amicorum.
+ Objection 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems + that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness. +
[33670] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas se extendit ad +dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem +requiratur societas amicorum.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently + nothing else is necessary for Happiness. +
[33671] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. VII, venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum +illa, scilicet cum divina sapientia, quae consistit in +contemplatione Dei. Et sic ad beatitudinem nihil aliud +requiritur.
+ I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, + to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation + of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do + good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may + do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends. +
But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential + to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being + of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to + happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from + without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship." +
[33672] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut +philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem +propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter +delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in +operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis +benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam +ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene +operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in +operibus vitae contemplativae. Sed si loquamur de perfecta +beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum +de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem +suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit +societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., +quod creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi +intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris. +Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo +adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in +Deo.
+ Reply to Objection 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God. +
[33673] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod gloria quae est essentialis beatitudini, est quam +habet homo non apud hominem, sed apud Deum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question + under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good. +
[33674] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod +habetur, non est plena sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non +potest, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore + if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor + to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect + Happiness. +
[33675] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini +quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem +proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non +habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur +dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter +se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.
We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can attain Happiness?
(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?
(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?
(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?
(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?
(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?
(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?
+[33676] +Iª-IIae q. 5 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ipsa +adeptione beatitudinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum +homo possit consequi beatitudinem. Secundo, utrum unus homo possit +esse alio beatior. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita +beatus. Quarto, utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti. Quinto, +utrum, homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem. Sexto, +utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius +superioris creaturae. Septimo, utrum requirantur opera hominis +aliqua ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Octavo, +utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual + is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have + the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature, + attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness. +
[33677] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit. +Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem ita natura +intellectualis est supra rationalem ut patet per Dionysium in libro +de Div. Nom., in multis locis. Sed bruta animalia, quae habent +naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem +rationalis naturae. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturae, +potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturae, qui est +beatitudo.
+ Objection 2: Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material + things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain + Happiness. +
[33678] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui est veritas pura. Sed +homini est connaturale ut veritatem intueatur in rebus +materialibus, unde species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus +intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non potest ad +beatitudinem pervenire.
+ Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. + Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that + he cannot attain Happiness. +
[33679] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest +pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum +et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo +transcendere non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem +adipisci.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 93:12): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord." +
[33680] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, beatus homo quem tu erudieris, +domine.
+ I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness. + Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect + good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that + man is capable of seeing God, as stated in + FP, Q[12], A[1]: in + which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists. +
[33681] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque +ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. +Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et +eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum, +et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem +adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis +divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est; in qua quidem +visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds + the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, + whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the + same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth + which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the + FP, Q[58], A[3]; + FP, Q[79], A[8]. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can + attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained + it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after + a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end. +
[33682] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam, et +aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura enim rationalis excedit +sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis obiectum, quia sensus nullo modo +potest cognoscere universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed +intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum +cognoscendi eandem intelligibilem veritatem, nam intellectualis +natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per +inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in primo +dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per +quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest +beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio +modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post +principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam +perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo +pertingere potest.
+ Reply to Objection 2: To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this + state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the + FP, Q[84], A[7] ; + FP, Q[89], A[1]. +
[33683] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est +connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per +phantasmata. Sed post huius vitae statum, habet alium modum +connaturalem, ut in primo dictum est.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation + of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained + it, he will be perfectly happy. +
[33684] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere Angelos gradu naturae, +ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior. Potest tamen eos +transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid +super Angelos esse, quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte +consequetur, perfecte beatus erit.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written ( + Mat. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was equally + rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier than another. +
[33685] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse +beatior. Beatitudo enim est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit +in I Ethic. Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces +redditur, dicitur enim Matth. XX, quod omnes qui operati sunt in +vinea, acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius, +aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt. Ergo +unus non erit alio beatior.
+ Objection 2: Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed + by another's. +
[33686] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo non potest esse aliquid +maius. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia maior +beatitudo.
+ Objection 3: Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire + is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater + good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater. +
[33687] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, desiderium +hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum +deest quod suppleri possit. Si autem nihil deest quod suppleri +possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud maius bonum. Ergo vel homo +non est beatus, vel, si est beatus, non potest alia maior beatitudo +esse.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify "the diverse + dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness + itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all. +
[33688] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, in domo patris mei mansiones multae +sunt; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit, diversae meritorum +dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna. Dignitas autem vitae +aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt +diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis +beatitudo.
+ I answer that, As stated above ( + Q[1], A[8]; + Q[2], A[7]), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of + that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, + since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or + enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, + that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And + in this sense one man can be happier than another. +
[33689] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in ratione beatitudinis duo +includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum; et +adeptio vel fruitio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod +est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo +alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus, +cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem +huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior, +quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit +autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius +dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest +aliquis alio beatior esse.
+ Reply to Objection 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the + divers degrees of enjoyment. +
[33690] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod unitas denarii significat unitatem beatitudinis ex +parte obiecti. Sed diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem +beatitudinis secundum diversum gradum fruitionis.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good. +
[33691] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum bonum, inquantum est +summi boni perfecta possessio sive fruitio.
+ Reply to Objection 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good," + as Augustine says (Enarr. in + Ps. 134). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other + goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the + happier for knowing them, but is happy for + knowing Thee alone." +
[33692] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum, cum +habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est bonum omnis boni, ut +Augustinus dicit. Sed dicitur aliquis alio beatior, ex diversa +eiusdem boni participatione. Additio autem aliorum bonorum non +auget beatitudinem, unde Augustinus dicit, in V Confess., qui te +et alia novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum +beatus.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written ( + Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can + be happy in this life. +
[33693] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi. +Dicitur enim in Psalmo CXVIII, beati immaculati in via, qui +ambulant in lege domini. Hoc autem in hac vita contingit. Ergo +aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.
+ Objection 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not + be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. + Therefore man can be happy in this life. +
[33694] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +imperfecta participatio summi boni non adimit rationem +beatitudinis, alioquin unus non esset alio beatior. Sed in hac vita +homines possunt participare summum bonum, cognoscendo et amando +Deum, licet imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse +beatus.
+ Objection 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature + does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from + Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy + in this life. +
[33695] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quod a pluribus dicitur, non potest totaliter falsum esse, videtur +enim esse naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter +deficit. Sed plures ponunt beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per +illud Psalmi CXLIII, beatum dixerunt populum cui haec sunt, +scilicet praesentis vitae bona. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest +esse beatus.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore + man cannot be happy in this life. +
[33696] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iob XIV, homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens +tempore, repletur multis miseriis. Sed beatitudo excludit +miseriam. Ergo homo in hac vita non potest esse beatus.
+ I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. + This may be seen from a twofold consideration. +
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, + and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable + evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties + on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire + for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present + life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man + naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life. +
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot + obtain in this life, as was shown in the + FP, Q[12], A[11]. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life. +
[33697] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod aliqualis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita +haberi potest, perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi +in hac vita. Et hoc quidem considerari potest dupliciter. Primo +quidem, ex ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione. Nam beatitudo, cum +sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne +desiderium implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum excludi. +Multis enim malis praesens vita subiacet, quae vitari non possunt, +et ignorantiae ex parte intellectus, et inordinatae affectioni ex +parte appetitus, et multiplicibus poenalitatibus ex parte corporis; +ut Augustinus diligenter prosequitur XIX de Civ. Dei. Similiter +etiam desiderium boni in hac vita satiari non potest. Naturaliter +enim homo desiderat permanentiam eius boni quod habet. Bona autem +praesentis vitae transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transeat, quam +naturaliter desideramus, et eam perpetuo permanere vellemus, quia +naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est quod in hac +vita vera beatitudo habeatur. Secundo, si consideretur id in quo +specialiter beatitudo consistit, scilicet visio divinae essentiae, +quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in primo ostensum +est. Ex quibus manifeste apparet quod non potest aliquis in hac +vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according + to + Rom. 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign + Good. +
[33698] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem +beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura vita, secundum illud Rom. VIII, +spe salvi facti sumus, vel propter aliquam participationem +beatitudinis, secundum aliqualem summi boni fruitionem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which + is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be + on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, + in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not + destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above ( + Q[3], A[2]), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject. +
[33699] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta +dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius obiecti beatitudinis, quod +quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur. Et talis imperfectio +tollit rationem verae beatitudinis. Alio modo potest esse +imperfecta ex parte ipsius participantis, qui quidem ad ipsum +obiectum beatitudinis secundum seipsum attingit, scilicet Deum, sed +imperfecte, per respectum ad modum quo Deus seipso fruitur. Et +talis imperfectio non tollit veram rationem beatitudinis, quia, cum +beatitudo sit operatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est, vera ratio +beatitudinis, consideratur ex obiecto, quod dat speciem actui, non +autem ex subiecto.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. + And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate. +
[33700] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod homines reputant in hac vita esse aliquam +beatitudinem, propter aliquam similitudinem verae beatitudinis. Et +sic non ex toto in sua aestimatione deficiunt.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according + to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in + a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness. +
[33701] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit amitti. Beatitudo +enim est perfectio quaedam. Sed omnis perfectio inest perfectibili +secundum modum ipsius. Cum igitur homo secundum suam naturam sit +mutabilis, videtur quod beatitudo mutabiliter ab homine +participetur. Et ita videtur quod homo beatitudinem possit +amittere.
+ Objection 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed + to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease + to be happy. +
[33702] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, +beatitudo consistit in actione intellectus, qui subiacet voluntati. +Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo videtur quod possit +desistere ab operatione qua homo beatificatur, et ita homo desinet +esse beatus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore + it seems that it has an end. +
[33703] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, +principio respondet finis. Sed beatitudo hominis habet principium, +quia homo non semper fuit beatus. Ergo videtur quod habeat +finem.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Mat. 25:46) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated + (A[2]), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost. +
[33704] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, de iustis, quod ibunt in vitam +aeternam; quae, ut dictum est, est beatitudo sanctorum. Quod autem +est aeternum, non deficit. Ergo beatitudo non potest amitti.
+ I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative + happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain + occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation. +
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act + that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like + happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains + an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this + life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state + (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change. +
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, + 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness. +
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the + "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to + hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of + losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that + man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never + will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is + the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly + happy, if evil be in him. +
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above ( + Q[3], A[8]) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine + Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, + something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience + attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good + things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written ( + Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and ( + Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any + inconvenience attached to it; because it is written + of the contemplation of wisdom ( + Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake + Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since + the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that + sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the + will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above ( + Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things: + and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, + man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things + as are subject to time and + movement. +
[33705] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, qualis in hac +vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate +contemplativa, quae amittitur vel per oblivionem, puta cum +corrumpitur scientia ex aliqua aegritudine; vel etiam per aliquas +occupationes, quibus totaliter abstrahitur aliquis a +contemplatione. Patet etiam idem in felicitate activa, voluntas +enim hominis transmutari potest, ut in vitium degeneret a virtute, +in cuius actu principaliter consistit felicitas. Si autem virtus +remaneat integra, exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem +beatitudinem talem perturbare, inquantum impediunt multas +operationes virtutum, non tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre, quia +adhuc remanet operatio virtutis, dum ipsas adversitates homo +laudabiliter sustinet. Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest, +quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo philosophus +dicit, in I Ethic., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non +simpliciter, sed sicut homines quorum natura mutationi subiecta +est. Si vero loquamur de beatitudine perfecta quae expectatur post +hanc vitam, sciendum est quod Origenes posuit, quorundam +Platonicorum errorem sequens, quod post ultimam beatitudinem homo +potest fieri miser. Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum +dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis. Cum +enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod +desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat. Naturaliter +autem homo desiderat retinere bonum quod habet, et quod eius +retinendi securitatem obtineat, alioquin necesse est quod timore +amittendi, vel dolore de certitudine amissionis, affligatur. +Requiritur igitur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat +opinionem bonum quod habet, nunquam se amissurum. Quae quidem +opinio si vera sit, consequens est quod beatitudinem nunquam +amittet. Si autem falsa sit, hoc ipsum est quoddam malum, falsam +opinionem habere, nam falsum est malum intellectus, sicut verum est +bonum ipsius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non igitur iam vere erit +beatus, si aliquod malum ei inest. Secundo idem apparet, si +consideretur ratio beatitudinis in speciali. Ostensum est enim +supra quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinae essentiae +consistit. Est autem impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam +essentiam, velit eam non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis +carere vult, aut est insufficiens, et quaeritur aliquid +sufficientius loco eius, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum, +propter quod in fastidium venit. Visio autem divinae essentiae +replet animam omnibus bonis, cum coniungat fonti totius bonitatis, +unde dicitur in Psalmo XVI, satiabor cum apparuerit gloria +tua; et Sap. VII, dicitur, venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter +cum illa, scilicet cum contemplatione sapientiae. Similiter +etiam non habet aliquod incommodum adiunctum, quia de +contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, Sap. VIII, non habet +amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus eius. +Sic ergo patet quod propria voluntate beatus non potest +beatitudinem deserere. Similiter etiam non potest eam perdere, Deo +subtrahente. Quia, cum subtractio beatitudinis sit quaedam poena, +non potest talis subtractio a Deo, iusto iudice, provenire, nisi +pro aliqua culpa, in quam cadere non potest qui Dei essentiam +videt, cum ad hanc visionem ex necessitate sequatur rectitudo +voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec aliquod +aliud agens potest eam subtrahere. Quia mens Deo coniuncta super +omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab huiusmodi coniunctione nullum aliud +agens potest ipsam excludere. Unde inconveniens videtur quod per +quasdam alternationes temporum transeat homo de beatitudine ad +miseriam, et e converso, quia huiusmodi temporales alternationes +esse non possunt, nisi circa ea quae subiacent tempori et +motui.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it + altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends + all change. +
[33706] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quae omnem +defectum excludit a beato. Et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam +habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quae hominem sublevat in +participationem aeternitatis transcendentis omnem mutationem.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, + to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy. +
[33707] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod voluntas ad opposita se habet in his quae ad finem +ordinantur, sed ad ultimum finem naturali necessitate ordinatur. +Quod patet ex hoc, quod homo non potest non velle esse beatus.
+ Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the + good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from + another. +
[33708] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod beatitudo habet principium ex conditione +participantis, sed caret fine, propter conditionem boni cuius +participatio facit beatum. Unde ab alio est initium beatitudinis; +et ab alio est quod caret fine.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing + is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore + man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. +
[33709] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per sua naturalia possit +beatitudinem consequi. Natura enim non deficit in necessariis. Sed +nihil est homini tam necessarium quam id per quod finem ultimum +consequitur. Ergo hoc naturae humanae non deest. Potest igitur homo +per sua naturalia beatitudinem consequi.
+ Objection 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational + creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers. +
[33710] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, +homo, cum sit nobilior irrationalibus creaturis, videtur esse +sufficientior. Sed irrationales creaturae per sua naturalia possunt +consequi suos fines. Ergo multo magis homo per sua naturalia potest +beatitudinem consequi.
+ Objection 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing + belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning + in human operations, is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain + to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers. +
[33711] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo est operatio perfecta, secundum philosophum. Eiusdem +autem est incipere rem, et perficere ipsam. Cum igitur operatio +imperfecta, quae est quasi principium in operationibus humanis, +subdatur naturali hominis potestati, qua suorum actuum est dominus; +videtur quod per naturalem potentiam possit pertingere ad +operationem perfectam, quae est beatitudo.
+ On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses + the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says ( + 1 Cor. 2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them + that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers. +
[33712] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, +homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et +voluntatem. Sed ultima beatitudo sanctis praeparata, excedit +intellectum hominis et voluntatem, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. +II, oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis +non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se. Ergo homo +per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi.
+ I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, + in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above + (Q[3], A[8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only + of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the + FP, Q[12], + A[4] + . For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence + (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its + substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine + Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain + final Happiness by his natural powers. +
[33713] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest, +potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus, +in cuius operatione consistit, de quo infra dicetur. Sed beatitudo +hominis perfecta, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in visione +divinae essentiae. Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra +naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturae, ut in primo +ostensum est. Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturae est +secundum modum substantiae eius, sicut de intelligentia dicitur in +libro de causis, quod cognoscit ea quae sunt supra se, et ea +quae sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiae suae. Omnis +autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit +a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem +substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest +consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided + other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did + it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. + But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him + happy. "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3). +
[33714] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis, +quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus +quia dedit ei rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi +conquirere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non +daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc +enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit +converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. Quae enim per amicos +possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus, ut dicitur in III +Ethic.
+ Reply to Objection 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition + than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in + order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect + health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, + without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs + the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this + good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers. +
[33715] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod nobilioris conditionis est natura quae potest +consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc +consequendum, quam natura quae non potest consequi perfectum bonum, +sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem +eius non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut philosophus dicit in II de +caelo. Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi +perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae; quam qui +solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem, sine medicinae +auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quae potest consequi +perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est +perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est +capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae +naturae.
+ Reply to Objection 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity, + if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. + Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation + which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its + object. Consequently the argument does not prove. +
[33716] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quando imperfectum et perfectum sunt eiusdem +speciei, ab eadem virtute causari possunt. Non autem hoc est +necesse, si sunt alterius speciei, non enim quidquid potest causare +dispositionem materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre. +Imperfecta autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis +potestati, non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta +quae est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex +obiecto. Unde ratio non sequitur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe + a twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which + is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order + of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the + order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures + acting on the lower, as stated in the + FP, Q[109], A[2]: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, + through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him. +
[33717] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit fieri beatus per actionem +alicuius superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli. Cum enim duplex +ordo inveniatur in rebus, unus partium universi ad invicem, alius +totius universi ad bonum quod est extra universum; primus ordo +ordinatur ad secundum sicut ad finem, ut dicitur XII Metaphys.; +sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius +exercitus ad ducem. Sed ordo partium universi ad invicem attenditur +secundum quod superiores creaturae agunt in inferiores, ut in primo +dictum est, beatitudo autem consistit in ordine hominis ad bonum +quod est extra universum, quod est Deus. Ergo per actionem +superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli, in hominem, homo beatus +efficitur.
+ Objection 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially + hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually + happy by an angel who is actually happy. +
[33718] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, +quod est in potentia tale, potest reduci in actum per id quod est +actu tale, sicut quod est potentia calidum, fit actu calidum per id +quod est actu calidum. Sed homo est in potentia beatus. Ergo potest +fieri actu beatus per Angelum, qui est actu beatus.
+ Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's + intellect as shown in the + FP, Q[111], A[1]. Therefore an angel can make a man happy. +
[33719] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, +beatitudo consistit in operatione intellectus, ut supra dictum est. +Sed Angelus potest illuminare intellectum hominis, ut in primo +habitum est. Ergo Angelus potest facere hominem beatum.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace and glory." +
[33720] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, gratiam et gloriam dabit +dominus.
+ I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which + surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above + nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now + it has been shown above + (A[5]) that Happiness is a good surpassing + created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man + made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as + of the virtue, in whose act it consists. +
[33721] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum omnis creatura naturae legibus sit subiecta, +utpote habens limitatam virtutem et actionem; illud quod excedit +naturam creatam, non potest fieri virtute alicuius creaturae. Et +ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit +immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci, et +cetera huiusmodi. Ostensum est autem quod beatitudo est quoddam +bonum excedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod per +actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur, sed homo beatus fit solo +Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta. Si vero loquamur +de beatitudine imperfecta, sic eadem ratio est de ipsa et de +virtute, in cuius actu consistit.
+ Reply to Objection 1: It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the + last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to + the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, + too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the + attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself + through the First Agent, which is God. +
[33722] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod plerumque contingit in potentiis activis ordinatis, +quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam, +inferiores vero potentiae coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi +finis disponendo, sicut ad artem gubernativam, quae praeest +navifactivae, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit. Sic +igitur et in ordine universi, homo quidem adiuvatur ab Angelis ad +consequendum ultimum finem, secundum aliqua praecedentia, quibus +disponitur ad eius consecutionem, sed ipsum ultimum finem +consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance + a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle + whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; + nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something + else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is + in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently + no creature can communicate its Happiness to another. +
[33723] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quando aliqua forma actu existit in aliquo secundum +esse perfectum et naturale, potest esse principium actionis in +alterum; sicut calidum per calorem calefacit. Sed si forma existit +in aliquo imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest +esse principium communicationis sui ad alterum, sicut intentio +coloris quae est in pupilla, non potest facere album; neque etiam +omnia quae sunt illuminata aut calefacta, possunt alia calefacere +et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio at calefactio essent usque ad +infinitum. Lumen autem gloriae, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo +quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale, in qualibet autem +creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel +participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam +beatitudinem alteri.
+ Reply to Objection 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as + to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the + FP, Q[106], A[1]: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God. +
[33724] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod Angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis, vel +etiam inferioris Angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum +operum non autem quantum ad visionem divinae essentiae, ut in primo +dictum est. Ad eam enim videndam, omnes immediate illuminantur a +Deo.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite + power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But + man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above + (A[6]), can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not + require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works. +
[33725] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requirantur aliqua opera hominis +ad hoc ut beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Deus enim, cum sit agens +infinitae virtutis, non praeexigit in agendo materiam, aut +dispositionem materiae, sed statim potest totum producere. Sed +opera hominis, cum non requirantur ad beatitudinem eius sicut causa +efficiens, ut dictum est, non possunt requiri ad eam nisi sicut +dispositiones. Ergo Deus, qui dispositiones non praeexigit in +agendo, beatitudinem sine praecedentibus operibus confert.
+ Objection 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established + nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect + forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works. +
[33726] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut Deus est auctor beatitudinis immediate, ita et naturam +immediate instituit. Sed in prima institutione naturae, produxit +creaturas nulla dispositione praecedente vel actione creaturae; sed +statim fecit unumquodque perfectum in sua specie. Ergo videtur quod +beatitudinem conferat homini sine aliquibus operationibus +praecedentibus.
+ Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says ( + Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining + Happiness. +
[33727] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus +confert iustitiam sine operibus. Non ergo requiruntur aliqua opera +hominis ad beatitudinem consequendam.
+ On the contrary, It is written ( + Jn. 13:17): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works. +
[33728] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, si haec scitis, beati eritis si +feceritis ea. Ergo per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenitur.
+ I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right + order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, + in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make + a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as + sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should + not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one + has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs + to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not + to be + moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can + becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in + the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained + in the + FP, Q[62], A[5]; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. + Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue. +
[33729] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, requiritur +ad beatitudinem, cum nihil aliud sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis +ad ultimum finem; quae ita exigitur ad consecutionem ultimi finis, +sicut debita dispositio materiae ad consecutionem formae. Sed ex +hoc non ostenditur quod aliqua operatio hominis debeat praecedere +eius beatitudinem, posset enim Deus simul facere voluntatem recte +tendentem in finem, et finem consequentem; sicut quandoque simul +materiam disponit, et inducit formam. Sed ordo divinae sapientiae +exigit ne hoc fiat, ut enim dicitur in II de caelo, eorum quae +nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu, +aliquid uno motu, aliquid pluribus. Habere autem perfectum +bonum sine motu, convenit ei quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere +autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei +proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam +operationem praecedentem. Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam +creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur +absque motu operationis, per quam tendit in ipsam. Sed Angelus, qui +est superior ordine naturae quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex +ordine divinae sapientiae, uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in +primo expositum est. Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis +motibus operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam, secundum +philosophum, beatitudo est praemium virtuosarum operationum.
+ Reply to Objection 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows + Happiness, but that the order in things be observed. +
[33730] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod operatio hominis non praeexigitur ad consecutionem +beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinae virtutis +beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.
+ Reply to Objection 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the + creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated + to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," + according to + Heb. 2:10, "had brought many children into glory"; + therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But + this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits + of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ. +
[33731] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod primas creaturas statim Deus perfectas produxit, +absque aliqua dispositione vel operatione creaturae praecedente, +quia sic instituit prima individua specierum, ut per ea natura +propagaretur ad posteros. Et similiter, quia per Christum, qui est +Deus et homo, beatitudo erat ad alios derivanda, secundum illud +apostoli ad Heb. II, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat; +statim a principio suae conceptionis, absque aliqua operatione +meritoria praecedente, anima eius fuit beata. Sed hoc est singulare +in ipso, nam pueris baptizatis subvenit meritum Christi ad +beatitudinem consequendam, licet desint eis merita propria, eo quod +per Baptismum sunt Christi membra effecti.
+ Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account + of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends + towards Happiness. +
[33732] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei, quae habetur +per gratiam iustificantem, quae quidem non datur propter opera +praecedentia. Non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo, +sed magis est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.
+ Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object + of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some + in other things." Therefore not all desire Happiness. +
[33733] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes appetant beatitudinem. +Nullus enim potest appetere quod ignorat, cum bonum apprehensum sit +obiectum appetitus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed multi nesciunt +quid sit beatitudo, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIII de Trin., +patet ex hoc, quod quidam posuerunt beatitudinem in voluptate +corporis, quidam in virtute animi, quidam in aliis rebus. Non +ergo omnes beatitudinem appetunt.
+ Objection 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above ( + Q[3], A[8]). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not + desire Happiness. +
[33734] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, +essentia beatitudinis est visio essentiae divinae, ut dictum est. +Sed aliqui opinantur hoc esse impossibile, quod Deus per essentiam +ab homine videatur, unde hoc non appetunt. Ergo non omnes homines +appetunt beatitudinem.
+ Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all + do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire + Happiness. +
[33735] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin. quod beatus est qui habet +omnia quae vult, et nihil male vult. Sed non omnes hoc volunt, +quidam enim male aliqua volunt, et tamen volunt illa se velle. Non +ergo omnes volunt beatitudinem.
+ On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he + would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy. +
[33736] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., si minus dixisset, +omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis, dixisset aliquid +quod nullus in sua non cognosceret voluntate. Quilibet ergo +vult esse beatus.
+ I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every + man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above ( + AA[3],4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently + to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be + satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which + it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; + because they know not in what thing the general notion of + happiness is found. + And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it.
[33737] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 co. Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudo dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, +secundum communem rationem beatitudinis. Et sic necesse est quod +omnis homo beatitudinem velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis +est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit +obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter +eius voluntati satisfacit. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud +est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur. Quod quilibet vult. Alio +modo possumus loqui de beatitudine secundum specialem rationem, +quantum ad id in quo beatitudo consistit. Et sic non omnes +cognoscunt beatitudinem, quia nesciunt cui rei communis ratio +beatitudinis conveniat. Et per consequens, quantum ad hoc, non +omnes eam volunt.
Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear. +
[33738] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 1 Unde patet +responsio ad primum.
+ Reply to Objection 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction, + there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired + in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general + notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends + thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, + or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity. +
[33739] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum voluntas sequatur apprehensionem intellectus seu +rationis, sicut contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, quod +tamen est diversum secundum rationis considerationem; ita contingit +quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, et tamen uno modo appetitur, +alio modo non appetitur. Beatitudo ergo potest considerari sub +ratione finalis boni et perfecti, quae est communis ratio +beatitudinis, et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas in +illud tendit, ut dictum est. Potest etiam considerari secundum +alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius operationis, +vel ex parte potentiae operativae, vel ex parte obiecti, et sic non +ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam.
+ Reply to Objection 3: This definition of Happiness given by some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled" + is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of + all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing + satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if + we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to + Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such + things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that + are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to + include perfect Happiness---that he "desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, + that "happy is he who has all he desires." +
[33740] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ista definitio beatitudinis quam quidam posuerunt, +beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, vel, cui omnia optata +succedunt, quodam modo intellecta, est bona et sufficiens; alio +vero modo, est imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter de +omnibus quae vult homo naturali appetitu, sic verum est quod qui +habet omnia quae vult, est beatus, nihil enim satiat naturalem +hominis appetitum, nisi bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo. Si +vero intelligatur de his quae homo vult secundum apprehensionem +rationis, sic habere quaedam quae homo vult, non pertinet ad +beatitudinem, sed magis ad miseriam inquantum huiusmodi habita +impediunt hominem ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult, sicut +etiam ratio accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione +veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus addidit ad +perfectionem beatitudinis, quod nihil mali velit. Quamvis primum +posset sufficere, si recte intelligeretur, scilicet quod beatus est +qui habet omnia quae vult.