Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
changeset 82:05ec843700ca
needs more corrections: good only through Q77
| author | ht |
|---|---|
| date | Sun, 20 Mar 2011 14:02:18 +0000 |
| parents | 43c19dd71b45 |
| children | f69488acd31e |
| files | summa/bilingual/FP_ix.html |
| diffstat | 1 files changed, 16471 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) [+] |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ix.html Sun Mar 20 14:02:18 2011 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,16471 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ix" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FP.ix-p0.1">TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q75">Q. 75. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE + OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES) + </a><br/><a href="#FP_Q76">Q. 76. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q77">Q. 77. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q78">Q. 78. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q79">Q. 79. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q80">Q. 80. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q81">Q. 81. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q82">Q. 82. OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q83">Q. 83. OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q84">Q. 84. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q85">Q. 85. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q86">Q. 86. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q87">Q. 87. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q88">Q. 88. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q89">Q. 89. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q90">Q. 90. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q91">Q. 91. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q92">Q. 92. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q93">Q. 93. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q94">Q. 94. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q95">Q. 95. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q96">Q. 96. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q97">Q. 97. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q98">Q. 98. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q99">Q. 99. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q100">Q. 100. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q101">Q. 101. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q102">Q. 102. OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FP_Q75" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q75-p0.1">Q. 75. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE + OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES) + </h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q75-p2"> Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual + and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers + the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the + soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says + that three things are to be found in spiritual substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of what belongs + to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation. + </p><p id="FP_Q75-p3"> Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second + is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry. + </p><p id="FP_Q75-p4"><a href="#FP_Q75_A1"> (1) Whether the soul is a body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p5"><a href="#FP_Q75_A2"> (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p6"><a href="#FP_Q75_A3"> (3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p7"><a href="#FP_Q75_A4"> (4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p8"><a href="#FP_Q75_A5"> (5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p9"><a href="#FP_Q75_A6"> (6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p10"><a href="#FP_Q75_A7"> (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 pr."><a name="31447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31447] +Iª q. 75 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem creaturae +spiritualis et corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex +spirituali et corporali substantia componitur. Et primo, de natura +ipsius hominis; secundo, de eius productione. Naturam autem hominis +considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex +parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad +animam. Et ideo prima consideratio circa animam versabitur. Et +quia, secundum Dionysium, XI cap. Angel. Hier., tria inveniuntur in +substantiis spiritualibus, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio; +primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; +secundo, ea quae pertinent ad virtutem sive potentias eius; tertio, +ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius. Circa primum duplex occurrit +consideratio, quarum prima est de ipsa anima secundum se; secunda, +de unione eius ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur septem. Primo, +utrum anima sit corpus. Secundo, utrum anima humana sit aliquid +subsistens. Tertio, utrum animae brutorum sint subsistentes. +Quarto, utrum anima sit homo; vel magis homo sit aliquid compositum +ex anima et corpore. Quinto, utrum sit composita ex materia et +forma. Sexto, utrum anima humana sit incorruptibilis. Septimo, +utrum anima sit eiusdem speciei cum Angelo.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q75_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A1-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 1. Whether the soul is a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, + because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not + hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, + unchanging movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be + the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved + is a body. Therefore the soul is a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31448] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit corpus. Anima enim est motor +corporis. Non autem est movens non motum. Tum quia videtur quod +nihil possit movere nisi moveatur, quia nihil dat alteri quod non +habet, sicut quod non est calidum non calefacit. Tum quia, si +aliquid est movens non motum, causat motum sempiternum et eodem +modo se habentem, ut probatur in VIII Physic., quod non apparet in +motu animalis, qui est ab anima. Ergo anima est movens motum. Sed +omne movens motum est corpus. Ergo anima est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. + If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31449] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Non potest autem esse +similitudo corporis ad rem incorpoream. Si igitur anima non esset +corpus, non posset cognoscere res corporeas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the + soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31450] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +moventis ad motum oportet esse aliquem contactum. Contactus autem +non est nisi corporum. Cum igitur anima moveat corpus, videtur quod +anima sit corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space + by its bulk." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31451] Iª q. 75 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod <i>anima simplex dicitur +respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium +loci</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which + live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life + is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, + supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for + they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the + soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, + based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body. + </p><p id="FP_Q75_A1-p7"> It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle + of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which + we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life + in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a + principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would + be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, + as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, + which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of + calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 co."><a name="31452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31452] Iª q. 75 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ad inquirendum de natura animae, oportet praesupponere quod +anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos +vivunt animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita +carentes. Vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet +cognitionis et motus. Horum autem principium antiqui philosophi, +imaginationem transcendere non valentes, aliquod corpus ponebant; +sola corpora res esse dicentes, et quod non est corpus, nihil esse. +Et secundum hoc, animam aliquod corpus esse dicebant. Huius autem +opinionis falsitas licet multipliciter ostendi possit tamen uno +utemur, quo et communius et certius patet animam corpus non esse. +Manifestum est enim quod non quodcumque vitalis operationis +principium est anima, sic enim oculus esset anima, cum sit quoddam +principium visionis; et idem esset dicendum de aliis animae +instrumentis. Sed primum principium vitae dicimus esse animam. +Quamvis autem aliquod corpus possit esse quoddam principium vitae, +sicut cor est principium vitae in animali; tamen non potest esse +primum principium vitae aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod +esse principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod +est corpus, alioquin omne corpus esset vivens, aut principium +vitae. Convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam +principium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu +tale, habet hoc ab aliquo principio quod dicitur actus eius. Anima +igitur, quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus, sed +corporis actus, sicut calor, qui est principium calefactionis, non +est corpus, sed quidam corporis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must + allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what + it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which + is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and + such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, + is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, + again, another mover, which is moved essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing + existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31453] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, cum omne quod movetur ab alio moveatur, quod non +potest in infinitum procedere, necesse est dicere quod non omne +movens movetur. Cum enim moveri sit exire de potentia in actum, +movens dat id quod habet mobili, inquantum facit ipsum esse in +actu. Sed sicut ostenditur in VIII Physic., est quoddam movens +penitus immobile, quod nec per se nec per accidens movetur, et tale +movens potest movere motum semper uniformem. Est autem aliud +movens, quod non movetur per se, sed movetur per accidens, et +propter hoc non movet motum semper uniformem. Et tale movens est +anima. Est autem aliud movens, quod per se movetur, scilicet +corpus. Et quia antiqui naturales nihil esse credebant nisi +corpora, posuerunt quod omne movens movetur, et quod anima per se +movetur, et est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, + and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only + potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the + likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but + that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between + actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it + must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31454] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est necessarium quod similitudo rei cognitae sit +actu in natura cognoscentis, sed si aliquid sit quod prius est +cognoscens in potentia et postea in actu, oportet quod similitudo +cogniti non sit actu in natura cognoscentis, sed in potentia +tantum; sicut color non est actu in pupilla, sed in potentia +tantum. Unde non oportet quod in natura animae sit similitudo rerum +corporearum in actu; sed quod sit in potentia ad huiusmodi +similitudines. Sed quia antiqui naturales nesciebant distinguere +inter actum et potentiam, ponebant animam esse corpus, ad hoc quod +cognosceret corpus; et ad hoc quod cognosceret omnia corpora, quod +esset composita ex principiis omnium corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the + latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31455] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod est duplex contactus, quantitatis et virtutis. Primo +modo, corpus non tangitur nisi a corpore. Secundo modo, corpus +potest tangi a re incorporea quae movet corpus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A2-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 2. Whether the human soul is something subsistent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." + Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is + not something subsistent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31456] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens. +Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est +hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est +aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to + say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31457] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod est subsistens, potest dici operari. Sed anima non dicitur +operari, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, <i>dicere animam sentire +aut intelligere, simile est ac si dicat eam aliquis texere vel +aedificare</i>. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from + the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot + exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31458] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +anima esset aliquid subsistens, esset aliqua eius operatio sine +corpore. Sed nulla est eius operatio sine corpore, nec etiam +intelligere, quia non contingit intelligere sine phantasmate, +phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo anima humana non est +aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, + will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those + things without which they are unable to think of any nature---i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things." Therefore the + nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, + something subsistent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31459] Iª q. 75 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. <i>Quisquis videt mentis naturam +et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, videt eos qui opinantur +eam esse corpoream, ob hoc errare, quod adiungunt ei ea sine quibus +nullam possunt cogitare naturam, scilicet corporum phantasias</i>. +Natura ergo mentis humanae non solum est incorporea, sed etiam +substantia, scilicet aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal + and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever + knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge + of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by + a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual + principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. + Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by + means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a + certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be + of that same color. + </p><p id="FP_Q75_A2-p7"> Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. + Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason + we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which + is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 co."><a name="31460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31460] Iª q. 75 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis +operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium +incorporeum et subsistens. Manifestum est enim quod homo per +intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem +potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua +natura, quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter impediret +cognitionem aliorum; sicut videmus quod lingua infirmi quae infecta +est cholerico et amaro humore, non potest percipere aliquid dulce, +sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale +haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora +cognoscere. Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. +Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et +similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, +quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet +cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color +sit non solum in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus +eiusdem coloris videtur. Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, +quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui +non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod +per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu, unde eo +modo aliquid operatur, quo est. Propter quod non dicimus quod calor +calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae +dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et +subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, + and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter + excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not + in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can + indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in + this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31461] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo, pro +quocumque subsistente, alio modo, pro subsistente completo in +natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam +accidentis et formae materialis, secundo modo, excludit etiam +imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo +modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars +speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi +subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et +corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to + be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate "per se" belongs to what exists "per se." But for + a thing to exist "per se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it + be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is + neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist + "per se"; nor can it for that reason be said to operate "per se." Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed + to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that + what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul + understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31462] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verba illa Aristoteles dicit non secundum propriam +sententiam, sed secundum opinionem illorum qui dicebant quod +intelligere est moveri; ut patet ex iis quae ibi praemittit. Vel +dicendum quod per se agere convenit per se existenti. Sed per se +existens quandoque potest dici aliquid si non sit inhaerens ut +accidens vel ut forma materialis, etiam si sit pars. Sed proprie et +per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhaerens, +neque est pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non posset +dici per se subsistens; et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde +et operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim +quod homo videt per oculum, et palpat per manum, aliter quam +calidum calefacit per calorem, quia calor nullo modo calefacit, +proprie loquendo. Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut +oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per +animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the + phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to + be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses + in order to perform its act of perception. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31463] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut +organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma +enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem +indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem, +alioquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat +exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A3-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 3. Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we + have just shown + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q75_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31464] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod animae brutorum animalium sint +subsistentes. Homo enim convenit in genere cum aliis animalibus. +Sed anima hominis est aliquid subsistens, ut ostensum est. Ergo et +animae aliorum animalium sunt subsistentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible + objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from + the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are + subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31465] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +similiter se habet sensitivum ad sensibilia, sicut intellectivum et +intelligibilia. Sed intellectus intelligit intelligibilia sine +corpore. Ergo et sensus apprehendit sensibilia sine corpore. Animae +autem brutorum animalium sunt sensitivae. Ergo sunt subsistentes, +pari ratione qua et anima hominis, quae est intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute + animals has an operation apart from the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31466] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +brutorum animalium anima movet corpus. Corpus autem non movet, sed +movetur. Anima ergo bruti animalis habet aliquam operationem sine +corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls + of animals are not subsistent." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31467] Iª q. 75 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in libro de Eccl. Dogmat., <i>solum hominem credimus +habere animam substantivam; animalium vero animae non sunt +substantivae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has + been said + <a href="#FP_Q75_A1" id="FP_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining + that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals + are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the + operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent + operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of + the eye is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has + no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we + conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything + follows the mode of its being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 co."><a name="31468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31468] Iª q. 75 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod antiqui philosophi nullam distinctionem ponebant inter sensum +et intellectum, et utrumque corporeo principio attribuebant, ut +dictum est. Plato autem distinxit inter intellectum et sensum; +utrumque tamen attribuit principio incorporeo, ponens quod, sicut +intelligere, ita et sentire convenit animae secundum seipsam. Et ex +hoc sequebatur quod etiam animae brutorum animalium sint +subsistentes. Sed Aristoteles posuit quod solum intelligere, inter +opera animae, sine organo corporeo exercetur. Sentire vero, et +consequentes operationes animae sensitivae, manifeste accidunt cum +aliqua corporis immutatione; sicut in videndo immutatur pupilla per +speciem coloris; et idem apparet in aliis. Et sic manifestum est +quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per +seipsam, sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est coniuncti. Ex quo +relinquitur quod, cum animae brutorum animalium per se non +operentur, non sint subsistentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet +esse et operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although man is of the same "genus" as other animals, he is of a different "species." Specific difference is derived from + the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of "genus." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31469] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod homo, etsi conveniat in genere cum aliis animalibus, +specie tamen differt, differentia autem speciei attenditur secundum +differentiam formae. Nec oportet quod omnis differentia formae +faciat generis diversitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to + the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch + as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible + corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For + an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. + If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect + requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31470] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sensitivum quodammodo se habet ad sensibilia sicut +intellectivum ad intelligibilia, inquantum scilicet utrumque est in +potentia ad sua obiecta. Sed quodammodo dissimiliter se habent, +inquantum sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione, +unde excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum. Quod in intellectu +non contingit, nam intellectus intelligens maxima intelligibilium, +magis potest postmodum intelligere minora. Si vero in intelligendo +fatigetur corpus, hoc est per accidens, in quantum intellectus +indiget operatione virium sensitivarum, per quas ei phantasmata +praeparantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive soul + is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other + motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does + not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not + an act of the sensitive soul without the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31471] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod vis motiva est duplex. Una quae imperat motum, +scilicet appetitiva. Et huius operatio in anima sensitiva non est +sine corpore; sed ira et gaudium et omnes huiusmodi passiones sunt +cum aliqua corporis immutatione. Alia vis motiva est exequens +motum, per quam membra redduntur habilia ad obediendum appetitui, +cuius actus non est movere, sed moveri. Unde patet quod movere non +est actus animae sensitivae sine corpore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A4-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 4. Whether the soul is man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.16" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:16</a>): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul. + Therefore the soul is the inward man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31472] Iª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit homo. Dicitur enim II ad Cor. +IV, <i>licet is qui foris est noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is qui +intus est, renovatur de die in diem</i>. Sed id quod est intus in +homine, est anima. Ergo anima est homo interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore + it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31473] Iª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima +humana est substantia quaedam. Non autem est substantia +universalis. Ergo est substantia particularis. Ergo est hypostasis +vel persona. Sed non nisi humana. Ergo anima est homo, nam persona +humana est homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and + body." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31474] Iª q. 75 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, commendat Varronem, <i>qui +hominem nec animam solam, nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et +corpus esse arbitrabatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, + for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs + to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the + species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does + not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, + signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular + man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, + flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given + species, must belong to the substance of the species. + </p><p id="FP_Q75_A4-p6"> It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the + operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are + attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore + that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above + <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, + it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation + was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 co."><a name="31475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31475] Iª q. 75 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod animam esse hominem dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, +quod homo sit anima, sed hic homo non sit anima, sed compositum ex +anima et corpore, puta Socrates. Quod ideo dico, quia quidam +posuerunt solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse +partem individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse +verum. Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat +definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat +formam tantum, sed formam et materiam. Unde materia est pars +speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est +principium individuationis; sed materia communis. Sicut enim de +ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et +his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et +carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse +quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub +specie contentorum. Alio vero modo potest intelligi sic, quod etiam +haec anima sit hic homo. Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si +poneretur quod animae sensitivae operatio esset eius propria sine +corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, +convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod +operatur operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur +operationes hominis. Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est +operatio animae tantum. Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio +hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima +tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. Plato vero, +ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset +anima utens corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the governor + of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, + the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the + body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond + the senses. And this is called the "outward" man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31476] Iª q. 75 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, secundum philosophum in IX Ethic., illud potissime +videtur esse unumquodque, quod est principale in ipso, sicut quod +facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas facere. Et hoc modo +aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo, aliquando +quidem pars intellectiva, secundum rei veritatem, quae dicitur homo +interior; aliquando vero pars sensitiva cum corpore, secundum +aestimationem quorundam, qui solum circa sensibilia detinentur. Et +hic dicitur homo exterior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence + a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part + of the human species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31477] Iª q. 75 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non quaelibet substantia particularis est hypostasis +vel persona, sed quae habet completam naturam speciei. Unde manus +vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec +anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A5-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 5. Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things + are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and + are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality + participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. + Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially + understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as part of itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31478] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma. +Potentia enim contra actum dividitur. Sed omnia quaecumque sunt in +actu, participant primum actum, qui Deus est; per cuius +participationem omnia sunt et bona et entia et viventia, ut patet +per doctrinam Dionysii in libro de Div. Nom. Ergo quaecumque sunt +in potentia, participant primam potentiam. Sed prima potentia est +materia prima. Cum ergo anima humana sit quodammodo in potentia, +quod apparet ex hoc quod homo quandoque est intelligens in +potentia; videtur quod anima humana participet materiam primam +tanquam partem sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul---namely, + to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge + and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31479] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, ibi invenitur materia. +Sed in anima inveniuntur proprietates materiae, quae sunt subiici +et transmutari, subiicitur enim scientiae et virtuti, et mutatur de +ignorantia ad scientiam, et de vitio ad virtutem. Ergo in anima est +materia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). + But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31480] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illa +quae non habent materiam, non habent causam sui esse, ut dicitur in +VIII Metaphys. Sed anima habet causam sui esse, quia creatur a Deo. +Ergo anima habet materiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore + the soul has matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="31481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31481] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod +non habet materiam, sed est forma tantum, est actus purus et +infinitus. Hoc autem solius Dei est. Ergo anima habet materiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31482] Iª q. 75 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus probat, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima non +est facta nec ex materia corporali, nec ex materia spirituali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs + to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue + of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, + if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an + act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being + opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, + which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate." + </p><p id="FP_Q75_A5-p8"> Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that + whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far + as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone + absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the + intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. + For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, + and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal + organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, + and + every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 co."><a name="31483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31483] Iª q. 75 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod anima non habet materiam. Et hoc potest considerari +dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ratione animae in communi. Est enim de +ratione animae, quod sit forma alicuius corporis. Aut igitur est +forma secundum se totam; aut secundum aliquam partem sui. Si +secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars eius sit materia, si +dicatur materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum, quia forma, +inquantum forma, est actus; id autem quod est in potentia tantum, +non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote +contra actum divisa. Si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem +sui, illam partem, dicemus esse animam, et illam materiam cuius +primo est actus, dicemus esse primum animatum. Secundo, specialiter +ex ratione humanae animae, inquantum est intellectiva. Manifestum +est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per +modum recipientis. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma +eius est in cognoscente anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem +aliquam in sua natura absolute, puta lapidem inquantum est lapis +absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam +rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva. Anima igitur intellectiva +est forma absoluta, non autem aliquid compositum ex materia et +forma. Si enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et +forma, formae rerum reciperentur in ea ut individuales, et sic non +cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, +quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali, materia enim est +principium individuationis formarum. Relinquitur ergo quod anima +intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas +absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as Dionysius + says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now + as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite + Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot + be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the + receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual + soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. + For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of + such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31484] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod primus actus est universale principium omnium actuum, +quia est infinitum, virtualiter in se omnia praehabens, ut dicit +Dionysius. Unde participatur a rebus, non sicut pars, sed secundum +diffusionem processionis ipsius. Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva +actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, qui +procedunt a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes +eius, sunt diversi. Unde non potest esse potentia una quae recipiat +omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens omnes actus +participatos, alioquin potentia receptiva adaequaret potentiam +activam primi actus. Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima +intellectiva, a potentia receptiva materiae primae, ut patet ex +diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas +individuales, intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas. Unde +talis potentia in anima intellectiva existens, non ostendit quod +anima sit composita ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality + of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of + subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason + of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31485] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod subiici et transmutari convenit materiae secundum +quod est in potentia. Sicut ergo est alia potentia intellectus, et +alia potentia materiae primae, ita est alia ratio subiiciendi et +transmutandi. Secundum hoc enim intellectus subiicitur scientiae, +et transmutatur de ignorantia ad scientiam, secundum quod est in +potentia ad species intelligibiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it + by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor + has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in + things composed of matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from + potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once." [*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter + sunt quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam + est . . . et ens quiddam."] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31486] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod forma est causa essendi materiae, et agens, unde +agens, inquantum reducit materiam in actum formae transmutando, est +ei causa essendi. Si quid autem est forma subsistens, non habet +esse per aliquod formale principium, nec habet causam transmutantem +de potentia in actum. Unde post verba praemissa, philosophus +concludit quod in his quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, +<i>nulla est alia causa nisi movens ex potestate ad actum, +quaecumque vero non habent materiam, omnia simpliciter sunt quod +vere entia aliquid</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per + se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as + Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, + Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances + there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. + Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that + by which a thing is. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="31487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31487] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus +eius. Quaecumque autem forma creata per se subsistens ponatur, +oportet quod participet esse, quia etiam ipsa vita, vel quidquid +sic diceretur, participat ipsum esse, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de +Div. Nom. Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem +participantis. Unde solus Deus, qui est ipsum suum esse, est actus +purus et infinitus. In substantiis vero intellectualibus est +compositio ex actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed +ex forma et esse participato. Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex +quo est et quod est, ipsum enim esse est quo aliquid est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A6-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 6. Whether the human soul is incorruptible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have + a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process + of life is alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast," as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv">Eccles. 3:19</a>). Therefore, as the same text concludes, "the death of man + and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the + human soul is corruptible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31488] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana sit corruptibilis. Quorum +enim est simile principium et similis processus, videtur esse +similis finis. Sed simile est principium generationis hominum et +iumentorum, quia de terra facta sunt. Similis est etiam vitae +processus in utrisque, quia <i>similiter spirant omnia, et nihil +habet homo iumento amplius</i>, ut dicitur Eccle. III. Ergo, ut +ibidem concluditur, <i>unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum, et +aequa utriusque conditio</i>. Sed anima brutorum animalium est +corruptibilis. Ergo et anima humana est corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.2" target="asv">Wis. 2:2</a>), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the + same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even as to our soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31489] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod est ex nihilo, vertibile est in nihilum, quia finis debet +respondere principio. Sed sicut dicitur Sap. II, <i>ex nihilo nati +sumus</i>, quod verum est non solum quantum ad corpus, sed etiam +quantum ad animam. Ergo ut ibidem concluditur, post hoc erimus +tanquam non fuerimus, etiam secundum animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through + a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without + the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31490] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulla +res est sine propria operatione. Sed propria operatio animae, quae +est intelligere cum phantasmate, non potest esse sine corpore, +nihil enim sine phantasmate intelligit anima; phantasma autem non +est sine corpore, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo anima non +potest remanere, destructo corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an + incorruptible substantial life." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31491] Iª q. 75 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod animae humanae +habent ex bonitate divina quod sint intellectuales et quod habeant +substantialem vitam inconsumptibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted + in two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, + that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence + belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, + whatever has existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se'; while things which do not subsist, such + as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now + it was shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q75_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, + when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted + unless it were corrupted "per se." This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything + subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; + but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires + the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be + separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist. + </p><p id="FP_Q75_A6-p7"> Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that + it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries + and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now + there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its + existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves + contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. + Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, + in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the + conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything + that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual + substance is incorruptible. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 co."><a name="31492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31492] Iª q. 75 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere animam humanam, quam dicimus intellectivum +principium, esse incorruptibilem. Dupliciter enim aliquid +corrumpitur, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Impossibile +est autem aliquid subsistens generari aut corrumpi per accidens, +idest aliquo generato vel corrupto. Sic enim competit alicui +generari et corrumpi, sicut et esse, quod per generationem +acquiritur et per corruptionem amittitur. Unde quod per se habet +esse, non potest generari vel corrumpi nisi per se, quae vero non +subsistunt, ut accidentia et formae materiales, dicuntur fieri et +corrumpi per generationem et corruptionem compositorum. Ostensum +est autem supra quod animae brutorum non sunt per se subsistentes, +sed sola anima humana. Unde animae brutorum corrumpuntur, corruptis +corporibus, anima autem humana non posset corrumpi, nisi per se +corrumperetur. Quod quidem omnino est impossibile non solum de +ipsa, sed de quolibet subsistente quod est forma tantum. Manifestum +est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparabile +ab ipso. Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde +materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam, +secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab +ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa. Unde +impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse. Dato etiam quod +anima esset ex materia et forma composita, ut quidam dicunt, adhuc +oporteret ponere eam incorruptibilem. Non enim invenitur corruptio +nisi ubi invenitur contrarietas, generationes enim et corruptiones +ex contrariis et in contraria sunt; unde corpora caelestia, quia +non habent materiam contrarietati subiectam, incorruptibilia sunt. +In anima autem intellectiva non potest esse aliqua contrarietas. +Recipit enim secundum modum sui esse, ea vero quae in ipsa +recipiuntur, sunt absque contrarietate; quia etiam rationes +contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, sed est una +scientia contrariorum. Impossibile est ergo quod anima intellectiva +sit corruptibilis. Potest etiam huius rei accipi signum ex hoc, +quod unumquodque naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium +autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Sensus autem +non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc, sed intellectus +apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne +habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper. Naturale +autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur intellectualis +substantia est incorruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2" target="asv">Wisdom 2</a>. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike + are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas + the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the + living soul" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.24" target="asv">Gn. 1:24</a>): while of man it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>) that "He breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: + "(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it." Again the process + of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv">Eccles. 3:19</a>): "All things breathe alike," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.2" target="asv">Wis. + 2:2 + </a>), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals + are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not + as to the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31493] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Salomon inducit rationem illam ex persona +insipientium, ut exprimitur Sap. II. Quod ergo dicitur quod homo et +alia animalia habent simile generationis principium, verum est +quantum ad corpus, similiter enim de terra facta sunt omnia +animalia. Non autem quantum ad animam, nam anima brutorum +producitur ex virtute aliqua corporea, anima vero humana a Deo. Et +ad hoc significandum dicitur Gen., quantum ad alia animalia, +producat terra animam viventem, quantum vero ad hominem, dicitur +quod inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae. Et ideo +concluditur Eccle. ult., <i>revertatur pulvis in terram suam, unde +erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum qui dedit illum</i>. Similiter +processus vitae est similis quantum ad corpus; ad quod pertinet +quod dicitur in Eccle., <i>similiter spirant omnia</i>; et Sap. II, +<i>fumus et flatus est in naribus nostris</i> et cetera. Sed non +est similis processus quantum ad animam, quia homo intelligit, non +autem animalia bruta. Unde falsum est quod dicitur, nihil habet +homo iumento amplius. Et ideo similis est interitus quantum ad +corpus, sed non quantum ad animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who + can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature + a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible + because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31494] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut posse creari dicitur aliquid non per potentiam +passivam, sed solum per potentiam activam creantis, qui ex nihilo +potest aliquid producere; ita cum dicitur aliquid vertibile in +nihil, non importatur in creatura potentia ad non esse, sed in +creatore potentia ad hoc quod esse non influat. Dicitur autem +aliquid corruptibile per hoc, quod inest ei potentia ad non +esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation + from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear + later on ( + <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q75_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[89], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31495] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intelligere cum phantasmate est propria operatio +animae secundum quod corpori est unita. Separata autem a corpore +habebit alium modum intelligendi, similem aliis substantiis a +corpore separatis, ut infra melius patebit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A7-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 7. Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature + of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel---namely, + eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31496] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima et Angelus sint unius speciei. +Unumquodque enim ordinatur ad proprium finem per naturam suae +speciei, per quam habet inclinationem ad finem. Sed idem est finis +animae et Angeli, scilicet beatitudo aeterna. Ergo sunt unius +speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing + nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate + specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31497] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ultima differentia specifica est nobilissima, quia complet rationem +speciei. Sed nihil est nobilius in Angelo et anima quam +intellectuale esse. Ergo conveniunt anima et Angelus in ultima +differentia specifica. Ergo sunt unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside + the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31498] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima +ab Angelo differre non videtur nisi per hoc, quod est corpori +unita. Corpus autem, cum sit extra essentiam animae, non videtur ad +eius speciem pertinere. Ergo anima et Angelus sunt unius +speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an + angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), "Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering + their knowledge of Divine things from visible things." Subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the + soul and an angel are not of the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31499] Iª q. 75 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quorum sunt diversae operationes naturales, ipsa differunt specie. +Sed animae et Angeli sunt diversae operationes naturales, quia ut +dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., <i>mentes angelicae +simplices et beatos intellectus habent, non de visibilibus +congregantes divinam cognitionem</i>; cuius contrarium postmodum de +anima dicit. Anima igitur et Angelus non sunt unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that + in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above ( + <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and + inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of + matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a + separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, + it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity + of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and + the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a "genus" are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, + are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the "principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," + as is written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. + For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of + the distinction of matter---that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even + then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction + of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these + incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the + same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>, ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 co."><a name="31500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31500] Iª q. 75 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Origenes posuit omnes animas humanas et Angelos esse unius +speciei. Et hoc ideo, quia posuit diversitatem gradus in huiusmodi +substantiis inventam, accidentalem, utpote ex libero arbitrio +provenientem, ut supra dictum est. Quod non potest esse, quia in +substantiis incorporeis non potest esse diversitas secundum numerum +absque diversitate secundum speciem, et absque naturali +inaequalitate. Quia si non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sed +sint formae subsistentes, manifestum est quod necesse erit in eis +esse diversitatem in specie. Non enim potest intelligi quod aliqua +forma separata sit nisi una unius speciei, sicut si esset albedo +separata, non posset esse nisi una tantum; haec enim albedo non +differt ab illa nisi per hoc, quod est huius vel illius. Diversitas +autem secundum speciem semper habet diversitatem naturalem +concomitantem, sicut in speciebus colorum unus est perfectior +altero, et similiter in aliis. Et hoc ideo, quia differentiae +dividentes genus sunt contrariae; contraria autem se habent +secundum perfectum et imperfectum, quia principium contrarietatis +est privatio et habitus ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Idem etiam +sequeretur, si huiusmodi substantiae essent compositae ex materia +et forma. Si enim materia huius distinguitur a materia illius, +necesse est quod vel forma sit principium distinctionis materiae, +ut scilicet materiae sint diversae propter habitudinem ad diversas +formas, et tunc sequitur adhuc diversitas secundum speciem et +inaequalitas naturalis. Vel materia erit principium distinctionis +formarum; nec poterit dici materia haec alia ab illa, nisi secundum +divisionem quantitativam, quae non habet locum in substantiis +incorporeis, cuiusmodi sunt Angelus et anima. Unde non potest esse +quod Angelus et anima sint unius speciei. Quomodo autem sint plures +animae unius speciei infra ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31501] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fine proximo et naturali. +Beatitudo autem aeterna est finis ultimus et supernaturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler + than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many + degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible + things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one + species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31502] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod differentia specifica ultima est nobilissima, +inquantum est maxime determinata, per modum quo actus est nobilior +potentia. Sic autem intellectuale non est nobilissimum, quia est +indeterminatum et commune ad multos intellectualitatis gradus, +sicut sensibile ad multos gradus in esse sensibili. Unde sicut non +omnia sensibilia sunt unius speciei, ita nec omnia +intellectualia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, + properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way + requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an + angel, who is not united to a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31503] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod corpus non est de essentia animae, sed anima ex +natura suae essentiae habet quod sit corpori unibilis. Unde nec +proprie anima est in specie; sed compositum. Et hoc ipsum quod +anima quodammodo indiget corpore ad suam operationem, ostendit quod +anima tenet inferiorem gradum intellectualitatis quam Angelus, qui +corpori non unitur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q76" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q76-p0.1">Q. 76. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q76-p2"> We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q76-p3"><a href="#FP_Q76_A1"> (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p4"><a href="#FP_Q76_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence + for all men? + </a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p5"><a href="#FP_Q76_A3"> (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p6"><a href="#FP_Q76_A4"> (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p7"><a href="#FP_Q76_A5"> (5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p8"><a href="#FP_Q76_A6"> (6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p9"><a href="#FP_Q76_A7"> (7) Whether by means of an accident?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p10"><a href="#FP_Q76_A8"> (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 pr."><a name="31504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31504] +Iª q. 76 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de unione +animae ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum +intellectivum principium uniatur corpori ut forma. Secundo, utrum +intellectivum principium numero multiplicetur secundum +multiplicationem corporum; vel sit unus intellectus omnium hominum. +Tertio, utrum in corpore cuius forma est principium intellectivum, +sit aliqua alia anima. Quarto, utrum sit in eo aliqua alia forma +substantialis. Quinto, quale debeat esse corpus cuius intellectivum +principium est forma. Sexto, utrum tali corpori uniatur mediante +aliquo alio corpore. Septimo, utrum mediante aliquo accidente. +Octavo, utrum anima sit tota in qualibet parte corporis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q76_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A1-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 1. Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) + that the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31505] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectivum principium non uniatur +corpori ut forma. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod +intellectus est separatus, et quod nullius corporis est actus. Non +ergo unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion + would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body + has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of + knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>); + which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31506] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +forma determinatur secundum naturam materiae cuius est forma, +alioquin non requireretur proportio inter materiam et formam. Si +ergo intellectus uniretur corpori ut forma, cum omne corpus habeat +determinatam naturam, sequeretur quod intellectus haberet +determinatam naturam. Et sic non esset omnium cognoscitivus, ut ex +superioribus patet, quod est contra rationem intellectus. Non ergo +intellectus unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received + must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the + intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable + of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. + Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31507] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quaecumque potentia receptiva est actus alicuius corporis, recipit +formam materialiter et individualiter, quia receptum est in +recipiente secundum modum recipientis. Sed forma rei intellectae +non recipitur in intellectu materialiter et individualiter, sed +magis immaterialiter et universaliter, alioquin intellectus non +esset cognoscitivus immaterialium et universalium, sed singularium +tantum, sicut et sensus. Intellectus ergo non unitur corpori ut +forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action + is not the action of a body, as appears from above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more + simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the + form + of a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31508] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +eiusdem est potentia et actio, idem enim est quod potest agere, et +quod agit. Sed actio intellectualis non est alicuius corporis, ut +ex superioribus patet. Ergo nec potentia intellectiva est alicuius +corporis potentia. Sed virtus sive potentia non potest esse +abstractior vel simplicior quam essentia a qua virtus vel potentia +derivatur. Ergo nec substantia intellectus est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever has "per se" existence is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: + so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intellectual principle has "per se" existence + and is subsistent, as was said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31509] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod per se habet esse, non unitur corpori ut forma, quia forma est +quo aliquid est; et sic ipsum esse formae non est ipsius formae +secundum se. Sed intellectivum principium habet secundum se esse, +et est subsistens, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo unitur corpori ut +forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the + form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise + matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its + own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was + shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A6" id="FP_Q76_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[6]</a>), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to + the body as its form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="31510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31510] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod inest alicui rei secundum se, semper inest ei. Sed formae +secundum se inest uniri materiae, non enim per accidens aliquod, +sed per essentiam suam est actus materiae; alioquin ex materia et +forma non fieret unum substantialiter, sed accidentaliter. Forma +ergo non potest esse sine propria materia. Sed intellectivum +principium, cum sit incorruptibile, ut supra ostensum est, remanet +corpori non unitum, corpore corrupto. Ergo intellectivum principium +non unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes + man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle + is the form of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31511] Iª q. 76 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +secundum philosophum, in VIII Metaphys., differentia sumitur a +forma rei. Sed differentia constitutiva hominis est rationale; quod +dicitur de homine ratione intellectivi principii. Intellectivum +ergo principium est forma hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that + whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a + body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the + body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as + it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body + lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily + perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, + and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether + it + be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De + Anima ii, 2). + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p10"> But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action + of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an + action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move + or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a + man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental + to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to + him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either + that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or + that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A4" id="FP_Q76_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one + cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which + Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p11"> The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, + and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked + to the body of this or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of + the intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive + faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the + intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of + colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colors, + the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say + that + the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, + it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p12"> Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and + body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. + First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation + of the intellect. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his + intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly, because since Socrates + is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that + it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act + of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action + of + understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action + of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore + if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to + an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a + corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the + action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do + not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the + action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect + with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows + that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is + one. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p13"> There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle---namely, that this particular man understands, + because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual + principle is united to the body as its form. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p14"> The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. + Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle + concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man + must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything + is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p15"> But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, + and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation + not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power + of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the + sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal + matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This + power is called the intellect. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p16"> It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could + the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed + of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part + of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the + "primary animate," as was said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q76_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 co."><a name="31512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31512] Iª q. 76 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis +operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo +primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuitur, +sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et quo primo scit +anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma corporis, et scientia +animae. Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est +actu, unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod +primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur +secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id +quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima, anima +enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum +locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo +primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima +intellectiva, est forma corporis. Et haec est demonstratio +Aristotelis in II de anima. Si quis autem velit dicere animam +intellectivam non esse corporis formam, oportet quod inveniat modum +quo ista actio quae est intelligere, sit huius hominis actio, +experitur enim unusquisque seipsum esse qui intelligit. Attribuitur +autem aliqua actio alicui tripliciter, ut patet per philosophum, V +Physic., dicitur enim movere aliquid aut agere vel secundum se +totum, sicut medicus sanat; aut secundum partem, sicut homo videt +per oculum; aut per accidens, sicut dicitur quod album aedificat, +quia accidit aedificatori esse album. Cum igitur dicimus Socratem +aut Platonem intelligere, manifestum est quod non attribuitur ei +per accidens, attribuitur enim ei inquantum est homo, quod +essentialiter praedicatur de ipso. Aut ergo oportet dicere quod +Socrates intelligit secundum se totum, sicut Plato posuit, dicens +hominem esse animam intellectivam, aut oportet dicere quod +intellectus sit aliqua pars Socratis. Et primum quidem stare non +potest, ut supra ostensum est, propter hoc quod ipse idem homo est +qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire, sentire autem non est +sine corpore, unde oportet corpus aliquam esse hominis partem. +Relinquitur ergo quod intellectus quo Socrates intelligit, est +aliqua pars Socratis ita quod intellectus aliquo modo corpori +Socratis uniatur. Hanc autem unionem Commentator, in III de anima, +dicit esse per speciem intelligibilem. Quae quidem habet duplex +subiectum, unum scilicet intellectum possibilem; et aliud ipsa +phantasmata quae sunt in organis corporeis. Et sic per speciem +intelligibilem continuatur intellectus possibilis corpori huius vel +illius hominis. Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit ad hoc +quod actio intellectus sit actio Socratis. Et hoc patet per +similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit ad +considerandum ea quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se habent +phantasmata ad intellectum, ut dicitur in III de anima, sicut +colores ad visum. Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita +species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod +ex hoc quod colores sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt in +visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti, non enim dicimus quod +paries videat, sed magis quod videatur. Ex hoc ergo quod species +phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili, non sequitur quod +Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat; sed quod ipse, vel +eius phantasmata intelligantur. Quidam autem dicere voluerunt quod +intellectus unitur corpori ut motor; et sic ex intellectu et +corpore fit unum, ut actio intellectus toti attribui possit. Sed +hoc est multipliciter vanum. Primo quidem, quia intellectus non +movet corpus nisi per appetitum, cuius motus praesupponit +operationem intellectus. Non ergo quia movetur Socrates ab +intellectu, ideo intelligit, sed potius e converso, quia +intelligit, ideo ab intellectu movetur Socrates. Secundo quia, cum +Socrates sit quoddam individuum in natura cuius essentia est una, +composita ex materia et forma; si intellectus non sit forma eius, +sequitur quod sit praeter essentiam eius; et sic intellectus +comparabitur ad totum Socratem sicut motor ad motum. Intelligere +autem est actio quiescens in agente, non autem transiens in +alterum, sicut calefactio. Non ergo intelligere potest attribui +Socrati propter hoc quod est motus ab intellectu. Tertio, quia +actio motoris nunquam attribuitur moto nisi sicut instrumento, +sicut actio carpentarii serrae. Si igitur intelligere attribuitur +Socrati quia est actio motoris eius, sequitur quod attribuatur ei +sicut instrumento. Quod est contra philosophum, qui vult quod +intelligere non sit per instrumentum corporeum. Quarto quia, licet +actio partis attribuatur toti, ut actio oculi homini; nunquam tamen +attribuitur alii parti, nisi forte per accidens, non enim dicimus +quod manus videat, propter hoc quod oculus videt. Si ergo ex +intellectu et Socrate dicto modo fit unum, actio intellectus non +potest attribui Socrati. Si vero Socrates est totum quod componitur +ex unione intellectus ad reliqua quae sunt Socratis, et tamen +intellectus non unitur aliis quae sunt Socratis nisi sicut motor; +sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter, et per consequens +nec ens simpliciter; sic enim aliquid est ens, quomodo et unum. +Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit, quod hic homo +intelligit, quia principium intellectivum est forma ipsius. Sic +ergo ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet quod intellectivum +principium unitur corpori ut forma. Potest etiam idem manifestari +ex ratione speciei humanae. Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius +operatione ostenditur. Propria autem operatio hominis, inquantum +est homo, est intelligere, per hanc enim omnia animalia +transcendit. Unde et Aristoteles, in libro Ethic., in hac +operatione, sicut in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem +constituit. Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem +sortiatur, quod est huius operationis principium. Sortitur autem +unumquodque speciem per propriam formam. Relinquitur ergo quod +intellectivum principium sit propria hominis forma. Sed +considerandum est quod, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto magis +dominatur materiae corporali, et minus ei immergitur, et magis sua +operatione vel virtute excedit eam. Unde videmus quod forma mixti +corporis habet aliquam operationem quae non causatur ex +qualitatibus elementaribus. Et quanto magis proceditur in +nobilitate formarum, tanto magis invenitur virtus formae materiam +elementarem excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus quam forma +metalli, et anima sensibilis plus quam anima vegetabilis. Anima +autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde intantum sua +virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod habet aliquam operationem +et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis. Et +haec virtus dicitur intellectus. Est autem attendendum quod, si +quis poneret animam componi ex materia et forma, nullo modo posset +dicere animam esse formam corporis. Cum enim forma sit actus, +materia vero sit ens in potentia tantum; nullo modo id quod est ex +materia et forma compositum, potest esse alterius forma secundum se +totum. Si autem secundum aliquid sui sit forma, id quod est forma +dicimus animam, et id cuius est forma dicimus primum animatum, ut +supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is + directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from + matter." It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal + organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act + which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, + to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima + iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31513] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic., ultima +formarum naturalium, ad quam terminatur consideratio philosophi +naturalis, scilicet anima humana, est quidem separata, sed tamen in +materia; quod ex hoc probat, quia homo ex materia generat hominem, +et sol. Separata quidem est secundum virtutem intellectivam, quia +virtus intellectiva non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis, +sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi intelligere enim est actus qui +non potest exerceri per organum corporale, sicut exercetur visio. +Sed in materia est inquantum ipsa anima cuius est haec virtus, est +corporis forma, et terminus generationis humanae. Sic ergo +philosophus dicit in III de anima quod intellectus est separatus, +quia non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p18"> <b>Reply to Objections 2 + & 3:</b> From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all + things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient + that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31514] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet +responsio ad secundum et tertium. Sufficit enim ad hoc quod homo +possit intelligere omnia per intellectum, et ad hoc quod +intellectus intelligat immaterialia et universalia, quod virtus +intellectiva non est corporis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there + is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31515] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod humana anima non est forma in materia corporali +immersa, vel ab ea totaliter comprehensa, propter suam +perfectionem. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam eius virtutem non esse +corporis actum; quamvis anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis +forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul + there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is + not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution + of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31516] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat +materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod +illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae. Quod +non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter +hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore, non autem +aliae formae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be + raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination + for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and + a natural inclination to be united to the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="31517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31517] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri, sicut secundum se +convenit corpori levi esse sursum. Et sicut corpus leve manet +quidem leve cum a loco proprio fuerit separatum, cum aptitudine +tamen et inclinatione ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in +suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et +inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A2-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 2. Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one + intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an + immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one species. + Therefore there is but one intellect in all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31518] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectivum principium non multiplicetur +secundum multiplicationem corporum, sed sit unus intellectus in +omnibus hominibus. Nulla enim substantia immaterialis multiplicatur +secundum numerum in una specie. Anima autem humana est substantia +immaterialis, non enim est composita ex materia et forma, ut supra +ostensum est. Non ergo sunt multae in una specie. Sed omnes homines +sunt unius speciei. Est ergo unus intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the + number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there + would be but a single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31519] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +remota causa, removetur effectus. Si ergo secundum multiplicationem +corporum multiplicarentur animae humanae, consequens videretur +quod, remotis corporibus, multitudo animarum non remaneret, sed ex +omnibus animabus remaneret aliquod unum solum. Quod est haereticum, +periret enim differentia praemiorum et poenarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals + are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according + to the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also + into yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31520] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +intellectus meus est alius ab intellectu tuo, intellectus meus est +quoddam individuum, et similiter intellectus tuus, particularia +enim sunt quae differunt numero et conveniunt in una specie. Sed +omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. +Ergo species rerum in intellectu meo et tuo reciperentur +individualiter, quod est contra rationem intellectus, qui est +cognoscitivus universalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, + what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something + individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; + since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is + contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, + therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="31521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31521] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectum est in intellectu intelligente. Si ergo intellectus +meus est alius ab intellectu tuo, oportet quod aliud sit +intellectum a me, et aliud sit intellectum a te. Et ita erit +individualiter numeratum, et intellectum in potentia tantum, et +oportebit abstrahere intentionem communem ab utroque, quia a +quibuslibet diversis contingit abstrahere aliquod commune +intelligibile. Quod est contra rationem intellectus, quia sic non +videretur distingui intellectus a virtute imaginativa. Videtur ergo +relinqui quod sit unus intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge + in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, + that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is + one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and + master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="31522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31522] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, cum +discipulus accipit scientiam a magistro, non potest dici quod +scientia magistri generet scientiam in discipulo, quia sic etiam +scientia esset forma activa, sicut calor; quod patet esse falsum. +Videtur ergo quod eadem numero scientia quae est in magistro, +communicetur discipulo. Quod esse non potest, nisi sit unus +intellectus utriusque. Videtur ergo quod sit unus intellectus +discipuli et magistri; et per consequens omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself." + But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect of all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="31523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31523] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de quantitate animae, <i>si plures +tantum animas humanas dixerim, ipse me ridebo</i>. Sed maxime +videtur anima esse una quantum ad intellectum. Ergo est unus +intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular + causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of different species. Therefore + it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31524] Iª q. 76 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod sicut se habent causae +universales ad universalia, ita se habent causae particulares ad +particularia. Sed impossibile est quod una anima secundum speciem, +sit diversorum animalium secundum speciem. Ergo impossibile est +quod anima intellectiva una numero, sit diversorum secundum +numerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect + itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by + something outside the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with + a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p10"> It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that + the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct individuals + to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p11"> Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. + For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, + but several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. + If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that + there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many + drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one + action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how + the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain + to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several + intellects and one sense---for instance, if two men had one eye---there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there + is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way + is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to + understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further + follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one + act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p12"> However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasms---that + is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you---if the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me + and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers + actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the + phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that + is a form. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; + as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species + of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, + notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms + which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, + therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 co."><a name="31525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31525] Iª q. 76 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod intellectum esse unum omnium hominum, omnino est impossibile. +Et hoc quidem patet, si, secundum Platonis sententiam homo sit ipse +intellectus. Sequeretur enim, si Socratis et Platonis est unus +intellectus tantum, quod Socrates et Plato sint unus homo; et quod +non distinguantur ab invicem nisi per hoc quod est extra essentiam +utriusque. Et erit tunc distinctio Socratis et Platonis non alia +quam hominis tunicati et cappati, quod est omnino absurdum. +Similiter etiam patet hoc esse impossibile, si, secundum sententiam +Aristotelis, intellectus ponatur pars, seu potentia, animae quae +est hominis forma. Impossibile est enim plurium numero diversorum +esse unam formam, sicut impossibile est quod eorum sit unum esse, +nam forma est essendi principium. Similiter etiam patet hoc esse +impossibile quocumque modo quis ponat unionem intellectus ad hunc +et ad illum hominem. Manifestum est enim quod, si sit unum +principale agens et duo instrumenta, dici poterit unum agens +simpliciter, sed plures actiones, sicut si unus homo tangat diversa +duabus manibus, erit unus tangens, sed duo tactus. Si vero e +converso instrumentum sit unum et principales agentes diversi, +dicentur quidem plures agentes, sed una actio, sicut si multi uno +fune trahant navem, erunt multi trahentes, sed unus tractus. Si +vero agens principale sit unum et instrumentum unum, dicetur unum +agens et una actio, sicut cum faber uno martello percutit, est unus +percutiens et una percussio. Manifestum est autem quod, +qualitercumque intellectus seu uniatur seu copuletur huic vel illi +homini, intellectus inter cetera quae ad hominem pertinent, +principalitatem habet, obediunt enim vires sensitivae intellectui, +et ei deserviunt. Si ergo poneretur quod essent plures intellectus +et sensus unus duorum hominum, puta si duo homines haberent unum +oculum; essent quidem plures videntes, sed una visio. Si vero +intellectus est unus, quantumcumque diversificentur alia quibus +omnibus intellectus utitur quasi instrumentis, nullo modo Socrates +et Plato poterunt dici nisi unus intelligens. Et si addamus quod +ipsum intelligere, quod est actio intellectus, non fit per aliquod +aliud organum, nisi per ipsum intellectum; sequetur ulterius quod +sit et agens unum et actio una; idest quod omnes homines sint unus +intelligens, et unum intelligere; dico autem respectu eiusdem +intelligibilis. Posset autem diversificari actio intellectualis mea +et tua per diversitatem phantasmatum, quia scilicet aliud est +phantasma lapidis in me et aliud in te, si ipsum phantasma, +secundum quod est aliud in me et aliud in te, esset forma +intellectus possibilis, quia idem agens secundum diversas formas +producit diversas actiones, sicut secundum diversas formas rerum +respectu eiusdem oculi sunt diversae visiones. Sed ipsum phantasma +non est forma intellectus possibilis, sed species intelligibilis +quae a phantasmatibus abstrahitur. In uno autem intellectu a +phantasmatibus diversis eiusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi una +species intelligibilis. Sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo possunt +esse diversa phantasmata lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eis +abstrahitur una species intelligibilis lapidis, per quam +intellectus unius hominis operatione una intelligit naturam +lapidis, non obstante diversitate phantasmatum. Si ergo unus +intellectus esset omnium hominum, diversitas phantasmatum quae sunt +in hoc et in illo, non posset causare diversitatem intellectualis +operationis huius et illius hominis, ut Commentator fingit in III +de anima. Relinquitur ergo quod omnino impossibile et inconveniens +est ponere unum intellectum omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; + in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while + it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31526] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, licet anima intellectiva non habeat materiam ex qua +sit, sicut nec Angelus, tamen est forma materiae alicuius; quod +Angelo non convenit. Et ideo secundum divisionem materiae sunt +multae animae unius speciei, multi autem Angeli unius speciei +omnino esse non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Everything has unity in the same way that it has being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge + of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; + yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. In like manner the multiplicity of souls + is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of + the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31527] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unumquodque hoc modo habet unitatem, quo habet esse, +et per consequens idem est iudicium de multiplicatione rei, et de +esse ipsius. Manifestum est autem quod anima intellectualis, +secundum suum esse, unitur corpori ut forma; et tamen, destructo +corpore, remanet anima intellectualis in suo esse. Et eadem ratione +multitudo animarum est secundum multitudinem corporum; et tamen, +destructis corporibus, remanent animae in suo esse +multiplicatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; + otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. + But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every + action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent + acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower + knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which + come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material---that is, not abstracted from material + conditions---its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication + of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. + But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without + those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as + to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily + be + an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31528] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod individuatio intelligentis, aut speciei per quam +intelligit, non excludit intelligentiam universalium, alioquin, cum +intellectus separati sint quaedam substantiae subsistentes, et per +consequens particulares, non possent universalia intelligere. Sed +materialitas cognoscentis et speciei per quam cognoscitur, +universalis cognitionem impedit. Sicut enim omnis actio est +secundum modum formae qua agens agit, ut calefactio secundum modum +caloris; ita cognitio est secundum modum speciei qua cognoscens +cognoscit. Manifestum est autem quod natura communis distinguitur +et multiplicatur secundum principia individuantia, quae sunt ex +parte materiae. Si ergo forma per quam fit cognitio, sit +materialis, non abstracta a conditionibus materiae, erit similitudo +naturae speciei aut generis, secundum quod est distincta et +multiplicata per principia individuantia, et ita non poterit +cognosci natura rei in sua communitate. Si vero species sit +abstracta a conditionibus materiae individualis, erit similitudo +naturae absque iis quae ipsam distinguunt et multiplicant, et ita +cognoscetur universale. Nec refert, quantum ad hoc, utrum sit unus +intellectus vel plures, quia si etiam esset unus tantum, oporteret +ipsum esse aliquem quendam, et speciem per quam intelligit esse +aliquam quandam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according + to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De + Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect + on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only + intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And + since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing + may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according + to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there is this difference, + according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence---that a thing is perceived by the sense according + to the disposition which it has outside the soul ---that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood + is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which + it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its + mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in + the same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="31529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31529] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sive intellectus sit unus sive plures, id quod +intelligitur est unum. Id enim quod intelligitur non est in +intellectu secundum se, sed secundum suam similitudinem, <i>lapis +enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis</i>, ut dicitur in III +de anima. Et tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem +species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra seipsum, +alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus +intelligibilibus. Contingit autem eidem rei diversa secundum +diversas formas assimilari. Et quia cognitio fit secundum +assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, sequitur quod idem a +diversis cognoscentibus cognosci contingit, ut patet in sensu, nam +plures vident eundem colorem, secundum diversas similitudines. Et +similiter plures intellectus intelligunt unam rem intellectam. Sed +hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum +sententiam Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam +dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua particularitate, +natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed +non habet illum modum essendi extra animam, secundum quem +intelligitur. Intelligitur enim natura communis seclusis principiis +individuantibus; non autem hunc modum essendi habet extra animam. +Sed secundum sententiam Platonis, res intellecta eo modo est extra +animam quo intelligitur, posuit enim naturas rerum a materia +separatas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q117_A1" id="FP_Q76_A2-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[117], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="31530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31530] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod scientia alia est in discipulo, et alia in magistro. +Quomodo autem causetur, in sequentibus ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="31531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31531] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod Augustinus intelligit animas non esse plures tantum, quin +uniantur in una ratione speciei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A3-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 3. Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such + as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual + soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A6" id="FP_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[6]</a>). Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual + soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31532] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod praeter animam intellectivam sint in +homine aliae animae per essentiam differentes, scilicet sensitiva +et nutritiva. Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile non sunt unius +substantiae. Sed anima intellectiva est incorruptibilis; aliae vero +animae, scilicet sensitiva et nutritiva, sunt corruptibiles, ut ex +superioribus patet. Ergo in homine non potest esse una essentia +animae intellectivae et sensitivae et nutritivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ + generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute + animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be + of the same "genus." Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, + therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31533] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod +anima sensitiva in homine est incorruptibilis, <i>contra, +corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt secundum genus</i>, ut +dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed anima sensitiva in equo et leone et +aliis brutis animalibus est corruptibilis. Si igitur in homine sit +incorruptibilis, non erit eiusdem generis anima sensitiva in homine +et bruto. Animal autem dicitur ex eo quod habet animam sensitivam. +Neque ergo animal erit unum genus commune hominis et aliorum +animalium. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div + class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p3a"><!-- Added by HST, missing +in original, copied from + http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques76.pdf --><b>Objection 3:</b> In <i>De Generatione Animalium</i> the Philosopher claims that the embryo is an animal +before being a man. But this cannot be the case if the same essence belongs to both the sentient soul and +the intellective soul, since something is an animal through the sentient soul and a man through the +intellective soul. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the sentient and intellective souls have a +single essence.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31534] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod embryo prius +est animal quam homo. Sed hoc esse non posset, si esset eadem +essentia animae sensitivae et intellectivae, est enim animal per +animam sensitivam, homo vero per animam intellectivam. Non ergo in +homine est una essentia animae sensitivae et intellectivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p4"><!-- labelled Objection 3 in +the original --> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the + form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" + by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated + by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is + not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31535] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod genus sumitur a materia, +differentia vero a forma. Sed rationale, quod est differentia +constitutiva hominis, sumitur ab anima intellectiva; animal vero +dicitur ex hoc quod habet corpus animatum anima sensitiva. Anima +ergo intellectiva comparatur ad corpus animatum anima sensitiva, +sicut forma ad materiam. Non ergo anima intellectiva est eadem per +essentiam cum anima sensitiva in homine; sed praesupponit eam sicut +materiale suppositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and + other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, + which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united + to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31536] Iª q. 76 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., <i>neque duas animas esse +dicimus in homine uno, sicut Iacobus et alii Syrorum scribunt, unam +animalem, qua animatur corpus, et immixta sit sanguini, et alteram +spiritualem, quae rationi ministret, sed dicimus unam et eandem +esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificat, et +semetipsam sua ratione disponit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different + vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge + in the brain. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal + organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have + been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if + the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. + But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only logically" distinct from the other + parts of the soul, "or also locally." + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p7"> The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, + but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less + if it be moved according to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it + is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three + different reasons. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p8"> In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one + except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and + therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, "a white man." If, therefore, + man were 'living' by one form, the vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the sensitive soul, and + "man" by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. + viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal + is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima + i, 5), "what contains them?"---that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because + rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p9"> Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things which are + derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, + as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms + are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is + presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) + Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows either that + one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered + to one another---or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential + predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal" is + predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way + about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which + is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p10"> Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which + could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p11"> We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically + one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species + and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more + perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these + genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to + numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls + to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual + soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. + Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another---since + a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal---so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal + by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 co."><a name="31537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31537] Iª q. 76 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Plato posuit diversas animas esse in corpore uno, etiam +secundum organa distinctas, quibus diversa opera vitae attribuebat; +dicens vim nutritivam esse in hepate, concupiscibilem in corde, +cognoscitivam in cerebro. Quam quidem opinionem Aristoteles +reprobat, in libro de anima, quantum ad illas animae partes quae +corporeis organis in suis operibus utuntur, ex hoc quod in +animalibus quae decisa vivunt, in qualibet parte inveniuntur +diversae operationes animae, sicut sensus et appetitus. Hoc autem +non esset, si diversa principia operationum animae, tanquam per +essentiam diversae, diversis partibus corporis distributa essent. +Sed de intellectiva sub dubio videtur relinquere utrum sit separata +ab aliis partibus animae solum ratione, an etiam loco. Opinio autem +Platonis sustineri utique posset, si poneretur quod anima unitur +corpori, non ut forma, sed ut motor, ut posuit Plato. Nihil enim +inconveniens sequitur, si idem mobile a diversis motoribus +moveatur, praecipue secundum diversas partes. Sed si ponamus animam +corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossibile videtur plures +animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. Quod quidem +triplici ratione manifestari potest. Primo quidem, quia animal non +esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae plures. Nihil enim est +simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab +eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae +denominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut +homo albus. Si igitur homo ab alia forma haberet quod sit vivum, +scilicet ab anima vegetabili; et ab alia forma quod sit animal, +scilicet ab anima sensibili; et ab alia quod sit homo, scilicet ab +anima rationali; sequeretur quod homo non esset unum simpliciter, +sicut et Aristoteles argumentatur contra Platonem, in VIII +Metaphys., quod si alia esset idea animalis, et alia bipedis, non +esset unum simpliciter animal bipes. Et propter hoc, in I de anima, +contra ponentes diversas animas in corpore, inquirit quid contineat +illas, idest quid faciat ex eis unum. Et non potest dici quod +uniantur per corporis unitatem, quia magis anima continet corpus, +et facit ipsum esse unum, quam e converso. Secundo, hoc apparet +impossibile ex modo praedicationis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis +formis, praedicantur ad invicem vel per accidens, si formae non +sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus quod album est dulce, +vel, si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se, +in secundo modo dicendi per se, quia subiectum ponitur in +definitione praedicati. Sicut superficies praeambula est ad +colorem, si ergo dicamus quod corpus superficiatum est coloratum, +erit secundus modus praedicationis per se. Si ergo alia forma sit a +qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo, +sequeretur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi +per accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent; +vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una +animarum sit ad aliam praeambula. Utrumque autem horum est +manifeste falsum, quia animal per se de homine praedicatur, non per +accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis, sed e +converso. Ergo oportet eandem formam esse per quam aliquid est +animal, et per quam aliquid est homo, alioquin homo non vere esset +id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur. +Tertio, apparet hoc esse impossibile per hoc, quod una operatio +animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam. Quod nullo modo +contingeret, nisi principium actionum esset per essentiam unum. Sic +ergo dicendum quod eadem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et +intellectiva et nutritiva. Quomodo autem hoc contingat, de facili +considerari potest, si quis differentias specierum et formarum +attendat. Inveniuntur enim rerum species et formae differre ab +invicem secundum perfectius et minus perfectum, sicut in rerum +ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et +homines animalibus brutis, et in singulis horum generum sunt gradus +diversi. Et ideo Aristoteles, in VIII Metaphys., assimilat species +rerum numeris, qui differunt specie secundum additionem vel +subtractionem unitatis. Et in II de anima, comparat diversas animas +speciebus figurarum, quarum una continet aliam; sicut pentagonum +continet tetragonum, et excedit. Sic igitur anima intellectiva +continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, et +nutritiva plantarum. Sicut ergo superficies quae habet figuram +pentagonam, non per aliam figuram est tetragona, et per aliam +pentagona; quia superflueret figura tetragona, ex quo in pentagona +continetur; ita nec per aliam animam Socrates est homo, et per +aliam animal, sed per unam et eandem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, + therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. + For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31538] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod anima sensitiva non habet incorruptibilitatem ex hoc +quod est sensitiva, sed ex hoc quod est intellectiva, ei +incorruptibilitas debetur. Quando ergo anima est sensitiva tantum, +corruptibilis est, quando vero cum sensitivo intellectivum habet, +est incorruptibilis. Licet enim sensitivum incorruptionem non det, +tamen incorruptionem intellectivo auferre non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals. + And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference + between man and the other animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31539] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod formae non collocantur in genere vel in specie, sed +composita. Homo autem corruptibilis est, sicut et alia animalia. +Unde differentia secundum corruptibile et incorruptibile, quae est +ex parte formarum, non facit hominem secundum genus ab aliis +animalibus differre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect + soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A2" id="FP_Q76_A3-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[118], A[2]</a>, ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31540] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prius embryo habet animam quae est sensitiva tantum; +qua abiecta, advenit perfectior anima, quae est simul sensitiva et +intellectiva; ut infra plenius ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which + flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, + as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can + consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something + imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence + the notion of the "genus"; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; + thence it gathers the "difference" of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31541] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel +intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, +diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere, quia ratio unum et idem +secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur, ut dictum +est, anima intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet, +et adhuc amplius; potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad +virtutem sensitivae, quasi quoddam imperfectum et materiale. Et +quia hoc invenit commune homini et aliis animalibus, ex hoc +rationem generis format. Id vero in quo anima intellectiva +sensitiva excedit, accipit quasi formale et completivum, et ex eo +format differentiam hominis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A4-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 4. Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), + that "the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially." Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. + But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the + soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31542] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in homine sit alia forma praeter animam +intellectivam. Dicit enim philosophus, in II de anima, quod +<i>anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis</i>. +Comparatur igitur anima ad corpus, sicut forma ad materiam. Sed +corpus habet aliquam formam substantialem per quam est corpus. Ergo +ante animam praecedit in corpore aliqua forma substantialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one + moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore + the other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only + potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal + there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31543] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, homo +et quodlibet animal est movens seipsum. Omne autem movens seipsum +dividitur in duas partes, quarum una est movens, et alia est mota, +ut probatur in VIII Physic. Pars autem movens est anima. Ergo +oportet quod alia pars sit talis quae possit esse mota. Sed materia +prima non potest moveri, ut dicitur in V Physic., cum sit ens solum +in potentia, quinimmo omne quod movetur est corpus. Ergo oportet +quod in homine et in quolibet animali sit alia forma substantialis, +per quam constituatur corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to + some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were + to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter + immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31544] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ordo +in formis attenditur secundum habitudinem ad materiam primam, prius +enim et posterius dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium. +Si ergo non esset in homine alia forma substantialis praeter animam +rationalem, sed immediate materiae primae inhaereret; sequeretur +quod esset in ordine imperfectissimarum formarum, quae immediate +inhaerent materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. + Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body + there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31545] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +corpus humanum est corpus mixtum. Mixtio autem non fit secundum +materiam tantum, quia tunc esset corruptio sola. Oportet ergo quod +remaneant formae elementorum in corpore mixto, quae sunt formae +substantiales. Ergo in corpore humano sunt aliae formae +substantiales praeter animam intellectivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing + there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be + in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31546] Iª q. 76 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, unius +rei est unum esse substantiale. Sed forma substantialis dat esse +substantiale. Ergo unius rei est una tantum forma substantialis. +Anima autem est forma substantialis hominis. Ergo impossibile est +quod in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis quam anima +intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists + maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its + being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have + said above + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for another substantial form + besides the intellectual soul to be found in man. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p8"> In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that + the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but + only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to + be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing + is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming + a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, + who held that primary matter was some actual being---for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort---maintained that + nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we + read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which + the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently + that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal + simple corruption, all of which is clearly false. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p9"> Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, + as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone + does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of + the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 co."><a name="31547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31547] Iª q. 76 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, si poneretur anima intellectiva non uniri corpori ut forma, +sed solum ut motor, ut Platonici posuerunt; necesse esset dicere +quod in homine esset alia forma substantialis, per quam corpus ab +anima mobile in suo esse constitueretur. Sed si anima intellectiva +unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut supra iam diximus, +impossibile est quod aliqua alia forma substantialis praeter eam +inveniatur in homine. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod +forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma +accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor +facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. Et +ideo cum advenit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri vel +generari simpliciter, sed fieri tale aut aliquo modo se habens, et +similiter cum recedit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid +corrumpi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Forma autem substantialis +dat esse simpliciter, et ideo per eius adventum dicitur aliquid +simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum simpliciter corrumpi. Et +propter hoc antiqui naturales, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse +aliquod ens actu, puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi, +dixerunt quod nihil generatur aut corrumpitur simpliciter, sed omne +fieri statuerunt alterari, ut dicitur in I Physic. Si igitur ita +esset, quod praeter animam intellectivam praeexisteret quaecumque +alia forma substantialis in materia, per quam subiectum animae +esset ens actu; sequeretur quod anima non daret esse simpliciter; +et per consequens quod non esset forma substantialis; et quod per +adventum animae non esset generatio simpliciter, neque per eius +abscessum corruptio simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid. Quae sunt +manifeste falsa. Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma +substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod +ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita +virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola +quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est +dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, +et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu +imperfectiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially"; + and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul." Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself + is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light + were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the + light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, + and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such + a potentiality "does not reject"---that is, does not exclude---the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31548] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Aristoteles non dicit animam esse actum corporis +tantum, sed actum corporis physici organici potentia vitam +habentis, et quod talis potentia non abiicit animam. Unde +manifestum est quod in eo cuius anima dicitur actus, etiam anima +includitur; eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod calor est actus +calidi, et lumen est actus lucidi; non quod seorsum sit lucidum +sine luce, sed quia est lucidum per lucem. Et similiter dicitur +quod anima est actus corporis etc., quia per animam et est corpus, +et est organicum, et est potentia vitam habens. Sed actus primus +dicitur in potentia respectu actus secundi, qui est operatio. Talis +enim potentia est non abiiciens, idest non excludens, animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes + the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate + body is the part moved. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31549] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod anima non movet corpus per esse suum, secundum quod +unitur corpori ut forma; sed per potentiam motivam, cuius actus +praesupponit iam corpus effectum in actu per animam; ut sic anima +secundum vim motivam sit pars movens, et corpus animatum sit pars +mota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is + always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while + that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31550] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in materia considerantur diversi gradus perfectionis, +sicut esse, vivere sentire et intelligere. Semper autem secundum +superveniens priori, perfectius est. Forma ergo quae dat solum +primum gradum perfectionis materiae, est imperfectissima, sed forma +quae dat primum et secundum, et tertium, et sic deinceps, est +perfectissima; et tamen materiae immediata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by + the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the + elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without + which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found + except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would + be distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture + apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p14"> Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial + forms, and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one + form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of each thing consists in something + indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. + viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less + impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p15"> Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the + mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the + power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed + body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31551] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod Avicenna posuit formas substantiales elementorum +integras remanere in mixto, mixtionem autem fieri secundum quod +contrariae qualitates elementorum reducuntur ad medium. Sed hoc est +impossibile. Quia diversae formae elementorum non possunt esse nisi +in diversis partibus materiae; ad quarum diversitatem oportet +intelligi dimensiones, sine quibus materia divisibilis esse non +potest. Materia autem dimensioni subiecta non invenitur nisi in +corpore. Diversa autem corpora non possunt esse in eodem loco. Unde +sequitur quod elementa sint in mixto distincta secundum situm. Et +ita non erit vera mixtio, quae est secundum totum, sed mixtio ad +sensum, quae est secundum minima iuxta se posita. Averroes autem +posuit, in III de caelo, quod formae elementorum, propter sui +imperfectionem, sunt mediae inter formas accidentales et +substantiales; et ideo recipiunt magis et minus; et ideo +remittuntur in mixtione et ad medium reducuntur, et conflatur ex +eis una forma. Sed hoc est etiam magis impossibile. Nam esse +substantiale cuiuslibet rei in indivisibili consistit; et omnis +additio et subtractio variat speciem, sicut in numeris, ut dicitur +in VIII Metaphys. Unde impossibile est quod forma substantialis +quaecumque recipiat magis et minus. Nec minus est impossibile +aliquid esse medium inter substantiam et accidens. Et ideo dicendum +est, secundum philosophum in I de Generat., quod formae elementorum +manent in mixto non actu, sed virtute. Manent enim qualitates +propriae elementorum, licet remissae, in quibus est virtus formarum +elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria +dispositio ad formam substantialem corporis mixti, puta formam +lapidis, vel animae cuiuscumque.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A5-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 5. Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. + But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31552] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva inconvenienter tali +corpori uniatur. Materia enim debet esse proportionata formae. Sed +anima intellectiva est forma incorruptibilis. Non ergo convenienter +unitur corpori corruptibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter + does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most + subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31553] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima +intellectiva est forma maxime immaterialis, cuius signum est, quod +habet operationem in qua non communicat materia corporalis. Sed +quanto corpus est subtilius, tanto minus habet de materia. Ergo +anima deberet subtilissimo corpori uniri, puta igni; et non corpori +mixto, et terrestri magis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual + soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31554] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum +forma sit principium speciei, ab una forma non proveniunt diversae +species. Sed anima intellectiva est una forma. Ergo non debet uniri +corpori quod componitur ex partibus dissimilium specierum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most + perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair + instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; + it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect + as being deprived of the above means of protection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="31555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31555] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +perfectioris formae debet esse perfectius susceptibile. Sed anima +intellectiva est perfectissima animarum. Cum igitur aliorum +animalium corpora habeant naturaliter insita tegumenta, puta +pilorum loco vestium, et unguium loco calceamentorum; habeant etiam +arma naturaliter sibi data, sicut ungues, dentes et cornua, ergo +videtur quod anima intellectiva non debuerit uniri corpori +imperfecto tanquam talibus auxiliis privato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31556] Iª q. 76 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, quod <i>anima est actus +corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the + matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q76_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with + the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from + individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore + the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now + the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be + united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p8"> Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, + such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality + with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, + the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its + completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. v). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most + equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best + sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed + in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 co."><a name="31557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31557] Iª q. 76 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum forma non sit propter materiam, sed potius materia +propter formam; ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia +sit talis, et non e converso. Anima autem intellectiva, sicut supra +habitum est, secundum naturae ordinem, infimum gradum in +substantiis intellectualibus tenet; intantum quod non habet +naturaliter sibi inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut Angeli, sed +oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus divisibilibus per viam sensus, +ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Natura autem nulli deest +in necessariis, unde oportuit quod anima intellectiva non solum +haberet virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi. Actio +autem sensus non fit sine corporeo instrumento. Oportuit igitur +animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, quod possit esse +conveniens organum sensus. Omnes autem alii sensus fundantur supra +tactum. Ad organum autem tactus requiritur quod sit medium inter +contraria, quae sunt calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, et +similia, quorum est tactus apprehensivus, sic enim est in potentia +ad contraria, et potest ea sentire. Unde quanto organum tactus +fuerit magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis, tanto +perceptibilior erit tactus. Anima autem intellectiva habet +completissime virtutem sensitivam, quia quod est inferioris +praeexistit perfectius in superiori ut dicit Dionysius in libro de +Div. Nom. Unde oportuit corpus cui unitur anima intellectiva, esse +corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reductum ad aequalitatem +complexionis. Et propter hoc homo inter omnia animalia melioris est +tactus. Et inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt +melioris intellectus. Cuius signum est, quod molles carne bene +aptos mente videmus, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does + not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise + its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p10"> Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that + the matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, + for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt + and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable + complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer + that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, + as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift + of grace. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31558] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod hanc obiectionem aliquis forte vellet evadere per +hoc, quod diceret corpus hominis ante peccatum incorruptibile +fuisse. Sed haec responsio non videtur sufficiens, quia corpus +hominis ante peccatum immortale fuit non per naturam, sed per +gratiae divinae donum; alioquin immortalitas eius per peccatum +sublata non esset, sicut nec immortalitas Daemonis. Et ideo aliter +dicendum est, quod in materia duplex conditio invenitur, una quae +eligitur ad hoc quod sit conveniens formae; alia quae ex +necessitate consequitur prioris dispositionis. Sicut artifex ad +formam serrae eligit materiam ferream, aptam ad secandum dura; sed +quod dentes serrae hebetari possint et rubiginem contrahere, +sequitur ex necessitate materiae. Sic igitur et animae +intellectivae debetur corpus quod sit aequalis complexionis, ex hoc +autem de necessitate materiae sequitur quod sit corruptibile. Si +quis vero dicat quod Deus potuit hanc necessitatem vitare, dicendum +est quod in constitutione rerum naturalium non consideratur quid +Deus facere possit, sed quid naturae rerum conveniat, ut Augustinus +dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt. Providit tamen Deus adhibendo +remedium contra mortem per gratiae donum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account + of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to + such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not + be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a + dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31559] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod animae intellectivae non debetur corpus propter ipsam +intellectualem operationem secundum se; sed propter sensitivam +virtutem, quae requirit organum aequaliter complexionatum. Et ideo +oportuit animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, et non simplici +elemento, vel corpori mixto in quo excederet ignis secundum +quantitatem, quia non posset esse aequalitas complexionis, propter +excedentem ignis activam virtutem. Habet autem hoc corpus +aequaliter complexionatum quandam dignitatem, per hoc quod est +remotum a contrariis; in quo quodammodo assimilatur corpori +caelesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole + does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions. + This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is + manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires + various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety + of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31560] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod partes animalis, ut oculus, manus, caro et os, et +huiusmodi, non sunt in specie, sed totum, et ideo non potest dici, +proprie loquendo, quod sint diversarum specierum, sed quod sint +diversarum dispositionum. Et hoc competit animae intellectivae, +quae quamvis sit una secundum essentiam, tamen propter sui +perfectionem est multiplex in virtute; et ideo, ad diversas +operationes, indiget diversis dispositionibus in partibus corporis +cui unitur. Et propter hoc videmus quod maior est diversitas +partium in animalibus perfectis quam in imperfectis, et in his quam +in plantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited + by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case + with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead + of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of + organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number + of purposes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="31561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31561] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod anima intellectiva, quia est universalium +comprehensiva, habet virtutem ad infinita. Et ideo non potuerunt +sibi determinari a natura vel determinatae existimationes +naturales, vel etiam determinata auxilia vel defensionum vel +tegumentorum; sicut aliis animalibus, quorum animae habent +apprehensionem et virtutem ad aliqua particularia determinata. Sed +loco horum omnium, homo habet naturaliter rationem, et manus, quae +sunt organa organorum, quia per eas homo potest sibi praeparare +instrumenta infinitorum modorum, et ad infinitos effectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A6-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 6. Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form + exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to + be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31562] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva uniatur corpori +mediantibus aliquibus dispositionibus accidentalibus. Omnis enim +forma est in materia sibi propria et disposita. Sed dispositiones +ad formam sunt accidentia quaedam. Ergo oportet praeintelligi +accidentia aliqua in materia ante formam substantialem, et ita ante +animam, cum anima sit quaedam substantialis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without + division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are + many belonging to one species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31563] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +diversae formae unius speciei requirunt diversas materiae partes. +Partes autem materiae diversae non possunt intelligi nisi secundum +divisionem dimensivarum quantitatum. Ergo oportet intelligere +dimensiones in materia ante formas substantiales, quae sunt multae +unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. + Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31564] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +spirituale applicatur corporali per contactum virtutis. Virtus +autem animae est eius potentia. Ergo videtur quod anima unitur +corpori mediante potentia, quae est quoddam accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. + vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial + form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31565] Iª q. 76 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod accidens est posterius substantia et tempore et ratione, ut +dicitur in VII Metaphys. Non ergo forma accidentalis aliqua potest +intelligi in materia ante animam, quae est forma substantialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions + mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required + the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A6-p7"> If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever + and its matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely + first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first + among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before + it is actual. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said + above + <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q76_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently + before the soul. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 co."><a name="31566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31566] Iª q. 76 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, si anima uniretur corpori solum ut motor, nihil prohiberet, +immo magis necessarium esset esse aliquas dispositiones medias +inter animam et corpus, potentiam scilicet ex parte animae, per +quam moveret corpus; et aliquam habilitatem ex parte corporis, per +quam corpus esset ab anima mobile. Sed si anima intellectiva unitur +corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut iam supra dictum est, +impossibile est quod aliqua dispositio accidentalis cadat media +inter corpus et animam, vel inter quamcumque formam substantialem +et materiam suam. Et huius ratio est quia, cum materia sit in +potentia ad omnes actus ordine quodam, oportet quod id quod est +primum simpliciter in actibus, primo in materia intelligatur. +Primum autem inter omnes actus est esse. Impossibile est ergo +intelligere materiam prius esse calidam vel quantam, quam esse in +actu. Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit +esse simpliciter, ut iam dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod +quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistant in materia ante +formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As appears from what has been already said + <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q76_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, + it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, + a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore + as + matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which + belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, + not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31567] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, forma perfectior virtute +continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. Et ideo una et eadem +existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus. +Una enim et eadem forma est per essentiam, per quam homo est ens +actu, et per quam est corpus, et per quam est vivum, et per quam +est animal, et per quam est homo. Manifestum est autem quod +unumquodque genus consequuntur propria accidentia. Sicut ergo +materia praeintelligitur perfecta secundum esse ante intellectum +corporeitatis, et sic de aliis; ita praeintelliguntur accidentia +quae sunt propria entis, ante corporeitatem. Et sic +praeintelliguntur dispositiones in materia ante formam, non quantum +ad omnem eius effectum, sed quantum ad posteriorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once + understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different + forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the + various degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as + different when brought under the observation of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31568] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod dimensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia +consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit. Unde +materia iam intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest +intelligi ut distincta in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas +formas secundum ulteriores perfectionis gradus. Quamvis enim eadem +forma sit secundum essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus +materiae attribuit, ut dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem +rationis differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual + soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31569] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod substantia spiritualis quae unitur corpori solum ut +motor, unitur ei per potentiam vel virtutem. Sed anima intellectiva +corpori unitur ut forma per suum esse. Administrat tamen ipsum et +movet per suam potentiam et virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A7-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 7. Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the + soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are + bodies. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31570] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima uniatur corpori animalis mediante +aliquo corpore. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII super Gen. ad Litt., +quod anima per lucem, idest ignem, et aerem, <i>quae sunt similiora +spiritui, corpus administrat</i>. Ignis autem et aer sunt corpora. +Ergo anima unitur corpori humano mediante aliquo corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But + when breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of + union between soul and body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31571] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id +quo subtracto solvitur unio aliquorum unitorum, videtur esse medium +inter ea. Sed deficiente spiritu, anima a corpore separatur. Ergo +spiritus, qui est quoddam corpus subtile, medium est in unione +corporis et animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual + soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to + be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the + elements, and unite them together. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31572] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea +quae sunt multum distantia, non uniuntur nisi per medium. Sed anima +intellectiva distat a corpore et quia est incorporea, et quia est +incorruptibilis. Ergo videtur quod uniatur ei mediante aliquo quod +sit corpus incorruptibile. Et hoc videtur esse aliqua lux +caelestis, quae conciliat elementa et redigit in unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its + shape are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the + body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31573] Iª q. 76 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod <i>non oportet +quaerere si unum est anima et corpus, sicut neque ceram et +figuram</i>. Sed figura unitur cerae nullo corpore mediante. Ergo +et anima corpori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other + bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant + from it by means of something nearer. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p7"> If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it + is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give + existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form + itself, + which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent, + which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p8"> From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the + soul and body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united + to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others said that + the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of + light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the + body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the + intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictious and ridiculous: for light is not + a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but + only + virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 co."><a name="31574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31574] Iª q. 76 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod si anima, secundum Platonicos, corpori uniretur solum ut +motor, conveniens esset dicere quod inter animam hominis, vel +cuiuscumque animalis, et corpus aliqua alia corpora media +intervenirent, convenit enim motori aliquid distans per media magis +propinqua movere. Si vero anima unitur corpori ut forma, sicut iam +dictum est, impossibile est quod uniatur ei aliquo corpore +mediante. Cuius ratio est, quia sic dicitur aliquid unum, quomodo +et ens. Forma autem per seipsam facit rem esse in actu, cum per +essentiam suam sit actus; nec dat esse per aliquod medium. Unde +unitas rei compositae ex materia et forma est per ipsam formam, +quae secundum seipsam unitur materiae ut actus eius. Nec est +aliquid aliud uniens nisi agens, quod facit materiam esse in actu, +ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Unde patet esse falsas opiniones eorum +qui posuerunt aliqua corpora esse media inter animam et corpus +hominis. Quorum quidam Platonici dixerunt quod anima intellectiva +habet corpus incorruptibile sibi naturaliter unitum, a quo nunquam +separatur, et eo mediante unitur corpori hominis corruptibili. +Quidam vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante spiritu corporeo. +Alii vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante luce, quam dicunt +esse corpus, et de natura quintae essentiae, ita quod anima +vegetabilis unitur corpori mediante luce caeli siderei; anima vero +sensibilis, mediante luce caeli crystallini; anima vero +intellectualis, mediante luce caeli Empyrei. Quod fictitium et +derisibile apparet, tum quia lux non est corpus; tum quia quinta +essentia non venit materialiter in compositionem corporis mixti, +cum sit inalterabilis, sed virtualiter tantum; tum etiam quia anima +immediate corpori unitur ut forma materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it moves + the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, + as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31575] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de anima inquantum movet corpus, +unde utitur verbo administrationis. Et verum est quod partes +grossiores corporis per subtiliores movet. Et primum instrumentum +virtutis motivae est spiritus, ut dicit philosophus in libro de +causa motus animalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the + removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, + as the first instrument of motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31576] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, subtracto spiritu, deficit unio animae ad corpus, +non quia sit medium; sed quia tollitur dispositio per quam corpus +est dispositum ad talem unionem. Est tamen spiritus medium in +movendo, sicut primum instrumentum motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate + existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not + an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. This is the + case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, + which is a being only in potentiality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31577] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima distat quidem a corpore plurimum, si utriusque +conditiones seorsum considerentur, unde si utrumque ipsorum +separatim esse haberet, oporteret quod multa media intervenirent. +Sed inquantum anima est forma corporis, non habet esse seorsum ab +esse corporis; sed per suum esse corpori unitur immediate. Sic enim +et quaelibet forma, si consideretur ut actus, habet magnam +distantiam a materia, quae est ens in potentia tantum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A8-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 8. Whether the soul is in each part of the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De + mot. animal. x): "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle + of the body causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31578] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit tota in qualibet parte +corporis. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de causa motus +animalium, <i>non opus est in unaquaque corporis parte esse animam; +sed in quodam principio corporis existente, alia vivere; eo quod +simul nata sunt facere proprium motum per naturam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in + an organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31579] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima +est in corpore cuius est actus. Sed est actus corporis organici. +Ergo non est nisi in corpore organico. Sed non quaelibet pars +corporis hominis est corpus organicum. Ergo anima non est in +qualibet parte corporis tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the + sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the + whole soul is in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31580] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in II +de anima dicitur quod sicut se habet pars animae ad partem +corporis, ut visus ad pupillam, ita anima tota ad totum corpus +animalis. Si igitur tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis, +sequitur quod quaelibet pars corporis sit animal.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part + of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and + hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="31581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31581] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omnes +potentiae animae in ipsa essentia animae fundantur. Si igitur anima +tota est in qualibet parte corporis, sequitur quod omnes potentiae +animae sint in qualibet corporis parte, et ita visus erit in aure, +et auditus in oculo. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus + one part would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul + is not in each part of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="31582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31582] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si in +qualibet parte corporis esset tota anima, quaelibet pars corporis +immediate dependeret ab anima. Non ergo una pars dependeret ab +alia, nec una pars esset principalior quam alia, quod est manifeste +falsum. Non ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31583] Iª q. 76 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod <i>anima in quocumque +corpore et in toto est tota, et in qualibet eius parte tota +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said, if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the + body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it + must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form + of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the + whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the + body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul + is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, + on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal + or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof + of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains + its species, retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole + body, and in each part thereof. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p9"> That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, + there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided into parts + of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as + a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, + further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to + forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative + whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface and + in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form + which + requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole + and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be + attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and + essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the + principle of operation. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p10"> Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to + distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part + of the surface. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight + more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, + then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface. + </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p11"> Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough + to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. + For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and + with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul + requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is + compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch + as they are ordained to the whole. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 co."><a name="31584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31584] Iª q. 76 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut in aliis iam dictum est, si anima uniretur corpori +solum ut motor, posset dici quod non esset in qualibet parte +corporis, sed in una tantum, per quam alias moveret. Sed quia anima +unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et in +qualibet parte corporis. Non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, +sed substantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est +perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Cum enim totum consistat +ex partibus, forma totius quae non dat esse singulis partibus +corporis, est forma quae est compositio et ordo, sicut forma domus, +et talis forma est accidentalis. Anima vero est forma +substantialis, unde oportet quod sit forma et actus non solum +totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Et ideo, recedente anima, sicut non +dicitur animal et homo nisi aequivoce, quemadmodum et animal pictum +vel lapideum; ita est de manu et oculo, aut carne et osse, ut +philosophus dicit. Cuius signum est, quod nulla pars corporis habet +proprium opus, anima recedente, cum tamen omne quod retinet +speciem, retineat operationem speciei. Actus autem est in eo cuius +est actus. Unde oportet animam esse in toto corpore, et in qualibet +eius parte. Et quod tota sit in qualibet parte eius, hinc +considerari potest, quia, cum totum sit quod dividitur in partes, +secundum triplicem divisionem est triplex totalitas. Est enim +quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, sicut tota +linea vel totum corpus. Est etiam quoddam totum quod dividitur in +partes rationis et essentiae; sicut definitum in partes +definitionis, et compositum resolvitur in materiam et formam. +Tertium autem totum est potentiale, quod dividitur in partes +virtutis. Primus autem totalitatis modus non convenit formis, nisi +forte per accidens; et illis solis formis, quae habent +indifferentem habitudinem ad totum quantitativum et partes eius. +Sicut albedo, quantum est de sui ratione, aequaliter se habet ut +sit in tota superficie et in qualibet superficiei parte; et ideo, +divisa superficie, dividitur albedo per accidens. Sed forma quae +requirit diversitatem in partibus, sicut est anima, et praecipue +animalium perfectorum, non aequaliter se habet ad totum et partes, +unde non dividitur per accidens per divisionem quantitatis. Sic +ergo totalitas quantitativa non potest attribui animae nec per se +nec per accidens. Sed totalitas secunda, quae attenditur secundum +rationis et essentiae perfectionem, proprie et per se convenit +formis. Similiter autem et totalitas virtutis, quia forma est +operationis principium. Si ergo quaereretur de albedine, utrum +esset tota in tota superficie et in qualibet eius parte, +distinguere oporteret. Quia si fiat mentio de totalitate +quantitativa, quam habet albedo per accidens, non tota esset in +qualibet parte superficiei. Et similiter dicendum est de totalitate +virtutis magis enim potest movere visum albedo quae est in tota +superficie, quam albedo quae est in aliqua eius particula. Sed si +fiat mentio de totalitate speciei et essentiae, tota albedo est in +qualibet superficiei parte. Sed quia anima totalitatem +quantitativam non habet, nec per se nec per accidens, ut dictum +est; sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis +secundum totalitatem perfectionis et essentiae; non autem secundum +totalitatem virtutis. Quia non secundum quamlibet suam potentiam +est in qualibet parte corporis; sed secundum visum in oculo, +secundum auditum in aure, et sic de aliis. Tamen attendendum est +quod, quia anima requirit diversitatem in partibus, non eodem modo +comparatur ad totum et ad partes, sed ad totum quidem primo et per +se, sicut ad proprium et proportionatum perfectibile; ad partes +autem per posterius, secundum quod habent ordinem ad totum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31585] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de potentia motiva animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31586] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod anima est actus corporis organici, sicut primi et +proportionati perfectibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible. + Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31587] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod animal est quod componitur ex anima et corpore toto, +quod est primum et proportionatum eius perfectibile. Sic autem +anima non est in parte. Unde non oportet quod pars animalis sit +animal.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and + the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore + each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation + of such a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="31588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31588] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod potentiarum animae quaedam sunt in ea secundum quod +excedit totam corporis capacitatem, scilicet intellectus et +voluntas, unde huiusmodi potentiae in nulla parte corporis esse +dicuntur. Aliae vero potentiae sunt communes animae et corpori, +unde talium potentiarum non oportet quod quaelibet sit in quocumque +est anima; sed solum in illa parte corporis quae est proportionata +ad talis potentiae operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body + are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which + serves the same power in a nobler manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="31589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31589] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod una pars corporis dicitur esse principalior quam +alia, propter potentias diversas quarum sunt organa partes +corporis. Quae enim est principalioris potentiae organum, est +principalior pars corporis, vel quae etiam eidem potentiae +principalius deservit.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q77" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q77-p0.1">Q. 77. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q77-p2"> We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under + the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q77-p3"><a href="#FP_Q77_A1"> (1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p4"><a href="#FP_Q77_A2"> (2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p5"><a href="#FP_Q77_A3"> (3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p6"><a href="#FP_Q77_A4"> (4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p7"><a href="#FP_Q77_A5"> (5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p8"><a href="#FP_Q77_A6"> (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p9"><a href="#FP_Q77_A7"> (7) Whether one power rises from another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p10"><a href="#FP_Q77_A8"> (8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 pr."><a name="31590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31590] +Iª q. 77 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae +pertinent ad potentias animae. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in +speciali. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum essentia +animae sit eius potentia. Secundo, utrum sit una tantum potentia +animae, vel plures. Tertio, quomodo potentiae animae distinguantur. +Quarto, de ordine ipsarum ad invicem. Quinto, utrum anima sit +subiectum omnium potentiarum. Sexto, utrum potentiae fluant ab +essentia animae. Septimo, utrum potentia una oriatur ex alia. +Octavo, utrum omnes potentiae animae remaneant in ea post +mortem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q77_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A1-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 1. Whether the essence of the soul is its power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and + love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, + and will are one life, one mind, one essence." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31591] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ipsa essentia animae sit eius potentia. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., quod <i>mens, notitia et +amor sunt substantialiter in anima, vel, ut idem dicam, +essentialiter</i>. Et in X dicit quod <i>memoria, intelligentia et +voluntas sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul + its own power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31592] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima +est nobilior quam materia prima. Sed materia prima est sua +potentia. Ergo multo magis anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified + or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which + is the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31593] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, forma +substantialis est simplicior quam accidentalis, cuius signum est, +quod forma substantialis non intenditur vel remittitur, sed in +indivisibili consistit. Forma autem accidentalis est ipsa sua +virtus. Ergo multo magis forma substantialis, quae est anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and + understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the soul is its own power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31594] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +potentia sensitiva est qua sentimus, et potentia intellectiva qua +intelligimus. Sed id quo primo sentimus et intelligimus est anima, +secundum philosophum, in II de anima. Ergo anima est suae +potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides + the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see OBJ 1) "are not in + the soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not + exceed the subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other things" (De + Trin. ix, 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31595] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod non est de essentia rei, est accidens. Si ergo potentia animae +est praeter essentiam eius, sequitur quod sit accidens. Quod est +contra Augustinum, in IX de Trin., ubi dicit quod <i>praedicta non +sunt in anima sicut in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore, +aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas, quidquid enim tale est, non +excedit subiectum in quo est; mens autem potest etiam alia amare et +cognoscere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, " a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, + as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q77_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="31596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31596] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, forma +simplex subiectum esse non potest. Anima autem est forma simplex, +cum non sit composita ex materia et forma, ut supra dictum est. Non +ergo potentia animae potest esse in ipsa sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; + and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; + and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 7"><a name="31597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31597] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +accidens non est principium substantialis differentiae. Sed +sensibile et rationale sunt substantiales differentiae, et sumuntur +a sensu et ratione, quae sunt potentiae animae. Ergo potentiae +animae non sunt accidentia. Et ita videtur quod potentia animae sit +eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more, then, + in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31598] Iª q. 77 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius dicit, XI cap. Caelest. Hier., quod <i>caelestes +spiritus dividuntur in essentiam, virtutem et operationem</i>. +Multo igitur magis in anima aliud est essentia, et aliud virtus +sive potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose + this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a + power and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the power directed to that act + cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of + substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle + of His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said + above when speaking of the angels ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q54_A3" id="FP_Q77_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>). Secondly, this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if + the very essence of the soul were the immediate + principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an + actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. + Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according + to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the + second act. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations; whence also it + is said in the definition of the soul, that it is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which potentiality, however, + "does not exclude the soul." Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality + by reason of an act, as act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 co."><a name="31599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31599] Iª q. 77 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod impossibile est dicere quod essentia animae sit eius potentia; +licet hoc quidam posuerint. Et hoc dupliciter ostenditur, quantum +ad praesens. Primo quia, cum potentia et actus dividant ens et +quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus referatur +potentia et actus. Et ideo, si actus non est in genere substantiae, +potentia quae dicitur ad illum actum, non potest esse in genere +substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae; +sed in solo Deo, cuius operatio est eius substantia. Unde Dei +potentia, quae est operationis principium, est ipsa Dei essentia. +Quod non potest esse verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua +creatura; ut supra etiam de Angelo dictum est. Secundo, hoc etiam +impossibile apparet in anima. Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est +actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis +principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae; sicut +semper habens animam actu est vivum. Non enim, inquantum est forma, +est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus +generationis. Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc +non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma; sed +secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest +suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum. +Invenitur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae. +Unde etiam in definitione animae dicitur quod est actus corporis +potentia vitam habentis, quae tamen potentia non abiicit animam. +Relinquitur ergo quod essentia animae non est eius potentia. Nihil +enim est in potentia secundum actum, inquantum est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known + and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. + In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are "one life, one mind, one essence." + Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is + predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each + part according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated + of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole + power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the + parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each + part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of + each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the + will are the one essence of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31600] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de mente secundum quod noscit se +et amat se. Sic ergo notitia et amor, inquantum referuntur ad ipsam +ut cognitam et amatam, substantialiter vel essentialiter sunt in +anima, quia ipsa substantia vel essentia animae cognoscitur et +amatur. Et similiter intelligendum est quod alibi dicit, quod sunt +una vita, una mens, una essentia. Vel, sicut quidam dicunt, haec +locutio verificatur secundum modum quo totum potestativum +praedicatur de suis partibus, quod medium est inter totum +universale et totum integrale. Totum enim universale adest cuilibet +parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini +et equo, et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur. Totum +vero integrale non est in qualibet parte, neque secundum totam +essentiam, neque secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo nullo modo de +singulis partibus praedicatur; sed aliquo modo, licet improprie, +praedicatur de omnibus simul, ut si dicamus quod paries, tectum et +fundamentum sunt domus. Totum vero potentiale adest singulis +partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam +virtutem. Et ideo quodammodo potest praedicari de qualibet parte; +sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale. Et per hunc modum +Augustinus dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una +animae essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing + else but its essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31601] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actus ad quem est in potentia materia prima, est +substantialis forma. Et ideo potentia materiae non est aliud quam +eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial + existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active + accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of + the soul is to the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31602] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actio est compositi, sicut et esse, existentis enim +est agere. Compositum autem per formam substantialem habet esse +substantialiter; per virtutem autem quae consequitur formam +substantialem, operatur. Unde sic se habet forma accidentalis +activa ad formam substantialem agentis (ut calor ad formam ignis), +sicut se habet potentia animae ad animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first + principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we + understand and sense." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31603] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis +principium, habet a forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis +est primum actionis principium, sed non proximum. Et secundum hoc +philosophus dicit quod <i>id quo intelligimus et sentimus, est +anima</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident; + because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a + subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second + species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five + universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence + of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not + caused by the essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused + by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood. In + this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of + the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood + in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His + argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident + transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31604] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, si accidens accipiatur secundum quod dividitur +contra substantiam, sic nihil potest esse medium inter substantiam +et accidens, quia dividuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem, +scilicet secundum esse in subiecto et non esse in subiecto. Et hoc +modo, cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit +accidens, et est in secunda specie qualitatis. Si vero accipiatur +accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic +aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens. Quia ad +substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei, non autem +quidquid est extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum +id quod non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei. Proprium +enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus +speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic +dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter +substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales. Quod +autem Augustinus dicit, quod notitia et amor non sunt in anima +sicut accidentia in subiecto, intelligitur secundum modum +praedictum, prout comparantur ad animam, non sicut ad amantem et +cognoscentem; sed prout comparantur ad eam sicut ad amatam et +cognitam. Et hoc modo procedit sua probatio, quia si amor esset in +anima amata sicut in subiecto, sequeretur quod accidens +transcenderet suum subiectum; cum etiam alia sint amata per +animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q77_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure + Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="31605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31605] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod anima, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet +tamen aliquid de potentialitate admixtum ut supra dictum est. Et +ideo potest esse subiectum accidentis. Propositio autem inducta +locum habet in Deo, qui est actus purus, in qua materia Boetius eam +introducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational + soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents + us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 7"><a name="31606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31606] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod rationale et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non +sumuntur a potentiis sensus et rationis; sed ab ipsa anima +sensitiva et rationali. Quia tamen formae substantiales, quae +secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia; nihil +prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum substantialium +poni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A2-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 2. Whether there are several powers of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness + of God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31607] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures potentiae animae. Anima +enim intellectiva maxime ad divinam similitudinem accedit. Sed in +Deo est una et simplex potentia. Ergo et in anima intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore + above all others it has one virtue or power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31608] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto virtus est superior, tanto est magis unita. Sed anima +intellectiva excedit omnes alias formas in virtute. Ergo maxime +debet habere unam virtutem seu potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different + degrees of perfection, as we have seen above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q77_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[76], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31609] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +operari est existentis in actu. Sed per eandem essentiam animae +homo habet esse secundum diversos gradus perfectionis, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo per eandem potentiam animae operatur diversas +operationes diversorum graduum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31610] Iª q. 77 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus, in II de anima ponit plures animae potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De + Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, + by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher + acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things + which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire + imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; + and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, + therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations + and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, + according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations + and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence. + </p><p id="FP_Q77_A2-p7"> There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers---because it is on the confines of spiritual + and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 co."><a name="31611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31611] Iª q. 77 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est ponere plures animae potentias. Ad cuius +evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II +de caelo, quae sunt in rebus infima, non possunt consequi perfectam +bonitatem, sed aliquam imperfectam consequuntur paucis motibus; +superiora vero his adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus multis; +his autem superiora sunt quae adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem +motibus paucis; summa vero perfectio invenitur in his quae absque +motu perfectam possident bonitatem. Sicut infime est ad sanitatem +dispositus qui non potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed aliquam +modicam consequitur paucis remediis; melius autem dispositus est +qui potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed remediis multis; et +adhuc melius, qui remediis paucis; optime autem, qui absque remedio +perfectam sanitatem habet. Dicendum est ergo quod res quae sunt +infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur, et ideo +quasdam paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo +autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem, quia +potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum +naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo, et ideo multis et +diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana. Angelis +vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est +aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam. Est et alia +ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet +quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et +ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; + although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31612] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in hoc ipso magis ad similitudinem Dei accedit anima +intellectiva quam creaturae inferiores, quod perfectam bonitatem +consequi potest; licet per multa et diversa; in quo deficit a +superioribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31613] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus unita est superior, si ad aequalia se +extendat. Sed virtus multiplicata est superior, si plura ei +subiiciantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several + powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31614] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod unius rei est unum esse substantiale, sed possunt +esse operationes plures. Et ideo est una essentia animae, sed +potentiae plures.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A3-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 3. Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species + by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore + the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31615] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae non distinguantur per actus et +obiecta. Nihil enim determinatur ad speciem per illud quod +posterius, vel extrinsecum est. Actus autem est posterior potentia; +obiectum autem est extrinsecum. Ergo per ea potentiae non +distinguuntur secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it + follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power + of vision extends to white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31616] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contraria sunt quae maxime differunt. Si igitur potentiae +distinguerentur penes obiecta, sequeretur quod contrariorum non +esset eadem potentia. Quod patet esse falsum fere in omnibus, nam +potentia visiva eadem est albi et nigri, et gustus idem est dulcis +et amari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, + the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive + power, and desired by the appetitive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31617] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +remota causa, removetur effectus. Si igitur potentiarum differentia +esset ex differentia obiectorum, idem obiectum non pertineret ad +diversas potentias. Quod patet esse falsum, nam idem est quod +potentia cognoscitiva cognoscit, et appetitiva appetit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong + to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, + yet they come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference + of their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31618] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod per se est causa alicuius, in omnibus causat illud. Sed +quaedam obiecta diversa, quae pertinent ad diversas potentias, +pertinent etiam ad aliquam unam potentiam, sicut sonus et color +pertinent ad visum et auditum, quae sunt diversae potentiae; et +tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam sensus communis. Non ergo +potentiae distinguuntur secundum differentiam obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts and operations + precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites," that is their objects. Therefore + the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31619] Iª q. 77 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +posteriora distinguuntur secundum priora. Sed philosophus dicit II +de anima, quod <i>priores potentiis actus et operationes secundum +rationem sunt</i>; et adhuc his priora sunt opposita, sive obiecta. +Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum actus et obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, + and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is + diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. + Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: + for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the + object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from + these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating + differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; + the + latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by + their acts and objects. + </p><p id="FP_Q77_A3-p8"> Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be colored is accidental + to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature + of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. + Hence "rational" and "irrational" are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like + manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power + of its very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is + divided into color, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color, namely, the sight, + and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something + colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers + of the soul are not distinct. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 co."><a name="31620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31620] Iª q. 77 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad +actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem +ordinatur, et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae +diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus. Ratio autem actus +diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio +vel est potentiae activae, vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur +ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, +color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum +autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis, +sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod +est finis augmenti. Ex his autem duobus actio speciem recipit, +scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine seu termino, differt enim +calefactio ab infrigidatione, secundum quod haec quidem a calido, +scilicet activo, ad calidum; illa autem a frigido ad frigidum +procedit. Unde necesse est quod potentiae diversificentur secundum +actus et obiecta. Sed tamen considerandum est quod ea quae sunt per +accidens, non diversificant speciem. Quia enim coloratum accidit +animali, non diversificantur species animalis per differentiam +coloris, sed per differentiam eius quod per se accidit animali, per +differentiam scilicet animae sensitivae, quae quandoque invenitur +cum ratione, quandoque sine ratione. Unde rationale et irrationale +sunt differentiae divisivae animalis, diversas eius species +constituentes. Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas obiectorum +diversificat potentias animae; sed differentia eius ad quod per se +potentia respicit. Sicut sensus per se respicit passibilem +qualitatem, quae per se dividitur in colorem, sonum et huiusmodi, +et ideo alia potentia sensitiva est coloris, scilicet visus, et +alia soni, scilicet auditus. Sed passibili qualitati, ut colorato +accidit esse musicum vel grammaticum, vel magnum et parvum, aut +hominem vel lapidem. Et ideo penes huiusmodi differentias potentiae +animae non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with + regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions + which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31621] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod actus, licet sit posterior potentia in esse, est +tamen prior in intentione et secundum rationem, sicut finis agente. +Obiectum autem, licet sit extrinsecum, est tamen principium vel +finis actionis. Principio autem et fini proportionantur ea quae +sunt intrinseca rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. + But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; + as sight does not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea + of the other, since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31622] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si potentia aliqua per se respiceret unum +contrariorum sicut obiectum, oporteret quod contrarium ad aliam +potentiam pertineret. Sed potentia animae non per se respicit +propriam rationem contrarii, sed communem rationem utriusque +contrariorum, sicut visus non respicit per se rationem albi, sed +rationem coloris. Et hoc ideo, quia unum contrariorum est +quodammodo ratio alterius, cum se habeant sicut perfectum et +imperfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong + to various powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31623] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est subiecto idem esse +diversum secundum rationem. Et ideo potest ad diversas potentias +animae pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power + is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which + the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus + it is that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, + however, are subject to one higher power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31624] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod potentia superior per se respicit universaliorem +rationem obiecti, quam potentia inferior, quia quanto potentia est +superior, tanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo multa conveniunt in +una ratione obiecti, quam per se respicit superior potentia, quae +tamen differunt secundum rationes quas per se respiciunt inferiores +potentiae. Et inde est quod diversa obiecta pertinent ad diversas +inferiores potentias, quae tamen uni superiori potentiae +subduntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A4-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 4. Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there + is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. + Therefore there is no order among them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31625] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis animae non sit ordo. In his +enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, non est prius et posterius, sed +sunt naturaliter simul. Sed potentiae animae contra se invicem +dividuntur. Ergo inter eas non est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not + order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore + there is no order among the powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31626] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potentiae animae comparantur ad obiecta, et ad ipsam animam. Sed ex +parte animae, inter eas non est ordo, quia anima est una. Similiter +etiam nec ex parte obiectorum, cum sint diversa et penitus +disparata, ut patet de colore et sono. In potentiis ergo animae non +est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the + action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. + Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31627] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +potentiis ordinatis hoc invenitur, quod operatio unius dependet ab +operatione alterius. Sed actus unius potentiae animae non dependet +ab actu alterius, potest enim visus exire in actum absque auditu, +et e converso. Non ergo inter potentias animae est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among themselves. + Therefore the powers of the soul have order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31628] Iª q. 77 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus, in II de anima, comparat partes sive potentias +animae figuris. Sed figurae habent ordinem ad invicem. Ergo et +potentiae animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain + order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of + which correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the + dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of + nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to the order of generation + and time; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among + the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise + the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul. + </p><p id="FP_Q77_A4-p7"> In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation + to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive + powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, + namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and + lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the + result. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 co."><a name="31629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31629] Iª q. 77 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam +ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias +animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. +Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab +altera, tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem obiectorum. +Dependentia autem unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi +potest, uno modo, secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt +naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum ordinem +generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur. +Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae +sunt priores potentiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas et imperant +eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores +potentiis animae nutritivae. Secundum vero ordinem secundum, e +converso se habet. Nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores, in +via generationis, potentiis animae sensitivae, unde ad earum +actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de potentiis +sensitivis respectu intellectivarum. Secundum autem ordinem +tertium, ordinantur quaedam vires sensitivae ad invicem, scilicet +visus, auditus et olfactus. Nam visibile est prius naturaliter, +quia est commune superioribus et inferioribus corporibus. Sonus +autem audibilis fit in aere, qui est naturaliter prior commixtione +elementorum, quam consequitur odor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature; + although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31630] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod alicuius generis species se habent secundum prius et +posterius, sicut numeri et figurae, quantum ad esse; licet simul +esse dicantur inquantum suscipiunt communis generis +praedicationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, + has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of + the acts, as we have said above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31631] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ordo iste potentiarum animae est et ex parte animae, +quae secundum ordinem quendam habet aptitudinem ad diversos actus, +licet sit una secundum essentiam; et ex parte obiectorum; et etiam +ex parte actuum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the + two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31632] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de illis potentiis in quibus +attenditur ordo solum secundum tertium modum. Illae autem potentiae +quae ordinantur secundum alios duos modos, ita se habent quod actus +unius dependet ab altera.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A5-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 5. Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the + body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is + the subject of the powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31633] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae sint in anima sicut +in subiecto. Sicut enim se habent potentiae corporis ad corpus, ita +se habent potentiae animae ad animam. Sed corpus est subiectum +corporalium potentiarum. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiarum +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher + says (De Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily." But the natural principles of the operations + of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31634] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +operationes potentiarum animae attribuuntur corpori propter animam, +quia, ut dicitur in II de anima, <i>anima est quo sentimus et +intelligimus primum</i>. Sed propria principia operationum animae +sunt potentiae. Ergo potentiae per prius sunt in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without + the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone + as their subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; + and for a similar reason, of all the other powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31635] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima quaedam +sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et +huiusmodi; quaedam vero sentit per corpus. Sed si potentia +sensitiva non esset in sola anima sicut in subiecto, nihil posset +sine corpore sentire. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiae +sensitivae; et pari ratione, omnium aliarum potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that "sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite." + Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the + powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31636] Iª q. 77 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod +<i>sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed +coniuncti</i>. Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto sicut in +subiecto. Non ergo sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum +suarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the + same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the + subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we + have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], AA[2]</a>,3; + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], + A[1] + </a>, ad 1), that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers + of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal + organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive + parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and + not in the soul alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 co."><a name="31637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31637] Iª q. 77 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens +operari, omne enim accidens denominat proprium subiectum. Idem +autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod +eius sit potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam +philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia. Manifestum est +autem ex supra dictis quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae +exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde +potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima +sicut in subiecto. Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae +exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et +auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus +nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium +operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non +in anima sola.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that + the composite has the power to perform such operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31638] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut +subiecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet +quod tales operationes operari possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31639] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes huiusmodi potentiae per prius sunt in anima +quam in coniuncto, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in +principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating + to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far + as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the + body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words "with the body or without + the body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without + the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be + understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, + that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without + the + body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on + hearing something. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31640] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae +propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam +pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, +sed recitando. Tamen, quantum ad praesens pertinet, hoc quod +dicitur anima quaedam sentire cum corpore et quaedam sine corpore, +dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod hoc quod dico cum +corpore vel sine corpore, determinet actum sentiendi secundum quod +exit a sentiente. Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio +sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale. +Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod praedicta determinent actum +sentiendi ex parte obiecti quod sentitur. Et sic quaedam sentit cum +corpore, idest in corpore existentia, sicut cum sentit vulnus vel +aliquid huiusmodi, quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, idest non +existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut cum +sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A6-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 6. Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple + thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they + cannot proceed from its essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31641] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae animae non fluant ab eius +essentia. Ab uno enim simplici non procedunt diversa. Essentia +autem animae est una et simplex. Cum ergo potentiae animae sint +multae et diversae, non possunt procedere ab eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the + powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its + essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31642] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud +a quo aliud procedit, est causa eius. Sed essentia animae non +potest dici causa potentiarum; ut patet discurrenti per singula +causarum genera. Ergo potentiae animae non fluunt ab eius +essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, + 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof + moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does + not produce its powers within itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31643] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +emanatio quendam motum nominat. Sed nihil movetur a seipso, ut +probatur in VII libro Physic.; nisi forte ratione partis, sicut +animal dicitur moveri a seipso, quia una pars eius est movens et +alia mota. Neque etiam anima movetur, ut probatur in I de anima. +Non ergo anima causat in se suas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is + included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed + from its essence as their cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31644] Iª q. 77 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed +subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in +definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Ergo potentiae +animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that + by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial + form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make + a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for + its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed + in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence + in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed + in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the + subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces + it. This I say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, + the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which + is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the + substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. + </p><p id="FP_Q77_A6-p7"> Now it is clear, from what has been said + <a href="#FP_Q77_A5" id="FP_Q77_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch + as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (A[1], ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite + is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the + composite, flow from the essence + of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according + as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 co."><a name="31645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31645] Iª q. 77 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et +partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, +et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt +autem in duobus. Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse +simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum. Forma +autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut +tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in +actu. Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma +substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in +quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo +subiecto. Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in +subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde +actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. +Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum +formae accidentalis, inquantum autem est in actu, est eius +productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente, nam +respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; +productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum. Secundo +autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum +minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter +formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est +propter completionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod +potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest +esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid +potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum. Compositum +autem est in actu per animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes +potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive +compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio, quia iam +dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est +actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. + Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and + also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31646] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere +ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium. Sic +igitur ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae +potentiae, tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum +diversitatem organorum corporalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material + cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all + its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31647] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et +quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est +susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia +animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium +activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; + thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31648] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est +per aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem +resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce +color.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A7-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 7. Whether one power of the soul arises from another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does + not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does + not arise from another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31649] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod una potentia animae non oriatur ab alia. +Eorum enim quae simul esse incipiunt, unum non oritur ab alio. Sed +omnes potentiae animae sunt simul animae concreatae. Ergo una earum +ab alia non oritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be + the subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31650] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potentia animae oritur ab anima sicut accidens a subiecto. Sed una +potentia animae non potest esse subiectum alterius, quia accidentis +non est accidens. Ergo una potentia non oritur ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. + Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31651] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +oppositum non oritur a suo opposito, sed unumquodque oritur ex +simili secundum speciem. Potentiae autem animae ex opposito +dividuntur, sicut diversae species. Ergo una earum non procedit ab +alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of + the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31652] Iª q. 77 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed actus unius potentiae +causatur ab alio; sicut actus phantasiae ab actu sensus. Ergo una +potentia animae causatur ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer + to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above + <a href="#FP_Q77_A4" id="FP_Q77_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence + of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is + compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or + together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less + perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the + principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of + the + intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; + wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered + as receptive principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it + has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this + account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 co."><a name="31653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31653] Iª q. 77 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in his quae secundum ordinem naturalem procedunt ab uno, sicut +primum est causa omnium, ita quod est primo propinquius, est +quodammodo causa eorum quae sunt magis remota. Ostensum est autem +supra quod inter potentias animae est multiplex ordo. Et ideo una +potentia animae ab essentia animae procedit mediante alia. Sed quia +essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum +et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel +simul cum corpore; agens autem et finis est perfectius, susceptivum +autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum, +consequens est quod potentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum +ordinem perfectionis et naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum +finis et activi principii. Videmus enim quod sensus est propter +intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens +participatio intellectus, unde secundum naturalem originem +quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto. Sed +secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae +imperfectiores inveniuntur principia respectu aliarum, sicut anima, +secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, consideratur sicut +subiectum et materiale quoddam respectu intellectus. Et propter +hoc, imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis, +prius enim animal generatur quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous + with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31654] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per +transmutationem, sed per naturalem quandam resultationem, et est +simul cum anima; ita est etiam de una potentia respectu +alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, + as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch + as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31655] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis; +sed unum accidens per prius recipitur in substantia quam aliud, +sicut quantitas quam qualitas. Et hoc modo unum accidens dicitur +esse subiectum alterius, ut superficies coloris, inquantum +substantia uno accidente mediante recipit aliud. Et similiter +potest dici de potentiis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. + But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect + things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31656] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod potentiae animae opponuntur ad invicem oppositione +perfecti et imperfecti; sicut etiam species numerorum et figurarum. +Haec autem oppositio non impedit originem unius ab alio, quia +imperfecta naturaliter a perfectis procedunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A8-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 8. Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu + et Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility + and irascibility." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31657] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae remaneant in anima +a corpore separata. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod +<i>anima recedit a corpore, secum trahens sensum et imaginationem, +rationem et intellectum et intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem et +irascibilitatem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are + never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31658] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potentiae animae sunt eius naturales proprietates. Sed proprium +semper inest, et nunquam separatur ab eo cuius est proprium. Ergo +potentiae animae sunt in ea etiam post mortem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says + (De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man." But weakness + is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the + separated soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31659] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +potentiae animae, etiam sensitivae, non debilitantur debilitato +corpore, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, <i>si senex accipiat +oculum iuvenis, videbit utique sicut et iuvenis</i>. Sed debilitas +est via ad corruptionem. Ergo potentiae animae non corrumpuntur +corrupto corpore, sed manent in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in + the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things + during thy lifetime" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="31660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31660] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +memoria est potentia animae sensitivae, ut philosophus probat. Sed +memoria manet in anima separata, dicitur enim, Luc. XVI, diviti +epuloni in Inferno secundum animam existenti, <i>recordare quia +recepisti bona in vita tua</i>. Ergo memoria manet in anima +separata; et per consequens aliae potentiae sensitivae partis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate + souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate + soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="31661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31661] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili, quae est potentia +sensitivae partis. Manifestum est autem animas separatas tristari +et gaudere de praemiis vel poenis quas habent. Ergo vis +concupiscibilis manet in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees + some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a + power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all + the other powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 6"><a name="31662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31662] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod sicut anima, cum +corpus iacet sine sensu nondum penitus mortuum, videt quaedam +secundum imaginariam visionem; ita cum fuerit a corpore penitus +separata per mortem. Sed imaginatio est potentia sensitivae partis. +Ergo potentia sensitivae partis manet in anima separata; et per +consequens omnes aliae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with + its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31663] Iª q. 77 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., <i>ex duabus tantum +substantiis constat homo, anima cum ratione sua, et carne cum +sensibus suis</i>. Ergo, defuncta carne, potentiae sensitivae non +manent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A8-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already ( + <a href="#FP_Q77_A5" id="FP_Q77_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">AA[5]</a>,6,7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as + their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. + But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot + remain after the destruction of the + subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, + as in their principle or root. + </p><p id="FP_Q77_A8-p10"> So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more + false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart + from the corporeal organ. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 co."><a name="31664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31664] Iª q. 77 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad +animam solam sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur +ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et +huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore +destructo. Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in +subiecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae. +Destructo autem subiecto, non potest accidens remanere. Unde, +corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed +virtute tantum manent in anima, sicut in principio vel radice. Et +sic falsum est, quod quidam dicunt huiusmodi potentias in anima +remanere etiam corpore corrupto. Et multo falsius, quod dicunt +etiam actus harum potentiarum remanere in anima separata, quia +talium potentiarum nulla est actio nisi per organum corporeum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although + we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31665] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod liber ille auctoritatem non habet. Unde quod ibi +scriptum est, eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua dicitur. Tamen +potest dici quod trahit secum anima huiusmodi potentias, non actu, +sed virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of + the composite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31666] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod huiusmodi potentiae quas dicimus actu in anima +separata non manere, non sunt proprietates solius animae, sed +coniuncti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual + principle of these powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31667] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dicuntur non debilitari huiusmodi potentiae +debilitato corpore, quia anima manet immutabilis, quae est virtuale +principium huiusmodi potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the + mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="31668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31668] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa recordatio accipitur eo modo quo Augustinus +ponit memoriam in mente; non eo modo quo ponitur pars animae +sensitivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="31669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31669] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod tristitia et gaudium sunt in anima separata, non +secundum appetitum sensitivum, sed secundum appetitum +intellectivum; sicut etiam in Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said + there (Retrac. ii, 24). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 6"><a name="31670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31670] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod Augustinus loquitur ibi inquirendo, non asserendo. Unde +quaedam ibi dicta retractat.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q78" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q78-p0.1">Q. 78. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q78-p2"> We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning + the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a + certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three + parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual + powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers. + </p><p id="FP_Q78-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q78-p4"><a href="#FP_Q78_A1"> (1) The powers of the soul considered generally;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p5"><a href="#FP_Q78_A2"> (2) The various species of the vegetative part;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p6"><a href="#FP_Q78_A3"> (3) The exterior senses;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p7"><a href="#FP_Q78_A4"> (4) The interior senses.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 pr."><a name="31671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31671] +Iª q. 78 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de potentiis +animae in speciali. Ad considerationem autem theologi pertinet +inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et +appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur. Sed quia cognitio +harum potentiarum quodammodo dependet ex aliis, ideo nostra +consideratio de potentiis animae in speciali erit tripartita, primo +namque considerandum est de his quae sunt praeambula ad +intellectum; secundo, de potentiis intellectivis; tertio, de +potentiis appetitivis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de +generibus potentiarum animae. Secundo, de speciebus vegetativae +partis. Tertio, de sensibus exterioribus. Quarto, de sensibus +interioribus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described---namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and + generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should + not class the above forces as powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31681] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes vegetativae +assignentur, scilicet nutritivum, augmentativum, et generativum. +Huiusmodi enim vires dicuntur naturales. Sed potentiae animae sunt +supra vires naturales. Ergo huiusmodi vires non debent poni +potentiae animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But + generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative + force should not be classed as a power of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31682] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad id +quod est commune viventibus et non viventibus, non debet aliqua +potentia animae deputari. Sed generatio est communis omnibus +generabilibus et corruptibilibus, tam viventibus quam non +viventibus. Ergo vis generativa non debet poni potentia animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, + does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31683] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima +potentior est quam natura corporea. Sed natura corporea eadem +virtute activa dat speciem et debitam quantitatem. Ergo multo magis +anima. Non est ergo alia potentia animae augmentativa a +generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing + exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation + of the living thing (De Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it." Therefore we should + not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="31684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31684] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +unaquaeque res conservatur in esse per id per quod esse habet. Sed +potentia generativa est per quam acquiritur esse viventis. Ergo per +eandem res viva conservatur. Sed ad conservationem rei viventis +ordinatur vis nutritiva, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim +potentia potens salvare suscipiens ipsam. Non debet ergo distingui +nutritiva potentia a generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf. De Anima + iii, 9) "growth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31685] Iª q. 78 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod opera huius animae +sunt generare, et alimento uti, et iterum augmentum facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said + <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q78_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is + whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the "generative" power. Another is whereby the living body acquires + its due quantity; to this is directed the "augmentative" power. Another is whereby the body of a living + thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the "nutritive" power. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A2-p8"> We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they + exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist + in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing + cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive + soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that + which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius + (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the + Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce another like unto + itself." And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 co."><a name="31686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31686] Iª q. 78 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod tres sunt potentiae vegetativae partis. Vegetativum enim, ut +dictum est, habet pro obiecto ipsum corpus vivens per animam, ad +quod quidem corpus triplex animae operatio est necessaria. Una +quidem, per quam esse acquirat, et ad hoc ordinatur potentia +generativa. Alia vero, per quam corpus vivum acquirit debitam +quantitatem, et ad hoc ordinatur vis augmentativa. Alia vero, per +quam corpus viventis salvatur et in esse, et in quantitate debita, +et ad hoc ordinatur vis nutritiva. Est tamen quaedam differentia +attendenda inter has potentias. Nam nutritiva et augmentativa +habent suum effectum in eo in quo sunt, quia ipsum corpus unitum +animae augetur et conservatur per vim augmentativam et nutritivam +in eadem anima existentem. Sed vis generativa habet effectum suum, +non in eodem corpore, sed in alio, quia nihil est generativum sui +ipsius. Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquat ad +dignitatem animae sensitivae, quae habet operationem in res +exteriores, licet excellentiori modo et universaliori, supremum +enim inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris, ut +patet per Dionysium, in VII cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo inter istas +tres potentias finalior et principalior et perfectior est +generativa, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim rei iam perfectae +facere alteram qualis ipsa est. Generativae autem deserviunt et +augmentativa et nutritiva, augmentativae vero nutritiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity + and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform + their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31687] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod huiusmodi vires dicuntur naturales, tum quia habent +effectum similem naturae, quae etiam dat esse et quantitatem et +conservationem (licet hae vires habeant hoc altiori modo), tum quia +hae vires exercent suas actiones instrumentaliter per qualitates +activas et passivas, quae sunt naturalium actionum principia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher + way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore + there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31688] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod generatio in rebus inanimatis est totaliter ab +extrinseco. Sed generatio viventium est quodam altiori modo, per +aliquid ipsius viventis, quod est semen, in quo est aliquod +principium corporis formativum. Et ideo oportet esse aliquam +potentiam rei viventis, per quam semen huiusmodi praeparetur, et +haec est vis generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. + For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is + generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according + to the condition of the matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31689] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia generatio viventium est ex aliquo semine, +oportet quod in principio animal generetur parvae quantitatis. Et +propter hoc necesse est quod habeat potentiam animae, per quam ad +debitam quantitatem perducatur. Sed corpus inanimatum generatur ex +materia determinata ab agente extrinseco, et ideo simul recipit +speciem et quantitatem secundum materiae conditionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As we have said above + <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q78_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, + in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance + of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="31690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31690] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, operatio vegetativi principii +completur mediante calore, cuius est humidum consumere. Et ideo, ad +restaurationem humidi deperditi, necesse est habere potentiam +nutritivam, per quam alimentum convertatur in substantiam corporis. +Quod etiam est necessarium ad actum virtutis augmentativae et +generativae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q78_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A3-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 3. Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers + are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31691] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur quinque +sensus exteriores. Sensus enim est cognoscitivus accidentium. Sunt +autem multa genera accidentium. Cum ergo potentiae distinguantur +per obiecta, videtur quod sensus multiplicentur secundum numerum +qui est in generibus accidentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called "common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but + are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies + the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it seems that there is much more need + for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color + or sound. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31692] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +magnitudo et figura, et alia quae dicuntur sensibilia communia, non +sunt sensibilia per accidens, sed contra ea dividuntur in II de +anima. Diversitas autem per se obiectorum diversificat potentias. +Cum ergo plus differant magnitudo et figura a colore quam sonus; +videtur quod multo magis debeat esse alia potentia sensitiva +cognoscitiva magnitudinis aut figurae, quam coloris et soni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; + such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than + five senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31693] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unus +sensus est unius contrarietatis; sicut visus albi et nigri. Sed +tactus est cognoscitivus plurium contrarietatum, scilicet calidi et +frigidi, humidi et sicci, et huiusmodi. Ergo non est sensus unus, +sed plures. Ergo plures sensus sunt quam quinque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as + a distinct sense of touch. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31694] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +species non dividitur contra genus. Sed gustus est tactus quidam. +Ergo non debet poni alter sensus praeter tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is no other besides the five senses." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31695] Iª q. 78 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>non est alter +sensus praeter quinque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the + elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction + or extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, + according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. + But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there + are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety + of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, + according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does + not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p8"> The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses + properly and "per se." Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior + cause of such immutation is what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause + are the sensitive powers diversified. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p9"> Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter + being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas + spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into + the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. + Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected + in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel + when they undergo alteration. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p10"> But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in "sight" while in others we find not only spiritual but also a + natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object + we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of "hearing"; for sound is caused by percussion and + commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of "smelling"; for in + order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place + in "touch" and "taste"; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity + of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural + immutation unless indirectly. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p11"> Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most + perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural + immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, + as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction + of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united + to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 co."><a name="31696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31696] Iª q. 78 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod rationem distinctionis et numeri sensuum exteriorum quidam +accipere voluerunt ex parte organorum, in quibus aliquod +elementorum dominatur, vel aqua, vel aer, vel aliquid huiusmodi. +Quidam autem ex parte medii, quod est vel coniunctum, vel +extrinsecum; et hoc vel aer, vel aqua, vel aliquid huiusmodi. +Quidam autem ex diversa natura sensibilium qualitatum, secundum +quod est qualitas simplicis corporis, vel sequens complexionem. Sed +nihil istorum conveniens est. Non enim potentiae sunt propter +organa, sed organa propter potentias, unde non propter hoc sunt +diversae potentiae, quia sunt diversa organa; sed ideo natura +instituit diversitatem in organis, ut congruerent diversitati +potentiarum. Et similiter diversa media diversis sensibus +attribuit, secundum quod erat conveniens ad actus potentiarum. +Naturas autem sensibilium qualitatum cognoscere non est sensus, sed +intellectus. Accipienda est ergo ratio numeri et distinctionis +exteriorum sensuum, secundum illud quod proprie et per se ad sensum +pertinet. Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est +immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod +per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cuius diversitatem +sensitivae potentiae distinguuntur. Est autem duplex immutatio, una +naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod +forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, +sicut calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma +immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma +coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem +autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio +formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola +immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora +naturalia sentirent dum alterantur. Sed in quibusdam sensibus +invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu. In quibusdam +autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte +obiecti tantum, vel etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte autem obiecti, +invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in sono, +qui est obiectum auditus, nam sonus ex percussione causatur et +aeris commotione. Secundum alterationem vero, in odore, qui est +obiectum olfactus, oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo +corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi, est +immutatio naturalis in tactu et gustu, nam et manus tangens calida +calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero +olfactus aut auditus nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in +sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque +immutatione naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, +et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et communior. Et post hoc +auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex +parte obiecti. Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter +prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Tactus +autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales, de quorum distinctione post +dicetur. Et inde est quod alii tres sensus non fiunt per medium +coniunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, +ut accidit in his duobus sensibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles + of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because "the senses are affected by the same + things whereby inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31697] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod non omnia accidentia habent vim immutativam secundum +se; sed solae qualitates tertiae speciei, secundum quas contingit +alteratio. Et ideo solae huiusmodi qualitates sunt obiecta sensuum, +quia, ut dicitur in VII Physic., <i>secundum eadem alteratur +sensus, secundum quae alterantur corpora inanimata</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper sensibles," + which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they + are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is + clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. + Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest + are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, + as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the + movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the + proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move + the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they + are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently + by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided + according to its proper subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31698] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur +communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et +sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia +propria primo et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualitates +alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad +quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt +species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; +cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus +autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subiectum uno modo vel +pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel localis +distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam +secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis, et sic +sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa. +Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativae, ut +superficies coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum +primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis; ut superficies +ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia +huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione +sensus. Alio enim modo immutatur sensus a magna superficie, et a +parva, quia etiam ipsa albedo dicitur magna vel parva, et ideo +dividitur secundum proprium subiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific + senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another + in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives + the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole + body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate + genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, + just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31699] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus videtur dicere in II de anima, +sensus tactus est unus genere, sed dividitur in multos sensus +secundum speciem; et propter hoc est diversarum contrarietatum. Qui +tamen non separantur ab invicem secundum organum, sed per totum +corpus se concomitantur; et ideo eorum distinctio non apparet. +Gustus autem, qui est perceptivus dulcis et amari, concomitatur +tactum in lingua, non autem per totum corpus; et ideo de facili a +tactu distinguitur. Posset tamen dici quod omnes illae +contrarietates, et singulae conveniunt in uno genere proximo, et +omnes in uno genere communi, quod est obiectum tactus secundum +rationem communem. Sed illud genus commune est innominatum; sicut +etiam genus proximum calidi et frigidi est innominatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue + only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is + one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason + of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only + a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily + immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet + and bitter: but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, + the object of touch. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31700] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sensus gustus, secundum dictum philosophi, est +quaedam species tactus quae est in lingua tantum. Non autem +distinguitur a tactu in genere, sed a tactu quantum ad illas +species quae per totum corpus diffunduntur. Si vero tactus sit unus +sensus tantum, propter unam rationem communem obiecti, dicendum +erit quod secundum rationem diversam immutationis, distinguitur +gustus a tactu. Nam tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et non +solum spirituali, quantum ad organum suum, secundum qualitatem quae +ei proprie obiicitur. Gustus autem organum non immutatur de +necessitate naturali immutatione secundum qualitatem quae ei +proprie obiicitur, ut scilicet lingua fiat dulcis vel amara; sed +secundum praeambulam qualitatem, in qua fundatur sapor, scilicet +secundum humorem, qui est obiectum tactus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q78_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A4-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 4. Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. + Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior + senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31701] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod interiores sensus inconvenienter +distinguantur. Commune enim non dividitur contra proprium. Ergo +sensus communis non debet enumerari inter vires interiores +sensitivas, praeter sensus exteriores proprios.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the + proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like + manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between + the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own + vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need + to assign an interior power, called the common sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31702] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad id +ad quod sufficit sensus proprius et exterior, non oportet ponere +aliquam vim apprehensivam interiorem. Sed ad iudicandum de +sensibilibus, sufficiunt sensus proprii et exteriores, unusquisque +enim sensus iudicat de proprio obiecto. Similiter etiam videntur +sufficere ad hoc quod percipiant suos actus, quia cum actio sensus +sit quodammodo medium inter potentiam et obiectum, videtur quod +multo magis visus possit suam visionem, tanquam sibi propinquiorem, +percipere, quam colorem; et sic de aliis. Non ergo necessarium fuit +ad hoc ponere interiorem potentiam, quae dicatur sensus +communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first + sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers + distinct from the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31703] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum philosophum, phantasticum et memorativum sunt passiones +primi sensitivi. Sed passio non dividitur contra subiectum. Ergo +memoria et phantasia non debent poni aliae potentiae praeter +sensum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but + what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that "those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." + Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the "estimative" power, for the perception + of intentions which the sense does not perceive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31704] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus minus dependet a sensu, quam quaecumque potentia +sensitivae partis. Sed intellectus nihil cognoscit nisi accipiendo +a sensu, unde dicitur in I posteriorum, quod <i>quibus deest unus +sensus, deficit una scientia</i>. Ergo multo minus debet poni una +potentia sensitivae partis ad percipiendum intentiones quas non +percipit sensus, quam vocant aestimativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, + which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative + and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add + the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the + estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="31705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31705] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, actus +cogitativae, qui est conferre et componere et dividere, et actus +reminiscitivae, qui est quodam syllogismo uti ad inquirendum, non +minus distant ab actu aestimativae et memorativae, quam actus +aestimativae ab actu phantasiae. Debent ergo vel cogitativa et +reminiscitiva poni aliae vires praeter aestimativam et memorativam; +vel aestimativa et memorativa non debent poni aliae vires praeter +phantasiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of + the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. + Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="31706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31706] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ponit tria genera visionum, +scilicet corporalem, quae fit per sensum; et spiritualem, quae fit +per imaginationem sive phantasiam; et intellectualem, quae fit per +intellectum. Non est ergo aliqua vis interior quae sit media inter +sensum et intellectum, nisi imaginativa tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative + and memorative powers." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31707] Iª q. 78 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Avicenna, in suo libro de anima, ponit quinque potentias +sensitivas interiores, scilicet sensum communem, phantasiam, +imaginativam, aestimativam, et memorativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for + the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to + diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p10"> Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time + of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not + be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, + for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the + sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also + retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things + are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power + is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct + from the power which preserves them. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p11"> Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there + would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, + and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain + things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages + and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as + a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are + useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. + And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by + the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p12"> Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper sense" and the "common sense" are appointed, and of their + distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" + is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. + Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the + "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like + intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for + instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned + among these intentions. + </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p13"> Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly + immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these + intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power by + which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some sort of + collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain + particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason + compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection + of the past; but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by + the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, + which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we + compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other + than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De + sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part---namely, + the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 co."><a name="31708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31708] Iª q. 78 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum natura non deficiat in necessariis, oportet esse tot +actiones animae sensitivae, quot sufficiant ad vitam animalis +perfecti. Et quaecumque harum actionum non possunt reduci in unum +principium, requirunt diversas potentias, cum potentia animae nihil +aliud sit quam proximum principium operationis animae. Est autem +considerandum quod ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non +solum apprehendat rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud +eius absentiam. Alioquin, cum animalis motus et actio sequantur +apprehensionem, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens; +cuius contrarium apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae +moventur motu processivo; moventur enim ad aliquid absens +apprehensum. Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non +solum recipiat species sensibilium, cum praesentialiter immutatur +ab eis; sed etiam eas retineat et conservet. Recipere autem et +retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa principia, nam +humida bene recipiunt, et male retinent; e contrario autem est de +siccis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, +oportet esse aliam potentiam quae recipiat species sensibilium, et +quae conservet. Rursus considerandum est quod, si animal moveretur +solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non +esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum +quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed +necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum +quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed +etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive +nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter +indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et +similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia +est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod +percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. +Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum +perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non +autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum. Sic ergo ad receptionem +formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis, de +quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum +retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive +imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio +quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad +apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, +ordinatur vis aestimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis +memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius +signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua +huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens. Et ipsa +ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi +intentiones computatur. Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad +formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia +animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. +Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia +animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam +instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae +in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine +dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi +intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui +medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem +capitis, est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio +intellectiva intentionum universalium. Ex parte autem memorativae, +non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita +recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi +syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum +individuales intentiones. Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam, +mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit +formas imaginatas; ut patet cum ex forma imaginata auri et forma +imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam +vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab +homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa. Cui etiam hanc +actionem attribuit Averroes, in libro quodam quem fecit de sensu et +sensibilibus. Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires +interiores sensitivae partis, scilicet sensum communem et +imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of + the exterior senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31709] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sensus interior non dicitur communis per +praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium +exteriorum sensuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, + by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between + two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common + term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, + again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper + sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, + and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31710] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sensus proprius iudicat de sensibili proprio, +discernendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut +discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a +dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui +inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum +communem pertinere discretionis iudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut +ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam +percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se +videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non +cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua +immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia +immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above ( + <a href="#FP_Q77_A7" id="FP_Q78_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[7]</a>), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions + of the "first sensitive." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31711] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut una potentia oritur ab anima, alia mediante, +ut supra dictum est; ita etiam anima subiicitur alii potentiae, +mediante alia. Et secundum hunc modum, phantasticum et memorativum +dicuntur passiones primi sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the + intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect + manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31712] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in +re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus +percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori +modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to + a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not + distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="31713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31713] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in +homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis; sed per +aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, +secundum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed +eaedem, perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear + that it is common to all interior apprehensions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="31714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31714] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod Augustinus spiritualem visionem dicit esse, quae fit per +similitudines corporum in absentia corporum. Unde patet quod +communis est omnibus interioribus apprehensionibus.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q79" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q79-p0.1">Q. 79. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q79-p2"> The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q79-p3"><a href="#FP_Q79_A1"> (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p4"><a href="#FP_Q79_A2"> (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p5"><a href="#FP_Q79_A3"> (3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p6"><a href="#FP_Q79_A4"> (4) Whether it is something in the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p7"><a href="#FP_Q79_A5"> (5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p8"><a href="#FP_Q79_A6"> (6) Whether memory is in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p9"><a href="#FP_Q79_A7"> (7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p10"><a href="#FP_Q79_A8"> (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p11"><a href="#FP_Q79_A9"> (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p12"><a href="#FP_Q79_A10"> (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p13"><a href="#FP_Q79_A11"> (11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p14"><a href="#FP_Q79_A12"> (12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p15"><a href="#FP_Q79_A13"> (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 pr."><a name="31715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31715] +Iª q. 79 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de potentiis +intellectivis. Circa quod quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum +intellectus sit potentia animae, vel eius essentia. Secundo, si est +potentia, utrum sit potentia passiva. Tertio, si est potentia +passiva, utrum sit ponere aliquem intellectum agentem. Quarto, +utrum sit aliquid animae. Quinto, utrum intellectus agens sit unus +omnium. Sexto, utrum memoria sit in intellectu. Septimo, utrum sit +alia potentia ab intellectu. Octavo, utrum ratio sit alia potentia +ab intellectu. Nono, utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae +potentiae. Decimo, utrum intelligentia sit alia potentia praeter +intellectum. Undecimo, utrum intellectus speculativus et practicus +sint diversae potentiae. Duodecimo, utrum synderesis sit aliqua +potentia intellectivae partis. Tertiodecimo, utrum conscientia sit +aliqua potentia intellectivae partis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q79_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A1-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 1. Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the + same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and + spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31716] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit aliqua potentia +animae, sed sit ipsa eius essentia. Intellectus idem enim videtur +esse quod mens. Sed mens non est potentia animae sed essentia, +dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., <i>mens et spiritus non +relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant</i>. Ergo intellectus +est ipsa essentia animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now + the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but + they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind + and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31717] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +diversa genera potentiarum animae non uniuntur in aliqua potentia +una, sed in sola essentia animae. Appetitivum autem et +intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, ut dicitur in +II de anima; conveniunt autem in mente, quia Augustinus, X de +Trin., ponit intelligentiam et voluntatem in mente. Ergo mens et +intellectus est ipsa essentia animae, et non aliqua eius +potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels + are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31718] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Gregorium, in homilia ascensionis, homo intelligit cum +Angelis. Sed Angeli dicuntur mentes et intellectus. Ergo mens et +intellectus hominis non est aliqua potentia animae, sed ipsa +anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore + it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31719] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ex +hoc convenit alicui substantiae quod sit intellectiva, quia est +immaterialis. Sed anima est immaterialis per suam essentiam. Ergo +videtur quod anima per suam essentiam sit intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31720] Iª q. 79 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus ponit intellectivum potentiam animae, ut patet in +II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In accordance with what has been already shown ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q54_A3" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q77_A1" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[77], A[1]</a>) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the + essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is + to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of + understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, + the intellect is power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 co."><a name="31721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31721] Iª q. 79 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere, secundum praemissa, quod intellectus sit +aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia. Tunc enim +solum immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei +operantis, quando ipsa operatio est eius esse, sicut enim potentia +se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad +esse. In solo Deo autem idem est intelligere quod suum esse. Unde +in solo Deo intellectus est eius essentia, in aliis autem creaturis +intellectualibus intellectus est quaedam potentia +intelligentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from + its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief + power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the + mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31722] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sensus accipitur aliquando pro potentia, aliquando +vero pro ipsa anima sensitiva, denominatur enim anima sensitiva +nomine principalioris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et similiter +anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine intellectus, quasi a +principaliori sua virtute; sicut dicitur in I de anima, quod +intellectus est substantia quaedam. Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus +dicit quod mens est spiritus, vel essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities + of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its + mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine + puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31723] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod appetitivum et intellectivum sunt diversa genera +potentiarum animae, secundum diversas rationes obiectorum. Sed +appetitivum partim convenit cum intellectivo, et partim cum +sensitivo, quantum ad modum operandi per organum corporale, vel +sine huiusmodi organo, nam appetitus sequitur apprehensionem. Et +secundum hoc Augustinus ponit voluntatem in mente, et philosophus +in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason + an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, + such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31724] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in Angelis non est alia vis nisi intellectiva, et +voluntas, quae ad intellectum consequitur. Et propter hoc Angelus +dicitur mens vel intellectus, quia tota virtus sua in hoc +consistit. Anima autem habet multas alias vires, sicut sensitivas +et nutritivas, et ideo non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power + of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31725] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ipsa immaterialitas substantiae intelligentis creatae +non est eius intellectus; sed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad +intelligendum. Unde non oportet quod intellectus sit substantia +animae, sed eius virtus et potentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A2-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 2. Whether the intellect is a passive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But + the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect + is not a passive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31726] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva. +Patitur enim unumquodque secundum materiam; sed agit ratione +formae. Sed virtus intellectiva consequitur immaterialitatem +substantiae intelligentis. Ergo videtur quod intellectus non sit +potentia passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31727] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potentia intellectiva est incorruptibilis, ut supra dictum est. Sed +intellectus si est passivus, est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in III +de anima. Ergo potentia intellectiva non est passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. + But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, + all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31728] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, agens +est nobilius patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt., +et Aristoteles in III de anima. Potentiae autem vegetativae partis +omnes sunt activae, quae tamen sunt infimae inter potentias animae. +Ergo multo magis potentiae intellectivae, quae sunt supremae, omnes +sunt activae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is in a way to be passive." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31729] Iª q. 79 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>intelligere est +pati quoddam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs + to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a + man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, + is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be + passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or + moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something + receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality + to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is + clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q79_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[1]</a>), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by + observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation + to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which + originally and + virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure + act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite + being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is + compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act. + </p><p id="FP_Q79_A2-p7"> Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter + of the heavenly bodies ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A1" id="FP_Q79_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[1]</a>). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things + that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, + by reason of its proximity to the first + intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence + and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is + at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear + from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. + And + so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently + the intellect is a passive power. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 co."><a name="31730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31730] Iª q. 79 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod pati tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo, propriissime, scilicet +quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi secundum naturam, +aut secundum propriam inclinationem; sicut cum aqua frigiditatem +amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur. +Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid +ab ipso abiicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens. Et +secundum hoc dicitur pati non solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui +sanatur; non solum qui tristatur, sed etiam qui laetatur; vel +quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel moveatur. Tertio modo, dicitur +aliquid pati communiter, ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia +ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod +aliquid abiiciatur. Secundum quem modum, omne quod exit de potentia +in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic +intelligere nostrum est pati. Quod quidem hac ratione apparet. +Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa +ens in universali. Considerari ergo potest utrum intellectus sit in +actu vel potentia, ex hoc quod consideratur quomodo intellectus se +habeat ad ens universale. Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus qui ad +ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis, et talis est +intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et +virtualiter totum ens praeexistit sicut in prima causa. Et ideo +intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed est actus purus. +Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu +totius entis universalis, quia sic oporteret quod esset ens +infinitum. Unde omnis intellectus creatus, per hoc ipsum quod est, +non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ipsa +intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum. Potentia autem dupliciter +se habet ad actum. Est enim quaedam potentia quae semper est +perfecta per actum; sicut diximus de materia corporum caelestium. +Quaedam autem potentia est, quae non semper est in actu, sed de +potentia procedit in actum; sicut invenitur in generabilibus et +corruptibilibus. Intellectus igitur angelicus semper est in actu +suorum intelligibilium, propter propinquitatem ad primum +intellectum, qui est actus purus, ut supra dictum est. Intellectus +autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime +remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu +intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil +est scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Quod manifeste +apparet ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in +potentia, postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu. Sic +igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum +tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia +passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense + passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31731] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de primo et secundo modo +passionis, qui sunt proprii materiae primae. Tertius autem modus +passionis est cuiuscumque in potentia existentis quod in actum +reducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite + is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive + intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the + two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal + organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" + intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it + is incorruptible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31732] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus passivus secundum quosdam dicitur +appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animae passiones; qui etiam in I +Ethic. dicitur rationalis per participationem, quia obedit rationi. +Secundum alios autem intellectus passivus dicitur virtus +cogitativa, quae nominatur ratio particularis. Et utroque modo +passivum accipi potest secundum primos duos modos passionis, +inquantum talis intellectus sic dictus, est actus alicuius organi +corporalis. Sed intellectus qui est in potentia ad intelligibilia, +quem Aristoteles ob hoc nominat intellectum possibilem, non est +passivus nisi tertio modo, quia non est actus organi corporalis. Et +ideo est incorruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they + refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative + power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such + a passive force being nobler than such an active one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31733] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et +passio referantur, non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus +autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. +Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, +scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi passivum +esse nobilius tali activo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A3-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 3. Whether there is an active intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things + intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. + Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is + active, but only that it is passive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31734] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non sit ponere intellectum agentem. Sicut +enim se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus noster +ad intelligibilia. Sed quia sensus est in potentia ad sensibilia +non ponitur sensus agens, sed sensus patiens tantum. Ergo, cum +intellectus noster sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, videtur quod +non debeat poni intellectus agens, sed possibilis tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for + sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But + in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity + for an active intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31735] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +dicatur quod in sensu etiam est aliquod agens, sicut lumen, contra, +lumen requiritur ad visum inquantum facit medium lucidum in actu, +nam color ipse secundum se est motivus lucidi. Sed in operatione +intellectus non ponitur aliquod medium quod necesse sit fieri in +actu. Ergo non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect + is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form + is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make + the species actually intelligible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31736] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +similitudo agentis recipitur in patiente secundum modum patientis. +Sed intellectus possibilis est virtus immaterialis. Ergo +immaterialitas eius sufficit ad hoc quod recipiantur in eo formae +immaterialiter. Sed ex hoc ipso aliqua forma est intelligibilis in +actu, quod est immaterialis. Ergo nulla necessitas est ponere +intellectum agentem, ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in +actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, + and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an active intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31737] Iª q. 79 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>sicut in omni +natura ita et in anima est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid +quo est omnia facere</i>. Est ergo ponere intellectum agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; + but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on + <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q79_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: + since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is + immaterial. And he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter + was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect + was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not + allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; + it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing + is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. + We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the + species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 co."><a name="31738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31738] Iª q. 79 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere +intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte +ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicetur. +Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, +et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid +intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale. Et huiusmodi vocabat +species, sive ideas, ex quarum participatione dicebat etiam +materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua naturaliter +constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus +nostros, ad hoc quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam +haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium +subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non +sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum +sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. +Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens +actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat +igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret +intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus +materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum +agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear + that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual + part, there is something active and something passive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31739] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non +oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte +nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, +omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et +aliquid passivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors + actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same + reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become + actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as + the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified + in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31740] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim +dicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu +visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter idem, +intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum. +Secundum alios vero, lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter +colores, ut fiant actu visibiles; sed ut medium fiat actu lucidum, +ut Commentator dicit in II de anima. Et secundum hoc, similitudo +qua Aristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur +quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc est necessarium ad videndum, ita +illud ad intelligendum; sed non propter idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their + dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now + the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist + apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial + nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually + intelligible by way of abstraction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31741] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, supposito agente, bene contingit diversimode recipi +eius similitudinem in diversis propter eorum dispositionem +diversam. Sed si agens non praeexistit, nihil ad hoc faciet +dispositio recipientis. Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid +existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, +quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non +sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset +intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum +abstractionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A4-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 4. Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light + for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9, </a> "He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active intellect is not something + in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31742] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae +nostrae. Intellectus enim agentis effectus est illuminare ad +intelligendum. Sed hoc fit per aliquid quod est altius anima; +secundum illud Ioan. I, <i>erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem +hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>. Ergo videtur quod intellectus +agens non sit aliquid animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes + not understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore + the active intellect is not something in our soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31743] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit intellectui agenti quod non +aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Sed anima nostra +non semper intelligit; sed aliquando intelligit et aliquando non +intelligit. Ergo intellectus agens non est aliquid animae +nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something + belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a man would always be able + to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31744] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, agens +et patiens sufficiunt ad agendum. Si igitur intellectus possibilis +est aliquid animae nostrae, qui est virtus passiva, et similiter +intellectus agens, qui est virtus activa; sequitur quod homo semper +poterit intelligere cum voluerit, quod patet esse falsum. Non est +ergo intellectus agens aliquid animae nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can + be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality + to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in + our soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31745] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est +substantia actu ens. Nihil autem est respectu eiusdem in actu et in +potentia. Si ergo intellectus possibilis, qui est in potentia ad +omnia intelligibilia, est aliquid animae nostrae; videtur +impossibile quod intellectus agens sit aliquid animae nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since + habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very + action of the passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the + soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the + soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore + the active intellect is not something in our soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="31746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31746] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si +intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae, oportet quod sit +aliqua potentia. Non est enim nec passio nec habitus, nam habitus +et passiones non habent rationem agentis respectu passionum animae; +sed magis passio est ipsa actio potentiae passivae, habitus autem +est aliquid quod ex actibus consequitur. Omnis autem potentia fluit +ab essentia animae. Sequeretur ergo quod intellectus agens ab +essentia animae procederet. Et sic non inesset animae per +participationem ab aliquo superiori intellectu, quod est +inconveniens. Non ergo intellectus agens est aliquid animae +nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active intellect, + "to be in the soul." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31747] Iª q. 79 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, III de anima quod <i>necesse est in anima +has esse differentias</i>, scilicet intellectum possibilem, et +agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe + that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power + of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence + of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called + intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but + only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. + Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which + it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the + soul + is helped to understand. + </p><p id="FP_Q79_A4-p9"> Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms + as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, + it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power + the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the + universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone + does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among + these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived + from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that + we + abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs + to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De + Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: + while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima + iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only + beatitude; as will be shown later on ( + <a href="#FP_Q90_A3" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>; FS, + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.3" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv"> Ps. 4:7, </a> "The light of Thy + countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 co."><a name="31748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31748] Iª q. 79 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod intellectus agens de quo philosophus loquitur, est aliquid +animae. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod supra animam +intellectivam humanam necesse est ponere aliquem superiorem +intellectum, a quo anima virtutem intelligendi obtineat. Semper +enim quod participat aliquid, et quod est mobile, et quod est +imperfectum, praeexigit ante se aliquid quod est per essentiam suam +tale, et quod est immobile et perfectum. Anima autem humana +intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, +cuius signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum +aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum +quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam +intelligentiam, tum quia non omnia intelligit; tum quia in his quae +intelligit, de potentia procedit ad actum. Oportet ergo esse +aliquem altiorem intellectum, quo anima iuvetur ad intelligendum. +Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum secundum substantiam +separatum, esse intellectum agentem, qui quasi illustrando +phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia actu. Sed, dato quod sit +aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen +oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo +intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit +intelligibilia in actu. Sicut et in aliis rebus naturalibus +perfectis, praeter universales causas agentes, sunt propriae +virtutes inditae singulis rebus perfectis, ab universalibus +agentibus derivatae, non enim solus sol generat hominem, sed est in +homine virtus generativa hominis; et similiter in aliis animalibus +perfectis. Nihil autem est perfectius in inferioribus rebus anima +humana. Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata +a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare. Et +hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas +universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu +intelligibilia. Nulla autem actio convenit alicui rei, nisi per +aliquod principium formaliter ei inhaerens; ut supra dictum est, +cum de intellectu possibili ageretur. Ergo oportet virtutem quae +est principium huius actionis, esse aliquid in anima. Et ideo +Aristoteles comparavit intellectum agentem lumini, quod est aliquid +receptum in aere. Plato autem intellectum separatum imprimentem in +animas nostras, comparavit soli; ut Themistius dicit in commentario +tertii de anima. Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei +documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo +beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen +intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>signatum est +super nos lumen vultus tui, domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31749] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illa lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis, a +qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: + "Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because + it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which + is in potentiality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31750] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod philosophus illa verba non dicit de intellectu +agente, sed de intellectu in actu. Unde supra de ipso praemiserat, +idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei. Vel, si intelligatur de +intellectu agente, hoc dicitur quia non est ex parte intellectus +agentis hoc quod quandoque intelligimus et quandoque non +intelligimus; sed ex parte intellectus qui est in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the + visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is + that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects + are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we + require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since + through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, + conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something + separate from the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31751] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum +possibilem ut obiectum agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu +ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia intelligeremus, cum +intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet +ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur, +praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentia phantasmatum, +et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi +opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut +per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones. Et +quantum ad hoc, non differt utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid +animae, vel aliquid separatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms + are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, + inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from + the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active + intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in + potentiality to such species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31752] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed +est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e +converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed +sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem +animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem +per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus +individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus +agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae +dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad +huiusmodi species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives + from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as + its other powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="31753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31753] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, cum essentia animae sit immaterialis, a supremo +intellectu creata, nihil prohibet virtutem quae a supremo +intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahit a materia, ab essentia +ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A5-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 5. Whether the active intellect is one in all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to + the number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not + multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31754] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens sit unus in omnibus. +Nihil enim quod est separatum a corpore, multiplicatur secundum +multiplicationem corporum. Sed intellectus agens est separatus, ut +dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non multiplicatur in multis +corporibus hominum, sed est unus in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is + still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31755] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus agens facit universale, quod est unum in multis. Sed +illud quod est causa unitatis, magis est unum. Ergo intellectus +agens est unus in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all + agree in one active intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31756] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnes +homines conveniunt in primis conceptionibus intellectus. His autem +assentiunt per intellectum agentem. Ergo conveniunt omnes in uno +intellectu agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various + things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31757] Iª q. 79 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est +sicut lumen. Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis. Ergo +non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The truth about this question depends on what we have already said + <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one + active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active + intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many + active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 co."><a name="31758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31758] Iª q. 79 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod veritas huius quaestionis dependet ex praemissis. Si enim +intellectus agens non esset aliquid animae, sed esset quaedam +substantia separata, unus esset intellectus agens omnium hominum. +Et hoc intelligunt qui ponunt unitatem intellectus agentis. Si +autem intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, ut quaedam virtus +ipsius, necesse est dicere quod sint plures intellectus agentes, +secundum pluralitatem animarum, quae multiplicantur secundum +multiplicationem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Non enim potest esse +quod una et eadem virtus numero sit diversarum substantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, + as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, + because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but + not as a separate substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31759] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod philosophus probat intellectum agentem esse +separatum, per hoc quod possibilis est separatus; quia, ut ipse +dicit, agens est honorabilius patiente. Intellectus autem +possibilis dicitur separatus, quia non est actus alicuius organi +corporalis. Et secundum hunc modum etiam intellectus agens dicitur +separatus, non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the + same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts + the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31760] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus agens causat universale abstrahendo a +materia. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod sit unus in omnibus +habentibus intellectum, sed quod sit unus in omnibus secundum +habitudinem ad omnia a quibus abstrahit universale, respectu quorum +universale est unum. Et hoc competit intellectui agenti inquantum +est immaterialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently + the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible + principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle + of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need + for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common + of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of + the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31761] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia quae sunt unius speciei, communicant in actione +consequente naturam speciei, et per consequens in virtute, quae est +actionis principium, non quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. +Cognoscere autem prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem +humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute +quae est principium huius actionis, et haec est virtus intellectus +agentis. Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. +Oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic +illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus, demonstrat +unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli; non autem +unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A6-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 6. Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the + higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast, + for he says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them + to memory." Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31762] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod memoria non sit in parte intellectiva +animae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod ad partem +superiorem animae pertinent quae non sunt hominibus pecoribusque +communia. Sed memoria est hominibus pecoribusque communis, dicit +enim ibidem quod <i>possunt pecora sentire per corporis sensus +corporalia, et ea mandare memoriae</i>. Ergo memoria non pertinet +ad partem animae intellectivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a + thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not + the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31763] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +memoria praeteritorum est. Sed praeteritum dicitur secundum aliquod +determinatum tempus. Memoria igitur est cognoscitiva alicuius sub +determinato tempore; quod est cognoscere aliquid sub hic et nunc. +Hoc autem non est intellectus, sed sensus. Memoria igitur non est +in parte intellectiva, sed solum in parte sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen + in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. + Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which + it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31764] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +memoria conservantur species rerum quae actu non cogitantur. Sed +hoc non est possibile accidere in intellectu, quia intellectus fit +in actu per hoc quod informatur specie intelligibili; intellectum +autem esse in actu, est ipsum intelligere in actu; et sic +intellectus omnia intelligit in actu, quorum species apud se habet. +Non ergo memoria est in parte intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31765] Iª q. 79 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., quod <i>memoria, intelligentia +et voluntas sunt una mens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must + first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that + this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are + acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual + apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every + thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon + as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand + that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the + intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active + intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; + which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual + part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual + part. + </p><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p7"> But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect + "is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. + And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Now, the passive intellect + is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the + fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but + not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the + act of understanding---namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration. + </p><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p8"> The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions + of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, + corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after + ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species + unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, + therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But + if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in + the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed + time, is something individual. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 co."><a name="31766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31766] Iª q. 79 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum de ratione memoriae sit conservare species rerum quae +actu non apprehenduntur, hoc primum considerari oportet, utrum +species intelligibiles sic in intellectu conservari possint. Posuit +enim Avicenna hoc esse impossibile. In parte enim sensitiva dicebat +hoc accidere, quantum ad aliquas potentias, inquantum sunt actus +organorum corporalium, in quibus conservari possunt aliquae species +absque actuali apprehensione. In intellectu autem, qui caret organo +corporali, nihil existit nisi intelligibiliter. Unde oportet +intelligi in actu illud cuius similitudo in intellectu existit. Sic +ergo, secundum ipsum, quam cito aliquis actu desinit intelligere +aliquam rem, desinit esse illius rei species in intellectu, sed +oportet, si denuo vult illam rem intelligere, quod convertat se ad +intellectum agentem, quem ponit substantiam separatam, ut ab illo +effluant species intelligibiles in intellectum possibilem. Et ex +exercitio et usu convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, +relinquitur, secundum ipsum, quaedam habilitas in intellectu +possibili convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, quam dicebat esse +habitum scientiae. Secundum igitur hanc positionem, nihil +conservatur in parte intellectiva, quod non actu intelligatur. Unde +non poterit poni memoria in parte intellectiva, secundum hunc +modum. Sed haec opinio manifeste repugnat dictis Aristotelis. Dicit +enim, in III de anima, quod, cum intellectus possibilis <i>sic fiat +singula ut sciens, dicitur qui secundum actum; et quod hoc accidit +cum possit operari per seipsum. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia +quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut ante addiscere aut invenire</i>. +Dicitur autem intellectus possibilis fieri singula, secundum quod +recipit species singulorum. Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species +intelligibilium, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem +quod semper operetur, quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, +licet aliter quam ante intelligere; eo scilicet modo quo sciens in +habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu. Repugnat etiam +praedicta positio rationi. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur +in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis +stabilis naturae et immobilis, quam materia corporalis. Si ergo +materia corporalis formas quas recipit, non solum tenet dum per eas +agit in actu, sed etiam postquam agere per eas cessaverit; multo +fortius intellectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species +intelligibiles, sive a sensibilibus acceptas, sive etiam ab aliquo +superiori intellectu effluxas. Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur +solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse +in intellectiva parte. Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod eius +obiectum sit praeteritum, ut praeteritum; memoria in parte +intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quae est apprehensiva +particularium. Praeteritum enim, ut praeteritum, cum significet +esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis +pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the + sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. + But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher + says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole + soul, but the intellect." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31767] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod memoria, secundum quod est conservativa specierum, +non est nobis pecoribusque communis. Species enim conservantur non +in parte animae sensitiva tantum, sed magis in coniuncto; cum vis +memorativa sit actus organi cuiusdam. Sed intellectus secundum +seipsum est conservativus specierum, praeter concomitantiam organi +corporalis. Unde philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>anima +est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition of past may be referred to two things---namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. + These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present + sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible + thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is + not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is + accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, + may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual + act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not + incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial + act, as we have said above of the intellect ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q79_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands + its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, + in as far as it regards past events, is + preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands + the past as something "here" and "now." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31768] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad +obiectum quod cognoscitur; et ad cognitionis actum. Quae quidem duo +simul coniunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva +alicuius per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili, unde simul +animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse +quoddam praeteritum sensibile. Sed quantum ad partem intellectivam +pertinet, praeteritio accidit, et non per se convenit, ex parte +obiecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum +est homo, homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in +praesenti vel in praeterito vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero +actus, praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut +in sensu. Quia intelligere animae nostrae est quidam particularis +actus, in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur +homo intelligere nunc vel heri vel cras. Et hoc non repugnat +intellectualitati, quia huiusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam +particulare, tamen est immaterialis actus, ut supra de intellectu +dictum est; et ideo sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis +ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus, ita intelligit suum +intelligere, quod est singularis actus vel in praeterito vel in +praesenti vel in futuro existens. Sic igitur salvatur ratio +memoriae, quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum, in intellectu, +secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum +quod intelligit praeteritum, prout est hic et nunc.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. + Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands + in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual + knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it + does not understand in act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31769] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod species intelligibilis aliquando est in intellectu in +potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia. +Aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc +intelligit actu. Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentiam et +actum, et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc +modum intellectus conservat species, etiam quando actu non +intelligit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A7-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 7. Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the + soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also + distinct from the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31770] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod alia potentia sit memoria intellectiva, et +alia intellectus. Augustinus enim, in X de Trin., ponit in mente +memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Manifestum est autem quod +memoria est alia potentia a voluntate. Ergo similiter est alia ab +intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory + in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31771] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eadem +ratio distinctionis est potentiarum sensitivae partis et +intellectivae. Sed memoria in parte sensitiva est alia potentia a +sensu, ut supra dictum est. Ergo memoria partis intellectivae est +alia potentia ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one + flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31772] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt sibi +invicem aequalia, et unum eorum ab alio oritur. Hoc autem esse non +posset, si memoria esset eadem potentia cum intellectu. Non est +ergo eadem potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to + the intellect, as we have said (A[6], ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31773] Iª q. 79 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, de +ratione memoriae est, quod sit thesaurus vel locus conservativus +specierum. Hoc autem philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit +intellectui, ut dictum est. Non ergo in parte intellectiva est alia +potentia memoria ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As has been said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined + in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A4" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not + be + differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object + under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object + under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality." Wherefore the passive + intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the + active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object + to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power + is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is + compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers + in the + intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for + it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 co."><a name="31774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31774] Iª q. 79 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, potentiae animae distinguuntur +secundum diversas rationes obiectorum; eo quod ratio cuiuslibet +potentiae consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est eius +obiectum. Dictum est etiam supra quod, si aliqua potentia secundum +propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem +rationem obiecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum +diversitates particularium differentiarum, sicut potentia visiva, +quae respicit suum obiectum secundum rationem colorati, non +diversificatur per diversitatem albi et nigri. Intellectus autem +respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod +intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri. Unde secundum +nullam differentiam entium, diversificatur differentia intellectus +possibilis. Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et +intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud +principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse +in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in +actu existente. Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, +ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, potentia autem passiva +comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens +in actu. Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in +intellectu esse potest, nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod +memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu, ad rationem enim +potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the + meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present + in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean + that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or + affection which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three + powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, + the act of the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31775] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, quamvis in III dist. I Sent. dicatur quod memoria, +intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires; tamen hoc non est +secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit in XIV de Trin., +quod <i>si accipiatur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum +quod semper praesto sunt animae, sive cogitentur sive non +cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam +autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, +sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque +coniungit</i>. Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus +pro tribus potentiis; sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animae +retentione, intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus, voluntatem +autem pro actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31776] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praeteritum et praesens possunt esse propriae +differentiae potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativae; non autem +potentiarum intellectivarum, ratione supra dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31777] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex +habitu. Et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei; non autem sicut potentia +potentiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A8-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 8. Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when + we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." + Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31778] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. In +libro enim de spiritu et anima dicitur, <i>cum ab inferioribus ad +superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde +imaginatio, deinde ratio, deinde intellectus</i>. Est ergo alia +potentia ratio ab intellectu, sicut imaginatio a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong + to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31779] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., quod intellectus comparatur ad +rationem sicut aeternitas ad tempus. Sed non est eiusdem virtutis +esse in aeternitate et esse in tempore. Ergo non est eadem potentia +ratio et intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to + man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is + distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31780] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, homo +communicat cum Angelis in intellectu, cum brutis vero in sensu. Sed +ratio, quae est propria hominis, qua animal rationale dicitur, est +alia potentia a sensu. Ergo pari ratione est alia potentia ab +intellectu, qui proprie convenit Angelis, unde et intellectuales +dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence + or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31781] Iª q. 79 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, III super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>illud quo +homo irrationabilibus animalibus antecellit, est ratio, vel mens, +vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius +appellatur</i>. Ratio ergo et intellectus et mens sunt una +potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. + For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, + so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible + truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend + the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible + truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, + as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And + since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that + human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood---namely, the first principles; + and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. + Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural + things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we + understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 co."><a name="31782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31782] Iª q. 79 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ratio et intellectus in homine non possunt esse diversae +potentiae. Quod manifeste cognoscitur, si utriusque actus +consideretur. Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem +intelligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno +intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam. Et +ideo Angeli, qui perfecte possident, secundum modum suae naturae, +cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis, non habent necesse procedere +de uno ad aliud; sed simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum +apprehendunt, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Homines +autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt, +procedendo de uno ad aliud, ut ibidem dicitur, et ideo rationales +dicuntur. Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere +sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est +perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili +procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod +ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, +procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima +principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima +principia, ad quae inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod +quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad +unam et eandem, etiam in naturalibus rebus, quia per eandem naturam +aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. Multo ergo magis per +eandem potentiam intelligimus et ratiocinamur. Et sic patet quod in +homine eadem potentia est ratio et intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book + is not of great authority. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31783] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illa enumeratio fit secundum ordinem actuum, non +secundum distinctionem potentiarum. Quamvis liber ille non sit +magnae auctoritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared + the intellect to eternity, and reason to time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31784] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum patet +responsio ex dictis. Aeternitas enim comparatur ad tempus, sicut +immobile ad mobile. Et ideo Boetius comparavit intellectum +aeternitati, rationem vero tempori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, + although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge + is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31785] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod alia animalia sunt ita infra hominem, quod non +possunt attingere ad cognoscendam veritatem, quam ratio inquirit. +Homo vero attingit ad cognoscendam intelligibilem veritatem, quam +Angeli cognoscunt; sed imperfecte. Et ideo vis cognoscitiva +Angelorum non est alterius generis a vi cognoscitiva rationis, sed +comparatur ad ipsam ut perfectum ad imperfectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A9-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 9. Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image + of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore + the higher and lower reason are two powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="31786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31786] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ratio superior et inferior sint diversae +potentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod imago +Trinitatis est in superiori parte rationis, non autem in inferiori. +Sed partes animae sunt ipsae eius potentiae. Ergo duae potentiae +sunt ratio superior et inferior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore + the higher reason is another power from the lower. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="31787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31787] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +oritur a seipso. Sed ratio inferior oritur a superiori, et ab ea +regulatur et dirigitur. Ergo ratio superior est alia potentia ab +inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, + is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And + he proves this from the principle that for those things which are "generically different, generically different parts of the + soul are ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as + corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it + seems that what the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine + (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the Philosopher calls + the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the + disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="31788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31788] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod scientificum animae quo +cognoscit anima necessaria, est aliud principium et alia pars +animae ab opinativo et ratiocinativo, quo cognoscit contingentia. +Et hoc probat per hoc, quia <i>ad ea quae sunt genere altera, +altera genere particula animae</i> ordinatur; contingens autem et +necessarium sunt altera genere, sicut corruptibile et +incorruptibile. Cum autem idem sit necessarium quod aeternum, et +temporale idem quod contingens; videtur quod idem sit quod +philosophus vocat scientificum, et superior pars rationis, quae +secundum Augustinum intendit aeternis conspiciendis et consulendis; +et quod idem sit quod philosophus vocat ratiocinativum vel +opinativum, et inferior ratio, quae secundum Augustinum intendit +temporalibus disponendis. Est ergo alia potentia animae ratio +superior, et ratio inferior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth + or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the + intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision." Therefore the opinionative power, + which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may + understand the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 4"><a name="31789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31789] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Damascenus dicit quod <i>ex imaginatione fit opinio; deinde mens, +diiudicans opinionem sive vera sit sive falsa, diiudicat veritatem; +unde et mens dicitur a metiendo. De quibus igitur iudicatum est iam +et determinatum vere, dicitur intellectus</i>. Sic igitur +opinativum, quod est ratio inferior, est aliud a mente et +intellectu, per quod potest intelligi ratio superior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they + are not two powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 s. c."><a name="31790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31790] Iª q. 79 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod ratio superior et +inferior non nisi per officia distinguuntur. Non ergo sunt duae +potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A9-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that + "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation + it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that + which "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two---namely, + eternal and temporal ---are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For + by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the + Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made": while by way of judgment, + from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of + things eternal we dispose of temporal things. + </p><p id="FP_Q79_A9-p8"> But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles + belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And + so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science---for example, perspective. But + the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it + were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore + the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions + of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 co."><a name="31791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31791] Iª q. 79 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ratio superior et inferior, secundum quod ab Augustino +accipiuntur, nullo modo duae potentiae animae esse possunt. Dicit +enim quod ratio superior est quae intendit aeternis conspiciendis +aut consulendis, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod ea in seipsis +speculatur; consulendis vero, secundum quod ex eis accipit regulas +agendorum. Ratio vero inferior ab ipso dicitur, quae intendit +temporalibus rebus. Haec autem duo, scilicet temporalia et aeterna, +comparantur ad cognitionem nostram hoc modo, quod unum eorum est +medium ad cognoscendum alterum. Nam secundum viam inventionis, per +res temporales in cognitionem devenimus aeternorum, secundum illud +apostoli, ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, +intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>, in via vero iudicii, per aeterna iam +cognita de temporalibus iudicamus, et secundum rationes aeternorum +temporalia disponimus. Potest autem contingere quod medium, et id +ad quod per medium pervenitur, ad diversos habitus pertineant, +sicut principia prima indemonstrabilia pertinent ad habitum +intellectus, conclusiones vero ex his deductae ad habitum +scientiae. Et ideo ex principiis geometriae contingit aliquid +concludere in alia scientia, puta in perspectiva. Sed eadem +potentia rationis est, ad quam pertinet et medium et ultimum. Est +enim actus rationis quasi quidam motus de uno in aliud perveniens, +idem autem est mobile quod pertransiens medium pertingit ad +terminum. Unde una et eadem potentia rationis est ratio superior et +inferior. Sed distinguuntur, secundum Augustinum, per officia +actuum, et secundum diversos habitus, nam superiori rationi +attribuitur sapientia, inferiori vero scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the + higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="31792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31792] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod secundum quamcumque rationem partitionis potest pars +dici. Inquantum ergo ratio dividitur secundum diversa officia, +ratio superior et inferior partitiones dicuntur, et non quia sunt +diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower + reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="31793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31793] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio inferior dicitur a superiori deduci, vel ab ea +regulari, inquantum principia quibus utitur inferior ratio, +deducuntur et diriguntur a principiis superioris rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found + even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part + is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, + that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a + power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect---namely, under the aspect + of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to + their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but + imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the + power, + but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. + And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul---namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," + not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, + concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper + genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared + as perfect and imperfect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="31794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31794] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientificum de quo philosophus loquitur non est idem +quod ratio superior, nam necessaria scibilia inveniuntur etiam in +rebus temporalibus, de quibus est scientia naturalis et +mathematica. Opinativum autem et ratiocinativum in minus est quam +ratio inferior, quia est contingentium tantum. Nec tamen est +simpliciter dicendum quod sit alia potentia qua intellectus +cognoscit necessaria, et alia qua cognoscit contingentia, quia +utraque cognoscit secundum eandem rationem obiecti, scilicet +secundum rationem entis et veri. Unde et necessaria, quae habent +perfectum esse in veritate, perfecte cognoscit; utpote ad eorum +quidditatem pertingens, per quam propria accidentia de his +demonstrat. Contingentia vero imperfecte cognoscit; sicut et habent +imperfectum esse et veritatem. Perfectum autem et imperfectum in +actu non diversificant potentiam; sed diversificant actus quantum +ad modum agendi, et per consequens principia actuum et ipsos +habitus. Et ideo philosophus posuit duas particulas animae, +scientificum et ratiocinativum, non quia sunt duae potentiae; sed +quia distinguuntur secundum diversam aptitudinem ad recipiendum +diversos habitus, quorum diversitatem ibi inquirere intendit. +Contingentia enim et necessaria, etsi differant secundum propria +genera, conveniunt tamen in communi ratione entis, quam respicit +intellectus, ad quam diversimode se habent secundum perfectum et +imperfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For "opinion" + signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" + or "measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken + the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed + judgment with approval. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 4"><a name="31795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31795] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa distinctio Damasceni est secundum diversitatem +actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Opinio enim +significat actum intellectus qui fertur in unam partem +contradictionis cum formidine alterius. Diiudicare vero, vel +mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad +examinationem propositorum. Et ex hoc sumitur nomen mentis. +Intelligere autem est cum quadam approbatione diiudicatis +inhaerere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A10-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 10. Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we + wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, + and afterwards intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are + distinct. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="31796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31796] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia ab +intellectu. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod <i>cum +ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit +nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, postea intellectus, +et postea intelligentia</i>. Sed imaginatio et sensus sunt diversae +potentiae. Ergo et intellectus et intelligentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, + intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power + from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="31797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31797] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius dicit, in V de Consol., quod <i>ipsum hominem aliter +sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia +intuetur</i>. Sed intellectus est eadem potentia cum ratione. Ergo +videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia quam intellectus; +sicut ratio est alia potentia quam imaginatio et sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from + others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; + but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that + which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, + examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly + internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some + special power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="31798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31798] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +actus sunt praevii potentiis, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed +intelligentia est quidam actus ab aliis actibus qui attribuuntur +intellectui divisus. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>primus motus +intelligentia dicitur; quae vero circa aliquid est intelligentia, +intentio vocatur; quae permanens et figurans animam ad id quod +intelligitur, excogitatio dicitur; excogitatio vero in eodem +manens, et seipsam examinans et diiudicans, phronesis dicitur</i> +(idest sapientia); <i>phronesis autem dilatata facit cogitationem, +idest interius dispositum sermonem; ex quo aiunt provenire sermonem +per linguam enarratum</i>. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit +quaedam specialis potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that "intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false." But + the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 s. c."><a name="31799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31799] Iª q. 79 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>intelligentia +indivisibilium est, in quibus non est falsum</i>. Sed huiusmodi +cognoscere pertinet ad intellectum. Ergo intelligentia non est alia +potentia praeter intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This word "intelligence" properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated + from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that + such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or + "minds." Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but + as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects---namely, + the "active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the active and + passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of + these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is + called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes + it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 co."><a name="31800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31800] Iª q. 79 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod hoc nomen intelligentia proprie significat ipsum actum +intellectus qui est intelligere. In quibusdam tamen libris de +Arabico translatis, substantiae separatae quas nos Angelos dicimus, +intelligentiae vocantur; forte propter hoc, quod huiusmodi +substantiae semper actu intelligunt. In libris tamen de Graeco +translatis, dicuntur intellectus seu mentes. Sic ergo intelligentia +ab intellectu non distinguitur sicut potentia a potentia; sed sicut +actus a potentia. Invenitur enim talis divisio etiam a philosophis. +Quandoque enim ponunt quatuor intellectus, scilicet intellectum +agentem, possibilem, et in habitu, et adeptum. Quorum quatuor +intellectus agens et possibilis sunt diversae potentiae; sicut et +in omnibus est alia potentia activa, et alia passiva. Alia vero +tria distinguuntur secundum tres status intellectus possibilis, qui +quandoque est in potentia tantum, et sic dicitur possibilis; +quandoque autem in actu primo, qui est scientia, et sic dicitur +intellectus in habitu; quandoque autem in actu secundo, qui est +considerare, et sic dicitur intellectus in actu, sive intellectus +adeptus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect + as act against power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="31801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31801] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, si recipi debet illa auctoritas, intelligentia +ponitur pro actu intellectus. Et sic dividitur contra intellectum, +sicut actus contra potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also + says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand + all things without any investigation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="31802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31802] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Boetius accipit intelligentiam pro actu intellectus +qui transcendit actum rationis. Unde ibidem dicit quod <i>ratio +tantum humani generis est, sicut intelligentia sola divini</i>, +proprium enim Dei est quod absque omni investigatione omnia +intelligat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power---namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all + only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence." Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge + of something else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search of what it "intends," + it is called "invention." When, by reference to something known for certain, it + examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to + the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being + fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from + which proceeds "external speech." For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced + to the one same principle, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A10-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="31803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31803] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnes illi actus quos Damascenus enumerat, sunt unius +potentiae, scilicet intellectivae. Quae primo quidem simpliciter +aliquid apprehendit, et hic actus dicitur intelligentia. Secundo +vero, id quod apprehendit, ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum +vel operandum, et hic vocatur intentio. Dum vero persistit in +inquisitione illius quod intendit, vocatur excogitatio. Dum vero id +quod est excogitatum examinat ad aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel +sapere; quod est phronesis, vel sapientiae, nam sapientiae est +iudicare, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Ex quo autem habet aliquid pro +certo, quasi examinatum, cogitat quomodo possit illud aliis +manifestare, et haec est dispositio interioris sermonis; ex qua +procedit exterior locutio. Non enim omnis differentia actuum +potentias diversificat; sed solum illa quae non potest reduci in +idem principium, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A11-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 11. Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different + kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the + practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="31804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31804] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus speculativus et practicus +sint diversae potentiae. Apprehensivum enim et motivum sunt diversa +genera potentiarum, ut patet in II de anima. Sed intellectus +speculativus est apprehensivus tantum, intellectus autem practicus +est motivus. Ergo sunt diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," + and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="31805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31805] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +diversa ratio obiecti diversificat potentiam. Sed obiectum +speculativi intellectus est verum, practici autem bonum; quae +differunt ratione. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus sunt +diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative + power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A11-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="31806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31806] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +parte intellectiva intellectus practicus comparatur ad +speculativum, sicut aestimativa ad imaginativam in parte sensitiva. +Sed aestimativa differt ab imaginativa sicut potentia a potentia, +ut supra dictum est. Ergo et intellectus practicus a +speculativo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore + the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 s. c."><a name="31807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31807] Iª q. 79 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in III de anima, quod intellectus speculativus per +extensionem fit practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. +Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae +potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a + thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to + a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental + whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it + is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while + the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima + iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, + the other practical---i.e. operative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 co."><a name="31808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31808] Iª q. 79 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae +potentiae. Cuius ratio est quia, ut supra dictum est, id quod +accidentaliter se habet ad obiecti rationem quam respicit aliqua +potentia, non diversificat potentiam, accidit enim colorato quod +sit homo, aut magnum aut parvum; unde omnia huiusmodi eadem visiva +potentia apprehenduntur. Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per +intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum +hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus. Nam +intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad +opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem, practicus vero +intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. Et +hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod +<i>speculativus differt a practico, fine</i>. Unde et a fine +denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, +idest operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it + according to its mode of apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="31809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31809] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens +motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum +suae apprehensionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something + true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the + aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed + to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect + knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="31810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31810] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verum et bonum se invicem includunt, nam verum est +quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam +verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur obiectum +appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni, sicut +cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere; ita obiectum intellectus +practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. +Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut et +speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said + above (A[7] , ad 2; + <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A11-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>, ad 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="31811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31811] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod multae differentiae diversificant sensitivas +potentias, quae non diversificant potentias intellectivas, ut supra +dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A12-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 12. Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, + seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A12-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:6, </a> "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore "synderesis" + is a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="31812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31812] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod synderesis sit quaedam specialis +potentia ab aliis distincta. Ea enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, +videntur esse unius generis. Sed in Glossa Hieronymi Ezech. I, +dividitur synderesis contra irascibilem et concupiscibilem et +rationalem; quae sunt quaedam potentiae. Ergo synderesis est +quaedam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But "synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because + "synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is + clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that 'synderesis' is a power just as sensuality is. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="31813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31813] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +opposita sunt unius generis. Sed synderesis et sensualitas opponi +videntur, quia synderesis semper inclinat ad bonum, sensualitas +autem semper ad malum; unde per serpentem significatur, ut patet +per Augustinum, XII de Trin. Videtur ergo quod synderesis sit +potentia, sicut et sensualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of + virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide + our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is + the same as reason: and thus it is a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="31814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31814] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod in naturali +iudicatorio adsunt quaedam <i>regulae et semina virtutum et vera et +incommutabilia</i>, haec autem dicimus synderesim. Cum ergo regulae +incommutabiles quibus iudicamus, pertineant ad rationem secundum +sui superiorem partem, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin.; videtur +quod synderesis sit idem quod ratio. Et ita est quaedam +potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), "rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not regard + opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational + power, since it is not found in brute animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 s. c."><a name="31815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31815] Iª q. 79 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> <i>Sed contra, +potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita</i>, secundum +philosophum. Synderesis autem non se habet ad opposita, sed ad +bonum tantum inclinat. Ergo synderesis non est potentia. Si enim +esset potentia, oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia, non enim +invenitur in brutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf. Alexander + of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q[73]] said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear + we must observe that, as we have said above + <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q79_A12-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things---namely, those + which are + naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle---and ends also at the understanding, + inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. + Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical + things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical + principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special + habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first + practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we + call "synderesis." Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles + we + proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural + habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 co."><a name="31816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31816] Iª q. 79 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus, licet quidam +posuerint synderesim esse quandam potentiam ratione altiorem; +quidam vero dixerint eam esse ipsam rationem, non ut est ratio, sed +ut est natura. Ad huius autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod, +sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, +ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum +absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili, +et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per +principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando +invenimus. Constat autem quod, sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur +de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus. +Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita, sicut principia +speculabilium, ita et principia operabilium. Prima autem principia +speculabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad aliquam +specialem potentiam; sed ad quendam specialem habitum, qui dicitur +intellectus principiorum, ut patet in VI Ethic. Unde et principia +operabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad specialem +potentiam; sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus +synderesim. Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et +murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad +inveniendum, et iudicamus inventa. Patet ergo quod synderesis non +est potentia, sed habitus naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can + belong to one power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="31817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31817] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illa divisio Hieronymi attenditur secundum +diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Diversi +autem actus possunt esse unius potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to "syneresis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of + one genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="31818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31818] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod similiter oppositio sensualitatis et synderesis +attenditur secundum oppositionem actuum; non sicut diversarum +specierum unius generis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason + as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="31819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31819] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod huiusmodi incommutabiles rationes sunt prima +principia operabilium, circa quae non contingit errare; et +attribuuntur rationi sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui. +Unde et utroque, scilicet ratione et synderesi, naturaliter +iudicamus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A13-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 13. Whether conscience be a power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says [*Commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.15" target="asv"> Rom. 2:15</a>] that "conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to + cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a power---either the mind itself, according to the text ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.13" target="asv">Eph. 4:13</a>), "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"---or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is + called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="31820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31820] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +tertiumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conscientia sit quaedam +potentia. Dicit enim Origenes quod <i>conscientia est spiritus +corrector et paedagogus animae sociatus, quo separatur a malis et +adhaeret bonis</i>. Sed spiritus in anima nominat potentiam +aliquam, vel ipsam mentem, secundum illud Ephes. IV, <i>renovamini +spiritu mentis vestrae</i>; vel ipsam imaginationem; unde et +imaginaria visio spiritualis vocatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII +super Gen. ad Litt. Est ergo conscientia quaedam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some + that "their mind and conscience are defiled" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.15" target="asv">Titus 1:15</a>). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="31821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31821] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil est peccati subiectum nisi potentia animae. Sed conscientia +est subiectum peccati, dicitur enim ad Tit. I, de quibusdam, quod +<i>inquinatae sunt eorum mens et conscientia</i>. Ergo videtur quod +conscientia sit potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not + always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by + many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="31822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31822] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +necesse est quod conscientia sit vel actus, vel habitus, vel +potentia. Sed non est actus, quia non semper maneret in homine. Nec +est habitus, non enim esset unum quid conscientia, sed multa; per +multos enim habitus cognoscitivos dirigimur in agendis. Ergo +conscientia est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 s. c."><a name="31823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31823] Iª q. 79 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia. Ergo conscientia non +est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A13-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which + in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies + the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to + an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. + Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. + </p><p id="FP_Q79_A13-p7"> The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or + incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: + which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; "Thy conscience + knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.23" target="asv">Eccles. 7:23</a>), and according to + this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done + or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge + that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it + is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, + conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first + natural habit---namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls 'synderesis' conscience (Gloss. + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:6</a>); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22] says that it is + the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 co."><a name="31824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31824] Iª q. 79 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod conscientia, proprie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus. Et +hoc patet tum ex ratione nominis, tum etiam ex his quae secundum +communem usum loquendi, conscientiae attribuuntur. Conscientia +enim, secundum proprietatem vocabuli, importat ordinem scientiae ad +aliquid, nam conscientia dicitur cum alio scientia. Applicatio +autem scientiae ad aliquid fit per aliquem actum. Unde ex ista +ratione nominis patet quod conscientia sit actus. Idem autem +apparet ex his quae conscientiae attribuuntur. Dicitur enim +conscientia testificari, ligare vel instigare, et etiam accusare +vel remordere sive reprehendere. Et haec omnia consequuntur +applicationem alicuius nostrae cognitionis vel scientiae ad ea quae +agimus. Quae quidem applicatio fit tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum +quod recognoscimus aliquid nos fecisse vel non fecisse, secundum +illud Eccle. VII, <i>scit conscientia tua te crebro maledixisse +aliis</i>, et secundum hoc, conscientia dicitur testificari. Alio +modo applicatur secundum quod per nostram conscientiam iudicamus +aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum, et secundum hoc, dicitur +conscientia instigare vel ligare. Tertio modo applicatur secundum +quod per conscientiam iudicamus quod aliquid quod est factum, sit +bene factum vel non bene factum, et secundum hoc, conscientia +dicitur excusare vel accusare, seu remordere. Patet autem quod +omnia haec consequuntur actualem applicationem scientiae ad ea quae +agimus. Unde proprie loquendo, conscientia nominat actum. Quia +tamen habitus est principium actus, quandoque nomen conscientiae +attribuitur primo habitui naturali, scilicet synderesi, sicut +Hieronymus, in Glossa Ezech. I, synderesim conscientiam nominat; et +Basilius naturale iudicatorium; et Damascenus dicit quod est lex +intellectus nostri. Consuetum enim est quod causae et effectus per +invicem nominentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the + mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="31825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31825] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod conscientia dicitur spiritus, secundum quod spiritus +pro mente ponitur, quia est quoddam mentis dictamen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he + is defiled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="31826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31826] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod inquinatio dicitur esse in conscientia, non sicut in +subiecto, sed sicut cognitum in cognitione, inquantum scilicet +aliquis scit se esse inquinatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the + habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first + principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have + said above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="31827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31827] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus, etsi non semper maneat in se, semper tamen +manet in sua causa, quae est potentia et habitus. Habitus autem ex +quibus conscientia informatur, etsi multi sint, omnes tamen +efficaciam habent ab uno primo, scilicet ab habitu primorum +principiorum, qui dicitur synderesis. Unde specialiter hic habitus +interdum conscientia nominatur, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q80" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q80-p0.1">Q. 80. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q80-p2"> Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers + in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q80-p3"><a href="#FP_Q80_A1"> (1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q80-p4"><a href="#FP_Q80_A2"> (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 pr."><a name="31828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31828] +Iª q. 80 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de potentiis +appetitivis. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de +appetitivo in communi; secundo, de sensualitate; tertio, de +voluntate; quarto, de libero arbitrio. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. +Primo, utrum debeat poni appetitus aliqua specialis potentia +animae. Secundo, utrum appetitus dividatur in appetitum sensitivum +et intellectivum, sicut in potentias diversas.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q80_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q80_A1-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 1. Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those + things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since + "all desire good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31829] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus non sit aliqua specialis animae +potentia. Ad ea enim quae sunt communia animatis et inanimatis, non +est aliqua potentia animae assignanda. Sed appetere est commune +animatis et inanimatis quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo appetitus non est specialis potentia +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive + power is not distinct from the apprehensive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31830] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potentiae distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed idem est quod +cognoscimus et appetimus. Ergo vim appetitivam non oportet esse +aliam praeter vim apprehensivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing---namely + its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some + particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31831] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +commune non distinguitur contra proprium. Sed quaelibet potentia +animae appetit quoddam particulare appetibile, scilicet obiectum +sibi conveniens. Ergo respectu huius obiecti quod est appetibile in +communi, non oportet accipi aliquam potentiam ab aliis distinctam, +quae appetitiva dicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) + distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31832] Iª q. 80 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus, in II de anima, distinguit appetitivum ab aliis +potentiis. Damascenus etiam, in II libro distinguit vires +appetitivas a cognitivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q80_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows + every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have + a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which + lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being---that + is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. + But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner + that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, + and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and + intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," + as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). + </p><p id="FP_Q80_A1-p7"> Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so + must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior + inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and + not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive + power to the soul. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 co."><a name="31833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31833] Iª q. 80 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad +cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur +aliqua inclinatio, sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in +superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem +in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in +his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae cognitione carent, +invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans +unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur +formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus +naturalis vocatur. In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic +determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam +naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum, sicut +sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium +intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum +sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad +Dei similitudinem appropinquant, in quo omnia praeexistunt, sicut +Dionysius dicit. Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in +habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet +quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, +quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio +pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest +ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma +naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae +appetitivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have + said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31834] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod appetere invenitur in habentibus cognitionem, supra +modum communem quo invenitur in omnibus, ut dictum est. Et ideo +oportet ad hoc determinari aliquam potentiam animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something + sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not + material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31835] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem +subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens +sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut +bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in obiectis requiritur ad +diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the + natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows + the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound + for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31836] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu +natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde +unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu. +Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo +appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius +vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad +audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q81" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q81-p0.1">Q. 81. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q81-p2"> Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q81-p3"><a href="#FP_Q81_A1"> (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q81-p4"><a href="#FP_Q81_A2"> (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q81-p5"><a href="#FP_Q81_A3"> (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 pr."><a name="31845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31845] +Iª q. 81 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +sensualitate. Circa quam quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum sensualitas +sit vis appetitiva tantum. Secundo, utrum dividatur sensualitas in +irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in diversas potentias. +Tertio, utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediant rationi.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q81_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A1-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 1. Whether sensuality is only appetitive?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the + sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong + to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31846] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod sensualitas non solum sit appetitiva, sed +etiam cognitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod +<i>sensualis animae motus, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, nobis +pecoribusque communis est</i>. Sed corporis sensus sub vi cognitiva +continentur. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality + against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31847] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quae +cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed +Augustinus, in XII de Trin., dividit sensualitatem contra rationem +superiorem et inferiorem; quae ad cognitionem pertinent. Ergo +sensualitas etiam est vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, + the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore + sensuality is a cognitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31848] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sensualitas in tentatione hominis tenet locum serpentis. Sed +serpens in tentatione primorum parentum se habuit ut nuntians et +proponens peccatum; quod est vis cognitivae. Ergo sensualitas est +vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31849] Iª q. 81 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod sensualitas definitur esse <i>appetitus rerum ad corpus +pertinentium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as + the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following + sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: + since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the + thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that + he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: + whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the + operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 co."><a name="31850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31850] Iª q. 81 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo +Augustinus loquitur XII de Trin., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen +potentiae, ut a visione visus. Motus autem sensualis est appetitus +apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae +virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus, nam +operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res +apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis +appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem +appetibilem. Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur +quieti, operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur +motui. Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae +virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand + that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to + the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain + to sensuality as a preamble. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31851] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod per hoc quod dicit Augustinus quod sensualis animae +motus intenditur in corporis sensus, non datur intelligi quod +corporis sensus sub sensualitate comprehendantur, sed magis quod +motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corporis, dum +scilicet appetimus ea quae per corporis sensus apprehenduntur. Et +sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi +praeambuli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive + power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31852] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sensualitas dividitur contra rationem superiorem et +inferiorem, inquantum communicant in actu motionis, vis enim +cognitiva, ad quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva, +sicut et appetitiva, ad quam pertinet sensualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified + by the serpent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31853] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod serpens non solum ostendit et proposuit peccatum, sed +etiam, inclinavit in effectum peccati. Et quantum ad hoc, +sensualitas per serpentem significatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q81_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A2-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 2. Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the + same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher + (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, + while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and + concupiscible are the same power in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31854] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus sensitivus non distinguatur in +irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in potentias diversas. Eadem +enim potentia animae est unius contrarietatis, ut visus albi et +nigri, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed conveniens et nocivum sunt +contraria. Cum ergo concupiscibilis respiciat conveniens, +irascibilis vero nocivum, videtur quod eadem potentia animae sit +irascibilis et concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible + power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31855] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +appetitus sensitivus non est nisi convenientium secundum sensum. +Sed conveniens secundum sensum est obiectum concupiscibilis. Ergo +nullus appetitus sensitivus est a concupiscibili differens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv">Mat. 13:33</a>: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible + part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31856] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, odium +est in irascibili, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Matth., +<i>possideamus in irascibili odium vitiorum</i>. Sed odium, cum +contrarietur amori, est in concupiscibili. Ergo eadem vis est +concupiscibilis et irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, + the irascible and the concupiscible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31857] Iª q. 81 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt duas vires, +irascibilem et concupiscibilem, partes appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species + of the sensitive appetite---the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural + corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what + is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are + a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, + not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to + resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive + apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part + two appetitive powers---one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and + to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that + hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, + because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for + sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, + following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible + appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; + and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, + as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable + things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason + all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for + instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels + of animals are about things concupiscible---namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 co."><a name="31858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31858] Iª q. 81 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas +dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species +appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Ad +cuius evidentiam, considerari oportet quod in rebus naturalibus +corruptibilibus, non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad +consequendum convenientia et refugiendum nociva; sed etiam ad +resistendum corrumpentibus et contrariis, quae convenientibus +impedimentum praebent et ingerunt nocumenta. Sicut ignis habet +naturalem inclinationem non solum ut recedat ab inferiori loco, qui +sibi non convenit, et tendat in locum superiorem sibi convenientem; +sed etiam quod resistat corrumpentibus et impedientibus. Quia +igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens +apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio +consequens formam naturalem; necesse est quod in parte sensitiva +sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter +inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum +sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. +Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae +convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur +irascibilis. Unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est arduum, quia +scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis. +Hae autem duae inclinationes non reducuntur in unum principium, +quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit, contra inclinationem +concupiscibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet +contraria. Unde etiam passiones irascibilis repugnare videntur +passionibus concupiscibilis, nam concupiscentia accensa minuit +iram, et ira accensa minuit concupiscentiam, ut in pluribus. Patet +etiam ex hoc, quod irascibilis est quasi propugnatrix et +defensatrix concupiscibilis, dum insurgit contra ea quae impediunt +convenientia, quae concupiscibilis appetit, et ingerunt nociva, +quae concupiscibilis refugit. Et propter hoc, omnes passiones +irascibilis incipiunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in eas +terminantur; sicut ira nascitur ex illata tristitia, et vindictam +inferens, in laetitiam terminatur. Propter hoc etiam pugnae +animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis, +ut dicitur in VIII de animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to + resist the onslaught of the unsuitable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31859] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod vis concupiscibilis est et convenientis et +inconvenientis. Sed irascibilis est ad resistendum inconvenienti +quod impugnat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not + impress the senses, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A2" id="FP_Q81_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[2]</a>); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because + it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31860] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva +est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quae est perceptiva eorum quae +sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in appetitu +sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens +secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali +ad suam defensionem. Et haec est vis irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong + to the irascible appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31861] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod odium simpliciter pertinet ad concupiscibilem; sed +ratione impugnationis quae ex odio causatur, potest ad irascibilem +pertinere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q81_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A3-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 3. Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts + of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. + xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31862] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non +obediant rationi. Irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis sunt partes +sensualitatis. Sed sensualitas non obedit rationi, unde per +serpentem significatur, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Trin. Ergo +irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according + to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q81_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites + do not obey reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31863] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod +obedit alicui, non repugnat ei. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis +repugnant rationi; secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VII, <i>video +aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Ergo +irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive + part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do + the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31864] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +rationali parte animae inferior est vis appetitiva, ita etiam et +vis sensitiva. Sed sensitiva pars animae non obedit rationi, non +enim audimus nec videmus quando volumus. Ergo similiter neque vires +sensitivi appetitus, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, +obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into + concupiscence and anger." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31865] Iª q. 81 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>obediens et persuasibile rationi +dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q81_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; + first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive + appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In + man the estimative power, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>), is + replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions. + Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally + guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from + universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is + divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal + principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible + are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain + universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited. + </p><p id="FP_Q81_A3-p7"> To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other + animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees + at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible + and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For + wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower + appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De + Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, + the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 co."><a name="31866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31866] Iª q. 81 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt superiori parti, in +qua est intellectus sive ratio et voluntas, dupliciter, uno modo +quidem, quantum ad rationem; alio vero modo, quantum ad voluntatem. +Rationi quidem obediunt quantum ad ipsos suos actus. Cuius ratio +est, quia appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est +moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, +timet. Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra +dictum est, vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio +particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde +ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem +ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem +universalem, unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus +concluduntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo patet quod ratio +universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per +concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit. Et quia +deducere universalia principia in conclusiones singulares, non est +opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis; ideo irascibilis et +concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire rationi, quam intellectui. +Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim +aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut +aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam instigatur. Voluntati etiam subiacet +appetitus sensitivus, quantum ad executionem, quae fit per vim +motivam. In aliis enim animalibus statim ad appetitum +concupiscibilis et irascibilis sequitur motus sicut ovis, timens +lupum statim fugit, quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus +qui repugnet. Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum +irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, +quod est appetitus superior. In omnibus enim potentiis motivis +ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi virtute primi moventis, +unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus +superior consentiat. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in III de +anima, quod <i>appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem, sicut +sphaera superior inferiorem</i>. Hoc ergo modo irascibilis et +concupiscibilis rationi subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible + powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31867] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sensualitas significatur per serpentem, quantum ad id +quod est proprium sibi ex parte sensitivae partis. Irascibilis +autem et concupiscibilis magis nominant sensitivum appetitum ex +parte actus, ad quem inducuntur ex ratione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates + the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called + despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, + since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal + by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of + their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by + a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command + both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or + reason + is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, + by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative + power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination + and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we + sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that + the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31868] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I politicorum, <i>est +quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et +politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico +principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali</i>. +Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis principatur +servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio +praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent. Principatus autem politicus +et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi +subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex +quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio. Sic igitur anima dicitur +dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in +nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum +animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est +moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur +principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia +appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti +imperio rationis. Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non +solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, +quam dirigit universalis ratio; sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. +Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, +per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio +vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod +irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non +excluditur quin ei obediant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is + not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore + they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but + can also form the phantasms of the imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31869] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensus exteriores indigent ad suos actus exterioribus +sensibilibus, quibus immutentur, quorum praesentia non est in +potestate rationis. Sed vires interiores, tam appetitivae quam +apprehensivae, non indigent exterioribus rebus. Et ideo subduntur +imperio rationis, quae potest non solum instigare vel mitigare +affectus appetitivae virtutis, sed etiam formare imaginativae +virtutis phantasmata.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q82" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q82-p0.1">Q. 82. OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q82-p2"> We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q82-p3"><a href="#FP_Q82_A1"> (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p4"><a href="#FP_Q82_A2"> (2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p5"><a href="#FP_Q82_A3"> (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p6"><a href="#FP_Q82_A4"> (4) Whether the will moves the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p7"><a href="#FP_Q82_A5"> (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 pr."><a name="31870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31870] +Iª q. 82 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de voluntate. +Circa quam quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum voluntas aliquid ex +necessitate appetat. Secundo, utrum omnia ex necessitate appetat. +Tertio, utrum sit eminentior potentia quam intellectus. Quarto, +utrum voluntas moveat intellectum. Quinto, utrum voluntas +distinguatur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q82_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A1-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 1. Whether the will desires something of necessity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is + not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31871] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas nihil ex necessitate appetat. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid est +necessarium, non est voluntarium. Sed omne quod voluntas appetit, +est voluntarium. Ergo nihil quod voluntas appetit, est necessario +desideratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is + a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite + things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31872] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potestates rationales, secundum philosophum, se habent ad opposita. +Sed voluntas est potestas rationalis, quia, ut dicitur in III de +anima, voluntas in ratione est. Ergo voluntas se habet ad opposita. +Ad nihil ergo de necessitate determinatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the + act of the will cannot be necessitated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31873] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum voluntatem sumus domini nostrorum actuum. Sed eius quod ex +necessitate est, non sumus domini. Ergo actus voluntatis non potest +de necessitate esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, + there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31874] Iª q. 82 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod <i>beatitudinem omnes +una voluntate appetunt</i>. Si autem non esset necessarium sed +contingens, deficeret ad minus in paucioribus. Ergo voluntas ex +necessitate aliquid vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to + it by an intrinsic principle---either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible---or + formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is + "natural" and "absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, + belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without + it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is + necessary for a journey. This is called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part of the agent, a thing + must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity of + coercion." + </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p7"> Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination + of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because + it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of + the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it + is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary. + </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p8"> But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will + to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship. + </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p9"> In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity + adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in + practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the + root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, + and every movement arises from something immovable. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 co."><a name="31875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31875] Iª q. 82 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necessitas dicitur multipliciter. Necesse est enim quod non +potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit alicui, uno modo ex principio +intrinseco, sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum +ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus +quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus +rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta. Alio modo +convenit alicui quod non possit non esse, ex aliquo extrinseco, vel +fine vel agente. Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc +consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem, ut cibus dicitur +necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter. Et haec vocatur necessitas +finis; quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. Ex agente autem hoc +alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita +quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas +coactionis. Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat +voluntati. Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra +inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclinatio +quaedam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid naturale quia est +secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium +quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossibile +est quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale; ita impossibile +est quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum sive violentum, et +voluntarium. Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando +ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo, sicut ex voluntate +transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem. +Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. +Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate +inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat +ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo, finis enim se habet in operativis +sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic. Oportet +enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, +sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum, quia natura rei est +primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo +immobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away the liberty + of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31876] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum de necessario +necessitate coactionis. Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert +libertatem voluntatis, ut ipsemet in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than + to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31877] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod voluntas secundum quod aliquid naturaliter vult, +magis respondet intellectui naturalium principiorum, quam rationi, +quae ad opposita se habet. Unde secundum hoc, magis est +intellectualis quam rationalis potestas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but + "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard + those actions of which we are masters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31878] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus +hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his +quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde appetitus ultimi +finis non est de his quorum domini sumus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A2-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 2. Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that + "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31879] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate omnia velit +quaecumque vult. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV de Div. Nom., quod malum +est praeter voluntatem. Ex necessitate ergo voluntas tendit in +bonum sibi propositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable + necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31880] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +obiectum voluntatis comparatur ad ipsam sicut movens ad mobile. Sed +motus mobilis necessario consequitur ex movente. Ergo videtur quod +obiectum voluntatis ex necessitate moveat ipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect + is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive + appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems + that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31881] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +apprehensum secundum sensum est obiectum appetitus sensitivi, ita +apprehensum secundum intellectum est obiectum intellectivi +appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed apprehensum secundum sensum ex +necessitate movet appetitum sensitivum, dicit enim Augustinus, +super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur visis. Ergo videtur +quod apprehensum secundum intellectum ex necessitate moveat +voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things. + Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31882] Iª q. 82 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, quod <i>voluntas est qua peccatur et recte +vivitur</i>, et sic se habet ad opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate +vult quaecumque vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect + naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already + <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent + propositions, the denial of which does not involve a + denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which + have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial + of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection + of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes + the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary + connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But + there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom + alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such + connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the + man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore + clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 co."><a name="31883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31883] Iª q. 82 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult. Ad cuius +evidentiam, considerandum est quod sicut intellectus naturaliter et +ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ultimo +fini, ut iam dictum est. Sunt autem quaedam intelligibilia quae non +habent necessariam connexionem ad prima principia; sicut +contingentes propositiones, ad quarum remotionem non sequitur +remotio primorum principiorum. Et talibus non ex necessitate +assentit intellectus. Quaedam autem propositiones sunt necessariae, +quae habent connexionem necessariam cum primis principiis; sicut +conclusiones demonstrabiles, ad quarum remotionem sequitur remotio +primorum principiorum. Et his intellectus ex necessitate assentit, +cognita connexione necessaria conclusionum ad principia per +demonstrationis deductionem, non autem ex necessitate assentit +antequam huiusmodi necessitatem connexionis per demonstrationem +cognoscat. Similiter etiam est ex parte voluntatis. Sunt enim +quaedam particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem +ad beatitudinem, quia sine his potest aliquis esse beatus, et +huiusmodi voluntas non de necessitate inhaeret. Sunt autem quaedam +habentia necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quibus scilicet +homo Deo inhaeret, in quo solo vera beatitudo consistit. Sed tamen +antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas huiusmodi +connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret, +nec his quae Dei sunt. Sed voluntas videntis Deum per essentiam, de +necessitate inhaeret Deo, sicut nunc ex necessitate volumus esse +beati. Patet ergo quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque +vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will + is not of necessity determined to one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31884] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod voluntas in nihil potest tendere nisi sub ratione +boni. Sed quia bonum est multiplex, propter hoc non ex necessitate +determinatur ad unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, + so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, + its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31885] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, +quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota eius +possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis +sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiicitur eius +possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex +necessitate movetur ab illo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one + thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power + that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appetite---that is, the will---may be + moved; but not of necessity from one thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31886] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut +ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum +illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est +collativa plurium, et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus +intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A3-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 3. Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the + end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31887] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas sit altior potentia quam +intellectus. Bonum enim et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed finis +est prima et altissima causarum. Ergo voluntas est prima et +altissima potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in + the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, + follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31888] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res +naturales inveniuntur procedere de imperfectis ad perfecta. Et hoc +etiam in potentiis animae apparet, proceditur enim de sensu ad +intellectum, qui est nobilior. Sed naturalis processus est de actu +intellectus in actum voluntatis. Ergo voluntas est perfectior et +nobilior potentia quam intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects + the will---namely, charity---is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>): "If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will + is a higher power than the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31889] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus sunt proportionati potentiis, sicut perfectiones +perfectibilibus. Sed habitus quo perficitur voluntas, scilicet +caritas, est nobilior habitibus quibus perficitur intellectus, +dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, <i>si noverim mysteria omnia, et si +habuero omnem fidem, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil sum</i>. +Ergo voluntas est altior potentia quam intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31890] Iª q. 82 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus, in X Ethic., ponit altissimam potentiam animae +esse intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is considered + to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore + the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear + if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the + intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea + of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more + simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect + is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows + that + the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something + else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something + higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler + than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though + color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27_A4" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a>), the action of the intellect consists in this---that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while + the act of the will consists in this---that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore + the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in + things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which + there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is + higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that + thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, + the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 co."><a name="31891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31891] Iª q. 82 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod eminentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter, uno +modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem +aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale, secundum +quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum. Si +ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic +intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione +obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et +magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus +est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cuius +ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem +aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est +nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam +obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum +ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter +intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate. Secundum quid autem, +et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas invenitur interdum altior +intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re +invenitur quam obiectum intellectus. Sicut si dicerem auditum esse +secundum quid nobiliorem visu, inquantum res aliqua cuius est +sonus, nobilior est aliqua re cuius est color, quamvis color sit +nobilior et simplicior sono. Ut enim supra dictum est, actio +intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in +intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas +inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est. Et ideo philosophus dicit, +in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis, +sunt in rebus; verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sunt +in mente. Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa +anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, +voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, +est infra animam; tunc etiam per comparationem ad talem rem, +intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam +cognitio, e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium +quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam +voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found + to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is + something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other + ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other + powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31892] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio causae accipitur secundum comparationem unius +ad alterum, et in tali comparatione ratio boni principalior +invenitur, sed verum dicitur magis absolute, et ipsius boni +rationem significat. Unde et bonum quoddam verum est. Sed rursus et +ipsum verum est quoddam bonum; secundum quod intellectus res +quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius. Et inter alios fines iste finis +est excellentior; sicut intellectus inter alias potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, + and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act + precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and + as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31893] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est +imperfectius, quia in uno et eodem potentia tempore praecedit +actum, et imperfectio perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius +simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim +actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior +voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim +intellectum movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31894] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de voluntate secundum +comparationem ad id quod supra animam est. Virtus enim caritatis +est qua Deum amamus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A4-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 4. Whether the will moves the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves + is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De + Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above + <a href="#FP_Q82_A3" id="FP_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31895] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat intellectum. Movens +enim est nobilius et prius moto, quia movens est agens; agens autem +est nobilius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt., +et philosophus in III de anima. Sed intellectus est prior et +nobilior voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas non movet +intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because + the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect + is not moved by the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31896] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +movens non movetur a moto, nisi forte per accidens. Sed intellectus +movet voluntatem, quia appetibile apprehensum per intellectum est +movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum. Ergo intellectus +non movetur a voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to + understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another + act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31897] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +velle possumus nisi sit intellectum. Si igitur ad intelligendum +movet voluntas volendo intelligere, oportebit quod etiam illud +velle praecedat aliud intelligere, et illud intelligere aliud +velle, et sic in infinitum, quod est impossibile. Non ergo voluntas +movet intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power + by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31898] Iª q. 82 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>in nobis est percipere quamcumque +volumus artem, et non percipere</i>. In nobis autem est aliquid per +voluntatem; percipimus autem artes per intellectum. Voluntas ergo +movet intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way + the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing + is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the + will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De + Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards + the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. + For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior + bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common + good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. + Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, + as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent + moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not + subject + to our will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 co."><a name="31899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31899] Iª q. 82 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum finis; +sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus +movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, +et movet ipsam ut finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum +agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet +impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae +vires; ut Anselmus dicit in libro de similitudinibus. Cuius ratio +est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia +quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt +fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in +politicis. Caelum enim, quod agit ad universalem conservationem +generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora corpora, +quorum unumquodque agit ad conservationem propriae speciei, vel +etiam individui. Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius +regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui +singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt. Obiectum autem +voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia +comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens; sicut visus +ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo +voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos +actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro +arbitrio non subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular + power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature + of its object---that is to say, as appetitive of universal good---and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate + act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another + according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above + <a href="#FP_Q82_A3" id="FP_Q82_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature + of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under + the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands + the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained + in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is + good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, + each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher + than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, + because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good + is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31900] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, +secundum quod intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri +universalis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam res, et +particularis potentia habens determinatum actum. Et similiter +voluntas dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum +communitatem sui obiecti, prout scilicet est appetitiva boni +communis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam determinata animae +potentia habens determinatum actum. Si ergo comparentur intellectus +et voluntas secundum rationem communitatis obiectorum utriusque, +sic dictum est supra quod intellectus est simpliciter altior et +nobilior voluntate. Si autem consideretur intellectus secundum +communitatem sui obiecti, et voluntas secundum quod est quaedam +determinata potentia, sic iterum intellectus est altior et prior +voluntate, quia sub ratione entis et veri, quam apprehendit +intellectus, continetur voluntas ipsa, et actus eius, et obiectum +ipsius. Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et +obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut +lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri. Si vero +consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod +est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et +potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut +quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et +obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam +speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et +potest ipsum movere. Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae +suis actibus invicem se includunt, quia intellectus intelligit +voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Et +simili ratione bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam +verum intellectum; et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est +quoddam bonum desideratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31901] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus alio modo movet voluntatem, quam voluntas +intellectum, ut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of + the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle + of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect ---namely, God---as also Aristotle + says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to + proceed indefinitely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31902] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in +intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est +quod praecedat apprehensio, sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit +motus voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est +aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est +Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Eudemicae, et per +hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A5-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 5. Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. + For the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to desire], and the irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. + But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; + as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv">Wis. 6:21</a>): "The + concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive + appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv"> Mat. 13:33 </a>warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts + of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31903] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui +debeant in appetitu superiori, qui est voluntas. Vis enim +concupiscibilis dicitur a concupiscendo; et irascibilis ab +irascendo. Sed aliqua concupiscentia est quae non potest pertinere +ad appetitum sensitivum, sed solum ad intellectivum, qui est +voluntas; sicut concupiscentia sapientiae, de qua dicitur Sap. VI, +<i>concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum</i>. Est +etiam quaedam ira quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum +sensitivum, sed intellectivum tantum; sicut cum irascimur contra +vitia. Unde et Hieronymus, super Matth., monet ut <i>odium vitiorum +possideamus in irascibili</i>. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis +distingui debent in appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in +sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the + sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible + power to the intellectual part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31904] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum quod communiter dicitur, caritas est in concupiscibili, +spes autem in irascibili. Non autem possunt esse in appetitu +sensitivo, quia non sunt sensibilium obiectorum, sed +intelligibilium. Ergo concupiscibilis et irascibilis sunt ponenda +in parte intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul has these powers"---namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational---"before + it is united to the body." But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, + as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A5" id="FP_Q82_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[78], AA[5]</a>,8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31905] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +libro de spiritu et anima dicitur quod has potentias (scilicet +irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et rationalem) <i>habet anima +antequam corpori misceatur</i>. Sed nulla potentia sensitivae +partis est animae tantum, sed coniuncti, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt in voluntate, quae est +appetitus intellectivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and + irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is + in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31906] Iª q. 82 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Gregorius Nyssenus, dicit, quod irrationalis pars animae +dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum; et idem dicit +Damascenus, in libro II. Et philosophus dicit, in III de anima quod +<i>voluntas in ratione est, in irrationali autem parte animae +concupiscentia et ira, vel desiderium et animus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said + above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A4" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q79_A7" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[7]</a>), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which + are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something + colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding + white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 co."><a name="31907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31907] Iª q. 82 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi +appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, +potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem +rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa +ratione communi contentas. Sicut quia visus respicit visibile +secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae +secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia +quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est +coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum +est nigrum. Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem +rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo +secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur +partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam +rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et +conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, +secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert +nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. +Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus +intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu +intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, +sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires +apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p7"> Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. + And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the + concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas + the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the + will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there + is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from + a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they + are on the part of the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31908] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter +accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, +cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic +communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu +sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque +passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et +hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic +accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam +tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising, that is, + with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive + appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of + the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are + attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, + which is called the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31909] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult +impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis. +Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. +Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest +in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus. Sic +etiam potest intelligi quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima, +quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt animae antequam uniatur +corpori (ut tamen intelligatur ordo naturae, et non temporis), +licet non sit necessarium verbis illius libri fidem adhibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but + from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. + And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this + way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the + irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, + and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection + is clear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31910] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio +ad tertium.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q83" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q83-p0.1">Q. 83. OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q83-p2"> We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q83-p3"><a href="#FP_Q83_A1"> (1) Whether man has free-will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p4"><a href="#FP_Q83_A2"> (2) What is free-will---a power, an act, or a habit?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p5"><a href="#FP_Q83_A3"> (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p6"><a href="#FP_Q83_A4"> (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 pr."><a name="31911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31911] +Iª q. 83 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de libero arbitrio. +Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo sit liberi +arbitrii. Secundo, quid sit liberum arbitrium, utrum sit potentia, +vel actus, vel habitus. Tertio si est potentia, utrum sit +appetitiva, vel cognitiva. Quarto, si est appetitiva, utrum sit +eadem potentia cum voluntate, vel alia.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q83_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A1-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 1. Whether man has free-will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31912] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit liberi arbitrii. Quicumque +enim est liberi arbitrii, facit quod vult. Sed homo non facit quod +vult, dicitur enim Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; +sed quod odi malum, illud facio</i>. Ergo homo non est liberi +arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv">Rom. 9:16</a>): "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31913] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque est liberi arbitrii, eius est velle et non velle, operari +et non operari. Sed hoc non est hominis, dicitur enim ad Rom. IX, +non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet +currere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is + not free. But God moves the will, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv">Prov. 21:1</a>): "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it" and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31914] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, +liberum est quod sui causa est</i>, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Quod +ergo movetur ab alio, non est liberum. Sed Deus movet voluntatem, +dicitur enim Prov. XXI, <i>cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque +voluerit vertet illud</i>; et Philipp. II, <i>Deus est qui operatur +in nobis velle et perficere</i>. Ergo homo non est liberi +arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.23" target="asv">Jer. 10:23</a>): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk." Therefore man has not free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31915] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque est liberi arbitrii, est dominus suorum actuum. Sed homo +non est dominus suorum actuum, quia, ut dicitur Ierem. X, <i>non +est in homine via eius, nec viri est ut dirigat gressus suos</i>. +Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in + our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some + particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31916] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., <i>qualis unusquisque est, talis +finis videtur ei</i>. Sed non est in potestate nostra aliquales +esse, sed hoc nobis est a natura. Ergo naturale est nobis quod +aliquem finem sequamur. Non ergo ex libero arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss adds: "That is of his free-will." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31917] Iª q. 83 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et +reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Glossa, idest in libertate +arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In + order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like + manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, + seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, + because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. + But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because + this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the + reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in + contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular + operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate + to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 co."><a name="31918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31918] Iª q. 83 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, +exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae. Ad +cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quaedam agunt absque +iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione +carentia. Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut +animalia bruta. Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, +naturali iudicio, et non libero, quia non ex collatione, sed ex +naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio +brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim +cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed +quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari +operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero +iudicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia +habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et +rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt +quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa +se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est +quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. + This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes---namely, "not to desire against reason," as Augustine says. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31919] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus, etsi +obediat rationi, tamen potest in aliquo repugnare, concupiscendo +contra illud quod ratio dictat. Hoc ergo est bonum quod homo non +facit cum vult, scilicet non concupiscere contra rationem, ut +Glossa Augustini ibidem dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because + the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31920] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum illud apostoli non sic est intelligendum quasi +homo non velit et non currat libero arbitrio, sed quia liberum +arbitrium ad hoc non est sufficiens, nisi moveatur et iuvetur a +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity + belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need + it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving + natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving + voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; + for He operates in each thing according to its own nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31921] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per +liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de +necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum +est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur +quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et +naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, +movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita +movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint +voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in +unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The + choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31922] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod dicitur non esse in homine via eius, quantum ad +executiones electionum, in quibus homo impediri potest, velit +nolit. Electiones autem ipsae sunt in nobis, supposito tamen divino +auxilio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q83_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in + the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual + part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject + to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q83_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[82], AA[1]</a>,2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such + a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual + part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does + his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject + something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said ( + <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q83_A1-p13.2" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will. + </p><p id="FP_Q83_A1-p14"> The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. + And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is + in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there + is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31923] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod qualitas hominis est duplex, una naturalis, et alia +superveniens. Naturalis autem qualitas accipi potest vel circa +partem intellectivam; vel circa corpus et virtutes corpori annexas. +Ex eo igitur quod homo est aliqualis qualitate naturali quae +attenditur secundum intellectivam partem, naturaliter homo appetit +ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem. Qui quidem appetitus +naturalis est, et non subiacet libero arbitrio, ut ex supradictis +patet. Ex parte vero corporis et virtutum corpori annexarum, potest +esse homo aliqualis naturali qualitate, secundum quod est talis +complexionis, vel talis dispositionis, ex quacumque impressione +corporearum causarum, quae non possunt in intellectivam partem +imprimere, eo quod non est alicuius corporis actus. Sic igitur +qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem, talis finis +videtur ei, quia ex huiusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad +eligendum aliquid vel repudiandum. Sed istae inclinationes +subiacent iudicio rationis, cui obedit inferior appetitus, ut +dictum est. Unde per hoc libertati arbitrii non praeiudicatur. +Qualitates autem supervenientes sunt sicut habitus et passiones, +secundum quae aliquis magis inclinatur in unum quam in alterum. +Tamen istae etiam inclinationes subiacent iudicio rationis. Et +huiusmodi etiam qualitates ei subiacent, inquantum in nobis est +tales qualitates acquirere, vel causaliter vel dispositive, vel a +nobis excludere. Et sic nihil est quod libertati arbitrii +repugnet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A2-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 2. Whether free-will is a power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, + not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31924] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia. +Arbitrium enim liberum nihil est aliud quam liberum iudicium. +Iudicium autem non nominat potentiam, sed actum. Ergo liberum +arbitrium non est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which + is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the + soul's habit of disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31925] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +liberum arbitrium dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis. +Facultas autem nominat facilitatem potestatis, quae quidem est per +habitum. Ergo liberum arbitrium est habitus. Bernardus etiam dicit +quod liberum arbitrium est habitus animae liber sui. Non ergo est +potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, + by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is not a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31926] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulla +potentia naturalis tollitur per peccatum. Sed liberum arbitrium +tollitur per peccatum, Augustinus enim dicit quod <i>homo male +utens libero arbitrio, et se perdit et ipsum</i>. Ergo liberum +arbitrium non est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it + chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31927] Iª q. 83 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod nihil est subiectum habitus, ut videtur, nisi potentia. Sed +liberum arbitrium est subiectum gratiae; qua sibi assistente, bonum +eligit. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q83_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium---i.e. free judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of + speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of + an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore + free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a + habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must + be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those + things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits---for instance, + to assent to first principles: while those things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we + have said of the desire of happiness ( + <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[82], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural + habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit. + </p><p id="FP_Q83_A2-p7"> Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to + actions and passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance + ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary + ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will + to be a habit. Therefore it is a power. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 co."><a name="31928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31928] Iª q. 83 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, quamvis liberum arbitrium nominet quendam actum secundum +propriam significationem vocabuli; secundum tamen communem usum +loquendi, liberum arbitrium dicimus id quod est huius actus +principium, scilicet quo homo libere iudicat. Principium autem +actus in nobis est et potentia et habitus, dicimur enim aliquid +cognoscere et per scientiam, et per intellectivam potentiam. +Oportet ergo quod liberum arbitrium vel sit potentia, vel sit +habitus, vel sit potentia cum aliquo habitu. Quod autem non sit +habitus, neque potentia cum habitu, manifeste apparet ex duobus. +Primo quidem, quia si est habitus, oportet quod sit habitus +naturalis, hoc enim est naturale homini, quod sit liberi arbitrii. +Nullus autem habitus naturalis adest nobis ad ea quae subsunt +libero arbitrio, quia ad ea respectu quorum habemus habitus +naturales, naturaliter inclinamur, sicut ad assentiendum primis +principiis; ea autem ad quae naturaliter inclinamur, non subsunt +libero arbitrio, sicut dictum est de appetitu beatitudinis. Unde +contra propriam rationem liberi arbitrii est, quod sit habitus +naturalis. Contra naturalitatem autem eius est, quod sit habitus +non naturalis. Et sic relinquitur quod nullo modo sit habitus. +Secundo hoc apparet, quia habitus dicuntur secundum quos <i>nos +habemus ad passiones vel ad actus bene vel male</i>, ut dicitur in +II Ethic., nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad +concupiscentias, per intemperantiam autem male; per scientiam etiam +bene nos habemus ad actum intellectus, dum verum cognoscimus per +habitum autem contrarium male. Liberum autem arbitrium +indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male. Unde impossibile +est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus. Relinquitur ergo quod sit +potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power + which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31929] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod consuetum est potentiam significari nomine actus. Et +sic per hunc actum qui est liberum iudicium, nominatur potentia +quae est huius actus principium. Alioquin, si liberum arbitrium +nominaret actum, non semper maneret in homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. + But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of + relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the + action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31930] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod facultas nominat quandoque potestatem expeditam ad +operandum. Et sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii. +Bernardus autem accipit habitum non secundum quod dividitur contra +potentiam, sed secundum quod significat habitudinem quandam, qua +aliquo modo se aliquis habet ad actum. Quod quidem est tam per +potentiam quam per habitum, nam per potentiam homo se habet ut +potens operari, per habitum autem ut aptus ad operandum bene vel +male.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as + regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this + work (FS, Q[85], seqq.; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109" id="FP_Q83_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[109])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31931] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homo peccando liberum arbitrium dicitur perdidisse, +non quantum ad libertatem naturalem, quae est a coactione; sed +quantum ad libertatem quae est a culpa et a miseria. De qua infra +in tractatu moralium dicetur, in secunda parte huius operis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A3-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 3. Whether free-will is an appetitive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that + "free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive + power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31932] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia +appetitiva, sed cognitiva. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>cum +rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium</i>. Sed ratio est +potentia cognitiva. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia +cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore + free-will is a cognitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31933] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +liberum arbitrium dicitur quasi liberum iudicium. Sed iudicare est +actus cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est cognitiva +potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a + certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31934] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad +liberum arbitrium praecipue pertinet electio. Sed electio videtur +ad cognitionem pertinere, quia electio importat quandam +comparationem unius ad alterum, quod est proprium cognitivae +virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act of + the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive + power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31935] Iª q. 83 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio est +desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis</i>. Sed desiderium est actus +appetitivae virtutis. Ergo et electio. Liberum autem arbitrium est +secundum quod eligimus. Ergo liberum arbitrium est virtus +appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; + and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things + concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the + cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred + to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. + Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive + power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines + to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of + this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which + is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act + of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 co."><a name="31936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31936] Iª q. 83 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod proprium liberi arbitrii est electio, ex hoc enim liberi +arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, +quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione +considerare oportet. Ad electionem autem concurrit aliquid ex parte +cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae, ex parte +quidem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid +sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur +quod appetendo acceptetur id quod per consilium diiudicatur. Et +ideo Aristoteles in VI Ethic. sub dubio derelinquit utrum +principalius pertineat electio ad vim appetitivam, vel ad vim +cognitivam, dicit enim quod electio vel est intellectus +appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus. Sed in III Ethic. in hoc +magis declinat quod sit appetitus intellectivus, nominans +electionem desiderium consiliabile. Et huius ratio est, quia +proprium obiectum electionis est illud quod est ad finem, hoc +autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni quod dicitur utile, +unde cum bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum appetitus, +sequitur quod electio sit principaliter actus appetitivae virtutis. +Et sic liberum arbitrium est appetitiva potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies + the rational power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31937] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod potentiae appetitivae concomitantur apprehensivas. Et +secundum hoc dicit Damascenus quod <i>cum rationali confestim +comitatur liberum arbitrium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, + by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, + we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31938] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iudicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio +consilii. Determinatur autem consilium, primo quidem per sententiam +rationis, et secundo per acceptationem appetitus, unde philosophus +dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>ex consiliari iudicantes desideramus +secundum consilium</i>. Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam +iudicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the + appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some + likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31939] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ista collatio quae importatur in nomine electionis, +pertinet ad consilium praecedens, quod est rationis. Appetitus +enim, quamvis non sit collativus, tamen inquantum a vi cognitiva +conferente movetur, habet quandam collationis similitudinem, dum +unum alteri praeoptat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A4-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 4. Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} + is one thing and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while {boulesis} seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, + according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will + is a distinct power from the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31940] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a +voluntate. Dicit enim Damascenus, in libro II, quod aliud est +thelesis, aliud vero bulesis, thelesis autem est voluntas; bulesis +autem videtur arbitrium liberum, quia bulesis, secundum ipsum, est +voluntas quae est circa aliquid quasi unius per comparationem ad +alterum. Ergo videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, + because "the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will + is a distinct power from the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31941] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed electio, quae est actus +liberi arbitrii, est aliud a voluntate, ut dicitur in III Ethic., +<i>quia voluntas est de fine, electio autem de iis quae sunt ad +finem</i>. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia a +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers---the active and the passive. Therefore, + also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only + be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31942] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +voluntas est appetitus intellectivus. Sed ex parte intellectus sunt +duae potentiae, scilicet agens et possibilis. Ergo etiam ex parte +appetitus intellectivi debet esse alia potentia praeter voluntatem. +Et haec non videtur esse nisi liberum arbitrium. Ergo liberum +arbitrium est alia potentia praeter voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31943] Iª q. 83 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod liberum arbitrium nihil +aliud est quam voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q64_A2" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[64], A[2]</a>). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite + we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their + respective objects and acts. For the act of "understanding" implies the simple + acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. + But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we + reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies + the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to + "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means + to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the + principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore + it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has + been shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[8]</a>) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and + to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the + free-will are not two powers, but one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 co."><a name="31944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31944] Iª q. 83 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod potentias appetitivas oportet esse proportionatas potentiis +apprehensivis, ut supra dictum est. Sicut autem ex parte +apprehensionis intellectivae se habent intellectus et ratio, ita ex +parte appetitus intellectivi se habent voluntas et liberum +arbitrium, quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva. Et hoc patet ex +habitudine obiectorum et actuum. Nam intelligere importat simplicem +acceptionem alicuius rei, unde intelligi dicuntur proprie +principia, quae sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur. +Ratiocinari autem proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem +alterius, unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex +principiis innotescunt. Similiter ex parte appetitus, velle +importat simplicem appetitum alicuius rei, unde voluntas dicitur +esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. Eligere autem est appetere +aliquid propter alterum consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae +sunt ad finem. Sicut autem se habet in cognitivis principium ad +conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimus; ita in appetitivis +se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem +appetuntur. Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad +rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum +arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est +intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et +moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et +propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, +sed una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> {Boulesis} is distinct from {thelesis} on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31945] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod bulesis distinguitur a thelesi, non propter +diversitatem potentiarum, sed propter differentiam actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Choice and will---that is, the act of willing ---are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand + and to reason, as we have said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31946] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod electio et voluntas, idest ipsum velle, sunt diversi +actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam, sicut etiam +intelligere et ratiocinari, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active + and a passive will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31947] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et +ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q84" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q84-p0.1">Q. 84. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q84-p2"> We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers + of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of + the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this + work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat + now. + </p><p id="FP_Q84-p3"> In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when + united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom. + </p><p id="FP_Q84-p4"> The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands + itself and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it. + </p><p id="FP_Q84-p5"> In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul + know them? (2) How and in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them? + </p><p id="FP_Q84-p6"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q84-p7"><a href="#FP_Q84_A1"> (1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p8"><a href="#FP_Q84_A2"> (2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p9"><a href="#FP_Q84_A3"> (3) If through some species, whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p10"><a href="#FP_Q84_A4"> (4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p11"><a href="#FP_Q84_A5"> (5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p12"><a href="#FP_Q84_A6"> (6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p13"><a href="#FP_Q84_A7"> (7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the + phantasms? + </a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p14"><a href="#FP_Q84_A8"> (8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 pr."><a name="31948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31948] +Iª q. 84 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +actibus animae, quantum ad potentias intellectivas et appetitivas, +aliae enim animae potentiae non pertinent directe ad +considerationem theologi. Actus autem appetitivae partis ad +considerationem moralis scientiae pertinent, et ideo in secunda +parte huius operis de eis tractabitur, in qua considerandum erit de +morali materia. Nunc autem de actibus intellectivae partis agetur. +In consideratione vero actuum, hoc modo procedemus, primo namque +considerandum est quomodo intelligit anima corpori coniuncta; +secundo, quomodo intelligit a corpore separata. Prima autem +consideratio erit tripartita, primo namque considerabitur quomodo +anima intelligit corporalia, quae sunt infra ipsam; secundo, +quomodo intelligit seipsam, et ea quae in ipsa sunt; tertio, +quomodo intelligit substantias immateriales, quae sunt supra ipsam. +Circa cognitionem vero corporalium, tria consideranda occurrunt, +primo quidem per quid ea cognoscit; secundo, quomodo et quo ordine; +tertio, quid in eis cognoscit. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, +utrum anima cognoscat corpora per intellectum. Secundo, utrum +intelligat ea per essentiam suam, vel per aliquas species. Tertio, +si per aliquas species, utrum species omnium intelligibilium sint +ei naturaliter innatae. Quarto, utrum effluant in ipsam ab +aliquibus formis immaterialibus separatis. Quinto, utrum anima +nostra omnia quae intelligit, videat in rationibus aeternis. Sexto, +utrum cognitionem intelligibilem acquirat a sensu. Septimo, utrum +intellectus possit actu intelligere per species intelligibiles quas +penes se habet, non convertendo se ad phantasmata. Octavo, utrum +iudicium intellectus impediatur per impedimentum sensitivarum +virtutum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q84_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A1-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 1. Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies + cannot be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses." He says also + (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. But such are not + bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31949] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima non cognoscat corpora per +intellectum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II Soliloq. quod <i>corpora +intellectu comprehendi non possunt; nec aliquod corporeum nisi +sensibus videri potest</i>. Dicit etiam, XII super Gen. ad Litt., +quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt per essentiam suam in +anima. Huiusmodi autem non sunt corpora. Ergo anima per intellectum +corpora cognoscere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the + senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, + which are sensible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31950] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +se habet sensus ad intelligibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad +sensibilia. Sed anima per sensum nullo modo potest cognoscere +spiritualia, quae sunt intelligibilia. Ergo nullo modo per +intellectum potest cognoscere corpora, quae sunt sensibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. + Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31951] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus est necessariorum et semper eodem modo se habentium. +Sed corpora omnia sunt mobilia, et non eodem modo se habentia. +Anima ergo per intellectum corpora cognoscere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; + and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31952] Iª q. 84 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod scientia est in intellectu. Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit +corpora, sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus. Et sic +peribit scientia naturalis, quae est de corpore mobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It should be said in order to elucidate this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things, + thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them + to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For + what is in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, + for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that "it is not possible + twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent," as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5). + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p7"> After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, + besides these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings he called + "species" or "ideas," by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man, + or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of + the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so that according to + this the soul does not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p8"> Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because, since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge + of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration + through moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are + to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they + differ from them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason + claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p9"> Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind + of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the + thing known. Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, + immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding + has a universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode + of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under + the same conditions of immateriality and immobility. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p10"> But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible + than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find + whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the + thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without + receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives + under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver + according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a + knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 co."><a name="31953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31953] Iª q. 84 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum, +ad evidentiam huius quaestionis, quod primi philosophi qui de +naturis rerum inquisiverunt, putaverunt nihil esse in mundo praeter +corpus. Et quia videbant omnia corpora mobilia esse, et putabant ea +in continuo fluxu esse, aestimaverunt quod nulla certitudo de rerum +veritate haberi posset a nobis. Quod enim est in continuo fluxu, +per certitudinem apprehendi non potest, quia prius labitur quam +mente diiudicetur, sicut Heraclitus dixit quod <i>non est possibile +aquam fluvii currentis bis tangere</i>, ut recitat philosophus in +IV Metaphys. His autem superveniens Plato, ut posset salvare certam +cognitionem veritatis a nobis per intellectum haberi, posuit +praeter ista corporalia aliud genus entium a materia et motu +separatum, quod nominabat species sive ideas, per quarum +participationem unumquodque istorum singularium et sensibilium +dicitur vel homo vel equus vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sic ergo dicebat +scientias et definitiones et quidquid ad actum intellectus +pertinet, non referri ad ista corpora sensibilia, sed ad illa +immaterialia et separata; ut sic anima non intelligat ista +corporalia, sed intelligat horum corporalium species separatas. Sed +hoc dupliciter apparet falsum. Primo quidem quia, cum illae species +sint immateriales et immobiles, excluderetur a scientiis cognitio +motus et materiae (quod est proprium scientiae naturalis) et +demonstratio per causas moventes et materiales. Secundo autem, quia +derisibile videtur ut, dum rerum quae nobis manifestae sunt +notitiam quaerimus, alia entia in medium afferamus, quae non +possunt esse earum substantiae, cum ab eis differant secundum esse, +et sic, illis substantiis separatis cognitis, non propter hoc de +istis sensibilibus iudicare possemus. Videtur autem in hoc Plato +deviasse a veritate, quia, cum aestimaret omnem cognitionem per +modum alicuius similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex +necessitate sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in cognito. +Consideravit autem quod forma rei intellectae est in intellectu +universaliter et immaterialiter et immobiliter, quod ex ipsa +operatione intellectus apparet, qui intelligit universaliter et per +modum necessitatis cuiusdam; modus enim actionis est secundum modum +formae agentis. Et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas +hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter et +immobiliter. Hoc autem necessarium non est. Quia etiam in ipsis +sensibilibus videmus quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium +quam in altero, puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio +remissior, et in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine +dulcedine. Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est +in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit +formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro. Et +similiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et +mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum +suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. +Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora +cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. + For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; + but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31954] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quantum ad ea +quibus intellectus cognoscit, non autem quantum ad ea quae +cognoscit. Cognoscit enim corpora intelligendo, sed non per +corpora, neque per similitudines materiales et corporeas; sed per +species immateriales et intelligibiles, quae per sui essentiam in +anima esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows + only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity + is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power; whereas the higher power operates + in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31955] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXII de Civit. Dei, non est +dicendum quod, sicut sensus cognoscit sola corporalia, ita +intellectus cognoscit sola spiritualia, quia sequeretur quod Deus +et Angeli corporalia non cognoscerent. Huius autem diversitatis +ratio est, quia inferior virtus non se extendit ad ea quae sunt +superioris virtutis; sed virtus superior ea quae sunt inferioris +virtutis, excellentiori modo operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when + there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves + immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he + remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an + immovable science of movable things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31956] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis motus supponit aliquid immobile, cum enim +transmutatio fit secundum qualitatem, remanet substantia immobilis; +et cum transmutatur forma substantialis, remanet materia immobilis. +Rerum etiam mutabilium sunt immobiles habitudines, sicut Socrates +etsi non semper sedeat, tamen immobiliter est verum quod, +quandocumque sedet, in uno loco manet. Et propter hoc nihil +prohibet de rebus mobilibus immobilem scientiam habere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A2-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 2. Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the + soul "collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it + gives them something of its own substance." But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies. Therefore the soul knows + bodies through its essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, and from which it + forms them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31957] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima per essentiam suam corporalia +intelligat. Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Trin., quod <i>anima +imagines corporum convolvit et rapit factas in semetipsa de +semetipsa, dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae</i>. Sed +per similitudines corporum corpora intelligit. Ergo per essentiam +suam, quam dat formandis talibus similitudinibus, et de qua eas +format, cognoscit corporalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that "the soul, after a fashion, is everything." Since, therefore, like is + known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31958] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>anima quodammodo est +omnia</i>. Cum ergo simile simili cognoscatur, videtur quod anima +per seipsam corporalia cognoscat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in + themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul + than in themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31959] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima +est superior corporalibus creaturis. Inferiora autem sunt in +superioribus eminentiori modo quam in seipsis, ut Dionysius dicit. +Ergo omnes creaturae corporeae nobiliori modo existunt in ipsa +substantia animae quam in seipsis. Per suam ergo substantiam potest +creaturas corporeas cognoscere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses." But the + soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31960] Iª q. 84 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., quod <i>mens corporearum rerum +notitias per sensus corporis colligit</i>. Ipsa autem anima non est +cognoscibilis per corporis sensus. Non ergo cognoscit corporea per +suam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that "like + is known by like." But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. + The Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial + nature, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist + immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that things + known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of + all things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And because the nature of a result is determined by + its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of + all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence + of our four material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. Consequently, since + they held that things exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material, thus failing + to discern intellect from sense. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p7"> But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not + exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act, + as is shown Metaph. ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known except through its act. It is therefore insufficient + to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we + further admit in the soul natures and forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like; thus does + Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i, 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially + in the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; + why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have + knowledge of fire. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p8"> We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. + The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are + external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is + in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no + power of knowledge whatever---such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing + receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species + not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which + receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, + sight has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have remarked above ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A3" id="FP_Q84_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[3]</a>): while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p9"> It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence + must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it + may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His + Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, + therefore, understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 co."><a name="31961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31961] Iª q. 84 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod antiqui philosophi posuerunt quod anima per suam essentiam +cognoscit corpora. Hoc enim animis omnium communiter inditum fuit, +quod simile simili cognoscitur. Existimabant autem quod forma +cogniti sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in re cognita. E +contrario tamen Platonici posuerunt. Plato enim, quia perspexit +intellectualem animam immaterialem esse et immaterialiter +cognoscere, posuit formas rerum cognitarum immaterialiter +subsistere. Priores vero naturales, quia considerabant res cognitas +esse corporeas et materiales, posuerunt oportere res cognitas etiam +in anima cognoscente materialiter esse. Et ideo, ut animae +attribuerent omnium cognitionem, posuerunt eam habere naturam +communem cum omnibus. Et quia natura principiatorum ex principiis +constituitur, attribuerunt animae naturam principii, ita quod qui +dixit principium omnium esse ignem, posuit animam esse de natura +ignis; et similiter de aere et aqua. Empedocles autem, qui posuit +quatuor elementa materialia et duo moventia, ex his etiam dixit +animam esse constitutam. Et ita, cum res materialiter in anima +ponerent, posuerunt omnem cognitionem animae materialem esse, non +discernentes inter intellectum et sensum. Sed haec opinio +improbatur. Primo quidem, quia in materiali principio, de quo +loquebantur, non existunt principiata nisi in potentia. Non autem +cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod est in potentia, sed solum +secundum quod est actu, ut patet in IX Metaphys., unde nec ipsa +potentia cognoscitur nisi per actum. Sic igitur non sufficeret +attribuere animae principiorum naturam ad hoc quod omnia +cognosceret, nisi inessent ei naturae et formae singulorum +effectuum, puta ossis et carnis et aliorum huiusmodi; ut +Aristoteles contra Empedoclem argumentatur in I de anima. Secundo +quia, si oporteret rem cognitam materialiter in cognoscente +existere, nulla ratio esset quare res quae materialiter extra +animam subsistunt, cognitione carerent, puta, si anima igne +cognoscit ignem, et ignis etiam qui est extra animam, ignem +cognosceret. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet materialia cognita in +cognoscente existere non materialiter, sed magis immaterialiter. Et +huius ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt +extra cognoscentem, cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt. +Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid unum. Unde +manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad +rationem materialitatis. Et ideo quae non recipiunt formas nisi +materialiter, nullo modo sunt cognoscitiva, sicut plantae; ut +dicitur in II libro de anima. Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius +habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Unde et +intellectus, qui abstrahit speciem non solum a materia, sed etiam a +materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit +quam sensus, qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, +sed cum materialibus conditionibus. Et inter ipsos sensus, visus +est magis cognoscitivus, quia est minus materialis, ut supra dictum +est. Et inter ipsos intellectus, tanto quilibet est perfectior, +quanto immaterialior. Ex his ergo patet quod, si aliquis +intellectus est qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet +quod essentia eius habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut antiqui +posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex principiis omnium +materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc autem est proprium Dei, ut +sua essentia sit immaterialiter comprehensiva omnium, prout +effectus virtute praeexistunt in causa. Solus igitur Deus per +essentiam suam omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque +etiam Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the formation + of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this + way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image; + but just as we say that a body is made into something colored because of its + being informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul "keeps something"---namely, + not informed with such image---"which is able freely to judge of the species of these images": and that this is the "mind" + or "intellect." And he says that the part which is informed with these images---namely, the imagination---is "common to us + and beasts." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31962] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de visione imaginaria, quae +fit per imagines corporum. Quibus imaginibus formandis dat anima +aliquid suae substantiae, sicut subiectum datur ut informetur per +aliquam formam. Et sic de seipsa facit huiusmodi imagines, non quod +anima vel aliquid animae convertatur, ut sit haec vel illa imago; +sed sicut dicitur de corpore fieri aliquid coloratum, prout +informatur colore. Et hic sensus apparet ex his quae sequuntur. +Dicit enim quod servat aliquid, scilicet non formatum tali imagine, +quod libere de specie talium imaginum iudicet, et hoc dicit esse +mentem vel intellectum. Partem autem quae informatur huiusmodi +imaginibus scilicet imaginativam, dicit esse communem nobis et +bestiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the + soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all---through the senses, to all things sensible---through + the intellect, to all things intelligible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31963] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu compositam ex +omnibus, sicut antiqui naturales; sed dixit quodammodo animam esse +omnia, inquantum est in potentia ad omnia; per sensum quidem ad +sensibilia, per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every creature has a finite and determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain + likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness + thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence + is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being + the universal principle of all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31964] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaelibet creatura habet esse finitum et +determinatum. Unde essentia superioris creaturae, etsi habeat +quandam similitudinem inferioris creaturae prout communicant in +aliquo genere, non tamen complete habet similitudinem illius, quia +determinatur ad aliquam speciem, praeter quam est species +inferioris creaturae. Sed essentia Dei est perfecta similitudo +omnium quantum ad omnia quae in rebus inveniuntur, sicut universale +principium omnium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A3-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 3. Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul understands all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension + (xxix in Ev.), that "man has understanding in common with the angels." But angels understand all things through innate species: + wherefore in the book De Causis it is said that "every intelligence is full of forms." Therefore the soul also has innate + species of things, by means of which it understands corporeal things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31965] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima intelligat omnia per species sibi +naturaliter inditas. Dicit enim Gregorius, in homilia ascensionis +quod <i>homo habet commune cum Angelis intelligere</i>. Sed Angeli +intelligunt omnia per formas naturaliter inditas, unde in libro de +causis dicitur quod <i>omnis intelligentia est plena formis</i>. +Ergo et anima habet species rerum naturaliter inditas, quibus +corporalia intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under + the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. + And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31966] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima +intellectiva est nobilior quam materia prima corporalis. Sed +materia prima est creata a Deo sub formis ad quas est in potentia. +Ergo multo magis anima intellectiva est creata a Deo sub speciebus +intelligibilibus. Et sic anima intelligit corporalia per species +sibi naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge, + answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, + concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; which would + not be the case unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal + things through innate species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31967] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus potest verum respondere nisi de eo quod scit. Sed aliquis +etiam idiota, non habens scientiam acquisitam, respondet verum de +singulis, si tamen ordinate interrogetur, ut narratur in Menone +Platonis de quodam. Ergo antequam aliquis acquirat scientiam, habet +rerum cognitionem. Quod non esset nisi anima haberet species +naturaliter inditas. Intelligit igitur anima res corporeas per +species naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31968] Iª q. 84 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, de intellectu loquens, +quod est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is + to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs + be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes + is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from + such potentiality to act---through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation---by instruction + or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images + which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De + Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality + to + all such species. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A3-p7"> But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, + as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man's intellect is filled + with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But + this seems to be unreasonable. First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems + impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for + no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And especially + unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established + above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q84_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76] , A[1]</a>): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered + by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense + be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind + can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things. We must + therefore conclude that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 co."><a name="31969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31969] Iª q. 84 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum forma sit principium actionis, oportet ut eo modo se +habeat aliquid ad formam quae est actionis principium, quo se habet +ad actionem illam, sicut si moveri sursum est ex levitate, oportet +quod in potentia tantum sursum fertur, esse leve solum in potentia, +quod autem actu sursum fertur, esse leve in actu. Videmus autem +quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum, tam secundum +sensum quam secundum intellectum. Et de tali potentia in actum +reducitur, ut sentiat quidem, per actiones sensibilium in sensum; +ut intelligat autem, per disciplinam aut inventionem. Unde oportet +dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines +quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt +principia intelligendi. Et propter hoc Aristoteles posuit quod +intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species +naturaliter inditas, sed est in principio in potentia ad huiusmodi +species omnes. Sed quia id quod habet actu formam, interdum non +potest agere secundum formam propter aliquod impedimentum, sicut +leve si impediatur sursum ferri; propter hoc Plato posuit quod +intellectus hominis naturaliter est plenus omnibus speciebus +intelligibilibus, sed per unionem corporis impeditur ne possit in +actum exire. Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum. Primo quidem +quia, si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse +possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, +quod nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere, nullus enim homo +obliviscitur ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum +sit maius sua parte, et alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur +inconveniens, si ponatur esse animae naturale corpori uniri, ut +supra habitum est, inconveniens enim est quod naturalis operatio +alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum +naturam. Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex +hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum, quae +apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus natus nullam +potest habere notitiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si animae +essent naturaliter inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes. Et ideo +dicendum est quod anima non cognoscit corporalia per species +naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades + of bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection + as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms + which it has not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by + its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A2" id="FP_Q84_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[2]</a>). In the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the + human intellect is in potentiality to such species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31970] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod homo quidem convenit cum Angelis in intelligendo, +deficit tamen ab eminentia intellectus eorum, sicut et corpora +inferiora, quae tantum existunt secundum Gregorium, deficiunt ab +existentia superiorum corporum. Nam materia inferiorum corporum non +est completa totaliter per formam, sed est in potentia ad formas +quas non habet, materia autem caelestium corporum est totaliter +completa per formam, ita quod non est in potentia ad aliam formam, +ut supra habitum est. Et similiter intellectus Angeli est perfectus +per species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam, intellectus autem +humanus est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Primary matter has substantial being through its form, consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would + not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does + not receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31971] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod materia prima habet esse substantiale per formam, et +ideo oportuit quod crearetur sub aliqua forma, alioquin non esset +in actu. Sub una tamen forma existens, est in potentia ad alias. +Intellectus autem non habet esse substantiale per speciem +intelligibilem; et ideo non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now + by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, + this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether + the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by + asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31972] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ordinata interrogatio procedit ex principiis +communibus per se notis, ad propria. Per talem autem processum +scientia causatur in anima addiscentis. Unde cum verum respondet de +his de quibus secundo interrogatur, hoc non est quia prius ea +noverit; sed quia tunc ea de novo addiscit. Nihil enim refert utrum +ille qui docet, proponendo vel interrogando procedat de principiis +communibus ad conclusiones, utrobique enim animus audientis +certificatur de posterioribus per priora.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A4-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 4. Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation + is caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the + intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect + in act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence + is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually + understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused + by some separate forms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31973] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod species intelligibiles effluant in animam +ab aliquibus formis separatis. Omne enim quod per participationem +est tale, causatur ab eo quod est per essentiam tale; sicut quod +est ignitum reducitur sicut in causam in ignem. Sed anima +intellectiva, secundum quod est actu intelligens, participat ipsa +intelligibilia, intellectus enim in actu, quodammodo est +intellectum in actu. Ergo ea quae secundum se et per essentiam suam +sunt intellecta in actu, sunt causae animae intellectivae quod actu +intelligat. Intellecta autem in actu per essentiam suam, sunt +formae sine materia existentes. Species igitur intelligibiles +quibus anima intelligit, causantur a formis aliquibus +separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the + senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible + species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But + these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible + forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31974] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +intelligibilia se habent ad intellectum, sicut sensibilia ad +sensum. Sed sensibilia quae sunt in actu extra animam, sunt causae +specierum sensibilium quae sunt in sensu, quibus sentimus. Ergo +species intelligibiles quibus intellectus noster intelligit, +causantur ab aliquibus actu intelligibilibus extra animam +existentibus. Huiusmodi autem non sunt nisi formae a materia +separatae. Formae igitur intelligibiles intellectus nostri effluunt +ab aliquibus substantiis separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in potentiality, + afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate + intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, are caused by some separate substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31975] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per id quod est actu. Si +ergo intellectus noster, prius in potentia existens, postmodum actu +intelligat, oportet quod hoc causetur ab aliquo intellectu qui +semper est in actu. Hic autem est intellectus separatus. Ergo ab +aliquibus substantiis separatis causantur species intelligibiles +quibus actu intelligimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the + fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31976] Iª q. 84 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quia secundum hoc sensibus non indigeremus ad intelligendum. Quod +patet esse falsum ex hoc praecipue quod qui caret uno sensu, nullo +modo potest habere scientiam de sensibilibus illius sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And + this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said + <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q84_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called + "per se" man, and the form or idea of a horse which is called "per se" horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms + are + participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter + to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individuating + stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea + takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held + that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that + the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said + above + <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q84_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p7"> But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves + in many ways (Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible + things, instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first + of which, said he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which + he called the "active intelligence," from which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible + species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are + derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the "active + intelligence." They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our + intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive + them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas + remain immovably in the soul. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p8"> But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said that + the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, nor is the + mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul, + for the latter's proper operation which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the + body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of + only certain separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand: + wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p9"> But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the + consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles: even this seems + an insufficient explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is overcome by + sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body: and thus the + senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters + through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p10"> And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the + "active intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural + for the soul to understand through species derived from the "active intelligence," it follows that at times the soul of an + individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its + very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding + sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore + conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 co."><a name="31977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31977] Iª q. 84 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam posuerunt species intelligibiles nostri intellectus +procedere ab aliquibus formis vel substantiis separatis. Et hoc +dupliciter. Plato enim, sicut dictum est, posuit formas rerum +sensibilium per se sine materia subsistentes; sicut formam hominis, +quam nominabat per se hominem, et formam vel ideam equi, quam +nominabat per se equum, et sic de aliis. Has ergo formas separatas +ponebat participari et ab anima nostra, et a materia corporali; ab +anima quidem nostra ad cognoscendum, a materia vero corporali ad +essendum; ut sicut materia corporalis per hoc quod participat ideam +lapidis, fit hic lapis, ita intellectus noster per hoc quod +participat ideam lapidis, fit intelligens lapidem. Participatio +autem ideae fit per aliquam similitudinem ipsius ideae in +participante ipsam, per modum quo exemplar participatur ab +exemplato. Sicut igitur ponebat formas sensibiles quae sunt in +materia corporali, effluere ab ideis sicut quasdam earum +similitudines; ita ponebat species intelligibiles nostri +intellectus esse similitudines quasdam idearum ab eis effluentes. +Et propter hoc, ut supra dictum est, scientias et definitiones ad +ideas referebat. Sed quia contra rationem rerum sensibilium est +quod earum formae subsistant absque materiis, ut Aristoteles +multipliciter probat; ideo Avicenna, hac positione remota, posuit +omnium rerum sensibilium intelligibiles species, non quidem per se +subsistere absque materia, sed praeexistere immaterialiter in +intellectibus separatis; a quorum primo derivantur huiusmodi +species in sequentem, et sic de aliis usque ad ultimum intellectum +separatum, quem nominat intellectum agentem; a quo, ut ipse dicit, +effluunt species intelligibiles in animas nostras, et formae +sensibiles in materiam corporalem. Et sic in hoc Avicenna cum +Platone concordat, quod species intelligibiles nostri intellectus +effluunt a quibusdam formis separatis, quas tamen Plato dicit per +se subsistere, Avicenna vero ponit eas in intelligentia agente. +Differunt etiam quantum ad hoc, quod Avicenna ponit species +intelligibiles non remanere in intellectu nostro postquam desinit +actu intelligere; sed indiget ut iterato se convertat ad +recipiendum de novo. Unde non ponit scientiam animae naturaliter +inditam, sicut Plato, qui ponit participationes idearum immobiliter +in anima permanere. Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio +assignari non posset quare anima nostra corpori uniretur. Non enim +potest dici quod anima intellectiva corpori uniatur propter corpus, +quia nec forma est propter materiam, nec motor propter mobile, sed +potius e converso. Maxime autem videtur corpus esse necessarium +animae intellectivae ad eius propriam operationem, quae est +intelligere, quia secundum esse suum a corpore non dependet. Si +autem anima species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam apta nata +esset recipere per influentiam aliquorum separatorum principiorum +tantum, et non acciperet eas ex sensibus, non indigeret corpore ad +intelligendum, unde frustra corpori uniretur. Si autem dicatur quod +indiget anima nostra sensibus ad intelligendum, quibus quodammodo +excitetur ad consideranda ea quorum species intelligibiles a +principiis separatis recipit; hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia +huiusmodi excitatio non videtur necessaria animae nisi inquantum +est consopita, secundum Platonicos, quodammodo et obliviosa propter +unionem ad corpus, et sic sensus non proficerent animae +intellectivae nisi ad tollendum impedimentum quod animae provenit +ex corporis unione. Remanet igitur quaerendum quae sit causa +unionis animae ad corpus. Si autem dicatur, secundum Avicennam, +quod sensus sunt animae necessarii, quia per eos excitatur ut +convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem, a qua recipit species; hoc +quidem non sufficit. Quia si in natura animae est ut intelligat per +species ab intelligentia agente effluxas, sequeretur quod quandoque +anima possit se convertere ad intelligentiam agentem ex +inclinatione suae naturae, vel etiam excitata per alium sensum, ut +convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem ad recipiendum species +sensibilium quorum sensum aliquis non habet. Et sic caecus natus +posset habere scientiam de coloribus, quod est manifeste falsum. +Unde dicendum est quod species intelligibiles quibus anima nostra +intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle + which is by its essence intelligible---namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and + material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31978] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod species intelligibiles quas participat noster +intellectus, reducuntur sicut in primam causam in aliquod +principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, scilicet in Deum. Sed +ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et +materialium, a quibus scientiam colligimus, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible. + Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31979] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod res materiales, secundum esse quod habent extra +animam, possunt esse sensibiles actu; non autem actu +intelligibiles. Unde non est simile de sensu et intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is + a power of the soul, as we have said ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q84_A4-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31980] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia +ad actum per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui +est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est, non autem per +aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte +sicut per causam remotam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A6-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 6. Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we + cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever + the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be perceived." Secondly, because, + "whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to + the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible + object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit." And + so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. + Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31987] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectiva cognitio non accipiatur a +rebus sensibilibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium +quaest., quod <i>non est expectanda sinceritas veritatis a corporis +sensibus</i>. Et hoc probat dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod +<i>omne quod corporeus sensus attingit, sine ulla intermissione +temporis commutatur, quod autem non manet, percipi non potest</i>. +Alio modo, per hoc quod <i>omnia quae per corpus sentimus, etiam +cum non adsunt sensibus, imagines tamen eorum patimur, ut in somno +vel furore; non autem sensibus discernere valemus utrum ipsa +sensibilia, vel imagines eorum falsas sentiamus. Nihil autem +percipi potest quod a falso non discernitur</i>. Et sic concludit +quod non est expectanda veritas a sensibus. Sed cognitio +intellectualis est apprehensiva veritatis. Non ergo cognitio +intellectualis est expectanda a sensibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): "We must not thing that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as + though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's action; for that which acts is in every way more + excellent than that which it acts on." Whence he concludes that "the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the + spirit causes it in itself." Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible + things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31988] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>non est putandum +facere aliquid corpus in spiritum, tanquam spiritus corpori +facienti materiae vice subdatur, omni enim modo praestantior est +qui facit, ea re de qua aliquid facit</i>. Unde concludit quod +<i>imaginem corporis non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in +seipso facit</i>. Non ergo intellectualis cognitio a sensibilibus +derivatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for + we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible + things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31989] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus non se extendit ultra virtutem suae causae. Sed +intellectualis cognitio se extendit ultra sensibilia, intelligimus +enim quaedam quae sensu percipi non possunt. Intellectualis ergo +cognitio non derivatur a rebus sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31990] Iª q. 84 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus probat, I Metaphys., et in fine Poster., quod +principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing from + the bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle + says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by a "discharge of images." And the reason for this + opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish + between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible, + they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression + Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p7"> Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making + use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual + knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated + by the intellect, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A4" id="FP_Q84_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a> ,5). Moreover he held that + sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: + but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself + the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that the "body + feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what + is + announced from without." Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor + sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses + rouse the intellect to the act of understanding. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p8"> Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense + has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of + the "composite." And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable + that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the "composite," + Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible + on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every + operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an + operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. + And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does + not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, + 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere intellectual operation is effected + in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he + calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A3" id="FP_Q84_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[79], AA[3]</a>,4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p9"> According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since + the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active + intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather + that it is in a way the material cause. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 co."><a name="31991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31991] Iª q. 84 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa istam quaestionem triplex fuit philosophorum opinio. +Democritus enim posuit quod <i>nulla est alia causa cuiuslibet +nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his corporibus quae cogitamus, +veniunt atque intrant imagines in animas nostras</i>; ut Augustinus +dicit in epistola sua ad Dioscorum. Et Aristoteles etiam dicit, in +libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod Democritus posuit cognitionem fieri +per idola et defluxiones. Et huius positionis ratio fuit, quia tam +ipse Democritus quam alii antiqui naturales non ponebant +intellectum differre a sensu, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de +anima. Et ideo, quia sensus immutatur a sensibili, arbitrabantur +omnem nostram cognitionem fieri per solam immutationem a +sensibilibus. Quam quidem immutationem Democritus asserebat fieri +per imaginum defluxiones. Plato vero e contrario posuit intellectum +differre a sensu; et intellectum quidem esse virtutem immaterialem +organo corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum non +potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio intellectualis non +fit per immutationem intellectus a sensibilibus, sed per +participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut dictum +est. Sensum etiam posuit virtutem quandam per se operantem. Unde +nec ipse sensus, cum sit quaedam vis spiritualis, immutatur a +sensibilibus, sed organa sensuum a sensibilibus immutantur, ex qua +immutatione anima quodammodo excitatur ut in se species sensibilium +formet. Et hanc opinionem tangere videtur Augustinus, XII super +Gen. ad Litt., ubi dicit quod <i>corpus non sentit, sed anima per +corpus, quo velut nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod +extrinsecus nuntiatur</i>. Sic igitur secundum Platonis opinionem, +neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam +sensibilis totaliter a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant +animam sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant +animam intellectivam ad intelligendum. Aristoteles autem media via +processit. Posuit enim cum Platone intellectum differre a sensu. +Sed sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine +communicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae +tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiter posuit de omnibus operationibus +sensitivae partis. Quia igitur non est inconveniens quod sensibilia +quae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc +Aristoteles cum Democrito concordavit, quod operationes sensitivae +partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum, non per +modum defluxionis, ut Democritus posuit, sed per quandam +operationem. Nam et Democritus omnem actionem fieri posuit per +influxionem atomorum, ut patet in I de Generat. Intellectum vero +posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione +corporis. Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem +incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, +secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium +corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est +honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit. Non tamen ita quod +intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione +aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et +nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra +diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in +actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte +phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia +phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed +oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non +potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa +intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia +causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect + is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their + likeness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31992] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod per verba illa Augustini datur intelligi quod veritas +non sit totaliter a sensibus expectanda. Requiritur enim lumen +intellectus agentis, per quod immutabiliter veritatem in rebus +mutabilibus cognoscamus, et discernamus ipsas res a similitudinibus +rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, + the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed + on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect + must be separate, namely, because "the agent is more noble than the + patient." And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but + also an active power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination, is an action + of the "composite," there is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far + as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored is compared to the + pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is through + the agency of the sensible, since "fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless + there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, even of things not perceived + by the senses. And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31993] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi non loquitur de intellectuali +cognitione, sed de imaginaria. Et quia, secundum Platonis +opinionem, vis imaginaria habet operationem quae est animae solius; +eadem ratione usus est Augustinus ad ostendendum quod corpora non +imprimunt suas similitudines in vim imaginariam, sed hoc facit ipsa +anima, qua utitur Aristoteles ad probandum intellectum agentem esse +aliquid separatum, quia scilicet agens est honorabilius patiente. +Et procul dubio oportet, secundum hanc positionem, in vi +imaginativa ponere non solum potentiam passivam, sed etiam activam. +Sed si ponamus, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, quod actio virtutis +imaginativae sit coniuncti, nulla sequitur difficultas, quia corpus +sensibile est nobilius organo animalis, secundum hoc quod +comparatur ad ipsum ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, sicut +coloratum in actu ad pupillam, quae colorata est in potentia. +Posset tamen dici quod, quamvis prima immutatio virtutis +imaginariae sit per motum sensibilium, quia phantasia est motus +factus secundum sensum, ut dicitur in libro de anima; tamen est +quaedam operatio animae in homine quae dividendo et componendo +format diversas rerum imagines, etiam quae non sunt a sensibus +acceptae. Et quantum ad hoc possunt accipi verba Augustini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual + knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31994] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis +cognitionis. Et ideo non est mirum si intellectualis cognitio ultra +sensitivam se extendit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A7-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 7. Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to + the phantasms? + </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without + turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the + intellect is in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, + without turning to the phantasms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31995] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus possit actu intelligere per +species intelligibiles quas penes se habet, non convertendo se ad +phantasmata. Intellectus enim fit in actu per speciem +intelligibilem qua informatur. Sed intellectum esse in actu, est +ipsum intelligere. Ergo species intelligibiles sufficiunt ad hoc +quod intellectus actu intelligat, absque hoc quod ad phantasmata se +convertat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually + imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31996] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magis +dependet imaginatio a sensu, quam intellectus ab imaginatione. Sed +imaginatio potest imaginari actu, absentibus sensibilibus. Ergo +multo magis intellectus potest intelligere actu, non convertendo se +ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect + cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. + Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31997] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +incorporalium non sunt aliqua phantasmata, quia imaginatio tempus +et continuum non transcendit. Si ergo intellectus noster non posset +aliquid intelligere in actu nisi converteretur ad phantasmata, +sequeretur quod non posset intelligere incorporeum aliquid. Quod +patet esse falsum, intelligimus enim veritatem ipsam, et Deum et +Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31998] Iª q. 84 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>nihil sine +phantasmate intelligit anima</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand + anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make + use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there + were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now + sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear + that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge + already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination + is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, + as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. + Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to + serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is + that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for + the purpose of understanding. + </p><p id="FP_Q84_A7-p7"> Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of + the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas + the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; + and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to + such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature + of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore + the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing + in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the + intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal + nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists + say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn + to the phantasms whenever it understands. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 co."><a name="31999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31999] Iª q. 84 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae +statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in +actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indiciis +apparet. Primo quidem quia, cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non +utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per +laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad eius +actum actus alicuius potentiae utentis organo corporali. Utuntur +autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires +pertinentes ad partem sensitivam. Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc +quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de +novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus +imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quod, impedito +actu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phreneticis; +et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtutis, ut in lethargicis; +impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam +praeaccepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, +quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua +phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat +quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium +volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex +quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum. Huius +autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur +cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a +corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis +a corpore separata; et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia +cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, +proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali +existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in +invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem +huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est +absque materia corporali, sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod +sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, +et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis +rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod +cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem +apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad +hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod +convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in +particulari existentem. Si autem proprium obiectum intellectus +nostri esset forma separata; vel si naturae rerum sensibilium +subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos; non +oporteret quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret +se ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have + said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q84_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make + use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32000] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod species conservatae in intellectu possibili, in eo +existunt habitualiter quando actu non intelligit, sicut supra +dictum est. Unde ad hoc quod intelligamus in actu, non sufficit +ipsa conservatio specierum; sed oportet quod eis utamur secundum +quod convenit rebus quarum sunt species, quae sunt naturae in +particularibus existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of + the individual, whereas the intellect does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32001] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam ipsum phantasma est similitudo rei +particularis, unde non indiget imaginatio aliqua alia similitudine +particularis, sicut indiget intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are + phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state + of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, + therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no + phantasms of the things themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32002] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur +a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt +phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei +circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, +cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias +etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, +cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam +comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid +intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, +licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A8-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 8. Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior + does not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the + intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32003] Iª q. 84 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod iudicium intellectus non impediatur per +ligamentum sensus. Superius enim non dependet ab inferiori. Sed +iudicium intellectus est supra sensum. Ergo iudicium intellectus +non impeditur per ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vigil. + i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through + suspension of the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32004] Iª q. 84 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +syllogizare est actus intellectus. In somno autem ligatur sensus, +ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vig.; contingit tamen quandoque +quod aliquis dormiens syllogizat. Ergo non impeditur iudicium +intellectus per ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, + 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment + of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32005] Iª q. 84 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod in dormiendo ea quae contra licitos mores contingunt, non +imputantur ad peccatum; ut Augustinus in XII super Gen. ad Litt. +dicit. Hoc autem non esset si homo in dormiendo liberum usum +rationis et intellectus haberet. Ergo impeditur rationis usus per +ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q84_A8-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>, our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything + cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is the term + and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is action, so the end + of natural science is that which + is perceived principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, + in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know + the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives + with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the + knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. + But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it + is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things + are known to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 co."><a name="32006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32006] Iª q. 84 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro +proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum +de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent +cognoscantur, et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et +finis iudicii. Dicit autem philosophus, in III de caelo, quod +<i>sicut finis factivae scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae +finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum</i>, faber +enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut +operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et similiter naturalis non +quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes +eorum quae videntur secundum sensum. Manifestum est autem quod non +posset esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus +ignoraret, et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium +scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. +Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a +nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde +impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, +cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and + principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance + to the judgment of the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32007] Iª q. 84 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, quamvis intellectus sit superior sensu, accipit +tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius obiecta prima et principalia in +sensibilibus fundantur. Et ideo necesse est quod impediatur +iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in + De Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. + For when the amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; + thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating and + drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus + it happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: + thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If + the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; + so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things, and their + images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from + the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination + are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while + asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32008] Iª q. 84 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sensus ligatur in dormientibus propter evaporationes +quasdam et fumositates resolutas, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et +Vig. Et ideo secundum dispositionem huiusmodi evaporationum, +contingit esse ligamentum sensus maius vel minus. Quando enim +multus fuerit motus vaporum, ligatur non solum sensus, sed etiam +imaginatio, ita ut nulla appareant phantasmata; sicut praecipue +accidit cum aliquis incipit dormire post multum cibum et potum. Si +vero motus vaporum aliquantulum fuerit remissior, apparent +phantasmata, sed distorta et inordinata; sicut accidit in +febricitantibus. Si vero adhuc magis motus sedetur, apparent +phantasmata ordinata; sicut maxime solet contingere in fine +dormitionis, et in hominibus sobriis et habentibus fortem +imaginationem. Si autem motus vaporum fuerit modicus, non solum +imaginatio remanet libera, sed etiam ipse sensus communis ex parte +solvitur; ita quod homo iudicat interdum in dormiendo ea quae videt +somnia esse, quasi diiudicans inter res et rerum similitudines. Sed +tamen ex aliqua parte remanet sensus communis ligatus; et ideo, +licet aliquas similitudines discernat a rebus, tamen semper in +aliquibus decipitur. Sic igitur per modum quo sensus solvitur et +imaginatio in dormiendo, liberatur et iudicium intellectus, non +tamen ex toto. Unde illi qui dormiendo syllogizant, cum excitantur, +semper recognoscunt se in aliquo defecisse.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q85" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q85-p0.1">Q. 85. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q85-p2"> We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q85-p3"><a href="#FP_Q85_A1"> (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p4"><a href="#FP_Q85_A2"> (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it + understands? + </a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p5"><a href="#FP_Q85_A3"> (3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p6"><a href="#FP_Q85_A4"> (4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p7"><a href="#FP_Q85_A5"> (5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p8"><a href="#FP_Q85_A6"> (6) Whether the intellect can err?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p9"><a href="#FP_Q85_A7"> (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p10"><a href="#FP_Q85_A8"> (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 pr."><a name="32009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32009] +Iª q. 85 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de modo et +ordine intelligendi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum +intellectus noster intelligat abstrahendo species a phantasmatibus. +Secundo, utrum species intelligibiles abstractae a phantasmatibus, +se habeant ad intellectum nostrum ut quod intelligitur, vel sicut +id quo intelligitur. Tertio, utrum intellectus noster naturaliter +intelligat prius magis universale. Quarto, utrum intellectus noster +possit multa simul intelligere. Quinto, utrum intellectus noster +intelligat componendo et dividendo. Sexto, utrum intellectus possit +errare. Septimo, utrum unus possit eandem rem melius intelligere +quam alius. Octavo, utrum intellectus noster per prius cognoscat +indivisibile quam divisibile.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q85_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A1-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 1. Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For + the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not + exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by + abstraction of the species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32010] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat res +corporeas et materiales per abstractionem a phantasmatibus. +Quicumque enim intellectus intelligit rem aliter quam sit, est +falsus. Formae autem rerum materialium non sunt abstractae a +particularibus, quorum similitudines sunt phantasmata. Si ergo +intelligamus res materiales per abstractionem specierum a +phantasmatibus, erit falsitas in intellectu nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood + apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter + is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from + the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the + phantasm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32011] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res +materiales sunt res naturales, in quarum definitione cadit materia. +Sed nihil potest intelligi sine eo quod cadit in definitione eius. +Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi sine materia. Sed materia +est individuationis principium. Ergo res materiales non possunt +intelligi per abstractionem universalis a particulari, quod est +abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. + But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither + does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself + on the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32012] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +III de anima dicitur quod phantasmata se habent ad animam +intellectivam sicut colores ad visum. Sed visio non fit per +abstractionem aliquarum specierum a coloribus, sed per hoc quod +colores imprimunt in visum. Ergo nec intelligere contingit per hoc +quod aliquid abstrahatur a phantasmatibus, sed per hoc quod +phantasmata imprimunt in intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul---the passive intellect and + the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, + but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to + the phantasm, as light is to color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but + rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32013] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ut +dicitur in III de anima, in intellectiva anima sunt duo, scilicet +intellectus possibilis, et agens. Sed abstrahere a phantasmatibus +species intelligibiles non pertinet ad intellectum possibilem, sed +recipere species iam abstractas. Sed nec etiam videtur pertinere ad +intellectum agentem, qui se habet ad phantasmata sicut lumen ad +colores, quod non abstrahit aliquid a coloribus, sed magis eis +influit. Ergo nullo modo intelligimus abstrahendo a +phantasmatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not, therefore, + by abstraction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32014] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus, in III de anima, dicit quod <i>intellectus intelligit +species in phantasmatibus</i>. Non ergo eas abstrahendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter." Therefore + material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32015] Iª q. 85 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>sicut res sunt separabiles a +materia, sic circa intellectum sunt</i>. Ergo oportet quod +materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a +similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. + For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power + is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power + of the sensitive part can only have + knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor + in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore + a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, + namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; + yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q85_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this + individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from + individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands + material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of + immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial. + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p9"> But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held + that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating things + abstract, as stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q85_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[84] , A[1]</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 co."><a name="32016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32016] Iª q. 85 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur +virtuti cognoscitivae. Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae +virtutis. Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi +corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae +potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia +huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis +potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. +Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi +corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, +sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae +obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens, etsi enim materialia +cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet +vel in seipsis vel in Deo. Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se +habet, non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam +virtus animae, quae est forma corporis, ut ex supra dictis patet. +Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem +corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali +materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non +prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia +individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est +dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a +phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium +aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra Angeli per +immaterialia materialia cognoscunt. Plato vero, attendens solum ad +immaterialitatem intellectus humani, non autem ad hoc quod est +corpori quodammodo unitus, posuit obiectum intellectus ideas +separatas; et quod intelligimus, non quidem abstrahendo, sed magis +abstracta participando, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does + not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we + understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not + really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply + falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from + one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that color + is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider + color and its properties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word what we thus + understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore color + can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as + a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion + of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the + phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. + If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word + "otherwise" refers to the thing understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; + and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the + species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one + who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode + of a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the + intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32017] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum +compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non +esse in alio, vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum +simplicis et absolutae considerationis; sicut cum intelligimus +unum, nihil considerando de alio. Abstrahere igitur per intellectum +ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta, secundum primum modum +abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate. Sed secundo modo abstrahere +per intellectum quae non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet +falsitatem; ut in sensibilibus manifeste apparet. Si enim +intelligamus vel dicamus colorem non inesse corpori colorato, vel +esse separatum ab eo, erit falsitas in opinione vel in oratione. Si +vero consideremus colorem et proprietates eius, nihil considerantes +de pomo colorato; vel quod sic intelligimus, etiam voce exprimamus; +erit absque falsitate opinionis et orationis. Pomum enim non est de +ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibet colorem intelligi, nihil +intelligendo de pomo. Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad +rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut +hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis +individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est +abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a +phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque +consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata +repraesentantur. Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui +intelligit rem aliter quam sit, verum est si ly aliter referatur ad +rem intellectam. Tunc enim intellectus est falsus, quando +intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit. Unde falsus esset intellectus, +si sic abstraheret speciem lapidis a materia, ut intelligeret eam +non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit. Non est autem verum quod +proponitur, si ly aliter accipiatur ex parte intelligentis. Est +enim absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in +intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo, quia intellectum est in +intelligente immaterialiter, per modum intellectus; non autem +materialiter, per modum rei materialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that + were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is + twofold, common, and "signate" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. + The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual + sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from "this flesh and + these bones," which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be + considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect form "flesh and bones." + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p12"> Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also + from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal + matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter + is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible + qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered + apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding + the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they + can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual + intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as "being," "unity," "power," + "act," and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to + consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to + be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32018] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit +forma solum, et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum +hoc, in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et +ideo aliter dicendum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet +communis, et signata vel individualis, communis quidem, ut caro et +os; individualis autem, ut hae carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus +igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili +individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem +hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de +ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII +Metaphys.; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis +non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus. Species +autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia +sensibili non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a +materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali. Materia enim +sensibilis dicitur materia corporalis secundum quod subiacet +qualitatibus sensibilibus, scilicet calido et frigido, duro et +molli, et huiusmodi. Materia vero intelligibilis dicitur substantia +secundum quod subiacet quantitati. Manifestum est autem quod +quantitas prius inest substantiae quam qualitates sensibiles. Unde +quantitates, ut numeri et dimensiones et figurae, quae sunt +terminationes quantitatum, possunt considerari absque qualitatibus +sensibilibus, quod est eas abstrahi a materia sensibili, non tamen +possunt considerari sine intellectu substantiae quantitati +subiectae, quod esset eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili communi. +Possunt tamen considerari sine hac vel illa substantia; quod est +eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili individuali. Quaedam vero sunt +quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut +ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi, quae etiam esse +possunt absque omni materia, ut patet in substantiis +immaterialibus. Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de +duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per +intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can + impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have + not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression + on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which + by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific + conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from + the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as + a body transferred from one place to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32019] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod colores habent eundem modum existendi prout sunt in +materia corporali individuali, sicut et potentia visiva, et ideo +possunt imprimere suam similitudinem in visum. Sed phantasmata, cum +sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, +non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus, +ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute imprimere in +intellectum possibilem. Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat +quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione +intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est +repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad +naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species +intelligibilis a phantasmatibus, non quod aliqua eadem numero +forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in +intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et +transfertur ad alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible + species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by + its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the + abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active + intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able + to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs + the passive intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32020] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et +iterum ab eis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species +intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur quidem, quia, sicut pars +sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, +ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut +ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur. Abstrahit autem +intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, +inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in +nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus +conditionibus, secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis +informatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things + in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of + which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A1-p15.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32021] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species +intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum +in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non +potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi +convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A2-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 2. Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. + For the understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing + of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this + species is what is actually understood. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32022] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus +abstractae, se habeant ad intellectum nostrum sicut id quod +intelligitur. Intellectum enim in actu est in intelligente, quia +intellectum in actu est ipse intellectus in actu. Sed nihil de re +intellecta est in intellectu actu intelligente, nisi species +intelligibilis abstracta. Ergo huiusmodi species est ipsum +intellectum in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the + soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually + understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32023] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectum in actu oportet in aliquo esse, alioquin nihil esset. +Sed non est in re quae est extra animam, quia, cum res extra animam +sit materialis, nihil quod est in ea, potest esse intellectum in +actu. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectum in actu sit in intellectu. +Et ita nihil est aliud quam species intelligibilis praedicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words are signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the + things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul---viz. the intelligible + species, are what is actually understood. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32024] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in I Periherm., quod <i>voces sunt notae earum +quae sunt in anima passionum</i>. Sed voces significant res +intellectas, id enim voce significamus quod intelligimus. Ergo +ipsae passiones animae, scilicet species intelligibiles, sunt ea +quae intelliguntur in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what + is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, + but that by which the intellect understands. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32025] Iª q. 85 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, sicut species +sensibilis ad sensum. Sed species sensibilis non est illud quod +sentitur, sed magis id quo sensus sentit. Ergo species +intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id quo +intelligit intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is + cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, + namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p7"> This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore + if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned + with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of + the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [* + <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q85_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[1]</a>]. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" + [*Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its + own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. + Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so + every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives + that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be + equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in + fact, every sort of apprehension. + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which + is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see + and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions + proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is + the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which + proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness + of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the + intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of + intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; + but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion + of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, + by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, + according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; + it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 co."><a name="32026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32026] Iª q. 85 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam posuerunt quod vires cognoscitivae quae sunt in nobis, +nihil cognoscunt nisi proprias passiones; puta quod sensus non +sentit nisi passionem sui organi. Et secundum hoc, intellectus +nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, idest speciem intelligibilem +in se receptam. Et secundum hoc, species huiusmodi est ipsum quod +intelligitur. Sed haec opinio manifeste apparet falsa ex duobus. +Primo quidem, quia eadem sunt quae intelligimus, et de quibus sunt +scientiae. Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae +sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus +quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus +quae sunt in anima; sicut secundum Platonicos omnes scientiae sunt +de ideis, quas ponebant esse intellecta in actu. Secundo, quia +sequeretur error antiquorum dicentium quod <i>omne quod videtur est +verum</i>; et sic quod contradictoriae essent simul verae. Si enim +potentia non cognoscit nisi propriam passionem, de ea solum +iudicat. Sic autem videtur aliquid, secundum quod potentia +cognoscitiva afficitur. Semper ergo iudicium potentiae +cognoscitivae erit de eo quod iudicat, scilicet de propria +passione, secundum quod est; et ita omne iudicium erit verum. Puta +si gustus non sentit nisi propriam passionem, cum aliquis habens +sanum gustum iudicat mel esse dulce, vere iudicabit; et similiter +si ille qui habet gustum infectum, iudicet mel esse amarum, vere +iudicabit, uterque enim iudicat secundum quod gustus eius +afficitur. Et sic sequitur quod omnis opinio aequaliter erit vera, +et universaliter omnis acceptio. Et ideo dicendum est quod species +intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit +intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut +dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre et +intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere +et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma +secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est +similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor calefacientis est similitudo +calefacti; similiter forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in +agente, est similitudo obiecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est +secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est +species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus +intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, +secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et +speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est +id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius +species intelligibilis est similitudo. Et hoc etiam patet ex +antiquorum opinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci. Ponebant +enim quod anima per terram quae in ipsa erat, cognosceret terram +quae extra ipsam erat; et sic de aliis. Si ergo accipiamus speciem +terrae loco terrae, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, qui dicit quod +<i>lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis</i>; sequetur quod +anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra +animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually + understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness + of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is + what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32027] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod intellectum est in intelligente per suam +similitudinem. Et per hunc modum dicitur quod intellectum in actu +est intellectus in actu, inquantum similitudo rei intellectae est +forma intellectus; sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus +in actu. Unde non sequitur quod species intelligibilis abstracta +sit id quod actu intelligitur, sed quod sit similitudo eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In these words "the thing actually understood" there is a double implication---the thing which is understood, and the fact + that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal" imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction + or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is + only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as + universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple + apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that + the color which is seen is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch + as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in + this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and + consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, + in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32028] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur intellectum in actu, duo importantur, +scilicet res quae intelligitur, et hoc quod est ipsum intelligi. Et +similiter cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur, +scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa +igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio +universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod +est intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, est in +intellectu. Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim +videt colorem pomi sine eius odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color +qui videtur sine odore manifestum est quod color qui videtur, non +est nisi in pomo; sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei +ex parte visus, inquantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non +odoris. Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc +vel in illo homine, sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine +individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod +sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitatis secundum +quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae +speciei, et non individualium principiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes + place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself + an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in + the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the + intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed + by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division + or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for + itself for the purpose of judging of external things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32029] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una +secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per +hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, +secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei +absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio +coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio +intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie +intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem +vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde +ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio +significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces +significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus +sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A3-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 3. Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its + own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because + "that is first which does not involve the existence of its correlative" (Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily + known as regards our intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32030] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod magis universalia non sint priora in +nostra cognitione intellectuali. Quia ea quae sunt priora et +notiora secundum naturam, sunt posteriora et minus nota secundum +nos. Sed universalia sunt priora secundum naturam, quia prius est a +quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia. Ergo universalia sunt +posteriora in cognitione nostri intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known + secondarily by us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32031] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +composita sunt priora quoad nos quam simplicia. Sed universalia +sunt simpliciora. Ergo sunt posterius nota quoad nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. + But the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore + the universals are secondarily known by us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32032] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in I Physic. quod definitum prius cadit in +cognitione nostra quam partes definitionis. Sed universaliora sunt +partes definitionis minus universalium, sicut animal est pars +definitionis hominis. Ergo universalia sunt posterius nota quoad +nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily + known by us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32033] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, per +effectus devenimus in causas et principia. Sed universalia sunt +quaedam principia. Ergo universalia sunt posterius nota quoad +nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "We must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual" (Phys. i, 1) + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32034] Iª q. 85 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in I Physic., quod <i>ex universalibus in singularia +oportet devenire</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible + knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, + it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our + intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every + power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality + and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object + is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, + and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and + hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards + we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things, + without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge + not only of the universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be + known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know + the less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal"; whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as + "rational" or "irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows "animal" before it knows + man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal. + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p8"> Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. + For by sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to place and time; in reference to place, + when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is + seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards + time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore "children at + first call men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The reason of this is clear: because + he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows "genus" + is in a state of potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between + potentiality and act. + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p9"> We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the + universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the + more common precedes the knowledge of the less common. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 co."><a name="32035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32035] Iª q. 85 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in cognitione nostri intellectus duo oportet considerare. +Primo quidem, quod cognitio intellectiva aliquo modo a sensitiva +primordium sumit. Et quia sensus est singularium, intellectus autem +universalium; necesse est quod cognitio singularium, quoad nos, +prior sit quam universalium cognitio. Secundo oportet considerare +quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit. Omne autem +quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum +incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum +perfectum. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus, est +scientia completa, per quam distincte et determinate res +cognoscuntur. Actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per +quam sciuntur res indistincte sub quadam confusione, quod enim sic +cognoscitur, secundum quid cognoscitur in actu, et quodammodo in +potentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Physic., quod <i>sunt primo +nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis; posterius autem cognoscimus +distinguendo distincte principia et elementa</i>. Manifestum est +autem quod cognoscere aliquid in quo plura continentur, sine hoc +quod habeatur propria notitia uniuscuiusque eorum quae continentur +in illo, est cognoscere aliquid sub confusione quadam. Sic autem +potest cognosci tam totum universale, in quo partes continentur in +potentia, quam etiam totum integrale, utrumque enim totum potest +cognosci in quadam confusione, sine hoc quod partes distincte +cognoscantur. Cognoscere autem distincte id quod continetur in toto +universali, est habere cognitionem de re minus communi. Sicut +cognoscere animal indistincte, est cognoscere animal inquantum est +animal, cognoscere autem animal distincte, est cognoscere animal +inquantum est animal rationale vel irrationale, quod est cognoscere +hominem vel leonem. Prius igitur occurrit intellectui nostro +cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem, et eadem ratio est si +comparemus quodcumque magis universale ad minus universale. Et quia +sensus exit de potentia in actum sicut et intellectus, idem etiam +ordo cognitionis apparet in sensu. Nam prius secundum sensum +diiudicamus magis commune quam minus commune, et secundum locum et +secundum tempus. Secundum locum quidem, sicut, cum aliquid videtur +a remotis, prius deprehenditur esse corpus, quam deprehendatur esse +animal; et prius deprehenditur esse animal, quam deprehendatur esse +homo; et prius homo, quam Socrates vel Plato. Secundum tempus +autem, quia puer a principio prius distinguit hominem a non homine, +quam distinguat hunc hominem ab alio homine; et ideo <i>pueri a +principio appellant omnes viros patres, posterius autem determinant +unumquemque</i>, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et huius ratio manifesta +est. Quia qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut +sciat distinctionis principium; sicut qui scit genus, est in +potentia ut sciat differentiam. Et sic patet quod cognitio +indistincta media est inter potentiam et actum. Est ergo dicendum +quod cognitio singularium est prior quoad nos quam cognitio +universalium, sicut cognitio sensitiva quam cognitio intellectiva. +Sed tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum, cognitio magis +communis est prior quam cognitio minus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of + universality. And since the intention of universality---viz. the relation of one and the same to many---is due to intellectual + abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal + animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to Plato, who + held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according + to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas. + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p11"> Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself---for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. + And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential + come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and + animal; for "the animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). + The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally + prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man + comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of + man. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32036] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod universale dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, +secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione +universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum +et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione +intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit +posterius. Unde in I de anima dicitur quod <i>animal universale aut +nihil est, aut posterius est</i>. Sed secundum Platonem, qui posuit +universalia subsistentia, secundum hanc considerationem universale +esset prius quam particularia, quae secundum eum non sunt nisi per +participationem universalium subsistentium, quae dicuntur ideae. +Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam naturam, scilicet +animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus. Et +sic dicendum est quod duplex est ordo naturae. Unus secundum viam +generationis et temporis, secundum quam viam, ea quae sunt +imperfecta et in potentia, sunt priora. Et hoc modo magis commune +est prius secundum naturam, quod apparet manifeste in generatione +hominis et animalis; nam prius generatur animal quam homo, ut +dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Alius est ordo perfectionis, +sive intentionis naturae; sicut actus simpliciter est prius +secundum naturam quam potentia, et perfectum prius quam +imperfectum. Et per hunc modum, minus commune est prius secundum +naturam quam magis commune, ut homo quam animal, naturae enim +intentio non sistit in generatione animalis, sed intendit generare +hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more common universal may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that + in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained + not only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, + but also more; as "man" contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore + "animal" in itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man" comes before "animal" considered as part of the same idea. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32037] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod universale magis commune comparatur ad minus commune +ut totum et ut pars. Ut totum quidem, secundum quod in magis +universali non solum continetur in potentia minus universale, sed +etiam alia; ut sub animali non solum homo, sed etiam equus. Ut pars +autem, secundum quod minus commune continet in sui ratione non +solum magis commune, sed etiam alia; ut homo non solum animal, sed +etiam rationale. Sic igitur animal consideratum in se, prius est in +nostra cognitione quam homo; sed homo est prius in nostra +cognitione quam quod animal sit pars rationis eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known + before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must + needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles + of definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined + would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know + how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32038] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod pars aliqua dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo +absolute, secundum quod in se est, et sic nihil prohibet prius +cognoscere partes quam totum, ut lapides quam domum. Alio modo, +secundum quod sunt partes huius totius, et sic necesse est quod +prius cognoscamus totum quam partes; prius enim cognoscimus domum +quadam confusa cognitione, quam distinguamus singulas partes eius. +Sic igitur dicendum est quod definientia, absolute considerata, +sunt prius nota quam definitum, alioquin non notificaretur +definitum per ea. Sed secundum quod sunt partes definitionis, sic +sunt posterius nota, prius enim cognoscimus hominem quadam confusa +cognitione, quam sciamus distinguere omnia quae sunt de hominis +ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far + as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of + knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, + and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according + to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, + 13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature + of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from + the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, + because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that which + is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual + part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because + the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, + knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with + unknown effects, and sometimes conversely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32039] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod universale, secundum quod accipitur cum intentione +universalitatis, est quidem quodammodo principium cognoscendi, +prout intentio universalitatis consequitur modum intelligendi qui +est per abstractionem. Non autem est necesse quod omne quod est +principium cognoscendi, sit principium essendi, ut Plato +existimavit, cum quandoque cognoscamus causam per effectum, et +substantiam per accidentia. Unde universale sic acceptum, secundum +sententiam Aristotelis, non est principium essendi, neque +substantia, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Si autem consideremus ipsam +naturam generis et speciei prout est in singularibus, sic +quodammodo habet rationem principii formalis respectu singularium, +nam singulare est propter materiam, ratio autem speciei sumitur ex +forma. Sed natura generis comparatur ad naturam speciei magis per +modum materialis principii, quia natura generis sumitur ab eo quod +est materiale in re, ratio vero speciei ab eo quod est formale; +sicut ratio animalis a sensitivo, ratio vero hominis ab +intellectivo. Et inde est quod ultima naturae intentio est ad +speciem, non autem ad individuum, neque ad genus, quia forma est +finis generationis, materia vero est propter formam. Non autem +oportet quod cuiuslibet causae vel principii cognitio sit posterior +quoad nos, cum quandoque cognoscamus per causas sensibiles, +effectus ignotos; quandoque autem e converso.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A4-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 4. Whether we can understand many things at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we can understand many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of + before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the same + time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32040] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod possimus multa simul intelligere. +Intellectus enim est supra tempus. Sed prius et posterius ad tempus +pertinent. Ergo intellectus non intelligit diversa secundum prius +et posterius, sed simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, + for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is + nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many + things at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32041] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +prohibet diversas formas non oppositas simul eidem actu inesse, +sicut odorem et colorem pomo. Sed species intelligibiles non sunt +oppositae. Ergo nihil prohibet intellectum unum simul fieri in actu +secundum diversas species intelligibiles et sic potest multa simul +intelligere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore + the intellect understands many things at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32042] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus simul intelligit aliquod totum, ut hominem vel domum. +Sed in quolibet toto continentur multae partes. Ergo intellectus +simul multa intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the + same is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another. + Therefore it knows many things at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32043] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non +potest cognosci differentia unius ad alterum, nisi simul utrumque +apprehendatur, ut dicitur in libro de anima, et eadem ratio est de +quacumque alia comparatione. Sed intellectus noster cognoscit +differentiam et comparationem unius ad alterum. Ergo cognoscit +multa simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that "understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32044] Iª q. 85 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in libro Topic., quod <i>intelligere est unum solum, +scire vero multa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by "one" but not by "many" intelligible + species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the + intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the + same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things + the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it + is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, + just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes. Now all + intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things + which + the species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected + at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 co."><a name="32045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32045] Iª q. 85 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum unius, +non autem multa per modum multorum, dico autem per modum unius vel +multorum, per unam vel plures species intelligibiles. Nam modus +cuiusque actionis consequitur formam quae est actionis principium. +Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, +simul intelligere potest, et inde est quod Deus omnia simul videt, +quia omnia videt per unum, quod est essentia sua. Quaecumque vero +intellectus per diversas species intelligit, non simul intelligit. +Et huius ratio est, quia impossibile est idem subiectum perfici +simul pluribus formis unius generis et diversarum specierum, sicut +impossibile est quod idem corpus secundum idem simul coloretur +diversis coloribus, vel figuretur diversis figuris. Omnes autem +species intelligibiles sunt unius generis, quia sunt perfectiones +unius intellectivae potentiae; licet res quarum sunt species, sint +diversorum generum. Impossibile est ergo quod idem intellectus +simul perficiatur diversis speciebus intelligibilibus, ad +intelligendum diversa in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible + species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude + is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32046] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod intellectus est supra tempus quod est numerus motus +corporalium rerum. Sed ipsa pluralitas specierum intelligibilium +causat vicissitudinem quandam intelligibilium operationum, secundum +quam una operatio est prior altera. Et hanc vicissitudinem +Augustinus nominat tempus, cum dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., +quod <i>Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging + to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32047] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non solum oppositae formae non possunt esse simul in +eodem subiecto, sed nec quaecumque formae eiusdem generis, licet +non sint oppositae, sicut patet per exemplum inductum de coloribus +et figuris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through + the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its + species; and so they are not understood at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32048] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod partes possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sub +quadam confusione, prout sunt in toto, et sic cognoscuntur per unam +formam totius, et sic simul cognoscuntur. Alio modo, cognitione +distincta, secundum quod quaelibet cognoscitur per suam speciem, et +sic non simul intelliguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference + or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32049] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod quando intellectus intelligit differentiam vel +comparationem unius ad alterum, cognoscit utrumque differentium vel +comparatorum sub ratione ipsius comparationis vel differentiae; +sicut dictum est quod cognoscit partes sub ratione totius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A5-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 5. Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of + many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition + and division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32050] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat +componendo et dividendo. Compositio enim et divisio non est nisi +multorum. Sed intellectus non potest simul multa intelligere. Ergo +non potest intelligere componendo et dividendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as + also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32051] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omni +compositioni et divisioni adiungitur tempus praesens, praeteritum +vel futurum. Sed intellectus abstrahit a tempore, sicut etiam ab +aliis particularibus conditionibus. Ergo intellectus non intelligit +componendo et dividendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, + for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that + the composition be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32052] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus intelligit per assimilationem ad res. Sed compositio et +divisio nihil est in rebus, nihil enim invenitur in rebus nisi res +quae significatur per praedicatum et subiectum, quae est una et +eadem si compositio est vera; homo enim est vere id quod est +animal. Ergo intellectus non componit et dividit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition + and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32053] Iª q. 85 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, voces +significant conceptiones intellectus, ut dicit philosophus in I +Periherm. Sed in vocibus est compositio et divisio; ut patet in +propositionibus affirmativis et negativis. Ergo intellectus +componit et dividit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality + to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: + so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends + something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and + proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily + compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, + which is the process of reasoning. + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A5-p7"> But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. + Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing + the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human + intellect knows by composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect + know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 co."><a name="32054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32054] Iª q. 85 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et +dividendo. Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, +similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non +statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et +similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione +capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de +ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium +obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et +accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum +hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et +ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est +ratiocinari. Intellectus autem angelicus et divinus se habet sicut +res incorruptibiles, quae statim a principio habent suam totam +perfectionem. Unde intellectus angelicus et divinus statim perfecte +totam rei cognitionem habet. Unde in cognoscendo quidditatem rei, +cognoscit de re simul quidquid nos cognoscere possumus componendo +et dividendo et ratiocinando. Et ideo intellectus humanus cognoscit +componendo et dividendo, sicut et ratiocinando. Intellectus autem +divinus et angelicus cognoscunt quidem compositionem et divisionem +et ratiocinationem, non componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando, +sed per intellectum simplicis quidditatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things + by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32055] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod compositio et divisio intellectus secundum quandam +differentiam vel comparationem fit. Unde sic intellectus cognoscit +multa componendo et dividendo, sicut cognoscendo differentiam vel +comparationem rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as + we have said + <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32056] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus et abstrahit a phantasmatibus; et tamen +non intelligit actu nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut supra +dictum est. Et ex ea parte qua se ad phantasmata convertit, +compositioni et divisioni intellectus adiungitur tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode + of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but + it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity + of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the + imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form with matter; + and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus + is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular + from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that + composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white." Nevertheless composition + of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the + intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" + and "whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white," means that "the man is something having + whiteness": and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition + of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; + man, that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter; and according to this + kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32057] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod similitudo rei recipitur in intellectu secundum modum +intellectus, et non secundum modum rei. Unde compositioni et +divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei; tamen +non eodem modo se habet in re, sicut in intellectu. Intellectus +enim humani proprium obiectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae +sub sensu et imaginatione cadit. Invenitur autem duplex compositio +in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic +respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte +praedicatur; nam genus sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero +completiva speciei a forma, particulare vero a materia individuali. +Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali +compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam +praedicatur accidens de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est albus. +Tamen differt compositio intellectus a compositione rei, nam ea +quae componuntur in re, sunt diversa; compositio autem intellectus +est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur. Non enim intellectus +sic componit, ut dicat quod homo est albedo; sed dicit quod homo +est albus, idest habens albedinem, idem autem est subiecto quod est +homo, et quod est habens albedinem. Et simile est de compositione +formae et materiae, nam animal significat id quod habet naturam +sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet naturam intellectivam, homo +vero quod habet utrumque, Socrates vero quod habet omnia haec cum +materia individuali; et secundum hanc identitatis rationem, +intellectus noster unum componit alteri praedicando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A8-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1) + that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements + are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32074] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster per prius cognoscat +indivisibile quam divisibile. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Physic., +quod <i>intelligimus et scimus ex principiorum et elementorum +cognitione</i>. Sed indivisibilia sunt principia et elementa +divisibilium. Ergo per prius sunt nobis nota indivisibilia quam +divisibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more + known," as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the + definition of a line; for as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points"; also unity + comes into the definition of number, for "number is multitude measured by one," as is said + Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32075] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per prius cognoscitur a +nobis, quia definitio est ex prioribus et notioribus, ut dicitur in +VI Topic. Sed indivisibile ponitur in definitione divisibilis, +sicut <i>linea enim</i>, ut Euclides dicit, <i>est longitudo sine +latitudine, cuius extremitates sunt duo puncta</i>. Et unitas +ponitur in definitione numeri, quia numerus est multitudo mensurata +per unum, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo intellectus noster per +prius intelligit indivisibile quam divisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the intellect + is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32076] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +simile simili cognoscitur. Sed indivisibile est magis simile +intellectui quam divisibile, quia intellectus est simplex, ut +dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus noster prius cognoscit +indivisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible is expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily. Therefore + likewise is the indivisible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32077] Iª q. 85 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>indivisibile monstratur sicut +privatio</i>. Sed privatio per posterius cognoscitur. Ergo et +indivisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, + as above stated ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship + to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said + De Anima iii, 6. First, the + continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to + us before its division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have + said above + <a href="#FP_Q85_A3" id="FP_Q85_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, + the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as we have + said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason + of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The + third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually + or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined + by + way of privation "as that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated + in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the + quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect. + </p><p id="FP_Q85_A8-p7"> But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it + would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated + by things. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 co."><a name="32078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32078] Iª q. 85 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est +quidditas rei materialis, quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex +praemissis patet. Et quia id quod est primo et per se cognitum a +virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium eius obiectum, considerari +potest quo ordine indivisibile intelligatur a nobis, ex eius +habitudine ad huiusmodi quidditatem. Dicitur autem indivisibile +tripliciter, ut dicitur in III de anima. Uno modo, sicut continuum +est indivisibile, quia est indivisum in actu, licet sit divisibile +in potentia. Et huiusmodi indivisibile prius est intellectum a +nobis quam eius divisio, quae est in partes, quia cognitio confusa +est prior quam distincta, ut dictum est. Alio modo dicitur +indivisibile secundum speciem, sicut ratio hominis est quoddam +indivisibile. Et hoc etiam modo indivisibile est prius intellectum +quam divisio eius in partes rationis, ut supra dictum est, et +iterum prius quam intellectus componat et dividat, affirmando vel +negando. Et huius ratio est, quia huiusmodi duplex indivisibile +intellectus secundum se intelligit, sicut proprium obiectum. Tertio +modo dicitur indivisibile quod est omnino indivisibile, ut punctus +et unitas, quae nec actu nec potentia dividuntur. Et huiusmodi +indivisibile per posterius cognoscitur, per privationem +divisibilis. Unde punctum privative definitur, punctum est cuius +pars non est, et similiter ratio unius est quod sit indivisibile, +ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Et huius ratio est, quia tale +indivisibile habet quandam oppositionem ad rem corporalem, cuius +quidditatem primo et per se intellectus accipit. Si autem +intellectus noster intelligeret per participationem indivisibilium +separatorum, ut Platonici posuerunt, sequeretur quod indivisibile +huiusmodi esset primo intellectum, quia secundum Platonicos, priora +prius participantur a rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects + we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always + depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider + that we know, when we can resolve principles into their causes." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32079] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in accipiendo scientiam, non semper principia et +elementa sunt priora, quia quandoque ex effectibus sensibilibus +devenimus in cognitionem principiorum et causarum intelligibilium. +Sed in complemento scientiae, semper scientia effectuum dependet ex +cognitione principiorum et elementorum, quia, ut ibidem dicit +philosophus, <i>tunc opinamur nos scire, cum principiata possumus +in causas resolvere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point is not included in the definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and + in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions + a point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore + it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in + the definition of the divisible, but rather conversely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32080] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod punctum non ponitur in definitione lineae communiter +sumptae, manifestum est enim quod in linea infinita, et etiam in +circulari, non est punctum nisi in potentia. Sed Euclides definit +lineam finitam rectam, et ideo posuit punctum in definitione +lineae, sicut terminum in definitione terminati. Unitas vero est +mensura numeri, et ideo ponitur in definitione numeri mensurati. +Non autem ponitur in definitione divisibilis, sed magis e +converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not + on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise + sight would perceive hearing rather than color. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32081] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod similitudo per quam intelligimus, est species cogniti +in cognoscente. Et ideo non secundum similitudinem naturae ad +potentiam cognoscitivam est aliquid prius cognitum, sed per +convenientiam ad obiectum, alioquin magis visus cognosceret auditum +quam colorem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q86" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q86-p0.1">Q. 86. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q86-p2"> We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q86-p3"><a href="#FP_Q86_A1"> (1) Whether it knows singulars?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p4"><a href="#FP_Q86_A2"> (2) Whether it knows the infinite?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p5"><a href="#FP_Q86_A3"> (3) Whether it knows contingent things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p6"><a href="#FP_Q86_A4"> (4) Whether it knows future things?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 pr."><a name="32082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32082] +Iª q. 86 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quid +intellectus noster in rebus materialibus cognoscat. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cognoscat singularia. Secundo, +utrum cognoscat infinita. Tertio, utrum cognoscat contingentia. +Quarto, utrum cognoscat futura.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether our intellect can know the infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, + as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[1]</a>). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32093] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster possit cognoscere +infinita. Deus enim excedit omnia infinita. Sed intellectus noster +potest cognoscere Deum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis +potest cognoscere omnia alia infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and "species." But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as + in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32094] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus noster natus est cognoscere genera et species. Sed +quorundam generum sunt infinitae species, sicut numeri, +proportionis et figurae. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere +infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies + being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually + known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32095] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +unum corpus non impediret aliud ab existendo in uno et eodem loco, +nihil prohiberet infinita corpora in uno loco esse. Sed una species +intelligibilis non prohibet aliam ab existendo simul in eodem +intellectu, contingit enim multa scire in habitu. Ergo nihil +prohibet intellectum nostrum infinitorum scientiam habere in +habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect + can know the infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32096] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus, cum non sit virtus materiae corporalis, ut supra +dictum est, videtur esse potentia infinita. Sed virtus infinita +potest super infinita. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere +infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered as such, is unknown." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32097] Iª q. 86 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in I Physic., quod <i>infinitum, inquantum est +infinitum, est ignotum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, + which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, + in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its + considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect + understand so many things, that it cannot understand more. + </p><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p8"> On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect + cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one + species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive + consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the infinite + is that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be + known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible. + </p><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p9"> For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge results from actual + consideration: since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for + us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, + counting them according to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually + nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained above. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 co."><a name="32098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32098] Iª q. 86 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum potentia proportionetur suo obiecto, oportet hoc modo se +habere intellectum ad infinitum, sicut se habet eius obiectum, quod +est quidditas rei materialis. In rebus autem materialibus non +invenitur infinitum in actu, sed solum in potentia, secundum quod +unum succedit alteri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Et ideo in +intellectu nostro invenitur infinitum in potentia, in accipiendo +scilicet unum post aliud, quia nunquam intellectus noster tot +intelligit, quin possit plura intelligere. Actu autem vel habitu +non potest cognoscere infinita intellectus noster. Actu quidem non, +quia intellectus noster non potest simul actu cognoscere nisi quod +per unam speciem cognoscit. Infinitum autem non habet unam speciem, +alioquin haberet rationem totius et perfecti. Et ideo non potest +intelligi nisi accipiendo partem post partem, ut ex eius +definitione patet in III Physic., <i>est enim infinitum cuius +quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid extra accipere</i>, et +sic infinitum cognosci non posset actu, nisi omnes partes eius +numerarentur, quod est impossibile. Et eadem ratione non possumus +intelligere infinita in habitu. In nobis enim habitualis cognitio +causatur ex actuali consideratione, intelligendo enim efficimur +scientes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde non possemus habere habitum +infinitorum secundum distinctam cognitionem, nisi consideravissemus +omnia infinita, numerando ea secundum cognitionis successionem, +quod est impossibile. Et ita nec actu nec habitu intellectus noster +potest cognoscere infinita, sed in potentia tantum, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the term 'infinite' is applied + to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, + it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is + unknown to us by reason + of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot + know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed + by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32099] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus dicitur infinitus sicut +forma quae non est terminata per aliquam materiam, in rebus autem +materialibus aliquid dicitur infinitum per privationem formalis +terminationis. Et quia forma secundum se nota est, materia autem +sine forma ignota, inde est quod infinitum materiale est secundum +se ignotum. Infinitum autem formale, quod est Deus, est secundum se +notum, ignotum autem quoad nos, propter defectum intellectus +nostri, qui secundum statum praesentis vitae habet naturalem +aptitudinem ad materialia cognoscenda. Et ideo in praesenti Deum +cognoscere non possumus nisi per materiales effectus. In futuro +autem tolletur defectus intellectus nostri per gloriam, et tunc +ipsum Deum in sua essentia videre poterimus, tamen absque +comprehensione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species + of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles; and this + is to know them potentially and confusedly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32100] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intellectus noster natus est cognoscere species per +abstractionem a phantasmatibus. Et ideo illas species numerorum et +figurarum quas quis non est imaginatus, non potest cognoscere nec +actu nec habitu, nisi forte in genere et in principiis +universalibus; quod est cognoscere in potentia et confuse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order + for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species + enter into our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time: and therefore there + must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32101] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si duo corpora essent in uno loco, vel plura, non +oporteret quod successive subintrarent locum, ut sic per ipsam +subintrationis successionem numerarentur locata. Sed species +intelligibiles ingrediuntur intellectum nostrum successive, quia +non multa simul actu intelliguntur. Et ideo oportet numeratas, et +non infinitas species esse in intellectu nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not + terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which + consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infinite number of individuals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32102] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sicut intellectus noster est infinitus virtute, ita +infinitum cognoscit. Est enim virtus eius infinita, secundum quod +non terminatur per materiam corporalem. Et est cognoscitivus +universalis, quod est abstractum a materia individuali, et per +consequens non finitur ad aliquod individuum, sed, quantum est de +se, ad infinita individua se extendit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q86_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A3-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 3. Whether our intellect can know contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects + of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32103] Iª q. 86 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit cognoscitivus +contingentium. Quia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., intellectus et +sapientia et scientia non sunt contingentium, sed +necessariorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts + from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime + not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32104] Iª q. 86 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +dicitur in IV Physic., <i>ea quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non +sunt, tempore mensurantur</i>. Intellectus autem a tempore +abstrahit, sicut et ab aliis conditionibus materiae. Cum igitur +proprium contingentium sit quandoque esse et quandoque non esse, +videtur quod contingentia non cognoscantur ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of + which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated + and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32105] Iª q. 86 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnis +scientia est in intellectu. Sed quaedam scientiae sunt de +contingentibus; sicut scientiae morales, quae sunt de actibus +humanis subiectis libero arbitrio; et etiam scientiae naturales, +quantum ad partem quae tractat de generabilibus et corruptibilibus. +Ergo intellectus est cognoscitivus contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since + every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation + of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, + for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; + whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is + the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover + it was laid down above + <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is the singular, which + in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have + said above + <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal + and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science + in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some + sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 co."><a name="32106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32106] Iª q. 86 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod contingentia dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, +secundum quod contingentia sunt. Alio modo, secundum quod in eis +aliquid necessitatis invenitur, nihil enim est adeo contingens, +quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. Sicut hoc ipsum quod est +Socratem currere, in se quidem contingens est; sed habitudo cursus +ad motum est necessaria, necessarium enim est Socratem moveri, si +currit. Est autem unumquodque contingens ex parte materiae, quia +contingens est quod potest esse et non esse; potentia autem +pertinet ad materiam. Necessitas autem consequitur rationem formae, +quia ea quae consequuntur ad formam, ex necessitate insunt. Materia +autem est individuationis principium, ratio autem universalis +accipitur secundum abstractionem formae a materia particulari. +Dictum autem est supra quod per se et directe intellectus est +universalium; sensus autem singularium, quorum etiam indirecte +quodammodo est intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur +contingentia, prout sunt contingentia, cognoscuntur directe quidem +sensu, indirecte autem ab intellectu, rationes autem universales et +necessariae contingentium cognoscuntur per intellectum. Unde si +attendantur rationes universales scibilium, omnes scientiae sunt de +necessariis. Si autem attendantur ipsae res, sic quaedam scientia +est de necessariis, quaedam vero de contingentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p6"> From which the replies to the objections are clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="32107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32107] Iª q. 86 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q86_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A4-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 4. Whether our intellect can know the future?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from + the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32108] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat futura. +Intellectus enim noster cognoscit per species intelligibiles, quae +abstrahunt ab hic et nunc, et ita se habent indifferenter ad omne +tempus. Sed potest cognoscere praesentia. Ergo potest cognoscere +futura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect + is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32109] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, homo +quando alienatur a sensibus, aliqua futura cognoscere potest; ut +patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Sed quando alienatur a +sensibus, magis viget intellectu. Ergo intellectus, quantum est de +se, est cognoscitivus futurorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by + their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32110] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cognitio intellectiva hominis efficacior est quam cognitio +quaecumque brutorum animalium. Sed quaedam animalia sunt quae +cognoscunt quaedam futura; sicut corniculae frequenter crocitantes +significant pluviam mox futuram. Ergo multo magis intellectus +humanus potest futura cognoscere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q86_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.8.6" target="asv">Eccles. 8:6,7</a>), "There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32111] Iª q. 86 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Eccle. VIII, <i>multa hominis afflictio, qui ignorat +praeterita, et futura nullo potest scire nuntio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above + <a href="#FP_Q86_A3" id="FP_Q86_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by + reflection only, as stated above + <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the + objects of science. + </p><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p7"> Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: + either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which + in the course of events is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said + above when treating of God's knowledge ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A13" id="FP_Q86_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[13]</a>). But forasmuch as it exists + in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with + its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. + If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more + or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 co."><a name="32112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32112] Iª q. 86 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod de cognitione futurorum eodem modo distinguendum est, sicut de +cognitione contingentium. Nam ipsa futura ut sub tempore cadunt, +sunt singularia, quae intellectus humanus non cognoscit nisi per +reflexionem, ut supra dictum est. Rationes autem futurorum possunt +esse universales, et intellectu perceptibiles, et de eis etiam +possunt esse scientiae. Ut tamen communiter de cognitione futurorum +loquamur, sciendum est quod futura dupliciter cognosci possunt, uno +modo, in seipsis; alio modo, in suis causis. In seipsis quidem +futura cognosci non possunt nisi a Deo; cui etiam sunt praesentia +dum in cursu rerum sunt futura, inquantum eius aeternus intuitus +simul fertur supra totum temporis cursum, ut supra dictum est cum +de Dei scientia ageretur. Sed prout sunt in suis causis, cognosci +possunt etiam a nobis. Et si quidem in suis causis sint ut ex +quibus ex necessitate proveniant, cognoscuntur per certitudinem +scientiae; sicut astrologus praecognoscit eclipsim futuram. Si +autem sic sint in suis causis ut ab eis proveniant ut in pluribus, +sic cognosci possunt per quandam coniecturam vel magis vel minus +certam, secundum quod causae sunt vel magis vel minus inclinatae ad +effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, + according to the order of the effects to the cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32113] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de cognitione quae fit per +rationes universales causarum, ex quibus futura cognosci possunt +secundum modum ordinis effectus ad causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii. 13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very + nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares + in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by + participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul + by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and + hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future. + </p><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p10"> But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it + is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the future by the impression + of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through + the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the + influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q57_A3" id="FP_Q86_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[3]</a>). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, + as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may also come from superior corporeal + causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence + of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to + be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such + events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as + stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii.], "impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, + when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, + and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32114] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII Confess., anima habet +quandam vim sortis, ut ex sui natura possit futura cognoscere, et +ideo quando retrahitur a corporeis sensibus, et quodammodo +revertitur ad seipsam, fit particeps notitiae futurorum. Et haec +quidem opinio rationabilis esset, si poneremus quod anima acciperet +cognitionem rerum secundum participationem idearum, sicut Platonici +posuerunt, quia sic anima ex sui natura cognosceret universales +causas omnium effectuum, sed impeditur per corpus; unde quando a +corporis sensibus abstrahitur, futura cognoscit. Sed quia iste +modus cognoscendi non est connaturalis intellectui nostro, sed +magis ut cognitionem a sensibus accipiat; ideo non est secundum +naturam animae quod futura cognoscat cum a sensibus alienatur; sed +magis per impressionem aliquarum causarum superiorum spiritualium +et corporalium. Spiritualium quidem, sicut cum virtute divina +ministerio Angelorum intellectus humanus illuminatur, et +phantasmata ordinantur ad futura aliqua cognoscenda; vel etiam cum +per operationem Daemonum fit aliqua commotio in phantasia ad +praesignandum aliqua futura quae Daemones cognoscunt, ut supra +dictum est. Huiusmodi autem impressiones spiritualium causarum +magis nata est anima humana suscipere cum a sensibus alienatur, +quia per hoc propinquior fit substantiis spiritualibus, et magis +libera ab exterioribus inquietudinibus. Contingit autem et hoc per +impressionem superiorum causarum corporalium. Manifestum est enim +quod corpora superiora imprimunt in corpora inferiora. Unde cum +vires sensitivae sint actus corporalium organorum, consequens est +quod ex impressione caelestium corporum immutetur quodammodo +phantasia. Unde cum caelestia corpora sint causa multorum +futurorum, fiunt in imaginatione aliqua signa quorundam futurorum. +Haec autem signa magis percipiuntur in nocte et a dormientibus, +quam de die et a vigilantibus, quia, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. +et Vigil., <i>quae deferuntur de die, dissolvuntur magis; plus est +enim sine turbatione aer noctis, eo quod silentiores sunt noctes. +Et in corpore faciunt sensum propter somnum, quia parvi motus +interiores magis sentiuntur a dormientibus quam a vigilantibus. Hi +vero motus faciunt phantasmata, ex quibus praevidentur +futura</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination + follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain + and the like, may be known rather from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), + that "some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is + not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to + bear on it." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32115] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod animalia bruta non habent aliquid supra phantasiam +quod ordinet phantasmata, sicut habent homines rationem; et ideo +phantasia brutorum animalium totaliter sequitur impressionem +caelestem. Et ideo ex motibus huiusmodi animalium magis possunt +cognosci quaedam futura, ut pluvia et huiusmodi, quam ex motibus +hominum, qui moventur per consilium rationis. Unde philosophus +dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod <i>quidam imprudentissimi +sunt maxime praevidentes, nam intelligentia horum non est curis +affecta, sed tanquam deserta et vacua ab omnibus, et mota secundum +movens ducitur</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q87" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q87-p0.1">Q. 87. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q87-p2"> We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points + of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q87-p3"><a href="#FP_Q87_A1"> (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p4"><a href="#FP_Q87_A2"> (2) Whether it knows its own habits?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p5"><a href="#FP_Q87_A3"> (3) How does the intellect know its own act?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p6"><a href="#FP_Q87_A4"> (4) How does it know the act of the will?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 pr."><a name="32116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32116] +Iª q. 87 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima +intellectiva cognoscat seipsam, et ea quae in se sunt. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cognoscat seipsam per suam +essentiam. Secundo, quomodo cognoscat habitus in se existentes. +Tertio, quomodo intellectus cognoscat proprium actum. Quarto, +quomodo cognoscat actum voluntatis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q87_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A1-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 1. Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the + mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32117] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva seipsam cognoscat per +suam essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., quod <i>mens +seipsam novit per seipsam, quoniam est incorporea</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its + own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32118] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Angelus et anima humana conveniunt in genere intellectualis +substantiae. Sed Angelus intelligit seipsum per essentiam suam. +Ergo et anima humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human + mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q87_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself + by its own essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32119] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, in +his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod +intelligitur</i>, ut dicitur III de anima. Sed mens humana est sine +materia, non enim est actus corporis alicuius, ut supra dictum est. +Ergo in mente humana est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur. +Ergo intelligit se per essentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But + it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its + own essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32120] Iª q. 87 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>intellectus intelligit +seipsum sicut et alia</i>. Sed alia non intelligit per essentias +eorum, sed per eorum similitudines. Ergo neque se intelligit per +essentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q87_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a + thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible + things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, + so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it + does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances + are intelligible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence. + </p><p id="FP_Q87_A1-p7"> Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence + God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible + things as "act," but not as a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed + by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot + understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human + intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards + sensible beings; and hence it is called "possible" [*Possibilis---elsewhere in this translation rendered "passive"---Ed.]. + Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but + not to be + understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings existed above + the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that + the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual + by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But + as + in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light + of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates + the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This + happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul + because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind + from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know + the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains + the types of all things as above stated ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A5" id="FP_Q87_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[5]</a>). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, + not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is, however, a difference between + these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind + itself being the principle of action whereby it + perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the + mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant + of the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let + the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"---i.e. to know how it differs + from other things; which is to know its essence and nature. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 co."><a name="32121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32121] Iª q. 87 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non +secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., sic enim +aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub cognitione cadit, prout actu +est. Et hoc quidem manifeste apparet in rebus sensibilibus, non +enim visus percipit coloratum in potentia, sed solum coloratum in +actu. Et similiter intellectus manifestum est quod, inquantum est +cognoscitivus rerum materialium, non cognoscit nisi quod est actu, +et inde est quod non cognoscit materiam primam nisi secundum +proportionem ad formam, ut dicitur in I Physic. Unde et in +substantiis immaterialibus, secundum quod unaquaeque earum se habet +ad hoc quod sit in actu per essentiam suam, ita se habet ad hoc +quod sit per suam essentiam intelligibilis. Essentia igitur Dei, +quae est actus purus et perfectus, est simpliciter et perfecte +secundum seipsam intelligibilis. Unde Deus per suam essentiam non +solum seipsum, sed etiam omnia intelligit. Angeli autem essentia +est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus, non tamen ut actus +purus neque completus. Unde eius intelligere non completur per +essentiam suam, etsi enim per essentiam suam se intelligat Angelus, +tamen non omnia potest per essentiam suam cognoscere, sed cognoscit +alia a se per eorum similitudines. Intellectus autem humanus se +habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, +sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium, unde +possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus, se +habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde ex seipso habet virtutem ut +intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit +actu. Sic enim etiam Platonici posuerunt ordinem entium +intelligibilium supra ordinem intellectuum, quia intellectus non +intelligit nisi per participationem intelligibilis; participans +autem est infra participatum, secundum eos. Si igitur intellectus +humanus fieret actu per participationem formarum intelligibilium +separatarum, ut Platonici posuerunt per huiusmodi participationem +rerum incorporearum intellectus humanus seipsum intelligeret. Sed +quia connaturale est intellectui nostro, secundum statum praesentis +vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra +dictum est; consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus +noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus +abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum +intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non +ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit +intellectus noster. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, +particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere +animam intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio +modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu +intellectus consideramus. Sed verum est quod iudicium et efficacia +huius cognitionis per quam naturam animae cognoscimus, competit +nobis secundum derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate +divina, in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur, sicut supra +dictum est. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in IX de Trin., <i>intuemur +inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, +definimus non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis +esse sempiternis rationibus debeat</i>. Est autem differentia inter +has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam, +sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo +mens percipit seipsam. Et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam +praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam, non +sufficit eius praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis +inquisitio. Unde et multi naturam animae ignorant, et multi etiam +circa naturam animae erraverunt. Propter quod Augustinus dicit, X +de Trin., de tali inquisitione mentis, <i>non velut absentem se +quaerat mens cernere; sed praesentem quaerat discernere</i>, idest +cognoscere differentiam suam ab aliis rebus, quod est cognoscere +quidditatem et naturam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own + act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident + in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or + because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, + whereas substance is visible by its accident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32122] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod mens seipsam per seipsam novit, quia tandem in sui +ipsius cognitionem pervenit, licet per suum actum, ipsa enim est +quae cognoscitur, quia ipsa seipsam amat, ut ibidem subditur. +Potest enim aliquid dici per se notum dupliciter, vel quia per +nihil aliud in eius notitiam devenitur, sicut dicuntur prima +principia per se nota; vel quia non sunt cognoscibilia per +accidens, sicut color est per se visibilis, substantia autem per +accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. + Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality + to intelligible things---as is the passive intellect---or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms---as + is the active intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32123] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod essentia Angeli est sicut actus in genere +intelligibilium, et ideo se habet et ut intellectus, et ut +intellectum. Unde Angelus suam essentiam per seipsum apprehendit. +Non autem intellectus humanus, qui vel est omnino in potentia +respectu intelligibilium, sicut intellectus possibilis; vel est +actus intelligibilium quae abstrahuntur a phantasmatibus, sicut +intellectus agens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, + by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood + in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, + which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself + understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter the intellect and what is understood + are the same," is equal to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the + same." For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of + some things are immaterial---as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas + there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator + says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in + their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32124] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi universaliter verum est in +omni intellectu. Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile, propter +similitudinem sensibilis, quae est forma sensus in actu; ita +intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, propter similitudinem +rei intellectae, quae est forma intellectus in actu. Et ideo +intellectus humanus, qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, +per eandem speciem intelligitur, sicut per formam suam. Idem autem +est dicere quod in his <i>quae sunt sine materia, idem est +intellectus et quod intelligitur</i>, ac si diceretur quod in his +quae sunt intellecta in actu, idem est intellectus et quod +intelligitur, per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu, quod +est sine materia. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia quorundam +essentiae sunt sine materia, sicut substantiae separatae quas +Angelos dicimus, quarum unaquaeque et est intellecta et est +intelligens, sed quaedam res sunt quarum essentiae non sunt sine +materia, sed solum similitudines ab eis abstractae. Unde et +Commentator dicit, in III de anima, quod propositio inducta non +habet veritatem nisi in substantiis separatis, verificatur enim +quodammodo in eis quod non verificatur in aliis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A2-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 2. Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith + is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but + we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence"; and the same principle applies to the other + habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by + themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32125] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat habitus +animae per essentiam eorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIII de Trin., +<i>non sic videtur fides in corde in quo est, sicut anima alterius +hominis ex motibus corporis videtur; sed eam tenet certissima +scientia, clamatque conscientia</i>. Et eadem ratio est de aliis +habitibus animae. Ergo habitus animae non cognoscuntur per actus, +sed per seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to + be known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the + soul are known by their essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32126] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res +materiales, quae sunt extra animam, cognoscuntur per hoc quod +similitudines earum sunt praesentialiter in anima; et ideo dicuntur +per suas similitudines cognosci. Sed habitus animae praesentialiter +per suam essentiam sunt in anima. Ergo per suam essentiam +cognoscuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things + to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32127] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, +propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis</i>. Sed res aliae +cognoscuntur ab anima propter habitus et species intelligibiles. +Ergo ista magis per seipsa ab anima cognoscuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior + to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32128] Iª q. 87 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +habitus sunt principia actuum, sicut et potentiae. Sed sicut +dicitur II de anima, <i>priores potentiis, secundum rationem, actus +et operationes sunt</i>. Ergo eadem ratione sunt priores habitibus. +Et ita habitus per actus cognoscuntur, sicut et potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said + <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being + of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he + can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit + by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence + causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained + above of the mind + <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 co."><a name="32129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32129] Iª q. 87 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod habitus quodammodo est medium inter potentiam puram et purum +actum. Iam autem dictum est quod nihil cognoscitur nisi secundum +quod est actu. Sic ergo inquantum habitus deficit ab actu perfecto, +deficit ab hoc, ut non sit per seipsum cognoscibilis, sed necesse +est quod per actum suum cognoscatur, sive dum aliquis percipit se +habere habitum, per hoc quod percipit se producere actum proprium +habitus; sive dum aliquis inquirit naturam et rationem habitus, ex +consideratione actus. Et prima quidem cognitio habitus fit per +ipsam praesentiam habitus, quia ex hoc ipso quod est praesens, +actum causat, in quo statim percipitur. Secunda autem cognitio +habitus fit per studiosam inquisitionem, sicut supra dictum est de +mente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior + act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32130] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, etsi fides non cognoscatur per exteriores corporis +motus, percipitur tamen etiam ab eo in quo est, per interiorem +actum cordis. Nullus enim fidem se habere scit, nisi per hoc quod +se credere percipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the + nature of a material thing as stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), but as that by which it understands. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32131] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod habitus sunt praesentes in intellectu nostro, non +sicut obiecta intellectus (quia obiectum intellectus nostri, +secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natura rei materialis, ut +supra dictum est); sed sunt praesentes in intellectu ut quibus +intellectus intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same order, + for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore + life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health + is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than + health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of + two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, + is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects + of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a + disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32132] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum dicitur, <i>propter quod unumquodque, illud +magis</i>, veritatem habet, si intelligatur in his quae sunt unius +ordinis, puta in uno genere causae, puta si dicatur quod sanitas +est propter vitam, sequitur quod vita sit magis desiderabilis. Si +autem accipiantur ea quae sunt diversorum ordinum, non habet +veritatem, ut si dicatur quod sanitas est propter medicinam, non +ideo sequitur quod medicina sit magis desiderabilis, quia sanitas +est in ordine finium, medicina autem in ordine causarum +efficientium. Sic igitur si accipiamus duo, quorum utrumque sit per +se in ordine obiectorum cognitionis; illud propter quod aliud +cognoscitur, erit magis notum, sicut principia conclusionibus. Sed +habitus non est de ordine obiectorum, inquantum est habitus; nec +propter habitum aliqua cognoscuntur sicut propter obiectum +cognitum, sed sicut propter dispositionem vel formam qua cognoscens +cognoscit, et ideo ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A3-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 3. Whether our intellect knows its own act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the + act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32133] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non cognoscat proprium actum. +Illud enim proprie cognoscitur, quod est obiectum cognoscitivae +virtutis. Sed actus differt ab obiecto. Ergo intellectus non +cognoscit suum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and + again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32134] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid cognoscitur, aliquo actu cognoscitur. Si igitur +intellectus cognoscit actum suum, aliquo actu cognoscit illum; et +iterum illum actum alio actu. Erit ergo procedere in infinitum, +quod videtur impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own + act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its + own act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32135] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +se habet sensus ad actum suum, ita et intellectus. Sed sensus +proprius non sentit actum suum, sed hoc pertinet ad sensum +communem, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo neque intellectus +intelligit actum suum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I understand." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32136] Iª q. 87 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>intelligo me +intelligere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: + for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the + perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. + Therefore the first thing understood + of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an + intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, + and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there + is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A1" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], + A[1] + </a>), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between + the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by + one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same + act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which + neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object + is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, + and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is + known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known + before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 co."><a name="32137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32137] Iª q. 87 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod +est actu. Ultima autem perfectio intellectus est eius operatio, non +enim est sicut actio tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio +operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut +perfectio et actus eius, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Hoc igitur est +primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum eius +intelligere. Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se +habent. Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est +ipsum suum intelligere. Et sic in Deo idem est quod intelligat se +intelligere et quod intelligat suam essentiam, quia sua essentia +est suum intelligere. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet +angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere, sicut supra dictum est, +sed tamen primum obiectum sui intelligere est eius essentia. Unde +etsi aliud sit in Angelo, secundum rationem, quod intelligat se +intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam, tamen simul et uno +actu utrumque intelligit, quia hoc quod est intelligere suam +essentiam, est propria perfectio suae essentiae; simul autem et uno +actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Est autem alius +intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec +sui intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid +extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo +cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et +secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per +actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum +intelligere. Et ideo philosophus dicit quod obiecta +praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding + is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, + in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as considered in material things, as + we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), from which it acquires + knowledge of all other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32138] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, scilicet +ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. +Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere. Sed non primo, quia +nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, +est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus +materialibus, ut dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium +aliorum devenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature + of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood + by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it + understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being + thus potentially infinite, as explained above ( + <a href="#FP_Q86_A2" id="FP_Q87_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32139] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ipsum intelligere humanum non est actus et perfectio +naturae intellectae materialis, ut sic possit uno actu intelligi +natura rei materialis et ipsum intelligere, sicut uno actu +intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Unde alius est actus quo +intellectus intelligit lapidem, et alius est actus quo intelligit +se intelligere lapidem, et sic inde. Nec est inconveniens in +intellectu esse infinitum in potentia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, + however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the + common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; + and so there is no comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32140] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensus proprius sentit secundum immutationem +materialis organi a sensibili exteriori. Non est autem possibile +quod aliquid materiale immutet seipsum; sed unum immutatur ab alio. +Et ideo actus sensus proprii percipitur per sensum communem. Sed +intellectus non intelligit per materialem immutationem organi, et +ideo non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A4-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 4. Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it + be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect + are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32141] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non intelligat actum +voluntatis. Nihil enim cognoscitur ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquo +modo praesens in intellectu. Sed actus voluntatis non est praesens +in intellectu, cum sint diversae potentiae. Ergo actus voluntatis +non cognoscitur ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore + the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known + by the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32142] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actus +habet speciem ab obiecto. Sed obiectum voluntatis differt ab +obiecto intellectus. Ergo et actus voluntatis speciem habet +diversam ab obiecto intellectus. Non ergo cognoscitur ab +intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor + by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions + of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect + to known such affections of the soul as the acts of the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32143] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, in libro X Confess., attribuit affectionibus animae +quod cognoscuntur neque per imagines, sicut corpora; <i>neque per +praesentiam, sicut artes, sed per quasdam notiones</i>. Non videtur +autem quod possint esse aliae notiones rerum in anima nisi vel +essentiae rerum cognitarum, vel earum similitudines. Ergo +impossibile videtur quod intellectus cognoscat affectiones animae, +quae sunt actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I will." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32144] Iª q. 87 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>intelligo me velle</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A1" id="FP_Q87_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[1]</a>), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an + inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; + and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is + in the sensible thing sensibly; and + likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its + principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)---that "the will is in the reason." + Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood + by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and + consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 co."><a name="32145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32145] Iª q. 87 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam +inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus +naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem. Inclinatio +autem cuiuslibet rei est in ipsa re per modum eius. Unde inclinatio +naturalis est naturaliter in re naturali; et inclinatio quae est +appetitus sensibilis, est sensibiliter in sentiente; et similiter +inclinatio intelligibilis, quae est actus voluntatis, est +intelligibiliter in intelligente, sicut in principio et in proprio +subiecto. Unde et philosophus hoc modo loquendi utitur in III de +anima, quod voluntas in ratione est. Quod autem intelligibiliter +est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur. +Unde actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et inquantum +aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam +huius actus, et per consequens naturam eius principii, quod est +habitus vel potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for + then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and + since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the + intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32146] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si voluntas et intellectus, +sicut sunt diversae potentiae, ita etiam subiecto differrent, sic +enim quod est in voluntate, esset absens ab intellectu. Nunc autem, +cum utrumque radicetur in una substantia animae, et unum sit +quodammodo principium alterius, consequens est ut quod est in +voluntate, sit etiam quodammodo in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained + in the other, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q82_A4" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>, ad 1; + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A4" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[16], A[4]</a>, ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those + of the intellect can fall under the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32147] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum et verum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis et +intellectus, differunt quidem ratione, verumtamen unum eorum +continetur sub alio, ut supra dictum est, nam verum est quoddam +bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et ideo quae sunt voluntatis +cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus possunt cadere sub +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, + as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine + says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32148] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod affectus animae non sunt in intellectu neque per +similitudinem tantum, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam ut in +subiecto, sicut artes; sed sicut principiatum in principio, in quo +habetur notio principiati. Et ideo Augustinus dicit affectus animae +esse in memoria per quasdam notiones.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q88" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q88-p0.1">Q. 88. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q88-p2"> We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are + three points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q88-p3"><a href="#FP_Q88_A1"> (1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?</a></p><p id="FP_Q88-p4"><a href="#FP_Q88_A2"> (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q88-p5"><a href="#FP_Q88_A3"> (3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 pr."><a name="32149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32149] +Iª q. 88 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima +humana cognoscat ea quae supra se sunt, scilicet immateriales +substantias. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum anima +humana, secundum statum praesentis vitae, possit intelligere +substantias immateriales quas Angelos dicimus, per seipsas. +Secundo, utrum possit ad earum notitiam pervenire per cognitionem +rerum materialium. Tertio, utrum Deus sit id quod primo a nobis +cognoscitur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q88_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A1-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 1. Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine + (De Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so + it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things." But these are the immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind + understands immaterial substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32150] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana, secundum statum vitae +praesentis, possit intelligere substantias immateriales per +seipsas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., <i>mens ipsa, sicut +corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic +incorporearum rerum per semetipsam</i>. Huiusmodi autem sunt +substantiae immateriales. Ergo mens substantias immateriales +intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature + is immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q88_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able to understand immaterial things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32151] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +simile simili cognoscitur. Sed magis assimilatur mens humana rebus +immaterialibus quam materialibus, cum ipsa mens sit immaterialis, +ut ex supradictis patet. Cum ergo mens nostra intelligat res +materiales, multo magis intelligit res immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted + by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De + Anima iii, 4. Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. + As material things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them + actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves + whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32152] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +ea quae sunt secundum se maxime sensibilia, non maxime sentiantur a +nobis, provenit ex hoc quod excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt +sensum. Sed excellentiae intelligibilium non corrumpunt +intellectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo ea quae sunt secundum +se maxime intelligibilia, sunt etiam maxime intelligibilia nobis. +Sed cum res materiales non sint intelligibiles nisi quia facimus +eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo a materia; manifestum est quod +magis sint secundum se intelligibiles substantiae quae secundum +suam naturam sunt immateriales. Ergo multo magis intelliguntur a +nobis quam res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature would be frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract + substances, "because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be understood at all." But in nature + nothing is idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32153] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Commentator dicit, in II Metaphys., quod si substantiae abstractae +non possent intelligi a nobis, <i>tunc natura otiose egisset, quia +fecit illud quod est naturaliter in se intellectum, non intellectum +ab aliquo</i>. Sed nihil est otiosum sive frustra in natura. Ergo +substantiae immateriales possunt intelligi a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether + superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances, + even the superior and immaterial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32154] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad +intelligibilia. Sed visus noster potest videre omnia corpora, sive +sint superiora et incorruptibilia, sive sint inferiora et +corruptibilia. Ergo intellectus noster potest intelligere omnes +substantias intelligibiles, et superiores et immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.16" target="asv">Wis. 9:16</a>): "The things that are in heaven, who shall search out?" But these substances are said to be in heaven, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv"> Mat. 18:10, </a> "Their angels in heaven," etc. Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32155] Iª q. 88 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Sap. IX, <i>quae in caelis sunt, quis +investigabit?</i> In caelis autem dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae +esse; secundum illud Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in caelis</i> et +cetera. Ergo non possunt substantiae immateriales per +investigationem humanam cognosci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of + all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called "Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, + and thus first and "per se" understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy + and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more + clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things. + </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p9"> But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship + to the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above + ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q88_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and "per + se" be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience + proves us to have. + </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p10"> Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge + of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which he calls the "active intellect," and which, + being a separate substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is perfectly united to us + so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate + substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can understand material things. + Now he said that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of both the active intellect + and intelligible objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that the active + intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to + matter. For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as + cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active + intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now + a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible + synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and + the active intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the nearer do we come to the + point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the intelligible + objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and + immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter + whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active + intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand separate + substances (because according to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by means of the active + intellect. + </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p11"> This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we could not + formally understand by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form and act, since + every agent acts according to its actuality, as was said of the passive intellect ( + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q70_A1" id="FP_Q88_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[70], A[1]</a>). Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a + separate substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated in things understood; + and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; just + as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its + light only is united to us, that we may see the colors. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above + explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard + to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects together do not + equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand + all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the active intellect + to be + so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances. + </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p12"> Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things: + and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that + happiness is a "kind of common good, communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is unreasonable that only the few + of any species attain to the end of the species. + </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p13"> Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and + after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge + of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he had named as the + chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge + of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united to the active intellect as some imagined. + </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p14"> Sixthly, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q88_A1-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>), the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects + to which the passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is "all + things potentially," and the active intellect is "all things in act." Therefore both intellects, according to the present + state of life, extend to material things only, + which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present + state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 co."><a name="32156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32156] Iª q. 88 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod secundum opinionem Platonis, substantiae immateriales non +solum a nobis intelliguntur, sed etiam sunt prima a nobis +intellecta. Posuit enim Plato formas immateriales subsistentes, +quas ideas vocabat, esse propria obiecta nostri intellectus, et ita +primo et per se intelliguntur a nobis. Applicatur tamen animae +cognitio rebus materialibus, secundum quod intellectui permiscetur +phantasia et sensus. Unde quanto magis intellectus fuerit +depuratus, tanto magis percipit immaterialium intelligibilem +veritatem. Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam, quam magis +experimur, intellectus noster, secundum statum praesentis vitae, +naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium; unde nihil +intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut ex dictis patet. +Et sic manifestum est quod substantias immateriales, quae sub sensu +et imaginatione non cadunt, primo et per se, secundum modum +cognitionis nobis expertum, intelligere non possumus. Sed tamen +Averroes, in Comment. tertii de anima, ponit quod in fine in hac +vita homo pervenire potest ad hoc quod intelligat substantias +separatas, per continuationem vel unionem cuiusdam substantiae +separatae nobis, quam vocat intellectum agentem, qui quidem, cum +sit substantia separata, naturaliter substantias separatas +intelligit. Unde cum fuerit nobis perfecte unitus, sic ut per eum +perfecte intelligere possimus, intelligemus et nos substantias +separatas; sicut nunc per intellectum possibilem nobis unitum +intelligimus res materiales. Ponit autem intellectum agentem sic +nobis uniri. Cum enim nos intelligamus per intellectum agentem et +per intelligibilia speculata, ut patet cum conclusiones +intelligimus per principia intellecta; necesse est quod intellectus +agens comparetur ad intellecta speculata vel sicut agens principale +ad instrumenta, vel sicut forma ad materiam. His enim duobus modis +attribuitur actio aliqua duobus principiis, principali quidem +agenti et instrumento, sicut sectio artifici et serrae; formae +autem et subiecto, sicut calefactio calori et igni. Sed utroque +modo intellectus agens comparabitur ad intelligibilia speculata +sicut perfectio ad perfectibile, et actus ad potentiam. Simul autem +recipitur in aliquo perfectum et perfectio; sicut visibile in actu +et lumen in pupilla. Simul igitur in intellectu possibili +recipiuntur intellecta speculata et intellectus agens. Et quanto +plura intellecta speculata recipimus, tanto magis appropinquamus ad +hoc quod intellectus agens perfecte uniatur nobis. Ita quod cum +omnia intellecta speculata cognoverimus, intellectus agens perfecte +unietur nobis; et poterimus per eum omnia cognoscere materialia et +immaterialia. Et in hoc ponit ultimam hominis felicitatem. Nec +refert, quantum ad propositum pertinet, utrum in illo statu +felicitatis intellectus possibilis intelligat substantias separatas +per intellectum agentem, ut ipse sentit, vel, ut ipse imponit +Alexandro, intellectus possibilis nunquam intelligat substantias +separatas (propter hoc quod ponit intellectum possibilem +corruptibilem), sed homo intelligat substantias separatas per +intellectum agentem. Sed praedicta stare non possunt. Primo quidem +quia, si intellectus agens est substantia separata, impossibile est +quod per ipsam formaliter intelligamus, quia id quo formaliter +agens agit, est forma et actus agentis; cum omne agens agat +inquantum est actu. Sicut etiam supra dictum est circa intellectum +possibilem. Secundo quia, secundum modum praedictum, intellectus +agens, si est substantia separata, non uniretur nobis secundum suam +substantiam; sed solum lumen eius, secundum quod participatur in +intellectis speculatis; et non quantum ad alias actiones +intellectus agentis, ut possimus per hoc intelligere substantias +immateriales. Sicut dum videmus colores illuminatos a sole, non +unitur nobis substantia solis, ut possimus actiones solis agere; +sed solum nobis unitur lumen solis ad visionem colorum. Tertio, +quia dato quod secundum modum praedictum uniretur nobis substantia +intellectus agentis, tamen ipsi non ponunt quod intellectus agens +totaliter uniatur nobis secundum unum intelligibile vel duo, sed +secundum omnia intellecta speculata. Sed omnia intellecta speculata +deficiunt a virtute intellectus agentis, quia multo plus est +intelligere substantias separatas, quam intelligere omnia +materialia. Unde manifestum est quod etiam intellectis omnibus +materialibus, non sic uniretur intellectus agens nobis, ut possemus +intelligere per eum substantias separatas. Quarto, quia intelligere +omnia intellecta materialia vix contingit alicui in hoc mundo; et +sic nullus, vel pauci ad felicitatem pervenirent. Quod est contra +philosophum, in I Ethic., qui dicit quod <i>felicitas est quoddam +bonum commune, quod potest pervenire omnibus non orbatis ad +virtutem</i>. Est etiam contra rationem quod finem alicuius speciei +ut in paucioribus consequantur ea quae continentur sub specie. +Quinto, quia philosophus dicit expresse, in I Ethic., quod +<i>felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam virtutem</i>. Et +enumeratis multis virtutibus, in decimo, concludit quod felicitas +ultima, consistens in cognitione maximorum intelligibilium, est +secundum virtutem sapientiae, quam posuerat in sexto esse caput +scientiarum speculativarum. Unde patet quod Aristoteles posuit +ultimam felicitatem hominis in cognitione substantiarum +separatarum, qualis potest haberi per scientias speculativas, et +non per continuationem intellectus agentis a quibusdam confictam. +Sexto, quia supra ostensum est quod intellectus agens non est +substantia separata, sed virtus quaedam animae, ad eadem active se +extendens, ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilis receptive, +quia, ut dicitur in III de anima, intellectus possibilis est quo +est omnia fieri, intellectus agens quo est omnia facere. Uterque +ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ad +materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, +et recipiuntur in intellectu possibili. Unde secundum statum +praesentis vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, neque per +intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere substantias immateriales +secundum seipsas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This + is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate + substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; + not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32157] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini haberi potest quod +illud quod mens nostra de cognitione incorporalium rerum accipere +potest, per seipsam cognoscere possit. Et hoc adeo verum est, ut +etiam apud philosophos dicatur quod scientia de anima est +principium quoddam ad cognoscendum substantias separatas. Per hoc +enim quod anima nostra cognoscit seipsam, pertingit ad cognitionem +aliquam habendam de substantiis incorporeis, qualem eam contingit +habere, non quod simpliciter et perfecte eas cognoscat, cognoscendo +seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true ---that the soul + needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the + knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of life, is such that it can be informed + with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things + rather than immaterial substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32158] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod similitudo naturae non est ratio sufficiens ad +cognitionem, alioquin oporteret dicere quod Empedocles dixit, quod +anima esset de natura omnium, ad hoc quod omnia cognosceret. Sed +requiritur ad cognoscendum, ut sit similitudo rei cognitae in +cognoscente quasi quaedam forma ipsius. Intellectus autem noster +possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natus informari +similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis, et +ideo cognoscit magis materialia quam substantias immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, + and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not + merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it + is that immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our present + state of life, so that it cannot understand them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32159] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod requiritur aliqua proportio obiecti ad potentiam +cognoscitivam, ut activi ad passivum, et perfectionis ad +perfectibile. Unde quod excellentia sensibilia non capiantur a +sensu, non sola ratio est quia corrumpunt organa sensibilia; sed +etiam quia sunt improportionata potentiis sensitivis. Et hoc modo +substantiae immateriales sunt improportionatae intellectui nostro, +secundum praesentem statum, ut non possint ab eo intelligi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it + does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another. + </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p19"> Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails + to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood + by us at all. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32160] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa ratio Commentatoris multipliciter deficit. Primo +quidem, quia non sequitur quod, si substantiae separatae non +intelliguntur a nobis, non intelligantur ab aliquo intellectu, +intelliguntur enim a seipsis, et a se invicem. Secundo, quia non +est finis substantiarum separatarum ut intelligantur a nobis. Illud +autem otiose et frustra esse dicitur, quod non consequitur finem ad +quem est. Et sic non sequitur substantias immateriales esse +frustra, etiam si nullo modo intelligerentur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do + not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way. The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which + is impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32161] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod eodem modo sensus cognoscit et superiora et inferiora +corpora, scilicet per immutationem organi a sensibili. Non autem +eodem modo intelliguntur a nobis substantiae materiales, quae +intelliguntur per modum abstractionis; et substantiae immateriales, +quae non possunt sic a nobis intelligi, quia non sunt earum aliqua +phantasmata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q88_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A2-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 2. Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says + (Coel. Hier. i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it + is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature." Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial + substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32162] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster per cognitionem rerum +materialium possit pervenire ad intelligendum substantias +immateriales. Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>non +est possibile humanae menti ad immaterialem illam sursum excitari +caelestium hierarchiarum contemplationem, nisi secundum se +materiali manuductione utatur</i>. Relinquitur ergo quod per +materialia manuduci possumus ad intelligendum substantias +immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene + defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial + substances can be understood by us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32163] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia est in intellectu. Sed scientiae et definitiones sunt de +substantiis immaterialibus, definit enim Damascenus Angelum; et de +Angelis aliqua documenta traduntur tam in theologicis quam in +philosophicis disciplinis. Ergo substantiae immateriales intelligi +possunt a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by + which it understands material things. Therefore also other material substances can be understood by us, through their material + effects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32164] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima +humana est de genere substantiarum immaterialium. Sed ipsa +intelligi potest a nobis per actum suum, quo intelligit materialia. +Ergo et aliae substantiae immateriales intelligi possunt a nobis +per suos effectus in rebus materialibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and + this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32165] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illa +sola causa per suos effectus comprehendi non potest, quae in +infinitum distat a suis effectibus. Hoc autem solius Dei est +proprium. Ergo aliae substantiae immateriales creatae intelligi +possunt a nobis per res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things + through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32166] Iª q. 88 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius dicit, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>sensibilibus +intelligibilia, et compositis simplicia, et corporalibus +incorporalia apprehendi non possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher named Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught that by + the understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial + substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything material + residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and + as the process of abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without + matter; and this would be the understanding of immaterial substance. + </p><p id="FP_Q88_A2-p8"> Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms and species of these material things; as the Platonists + supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material things, + it follows that however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, it could never arrive at + anything akin to immaterial substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances + through material substances. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 co."><a name="32167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32167] Iª q. 88 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut Averroes narrat in III de anima, quidam Avempace +nomine, posuit quod per intellectum substantiarum materialium +pervenire possumus, secundum vera philosophiae principia, ad +intelligendum substantias immateriales. Cum enim intellectus noster +natus sit abstrahere quidditatem rei materialis a materia, si +iterum in illa quidditate sit aliquid materiae, poterit iterato +abstrahere, et cum hoc in infinitum non procedat, tandem pervenire +poterit ad intelligendum aliquam quidditatem quae sit omnino sine +materia. Et hoc est intelligere substantiam immaterialem. Quod +quidem efficaciter diceretur, si substantiae immateriales essent +formae et species horum materialium, ut Platonici posuerunt. Hoc +autem non posito, sed supposito quod substantiae immateriales sint +omnino alterius rationis a quidditatibus materialium rerum; +quantumcumque intellectus noster abstrahat quidditatem rei +materialis a materia, nunquam perveniet ad aliquid simile +substantiae immateriali. Et ideo per substantias materiales non +possumus perfecte substantias immateriales intelligere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof; + for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material + things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32168] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ex rebus materialibus ascendere possumus in aliqualem +cognitionem immaterialium rerum, non tamen in perfectam, quia non +est sufficiens comparatio rerum materialium ad immateriales, sed +similitudines si quae a materialibus accipiuntur ad immaterialia +intelligenda, sunt multum dissimiles, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. +Cael. Hier.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies + by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us + in such a way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by + their relation to material things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32169] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod de superioribus rebus in scientiis maxime tractatur +per viam remotionis, sic enim corpora caelestia notificat +Aristoteles per negationem proprietatum inferiorum corporum. Unde +multo magis immateriales substantiae a nobis cognosci non possunt, +ut earum quidditates apprehendamus, sed de eis nobis in scientiis +documenta traduntur per viam remotionis et alicuius habitudinis ad +res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power + and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such act, nor through any + other material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32170] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, +quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et +naturam. Sed neque per hoc, neque per alia quae in rebus +materialibus inveniuntur, perfecte cognosci potest immaterialium +substantiarum virtus et natura, quia huiusmodi non adaequant earum +virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or + in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, + as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural + genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q88_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according + to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32171] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod substantiae immateriales creatae in genere quidem +naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est +in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae, conveniunt tamen cum eis +in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in +praedicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non sit earum esse. +Sed Deus non convenit cum rebus materialibus neque secundum genus +naturale, neque secundum genus logicum, quia Deus nullo modo est in +genere, ut supra dictum est. Unde per similitudines rerum +materialium aliquid affirmative potest cognosci de Angelis secundum +rationem communem, licet non secundum rationem speciei; de Deo +autem nullo modo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q88_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A3-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 3. Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is the first object known by the human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by + which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But + we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De + Vera Relig. xxxi; [*Confess. xii, 25]). Therefore God is the first object known to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32172] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit primum quod a mente humana +cognoscitur. Illud enim in quo omnia alia cognoscuntur, et per quod +de aliis iudicamus, est primo cognitum a nobis; sicut lux ab oculo, +et principia prima ab intellectu. Sed omnia in luce primae +veritatis cognoscimus, et per eam de omnibus iudicamus; ut dicit +Augustinus in libro de Trin., et in libro de vera Relig. Ergo Deus +est id quod primo cognoscitur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light + which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv">Jn. 1:9</a>). Therefore God is our first and most known object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32173] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed Deus est causa omnis +nostrae cognitionis, ipse enim est <i>lux vera, quae illuminat +omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>, ut dicitur Ioan. I. +Ergo Deus est id quod primo et maxime est cognitum nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32174] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod primo cognoscitur in imagine, est exemplar quo imago formatur. +Sed in mente nostra est Dei imago, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo id +quod primo cognoscitur in mente nostra est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man hath seen God at any time" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv">Jn. 1:18</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32175] Iª q. 88 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances + <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first + object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the + things that are made": while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is + the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q85_A8" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[85], A[8]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q87_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[87], A[2]</a>, ad 2) + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 co."><a name="32176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32176] Iª q. 88 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum intellectus humanus, secundum statum praesentis vitae, +non possit intelligere substantias immateriales creatas, ut dictum +est; multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae +increatae. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod Deus non est primum +quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in Dei +cognitionem pervenimus, secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. I, +<i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, +conspiciuntur</i>. Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum +statum praesentis vitae, est quidditas rei materialis, quae est +nostri intellectus obiectum, ut multoties supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural + or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[2]</a>). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much less can it be said that God is the + first object known by our intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32177] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in luce primae veritatis omnia intelligimus et +iudicamus, inquantum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri, sive naturale +sive gratuitum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio veritatis +primae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum ipsum lumen intellectus +nostri non se habeat ad intellectum nostrum sicut quod +intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur; multo minus Deus est id +quod primo a nostro intellectu intelligitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so," must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, + as explained above ( + <a href="#FP_Q81_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>, ad 3). Other things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first + cause of our faculty of knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32178] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod propter quod unumquodque, illud magis, intelligendum +est in his quae sunt unius ordinis, ut supra dictum est. Propter +Deum autem alia cognoscuntur, non sicut propter primum cognitum, +sed sicut propter primam cognoscitivae virtutis causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know + God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32179] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si in anima nostra esset perfecta imago Dei, sicut +filius est perfecta imago patris, statim mens nostra intelligeret +Deum. Est autem imago imperfecta. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q89" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q89-p0.1">Q. 89. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q89-p2"> We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q89-p3"><a href="#FP_Q89_A1"> (1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p4"><a href="#FP_Q89_A2"> (2) Whether it understands separate substances?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p5"><a href="#FP_Q89_A3"> (3) Whether it understands all natural things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p6"><a href="#FP_Q89_A4"> (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p7"><a href="#FP_Q89_A5"> (5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p8"><a href="#FP_Q89_A6"> (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p9"><a href="#FP_Q89_A7"> (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p10"><a href="#FP_Q89_A8"> (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 pr."><a name="32180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32180] +Iª q. 89 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de cognitione +animae separatae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum anima +separata a corpore possit intelligere. Secundo, utrum intelligat +substantias separatas. Tertio, utrum intelligat omnia naturalia. +Quarto, utrum cognoscat singularia. Quinto, utrum habitus scientiae +hic acquisitae remaneat in anima separata. Sexto, utrum possit uti +habitu scientiae hic acquisitae. Septimo, utrum distantia localis +impediat cognitionem animae separatae. Octavo, utrum animae +separatae a corporibus cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to + the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect + when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[1]</a>). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the + body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32189] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata non intelligat substantias +separatas. Perfectior enim est anima corpori coniuncta, quam a +corpore separata, cum anima sit naturaliter pars humanae naturae; +quaelibet autem pars perfectior est in suo toto. Sed anima +coniuncta corpori non intelligit substantias separatas, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo multo minus cum fuerit a corpore separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to + the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an + angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32190] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +quod cognoscitur, vel cognoscitur per sui praesentiam, vel per suam +speciem. Sed substantiae separatae non possunt cognosci ab anima +per suam praesentiam, quia nihil illabitur animae nisi solus Deus. +Neque etiam per aliquas species quas anima ab Angelo abstrahere +possit, quia Angelus simplicior est quam anima. Ergo nullo modo +anima separata potest cognoscere substantias separatas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, + therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; + which cannot be reasonably be said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32191] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidam philosophi posuerunt in cognitione separatarum substantiarum +consistere ultimam hominis felicitatem. Si ergo anima separata +potest intelligere substantias separatas, ex sola sua separatione +consequitur felicitatem. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and + Abraham ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.23" target="asv">Lk. 16:23</a>). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32192] Iª q. 89 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod animae separatae cognoscunt alias animas separatas; sicut +dives in Inferno positus vidit Lazarum et Abraham, Luc. XVI. Ergo +vident etiam et Daemones et Angelos animae separatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"---i.e. by knowing itself + ( + <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[1]</a>, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. + Now it was said above + <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not + understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands + itself through its own act, as shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[87], A[1]</a>). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply + intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands + what is above itself and what is below + itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one + who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of + a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart + from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels + so + far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 co."><a name="32193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32193] Iª q. 89 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in IX de Trin., <i>mens nostra +cognitionem rerum incorporearum per seipsam accipit</i>, idest +cognoscendo seipsam, sicut supra dictum est. Per hoc ergo quod +anima separata cognoscit seipsam, accipere possumus qualiter +cognoscit alias substantias separatas. Dictum est autem quod +quandiu anima corpori est unita, intelligit convertendo se ad +phantasmata. Et ideo nec seipsam potest intelligere nisi inquantum +fit actu intelligens per speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam, sic +enim per actum suum intelligit seipsam, ut supra dictum est. Sed +cum fuerit a corpore separata, intelliget non convertendo se ad +phantasmata, sed ad ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, unde +seipsam per seipsam intelliget. Est autem commune omni substantiae +separatae quod intelligat id quod est supra se, et id quod est +infra se, per modum suae substantiae, sic enim intelligitur aliquid +secundum quod est in intelligente; est autem aliquid in altero per +modum eius in quo est. Modus autem substantiae animae separatae est +infra modum substantiae angelicae, sed est conformis modo aliarum +animarum separatarum. Et ideo de aliis animabus separatis perfectam +cognitionem habet; de Angelis autem imperfectam et deficientem, +loquendo de cognitione naturali animae separatae. De cognitione +autem gloriae est alia ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: + but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence + in the present life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32194] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod anima separata est quidem imperfectior, si +consideretur natura qua communicat cum natura corporis, sed tamen +quodammodo est liberior ad intelligendum, inquantum per gravedinem +et occupationem corporis a puritate intelligentiae impeditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge + of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32195] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod anima separata intelligit Angelos per similitudines +divinitus impressas. Quae tamen deficiunt a perfecta +repraesentatione eorum, propter hoc quod animae natura est inferior +quam Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen + only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness---not final and ultimate + happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32196] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in cognitione substantiarum separatarum non +quarumcumque, consistit ultima hominis felicitas, sed solius Dei, +qui non potest videri nisi per gratiam. In cognitione vero aliarum +substantiarum separatarum est magna felicitas, etsi non ultima, si +tamen perfecte intelligantur. Sed anima separata naturali +cognitione non perfecte eas intelligit, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A3-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 3. Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. + Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32197] Iª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata omnia naturalia cognoscat. +In substantiis enim separatis sunt rationes omnium rerum +naturalium. Sed animae separatae cognoscunt substantias separatas. +Ergo cognoscunt omnia naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But + the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more + can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32198] Iª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, qui +intelligit magis intelligibile, multo magis potest intelligere +minus intelligibile. Sed anima separata intelligit substantias +separatas, quae sunt maxima intelligibilium. Ergo multo magis +potest intelligere omnia naturalia, quae sunt minus +intelligibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn + many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural + things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 1"><a name="32199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32199] Iª q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, in +Daemonibus magis viget naturalis cognitio quam in anima separata. +Sed Daemones non omnia naturalia cognoscunt; sed multa addiscunt +per longi temporis experientiam, ut Isidorus dicit. Ergo neque +animae separatae omnia naturalia cognoscunt.</p><p title="I q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 2"><a name="32200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32200] Iª q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +anima statim cum est separata, omnia naturalia cognosceret, frustra +homines studerent ad rerum scientiam capessendam. Hoc autem est +inconveniens. Non ergo anima separata omnia naturalia +cognoscit.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q89_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, + as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through + such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, + have the same relation + through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. + Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures + of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows + that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused + manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 co."><a name="32201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32201] Iª q. 89 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, anima separata intelligit per species +quas recipit ex influentia divini luminis, sicut et Angeli, sed +tamen, quia natura animae est infra naturam Angeli, cui iste modus +cognoscendi est connaturalis, anima separata per huiusmodi species +non accipit perfectam rerum cognitionem, sed quasi in communi et +confusam. Sicut igitur se habent Angeli ad perfectam cognitionem +rerum naturalium per huiusmodi species, ita animae separatae ad +imperfectam et confusam. Angeli autem per huiusmodi species +cognoscunt cognitione perfecta omnia naturalia, quia omnia quae +Deus fecit in propriis naturis, fecit in intelligentia angelica, ut +dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt. Unde et animae separatae de +omnibus naturalibus cognitionem habent, non certam et propriam, sed +communem et confusam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q89_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[87], A[1]</a>). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32202] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod nec ipse Angelus per suam substantiam cognoscit omnia +naturalia, sed per species quasdam, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo +non propter hoc sequitur quod anima cognoscat omnia naturalia, quia +cognoscit quoquo modo substantiam separatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural + things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32203] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut anima separata non perfecte intelligit +substantias separatas ita nec omnia naturalia perfecte cognoscit, +sed sub quadam confusione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as + future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural + things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32204] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Isidorus loquitur de cognitione futurorum; quae nec +Angeli nec Daemones nec animae separatae cognoscunt, nisi vel in +suis causis, vel per revelationem divinam. Nos autem loquimur de +cognitione naturalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow + that to study in order to learn is useless. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32205] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod cognitio quae acquiritur hic per studium, est propria +et perfecta; illa autem est confusa. Unde non sequitur quod studium +addiscendi sit frustra.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A4-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 4. Whether the separated soul knows singulars?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the + separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q77_A8" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[8]</a>). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown ( + <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32206] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata non cognoscat singularia. +Nulla enim potentia cognoscitiva remanet in anima separata nisi +intellectus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed intellectus non est +cognoscitivus singularium, ut supra habitum est. Ergo anima +separata singularia non cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no + determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32207] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magis +est determinata cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquid in singulari, quam +illa qua cognoscitur aliquid in universali. Sed anima separata non +habet determinatam cognitionem de speciebus rerum naturalium. Multo +igitur minus cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know + all singulars. Therefore it knows none. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32208] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +cognoscit singularia, et non per sensum, pari ratione omnia +singularia cognosceret. Sed non cognoscit omnia singularia. Ergo +nulla cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.28" target="asv">Lk. 16:28</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32209] Iª q. 89 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dives in Inferno positus dixit, habeo quinque fratres, ut +habetur Luc. XVI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that + there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be + directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for + the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal + and individual principles ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine + Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels + have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas + separated have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know + not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these + species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or + by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned + according to the mode of the recipient. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 co."><a name="32210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32210] Iª q. 89 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod animae separatae aliqua singularia cognoscunt, sed non omnia, +etiam quae sunt praesentia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est +quod duplex est modus intelligendi. Unus per abstractionem a +phantasmatibus, et secundum istum modum singularia per intellectum +cognosci non possunt directe, sed indirecte, sicut supra dictum +est. Alius modus intelligendi est per influentiam specierum a Deo, +et per istum modum intellectus potest singularia cognoscere. Sicut +enim ipse Deus per suam essentiam, inquantum est causa universalium +et individualium principiorum, cognoscit omnia et universalia et +singularia, ut supra dictum est; ita substantiae separatae per +species, quae sunt quaedam participatae similitudines illius +divinae essentiae, possunt singularia cognoscere. In hoc tamen est +differentia inter Angelos et animas separatas, quia Angeli per +huiusmodi species habent perfectam et propriam cognitionem de +rebus, animae vero separatae confusam. Unde Angeli, propter +efficaciam sui intellectus per huiusmodi species non solum naturas +rerum in speciali cognoscere possunt, sed etiam singularia sub +speciebus contenta. Animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere +per huiusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae quodammodo +determinantur, vel per praecedentem cognitionem, vel per aliquam +affectionem, vel per naturalem habitudinem, vel per divinam +ordinationem, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, determinatur in +eo secundum modum recipientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained + above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32211] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod intellectus per viam abstractionis non est +cognoscitivus singularium. Sic autem anima separata non intelligit, +sed sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate + relation, as we have said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32212] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ad illarum rerum species vel individua cognitio +animae separatae determinatur, ad quae anima separata habet aliquam +determinatam habitudinem, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore + there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32213] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima separata non se habet aequaliter ad omnia +singularia, sed ad quaedam habet aliquam habitudinem quam non habet +ad alia. Et ideo non est aequalis ratio ut omnia singularia +cognoscat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A5-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 5. Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for + the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32214] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae non +remaneat in anima separata. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, +scientia destruetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of + knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel + some who are better; which seems unreasonable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32215] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidam minus boni in hoc mundo scientia pollent, aliis magis bonis +carentibus scientia. Si ergo habitus scientiae permaneret etiam +post mortem in anima, sequeretur quod aliqui minus boni etiam in +futuro statu essent potiores aliquibus magis bonis. Quod videtur +inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here + acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject + which cannot be. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32216] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +animae separatae habebunt scientiam per influentiam divini luminis. +Si igitur scientia hic acquisita in anima separata remaneat, +sequetur quod duae erunt formae unius speciei in eodem subiecto. +Quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that "a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed + by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge + is destroyed by death. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32217] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in libro Praedicament., quod <i>habitus est +qualitas difficile mobilis; sed ab aegritudine, vel ab aliquo +huiusmodi, quandoque corrumpitur scientia</i>. Sed nulla est ita +fortis immutatio in hac vita, sicut immutatio quae est per mortem. +Ergo videtur quod habitus scientiae per mortem corrumpatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32218] Iª q. 89 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinum, <i>discamus in +terris, quorum scientia nobis perseveret in caelo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, + cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it + would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed. + </p><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p8"> But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), + the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can + be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" + (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the + mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a + certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding + the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides + chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same + distinction is to be applied to habit. + </p><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p9"> Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the + sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De + Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by + cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not + corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q89_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary + to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety may exist in + the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in + statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces + anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge + is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false + argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as + it + is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 co."><a name="32219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32219] Iª q. 89 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam posuerunt habitum scientiae non esse in ipso +intellectu, sed in viribus sensitivis, scilicet imaginativa, +cogitativa et memorativa; et quod species intelligibiles non +conservantur in intellectu possibili. Et si haec opinio vera esset, +sequeretur quod, destructo corpore, totaliter habitus scientiae hic +acquisitae destrueretur. Sed quia scientia est in intellectu, qui +est locus specierum, ut dicitur in III de anima; oportet quod +habitus scientiae hic acquisitae partim sit in praedictis viribus +sensitivis, et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari +ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiae acquiritur, nam +<i>habitus sunt similes actibus ex quibus acquiruntur</i>, ut +dicitur in II Ethic. Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in praesenti +vita scientia acquiritur, sunt per conversionem intellectus ad +phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per +tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas +quaedam ad considerandum per species susceptas; et in praedictis +inferioribus viribus acquiritur quaedam habilitas ut facilius per +conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari. +Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est +in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in +inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu. Quantum +ergo ad id quod aliquis praesentis scientiae habet in inferioribus +viribus, non remanebit in anima separata, sed quantum ad id quod +habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat. Quia, ut dicitur +in libro de longitudine et brevitate vitae, dupliciter corrumpitur +aliqua forma, uno modo, per se, quando corrumpitur a suo contrario, +ut calidum a frigido; alio modo, per accidens, scilicet per +corruptionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem quod per corruptionem +subiecti, scientia quae est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non +potest, cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis, ut supra ostensum est. +Similiter etiam nec per contrarium corrumpi possunt species +intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili, quia intentioni +intelligibili nihil est contrarium; et praecipue quantum ad +simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est. Sed +quantum ad operationem qua intellectus componit et dividit, vel +etiam ratiocinatur, sic invenitur contrarietas in intellectu, +secundum quod falsum in propositione vel in argumentatione est +contrarium vero. Et hoc modo interdum scientia corrumpitur per +contrarium, dum scilicet aliquis per falsam argumentationem +abducitur a scientia veritatis. Et ideo philosophus, in libro +praedicto, ponit duos modos quibus scientia per se corrumpitur, +scilicet oblivionem, ex parte memorativae, et deceptionem, ex parte +argumentationis falsae. Sed hoc non habet locum in anima separata. +Unde dicendum est quod habitus scientiae, secundum quod est in +intellectu manet in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion + quoted, "Now, I know in part." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32220] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de scientia quantum ad +habitum, sed quantum ad cognitionis actum. Unde ad huius +probationem inducit, nunc cognosco ex parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the + future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed + by the better man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32221] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut secundum staturam corporis aliquis minus bonus +erit maior aliquo magis bono; ita nihil prohibet aliquem minus +bonum habere aliquem scientiae habitum in futuro, quem non habet +aliquis magis bonus. Sed tamen hoc quasi nullius momenti est in +comparatione ad alias praerogativas quas meliores habebunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32222] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod utraque scientia non est unius rationis. Unde nullum +inconveniens sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32223] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de corruptione scientiae quantum +ad id quod habet ex parte sensitivarum virium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A6-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 6. Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De + Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known + is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32224] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod actus scientiae hic acquisitae non maneat +in anima separata. Dicit enim philosophus, in I de anima, quod +corrupto corpore, anima neque reminiscitur neque amat. Sed +considerare ea quae prius aliquis novit, est reminisci. Ergo anima +separata non potest habere actum scientiae quam hic acquisivit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. + But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q89_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this + life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32225] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +species intelligibiles non erunt potentiores in anima separata quam +sint in anima corpori unita. Sed per species intelligibiles non +possumus modo intelligere, nisi convertendo nos super phantasmata, +sicut supra habitum est. Ergo nec anima separata hoc poterit. Et +ita nullo modo per species intelligibiles hic acquisitas anima +separata intelligere poterit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But + the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other + acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce + any act of knowledge acquired in this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32226] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>habitus similes actus +reddunt actibus per quos acquiruntur</i>. Sed habitus scientiae hic +acquiritur per actus intellectus convertentis se supra phantasmata. +Ergo non potest alios actus reddere. Sed tales actus non competunt +animae separatae. Ergo anima separata non habebit aliquem actum +scientiae hic acquisitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Dives in hell ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>): "Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32227] Iª q. 89 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Luc. XVI, dicitur ad divitem in Inferno positum, <i>recordare +quia recepisti bona in vita tua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Action offers two things for our consideration---its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the + faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered + from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see + it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain + in the separated soul, as stated above + <a href="#FP_Q89_A5" id="FP_Q89_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible + species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different + way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here + acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a + different way. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 co."><a name="32228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32228] Iª q. 89 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum +ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod +actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est +obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis. +Sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis quae +est in oculo, sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva +oculi. Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in anima separata, +sicut dictum est; status autem animae separatae non sit idem sicut +modo est, sequitur quod secundum species intelligibiles hic +acquisitas, anima separata intelligere possit quae prius +intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad +phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae. Et ita +manet quidem in anima separata actus scientiae hic acquisitae, sed +non secundum eundem modum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to + the intellect, as explained above ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q89_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32229] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de reminiscentia, secundum quod +memoria pertinet ad partem sensitivam, non autem secundum quod +memoria est quodammodo in intellectu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32230] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversa +virtute specierum, sed ex diverso statu animae intelligentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just + things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, + Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32231] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes +actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem +quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari iusta, sed non iuste, idest +delectabiliter, causat habitum iustitiae politicae, per quem +delectabiliter operamur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A7-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 7. Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that + "the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here." But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore + local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32232] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod distantia localis impediat cognitionem +animae separatae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de cura pro +mortuis agenda, quod <i>animae mortuorum ibi sunt, ubi ea quae hic +fiunt scire non possunt</i>. Sciunt autem ea quae apud eos aguntur. +Ergo distantia localis impedit cognitionem animae separatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the demon's rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown + to us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, + therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon's. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32233] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de divinatione Daemonum, quod +<i>Daemones, propter celeritatem motus, aliqua nobis ignota +denuntiant</i>. Sed agilitas motus ad hoc nihil faceret, si +distantia localis cognitionem Daemonis non impediret. Multo igitur +magis distantia localis impedit cognitionem animae separatae, quae +est inferior secundum naturam quam Daemon.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated + soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32234] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +distat aliquis secundum locum, ita secundum tempus sed distantia +temporis impedit cognitionem animae separatae, non enim cognoscunt +futura. Ergo videtur quod etiam distantia secundum locum animae +separatae cognitionem impediat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.23" target="asv">Lk. 16:23</a>), that Dives, "lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local distance does not impede + knowledge in the separated soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32235] Iª q. 89 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Luc. XVI, quod <i>dives cum esset in tormentis, +elevans oculos suos, vidit Abraham a longe</i>. Ergo distantia +localis non impedit animae separatae cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be + that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon + the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction + of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which + do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived + from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered + by local distance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 co."><a name="32236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32236] Iª q. 89 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam posuerunt quod anima separata cognosceret singularia +abstrahendo a sensibilibus. Quod si esset verum, posset dici quod +distantia localis impediret animae separatae cognitionem, +requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam separatam, +vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum ad utrumque, +requireretur distantia determinata. Sed praedicta positio est +impossibilis, quia abstractio specierum a sensibilibus fit +mediantibus sensibus et aliis potentiis sensitivis, quae in anima +separata actu non manent. Intelligit autem anima separata +singularia per influxum specierum ex divino lumine, quod quidem +lumen aequaliter se habet ad propinquum et distans. Unde distantia +localis nullo modo impedit animae separatae cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are 'there,' as if impeded by + local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain + <a href="#FP_Q89_A8" id="FP_Q89_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32237] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus non dicit quod propter hoc quod ibi sunt +animae mortuorum, ea quae hic sunt videre non possunt, ut localis +distantia huius ignorantiae causa esse credatur, sed hoc potest +propter aliquid aliud contingere, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive + powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way + of narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32238] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum opinionem illam qua +aliqui posuerunt quod Daemones habent corpora naturaliter sibi +unita, secundum quam positionem, etiam potentias sensitivas habere +possunt, ad quarum cognitionem requiritur determinata distantia. Et +hanc opinionem etiam in eodem libro Augustinus expresse tangit, +licet eam magis recitando quam asserendo tangere videatur, ut patet +per ea quae dicit XXI libro de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as + a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and + is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32239] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod futura, quae distant secundum tempus, non sunt entia +in actu. Unde in seipsis non sunt cognoscibilia, quia sicut deficit +aliquid ab entitate, ita deficit a cognoscibilitate. Sed ea quae +sunt distantia secundum locum, sunt entia in actu, et secundum se +cognoscibilia. Unde non est eadem ratio de distantia locali, et de +distantia temporis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A8-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 8. Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they + have, according to what Dives said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.27" target="asv">Lk. 16:27,28</a>), "I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments." Therefore separated + souls know what passes on earth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32240] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod animae separatae cognoscant ea quae hic +aguntur. Nisi enim ea cognoscerent, de eis curam non haberent. Sed +habent curam de his quae hic aguntur; secundum illud Luc. XVI, +<i>habeo quinque fratres, ut testificetur illis, ne et ipsi veniant +in hunc locum tormentorum</i>. Ergo animae separatae cognoscunt ea +quae hic aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared + to Saul ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.28.11" target="asv">1 Kings 28:11</a>). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32241] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +frequenter mortui vivis apparent, vel dormientibus vel +vigilantibus, et eos admonent de iis quae hic aguntur; sicut Samuel +apparuit Sauli, ut habetur I Reg. XXVIII. Sed hoc non esset si ea +quae hic sunt non cognoscerent. Ergo ea quae hic aguntur +cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it + must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false + <a href="#FP_Q89_A7" id="FP_Q89_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32242] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +animae separatae cognoscunt ea quae apud eas aguntur. Si ergo quae +apud nos aguntur non cognoscerent, impediretur earum cognitio per +localem distantiam. Quod supra negatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.21" target="asv">Job 14:21</a>): "He will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32243] Iª q. 89 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Iob XIV, <i>sive fuerint filii eius nobiles, sive +ignobiles, non intelliget</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q89_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows + from what has been laid down + <a href="#FP_Q89_A4" id="FP_Q89_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous + knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both + by Divine order and by their + mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of + what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the + spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct + in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the souls of + the + dead have no concern in the affairs of the living." + </p><p id="FP_Q89_A8-p7"> Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory + continues the passage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, + we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: "The dead, + even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss quotes on the + text, "Abraham hath not known us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.16" target="asv">Is. 63:16</a>). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; + and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised + to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 22:20</a>). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every one take, as he pleases, + what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed, seems to be + the more probable one---that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the + angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are + most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except + in + accordance with Divine justice. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 co."><a name="32244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32244] Iª q. 89 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, secundum naturalem cognitionem, de qua nunc hic agitur, +animae mortuorum nesciunt quae hic aguntur. Et huius ratio ex +dictis accipi potest. Quia anima separata cognoscit singularia per +hoc quod quodammodo determinata est ad illa, vel per vestigium +alicuius praecedentis cognitionis seu affectionis, vel per +ordinationem divinam. Animae autem mortuorum, secundum ordinationem +divinam, et secundum modum essendi, segregatae sunt a conversatione +viventium, et coniunctae conversationi spiritualium substantiarum +quae sunt a corpore separatae. Unde ea quae apud nos aguntur +ignorant. Et hanc rationem assignat Gregorius in XII Moralium, +dicens, <i>mortui vita in carne viventium post eos, qualiter +disponatur, nesciunt, quia vita spiritus longe est a vita carnis; +et sicut corporea atque incorporea diversa sunt genere, ita sunt +distincta cognitione</i>. Et hoc etiam Augustinus videtur tangere +in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, dicens quod <i>animae +mortuorum rebus viventium non intersunt</i>. Sed quantum ad animas +beatorum, videtur esse differentia inter Gregorium et Augustinum. +Nam Gregorius ibidem subdit, <i>quod tamen de animabus sanctis +sentiendum non est, quia quae intus omnipotentis Dei claritatem +vident, nullo modo credendum est quod sit foris aliquid quod +ignorent</i>. Augustinus vero, in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, +expresse dicit quod <i>nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant +vivi et eorum filii</i>, ut habetur in Glossa, super illud, +<i>Abraham nescivit nos</i>, Isaiae LXIII. Quod quidem confirmat +per hoc quod a matre sua non visitabatur, nec in tristitiis +consolabatur, sicut quando vivebat; nec est probabile ut sit facta +vita feliciore crudelior. Et per hoc quod dominus promisit Iosiae +regi quod prius moreretur ne videret mala quae erant populo +superventura, ut habetur IV Reg. XXII. Sed Augustinus hoc dubitando +dicit, unde praemittit, <i>ut volet, accipiat quisque quod +dicam</i>. Gregorius autem assertive, quod patet per hoc quod +dicit, <i>nullo modo credendum est</i>. Magis tamen videtur, +secundum sententiam Gregorii, quod animae sanctorum Deum videntes, +omnia praesentia quae hic aguntur cognoscant. Sunt enim Angelis +aequales, de quibus etiam Augustinus asserit quod ea quae apud +vivos aguntur non ignorant. Sed quia sanctorum animae sunt +perfectissime iustitiae divinae coniunctae, nec tristantur, nec +rebus viventium se ingerunt, nisi secundum quod iustitiae divinae +dispositio exigit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring + forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known + to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by "the revelation of the + Holy Ghost," as Augustine says in the same book. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32245] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod animae mortuorum possunt habere curam de rebus +viventium, etiam si ignorent eorum statum; sicut nos curam habemus +de mortuis, eis suffragia impendendo, quamvis eorum statum +ignoremus. Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos +cognoscere, sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt; vel +per Angelos seu Daemones; vel etiam spiritu Dei revelante, sicut +Augustinus in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls + of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living---and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur + through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the + living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says + in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.46.23" target="asv"> Ecclus. 46:23, </a> "he slept, and told the king the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, + the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32246] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc quod mortui viventibus apparent qualitercumque, +vel contingit per specialem Dei dispensationem, ut animae mortuorum +rebus viventium intersint, et est inter divina miracula +computandum. Vel huiusmodi apparitiones fiunt per operationes +Angelorum bonorum vel malorum, etiam ignorantibus mortuis, sicut +etiam vivi ignorantes aliis viventibus apparent in somnis, ut +Augustinus dicit in libro praedicto. Unde et de Samuele dici potest +quod ipse apparuit per revelationem divinam; secundum hoc quod +dicitur Eccli. XLVI, quod <i>dormivit, et notum fecit regi finem +vitae suae</i>. Vel illa apparitio fuit procurata per Daemones, si +tamen Ecclesiastici auctoritas non recipiatur, propter hoc quod +inter canonicas Scripturas apud Hebraeos non habetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32247] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ignorantia huiusmodi non contingit ex locali +distantia, sed propter causam praedictam.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q90" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q90-p0.1">Q. 90. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q90-p2"> After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: + (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place + of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of man's soul; + (2) the production of man's body; (3) the production of the woman. + </p><p id="FP_Q90-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q90-p4"><a href="#FP_Q90_A1"> (1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p5"><a href="#FP_Q90_A2"> (2) Whether, if made, it was created?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p6"><a href="#FP_Q90_A3"> (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p7"><a href="#FP_Q90_A4"> (4) Whether it was made before the body?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 pr."><a name="32248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32248] +Iª q. 90 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa considerandum est de +prima hominis productione. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, +primo considerandum est de productione ipsius hominis; secundo, de +fine productionis; tertio, de statu et conditione hominis primo +producti; quarto, de loco eius. Circa productionem autem +consideranda sunt tria, primo, de productione hominis quantum ad +animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus viri; tertio, quantum ad +productionem mulieris. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum anima humana sit aliquid factum, vel sit de substantia ipsius +Dei. Secundo, supposito quod sit facta, utrum sit creata. Tertio, +utrum sit facta mediantibus Angelis. Quarto, utrum sit facta ante +corpus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q90_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A1-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 1. Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's substance. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." + But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32249] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit facta, sed sit de substantia +Dei. Dicitur enim Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, +et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo +in animam viventem</i>. Sed ille qui spirat, aliquid a se emittit. +Ergo anima qua homo vivit, est aliquid de substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q90_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore + the soul is of God's substance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32250] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut +supra habitum est, anima est forma simplex. Sed forma est actus. +Ergo anima est actus purus, quod est solius Dei. Ergo anima est de +substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only + be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32251] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quaecumque sunt, et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et +mens sunt, et nullo modo differunt, quia oporteret quod aliquibus +differentiis differrent, et sic essent composita. Ergo Deus et mens +humana idem sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary + to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32252] Iª q. 90 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus, in libro de origine animae, enumerat quaedam quae +dicit esse multum aperteque perversa, et fidei Catholicae adversa; +inter quae primum est, quod quidam dixerunt <i>Deum animam non de +nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said + ( + <a href="#FP_Q77_A2" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77] , A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[6]</a>), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence ---acquires its knowledge somehow from + things---and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is + a pure act---receives nothing from any other---and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[1]</a>,7; + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p7"> This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature + of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that + God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same + nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the + soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal + light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body. + </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p8"> Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, + but the form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates + (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]) So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, + as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees + of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. + </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p9"> But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[1]</a>,8; and + <a href="#FP_Q75_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 co."><a name="32253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32253] Iª q. 90 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei, manifestam +improbabilitatem continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana +est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a +rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quae omnia aliena sunt +a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et +nullam in se diversitatem habens, ut supra probatum est. Sed hic +error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus +antiquorum. Primi enim qui naturas rerum considerare incoeperunt, +imaginationem transcendere non valentes, nihil praeter corpora esse +posuerunt. Et ideo Deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, quod aliorum +corporum iudicabant esse principium. Et quia animam ponebant esse +de natura illius corporis quod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur +in I de anima, per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de natura +Dei. Iuxta quam positionem etiam Manichaei, Deum esse quandam lucem +corpoream existimantes, quandam partem illius lucis animam esse +posuerunt corpori alligatam. Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc, +quod aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt, non tamen a +corpore separatum, sed corporis formam. Unde et Varro dixit quod +<i>Deus est anima mundum motu et ratione gubernans</i>; ut +Augustinus narrat, VII de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur illius totalis +animae partem aliqui posuerunt animam hominis, sicut homo est pars +totius mundi; non valentes intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos +spiritualium substantiarum gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones +corporum. Haec autem omnia sunt impossibilia, ut supra probatum +est. Unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the + same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, + but an extraneous thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32254] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod inspirare non est accipiendum corporaliter, sed idem +est Deum inspirare, quod spiritum facere. Quamvis et homo +corporaliter spirans non emittat aliquid de sua substantia, sed de +natura extranea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above + explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q90_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32255] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod anima, etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam +essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per +participationem; ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo non est actus +purus, sicut Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. + For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble + each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple + things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter + into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot + say that these again differ by some further difference. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32256] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod differens, proprie acceptum, aliquo differt, unde ibi +quaeritur differentia, ubi est convenientia. Et propter hoc oportet +differentia esse composita quodammodo, cum in aliquo differant, et +in aliquo conveniant. Sed secundum hoc, licet omne differens sit +diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens; ut dicitur in X +Metaphys. Nam simplicia diversa sunt seipsis, non autem differunt +aliquibus differentiis, ex quibus componantur. Sicut homo et asinus +differunt rationali et irrationali differentia, de quibus non est +dicere quod ulterius aliis differentiis differant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A2-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 2. Whether the soul was produced by creation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from + matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it + was not created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32257] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit producta in esse per +creationem. Quod enim in se habet aliquid materiale, fit ex +materia. Sed anima habet in se aliquid materiale, cum non sit actus +purus. Ergo anima est facta ex materia. Non ergo est creata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to + act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. + Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32258] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis +actus materiae alicuius videtur educi de potentia materiae, cum +enim materia sit in potentia ad actum, actus quilibet praeexistit +in materia in potentia. Sed anima est actus materiae corporalis, ut +ex eius definitione apparet. Ergo anima educitur de potentia +materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come + into existence by generation; which is not true. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32259] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima +est forma quaedam. Si igitur anima fit per creationem, pari ratione +omnes aliae formae. Et sic nulla forma exibit in esse per +generationem. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>): "God created man to His own image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32260] Iª q. 90 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam</i>. +Est autem homo ad imaginem Dei secundum animam. Ergo anima exivit +in esse per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since + to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly + exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and + truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) + by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence + it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same + is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be + made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a + subsistent form, as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q90_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter---whether corporeal, + which would render it a corporeal being---or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into + another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 co."><a name="32261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32261] Iª q. 90 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem, quod +non est verum de aliis formis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit +via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit +esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, +quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et +vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid +est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea +aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod +accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. Et eadem ratio est de +omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non +subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod +composita subsistentia fiunt. Anima autem rationalis est forma +subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse +et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente, neque +corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae; neque spirituali, quia +sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est +dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated + existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds + if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality + to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; + otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32262] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, +formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum, quod quidem ex +necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se +consequitur ad formam. Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita +ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa materia +non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia caelestis +corporis, alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima +potest fieri ex materia praeiacente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was + in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and + exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q90_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32263] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est +quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia +anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, +sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae +corporalis, ut supra dictum est; propterea non educitur de potentia +materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32264] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est simile de anima rationali, et de aliis +formis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A3-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 3. Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual + things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says + (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, + the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32265] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis non sit producta a Deo +immediate, sed mediantibus Angelis. Maior enim ordo est in +spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Sed corpora inferiora +producuntur per corpora superiora, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de +Div. Nom. Ergo et inferiores spiritus, qui sunt animae rationales, +producuntur per spiritus superiores, qui sunt Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of + things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the + higher," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls + by angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32266] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, finis +rerum respondet principio, Deus enim est principium et finis rerum. +Ergo et exitus rerum a principio respondet reductioni rerum in +finem. Sed infima reducuntur per prima, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo et +infima procedunt in esse per prima, scilicet animae per +Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect + than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something + specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32267] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, +perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere</i>, ut dicitur in IV +Meteor. Sed spirituales substantiae sunt multo magis perfectae quam +corporales. Cum ergo corpora faciant sibi similia secundum speciem, +multo magis Angeli poterunt facere aliquid infra se secundum +speciem naturae, scilicet animam rationalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>) that God Himself "breathed into the face of man the breath of life." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32268] Iª q. 90 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. II, quod <i>Deus ipse inspiravit in faciem +hominis spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against + faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for + the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something + derived from the first cause, as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q90_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], + A[3] + </a>): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts + by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change + in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 co."><a name="32269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32269] Iª q. 90 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam posuerunt quod Angeli, secundum quod operantur in +virtute Dei, causant animas rationales. Sed hoc est omnino +impossibile, et a fide alienum. Ostensum est enim quod anima +rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem. Solus autem Deus +potest creare. Quia solius primi agentis est agere, nullo +praesupposito, cum semper agens secundum praesupponat aliquid a +primo agente, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem agit aliquid ex +aliquo praesupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens +agit nisi transmutando; sed solus Deus agit creando. Et quia anima +rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicuius +materiae, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p7"> Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and + that the higher things lead forward the inferior---all these things are effected through a certain transmutation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32270] Iª q. 90 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet +solutio ad obiecta. Nam quod corpora causant vel sibi similia vel +inferiora, et quod superiora reducunt inferiora, totum hoc provenit +per quandam transmutationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A4-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 4. Whether the human soul was produced before the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and + adornment, as shown above ( + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A1" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q70_A1" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[70], A[1]</a>). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of + man was made before the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32271] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. +Opus enim creationis praecessit opus distinctionis et ornatus, ut +supra habitum est. Sed anima producta est in esse per creationem; +corpus autem factum est in fine ornatus. Ergo anima hominis +producta est ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before + bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also + the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32272] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima +rationalis magis convenit cum Angelis quam cum animalibus brutis. +Sed Angeli creati fuerunt ante corpora, vel statim a principio cum +corporali materia; corpus autem hominis formatum est sexto die, +quando et bruta animalia sunt producta. Ergo anima hominis fuit +creata ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning + it was created before the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32273] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, finis +proportionatur principio. Sed anima in fine remanet post corpus. +Ergo et in principio fuit creata ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was + produced in the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32274] Iª q. 90 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod actus proprius fit in potentia propria. Cum ergo anima sit +proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the + same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are + equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them---namely, the souls of men or of heavenly + bodies---are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free + from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken ( + <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q90_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>); and so we need say nothing about it here. + </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p7"> Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, + before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, + not actually, but only as to some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing + corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems + that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and + that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as + his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was + made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that + the + soul was already created." + </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p8"> Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not + united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally + a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their + perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural + perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. + </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p9"> Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days ( + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q74_A2" id="FP_Q90_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[2]</a>), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual + nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both + the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 co."><a name="32275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32275] Iª q. 90 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Origenes posuit non solum animam primi hominis, sed animas +omnium hominum ante corpora simul cum Angelis creatas; propter hoc +quod credidit omnes spirituales substantias, tam animas quam +Angelos, aequales esse secundum suae naturae conditionem, sed solum +merito distare; sic ut quaedam earum corporibus alligarentur, quae +sunt animae hominum vel caelestium corporum; quaedam vero in sui +puritate, secundum diversos ordines, remanerent. De qua opinione +supra iam diximus, et ideo relinquatur ad praesens. Augustinus +vero, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod anima primi hominis +ante corpus cum Angelis est creata, propter aliam rationem. Quia +scilicet ponit quod corpus hominis in illis operibus sex dierum non +fuit productum in actu, sed solum secundum causales rationes, quod +non potest de anima dici; quia nec ex aliqua materia corporali aut +spirituali praeexistente facta fuit, nec ex aliqua virtute creata +produci potuit. Et ideo videtur quod ipsamet anima in operibus sex +dierum, in quibus omnia facta fuerunt, simul cum Angelis fuerit +creata; et quod postmodum propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad +corpus administrandum. Sed hoc non dicit asserendo, ut eius verba +demonstrant. Dicit enim, <i>credatur, si nulla Scripturarum +auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum +sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis +mundi, anima vero iam ipsa crearetur</i>. Posset autem hoc utique +tolerari secundum eos qui ponunt quod anima habet per se speciem et +naturam completam, et quod non unitur corpori ut forma, sed solum +ad ipsum administrandum. Si autem anima unitur corpori ut forma, et +est naturaliter pars humanae naturae, hoc omnino esse non potest. +Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfecto +statu suae naturae, secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei species +exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet +naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde +non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari. Sustinendo ergo +opinionem Augustini de operibus sex dierum, dici poterit quod anima +humana praecessit in operibus sex dierum secundum quandam +similitudinem generis, prout convenit cum Angelis in intellectuali +natura; ipsa vero fuit creata simul cum corpore. Secundum alios +vero sanctos, tam anima quam corpus primi hominis in operibus sex +dierum sunt producta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that + the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, + not separately, but in the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32276] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, si natura animae haberet integram speciem, ita quod +secundum se crearetur, ratio illa procederet, ut per se in +principio crearetur. Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non +fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still + more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32277] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter est +dicendum ad secundum. Nam anima si per se speciem haberet, magis +conveniret cum Angelis. Sed inquantum est forma corporis, pertinet +ad genus animalium, ut formale principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul + was first created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32278] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod animam remanere post corpus, accidit per defectum +corporis, qui est mors. Qui quidem defectus in principio creationis +animae, esse non debuit.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q91" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q91-p0.1">Q. 91. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q91-p2"> We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q91-p3"><a href="#FP_Q91_A1"> (1) The matter from which it was produced;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p4"><a href="#FP_Q91_A2"> (2) The author by whom it was produced;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p5"><a href="#FP_Q91_A3"> (3) The disposition it received in its production;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p6"><a href="#FP_Q91_A4"> (4) The mode and order of its production.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 pr."><a name="32279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32279] +Iª q. 91 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +productione corporis primi hominis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, de materia ex qua productum est. Secundo, de +auctore a quo productum est. Tertio, de dispositione quae ei per +productionem est attributa. Quarto, de modo et ordine productionis +ipsius.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q91_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A1-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 1. Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to + make something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off from actual existence than "being + in potentiality." But since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's + body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made + of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32280] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod corpus primi hominis non sit factum de +limo terrae. Maioris enim virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, +quam ex aliquo, quia plus distat ab actu non ens quam ens in +potentia. Sed cum homo sit dignissima creaturarum inferiorum, +decuit ut virtus Dei maxime ostenderetur in productione corporis +eius. Ergo non debuit fieri ex limo terrae, sed ex nihilo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected + by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32281] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +corpora caelestia sunt nobiliora terrenis. Sed corpus humanum habet +maximam nobilitatem, cum perficiatur a nobilissima forma, quae est +anima rationalis. Ergo non debuit fieri de corpore terrestri, sed +magis de corpore caelesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is + most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32282] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ignis +et aer sunt nobiliora corpora quam terra et aqua, quod ex eorum +subtilitate apparet. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit dignissimum, +magis debuit fieri ex igne et ex aere quam ex limo terrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the + four elements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32283] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +corpus humanum est compositum ex quatuor elementis. Non ergo est +factum ex limo terrae, sed ex omnibus elementis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God made man of the slime of the earth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32284] Iª q. 91 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo +terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united + in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according + to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as + all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection + is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed + of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly + bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, + yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where + there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man + by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have + the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; + because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called 'a little world,' because all creatures + of the world are in a way to be found in him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 co."><a name="32285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32285] Iª q. 91 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum Deus perfectus sit, operibus suis perfectionem dedit +secundum eorum modum; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, <i>Dei perfecta +sunt opera</i>. Ipse autem simpliciter perfectus est, ex hoc quod +omnia in se praehabet, non per modum compositionis, sed simpliciter +et unite, ut Dionysius dicit, eo modo quo diversi effectus +praeexistunt in causa, secundum unam eius essentiam. Ista autem +perfectio ad Angelos quidem derivatur, secundum quod omnia sunt in +eorum cognitione quae sunt a Deo in natura producta, per formas +diversas. Ad hominem vero derivatur inferiori modo huiusmodi +perfectio. Non enim in sua cognitione naturali habet omnium +naturalium notitiam; sed est ex rebus omnibus quodammodo +compositus, dum de genere spiritualium substantiarum habet in se +animam rationalem, de similitudine vero caelestium corporum habet +elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis, +elementa vero secundum substantiam. Ita tamen quod superiora +elementa praedominantur in eo secundum virtutem, scilicet ignis et +aer, quia vita praecipue consistit in calido, quod est ignis, et +humido, quod est aeris. Inferiora vero elementa abundant in eo +secundum substantiam, aliter enim non posset esse mixtionis +aequalitas, nisi inferiora elementa, quae sunt minoris virtutis, +secundum quantitatem in homine abundarent. Et ideo dicitur corpus +hominis de limo terrae formatum, quia limus dicitur terra aquae +permixta. Et propter hoc homo dicitur minor mundus, quia omnes +creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting + that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, + as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32286] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod virtus Dei creantis manifestata est in corpore +hominis, dum eius materia est per creationem producta. Oportuit +autem ut ex materia quatuor elementorum fieret corpus humanum, ut +homo haberet convenientiam cum inferioribus corporibus, quasi +medium quoddam existens inter spirituales et corporales +substantias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly + body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs + of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters + materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the + soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false---that light is a body. Secondly, + it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, + since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects + of its power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32287] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quamvis corpus caeleste sit simpliciter nobilius +terrestri corpore, tamen quantum ad actus animae rationalis, est +minus conveniens. Nam anima rationalis accipit notitiam veritatis +quodammodo per sensus; quorum organa formari non possunt ex corpore +caelesti, cum sit impassibile. Nec est verum quod quidam dicunt +aliquid de quinta essentia materialiter ad compositionem humani +corporis advenire, ponentes animam uniri corpori mediante quadam +luce. Primo enim, falsum est quod dicunt, lucem esse corpus. +Secundo vero, impossibile est aliquid de quinta essentia vel a +corpore caelesti dividi, vel elementis permisceri, propter +caelestis corporis impassibilitatem. Unde non venit in +compositionem mixtorum corporum, nisi secundum suae virtutis +effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw + the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for + the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have + the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; + either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such contraries---thus, for instance, the pupil of the + eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since + it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense---or so that the organ is a medium + between two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32288] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si ignis et aer, quae sunt maioris virtutis in +agendo, etiam secundum quantitatem in compositione humani corporis +abundarent, omnino ad se traherent alia, et non posset fieri +aequalitas commixtionis, quae est necessaria in compositione +hominis ad bonitatem sensus tactus, qui est fundamentum sensuum +aliorum. Oportet enim organum cuiuslibet sensus non habere in actu +contraria quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed in potentia tantum. +Vel ita quod omnino careat toto genere contrariorum, sicut pupilla +caret colore, ut sit in potentia ad omnes colores, quod in organo +tactus non erat possibile, cum sit compositum ex elementis, quorum +qualitates percipit tactus. Vel ita quod organum sit medium inter +contraria, ut necesse est in tactu accidere, medium enim est +quodammodo in potentia ad extrema.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, + because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention + is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately + addressed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32289] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod in limo terrae est terra, et aqua conglutinans partes +terrae. De aliis autem elementis Scriptura mentionem non fecit, tum +quia minus abundant secundum quantitatem in corpore hominis, ut +dictum est; tum etiam quia in tota rerum productione, de igne et +aere, quae sensu non percipiuntur a rudibus mentionem non fecit +Scriptura, quae rudi populo tradebatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A2-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 2. Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal + things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above + <a href="#FP_Q91_A1" id="FP_Q91_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32290] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod corpus humanum non sit immediate a Deo +productum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod corporalia +disponuntur a Deo per angelicam creaturam. Sed corpus humanum +formatum fuit ex materia corporali, ut dictum est. Ergo debuit +produci mediantibus Angelis, et non immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can + be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active + power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate + regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32291] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod +fieri potest virtute creata, non est necessarium quod immediate +producatur a Deo. Sed corpus humanum produci potest per virtutem +creatam caelestis corporis, nam et quaedam animalia ex +putrefactione generantur per virtutem activam corporis caelestis; +et Albumasar dicit quod in locis in quibus nimis abundat calor aut +frigus, homines non generantur, sed in locis temperatis tantum. +Ergo non oportuit quod immediate corpus humanum formaretur a +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement + of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems + that a heavenly body had part in its production. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32292] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nihil +fit ex materia corporali nisi per aliquam materiae transmutationem. +Sed omnis transmutatio corporalis causatur ex motu caelestis +corporis, qui est primus motuum. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit +productum ex materia corporali, videtur quod ad eius formationem +aliquid operatum fuerit corpus caeleste.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the + causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists + in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was + produced by some created power, and not immediately by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32293] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod homo factus est +secundum corpus, in operibus sex dierum, secundum causales rationes +quas Deus inseruit creaturae corporali; postmodum vero fuit +formatum in actu. Sed quod praeexistit in corporali creatura +secundum causales rationes, per aliquam virtutem corpoream produci +potest. Ergo corpus humanum productum est aliqua virtute creata, et +non immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:1</a>): "God created man out of the earth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32294] Iª q. 91 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, <i>Deus de terra creavit hominem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from + God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher + refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as + we have explained ( + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A4" id="FP_Q91_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[4]</a>); and because the agent must + be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, + and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of + another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, + can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of + any + preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature + of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of + the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 co."><a name="32295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32295] Iª q. 91 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod prima formatio humani corporis non potuit esse per aliquam +virtutem creatam, sed immediate a Deo. Posuerunt siquidem aliqui +formas quae sunt in materia corporali, a quibusdam formis +immaterialibus derivari. Sed hanc opinionem repellit philosophus, +in VII Metaphys., per hoc quod formis non competit per se fieri, +sed composito, ut supra expositum est; et quia oportet agens esse +simile facto non convenit quod forma pura, quae est sine materia, +producat formam quae est in materia, quae non fit nisi per hoc quod +compositum fit. Et ideo oportet quod forma quae est in materia, sit +causa formae quae est in materia, secundum quod compositum a +composito generatur. Deus autem, quamvis omnino sit immaterialis, +tamen solus est qui sua virtute materiam producere potest creando. +Unde ipsius solius est formam producere in materia absque +adminiculo praecedentis formae materialis. Et propter hoc, Angeli +non possunt transmutare corpora ad formam aliquam, nisi adhibitis +seminibus quibusdam, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Quia +igitur corpus humanum nunquam formatum fuerat, cuius virtute per +viam generationis aliud simile in specie formaretur, necesse fuit +quod primum corpus hominis immediate formaretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond + the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body + of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body + of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting + the dust. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32296] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, etsi Angeli aliquod ministerium Deo exhibeant in his +quae circa corpora operatur; aliqua tamen Deus in creatura corporea +facit, quae nullo modo Angeli facere possunt; sicut quod suscitat +mortuos, et illuminat caecos. Secundum quam virtutem etiam corpus +primi hominis de limo terrae formavit. Potuit tamen fieri ut +aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis Angeli +exhiberent; sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres +colligendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although + the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. + ii, 26), "man and the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production + of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the + production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce + a perfect than an imperfect thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32297] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod animalia perfecta, quae generantur ex semine, non +possunt generari per solam virtutem caelestis corporis, ut Avicenna +fingit; licet ad eorum generationem naturalem cooperetur virtus +caelestis corporis, prout philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod +<i>homo generat hominem ex materia, et sol</i>. Et exinde est quod +exigitur locus temperatus ad generationem hominum et aliorum +animalium perfectorum. Sufficit autem virtus caelestium corporum ad +generandum quaedam animalia imperfectiora ex materia disposita, +manifestum est enim quod plura requiruntur ad productionem rei +perfectae, quam ad productionem rei imperfectae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the + Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from + the slime of the earth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32298] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod motus caeli est causa transmutationum naturalium, non +tamen transmutationum quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, et sola +virtute divina, sicut quod mortui resuscitantur, quod caeci +illuminantur. Quibus est simile quod homo ex limo terrae +formatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive + potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can + produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In + this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in + their causal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32299] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod secundum rationes causales in creaturis dicitur +aliquid praeexistere dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum potentiam +activam et passivam, ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri +possit, sed etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere +possit. Alio modo, secundum potentiam passivam tantum, ut scilicet +de materia praeexistenti fieri possit a Deo. Et hoc modo, secundum +Augustinum, corpus hominis praeextitit in operibus productis +secundum causales rationes.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A3-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 3. Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought + to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses + and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly + disposed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32300] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod corpus hominis non habuerit convenientem +dispositionem. Cum enim homo sit nobilissimum animalium, corpus +hominis debuit esse dispositum optime ad ea quae sunt propria +animalis, scilicet ad sensum et motum. Sed quaedam animalia +inveniuntur acutioris sensus quam homo, et velocioris motus; sicut +canes melius odorant, et aves velocius moventur. Ergo corpus +hominis non est convenienter dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided + with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32301] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +perfectum est cui nihil deest. Sed plura desunt humano corpori quam +corporibus aliorum animalium, quae habent tegumenta et arma +naturalia ad sui protectionem, quae homini desunt. Ergo corpus +humanum est imperfectissime dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone + in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32302] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, homo +plus distat a plantis quam ab animalibus brutis. Sed plantae habent +staturam rectam; animalia autem bruta pronam. Ergo homo non debuit +habere staturam rectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>): "God made man right." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32303] Iª q. 91 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Eccle. VII, <i>Deus fecit hominem rectum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to + give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this + entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he + makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it + of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. + Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This + is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance." + </p><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p7"> Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, + and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which + was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it + is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in + the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 co."><a name="32304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32304] Iª q. 91 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina, unde sunt +quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet autem artifex intendit +suo operi dispositionem optimam inducere, non simpliciter, sed per +comparationem ad finem. Et si talis dispositio habet secum +adiunctum aliquem defectum, artifex non curat. Sicut artifex qui +facit serram ad secandum, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad +secandum; nec curat eam facere ex vitro, quae est pulchrior +materia, quia talis pulchritudo esset impedimentum finis. Sic +igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non +quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem. Et hoc +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., <i>et quia dignius est +sic, non tamen simpliciter, sed ad uniuscuiusque substantiam</i>. +Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et +operationes ipsius, materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta +propter actiones agentis. Dico ergo quod Deus instituit corpus +humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad talem +formam et ad tales operationes. Et si aliquis defectus in +dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod +talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad ea quae +requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et +ad animae operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for + this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior + sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all + animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom + of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man + for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the + smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute + hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. + The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is + inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32305] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod tactus, qui est fundamentum aliorum sensuum, est +perfectior in homine quam in aliquo alio animali, et propter hoc +oportuit quod homo haberet temperatissimam complexionem inter omnia +animalia. Praecedit etiam homo omnia alia animalia, quantum ad +vires sensitivas interiores; sicut ex supra dictis apparet. Ex +quadam autem necessitate contingit quod, quantum ad aliquos +exteriores sensus, homo ab aliis animalibus deficiat. Sicut homo, +inter omnia animalia, habet pessimum olfactum. Necessarium enim +fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, respectu sui corporis haberet +maximum cerebrum, tum ut liberius in eo perficerentur operationes +interiorum virium sensitivarum, quae sunt necessariae ad +intellectus operationem, ut supra dictum est; tum etiam ut +frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis, quem necesse est in +homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit rectae staturae. Magnitudo +autem cerebri, propter eius humiditatem, est impedimentum olfactus, +qui requirit siccitatem. Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare +quaedam animalia sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam +homo, propter impedimentum horum sensuum quod necesse est consequi +in homine ex perfecta complexionis aequalitate. Et eadem etiam +ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quaedam animalia sunt homine +velociora, cui excellentiae velocitatis repugnat aequalitas humanae +complexionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are + the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness + of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby + he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of + infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ of organs." Moreover this was more + becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an + infinite number of instruments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32306] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium +arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo pilorum aut plumarum, quae +sunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiae terrestris +elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et teneritudini complexionis +humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet +rationem et manus, quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et +alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis. Unde et manus, in III de +anima, dicitur organum organorum. Et hoc etiam magis competebat +rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet +facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi parandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose + of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, + whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure + in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses + are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking + food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which + is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, + both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts + of the + interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other + parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; + and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he + used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding + mouth, + with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other + animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation. + </p><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p11"> Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the + superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed + as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond + to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle + disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids + itself of the surplus. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32307] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter +quatuor. Primo quidem, quia sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad +vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad +cognoscendum. Unde, cum cetera animalia non delectentur in +sensibilibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et venerea, solus homo +delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et +ideo, quia sensus praecipue vigent in facie, alia animalia habent +faciem pronam ad terram, quasi ad cibum quaerendum et providendum +sibi de victu, homo vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et +praecipue per visum, qui est subtilior et plures differentias rerum +ostendit, libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere, et +caelestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat +veritatem. Secundo, ut interiores vires liberius suas operationes +habeant, dum cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perficiuntur, non est +depressum, sed super omnes partes corporis elevatum. Tertio, quia +oporteret quod, si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus +loco anteriorum pedum. Et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera +perficienda cessaret. Quarto, quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et +uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum +caperet ore. Et ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, +et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet +in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio omnino impediret +locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis. Et tamen homo staturam +rectam habens, maxime distat a plantis. Nam homo habet superius +sui, idest caput, versus superius mundi, et inferius sui versus +inferius mundi, et ideo est optime dispositus secundum +dispositionem totius. Plantae vero habent superius sui versus +inferius mundi (nam radices sunt ori proportionales), inferius +autem sui versus superius mundi. Animalia vero bruta medio modo, +nam superius animalis est pars qua accipit alimentum, inferius +autem est pars qua emittit superfluum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A4-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 4. Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made + by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and + it was made." Therefore the same should have been said of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32308] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter corporis humani productio +in Scriptura describatur. Sicut enim corpus humanum est factum a +Deo, ita et alia opera sex dierum. Sed in aliis operibus dicitur, +<i>dixit Deus, fiat, et factum est</i>. Ergo similiter dici debuit +de hominis productione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above + <a href="#FP_Q91_A2" id="FP_Q91_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us make man." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32309] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +corpus humanum a Deo immediate est factum, ut supra dictum est. +Ergo inconvenienter dicitur, faciamus hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man + of the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into him the breath of life." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32310] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, forma +humani corporis est ipsa anima, quae est spiraculum vitae. +Inconvenienter ergo, postquam dixerat, <i>formavit Deus hominem de +limo terrae</i>, subiunxit, <i>et inspiravit in faciem eius +spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly + said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32311] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +anima, quae est spiraculum vitae, est in toto corpore, et +principaliter in corde. Non ergo debuit dicere, quod <i>inspiravit +in faciem eius spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according + to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: "To His image He made them," he should + not have added, "male and female He created them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="32312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32312] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, sexus +masculinus et femininus pertinent ad corpus, imago vero Dei ad +animam. Sed anima, secundum Augustinum, fuit facta ante corpus. +Inconvenienter ergo cum dixisset, <i>ad imaginem suam fecit +illum</i>, addidit, <i>masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Is the authority of Scripture. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32313] Iª q. 91 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> In contrarium est +auctoritas Scripturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though + He did not make other things; since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.101.26" target="asv">Ps. 101:26</a>), "The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.94.5" target="asv">Ps. 94:5</a>), "His hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture + uses a special way of + speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care + what we have chiefly in mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32314] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +ad primum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in VI super Gen. ad Litt., +non in hoc praeeminet homo aliis rebus, quod Deus ipse fecit +hominem, quasi alia ipse non fecerit; cum scriptum sit, <i>opera +manuum tuarum sunt caeli</i>, et alibi, <i>aridam fundaverunt manus +eius</i>, sed in hoc quod ad imaginem Dei factus est homo. Utitur +tamen Scriptura in productione hominis speciali modo loquendi, ad +ostendendum quod alia propter hominem facta sunt. Ea enim quae +principaliter intendimus, cum maiori deliberatione et studio +consuevimus facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. + But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32315] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est intelligendum Deum Angelis dixisse, faciamus +hominem; ut quidam perverse intellexerunt. Sed hoc dicitur ad +significandum pluralitatem divinarum personarum, quarum imago +expressius invenitur in homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the + formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the + body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as + regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. + </p><p id="FP_Q91_A4-p11"> To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man," must be understood of the production of the body + with the soul; and that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of life," should be understood of + the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22</a>). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we + read farther on, "And man was made a living soul"; which words the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.45" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:45</a>) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the + words, "He breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form + of the body. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32316] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt corpus hominis prius tempore +formatum, et postmodum Deum formato iam corpori animam infudisse. +Sed contra rationem perfectionis primae institutionis rerum est, +quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel animam sine corpore fecerit, +cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae. Et hoc etiam est magis +inconveniens de corpore, quod dependet ex anima, et non e converso. +Et ideo ad hoc excludendum, quidam posuerunt quod, cum dicitur, +formavit Deus hominem, intelligitur productio corporis simul cum +anima; quod autem additur, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum +vitae, intelligitur de spiritu sancto; sicut et dominus insufflavit +in apostolos, dicens, accipite spiritum sanctum, Ioan. XX. Sed haec +expositio, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civ. Dei, excluditur per +verba Scripturae. Nam subditur ad praedicta, <i>et factus est homo +in animam viventem</i>, quod apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, non ad vitam +spiritualem, sed ad vitam animalem refert. Per spiraculum ergo +vitae intelligitur anima, ut sic quod dicitur, <i>inspiravit in +faciem eius spiraculum vitae</i>, sit quasi expositio eius quod +praemiserat; nam anima est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore + Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32317] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, quia operationes vitae magis manifestantur in facie +hominis, propter sensus ibi existentes; ideo dicit in faciem +hominis inspiratum esse spiraculum vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to + him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day + both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the + sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="32318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32318] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, omnia opera sex dierum simul +sunt facta. Unde animam primi hominis, quam ponit simul factam cum +Angelis, non ponit factam ante sextum diem; sed in ipso sexto die +ponit esse factam et animam primi hominis in actu, et corpus eius +secundum rationes causales. Alii vero doctores ponunt et animam et +corpus hominis factum sexto die in actu.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q92" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q92-p0.1">Q. 92. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q92-p2"> We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q92-p3"><a href="#FP_Q92_A1"> (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p4"><a href="#FP_Q92_A2"> (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p5"><a href="#FP_Q92_A3"> (3) Whether of man's rib?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p6"><a href="#FP_Q92_A4"> (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 pr."><a name="32319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32319] +Iª q. 92 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +productione mulieris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +in illa rerum productione debuerit mulier produci. Secundo, utrum +debuerit fieri de viro. Tertio, utrum de costa viri. Quarto, utrum +facta fuerit immediate a Deo.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q92_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A1-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 1. Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. + ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production + of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32320] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit produci in prima rerum +productione. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., +quod <i>femina est mas occasionatus</i>. Sed nihil occasionatum et +deficiens debuit esse in prima rerum institutione. Ergo in illa +prima rerum institutione mulier producenda non fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>): "Thou shalt be under the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." But woman + is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first + production of things before sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32321] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +subiectio et minoratio ex peccato est subsecuta, nam, ad mulierem +dictum est post peccatum, Gen. III, <i>sub viri potestate eris</i>; +et Gregorius dicit quod, <i>ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares +sumus</i>. Sed mulier naturaliter est minoris virtutis et +dignitatis quam vir, semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, +ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non debuit mulier +produci in prima rerum productione ante peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore + He should not have made woman. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32322] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +occasiones peccatorum sunt amputandae. Sed Deus praescivit quod +mulier esset futura viro in occasionem peccati. Ergo non debuit +mulierem producere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv">Gn. 2:18</a>): "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32323] Iª q. 92 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus +ei adiutorium simile sibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, + as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. + This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not + possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other + specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not + from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; + for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation + invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and + the + passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is + principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only + at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always + united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still + nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two + forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. + Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be two in one flesh" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 co."><a name="32324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32324] Iª q. 92 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in +adiutorium viri, non quidem in adiutorium alicuius alterius operis, +ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius +iuvari possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem; sed in +adiutorium generationis. Quod manifestius videri potest, si in +viventibus modus generationis consideretur. Sunt enim quaedam +viventia, quae in seipsis non habent virtutem activam generationis, +sed ab agente alterius speciei generantur; sicut plantae et +animalia quae generantur sine semine ex materia convenienti per +virtutem activam caelestium corporum. Quaedam vero habent virtutem +generationis activam et passivam coniunctam; sicut accidit in +plantis quae generantur ex semine. Non enim est in plantis aliquod +nobilius opus vitae quam generatio, unde convenienter omni tempore +in eis virtuti passivae coniungitur virtus activa generationis. +Animalibus vero perfectis competit virtus activa generationis +secundum sexum masculinum, virtus vero passiva secundum sexum +femininum. Et quia est aliquod opus vitae nobilius in animalibus +quam generatio, ad quod eorum vita principaliter ordinatur; ideo +non omni tempore sexus masculinus feminino coniungitur in +animalibus perfectis, sed solum tempore coitus; ut imaginemur per +coitum sic fieri unum ex mare et femina, sicut in planta omni +tempore coniunguntur vis masculina et feminina, etsi in quibusdam +plus abundet una harum, in quibusdam plus altera. Homo autem adhuc +ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere. Et ideo +adhuc in homine debuit esse maiori ratione distinctio utriusque +virtutis, ut seorsum produceretur femina a mare, et tamen +carnaliter coniungerentur in unum ad generationis opus. Et ideo +statim post formationem mulieris, dicitur Gen. II, <i>erunt duo in +carne una</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the + production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force + or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as + the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human + nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. + Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, + God formed not only the male but also the female. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32325] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est +aliquid deficiens et occasionatum. Quia virtus activa quae est in +semine maris, intendit producere sibi simile perfectum, secundum +masculinum sexum, sed quod femina generetur, hoc est propter +virtutis activae debilitatem, vel propter aliquam materiae +indispositionem, vel etiam propter aliquam transmutationem ab +extrinseco, puta a ventis Australibus, qui sunt humidi, ut dicitur +in libro de Generat. Animal. Sed per comparationem ad naturam +universalem, femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de +intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata. Intentio autem +naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor +naturae. Et ideo instituendo naturam, non solum marem, sed etiam +feminam produxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this + kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior + makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order + would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others + wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of + reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove ( + <a href="#FP_Q96_A3" id="FP_Q92_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32326] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est subiectio. Una servilis, secundum quam +praesidens utitur subiecto ad sui ipsius utilitatem et talis +subiectio introducta est post peccatum. Est autem alia subiectio +oeconomica vel civilis, secundum quam praesidens utitur subiectis +ad eorum utilitatem et bonum. Et ista subiectio fuisset etiam ante +peccatum, defuisset enim bonum ordinis in humana multitudine, si +quidam per alios sapientiores gubernati non fuissent. Et sic ex +tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia +naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis. Nec +inaequalitas hominum excluditur per innocentiae statum, ut infra +dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. + Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is + so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32327] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi, +Deus subtraxisset a mundo, remansisset universum imperfectum. Nec +debuit bonum commune tolli, ut vitaretur particulare malum, +praesertim cum Deus sit adeo potens, ut quodlibet malum possit +ordinare in bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A2-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 2. Whether woman should have been made from man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals + the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32328] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit fieri ex viro. Sexus +enim communis est homini et aliis animalibus. Sed in aliis +animalibus feminae non sunt factae ex maribus. Ergo nec in homine +fieri debuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man + was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32329] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eorum +quae sunt eiusdem speciei, eadem est materia. Sed mas et femina +sunt eiusdem speciei. Cum igitur vir fuerit factus ex limo terrae, +ex eodem debuit fieri femina, et non ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for + that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.6" target="asv">Lev. 18:6</a>). Therefore woman should not have been made from man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32330] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +mulier facta est in adiutorium viro ad generationem. Sed nimia +propinquitas reddit personam ad hoc ineptam, unde personae +propinquae a matrimonio excluduntur, ut patet Levit. XVIII. Ergo +mulier non debuit fieri ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:5</a>): "He created of him," that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32331] Iª q. 92 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, creavit ex ipso, scilicet viro, +adiutorium sibi simile, idest mulierem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from + the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is + the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore + Paul says that "God made the whole human race from one" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.26" target="asv">Acts + 17:26 + </a>). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. + Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.23" target="asv">Gn. 2:23,24</a>): "She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." This was most + necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other + animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. + viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose + of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it + was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. + For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.32" target="asv">Eph. + 5:32 + </a>): "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 co."><a name="32332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32332] Iª q. 92 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod conveniens fuit mulierem, in prima rerum institutione, ex viro +formari, magis quam in aliis animalibus. Primo quidem, ut in hoc +quaedam dignitas primo homini servaretur, ut, secundum Dei +similitudinem, esset ipse principium totius suae speciei, sicut +Deus est principium totius universi. Unde et Paulus dicit, Act. +XVII, quod <i>Deus fecit ex uno omne genus hominum</i>. Secundo, ut +vir magis diligeret mulierem, et ei inseparabilius inhaereret, dum +cognosceret eam ex se esse productam. Unde dicitur Gen. II, <i>de +viro sumpta est, quamobrem relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et +adhaerebit uxori suae</i>. Et hoc maxime necessarium fuit in specie +humana, in qua mas et femina commanent per totam vitam, quod non +contingit in aliis animalibus. Tertio quia, ut philosophus dicit in +VIII Ethic., mas et femina coniunguntur in hominibus non solum +propter necessitatem generationis, ut in aliis animalibus; sed +etiam propter domesticam vitam, in qua sunt alia opera viri et +feminae, et in qua vir est caput mulieris. Unde convenienter ex +viro formata est femina, sicut ex suo principio. Quarto est ratio +sacramentalis; figuratur enim per hoc quod Ecclesia a Christo sumit +principium. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, <i>sacramentum hoc +magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p7"> Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32333] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet +responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to + one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate + species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such + as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32334] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod materia est ex qua aliquid fit. Natura autem creata +habet determinatum principium; et, cum sit determinata ad unum, +etiam habet determinatum processum, unde ex determinata materia +producit aliquid in determinata specie. Sed virtus divina, cum sit +infinita, potest idem secundum speciem ex quacumque materia facere; +sicut virum ex limo terrae, et mulierem ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced + from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this + argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32335] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex naturali generatione contrahitur quaedam +propinquitas quae matrimonium impedit. Sed mulier non est producta +a viro per naturalem generationem, sed sola virtute divina, unde +Eva non dicitur filia Adae. Et propter hoc, ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A4-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 4. Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another + individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately + by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32344] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non fuerit immediate formata a Deo. +Nullum enim individuum ex simili secundum speciem productum, fit +immediate a Deo. Sed mulier facta est de viro, qui est eiusdem +speciei cum ipsa. Ergo non est facta immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body + was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32345] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod corporalia dispensantur a Deo +per Angelos. Sed corpus mulieris ex materia corporali est formatum. +Ergo est factum per ministerium Angelorum, et non immediate a +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, + and not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32346] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea +quae praeextiterunt in creaturis secundum rationes causales, +producuntur virtute alicuius creaturae, et non immediate a Deo. Sed +secundum causales rationes corpus mulieris in primis operibus +productum fuit, ut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non +fuit producta mulier immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from + the man's rib." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32347] Iª q. 92 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, <i>formare vel aedificare +costam ut mulier esset, non potuit nisi Deus, a quo universa natura +subsistit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (A[2], ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence + man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species + cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary + course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime + of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 co."><a name="32348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32348] Iª q. 92 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, uniuscuiusque speciei generatio +naturalis est ex determinata materia. Materia autem ex qua +naturaliter generatur homo, est semen humanum viri vel feminae. +Unde ex alia quacumque materia individuum humanae speciei generari +non potest naturaliter. Solus autem Deus, qui est naturae +institutor, potest praeter naturae ordinem res in esse producere. +Et ideo solus Deus potuit vel virum de limo terrae, vel mulierem de +costa viri formare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32349] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quando individuum generatur ex +simili secundum speciem, generatione naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; + but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body + of the woman formed by them from the man's rib. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32350] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., an +ministerium Angeli exhibuerint Deo in formatione mulieris, +nescimus, certum tamen est quod, sicut corpus viri de limo non fuit +formatum per Angelos, ita nec corpus mulieris de costa viri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it + made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in + the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active + potentiality of the Creator. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32351] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit, <i>non habuit +prima rerum conditio ut femina omnino sic fieret; sed tantum hoc +habuit, ut sic fieri posset</i>. Et ideo secundum causales rationes +praeextitit corpus mulieris in primis operibus, non secundum +potentiam activam, sed secundum potentiam passivam tantum, in +ordine ad potentiam activam creatoris.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q93" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q93-p0.1">Q. 93. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q93-p2"> We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." + There are under this head nine points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q93-p3"><a href="#FP_Q93_A1"> (1) Whether the image of God is in man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p4"><a href="#FP_Q93_A2"> (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p5"><a href="#FP_Q93_A3"> (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p6"><a href="#FP_Q93_A4"> (4) Whether the image of God is in every man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p7"><a href="#FP_Q93_A5"> (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p8"><a href="#FP_Q93_A6"> (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p9"><a href="#FP_Q93_A7"> (7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and acts?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p10"><a href="#FP_Q93_A8"> (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p11"><a href="#FP_Q93_A9"> (9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 pr."><a name="32352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32352] +Iª q. 93 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de fine sive +termino productionis hominis, prout dicitur factus ad imaginem et +similitudinem Dei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem. Primo, utrum in +homine sit imago Dei. Secundo, utrum imago Dei sit in +irrationalibus creaturis. Tertio, utrum imago Dei sit magis in +Angelo quam in homine. Quarto, utrum imago Dei sit in omni homine. +Quinto, utrum in homine sit imago Dei per comparationem ad +essentiam, vel ad personas divinas omnes, aut unam earum. Sexto, +utrum imago Dei inveniatur in homine solum secundum mentem. +Septimo, utrum imago Dei sit in homine secundum potentias, aut +secundum habitus, aut actus. Octavo, utrum per comparationem ad +omnia obiecta. Nono, de differentia imaginis et similitudinis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q93_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A1-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 1. Whether the image of God is in man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32353] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine. Dicitur enim +Isaiae XL, <i>cui similem fecistis Deum; aut quam imaginem ponetis +ei?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.15" target="asv">Col. 1:15</a>): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the image of God is not to be found + in man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32354] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, esse +Dei imaginem est proprium primogeniti, de quo dicit apostolus, ad +Colos. I, <i>qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis +creaturae</i>. Non ergo in homine invenitur Dei imago.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.]) that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; + and he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But there + is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can + be no image of God in man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32355] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., quod <i>imago est eius rei ad +quam imaginatur, species indifferens</i>; et iterum dicit quod +<i>imago est rei ad rem coaequandam indiscreta et unita +similitudo</i>. Sed non est species indifferens Dei et hominis; nec +potest esse aequalitas hominis ad Deum. Ergo in homine non potest +esse imago Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32356] Iª q. 93 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et +similitudinem nostram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there + is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to + likeness---namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation + of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to + another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. + </p><p id="FP_Q93_A1-p7"> But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image + there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect + image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that + in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of + equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect + likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition + "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 co."><a name="32357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32357] Iª q. 93 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., +<i>ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est +similitudo, non continuo est imago</i>. Ex quo patet quod +similitudo est de ratione imaginis, et quod imago aliquid addit +supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum, +imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius. Unde +ovum, quantumcumque sit alteri ovo simile et aequale, quia tamen +non est expressum ex illo, non dicitur imago eius. Aequalitas autem +non est de ratione imaginis, quia, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit, +<i>ubi est imago, non continuo est aequalitas</i>; ut patet in +imagine alicuius in speculo relucente. Est tamen de ratione +perfectae imaginis, nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid +imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est. Manifestum est autem +quod in homine invenitur aliqua Dei similitudo, quae deducitur a +Deo sicut ab exemplari, non tamen est similitudo secundum +aequalitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale +exemplatum. Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen +perfecta, sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit +hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, praepositio enim ad accessum +quendam significat, qui competit rei distanti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But God + made a spiritual image to Himself in man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32358] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod propheta loquitur de corporalibus imaginibus ab +homine fabricatis, et ideo signanter dicit, <i>quam imaginem +ponetis ei?</i> Sed Deus ipse sibi in homine posuit spiritualem +imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is + said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the + image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, + the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, + who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver + coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32359] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod primogenitus omnis creaturae est imago Dei perfecta, +perfecte implens illud cuius imago est, et ideo dicitur imago, et +nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur +imago; et propter imperfectionem similitudinis, dicitur ad +imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest esse nisi in +identitate naturae, imago Dei est in filio suo primogenito sicut +imago regis in filio sibi connaturali; in homine autem sicut in +aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo; ut patet per +Augustinum in libro de decem chordis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not + only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature + is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood + of a perfect image. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32360] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, eo modo dicitur species +indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid non solum numero +aut specie aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel +proportionem quandam, et sic est unitas vel convenientia creaturae +ad Deum. Quod autem dicit rei ad rem coaequandam, pertinet ad +rationem perfectae imaginis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A2-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 2. Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are + contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore + the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32361] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei inveniatur in irrationalibus +creaturis. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., <i>habent +causata causarum suarum contingentes imagines</i>. Sed Deus est +causa non solum rationalium creaturarum, sed etiam irrationalium. +Ergo imago Dei invenitur in irrationalibus creaturis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32362] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto est expressior similitudo in aliquo, tanto magis accedit ad +rationem imaginis. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod +radius solaris maxime habet similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Ergo +est ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness + than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called "very good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32363] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto aliquid est magis perfectum in bonitate, tanto magis est Deo +simile. Sed totum universum est perfectius in bonitate quam homo, +quia etsi bona sint singula, tamen simul omnia dicuntur valde bona, +Gen. I. Ergo totum universum est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum +homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore + the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32364] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Boetius in libro de Consol., dicit de Deo, <i>mundum mente gerens, +similique in imagine formans</i>. Ergo totus mundus est ad imaginem +Dei, et non solum rationalis creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving + him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made + to God's image. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32365] Iª q. 93 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, VI super Gen. ad Litt., <i>hoc excellit in +homine, quia Deus ad imaginem suam hominem fecit, propter hoc quod +dedit ei mentem intellectualem, qua praestat pecoribus</i>. Ea ergo +quae non habent intellectum, non sunt ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only + generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For + instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. + Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that + thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus + the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak + of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species." + </p><p id="FP_Q93_A2-p8"> Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most + commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as + Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." + It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 co."><a name="32366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32366] Iª q. 93 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod non quaelibet similitudo, etiam si sit expressa ex altero, +sufficit ad rationem imaginis. Si enim similitudo sit secundum +genus tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter +hoc dicetur aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius, non enim posset dici +quod vermis qui oritur ex homine, sit imago hominis propter +similitudinem generis; neque iterum potest dici quod, si aliquid +fiat album ad similitudinem alterius, quod propter hoc sit ad eius +imaginem, quia album est accidens commune pluribus speciebus. +Requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum +speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo, vel ad minus secundum +aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et praecipue secundum figuram, +sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius +dicit quod imago est species indifferens. Manifestum est autem quod +similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam. +Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, +inquantum sunt; secundo vero, inquantum vivunt; tertio vero, +inquantum sapiunt vel intelligunt. Quae, ut Augustinus dicit in +libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>ita sunt Deo similitudine +proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius</i>. Sic ergo patet +quod solae intellectuales creaturae, proprie loquendo, sunt ad +imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so + far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that + effects are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32367] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omne imperfectum est quaedam participatio perfecti. +Et ideo etiam ea quae deficiunt a ratione imaginis, inquantum tamen +aliqualem Dei similitudinem habent, participant aliquid de ratione +imaginis. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod causata habent causarum +contingentes imagines, idest quantum contingit ea habere, et non +simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is + involved in the idea of an image. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32368] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Dionysius assimilat radium solarem divinae bonitati +quantum ad causalitatem; non secundum dignitatem naturae, quae +requiritur ad rationem imaginis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively + and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for + the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. + Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we + do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32369] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod universum est perfectius in bonitate quam +intellectualis creatura extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et +collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in +intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni. Vel dicendum +quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem. Unde +cum dicitur quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, +non excluditur quin universum, secundum aliquam sui partem, sit ad +imaginem Dei; sed excluduntur aliae partes universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in + the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, + using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are + like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, + like to the Supreme Wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32370] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod imago accipitur a Boetio secundum rationem +similitudinis qua artificiatum imitatur speciem artis quae est in +mente artificis, sic autem quaelibet creatura est imago rationis +exemplaris quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc +de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem in +natura; prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum +sunt entia; et primae vitae inquantum sunt viventia; et summae +sapientiae, inquantum sunt intelligentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A3-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 3. Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii + (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to + say that the angels are more than man to the image of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32371] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam +homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de imagine, quod Deus nulli +alii creaturae dedit quod sit ad imaginem suam, nisi homini. Non +ergo verum est quod Angelus magis dicatur ad imaginem Dei quam +homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be + between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature is called God's image so far as it is akin + to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32372] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>homo ita +est ad imaginem Dei, ut, nulla interposita creatura, formetur a +Deo. Et ideo nihil est illi coniunctius</i>. Sed imago Dei dicitur +aliqua creatura, inquantum Deo coniungitur. Ergo Angelus non est +magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does + not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are + not more to the image of God than man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32373] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +creatura dicitur ad imaginem Dei, inquantum est intellectualis +naturae. Sed intellectualis natura non intenditur nec remittitur, +non enim est de genere accidentis, cum sit in genere substantiae. +Ergo Angelus non est magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is called a "seal of resemblance" [ + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.12" target="asv">Ezech. 28:12</a>] because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32374] Iª q. 93 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Gregorius, in quadam homilia, quod <i>Angelus dicitur +signaculum similitudinis, quia in eo similitudo divinae imaginis +magis insinuatur expressa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, + the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature + is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[8]</a>). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, + so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; + and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole + human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things + the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the + Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals + would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, + we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man + is more like to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 co."><a name="32375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32375] Iª q. 93 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod de imagine Dei loqui dupliciter possumus. Uno modo, quantum ad +id in quo primo consideratur ratio imaginis, quod est +intellectualis natura. Et sic imago Dei est magis in Angelis quam +sit in hominibus, quia intellectualis natura perfectior est in eis, +ut ex supra dictis patet. Secundo potest considerari imago Dei in +homine, quantum ad id in quo secundario consideratur, prout +scilicet in homine invenitur quaedam Dei imitatio, inquantum +scilicet homo est de homine, sicut Deus de Deo; et inquantum anima +hominis est tota in toto corpore eius, et iterum tota in qualibet +parte ipsius, sicut Deus se habet ad mundum. Et secundum haec et +similia, magis invenitur Dei imago in homine quam in Angelo. Sed +quantum ad hoc non attenditur per se ratio divinae imaginis in +homine, nisi praesupposita prima imitatione, quae est secundum +intellectualem naturam, alioquin etiam animalia bruta essent ad +imaginem Dei. Et ideo, cum quantum ad intellectualem naturam +Angelus sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo, simpliciter +concedendum est Angelum magis esse ad imaginem Dei; hominem autem +secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32376] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus excludit a Dei imagine alias inferiores +creaturas intellectu carentes, non autem Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; + so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine + had said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." + Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32377] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut ignis dicitur esse subtilissimum corporum +secundum suam speciem, cum tamen unus ignis sit alio subtilior; ita +dicitur quod nihil est coniunctius Deo quam mens humana, secundum +genus intellectualis naturae; quia, sicut ipse supra praemiserat, +<i>quae sapiunt, ita sunt illi similitudine proxima, ut in +creaturis nihil sit propinquius</i>. Unde per hoc non excluditur +quin Angelus sit magis ad Dei imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect + than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; + nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32378] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod substantia non recipit magis et +minus, non intelligitur quod una species substantiae non sit +perfectior quam alia, sed quod unum et idem individuum non +participet suam speciem quandoque magis, quandoque minus. Nec etiam +a diversis individuis participatur species substantiae secundum +magis et minus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A4-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 4. Whether the image of God is found in every man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman + is the image [Vulg. glory] of man" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32379] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in quolibet +homine. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod <i>vir est imago +Dei, mulier autem est imago viri</i>. Cum ergo mulier sit +individuum humanae speciei, non cuilibet individuo convenit esse +imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But all men are not predestined. + Therefore all men have not the conformity of image. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32380] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, quod <i>illos quos Deus praescivit +conformes fieri imagini filii sui, hos praedestinavit</i>. Sed non +omnes homines praedestinati sunt. Ergo non omnes homines habent +conformitatem imaginis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained + <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32381] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +similitudo est de ratione imaginis, ut supra dictum est. Sed per +peccatum fit homo Deo dissimilis. Ergo amittit Dei imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.38.7" target="asv">Ps. 38:7</a>): "Surely man passeth as an image." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32382] Iª q. 93 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXVIII, <i>veruntamen in imagine pertransit +homo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according + to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, + that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as + man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude + consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows + and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and + loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, + O Lord, is signed upon us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of "creation," of + "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 co."><a name="32383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32383] Iª q. 93 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse +dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod +intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem +intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum +intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari +in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem +naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum, et haec aptitudo +consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus +hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum +cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte, et haec est imago per +conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu +cognoscit et amat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum +similitudinem gloriae. Unde super illud Psalmi IV, <i>signatum est +super nos lumen vultus tui, domine</i>, Glossa distinguit triplicem +imaginem, scilicet creationis, recreationis et similitudinis. Prima +ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis +tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence + after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is added, "Male and female He created them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>). Moreover it is said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both + sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of + God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every + creature. So when the Apostle had said that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man," he adds his + reason for saying this: "For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32384] Iª q. 93 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod tam in viro quam in muliere invenitur Dei imago +quantum ad id in quo principaliter ratio imaginis consistit, +scilicet quantum ad intellectualem naturam. Unde Gen. I, cum +dixisset, <i>ad imaginem Dei creavit illum</i>, scilicet hominem, +subdidit, <i>masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>, et dixit +pluraliter eos, ut Augustinus dicit, ne intelligatur in uno +individuo uterque sexus fuisse coniunctus. Sed quantum ad aliquid +secundario imago Dei invenitur in viro, secundum quod non invenitur +in muliere, nam vir est principium mulieris et finis, sicut Deus +est principium et finis totius creaturae. Unde cum apostolus +dixisset quod <i>vir imago et gloria est Dei, mulier autem est +gloria viri</i>; ostendit quare hoc dixerit, subdens, <i>non enim +vir est ex muliere, sed mulier ex viro; et vir non est creatus +propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p8"> Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32385] Iª q. 93 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum et +tertium dicendum quod illae rationes procedunt de imagine quae est +secundum conformitatem gratiae et gloriae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A5-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 5. Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De + Fide ad Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made." And Hilary + (De Trin. v) says: "Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity." Therefore the image of God in man is + of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32386] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in homine non sit imago Dei quantum ad +Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de +fide ad Petrum, <i>una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter +divinitas, et imago ad quam factus est homo</i>. Et Hilarius, in V +de Trin., dicit quod <i>homo fit ad communem Trinitatis +imaginem</i>. Est ergo in homine imago Dei quantum ad essentiam, et +non quantum ad Trinitatem personarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De + Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." + Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that "man was made to the image of God, it + means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the + fulness of goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. + Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32387] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +libro de Eccles. Dogmat. dicitur quod imago Dei attenditur in +homine secundum aeternitatem. Damascenus etiam dicit quod +<i>hominem esse ad imaginem Dei, significat intellectuale, et +arbitrio liberum, et per se potestativum</i>. Gregorius etiam +Nyssenus dicit quod, cum Scriptura dixit hominem factum ad imaginem +Dei, <i>aequale est ac si diceret humanam naturam omnis boni factam +esse participem; bonitatis enim plenitudo divinitas est</i>. Haec +autem omnia non pertinent ad distinctionem personarum, sed magis ad +essentiae unitatem. Ergo in homine est imago Dei, non secundum +Trinitatem personarum, sed secundum essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God + as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man + could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q93_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32388] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago +ducit in cognitionem eius cuius est imago. Si igitur in homine est +imago Dei secundum Trinitatem personarum, cum homo per naturalem +rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem +cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum personarum. +Quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. + vi, 2) that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, + this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32389] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, nomen +imaginis non cuilibet trium personarum convenit, sed soli filio, +dicit enim Augustinus, in VI de Trin., quod <i>solus filius est +imago patris</i>. Si igitur in homine attenderetur Dei imago +secundum personam, non esset in homine imago totius Trinitatis, sed +filii tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made + to the image of God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32390] Iª q. 93 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Hilarius, in IV de Trin., per hoc quod homo dicitur ad +imaginem Dei factus, ostendit pluralitatem divinarum +personarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as we have seen ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q40_A2" id="FP_Q93_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[2]</a>), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin + is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, + and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the + Divine Persons is suitable to the + Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same + image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in + man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God + Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 co."><a name="32391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32391] Iª q. 93 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra habitum est, distinctio divinarum personarum non +est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes +originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus +originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae, +aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, +atque aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum +personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Unde esse ad +imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinae naturae, non excludit hoc +quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repraesentationem trium +personarum; sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur. Sic igitur dicendum +est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et +quantum ad Trinitatem personarum, nam et in ipso Deo in tribus +personis una existit natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p8"> Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32392] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet +responsio ad duo prima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. + xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: + "We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32393] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine +perfecte repraesentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in XV de +Trin., maxima est differentia huius Trinitatis quae est in nobis, +ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, <i>Trinitatem +quae in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse +Trinitatem, credimus potius quam videmus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, + because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness + to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, + the Father would not have said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but + "to Thy image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of God," the sense is not that the Father made man + to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, + of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in two ways: first, so that + this preposition "to" points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way that Our image + may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made (like) + to that one." Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is + put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32394] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt in homine esse solum imaginem filii. +Sed hoc improbat Augustinus, in XII de Trin. Primo quidem, per hoc +quod, cum secundum aequalitatem essentiae filius sit patri similis, +necesse est, si homo sit factus ad similitudinem filii, quod sit +factus ad similitudinem patris. Secundo quia, si homo esset factus +solum ad imaginem filii, non diceret pater, <i>faciamus hominem ad +imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>, sed tuam. Cum ergo dicitur, +ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, non est intelligendum quod pater +fecerit hominem solum ad imaginem filii, qui est Deus, ut quidam +exposuerunt, sed intelligendum est quod Deus Trinitas fecit hominem +ad imaginem suam, idest totius Trinitatis. Cum autem dicitur quod +Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, dupliciter potest intelligi. +Uno modo, quod haec praepositio ad designet terminum factionis, ut +sit sensus, faciamus hominem taliter, ut sit in eo imago. Alio +modo, haec praepositio ad potest designare causam exemplarem; sicut +cum dicitur, iste liber est factus ad illum. Et sic imago Dei est +ipsa essentia divina, quae abusive imago dicitur, secundum quod +imago ponitur pro exemplari. Vel, secundum quod quidam dicunt, +divina essentia dicitur imago, quia secundum eam una persona aliam +imitatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A6-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 6. Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>) that "the man is the image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only + in his mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32395] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine solum secundum +mentem. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei. +Sed vir non est solum mens. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur solum +secundum mentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>): "God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them." But the distinction + of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32396] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Gen. +I, <i>creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei +creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>. Sed distinctio +masculi et feminae est secundum corpus. Ergo etiam secundum corpus +attenditur Dei imago in homine, et non secundum mentem tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image + of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32397] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago +praecipue videtur attendi secundum figuram. Sed figura ad corpus +pertinet. Ergo imago Dei attenditur in homine etiam secundum +corpus, et non secundum mentem tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or + imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity + by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="32398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32398] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., triplex visio +invenitur in nobis, scilicet corporalis, spiritualis sive +imaginaria, et intellectualis. Si ergo secundum visionem +intellectualem, quae ad mentem pertinet, est aliqua Trinitas in +nobis, secundum quam sumus ad imaginem Dei; pari ratione et in +aliis visionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv">Eph. 4:23,24</a>): "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which + consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv">Col. 3:10</a>): "Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the image of Him that created him," + where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man + is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32399] Iª q. 93 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit, ad Eph. IV, <i>renovamini spiritu mentis +vestrae, et induite novum hominem</i>, ex quo datur intelligi quod +renovatio nostra, quae fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad +mentem pertinet. Sed ad Col. III, dicit, <i>induentes novum +hominem, qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius +qui creavit eum</i>, ubi renovationem quae est secundum novi +hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem +Dei pertinet solum ad mentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" + as we have explained above ( + <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational + creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; + while in the other parts, + which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference + to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in + which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, + as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as + not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so + also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. + </p><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p8"> Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness + of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of + the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they + imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained + <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, + if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the + Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q28_A3" id="FP_Q93_A6-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[28], A[3]</a>); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of + the + love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, + however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence + of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it + proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house + points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good + end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" + in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 co."><a name="32400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32400] Iª q. 93 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in +sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum +imaginis, ut supra dictum est, in aliis autem creaturis per modum +vestigii. Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias +creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in +ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem. +In aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, +invenitur similitudo vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus +secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur. Cuius ratio manifeste +cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repraesentat vestigium, et +quo repraesentat imago. Imago enim repraesentat secundum +similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repraesentat +per modum effectus qui sic repraesentat suam causam, quod tamen ad +speciei similitudinem non pertingit, impressiones enim quae ex motu +animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia; et similiter cinis +dicitur vestigium ignis; et desolatio terrae, vestigium hostilis +exercitus. Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter +creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in +creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad +hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatae. Nam +quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae +rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei +pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et +vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae +vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam +vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio +consideretur. Similiter, cum increata Trinitas distinguatur +secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut +supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur +processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum +voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam +repraesentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur +principium verbi, et verbum, et amor; sed apparet in eis quoddam +vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producente. Nam hoc ipsum +quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam, demonstrat +quod sit a quodam principio; species vero eius demonstrat verbum +facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis; +ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad +bonum, sicut usus aedificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic +igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis +secundum mentem; sed secundum alias partes eius, per modum +vestigii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; + as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God + as existing in every part of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32401] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter +sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; +sicut denarius dicitur imago Caesaris, inquantum habet Caesaris +imaginem. Unde non oportet quod secundum quamlibet partem hominis +accipiatur Dei imago.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. + They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the + woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." + All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is + the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the + image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after + the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," + it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that + the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of sex, but that the + image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv">Col. 3:10</a>), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [*these + words are in reality from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv"> Gal. 3:28</a>] (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew"). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32402] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin., quidam imaginem +Trinitatis in homine posuerunt, non secundum unum individuum, sed +secundum plura; dicentes quod <i>vir patris personam intimat; filii +vero personam, quod de viro ita processit ut de illo nasceretur; +atque ita tertiam personam, velut spiritum sanctum, dicunt esse +mulierem, quae ita de viro processit ut non ipsa esset filius aut +filia</i>. Quod prima facie absurdum videtur. Primo quidem, quia +sequeretur quod spiritus sanctus esset principium filii, sicut +mulier est principium prolis quae nascitur de viro. Secundo, quia +unus homo non esset nisi ad imaginem unius personae. Tertio, quia +secundum hoc Scriptura de imagine Dei in homine mentionem facere +non debuisset, nisi producta iam prole. Et ideo dicendum est quod +Scriptura, postquam dixerat, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, +addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, non ut imago Dei secundum +distinctiones sexuum attendatur; sed quia imago Dei utrique sexui +est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio +sexuum. Unde apostolus, ad Col. III, postquam dixerat, secundum +imaginem eius qui creavit illum, subdit, ubi non est masculus et +femina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial + animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that + it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But + this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; + but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32403] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quamvis imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum +figuram corpoream, tamen <i>corpus hominis, quia solum inter +terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, +sed tale est ut ad contemplandum caelum sit aptius, magis in hoc ad +imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cetera corpora animalium, +factum iure videri potest</i>; ut Augustinus dicit in libro +octoginta trium quaest. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi +in corpore hominis sit imago Dei, sed quia ipsa figura humani +corporis repraesentat imaginem Dei in anima, per modum +vestigii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal + vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the + sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest + on what is seen. + </p><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p13"> Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused + by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the + intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species + of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not + extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality + and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, + but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only + which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the + Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from + them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not + thus properly represented. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="32404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32404] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod tam in visione corporali quam in visione imaginaria +invenitur quaedam Trinitas, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trin. +In visione enim corporali est quidem primo species exterioris +corporis; secundo vero ipsa visio, quae fit per impressionem +cuiusdam similitudinis praedictae speciei in visum; tertio est ibi +intentio voluntatis applicans visum ad videndum, et eum in re visa +detinens. Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo +quidem species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, +quae provenit ex hoc quod acies animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, +informatur secundum praedictam speciem; tertio vero invenitur +intentio voluntatis coniungens utrumque. Sed utraque Trinitas +deficit a ratione divinae imaginis. Nam ipsa species exterioris +corporis est extra naturam animae, species autem quae est in +memoria, etsi non sit extra animam, est tamen adventitia animae, et +ita utrobique deficit repraesentatio connaturalitatis et +coaeternitatis divinarum personarum. Visio vero corporalis non +procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a +sensu videntis, et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a +specie quae in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute +imaginativa, et ita per hoc non repraesentatur convenienter +processio filii a solo patre. Intentio vero voluntatis, quae +coniungit duo praedicta, non ex eis procedit, neque in visione +corporea neque in spirituali, unde non convenienter repraesentatur +processio spiritus sancti a patre et filio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A7-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 7. Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man + was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist + does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32405] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in anima secundum +actus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, quod homo factus est +ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod <i>sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id +esse ac nosse diligimus</i>. Sed esse non significat actum. Ergo +imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things---mind, knowledge, and love. But + mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does + not extend to the acts of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32406] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, in IX de Trin., assignat imaginem Dei in anima secundum +haec tria, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. Mens autem non +significat actum; sed magis potentiam, vel etiam essentiam +intellectivae animae. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur secundum +actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But + these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of + God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32407] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, X de Trin., assignat imaginem Trinitatis in anima +secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Sed haec tria sunt +vires naturales animae, ut Magister dicit, III distinctione I libri +Sent. Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum +actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God + does not extend to the acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="32408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32408] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, imago +Trinitatis semper manet in anima. Sed actus non semper manet. Ergo +imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether + sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be + referred to actual vision. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32409] Iª q. 93 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus, XI de Trin., assignat Trinitatem in inferioribus +animae partibus secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et +imaginariam. Ergo et Trinitas quae est in mente, secundum quam homo +est ad imaginem Dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained + <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is + to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the + Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, + and the procession of Love connecting + Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and + chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we + possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are + the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image + of + the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist + therein. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 co."><a name="32410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32410] Iª q. 93 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet +aliqualis repraesentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinae +debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter +attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad +repraesentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinae autem +personae distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et +amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine +actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de +Trin. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in +mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, +cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem +prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; +unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et +quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima +secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis +scilicet actus virtualiter existunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so + far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), + and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32411] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod esse nostrum ad imaginem Dei pertinet, quod est nobis +proprium supra alia animalia; quod quidem esse competit nobis +inquantum mentem habemus. Et ideo eadem est haec Trinitas cum illa +quam Augustinus ponit in IX de Trin., quae consistit in mente, +notitia et amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in + a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself---namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches + itself, as Augustine subsequently proves---De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to + mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, + understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to + these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32412] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus hanc Trinitatem primo adinvenit in mente. +Sed quia mens, etsi se totam quodammodo cognoscat, etiam quodammodo +se ignorat, prout scilicet est ab aliis distincta; et sic etiam se +quaerit, ut Augustinus consequenter probat in X de Trin., ideo, +quasi notitia non totaliter menti coaequetur, accipit in anima tria +quaedam propria mentis, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et +voluntatem, quae nullus ignorat se habere, et in istis tribus +potius imaginem Trinitatis assignat, quasi prima assignatio sit +quodammodo deficiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually + consider them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our + memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. + <a href="#FP_Q79_A7" id="FP_Q93_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[7]</a>, ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without + actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), + this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that + whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent." + From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in + these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul + in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers + as stated in the Sentences. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32413] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat XIV de Trin., intelligere +dicimur et velle seu amare aliqua, et quando de his cogitamus, et +quando de his non cogitamus. Sed quando sine cogitatione sunt, ad +solam memoriam pertinent; quae nihil est aliud, secundum ipsum, +quam habitualis retentio notitiae et amoris. Sed quia, ut ipse +dicit, <i>verbum ibi esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus +enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiori verbo quod ad nullius +gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista +cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate. Hanc +autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam +voluntatem sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem +parentemque coniungit</i>. Ex quo patet quod imaginem divinae +Trinitatis potius ponit in intelligentia et voluntate actuali, quam +secundum quod sunt in habituali retentione memoriae, licet etiam +quantum ad hoc, aliquo modo sit imago Trinitatis in anima, ut +ibidem dicitur. Et sic patet quod memoria, intelligentia et +voluntas non sunt tres vires, ut in sententiis dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever + understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. + But he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." + Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually + but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. + But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always + actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): + "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand + and + consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="32414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32414] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod aliquis respondere posset per hoc quod Augustinus +dicit XIV de Trin., quod <i>mens semper sui meminit, semper se +intelligit et amat</i>. Quod quidam sic intelligunt, quasi animae +adsit actualis intelligentia et amor sui ipsius. Sed hunc +intellectum excludit per hoc quod subdit, quod <i>non semper se +cogitat discretam ab his quae non sunt quod ipsa</i>. Et sic patet +quod anima semper intelligit et amat se, non actualiter, sed +habitualiter. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod, percipiendo actum +suum, seipsam intelligit quandocumque aliquid intelligit. Sed quia +non semper est actu intelligens, ut patet in dormiente, ideo +oportet dicere quod actus, etsi non semper maneant in seipsis, +manent tamen semper in suis principiis, scilicet potentiis et +habitibus. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., <i>si secundum hoc +facta est ad imaginem Dei anima rationalis, quod uti ratione atque +intellectu ad intelligendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, ab initio +quo esse coepit, fuit in ea Dei imago</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A8-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 8. Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the + image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above + <a href="#FP_Q93_A7" id="FP_Q93_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>, according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any + object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32415] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod imago divinae Trinitatis sit in anima non +solum per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus. Imago enim +divinae Trinitatis invenitur in anima, sicut dictum est, secundum +quod verbum in nobis procedit a dicente et amor ab utroque. Sed hoc +invenitur in nobis secundum quodcumque obiectum. Ergo secundum +quodcumque obiectum invenitur in mente nostra imago divinae +Trinitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without + separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of + the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32416] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., quod <i>cum quaerimus in anima +Trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem +in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum</i>. Ergo etiam +secundum temporalia obiecta invenitur imago Trinitatis in +anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason + of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common + to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32417] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod +Deum intelligamus et amemus, convenit nobis secundum gratiae donum. +Si igitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem seu +dilectionem Dei, attendatur imago Trinitatis in anima, non erit +imago Dei in homine secundum naturam, sed secundum gratiam. Et sic +non erit omnibus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:18</a>): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. + Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="32418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32418] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sancti qui sunt in patria, maxime conformantur imagini Dei secundum +gloriae visionem, unde dicitur, II ad Cor. III, <i>in eandem +imaginem transformamur, a claritate in claritatem</i>. Sed secundum +visionem gloriae temporalia cognoscuntur. Ergo etiam per +comparationem ad temporalia, Dei imago attenditur in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves + itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less, + therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32419] Iª q. 93 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod <i>non propterea est Dei +imago in mente, quia sui meminit, et intelligit et diligit se, sed +quia potest etiam meminisse, intelligere et amare Deum, a quo facta +est</i>. Multo igitur minus secundum alia obiecta attenditur imago +Dei in mente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we + need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, + so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated ( + <a href="#FP_Q93_A6" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">AA[6]</a>,7), are distinguished from each other according to the + procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by + the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects + diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that + of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to + the + verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul + according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an + object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected + in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind remembers + itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, + rightly called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby + it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 co."><a name="32420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32420] Iª q. 93 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, imago importat similitudinem utcumque +pertingentem ad speciei repraesentationem. Unde oportet quod imago +divinae Trinitatis attendatur in anima secundum aliquid quod +repraesentat divinas personas repraesentatione speciei, sicut est +possibile creaturae. Distinguuntur autem divinae personae, ut +dictum est, secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab +utroque. Verbum autem Dei nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui +ipsius, et amor procedit a Deo secundum quod seipsum amat. +Manifestum est autem quod diversitas obiectorum diversificat +speciem verbi et amoris, non enim idem est specie in corde hominis +verbum conceptum de lapide et de equo, nec idem specie amor. +Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum +de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum. Et sic imago Dei +attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in +Deum. Fertur autem in aliquid mens dupliciter, uno modo, directe et +immediate; alio modo, indirecte et mediate, sicut cum aliquis, +videndo imaginem hominis in speculo, dicitur ferri in ipsum +hominem. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod <i>mens +meminit sui, intelligit se, et diligit se, hoc si cernimus, +cernimus Trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei</i>. +Sed hoc est, non quia fertur mens in seipsam absolute, sed prout +per hoc ulterius potest ferri in Deum; ut patet per auctoritatem +supra inductam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what + proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32421] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ad rationem imaginis, non solum oportet attendere +quod aliquid procedat ab aliquo; sed etiam quid a quo procedat, +scilicet quod verbum Dei procedit a notitia de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation + of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that + part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not + to be seen there," as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of + temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; + but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. + Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will + no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32422] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in tota quidem anima invenitur aliqua Trinitas, non +quidem ita quod praeter actionem temporalium et contemplationem +aeternorum, <i>quaeratur aliquod tertium quo Trinitas +impleatur</i>, prout ibidem subditur. Sed in illa parte rationis +quae derivatur a parte temporalium, etsi <i>Trinitas inveniri +possit, non tamen imago Dei potest inveniri</i>, ut postea dicitur, +quia huiusmodi temporalium notitia adventitia est animae. Et +habitus etiam ipsi quibus temporalia cognoscuntur, non semper +adsunt; sed quandoque quidem praesentialiter adsunt, quandoque +autem secundum memoriam tantum, etiam postquam adesse incipiunt. +Sicut patet de fide, quae temporaliter nobis advenit in praesenti, +in statu autem futurae beatitudinis iam non erit fides, sed memoria +fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as + seen above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>; + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A3" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q60_A5" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.3" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already + said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be + so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured + and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32423] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod meritoria Dei cognitio et dilectio non est nisi per +gratiam. Est tamen aliqua Dei cognitio et dilectio naturalis, ut +supra habitum est. Et hoc etiam ipsum naturale est, quod mens ad +intelligendum Deum ratione uti potest, secundum quod imaginem Dei +semper diximus permanere in mente, sive haec imago Dei ita sit +obsoleta, quasi obumbrata, ut pene nulla sit, ut in his qui non +habent usum rationis; sive sit obscura atque deformis, ut in +peccatoribus; sive sit clara et pulchra, ut in iustis, sicut +Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the + image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully + adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="32424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32424] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod secundum visionem gloriae, temporalia videbuntur in +ipso Deo; et ideo huiusmodi temporalium visio ad Dei imaginem +pertinebit. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod +<i>in illa natura cui mens feliciter adhaerebit, immutabile videbit +omne quod viderit</i>. Nam et in ipso verbo increato sunt rationes +omnium creaturarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A9-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 9. Whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." For "genus" is not properly distinguished from + "species." Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, + but not conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness" is not properly to be distinguished from "image." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="32425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32425] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo ab imagine non convenienter +distinguatur. Genus enim non convenienter distinguitur a specie. +Sed similitudo comparatur ad imaginem, ut genus ad speciem, quia +<i>ubi est imago, ibi est continuo similitudo, sed non +convertitur</i>, ut dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo +inconvenienter similitudo ab imagine distinguitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation + of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness + is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="32426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32426] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ratio +imaginis attenditur non solum secundum repraesentationem divinarum +personarum, sed etiam secundum repraesentationem divinae essentiae, +ad quam repraesentationem pertinet immortalitas et indivisibilitas. +Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod <i>similitudo est in essentia, +quia est immortalis et indivisibilis; imago autem in aliis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the image of God in man is threefold---the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained + <a href="#FP_Q93_A4" id="FP_Q93_A9-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is + taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="32427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32427] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago +Dei in homine est triplex, scilicet naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut +supra habitum est. Sed innocentia et iustitia ad gratiam pertinent. +Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod <i>imago accipitur secundum +memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; similitudo autem secundum +innocentiam et iustitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. + Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in + the love of virtue." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 4"><a name="32428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32428] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +cognitio veritatis ad intelligentiam pertinet, amor autem virtutis +ad voluntatem, quae sunt duae partes imaginis. Non ergo +convenienter dicitur quod <i>imago sit in cognitione veritatis, +similitudo in dilectione virtutis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and "likeness," + since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 s. c."><a name="32429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32429] Iª q. 93 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>sunt +qui non frustra intelligunt duo dicta esse ad imaginem et +similitudinem; cum, si una res esset, unum nomen sufficere +potuisset</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, + since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. + Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying + some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between + "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is + subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, + likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we + have said above + <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it + signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation + is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in + more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the + image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without + doubt was made to the image of God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the + body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of + God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness + may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says + (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness + implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the + love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 co."><a name="32430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32430] Iª q. 93 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod similitudo quaedam unitas est, unum enim in qualitate +similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Unum autem, cum sit +de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus, et ad singula potest +aptari; sicut et bonum et verum. Unde, sicut bonum alicui rei +particulari potest comparari ut praeambulum ad ipsam, et ut +subsequens, prout designat aliquam perfectionem ipsius; ita etiam +est de comparatione similitudinis ad imaginem. Est enim bonum +praeambulum ad hominem, secundum quod homo est quoddam particulare +bonum, et rursus bonum subsequitur ad hominem, inquantum aliquem +hominem specialiter dicimus esse bonum, propter perfectionem +virtutis. Et similiter similitudo consideratur ut praeambulum ad +imaginem, inquantum est communius quam imago, ut supra dictum est, +consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat +quandam imaginis perfectionem; dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse +similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel +imperfecte repraesentat ipsum. Sic ergo similitudo potest ab +imagine distingui dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est praeambula ad +ipsam, et in pluribus existens. Et sic similitudo attenditur +secundum ea quae sunt communiora proprietatibus naturae +intellectualis, secundum quas proprie attenditur imago. Et secundum +hoc dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod spiritus, idest +mens, ad imaginem Dei, nullo dubitante, factus est, cetera autem +hominis, scilicet quae pertinent ad inferiores partes animae, vel +etiam ad ipsum corpus, ad similitudinem facta esse aliqui volunt. +Secundum hoc etiam in libro de quantitate animae dicitur quod +similitudo Dei attenditur in anima, inquantum est incorruptibilis, +nam corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt differentiae entis +communis. Alio modo potest considerari similitudo, secundum quod +significat imaginis expressionem et perfectionem. Et secundum hoc +Damascenus dicit quod <i>id quod est secundum imaginem, +intellectuale significat, et arbitrio liberum per se potestativum, +quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini +possibile est inesse, similitudinem</i>. Et ad idem refertur quod +similitudo dicitur ad dilectionem virtutis pertinere, non enim est +virtus sine dilectione virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so + far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea of "image." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="32431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32431] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum +communem rationem similitudinis (sic enim includitur in ratione +ipsius imaginis), sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a +ratione imaginis, vel etiam est imaginis perfectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual + nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="32432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32432] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad imaginem, prout +repraesentat divinam essentiam secundum ea quae sunt propria +intellectualis naturae, non autem secundum conditiones consequentes +ens in communi, ut est esse simplicem et indissolubilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" + exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="32433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32433] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam virtutes quaedam naturaliter insunt animae, ad +minus secundum quaedam earum semina, et secundum has posset attendi +similitudo naturalis. Quamvis non sit inconveniens ut id quod +secundum assignationem unam dicitur imago, secundum aliam dicatur +similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as + virtue itself belongs to likeness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 4"><a name="32434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32434] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod dilectio verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinet ad +rationem imaginis, sed dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem, +sicut et virtus.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q94" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q94-p0.1">Q. 94. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q94-p2"> We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning + the first there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as + to his will. + </p><p id="FP_Q94-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q94-p4"><a href="#FP_Q94_A1"> (1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p5"><a href="#FP_Q94_A2"> (2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p6"><a href="#FP_Q94_A3"> (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p7"><a href="#FP_Q94_A4"> (4) Whether he could err or be deceived?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 pr."><a name="32435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32435] +Iª q. 94 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de statu vel +conditione primi hominis. Et primo, quantum ad animam; secundo, +quantum ad corpus. Circa primum consideranda sunt duo, primo, de +conditione hominis quantum ad intellectum; secundo, de conditione +hominis quantum ad voluntatem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum primus homo viderit Deum per essentiam. Secundo, utrum +videre potuerit substantias separatas, idest Angelos. Tertio, utrum +habuerit omnium scientiam. Quarto, utrum potuerit errare vel +decipi.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q94_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A1-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 1. Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. + But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says + (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy + must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the first + man in paradise saw God through His Essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32436] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo per essentiam Deum viderit. +Beatitudo enim hominis in visione divinae essentiae consistit. Sed +primus homo, in Paradiso conversans, beatam et omnium divitem +habuit vitam, ut Damascenus dicit in II libro. Et Augustinus dicit, +in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>si homines habebant affectus suos quales +nunc habemus, quomodo erant beati in illo inenarrabilis +beatitudinis loco, idest Paradiso?</i> Ergo primus homo in Paradiso +vidit Deum per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that "the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." + But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32437] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>primo homini non aberat +quidquam quod bona voluntas adipisceretur</i>. Sed nihil melius +bona voluntas adipisci potest quam divinae essentiae visionem. Ergo +homo per essentiam Deum videbat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the vision of God is His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence + "saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma + implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state + saw God through His Essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32438] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, visio +Dei per essentiam est qua videtur Deus sine medio et sine +aenigmate. Sed homo in statu innocentiae vidit Deum sine medio; ut +Magister dicit in I distinctione IV libri Sent. Vidit etiam sine +aenigmate, quia aenigma obscuritatem importat, ut Augustinus dicit, +XV de Trin.; obscuritas autem introducta est per peccatum. Ergo +homo in primo statu vidit Deum per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.46" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:46</a>): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. + Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32439] Iª q. 94 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, quod <i>non prius quod +spirituale est, sed quod animale</i>. Sed maxime spirituale est +videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo primus homo, in primo statu +animalis vitae, Deum per essentiam non vidit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be + said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.21" target="asv">Gn. 2:21</a>). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence + has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, + since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly + turn away from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of + God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence. + </p><p id="FP_Q94_A1-p7"> Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our + knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this + clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His + creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in + it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is + seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. + But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he + is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>): "God made man + right." And man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher + nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear + and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a + natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak to the + first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him + the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible + effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 co."><a name="32440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32440] Iª q. 94 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod primus homo Deum per essentiam non vidit, secundum communem +statum illius vitae; nisi forte dicatur quod viderit eum in raptu, +quando Deus immisit soporem in Adam, ut dicitur Gen. II. Et huius +ratio est quia, cum divina essentia sit ipsa beatitudo, hoc modo se +habet intellectus videntis divinam essentiam ad Deum, sicut se +habet quilibet homo ad beatitudinem. Manifestum est autem quod +nullus homo potest per voluntatem a beatitudine averti, naturaliter +enim, et ex necessitate, homo vult beatitudinem, et fugit miseriam. +Unde nullus videns Deum per essentiam, potest voluntate averti a +Deo, quod est peccare. Et propter hoc, omnes videntes Deum per +essentiam, sic in amore Dei stabiliuntur, quod in aeternum peccare +non possunt. Cum ergo Adam peccaverit, manifestum est quod Deum per +essentiam non videbat. Cognoscebat tamen Deum quadam altiori +cognitione quam nos cognoscamus, et sic quodammodo eius cognitio +media erat inter cognitionem praesentis status, et cognitionem +patriae, qua Deus per essentiam videtur. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod visio Dei per essentiam dividitur contra +visionem Dei per creaturam. Quanto autem aliqua creatura est altior +et Deo similior, tanto per eam Deus clarius videtur, sicut homo +perfectius videtur per speculum in quo expressius imago eius +resultat. Et sic patet quod multo eminentius videtur Deus per +intelligibiles effectus, quam per sensibiles et corporeos. A +consideratione autem plena et lucida intelligibilium effectuum +impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a +sensibilibus, et circa ea occupatur. Sed, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, +Deus fecit hominem rectum. Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis +divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderentur, et +superiora ab inferioribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non +impediebatur per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplatione +intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis +percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita. Unde dicit +Augustinus, in XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>fortassis Deus +primis hominibus antea loquebatur, sicut cum Angelis loquitur, ipsa +incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum; etsi non tanta +participatione divinae essentiae, quantam capiunt Angeli</i>. Sic +igitur per huiusmodi intelligibiles effectus Dei, Deum clarius +cognoscebat quam modo cognoscamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of + the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. + xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32441] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod homo in Paradiso beatus fuit, non illa perfecta +beatitudine in quam transferendus erat, quae in divinae essentiae +visione consistit, habebat tamen beatam vitam secundum quendam +modum, ut Augustinus dicit XI super Gen. ad Litt., inquantum +habebat integritatem et perfectionem quandam naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while + in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32442] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona voluntas est ordinata voluntas. Non autem +fuisset primi hominis ordinata voluntas, si in statu meriti habere +voluisset quod ei promittebatur pro praemio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, + a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge + of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without + the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the + knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, + especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied + in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity + of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take + obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with + sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32443] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod duplex est medium. Quoddam, in quo simul videtur quod +per medium videri dicitur; sicut cum homo videtur per speculum, et +simul videtur cum ipso speculo. Aliud medium est, per cuius +notitiam in aliquid ignotum devenimus; sicut est medium +demonstrationis. Et sine tali medio Deus videbatur, non tamen sine +primo medio. Non enim oportebat primum hominem pervenire in Dei +cognitionem per demonstrationem sumptam ab aliquo effectu, sicut +nobis est necessarium; sed simul in effectibus, praecipue +intelligibilibus, suo modo Deum cognoscebat. Similiter etiam est +considerandum quod obscuritas quae importatur in nomine aenigmatis, +dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo, secundum quod quaelibet +creatura est quoddam obscurum, si comparetur ad immensitatem +divinae claritatis, et sic Adam videbat Deum in aenigmate, quia +videbat Deum per effectum creatum. Alio modo potest accipi +obscuritas quae consecuta est ex peccato, prout scilicet impeditur +homo a consideratione intelligibilium per sensibilium occupationem, +et secundum hoc, non vidit Deum in aenigmate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A3-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 3. Whether the first man knew all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, + or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired + by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural + species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says + (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it + would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32452] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non habuerit scientiam omnium. +Aut enim habuit talem scientiam per species acquisitas, aut per +species connaturales, aut per species infusas. Non autem per +species acquisitas, huiusmodi enim cognitio ab experientia +causatur, ut dicitur in I Metaphys.; ipse autem non tunc fuerat +omnia expertus. Similiter etiam nec per species connaturales, quia +erat eiusdem naturae nobiscum; anima autem nostra est sicut tabula +in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Si autem per +species infusas, ergo scientia eius quam habebat de rebus, non erat +eiusdem rationis cum scientia nostra, quam a rebus acquirimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, + knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam + know all things when he was first created. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32453] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei est idem modus consequendi +perfectionem. Sed alii homines non statim in sui principio habent +omnium scientiam, sed eam per temporis successionem acquirunt +secundum suum modum. Ergo nec Adam, statim formatus, habuit omnium +scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the + soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore + also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32454] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +status praesentis vitae homini conceditur ut in eo proficiat anima +et quantum ad cognitionem, et quantum ad meritum; propter hoc enim +anima corpori videtur esse unita. Sed homo in statu illo +profecisset quantum ad meritum. Ergo etiam profecisset quantum ad +cognitionem rerum. Non ergo habuit omnium rerum scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man named the animals ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.20" target="asv">Gn. 2:20</a>). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals' natures; and in like manner he was + possessed of the knowledge of all other things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32455] Iª q. 94 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod ipse imposuit nomina animalibus, ut dicitur Gen. II. Nomina +autem debent naturis rerum congruere. Ergo Adam scivit naturas +omnium animalium, et pari ratione, habuit omnium aliorum +scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality + is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they + might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards + others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but + also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the + work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others. + </p><p id="FP_Q94_A3-p7"> Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to + have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in + the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his + own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things + surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to + know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these + supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known + by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such + as + the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; + and the like. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 co."><a name="32456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32456] Iª q. 94 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod naturali ordine perfectum praecedit imperfectum, sicut et +actus potentiam, quia ea quae sunt in potentia, non reducuntur ad +actum nisi per aliquod ens actu. Et quia res primitus a Deo +institutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut +essent aliorum principia; ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in +quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse +principium alterius non solum per generationem corporalem, sed +etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo, sicut primus +homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim +posset generare; ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum +ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non +potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo +primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam +in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et haec sunt omnia illa quae +virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quaecumque +scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt. Ad gubernationem +autem vitae propriae et aliorum, non solum requiritur cognitio +eorum quae naturaliter sciri possunt, sed etiam cognitio eorum quae +naturalem cognitionem excedunt; eo quod vita hominis ordinatur ad +quendam finem supernaturalem; sicut nobis, ad gubernationem vitae +nostrae, necessarium est cognoscere quae fidei sunt. Unde et de his +supernaturalibus tantam cognitionem primus homo accepit, quanta +erat necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae secundum statum +illum. Alia vero, quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci +possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus +homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura +contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli iaceant in +flumine, et alia huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as + the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32457] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod primus homo habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo +infusas. Nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia +nostra; sicut nec oculi quos caeco nato Christus dedit, fuerunt +alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To Adam, as being the first man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what + is above explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32458] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Adam debebat aliquid habere perfectionis, inquantum +erat primus homo, quod ceteris hominibus non competit; ut ex dictis +patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what + he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also + have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. + Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; + since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32459] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Adam in scientia naturalium scibilium non profecisset +quantum ad numerum scitorum, sed quantum ad modum sciendi, quia +quae sciebat intellectualiter, scivisset postmodum per +experimentum. Quantum vero ad supernaturalia cognita, profecisset +etiam quantum ad numerum, per novas revelationes; sicut et Angeli +proficiunt per novas illuminationes. Nec tamen est simile de +profectu meriti, et scientiae, quia unus homo non est alteri +principium merendi, sicut est sciendi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A4-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 4. Whether man in his first state could be deceived?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14</a>) that "the woman being seduced was in the transgression." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32460] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo in primo statu decipi potuisset. +Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>mulier seducta in +praevaricatione fuit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought + that he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32461] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Magister dicit, XXI dist. II Sent., quod <i>ideo mulier non horruit +serpentem loquentem, quia officium loquendi eum accepisse a Deo +putavit</i>. Sed hoc falsum erat. Ergo mulier decepta fuit ante +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes + is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived + in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32462] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +naturale est quod quanto aliquid remotius videtur, tanto minus +videtur. Sed natura oculi non est contracta per peccatum. Ergo hoc +idem in statu innocentiae contigisset. Fuisset ergo homo deceptus +circa quantitatem rei visae, sicut et modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the + things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he + would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32463] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod in somno adhaeret +anima similitudini tanquam ipsi rei. Sed homo in statu innocentiae +comedisset, et per consequens dormivisset et somniasset. Ergo +deceptus fuisset, adhaerendo similitudinibus tanquam rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above + + <a href="#FP_Q94_A3" id="FP_Q94_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="32464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32464] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +primus homo nescivisset cogitationes hominum et futura +contingentia, ut dictum est. Si igitur aliquis super his sibi +falsum diceret, deceptus fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment + of man condemned." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32465] Iª q. 94 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, <i>approbare vera pro falsis, non est natura +instituti hominis, sed poena damnati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, + as though it were true, but without the assent of belief---or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be + deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his + knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide + sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory + to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed. + </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p9"> Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist." + Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, + 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to + assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the + first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false + opinion. + </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p10"> This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to + God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded + ( + <a href="#FP_Q85_A6" id="FP_Q94_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[6]</a>), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but + whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as + the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, + but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was + incompatible with deception of the intellect. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 co."><a name="32466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32466] Iª q. 94 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam dixerunt quod in nomine deceptionis duo possunt +intelligi, scilicet qualiscumque existimatio levis, qua aliquis +adhaeret falso tanquam vero, sine assensu credulitatis; et iterum +firma credulitas. Quantum ergo ad ea quorum scientiam Adam habebat, +neutro istorum modorum homo decipi poterat ante peccatum. Sed +quantum ad ea quorum scientiam non habebat, decipi poterat, large +accepta deceptione pro existimatione qualicumque sine assensu +credulitatis. Quod ideo dicunt, quia existimare falsum in talibus, +non est noxium homini; et ex quo temere assensus non adhibetur, non +est culpabile. Sed haec positio non convenit integritati primi +status, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civit. Dei, <i>in illo +statu erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente, nullum malum +omnino esse poterat</i>. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut verum est +bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum eius, ut dicitur in VI +Ethic. Unde non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus +hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris +corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, +puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat; ita in +intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen +poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi. Quod etiam ex ipsa rectitudine +primi status apparet, secundum quam, quandiu anima maneret Deo +subdita, tandiu in homine inferiora superioribus subderentur, nec +superiora per inferiora impedirentur. Manifestum est autem ex +praemissis quod intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus +est. Unde ex seipso nunquam decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit +in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo +huiusmodi. Unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est +ligatum, non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando +ligatur, ut patet in dormientibus. Unde manifestum est quod +rectitudo primi status non compatiebatur aliquam deceptionem circa +intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. + For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already + acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32467] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum +operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim +Augustinus, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>mulier verbis serpentis +non crederet, nisi iam inesset menti eius amor propriae potestatis, +et quaedam de se superba praesumptio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some + supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32468] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mulier putavit serpentem hoc accepisse loquendi +officium, non per naturam, sed aliqua supernaturali operatione. +Quamvis non sit necessarium auctoritatem Magistri sententiarum +sequi in hac parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would + not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32469] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si aliquid repraesentatum fuisset sensui vel +phantasiae primi hominis aliter quam sit in rerum natura, non tamen +deciperetur, quia per rationem veritatem diiudicaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper + action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32470] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod id quod accidit in somno, non imputatur homini, quia +non habet usum rationis, qui est proprius hominis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive + state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been + to entertain a false opinion. + </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p16"> It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his + knowledge did not extend. + </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p17"> If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that + man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="32471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32471] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod alicui dicenti falsum de contingentibus futuris vel +cogitationibus cordium, homo in statu innocentiae non credidisset +ita esse, sed credidisset quod hoc esset possibile, et hoc non +esset existimare falsum. Vel potest dici quod divinitus ei +subventum fuisset, ne deciperetur in his quorum scientiam non +habebat. Nec est instantia, quam quidam afferunt, quod in +tentatione non fuit ei subventum ne deciperetur, licet tunc maxime +indigeret. Quia iam praecesserat peccatum in animo, et ad divinum +auxilium recursum non habuit.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q95" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q95-p0.1">Q. 95. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q95-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace + and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. + </p><p id="FP_Q95-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q95-p4"><a href="#FP_Q95_A1"> (1) Whether the first man was created in grace?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p5"><a href="#FP_Q95_A2"> (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p6"><a href="#FP_Q95_A3"> (3) Whether he had all virtues?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p7"><a href="#FP_Q95_A4"> (4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 pr."><a name="32472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32472] +Iª q. 95 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae +pertinent ad voluntatem primi hominis. Et circa hoc consideranda +sunt duo, primo quidem, de gratia et iustitia primi hominis; +secundo, de usu iustitiae quantum ad dominium super alia. Circa +primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum primus homo creatus fuerit +in gratia. Secundo, utrum in statu innocentiae habuerit animae +passiones. Tertio, utrum habuit virtutes omnes. Quarto, utrum opera +eius fuissent aeque efficacia ad merendum, sicut modo sunt.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q95_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A1-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 1. Whether the first man was created in grace?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.45" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:45</a>): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. + Therefore Christ alone was made in grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32473] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non fuerit creatus in gratia. +Apostolus enim, I Cor. XV, distinguens Adam a Christo, dicit, +<i>factus est primus Adam in animam viventem; novissimus autem in +spiritum vivificantem</i>. Sed vivificatio spiritus est per +gratiam. Ergo hoc est proprium Christi, quod fuerit factus in +gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of + St. Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam + was not created in grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32474] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaestionibus veteris et novi +testamenti, quod <i>Adam non habuit spiritum sanctum</i>. Sed +quicumque habet gratiam, habet spiritum sanctum. Ergo Adam non fuit +creatus in gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what + they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." God thus first + created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32475] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, quod <i>Deus +sic ordinavit Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut prius in eis +ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset +suae gratiae beneficium, iustitiaeque iudicium</i>. Primo ergo +condidit hominem et Angelum in sola naturali arbitrii libertate, et +postmodum eis gratiam contulit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient + to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32476] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Magister dicit, in XXIV distinctione libri II Sent., quod <i>homini +in creatione datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat, sed non +poterat proficere</i>. Quicumque autem habet gratiam, potest +proficere per meritum. Ergo primus homo non fuit creatus in +gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place + between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his + creation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32477] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ad +hoc quod aliquis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte +recipientis, cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale +inter Deum et animam. Sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi +prius existentis. Ergo homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti +suae creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes + glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="32478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32478] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +natura plus distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est +aliud quam gratia consummata. Sed in homine gratia praecessit +gloriam. Ergo multo magis natura praecessit gratiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): + "God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32479] Iª q. 95 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, homo +et Angelus aequaliter ordinantur ad gratiam. Sed Angelus est +creatus in gratia, dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, quod +<i>Deus simul erat in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam</i>. +Ergo et homo creatus fuit in gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A1-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities + of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence. + </p><p id="FP_Q95_A1-p10"> But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he + was created in grace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:30, </a> "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the + body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject + to God, the lower powers remained subject to + reason, as Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection + of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; + since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that + also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a + supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence + Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they + were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding + to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may + gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 co."><a name="32480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32480] Iª q. 95 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit quidem creatus in +gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia fuit sibi collata antequam +peccasset, plurimae enim sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem +in statu innocentiae gratiam habuisse. Sed quod etiam fuerit +conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa +rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud +Eccle. VII, <i>Deus fecit hominem rectum</i>. Erat enim haec +rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero +inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat +causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo +subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit. Manifestum +est autem quod illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum +virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum +mansisset, cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum +permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom. Unde +manifestum est quod et illa prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo +subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum +supernaturale donum gratiae, non enim potest esse quod effectus sit +potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod +<i>posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia +deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, +senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam +poenam inobedientiae suae</i>. Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente +gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in +anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual + life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's + words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards + the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32481] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod apostolus illa verba inducit ad ostendendum esse +corpus spirituale, si est corpus animale, quia vita spiritualis +corporis incoepit in Christo, qui est primogenitus ex mortuis, +sicut vita corporis animalis incoepit in Adam. Non ergo ex verbis +apostoli habetur quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam; +sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with + the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness + directly after death. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32482] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in eodem loco, non negatur +quin aliquo modo fuerit in Adam spiritus sanctus, sicut et in aliis +iustis, sed quod non sic fuerit in eo, sicut nunc est in fidelibus, +qui admittuntur ad perceptionem haereditatis aeternae statim post +mortem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed + grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards + by being so confirmed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32483] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non habetur quod +Angelus vel homo prius fuerit creatus in naturali libertate +arbitrii, quam habuisset gratiam, sed quod prius ostendit quid in +eis posset liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem, et quid postmodum +consecuti sunt per auxilium gratiae confirmantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state + of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created + that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32484] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum qui +posuerunt hominem non esse creatum in gratia, sed in naturalibus +tantum. Vel potest dici quod, etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, +non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per +meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the + first moment of his existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32485] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil +prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem +gratiae consensisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="32486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32486] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum +quod gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum +naturae. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A2-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 2. Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.7" target="asv">Gal. 5:7</a>). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32487] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in primo homine non fuerint animae +passiones. Secundum enim passiones animae contingit quod caro +concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed hoc non erat in statu +innocentiae. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erant animae +passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32488] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima +Adae erat nobilior quam corpus. Sed corpus Adae fuit impassibile. +Ergo nec in anima eius fuerunt passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore + the passions were entirely excluded from him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32489] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, per +virtutem moralem comprimuntur animae passiones. Sed in Adam fuit +virtus moralis perfecta. Ergo totaliter passiones excludebantur ab +eo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of + the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32490] Iª q. 95 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod erat in eis amor +imperturbatus in Deum, et quaedam aliae animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the + soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive + state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such + as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning + concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the + proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they + exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times + our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual + appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so + that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 co."><a name="32491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32491] Iª q. 95 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensuali, cuius obiectum est +bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad +bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et +quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod +bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, +ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones quae +respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; +similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et +nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae +possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt +futuri boni ut suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non +affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae. Aliter tamen quam in +nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non +totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis +praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex +iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus +aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior +appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo +passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of + innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32492] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per hoc quod +passiones rationi repugnant, quod in statu innocentiae non +erat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as + will be explained later on ( + <a href="#FP_Q97_A2" id="FP_Q95_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[2]</a>); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32493] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod corpus humanum in statu innocentiae erat impassibile +quantum ad passiones quae removent dispositionem naturalem, ut +infra dicetur. Et similiter anima fuit impassibilis quantum ad +passiones quae impediunt rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he + ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32494] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit +passiones, sed ordinat eas, <i>temperati enim est concupiscere +sicut oportet, et quae oportet</i>, ut dicitur in III Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A3-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 3. Whether Adam had all the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence + is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the + passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32495] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Adam non habuerit omnes virtutes. Quaedam +enim virtutes ordinantur ad refraenandam immoderantiam passionum; +sicut per temperantiam refraenatur immoderata concupiscentia, et +per fortitudinem immoderatus timor. Sed immoderantia passionum non +erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo nec dictae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude + with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above + <a href="#FP_Q95_A2" id="FP_Q95_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither did those virtues exist then. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32496] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam virtutes sunt circa passiones respicientes malum; ut +mansuetudo circa iras, et fortitudo circa timores. Sed tales +passiones non erant in statu innocentiae, ut dictum est. Ergo nec +huiusmodi virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state + of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32497] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +poenitentia est quaedam virtus respiciens peccatum prius commissum. +Misericordia etiam est quaedam virtus respiciens miseriam. Sed in +statu innocentiae non erat peccatum nec miseria. Ergo neque +huiusmodi virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not + every virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32498] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +perseverantia est quaedam virtus. Sed hanc Adam non habuit; ut +sequens peccatum ostendit. Ergo non habuit omnes virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which + seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="32499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32499] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, fides +quaedam virtus est. Sed haec in statu innocentiae non fuit, +importat enim aenigmaticam cognitionem, quae perfectioni primi +status repugnare videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth + to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32500] Iª q. 95 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in quadam homilia, <i>princeps vitiorum +devicit Adam de limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia +armatum, temperantia compositum, claritate splendidum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For + it was shown above + <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q95_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the + virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to + the dictate of reason, as will be + explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (FS, + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q63_A2" id="FP_Q95_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. + </p><p id="FP_Q95_A3-p9"> It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; + and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature + as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection + of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things + not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of + the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the + primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection + of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow + for + sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible + with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their + acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his + neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards + what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if + he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 co."><a name="32501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32501] Iª q. 95 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod homo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes. +Et hoc ex dictis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra quod +talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subiecta, +inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt +quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, et +inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis; ut magis +patebit cum de virtutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status +exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet. Sed +considerandum est quod virtutum quaedam sunt, quae de sui ratione +nullam imperfectionem important, ut caritas et iustitia. Et +huiusmodi virtutes fuerunt in statu innocentiae simpliciter, et +quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quaedam vero sunt, quae de +sui ratione imperfectionem important, vel ex parte actus vel ex +parte materiae. Et si huiusmodi imperfectio non repugnat +perfectioni primi status, nihilominus huiusmodi virtutes poterant +esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur, +et spes, quae est eorum quae non habentur. Perfectio enim primi +status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et +ut haberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et +spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum +ad actum. Si vero imperfectio quae est de ratione virtutis +alicuius, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat huiusmodi +virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, ut patet +de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de +misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena; perfectioni enim +primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde +huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non +secundum actum, erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si +peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio +videret, eam pro posse repelleret. Sicut philosophus dicit, in IV +Ethic., quod verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, <i>contingit +studioso solum sub conditione, est enim sic dispositus, quod +verecundaretur si turpe aliquid committeret</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens + to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se' competent to moderate the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32502] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod accidit temperantiae et fortitudini quod +superabundantiam passionum repellat, inquantum invenit passiones +superabundantes in subiecto. Sed per se convenit huiusmodi +virtutibus passiones moderari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in + the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible + with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. + Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive + state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such + passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. + But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates + not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the + act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating + daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32503] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illae passiones ad malum ordinatae, repugnant +perfectioni primi status, quae habent respectum ad malum in ipso +qui afficitur passione, ut timor et dolor. Sed passiones quae +respiciunt malum in altero, non repugnant perfectioni primi status, +poterat enim homo in primo statu habere odio malitiam Daemonum, +sicut et diligere bonitatem Dei. Unde et virtutes quae circa tales +passiones essent, possent esse in primo statu, et quantum ad +habitum et quantum ad actum. Quae vero sunt circa passiones +respicientes malum in eodem subiecto, si circa huiusmodi solas +passiones sunt, non poterant esse in primo statu secundum actum, +sed solum secundum habitum; sicut de poenitentia et misericordia +dictum est. Sed sunt quaedam virtutes quae non sunt circa has +passiones solum, sed etiam circa alias; sicut temperantia, quae non +solum est circa tristitias, sed etiam circa delectationes; et +fortitudo, quae non solum est circa timores, sed etiam circa +audaciam et spem. Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus +temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et +similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive +spei; non autem secundum quod moderantur tristitiam et timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> appears from what has been said above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32504] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium patet +solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice + of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; + signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32505] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod perseverantia dupliciter sumitur. Uno modo, prout est +quaedam virtus, et sic significat quendam habitum, quo quis eligit +perseverare in bono. Et sic Adam perseverantiam habuit. Alio modo, +prout est circumstantia virtutis, et sic significat continuationem +quandam virtutis absque interruptione. Et hoc modo Adam +perseverantiam non habuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> appears from what has been said above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="32506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32506] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum patet +responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A4-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 4. Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the + mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. + Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32507] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod opera primi hominis fuerint minus +efficacia ad merendum quam opera nostra. Gratia enim ex Dei +misericordia datur, quae magis indigentibus subvenit magis. Sed nos +indigemus magis gratia quam primus homo in statu innocentiae. Ergo +copiosius infunditur nobis gratia. Quae cum sit radix meriti, opera +nostra efficaciora ad merendum redduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:5</a>): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the + difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32508] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad +meritum requiritur pugna quaedam et difficultas. Dicitur enim II ad +Tim. II, <i>non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit</i>. Et +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus est circa difficile +et bonum</i>. Sed nunc est maior pugna et difficultas. Ergo et +maior efficacia ad merendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit + now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32509] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Magister dicit, XXIV distinctione II libri Sent., quod <i>homo non +meruisset, tentationi resistendo; nunc autem meretur qui tentationi +resistit</i>. Ergo efficaciora sunt opera nostra ad merendum quam +in primo statu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32510] Iª q. 95 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quia secundum hoc, homo esset melioris conditionis post +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds + in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions + proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. + This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites + into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate + degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the + degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good. + </p><p id="FP_Q95_A4-p7"> We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we + consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human + nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, + he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for + merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with + difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 co."><a name="32511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32511] Iª q. 95 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quantitas meriti ex duobus potest pensari. Uno modo, ex radice +caritatis et gratiae. Et talis quantitas meriti respondet praemio +essentiali, quod consistit in Dei fruitione, qui enim ex maiori +caritate aliquid facit, perfectius Deo fruetur. Alio modo pensari +potest quantitas meriti ex quantitate operis. Quae quidem est +duplex, scilicet absoluta, et proportionalis. Vidua enim quae misit +duo aera minuta in gazophylacium; minus opus fecit quantitate +absoluta, quam illi qui magna munera posuerunt, sed quantitate +proportionali vidua plus fecit, secundum sententiam domini, quia +magis eius facultatem superabat. Utraque tamen quantitas meriti +respondet praemio accidentali; quod est gaudium de bono creato. Sic +igitur dicendum quod efficaciora fuissent hominis opera ad merendum +in statu innocentiae quam post peccatum, si attendatur quantitas +meriti ex parte gratiae; quae tunc copiosior fuisset, nullo +obstaculo in natura humana invento. Similiter etiam, si +consideretur absoluta quantitas operis, quia, cum homo esset +maioris virtutis, maiora opera fecisset. Sed si consideretur +quantitas proportionalis, maior invenitur ratio meriti post +peccatum, propter hominis imbecillitatem, magis enim excedit parvum +opus potestatem eius qui cum difficultate operatur illud, quam opus +magnum potestatem eius qui sine difficultate operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before + sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace + also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32512] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod homo post peccatum ad plura indiget gratia quam ante +peccatum, sed non magis. Quia homo, etiam ante peccatum, indigebat +gratia ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quae est principalis +necessitas gratiae. Sed homo post peccatum, super hoc, indiget +gratia etiam ad peccati remissionem, et infirmitatis +sustentationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. + It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is + caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another + performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult + to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32513] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod difficultas et pugna pertinent ad quantitatem meriti, +secundum quantitatem operis proportionalem, ut dictum est. Et est +signum promptitudinis voluntatis, quae conatur ad id quod est sibi +difficile, promptitudo autem voluntatis causatur ex magnitudine +caritatis. Et tamen potest contingere quod aliquis ita prompta +voluntate faciat opus aliquod facile, sicut alius difficile, quia +paratus esset facere etiam quod sibi esset difficile. Difficultas +tamen actualis, inquantum est poenalis, habet etiam quod sit +satisfactoria pro peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did + not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch + as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than + now to resist temptation even without grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32514] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod resistere tentationi primo homini non fuisset +meritorium, secundum opinionem ponentium quod gratiam non haberet; +sicut nec modo est meritorium non habenti gratiam. Sed in hoc est +differentia, quia in primo statu nihil erat interius impellens ad +malum, sicut modo est, unde magis tunc poterat homo resistere +tentationi sine gratia, quam modo.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q96" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q96-p0.1">Q. 96. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q96-p2"> We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of + inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q96-p3"><a href="#FP_Q96_A1"> (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p4"><a href="#FP_Q96_A2"> (2) Whether he was master over all creatures?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p5"><a href="#FP_Q96_A3"> (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p6"><a href="#FP_Q96_A4"> (4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 pr."><a name="32515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32515] +Iª q. 96 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de dominio +quod competebat homini in statu innocentiae. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae +animalibus dominaretur. Secundo, utrum dominaretur omni creaturae. +Tertio, utrum in statu innocentiae omnes homines fuissent aequales. +Quarto, utrum in illo statu homo hominibus dominaretur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q96_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A1-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 1. Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, + 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels + need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no + mastership of the animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32516] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiae animalibus non +dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX super Gen. ad Litt., quod +ministerio Angelorum animalia sunt adducta ad Adam, ut eis nomina +imponeret. Non autem fuisset ibi necessarium Angelorum ministerium, +si homo per seipsum animalibus dominabatur. Non ergo in statu +innocentiae habuit dominium homo super alia animalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals + are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32517] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea +quae ad invicem discordant, non recte sub uno dominio congregantur. +Sed multa animalia naturaliter ad invicem discordant, sicut ovis et +lupus. Ergo omnia animalia sub hominis dominio non +continebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St. Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as + quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv"> Gn. 1:26</a>]: "God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals + would become useful to man." Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32518] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Hieronymus dicit quod <i>homini ante peccatum non indigenti, Deus +animalium dominationem dedit, praesciebat enim hominem adminiculo +animalium adiuvandum fore post lapsum</i>. Ergo ad minus usus +dominii super animalia non competebat homini ante peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man + had no mastership over the irrational animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32519] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +proprium domini esse videtur praecipere. Sed praeceptum non recte +fertur nisi ad habentem rationem. Ergo homo non habebat dominium +super animalia irrationalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth" [Vulg."and the + whole earth"]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32520] Iª q. 96 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, <i>praesit piscibus maris, et +volatilibus caeli, et bestiis terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q96_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore + in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals + are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the + generation of things we + perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect + form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use + of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use + of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. + Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises + a natural right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. + Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, + this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated + prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards + all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection + of other animals to man is proved to be natural. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 co."><a name="32521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32521] Iª q. 96 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, inobedientia ad hominem eorum quae ei +debent esse subiecta, subsecuta est in poenam eius, eo quod ipse +fuit inobediens Deo. Et ideo in statu innocentiae, ante +inobedientiam praedictam, nihil ei repugnabat quod naturaliter +deberet ei esse subiectum. Omnia autem animalia sunt homini +naturaliter subiecta. Quod apparet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex ipso +naturae processu. Sicut enim in generatione rerum intelligitur +quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecto ad perfectum (nam materia +est propter formam, et forma imperfectior propter perfectiorem), +ita etiam est in usu rerum naturalium, nam imperfectiora cedunt in +usum perfectorum; plantae enim utuntur terra ad sui nutrimentum, +animalia vero plantis, et homines plantis et animalibus. Unde +naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus. Et propter hoc philosophus +dicit, in I Politic., quod venatio sylvestrium animalium est iusta +et naturalis, quia per eam homo vindicat sibi quod est naturaliter +suum. Secundo apparet hoc ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae +semper inferiora per superiora gubernat. Unde, cum homo sit supra +cetera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter eius +gubernationi alia animalia subduntur. Tertio apparet idem ex +proprietate hominis, et aliorum animalium. In aliis enim animalibus +invenitur, secundum aestimationem naturalem, quaedam participatio +prudentiae ad aliquos particulares actus, in homine autem invenitur +universalis prudentia, quae est ratio omnium agibilium. Omne autem +quod est per participationem, subditur ei quod est per essentiam et +universaliter. Unde patet quod naturalis est subiectio aliorum +animalium ad hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally + higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for + instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32522] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in subiectos multa potest facere superior potestas, +quae non potest facere inferior. Angelus autem est naturaliter +superior homine. Unde aliquis effectus poterat fieri circa animalia +virtute angelica, qui non poterat fieri potestate humana; scilicet +quod statim omnia animalia congregarentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only + in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed + by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion + and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.30" target="asv">Gn. 1:30</a>, say that trees and herbs were + given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. + They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for + that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have + been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained + falcon. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32523] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod animalia quae nunc sunt ferocia et +occidunt alia animalia, in statu illo fuissent mansueta non solum +circa hominem, sed etiam circa alia animalia. Sed hoc est omnino +irrationabile. Non enim per peccatum hominis natura animalium est +mutata, ut quibus nunc naturale est comedere aliorum animalium +carnes, tunc vixissent de herbis, sicut leones et falcones. Nec +Glossa Bedae dicit, Gen. I, quod ligna et herbae datae sunt omnibus +animalibus et avibus in cibum, sed quibusdam. Fuisset ergo +naturalis discordia inter quaedam animalia. Nec tamen propter hoc +subtraherentur dominio hominis; sicut nec nunc propter hoc +subtrahuntur dominio Dei, cuius providentia hoc totum dispensatur. +Et huius providentiae homo executor fuisset, ut etiam nunc apparet +in animalibus domesticis, ministrantur enim falconibus domesticis +per homines gallinae in cibum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals---neither for clothing, since then they were + naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence---nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise---nor + to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge + of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the + animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32524] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homines in statu innocentiae non indigebant +animalibus ad necessitatem corporalem, neque ad tegumentum, quia +nudi erant, et non erubescebant, nullo instante inordinatae +concupiscentiae motu; neque ad cibum, quia lignis Paradisi +vescebantur; neque ad vehiculum, propter corporis robur. Indigebant +tamen eis ad experimentalem cognitionem sumendam de naturis eorum. +Quod significatum est per hoc, quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, +ut eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas designant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that + cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the + present state some domestic animals obey him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32525] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod alia animalia habent quandam participationem +prudentiae et rationis secundum aestimationem naturalem; ex qua +contingit quod grues sequuntur ducem, et apes obediunt regi. Et sic +tunc omnia animalia per seipsa homini obedivissent, sicut nunc +quaedam domestica ei obediunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q96_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A2-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 2. Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally + has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy + angels." Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32526] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo non habuisset dominium super omnes +alias creaturas. Angelus enim naturaliter est maioris potestatis +quam homo. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus III de Trin., <i>materia +corporalis non obedivisset ad nutum etiam sanctis Angelis</i>. Ergo +multo minus homini in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not naturally + obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have + mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32527] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +plantis non sunt de viribus animae nisi nutritiva et augmentativa +et generativa. Hae autem non sunt natae obedire rationi; ut in uno +et eodem homine apparet. Ergo, cum dominium competat homini +secundum rationem, videtur quod plantis homo in statu innocentiae +non dominaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; + for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32528] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque dominatur alicui rei, potest illam rem mutare. Sed homo +non potuisset mutare cursum caelestium corporum, hoc enim solius +Dei est, ut Dionysius dicit in epistola ad Polycarpum. Ergo non +dominabatur eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "That he may have dominion over . . . every creature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32529] Iª q. 96 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, <i>praesit universae +creaturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he + can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his "reason," which makes him like to the angels'; + his "sensitive powers," whereby he is like the animals; his "natural forces," which liken him to the plants; and "the body + itself," wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of + a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all + creatures," we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible + and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man + had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by + commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted + not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 co."><a name="32530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32530] Iª q. 96 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia, et ideo secundum modum quo +dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei +dominari aliis. Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet +rationem, secundum quam convenit cum Angelis; vires sensitivas, +secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum +quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit +cum rebus inanimatis. Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis, +et non subiecti dominio. Unde homo Angelis non dominabatur in primo +statu, et quod dicitur omni creaturae, intelligitur quae non est ad +imaginem Dei. Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut irascibili et +concupiscibili, quae aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima +imperando. Unde et in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per +imperium dominabatur. Viribus autem naturalibus, et ipsi corpori, +homo dominatur non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo +in statu innocentiae dominabatur plantis et rebus inanimatis, non +per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimento utendo eorum +auxilio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p7"> The answers to the objections appear from the above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="32531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32531] Iª q. 96 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q96_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A3-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 3. Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no + sin, there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32532] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homines in statu innocentiae omnes +fuissent aequales. Dicit enim Gregorius quod, <i>ubi non +delinquimus, omnes pares sumus</i>. Sed in statu innocentiae non +erat delictum. Ergo omnes erant pares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19, </a> "Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there was among men an + abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32533] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +similitudo et aequalitas est ratio mutuae dilectionis; secundum +illud Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile, sic et omnis +homo proximum sibi</i>. In illo autem statu inter homines abundabat +dilectio, quae est vinculum pacis. Ergo omnes fuissent pares in +statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the + part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through + a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive + state. Therefore, etc. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32534] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cessante causa, cessat effectus. Sed causa inaequalitatis inter +homines videtur nunc esse, ex parte quidem Dei, quod quosdam pro +meritis praemiat, quosdam vero punit, ex parte vero naturae, quia +propter naturae defectum quidam nascuntur debiles et orbati, quidam +autem fortes et perfecti. Quae in primo statu non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "The things which are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of God"]. But order chiefly consists + in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place." + Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32535] Iª q. 96 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Rom. XIII, <i>quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt</i>. Ordo +autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere, dicit enim +Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>ordo est parium dispariumque rerum +sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio</i>. Ergo in primo statu, qui +decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation + depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union + have been sterile. + </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p7"> Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of + necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; + hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. + </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p8"> There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not + to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain + life. + </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p9"> So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body + than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus + surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 co."><a name="32536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32536] Iª q. 96 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu fuisse, +ad minus quantum ad sexum, quia sine diversitate sexus, generatio +non fuisset. Similiter etiam quantum ad aetatem, sic enim quidam ex +aliis nascebantur; nec illi qui miscebantur, steriles erant. Sed et +secundum animam diversitas fuisset, et quantum ad iustitiam et +quantum ad scientiam. Non enim ex necessitate homo operabatur, sed +per liberum arbitrium; ex quo homo habet quod possit magis et minus +animum applicare ad aliquid faciendum vel volendum vel +cognoscendum. Unde quidam magis profecissent in iustitia et +scientia quam alii. Ex parte etiam corporis, poterat esse +disparitas. Non enim erat exemptum corpus humanum totaliter a +legibus naturae, quin ex exterioribus agentibus aliquod commodum +aut auxilium reciperet magis et minus, cum etiam et cibis eorum +vita sustentaretur. Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum +diversam dispositionem aeris et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui +robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et maiores et +pulchriores et melius complexionati. Ita tamen quod in illis qui +excederentur, nullus esset defectus sive peccatum, sive circa +animam sive circa corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some + are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32537] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Gregorius per verba illa intendit excludere +disparitatem quae est secundum differentiam iustitiae et peccati; +ex qua contingit quod aliqui poenaliter sunt sub aliis +coercendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between + equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; + although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32538] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aequalitas est causa quod dilectio mutua sit +aequalis. Sed tamen inter inaequales potest esse maior dilectio +quam inter aequales, licet non aequaliter utrinque respondeat. +Pater enim plus diligit filium naturaliter, quam frater fratrem; +licet filius non tantundem diligat patrem, sicut ab eo +diligitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He + would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise + on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32539] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod causa disparitatis poterat esse et ex parte Dei, non +quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam praemiaret; sed ut quosdam +plus, quosdam minus sublimaret, ut pulchritudo ordinis magis in +hominibus reluceret. Et etiam ex parte naturae poterat disparitas +causari secundum praedictum modum, absque aliquo defectu +naturae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q97" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q97-p0.1">Q. 97. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q97-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; + secondly, as regards the preservation of the species. + </p><p id="FP_Q97-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q97-p4"><a href="#FP_Q97_A1"> (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p5"><a href="#FP_Q97_A2"> (2) Whether he was impassible?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p6"><a href="#FP_Q97_A3"> (3) Whether he stood in need of food?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p7"><a href="#FP_Q97_A4"> (4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 pr."><a name="32546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32546] +Iª q. 97 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae +pertinent ad statum primi hominis secundum corpus. Et primo, +quantum ad conservationem individui; secundo, quantum ad +conservationem speciei. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum homo in statu innocentiae esset immortalis. Secundo, utrum +esset impassibilis. Tertio, utrum indigeret cibis. Quarto, utrum +per lignum vitae immortalitatem consequeretur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q97_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A1-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. + But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32547] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non erat +immortalis. Mortale enim ponitur in definitione hominis. Sed remota +definitione, aufertur definitum. Ergo si homo erat, non poterat +esse immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there + can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in + the present state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32548] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +corruptibile et incorruptibile genere differunt, ut dicitur in X +Metaphys. Sed eorum quae differunt genere, non est transmutatio in +invicem. Si ergo primus homo fuit incorruptibilis, non posset homo +in statu isto esse corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, + for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this + be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.10.2" target="asv"> Wis. 10:2</a>: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not + the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32549] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +homo in statu innocentiae fuit immortalis, aut hoc habuit per +naturam, aut per gratiam. Sed non per naturam, quia, cum natura +eadem maneat secundum speciem, nunc quoque esset immortalis. +Similiter nec per gratiam, quia primus homo gratiam per +poenitentiam recuperavit, secundum illud Sap. X, <i>eduxit illum a +delicto suo</i>; ergo immortalitatem recuperasset; quod patet esse +falsum. Non ergo homo erat immortalis in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv"> Apoc. 21:4</a>: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore + man was not immortal in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32550] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +immortalitas promittitur homini in praemium; secundum illud Apoc. +XXI, <i>mors ultra non erit</i>. Sed homo non fuit conditus in +statu praemii, sed ut praemium mereretur. Ergo homo in statu +innocentiae non fuit immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By sin death came into the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32551] Iª q. 97 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur ad Rom. V, quod <i>per peccatum intravit mors in +mundum</i>. Ergo ante peccatum homo erat immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter---that is to say, either because it possesses no + matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. + Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being + by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from + corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul + of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor + of incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible + and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous + author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might + achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but + by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption + so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the + capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q97_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity + of corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 co."><a name="32552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32552] Iª q. 97 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter. Uno modo, ex +parte materiae, eo scilicet quod vel non habet materiam, sicut +Angelus; vel habet materiam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam +formam, sicut corpus caeleste. Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam +incorruptibile. Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte +formae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua +dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur. Et hoc +dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus +in epistola ad Dioscorum, <i>tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, +ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis</i>, +idest incorruptionis vigor. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid +incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in +statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis. Quia, ut +Augustinus dicit in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., <i>Deus +hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut +ipse sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam aut ad mortem</i>. Non enim +corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem +in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter +divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione +praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod +rationabiliter factum est. Quia enim anima rationalis excedit +proportionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est. Conveniens +fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservare +posset supra naturam corporalis materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p8"> Reply OBJ 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32553] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo et +secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de incorruptibili +et immortali per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace + as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect + of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, + as we shall explain further on (TP, + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A4" id="FP_Q97_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[14] , A[4]</a>, ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32554] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat +animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae. Et quamvis gratiam +recuperaverit ad remissionem culpae et meritum gloriae, non tamen +ad amissae immortalitatis effectum. Hoc enim reservabatur Christo, +per quem naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat, ut infra +dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32555] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod differt immortalitas gloriae, quae promittitur in +praemium, ab immortalitate quae fuit homini collata in statu +innocentiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q97_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A2-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of + innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32556] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae fuisset +passibilis. Sentire enim est pati quoddam. Sed homo in statu +innocentiae fuisset sensibilis. Ergo fuisset passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.21" target="asv"> Gn. 2:21, </a> "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32557] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +somnus passio quaedam est. Sed homo in statu innocentiae +dormivisset; secundum illud Gen. II, <i>immisit Deus soporem in +Adam</i>. Ergo fuisset passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of + the cutting out of part of his body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32558] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ibidem subditur quod tulit unam de costis eius. Ergo fuisset +passibilis etiam per abscissionem partis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had + come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man + was passible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32559] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +corpus hominis molle fuit. Sed molle naturaliter passivum est a +duro. Ergo si corpori primi hominis obvium fuisset aliquod corpus +durum, ab eo passum fuisset. Et sic primus homo fuit +passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive suffering + wastes the very substance." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32560] Iª q. 97 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quia, si fuit passibilis, fuit etiam corruptibilis, quia passio, +magis facta, abiicit a substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its + natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according + as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind + of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and + sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both + in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could + curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 co."><a name="32561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32561] Iª q. 97 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie, et sic pati +dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est +effectus actionis, in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et +patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali +dispositione. Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum +quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; +sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur +secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et +patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo +dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum +corpus, sicut et immortalis, poterat enim passionem prohibere, +sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p8"> Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, + but are ordered to his natural welfare. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32562] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet +responsio ad duo prima. Nam sentire et dormire non removent hominem +a naturali dispositione, sed ad bonum naturae ordinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As already explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q92_A3" id="FP_Q97_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. + Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32563] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, costa illa fuit in Adam, +inquantum erat principium humani generis; sicut semen est in +homine, inquantum est principium per generationem. Sicut igitur +decisio seminis non est cum passione quae removeat hominem a +naturali dispositione, ita etiam est dicendum de separatione illius +costae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his + reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of + a harmful nature could come upon him unawares. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32564] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat +praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro, partim quidem +per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam +per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei +occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q97_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A3-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 3. Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has + lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32565] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non indigebat +cibis. Cibus enim necessarius est homini ad restaurationem +deperditi. Sed in corpore Adae, ut videtur, nulla fiebat +deperditio, quia incorruptibile erat. Ergo non erat ei cibus +necessarius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it + does not appear how food could be needful to him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32566] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cibus +est necessarius ad nutriendum. Sed nutritio non est sine passione. +Cum ergo corpus hominis esset impassibile, non erat ei cibus +necessarius, ut videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he + would not have died. Therefore he did not require food. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32567] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cibus +dicitur esse nobis necessarius ad vitae conservationem. Sed Adam +aliter vitam poterat conservare, quia si non peccaret, non +moreretur. Ergo cibus non erat ei necessarius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore + it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32568] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ad +sumptionem cibi sequitur emissio superfluitatum, quae habent +quandam turpitudinem non convenientem dignitati primi status. Ergo +videtur quod homo in primo statu cibis non uteretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.16" target="asv">Gn. 2:16</a>): "Of every tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32569] Iª q. 97 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso, +comedetis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q97_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life + needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called + a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls---that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "Man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving + life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as + possessing an intellectual immaterial power. + </p><p id="FP_Q97_A3-p8"> Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body + was called "animal" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.44" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:44 </a>seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher + says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore + such operations befitted + man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate + to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, + whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in + the state of innocence. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 co."><a name="32570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32570] Iª q. 97 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod homo in statu innocentiae habuit vitam animalem cibis +indigentem; post resurrectionem vero habebit vitam spiritualem +cibis non indigentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod +anima rationalis et anima est et spiritus. Dicitur autem esse anima +secundum illud quod est sibi commune et aliis animabus, quod est +vitam corpori dare, unde dicitur Gen. II, <i>factus est homo in +animam viventem</i>, idest vitam corpori dantem. Sed spiritus +dicitur secundum illud quod est proprium sibi et non aliis +animabus, quod scilicet habeat virtutem intellectivam immaterialem. +In primo igitur statu anima rationalis communicabat corpori id quod +competit ei inquantum est anima, et ideo corpus illud dicebatur +animale, inquantum scilicet habebat vitam ab anima. Primum autem +principium vitae in istis inferioribus, ut dicitur in libro de +anima, est anima vegetabilis, cuius opera sunt alimento uti et +generare et augeri. Et ideo haec opera homini in primo statu +competebant. In ultimo vero statu post resurrectionem, anima +communicabit quodammodo corpori ea quae sunt sibi propria inquantum +est spiritus, immortalitatem quidem, quantum ad omnes; +impassibilitatem vero et gloriam et virtutem, quantum ad bonos, +quorum corpora spiritualia dicentur. Unde post resurrectionem +homines cibis non indigebunt, sed in statu innocentiae eis +indigebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): + "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." + For we have explained + <a href="#FP_Q97_A1" id="FP_Q97_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition + of the body: so + that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the + humor, man was obliged to take food. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32571] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de quaest. Vet. et +Nov. Test., <i>quomodo immortale corpus habebat, quod cibo +sustentabatur? Immortale enim non eget esca neque potu</i>. Dictum +est enim supra quod immortalitas primi status erat secundum vim +quandam supernaturalem in anima residentem; non autem secundum +aliquam dispositionem corpori inhaerentem. Unde per actionem +caloris aliquid de humido illius corporis poterat deperdi; et ne +totaliter consumeretur, necesse erat per assumptionem cibi homini +subveniri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. + So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion + conduced to the perfection of the nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32572] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in nutritione est quaedam passio et alteratio, +scilicet ex parte alimenti, quod convertitur in substantiam eius +quod alitur. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod corpus hominis +fuerit passibile, sed quod cibus assumptus erat passibilis. Quamvis +etiam talis passio esset ad perfectionem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same + time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32573] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si homo sibi non subveniret de cibo, peccaret; sicut +peccavit sumendo vetitum cibum. Simul enim sibi praeceptum fuit ut +a ligno scientiae boni et mali abstineret, et ut de omni alio ligno +Paradisi vesceretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been + nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. + Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32574] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod homo in statu innocentiae non +assumpsisset de cibo nisi quantum fuisset ei necessarium, unde non +fuisset ibi superfluitatum emissio. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur, +quod in cibo assumpto non esset aliqua faeculentia, quae non esset +apta ut converteretur in hominis nutrimentum. Unde oportebat +superfluitates emitti. Tamen fuisset divinitus provisum ut nulla ex +hoc indecentia esset.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q98" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q98-p0.1">Q. 98. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q98-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the + offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q98-p3"><a href="#FP_Q98_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q98-p4"><a href="#FP_Q98_A2"> (2) Whether generation would have been through coition?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 pr."><a name="32582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32582] +Iª q. 98 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae +pertinent ad conservationem speciei. Et primo, de ipsa generatione; +secundo, de conditione prolis genitae. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. +Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio. Secundo, utrum +fuisset generatio per coitum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q98_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q98_A1-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, "corruption is + contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of + innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32583] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset +generatio. Generationi enim corruptio est contraria, ut dicitur in +V Physic. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. In statu autem +innocentiae non fuisset corruptio. Ergo neque generatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore + there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived + for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32584] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +generatio ordinatur ad hoc quod conservetur in specie quod secundum +individuum conservari non potest, unde et in illis individuis quae +in perpetuum durant, generatio non invenitur. Sed in statu +innocentiae homo in perpetuum absque morte vixisset. Ergo in statu +innocentiae generatio, non fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion + of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights + when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, + as Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the + state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32585] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, per +generationem homines multiplicantur. Sed multiplicatis dominis, +necesse est fieri possessionum divisionem, ad evitandam confusionem +dominii. Ergo, cum homo sit institutus dominus animalium, facta +multiplicatione humani generis per generationem, secuta fuisset +divisio dominii. Quod videtur esse contrarium iuri naturali, +secundum quod omnia sunt communia, ut Isidorus dicit. Non ergo +fuisset generatio in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.28" target="asv">Gn. 1:28</a>): "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original + number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32586] Iª q. 98 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>crescite et multiplicamini, et replete +terram</i>. Huiusmodi autem multiplicatio absque nova generatione +fieri non potuisset, cum duo tantum fuerint primitus instituti. +Ergo in primo statu generatio fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise + man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, + by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally + incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's + purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of + nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but + as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become void. + </p><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p7"> Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose + of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible + substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the + chief purpose of nature. + </p><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p8"> Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which + is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the + Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, + He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 co."><a name="32587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32587] Iª q. 98 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem +humani generis, alioquin peccatum hominis fuisset valde +necessarium, ex quo tantum bonum consecutum est. Est ergo +considerandum quod homo, secundum suam naturam, est constitutus +quasi medium quoddam inter creaturas corruptibiles et +incorruptibiles, nam anima eius est naturaliter incorruptibilis, +corpus vero naturaliter corruptibile. Est autem considerandum quod +alio modo intentio naturae fertur ad corruptibiles, et +incorruptibiles creaturas. Id enim per se videtur esse de +intentione naturae, quod est semper et perpetuum. Quod autem est +solum secundum aliquod tempus, non videtur esse principaliter de +intentione naturae, sed quasi ad aliud ordinatum, alioquin, eo +corrupto, naturae intentio cassaretur. Quia igitur in rebus +corruptibilibus nihil est perpetuum et semper manens nisi species, +bonum speciei est de principali intentione naturae, ad cuius +conservationem naturalis generatio ordinatur. Substantiae vero +incorruptibiles manent semper non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam +secundum individua, et ideo etiam ipsa individua sunt de principali +intentione naturae. Sic igitur homini ex parte corporis, quod +corruptibile est secundum naturam suam, competit generatio. Ex +parte vero animae, quae incorruptibilis est, competit ei quod +multitudo individuorum sit per se intenta a natura, vel potius a +naturae auctore, qui solus est humanarum animarum creator. Et ideo, +ad multiplicationem humani generis, generationem in humano genere +statuit, etiam in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. + Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32588] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de +se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per +animam. Et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur +corruptibilibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would + have been required for the multiplication of the individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32589] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod generatio in statu innocentiae, etsi non fuisset +propter conservationem speciei, fuisset tamen propter +multiplicationem individuorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community + of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will + of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's + need, those things of which they were masters---a state of things to be observed + even now among many good men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32590] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est +fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est +occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in +statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod +absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum +quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio +subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros +observetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q98_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q98_A2-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide + Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was "like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, + when men will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as is written + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32591] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio +per coitum. Quia, ut Damascenus dicit, primus homo erat in Paradiso +terrestri sicut Angelus quidam. Sed in futuro resurrectionis statu, +quando erunt homines Angelis similes, neque nubent neque nubentur, +ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Ergo neque in Paradiso fuisset generatio +per coitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed + before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv">Gn. 4:1</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32592] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, primi +homines in perfecta aetate conditi fuerunt. Si igitur in eis ante +peccatum generatio fuisset per coitum, fuissent etiam in Paradiso +carnaliter coniuncti. Quod patet esse falsum, secundum +Scripturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight + which he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared + to beasts by reason of sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.13" target="asv"> Ps. 48:13</a>: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them." Therefore, + before sin, there + would have been no such intercourse of man and woman. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32593] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +coniunctione carnali maxime efficitur homo similis bestiis, propter +vehementiam delectationis, unde etiam continentia laudatur, per +quam homines ab huiusmodi delectationibus abstinent. Sed bestiis +homo comparatur propter peccatum, secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, +<i>homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est +iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis</i>. Ergo ante +peccatum non fuisset maris et feminae carnalis coniunctio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. + Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32594] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in +statu innocentiae nulla fuisset corruptio. Sed per coitum +corrumpitur integritas virginalis. Ergo coitus in statu innocentiae +non fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> God made man and woman before sin ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">2</a>). But nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which + the distinction of sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv">Gn. 2:18</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.20" target="asv">20</a>). But she is not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in + anything else. Therefore there would + have been such generation also in the state of innocence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 1"><a name="32595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32595] Iª q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Deus ante peccatum masculum et feminam fecit, ut dicitur Gen. +I et II. Nihil autem est frustra in operibus Dei. Ergo etiam si +homo non peccasset, fuisset coitus, ad quem distinctio sexuum +ordinatur.</p><p title="I q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 2"><a name="32596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32596] Iª q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Gen. +II, dicitur mulier esse facta in adiutorium viri. Sed non ad aliud +nisi ad generationem quae fit per coitum, quia ad quodlibet aliud +opus, convenientius adiuvari posset vir per virum quam per feminam. +Ergo etiam in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio per coitum.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q98_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded + that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. + Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied + without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and + female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this + is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by + coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q97_A3" id="FP_Q98_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[3]</a>), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot + allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin. + </p><p id="FP_Q98_A2-p8"> Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which + comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. + Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of + nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second + thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, + when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from + supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved + by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 co."><a name="32597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32597] Iª q. 98 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam antiquorum doctorum, considerantes concupiscentiae +foeditatem quae invenitur in coitu in isto statu, posuerunt quod in +statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Unde Gregorius +Nyssenus dicit in libro quem fecit de homine, quod in Paradiso +aliter fuisset multiplicatum genus humanum, sicut multiplicati sunt +Angeli, absque concubitu, per operationem divinae virtutis. Et +dicit quod Deus ante peccatum fecit masculum et feminam, respiciens +ad modum generationis qui futurus erat post peccatum, cuius Deus +praescius erat. Sed hoc non dicitur rationabiliter. Ea enim quae +sunt naturalia homini, neque subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per +peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod homini, secundum animalem +vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, ut supra dictum est, +naturale est generare per coitum, sicut et ceteris animalibus +perfectis. Et hoc declarant naturalia membra ad hunc usum deputata. +Et ideo non est dicendum quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non +fuisset ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum. Sunt igitur in +coitu duo consideranda, secundum praesentem statum. Unum quod +naturae est, scilicet coniunctio maris et feminae ad generandum. In +omni enim generatione requiritur virtus activa et passiva. Unde, +cum in omnibus in quibus est distinctio sexuum, virtus activa sit +in mare, virtus vero passiva in femina; naturae ordo exigit ut ad +generandum conveniant per coitum mas et femina. Aliud autem quod +considerari potest, est quaedam deformitas immoderatae +concupiscentiae. Quae in statu innocentiae non fuisset quando +inferiores vires omnino rationi subdebantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, +in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri +sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra +quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum +tranquillitate animi et corporis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the + resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32598] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per +spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad +corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, +spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Unde +non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they + were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command + relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32599] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., ideo +primi parentes in Paradiso non coierunt, quia, formata muliere, +post modicum propter peccatum de Paradiso eiecti sunt, vel quia +expectabatur divina auctoritas ad determinatum tempus commixtionis, +a qua acceperunt universale mandatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. + In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of + sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity + of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of + concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not + to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" + I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the + glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do + not + exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence + would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it + removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32600] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in +coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem +concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest. Sed in statu +innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, +non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt +(fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset +purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis +concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi +delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit +minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non +immoderate delectationi inhaereat; et dico immoderate, praeter +mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non +minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius +concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit. Et hoc +sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt +magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem +animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset +laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum +fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc +autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state "intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; + this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by + groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate + action." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32601] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>in illo +statu nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus +uxoris. Ita enim potuit utero coniugis, salva integritate feminei +genitalis, virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest, eadem +integritate salva, ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris +emitti. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis +impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret; sic ad concipiendum non +libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque +coniungeret</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q99" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q99-p0.1">Q. 99. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q99-p2"> We must now consider the condition of the offspring---first, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in + knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q99-p3"><a href="#FP_Q99_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?</a></p><p id="FP_Q99-p4"><a href="#FP_Q99_A2"> (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 pr."><a name="32602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32602] +Iª q. 99 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de conditione +prolis generandae. Et primo, quantum ad corpus; secundo, quantum ad +iustitiam; tertio, quantum ad scientiam. Circa primum quaeruntur +duo. Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae pueri mox geniti habuissent +perfectam virtutem corpoream. Secundo, utrum omnes fuissent nati in +sexu masculino.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q99_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q99_A2-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 2. Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, + 3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing + would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32613] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in primo statu feminae natae non fuissent. +Dicit enim philosophus, in libro II de Generat. Animal., quod +femina est mas occasionatus, quasi praeter intentionem naturae +proveniens. Sed in statu illo nihil evenisset innaturale in hominis +generatione. Ergo feminae natae non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire + cannot burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's + active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always + have been born. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32614] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +agens generat sibi simile, nisi impediatur vel propter defectum +virtutis, vel propter indispositionem materiae, sicut parvus ignis +non potest comburere ligna viridia. In generatione autem vis activa +est in mare. Cum igitur in statu innocentiae nullus fuisset +defectus virtutis ex parte maris, nec indispositio materiae ex +parte feminae, videtur quod semper masculi nati fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have + been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in + the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32615] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +statu innocentiae generatio ad multiplicationem hominum +ordinabatur. Sed sufficienter homines multiplicari potuissent per +primum hominem et per primam feminam, ex quo in perpetuum victuri +erant. Ergo non fuit necessarium quod in statu innocentiae feminae +nascerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But established + male and female in human nature, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">2</a>). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32616] Iª q. 99 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod sic natura processisset in generando, sicut eam Deus +instituit. Sed Deus instituit marem et feminam in natura humana, ut +dicitur Gen. I et II. Ergo etiam in statu illo fuissent mares et +feminae generati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different + grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore + in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 co."><a name="32617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32617] Iª q. 99 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod nihil eorum quae ad complementum humanae naturae pertinent, in +statu innocentiae defuisset. Sicut autem ad perfectionem universi +pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita etiam diversitas sexus est ad +perfectionem humanae naturae. Et ideo in statu innocentiae uterque +sexus per generationem productus fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: + but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q92_A1" id="FP_Q99_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[1]</a>, ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32618] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod femina dicitur mas occasionatus, quia est praeter +intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem +naturae universalis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; + but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind + favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of + the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). + Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will + of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32619] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod generatio feminae non solum contingit ex defectu +virtutis activae vel indispositione materiae, ut obiectio tangit. +Sed quandoque quidem ex aliquo accidenti extrinseco; sicut +philosophus dicit, in libro de animalibus, quod <i>ventus +Septentrionalis coadiuvat ad generationem masculorum, Australis +vero ad generationem feminarum</i>. Quandoque etiam ex conceptione +animae, ad quam de facili immutatur corpus. Et praecipue in statu +innocentiae hoc esse poterat, quando corpus magis erat animae +subiectum; ut scilicet secundum voluntatem generantis, +distingueretur sexus in prole.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that + all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in + equal number. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32620] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod proles fuisset genita vivens vita animali, ad quam +sicut pertinet alimento uti, sic etiam generare. Unde conveniebat +quod omnes generarent, et non solum primi parentes. Ad quod +consequens videtur quod tot fuissent generatae feminae, quot et +mares.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q100" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q100-p0.1">Q. 100. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q100-p2"> We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q100-p3"><a href="#FP_Q100_A1"> (1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?</a></p><p id="FP_Q100-p4"><a href="#FP_Q100_A2"> (2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 pr."><a name="32621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32621] +Iª q. 100 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +conditione prolis generandae quantum ad iustitiam. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum homines fuissent nati cum iustitia. +Secundo, utrum nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q100_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q100_A1-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 1. Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor + says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32622] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homines non fuissent cum iustitia nati. +Dicit enim Hugo de sancto Victore quod <i>primus homo ante peccatum +generaret quidem filios sine peccato, sed non paternae iustitiae +haeredes</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.16" target="asv">Rom. 5:16</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.21" target="asv">21</a>). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children + would not have been born righteous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32623] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +iustitia est per gratiam, ut apostolus dicit ad Rom. V. Sed gratia +non transfunditur, quia sic esset naturalis; sed a solo Deo +infunditur. Ergo pueri cum iustitia nati non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness + have been transmitted from parents, to the children. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32624] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iustitia in anima est. Sed anima non est ex traduce. Ergo nec +iustitia traducta fuisset a parentibus in filios.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness + together with the rational soul." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32625] Iª q. 100 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu Virg., <i>quod simul cum +rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si +non peccaret</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, + must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. + But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first + man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as + caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the + fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin + of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have + been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 co."><a name="32626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32626] Iª q. 100 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Unde +quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse +est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione +naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset. In accidentibus +autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus +similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus +fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis +speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti +naturae. Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum +autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse +peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros. Et propter +hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad +originalem iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act + thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32627] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum Hugonis est intelligendum non quantum ad +habitum iustitiae, sed quantum ad executionem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with + original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when + he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, + as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>), we must conclude that if + children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first + man was created in grace ( + <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would + have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted + by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human + body is apt to receive it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32628] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum +iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia +originali. Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine +factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad +Deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; +necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali +iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo +homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus. Non tamen +fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa +per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum +habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est +dispositum infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex +traduce.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p9"> From this the reply to the third objection is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32629] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet +solutio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q100_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q100_A2-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. + iv) on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.3.13" target="asv"> Job 3:13</a>: "For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten + "children of hell"; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer." Therefore + all would have been born confirmed + in righteousness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32630] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae nati fuissent +in iustitia confirmati. Dicit enim Gregorius, IV Moralium, super +illud, <i>somno meo requiescerem etc., si parentem primum nulla +putredo peccati corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios Gehennae +generaret; sed hi qui nunc per redemptorem salvandi sunt, soli ab +illo electi nascerentur</i>. Ergo nascerentur omnes in iustitia +confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would + have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children + would have been born confirmed in righteousness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32631] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Anselmus dicit, in libro cur Deus homo, quod <i>si primi parentes +sic vixissent ut tentati non peccassent, ita confirmarentur cum +omni propagine sua, ut ultra peccare non possent</i>. Ergo pueri +nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity + of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity + of preserving righteousness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32632] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum est potentius quam malum. Sed propter peccatum primi hominis +consecuta est necessitas peccandi in his qui nascuntur ex eo. Ergo +si primus homo in iustitia perstitisset, derivaretur ad posteros +necessitas observandi iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable + henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have + begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32633] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Angelus adhaerens Deo aliis peccantibus, statim est in iustitia +confirmatus, ut ulterius peccare non posset. Ergo similiter et +homo, si tentationi restitisset, confirmatus fuisset. Sed qualis +ipse fuit, tales alios generasset. Ergo et eius filii confirmati in +iustitia nascerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they---that is our first parents---had + committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would + have been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might + have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in + righteousness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32634] Iª q. 100 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>tam felix universa esset +humana societas si nec illi</i>, scilicet primi parentes, <i>malum +quod in posteros traiicerent, nec quisquam ex stirpe eorum +iniquitatem committeret, quae damnationem reciperet</i>. Ex quo +datur intelligi quod, etiam si primi homines non peccassent, aliqui +ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere. Non ergo +nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it + is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the + parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed + in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once + it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing + is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the + case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to + that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would + have + ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 co."><a name="32635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32635] Iª q. 100 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod non videtur possibile quod pueri in statu innocentiae +nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. Manifestum est enim quod pueri +in sua nativitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum +parentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quandiu +generassent, non fuissent confirmati in iustitia. Ex hoc enim +creatura rationalis in iustitia confirmatur, quod efficitur beata +per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non potest non inhaerere, cum +ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, a qua nullus potest averti, cum +nihil desideretur et ametur nisi sub ratione boni. Et hoc dico +secundum legem communem, quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali secus +accidere potest, sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei. Quam cito +autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem pervenisset quod Deum per +essentiam videret, efficeretur spiritualis et mente et corpore, et +animalis vita cessaret, in qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde +manifestum est quod parvuli non nascerentur in iustitia +confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin + which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, + they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, + but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32636] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, si Adam non peccasset, non generaret ex se filios +Gehennae, ita scilicet quod ab ipso peccatum contraherent, quod est +causa Gehennae. Possent tamen fieri filii Gehennae per liberum +arbitrium peccando. Vel, si filii Gehennae non fierent per +peccatum, hoc non esset propter hoc, quia essent in iustitia +confirmati; sed propter divinam providentiam, per quam a peccato +conservarentur immunes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: + "It seems that if they had lived, etc." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32637] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Anselmus hoc non dicit asserendo, sed opinando. Quod +patet ex ipso modo loquendi, cum dicit, videtur quod, si vixissent +et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. + For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, + which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity + of not sinning, which is only in the blessed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32638] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio ista non est efficax, quamvis per eam Anselmus +motus fuisse videatur, ut ex eius verbis apparet. Non enim sic per +peccatum primi parentis eius posteri necessitatem peccandi +incurrunt, ut ad iustitiam redire non possint, quod est tantum in +damnatis. Unde nec ita necessitatem non peccandi transmisisset ad +posteros, quod omnino peccare non possent, quod est tantum in +beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas + the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q64_A2" id="FP_Q100_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[64], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32639] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod non est simile de homine et Angelo. Nam homo habet +liberum arbitrium vertibile et ante electionem et post, non autem +Angelus, sicut supra dictum est, cum de Angelis ageretur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q101" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q101-p0.1">Q. 101. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q101-p2"> We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q101-p3"><a href="#FP_Q101_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q101-p4"><a href="#FP_Q101_A2"> (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 pr."><a name="32640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32640] +Iª q. 101 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +conditione prolis generandae quantum ad scientiam. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum pueri nascerentur in scientia +perfecti. Secundo, utrum statim post nativitatem habuissent +perfectum usum rationis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q101_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q101_A1-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten + children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge ( + <a href="#FP_Q94_A3" id="FP_Q101_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[94], A[3]</a>). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32641] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae pueri nati fuissent +in scientia perfecti. Qualis enim fuit Adam, tales filios +generasset. Sed Adam fuit in scientia perfectus, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo filii nascerentur ab eo in scientia perfecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. FS, + <a href="#FP_Q85_A3" id="FP_Q101_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[3]</a>). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they + were born. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32642] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ignorantia ex peccato causatur, ut Beda dicit. Sed ignorantia est +privatio scientiae. Ergo ante peccatum pueri mox nati omnem +scientiam habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since + it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32643] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +pueri mox nati iustitiam habuissent. Sed ad iustitiam requiritur +scientia, quae dirigit in agendis. Ergo etiam scientiam +habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). + But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children + would have been without knowledge at birth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32644] Iª q. 101 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod anima nostra per naturam est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil +est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed eadem animae natura +est modo, quae tunc fuisset. Ergo animae puerorum in principio +scientia caruissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we + must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above + explained ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[6]</a>); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for + its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive + powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; + but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 co."><a name="32645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32645] Iª q. 101 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli +auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus +naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per +sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, et ideo anima unitur +corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non +esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per +sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est quod pueri in statu +innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia; sed eam in +processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo +vel addiscendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and + instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents + which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32646] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens +primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et +instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non +generabat filios similes sibi; sed solum quantum ad accidentia +naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, + for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only + nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32647] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ignorantia est privatio scientiae quae debet haberi +pro tempore illo. Quod in pueris mox natis non fuisset, habuissent +enim scientiam quae eis competebat secundum tempus illud. Unde +ignorantia in eis non fuisset, sed nescientia respectu aliquorum. +Quam etiam Dionysius ponit in Angelis sanctis, in VII Cael. +Hier.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal + principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise + their knowledge of other universal principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32648] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum +eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per +universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent +quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium +principiorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q101_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q101_A2-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 2. Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason + in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it + is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q101_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv">Wis. 9:15</a>). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at + birth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32649] Iª q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae mox nati +habuissent perfectum usum rationis. Nunc enim pueri perfectum usum +rationis non habent propter hoc, quod anima per corpus aggravatur. +Hoc autem tunc non erat, quia, ut dicitur Sap. IX, <i>corpus quod +corrumpitur, aggravat animam</i>. Ergo ante peccatum et +corruptionem a peccato subsecutam, pueri mox nati perfectum usum +rationis habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, + therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32650] Iª q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam alia animalia mox nata habent naturalis industriae usum, +sicut agnus statim fugit lupum. Multo ergo magis homines in statu +innocentiae mox nati habuissent usum perfectum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have + had the perfect use of reason from the very outset. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32651] Iª q. 101 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus +generatis. Ergo pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum +usum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired + and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. + Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of + the former is of necessity + hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account + of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state + of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they + would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above + regarding the use of their limbs ( + <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 co."><a name="32652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32652] Iª q. 101 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, usus rationis dependet +quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et +impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum +rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Vires +autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et +ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus +impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus. In pueris autem est +impedimentum harum virium, propter nimiam humiditatem cerebri. Et +ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum +membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent +perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate. +Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos +pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum +superius est dictum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to + man at all ages. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32653] Iª q. 101 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, +quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad +hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from + the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment + exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32654] Iª q. 101 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum +industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc +patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis +generibus animalium inveniuntur. Et tamen in homine est speciale +impedimentum propter abundantiam humiditatis cerebri, ut supra +dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q102" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q102-p0.1">Q. 102. OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q102-p2"> We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q102-p3"><a href="#FP_Q102_A1"> (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p4"><a href="#FP_Q102_A2"> (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p5"><a href="#FP_Q102_A3"> (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p6"><a href="#FP_Q102_A4"> (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 pr."><a name="32655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32655] +Iª q. 102 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de loco +hominis, qui est Paradisus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum Paradisus sit locus corporeus. Secundo, utrum sit conveniens +locus habitationis humanae. Tertio, ad quid homo in Paradiso +positus fuit. Quarto, utrum in Paradiso debuit fieri.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q102_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A1-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 1. Whether paradise is a corporeal place?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv"> Gn. 2:8</a>] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary + to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume + the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32656] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non sit locus corporeus. Dicit +enim Beda quod <i>Paradisus pertingit usque ad lunarem +circulum</i>. Sed nullus locus terrenus talis esse potest, tum quia +contra naturam terrae esset quod tantum elevaretur; tum etiam quia +sub globo lunari est regio ignis, qui terram consumeret. Non est +ergo Paradisus locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.10" target="asv">Gn. 2:10</a>). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore + paradise is not a corporeal place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32657] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Scriptura commemorat quatuor flumina in Paradiso oriri, ut patet +Gen. II. Illa autem flumina quae ibi nominantur, alibi habent +manifestas origines; ut patet etiam per philosophum in libro +Meteor. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore + apparently it is not a corporeal place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32658] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +aliqui diligentissime inquisierunt omnia loca terrae habitabilis, +qui tamen nullam mentionem faciunt de loco Paradisi. Ergo non +videtur esse locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written + of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.18" target="asv">Prov. 3:18</a>). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32659] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in +Paradiso describitur lignum vitae esse. Sed lignum vitae est +aliquid spirituale, dicitur enim Prov. III, de sapientia, quod est +lignum vitae his qui apprehendunt eam. Ergo et Paradisus non est +locus corporeus, sed spiritualis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for + corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of + the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32660] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si +Paradisus est locus corporalis, oportet quod et ligna Paradisi sint +corporalia. Sed hoc non videtur, cum corporalia ligna sint producta +tertio die; de plantatione autem lignorum Paradisi legitur Gen. II, +post opera sex dierum. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; + others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32661] Iª q. 102 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>tres sunt de +Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo +corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui +spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum +accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; + so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about + paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical + truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so + paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting + that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now + the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than + the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 co."><a name="32662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32662] Iª q. 102 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, <i>quae commode dici +possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente +dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum +gestarum narratione commendata credatur</i>. Ea enim quae de +Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae +proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro +fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales +expositiones fabricandae. Est ergo Paradisus, ut Isidorus dicit in +libro Etymol., <i>locus in orientis partibus constitutus, cuius +vocabulum a Graeco in Latinum vertitur hortus</i>. Convenienter +autem in parte Orientali dicitur situs. Quia credendum est quod in +nobilissimo loco totius terrae sit constitutus. Cum autem oriens +sit dextera caeli, ut patet per philosophum in II de caelo; dextera +autem est nobilior quam sinistra; conveniens fuit ut in Orientali +parte Paradisus terrenus institueretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to + the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually + even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, + is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly + bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by + clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon---that is, to the middle space of the air, + where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it + would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, + as + is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32663] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Bedae verbum non est verum, si secundum sensum +manifestum intelligatur. Potest tamen exponi quod usque ad locum +lunaris globi ascendit, non secundum situs eminentiam, sed secundum +similitudinem, quia est ibi perpetua aeris temperies, ut Isidorus +dicit, et in hoc assimilatur corporibus caelestibus, quae sunt +absque contrarietate. Magis tamen fit mentio de lunari globo quam +de aliis sphaeris, quia lunaris globus est terminus caelestium +corporum versus nos; et luna etiam est magis terrae affinis inter +omnia corpora caelestia; unde et quasdam tenebras nebulosas habet, +quasi accedens ad opacitatem. Quidam autem dicunt quod Paradisus +pertingebat usque ad lunarem globum, idest usque ad medium aeris +interstitium, in quo generantur pluviae et venti et huiusmodi, quia +dominium super huiusmodi evaporationes maxime attribuitur lunae. +Sed secundum hoc, locus ille non esset conveniens habitationi +humanae, tum quia ibi est maxima intemperies; tum quia non est +contemperatus complexioni humanae, sicut aer inferior magis terrae +vicinus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose + sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that + such is the case with some other streams?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32664] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., +<i>credendum est, quoniam locus Paradisi a cognitione hominum est +remotissimus, flumina, quorum fontes noti esse dicuntur, alicubi +isse sub terras, et post tractus prolixarum regionum, locis aliis +erupisse. Nam hoc solere nonnullas aquas facere, quis +ignorat?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot + be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32665] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione +aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius +aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores +locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated + ( + <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[97] , A[4]</a>). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In + like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after + eating of it, man was to learn, by + experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also + be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32666] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta +quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra +dictum est. Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et +petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit +Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis +arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius +esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter +obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter +potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their + seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. + According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the + trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the + work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted + a paradise of pleasure from the beginning" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv">Gn. 2:8</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32667] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt +plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed +post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam +aliae in actu. Secundum alios vero sanctos, oportet dicere quod +omnes plantae productae sunt in actu tertio die, et etiam ligna +Paradisi, sed quod dicitur de plantatione lignorum Paradisi post +opera sex dierum, intelligitur per recapitulationem esse dictum. +Unde littera nostra habet, <i>plantaverat dominus Deus Paradisum +voluptatis a principio</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A2-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 2. Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. + But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed---that is, the empyrean + heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32668] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non fuerit locus conveniens +habitationi humanae. Homo enim et Angelus similiter ad beatitudinem +ordinantur. Sed Angelus statim a principio factus est habitator +loci beatorum, scilicet caeli Empyrei. Ergo etiam ibi debuit +institui habitatio hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of + the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the + desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided + for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32669] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +locus aliquis debetur homini, aut debetur ei ratione animae, aut +ratione corporis. Si ratione animae, debetur ei pro loco caelum, +qui videtur esse locus naturalis animae, cum omnibus insitus sit +appetitus caeli. Ratione autem corporis, non debetur ei alius locus +quam aliis animalibus. Ergo Paradisus nullo modo fuit locus +conveniens habitationi humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were + adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32670] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +frustra est locus in quo nullum locatum continetur. Sed post +peccatum Paradisus non est locus habitationis humanae. Ergo, si est +locus habitationi humanae congruus, in vanum videtur a Deo +institutus fuisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not + of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator---a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year + the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32671] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +homini, cum sit temperatae complexionis congruus est locus +temperatus. Sed locus Paradisi non est locus temperatus, dicitur +enim esse sub aequinoctiali circulo, qui locus videtur esse +calidissimus, cum bis in anno sol pertranseat super summitatem +capitum eorum qui ibi habitant. Ergo Paradisus non est locus +congruus habitationi humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32672] Iª q. 102 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Damascenus dicit de Paradiso, quod <i>est divina regio, et +digna eius qui secundum imaginem Dei erat, conversatio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a href="#FP_Q97_A1" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[1]</a>), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul + there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From + within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[97], A[4]</a>), and man was able to + ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere + of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions + were found; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of + a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise + was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 co."><a name="32673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32673] Iª q. 102 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et +immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis +haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus +a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori +et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem +humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni +occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae +exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, +unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris. In +Paradiso autem utrumque invenitur, quia, ut Damascenus dicit, +<i>est locus temperato et tenuissimo et purissimo aere +circumfulgens, plantis semper floridis comatus</i>. Unde manifestum +est quod Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, +secundum primae immortalitatis statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, + it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through + spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, + as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the + state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very + nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler + over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed + from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final + beatitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32674] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et +est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est +locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in +III de Trin., <i>Deus regit creaturam corporalem per +spiritualem</i>; unde conveniens est quod spiritualis natura sit +supra omnem corporalem constituta, sicut ei praesidens. Quantum +autem ad secundum, convenit statui beatitudinis, qui est firmatus +in summa stabilitate. Sic igitur locus beatitudinis congruit Angelo +secundum naturam suam, unde ibi creatus est. Non autem congruit +homini secundum suam naturam, cum non praesideat toti corporali +creaturae per modum gubernationis, sed competit ei solum ratione +beatitudinis. Unde non est positus a principio in caelo Empyreo; +sed illuc transferendus erat in statu finalis beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular + place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as + regards both his body and his soul---that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. + This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene + says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were + brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32675] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui +spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per +congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali +attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini +et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in +anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non +competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, <i>in +Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat</i>, licet ex quadam +dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et +serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in + vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that + Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32676] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi +hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit +homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat. +Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid +homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in +illo Paradiso habitent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account + of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never + too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, + Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable + on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically + overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must + hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32677] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod illi qui dicunt Paradisum esse sub circulo +aequinoctiali, opinantur sub circulo illo esse locum +temperatissimum, propter aequalitatem dierum et noctium omni +tempore; et quia sol nunquam multum ab eis elongatur, ut sit apud +eos superabundantia frigoris; nec iterum est apud eos, ut dicunt, +superabundantia caloris, quia etsi sol pertranseat super eorum +capita, non tamen diu moratur ibi in hac dispositione. Aristoteles +tamen, in libro Meteor., expresse dicit quod regio illa est +inhabitabilis propter aestum. Quod videtur probabilius, quia terrae +per quas nunquam sol pertransit in directum capitis, sunt +intemperatae in calore propter solam vicinitatem solis. Quidquid +autem de hoc sit, credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo +constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A3-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 3. Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin + would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. 3:17</a>). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32678] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit positus in Paradiso ut +operaretur et custodiret illum. Quod enim introductum est in poenam +peccati, non fuisset in Paradiso in statu innocentiae. Sed +agricultura introducta est in poenam peccati, ut dicitur Gen. III. +Ergo homo non fuit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear + of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32679] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +custodia non est necessaria, ubi non timetur violentus invasor. Sed +in Paradiso nullus timebatur violentus invasor. Ergo non erat +necessarium ut Paradisum custodiret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, + and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32680] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +homo positus est in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret ipsum, +videtur sequi quod homo factus sit propter Paradisum, et non e +converso, quod videtur esse falsum. Ergo homo non est positus in +Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.15" target="asv">Gn. 2: 15</a>): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32681] Iª q. 102 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit +illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret +illum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that + God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man + at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption + and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have + involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of + nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest + he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 co."><a name="32682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32682] Iª q. 102 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., verbum istud +Genesis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo sic, quod Deus posuit +hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem, +operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine +cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset +influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo. +Alio modo potest intelligi, ut homo operaretur et custodiret +Paradisum. Nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post +peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis +naturae. Custodia etiam illa non esset contra invasores, sed esset +ad hoc quod homo sibi Paradisum custodiret, ne ipsum peccando +amitteret. Et hoc totum in bonum hominis cedebat, et sic Paradisus +ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p7"> Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="32683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32683] Iª q. 102 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A4-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 4. Whether man was created in paradise?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place---namely, the empyrean heaven. + But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32684] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo factus fuerit in Paradiso. Angelus +enim in loco suae habitationis creatus fuit, scilicet in caelo +Empyreo. Sed Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae ante +peccatum. Ergo videtur quod in Paradiso homo debuit fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the + earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created ( + <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[4]</a>). Therefore he was created in paradise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32685] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, alia +animalia conservantur in loco suae generationis; sicut pisces in +aquis, et animalia gressibilia in terra, unde producta sunt. Homo +autem conservatus fuisset in Paradiso, ut dictum est. Ergo in +Paradiso fieri debuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32686] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +mulier in Paradiso facta fuit. Sed vir dignior est muliere. Ergo +multo magis vir debuit fieri in Paradiso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.15" target="asv">Gn. 2:15</a>): "God took man and placed him in paradise." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32687] Iª q. 102 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in +Paradiso</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was + man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human + nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; + and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 co."><a name="32688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32688] Iª q. 102 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad +incorruptionem primi status. Incorruptio autem illa non erat +hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono. Ut ergo +hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae, Deus hominem +extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut +habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum +spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32689] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est locus congruus Angelis etiam +quantum ad eorum naturam, et ideo ibi sunt creati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p8"> In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32690] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum ad secundum. Loca enim illa congruunt animalibus secundum +suam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her + body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32691] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem +suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius +formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in +quo parentes iam erant positi.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>