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<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> <style> h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; orphans: 2; widows: 2; } @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} </style> </head> <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ix" class="div2"> <h2 id="FP.ix-p0.1">TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q75">Q. 75. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FP_Q76">Q. 76. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q77">Q. 77. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q78">Q. 78. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q79">Q. 79. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q80">Q. 80. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q81">Q. 81. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q82">Q. 82. OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q83">Q. 83. OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q84">Q. 84. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q85">Q. 85. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q86">Q. 86. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q87">Q. 87. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q88">Q. 88. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q89">Q. 89. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q90">Q. 90. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q91">Q. 91. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q92">Q. 92. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q93">Q. 93. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q94">Q. 94. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q95">Q. 95. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q96">Q. 96. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q97">Q. 97. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q98">Q. 98. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q99">Q. 99. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q100">Q. 100. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q101">Q. 101. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q102">Q. 102. OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> <div id="FP_Q75" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q75-p0.1">Q. 75. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES) </h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q75-p2"> Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation. </p><p id="FP_Q75-p3"> Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry. </p><p id="FP_Q75-p4"><a href="#FP_Q75_A1"> (1) Whether the soul is a body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p5"><a href="#FP_Q75_A2"> (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p6"><a href="#FP_Q75_A3"> (3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p7"><a href="#FP_Q75_A4"> (4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p8"><a href="#FP_Q75_A5"> (5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p9"><a href="#FP_Q75_A6"> (6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p10"><a href="#FP_Q75_A7"> (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 pr."><a name="31447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31447] Iª q. 75 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem creaturae spiritualis et corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur. Et primo, de natura ipsius hominis; secundo, de eius productione. Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam. Et ideo prima consideratio circa animam versabitur. Et quia, secundum Dionysium, XI cap. Angel. Hier., tria inveniuntur in substantiis spiritualibus, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio; primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad virtutem sive potentias eius; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius. Circa primum duplex occurrit consideratio, quarum prima est de ipsa anima secundum se; secunda, de unione eius ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur septem. Primo, utrum anima sit corpus. Secundo, utrum anima humana sit aliquid subsistens. Tertio, utrum animae brutorum sint subsistentes. Quarto, utrum anima sit homo; vel magis homo sit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. Quinto, utrum sit composita ex materia et forma. Sexto, utrum anima humana sit incorruptibilis. Septimo, utrum anima sit eiusdem speciei cum Angelo.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q75_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A1-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 1. Whether the soul is a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul is a body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31448] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit corpus. Anima enim est motor corporis. Non autem est movens non motum. Tum quia videtur quod nihil possit movere nisi moveatur, quia nihil dat alteri quod non habet, sicut quod non est calidum non calefacit. Tum quia, si aliquid est movens non motum, causat motum sempiternum et eodem modo se habentem, ut probatur in VIII Physic., quod non apparet in motu animalis, qui est ab anima. Ergo anima est movens motum. Sed omne movens motum est corpus. Ergo anima est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31449] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Non potest autem esse similitudo corporis ad rem incorpoream. Si igitur anima non esset corpus, non posset cognoscere res corporeas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31450] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, moventis ad motum oportet esse aliquem contactum. Contactus autem non est nisi corporum. Cum igitur anima moveat corpus, videtur quod anima sit corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31451] Iª q. 75 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod <i>anima simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium loci</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body. </p><p id="FP_Q75_A1-p7"> It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 co."><a name="31452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31452] Iª q. 75 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ad inquirendum de natura animae, oportet praesupponere quod anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita carentes. Vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet cognitionis et motus. Horum autem principium antiqui philosophi, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, aliquod corpus ponebant; sola corpora res esse dicentes, et quod non est corpus, nihil esse. Et secundum hoc, animam aliquod corpus esse dicebant. Huius autem opinionis falsitas licet multipliciter ostendi possit tamen uno utemur, quo et communius et certius patet animam corpus non esse. Manifestum est enim quod non quodcumque vitalis operationis principium est anima, sic enim oculus esset anima, cum sit quoddam principium visionis; et idem esset dicendum de aliis animae instrumentis. Sed primum principium vitae dicimus esse animam. Quamvis autem aliquod corpus possit esse quoddam principium vitae, sicut cor est principium vitae in animali; tamen non potest esse primum principium vitae aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod esse principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus, alioquin omne corpus esset vivens, aut principium vitae. Convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam principium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu tale, habet hoc ab aliquo principio quod dicitur actus eius. Anima igitur, quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus, sed corporis actus, sicut calor, qui est principium calefactionis, non est corpus, sed quidam corporis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31453] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum omne quod movetur ab alio moveatur, quod non potest in infinitum procedere, necesse est dicere quod non omne movens movetur. Cum enim moveri sit exire de potentia in actum, movens dat id quod habet mobili, inquantum facit ipsum esse in actu. Sed sicut ostenditur in VIII Physic., est quoddam movens penitus immobile, quod nec per se nec per accidens movetur, et tale movens potest movere motum semper uniformem. Est autem aliud movens, quod non movetur per se, sed movetur per accidens, et propter hoc non movet motum semper uniformem. Et tale movens est anima. Est autem aliud movens, quod per se movetur, scilicet corpus. Et quia antiqui naturales nihil esse credebant nisi corpora, posuerunt quod omne movens movetur, et quod anima per se movetur, et est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31454] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non est necessarium quod similitudo rei cognitae sit actu in natura cognoscentis, sed si aliquid sit quod prius est cognoscens in potentia et postea in actu, oportet quod similitudo cogniti non sit actu in natura cognoscentis, sed in potentia tantum; sicut color non est actu in pupilla, sed in potentia tantum. Unde non oportet quod in natura animae sit similitudo rerum corporearum in actu; sed quod sit in potentia ad huiusmodi similitudines. Sed quia antiqui naturales nesciebant distinguere inter actum et potentiam, ponebant animam esse corpus, ad hoc quod cognosceret corpus; et ad hoc quod cognosceret omnia corpora, quod esset composita ex principiis omnium corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31455] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod est duplex contactus, quantitatis et virtutis. Primo modo, corpus non tangitur nisi a corpore. Secundo modo, corpus potest tangi a re incorporea quae movet corpus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A2-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 2. Whether the human soul is something subsistent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31456] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens. Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31457] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod est subsistens, potest dici operari. Sed anima non dicitur operari, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, <i>dicere animam sentire aut intelligere, simile est ac si dicat eam aliquis texere vel aedificare</i>. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31458] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si anima esset aliquid subsistens, esset aliqua eius operatio sine corpore. Sed nulla est eius operatio sine corpore, nec etiam intelligere, quia non contingit intelligere sine phantasmate, phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo anima humana non est aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature---i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things." Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31459] Iª q. 75 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. <i>Quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, videt eos qui opinantur eam esse corpoream, ob hoc errare, quod adiungunt ei ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam, scilicet corporum phantasias</i>. Natura ergo mentis humanae non solum est incorporea, sed etiam substantia, scilicet aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color. </p><p id="FP_Q75_A2-p7"> Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 co."><a name="31460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31460] Iª q. 75 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens. Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter impediret cognitionem aliorum; sicut videmus quod lingua infirmi quae infecta est cholerico et amaro humore, non potest percipere aliquid dulce, sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere. Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus eiusdem coloris videtur. Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu, unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est. Propter quod non dicimus quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31461] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente, alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis, secundo modo, excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate "per se" belongs to what exists "per se." But for a thing to exist "per se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist "per se"; nor can it for that reason be said to operate "per se." Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31462] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod verba illa Aristoteles dicit non secundum propriam sententiam, sed secundum opinionem illorum qui dicebant quod intelligere est moveri; ut patet ex iis quae ibi praemittit. Vel dicendum quod per se agere convenit per se existenti. Sed per se existens quandoque potest dici aliquid si non sit inhaerens ut accidens vel ut forma materialis, etiam si sit pars. Sed proprie et per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhaerens, neque est pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non posset dici per se subsistens; et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde et operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculum, et palpat per manum, aliter quam calidum calefacit per calorem, quia calor nullo modo calefacit, proprie loquendo. Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31463] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem, alioquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A3-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 3. Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we have just shown <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q75_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31464] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod animae brutorum animalium sint subsistentes. Homo enim convenit in genere cum aliis animalibus. Sed anima hominis est aliquid subsistens, ut ostensum est. Ergo et animae aliorum animalium sunt subsistentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31465] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, similiter se habet sensitivum ad sensibilia, sicut intellectivum et intelligibilia. Sed intellectus intelligit intelligibilia sine corpore. Ergo et sensus apprehendit sensibilia sine corpore. Animae autem brutorum animalium sunt sensitivae. Ergo sunt subsistentes, pari ratione qua et anima hominis, quae est intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31466] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, brutorum animalium anima movet corpus. Corpus autem non movet, sed movetur. Anima ergo bruti animalis habet aliquam operationem sine corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31467] Iª q. 75 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccl. Dogmat., <i>solum hominem credimus habere animam substantivam; animalium vero animae non sunt substantivae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has been said <a href="#FP_Q75_A1" id="FP_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 co."><a name="31468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31468] Iª q. 75 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi nullam distinctionem ponebant inter sensum et intellectum, et utrumque corporeo principio attribuebant, ut dictum est. Plato autem distinxit inter intellectum et sensum; utrumque tamen attribuit principio incorporeo, ponens quod, sicut intelligere, ita et sentire convenit animae secundum seipsam. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod etiam animae brutorum animalium sint subsistentes. Sed Aristoteles posuit quod solum intelligere, inter opera animae, sine organo corporeo exercetur. Sentire vero, et consequentes operationes animae sensitivae, manifeste accidunt cum aliqua corporis immutatione; sicut in videndo immutatur pupilla per speciem coloris; et idem apparet in aliis. Et sic manifestum est quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam, sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est coniuncti. Ex quo relinquitur quod, cum animae brutorum animalium per se non operentur, non sint subsistentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although man is of the same "genus" as other animals, he is of a different "species." Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of "genus." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31469] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo, etsi conveniat in genere cum aliis animalibus, specie tamen differt, differentia autem speciei attenditur secundum differentiam formae. Nec oportet quod omnis differentia formae faciat generis diversitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31470] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod sensitivum quodammodo se habet ad sensibilia sicut intellectivum ad intelligibilia, inquantum scilicet utrumque est in potentia ad sua obiecta. Sed quodammodo dissimiliter se habent, inquantum sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione, unde excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum. Quod in intellectu non contingit, nam intellectus intelligens maxima intelligibilium, magis potest postmodum intelligere minora. Si vero in intelligendo fatigetur corpus, hoc est per accidens, in quantum intellectus indiget operatione virium sensitivarum, per quas ei phantasmata praeparantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31471] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod vis motiva est duplex. Una quae imperat motum, scilicet appetitiva. Et huius operatio in anima sensitiva non est sine corpore; sed ira et gaudium et omnes huiusmodi passiones sunt cum aliqua corporis immutatione. Alia vis motiva est exequens motum, per quam membra redduntur habilia ad obediendum appetitui, cuius actus non est movere, sed moveri. Unde patet quod movere non est actus animae sensitivae sine corpore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A4-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 4. Whether the soul is man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.16" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:16</a>): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul is the inward man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31472] Iª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit homo. Dicitur enim II ad Cor. IV, <i>licet is qui foris est noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is qui intus est, renovatur de die in diem</i>. Sed id quod est intus in homine, est anima. Ergo anima est homo interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31473] Iª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima humana est substantia quaedam. Non autem est substantia universalis. Ergo est substantia particularis. Ergo est hypostasis vel persona. Sed non nisi humana. Ergo anima est homo, nam persona humana est homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p4"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and body." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31474] Iª q. 75 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, commendat Varronem, <i>qui hominem nec animam solam, nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et corpus esse arbitrabatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A4-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species. </p><p id="FP_Q75_A4-p6"> It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 co."><a name="31475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31475] Iª q. 75 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod animam esse hominem dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod homo sit anima, sed hic homo non sit anima, sed compositum ex anima et corpore, puta Socrates. Quod ideo dico, quia quidam posuerunt solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse partem individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse verum. Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam. Unde materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis; sed materia communis. Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub specie contentorum. Alio vero modo potest intelligi sic, quod etiam haec anima sit hic homo. Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si poneretur quod animae sensitivae operatio esset eius propria sine corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod operatur operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur operationes hominis. Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est operatio animae tantum. Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. Plato vero, ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset anima utens corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the "outward" man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31476] Iª q. 75 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum in IX Ethic., illud potissime videtur esse unumquodque, quod est principale in ipso, sicut quod facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas facere. Et hoc modo aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo, aliquando quidem pars intellectiva, secundum rei veritatem, quae dicitur homo interior; aliquando vero pars sensitiva cum corpore, secundum aestimationem quorundam, qui solum circa sensibilia detinentur. Et hic dicitur homo exterior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31477] Iª q. 75 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non quaelibet substantia particularis est hypostasis vel persona, sed quae habet completam naturam speciei. Unde manus vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A5-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 5. Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as part of itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31478] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma. Potentia enim contra actum dividitur. Sed omnia quaecumque sunt in actu, participant primum actum, qui Deus est; per cuius participationem omnia sunt et bona et entia et viventia, ut patet per doctrinam Dionysii in libro de Div. Nom. Ergo quaecumque sunt in potentia, participant primam potentiam. Sed prima potentia est materia prima. Cum ergo anima humana sit quodammodo in potentia, quod apparet ex hoc quod homo quandoque est intelligens in potentia; videtur quod anima humana participet materiam primam tanquam partem sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul---namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31479] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, ibi invenitur materia. Sed in anima inveniuntur proprietates materiae, quae sunt subiici et transmutari, subiicitur enim scientiae et virtuti, et mutatur de ignorantia ad scientiam, et de vitio ad virtutem. Ergo in anima est materia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31480] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illa quae non habent materiam, non habent causam sui esse, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Sed anima habet causam sui esse, quia creatur a Deo. Ergo anima habet materiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="31481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31481] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod non habet materiam, sed est forma tantum, est actus purus et infinitus. Hoc autem solius Dei est. Ergo anima habet materiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31482] Iª q. 75 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus probat, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima non est facta nec ex materia corporali, nec ex materia spirituali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A5-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate." </p><p id="FP_Q75_A5-p8"> Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 co."><a name="31483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31483] Iª q. 75 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod anima non habet materiam. Et hoc potest considerari dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ratione animae in communi. Est enim de ratione animae, quod sit forma alicuius corporis. Aut igitur est forma secundum se totam; aut secundum aliquam partem sui. Si secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars eius sit materia, si dicatur materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum, quia forma, inquantum forma, est actus; id autem quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contra actum divisa. Si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem sui, illam partem, dicemus esse animam, et illam materiam cuius primo est actus, dicemus esse primum animatum. Secundo, specialiter ex ratione humanae animae, inquantum est intellectiva. Manifestum est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma eius est in cognoscente anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absolute, puta lapidem inquantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva. Anima igitur intellectiva est forma absoluta, non autem aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Si enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et forma, formae rerum reciperentur in ea ut individuales, et sic non cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali, materia enim est principium individuationis formarum. Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31484] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod primus actus est universale principium omnium actuum, quia est infinitum, virtualiter in se omnia praehabens, ut dicit Dionysius. Unde participatur a rebus, non sicut pars, sed secundum diffusionem processionis ipsius. Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, qui procedunt a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes eius, sunt diversi. Unde non potest esse potentia una quae recipiat omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens omnes actus participatos, alioquin potentia receptiva adaequaret potentiam activam primi actus. Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima intellectiva, a potentia receptiva materiae primae, ut patet ex diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas individuales, intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas. Unde talis potentia in anima intellectiva existens, non ostendit quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31485] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod subiici et transmutari convenit materiae secundum quod est in potentia. Sicut ergo est alia potentia intellectus, et alia potentia materiae primae, ita est alia ratio subiiciendi et transmutandi. Secundum hoc enim intellectus subiicitur scientiae, et transmutatur de ignorantia ad scientiam, secundum quod est in potentia ad species intelligibiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once." [*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam."] </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31486] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod forma est causa essendi materiae, et agens, unde agens, inquantum reducit materiam in actum formae transmutando, est ei causa essendi. Si quid autem est forma subsistens, non habet esse per aliquod formale principium, nec habet causam transmutantem de potentia in actum. Unde post verba praemissa, philosophus concludit quod in his quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, <i>nulla est alia causa nisi movens ex potestate ad actum, quaecumque vero non habent materiam, omnia simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="31487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31487] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius. Quaecumque autem forma creata per se subsistens ponatur, oportet quod participet esse, quia etiam ipsa vita, vel quidquid sic diceretur, participat ipsum esse, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom. Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem participantis. Unde solus Deus, qui est ipsum suum esse, est actus purus et infinitus. In substantiis vero intellectualibus est compositio ex actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed ex forma et esse participato. Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex quo est et quod est, ipsum enim esse est quo aliquid est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A6-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 6. Whether the human soul is incorruptible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast," as it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv">Eccles. 3:19</a>). Therefore, as the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31488] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana sit corruptibilis. Quorum enim est simile principium et similis processus, videtur esse similis finis. Sed simile est principium generationis hominum et iumentorum, quia de terra facta sunt. Similis est etiam vitae processus in utrisque, quia <i>similiter spirant omnia, et nihil habet homo iumento amplius</i>, ut dicitur Eccle. III. Ergo, ut ibidem concluditur, <i>unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio</i>. Sed anima brutorum animalium est corruptibilis. Ergo et anima humana est corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.2" target="asv">Wis. 2:2</a>), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even as to our soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31489] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod est ex nihilo, vertibile est in nihilum, quia finis debet respondere principio. Sed sicut dicitur Sap. II, <i>ex nihilo nati sumus</i>, quod verum est non solum quantum ad corpus, sed etiam quantum ad animam. Ergo ut ibidem concluditur, post hoc erimus tanquam non fuerimus, etiam secundum animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31490] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulla res est sine propria operatione. Sed propria operatio animae, quae est intelligere cum phantasmate, non potest esse sine corpore, nihil enim sine phantasmate intelligit anima; phantasma autem non est sine corpore, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo anima non potest remanere, destructo corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an incorruptible substantial life." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31491] Iª q. 75 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod animae humanae habent ex bonitate divina quod sint intellectuales et quod habeant substantialem vitam inconsumptibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se'; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q75_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted "per se." This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist. </p><p id="FP_Q75_A6-p7"> Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 co."><a name="31492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31492] Iª q. 75 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere animam humanam, quam dicimus intellectivum principium, esse incorruptibilem. Dupliciter enim aliquid corrumpitur, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Impossibile est autem aliquid subsistens generari aut corrumpi per accidens, idest aliquo generato vel corrupto. Sic enim competit alicui generari et corrumpi, sicut et esse, quod per generationem acquiritur et per corruptionem amittitur. Unde quod per se habet esse, non potest generari vel corrumpi nisi per se, quae vero non subsistunt, ut accidentia et formae materiales, dicuntur fieri et corrumpi per generationem et corruptionem compositorum. Ostensum est autem supra quod animae brutorum non sunt per se subsistentes, sed sola anima humana. Unde animae brutorum corrumpuntur, corruptis corporibus, anima autem humana non posset corrumpi, nisi per se corrumperetur. Quod quidem omnino est impossibile non solum de ipsa, sed de quolibet subsistente quod est forma tantum. Manifestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparabile ab ipso. Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam, secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa. Unde impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse. Dato etiam quod anima esset ex materia et forma composita, ut quidam dicunt, adhuc oporteret ponere eam incorruptibilem. Non enim invenitur corruptio nisi ubi invenitur contrarietas, generationes enim et corruptiones ex contrariis et in contraria sunt; unde corpora caelestia, quia non habent materiam contrarietati subiectam, incorruptibilia sunt. In anima autem intellectiva non potest esse aliqua contrarietas. Recipit enim secundum modum sui esse, ea vero quae in ipsa recipiuntur, sunt absque contrarietate; quia etiam rationes contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, sed est una scientia contrariorum. Impossibile est ergo quod anima intellectiva sit corruptibilis. Potest etiam huius rei accipi signum ex hoc, quod unumquodque naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Sensus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc, sed intellectus apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper. Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur intellectualis substantia est incorruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2" target="asv">Wisdom 2</a>. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the living soul" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.24" target="asv">Gn. 1:24</a>): while of man it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>) that "He breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: "(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it." Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv">Eccles. 3:19</a>): "All things breathe alike," and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.2" target="asv">Wis. 2:2 </a>), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31493] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Salomon inducit rationem illam ex persona insipientium, ut exprimitur Sap. II. Quod ergo dicitur quod homo et alia animalia habent simile generationis principium, verum est quantum ad corpus, similiter enim de terra facta sunt omnia animalia. Non autem quantum ad animam, nam anima brutorum producitur ex virtute aliqua corporea, anima vero humana a Deo. Et ad hoc significandum dicitur Gen., quantum ad alia animalia, producat terra animam viventem, quantum vero ad hominem, dicitur quod inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae. Et ideo concluditur Eccle. ult., <i>revertatur pulvis in terram suam, unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum qui dedit illum</i>. Similiter processus vitae est similis quantum ad corpus; ad quod pertinet quod dicitur in Eccle., <i>similiter spirant omnia</i>; et Sap. II, <i>fumus et flatus est in naribus nostris</i> et cetera. Sed non est similis processus quantum ad animam, quia homo intelligit, non autem animalia bruta. Unde falsum est quod dicitur, nihil habet homo iumento amplius. Et ideo similis est interitus quantum ad corpus, sed non quantum ad animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31494] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut posse creari dicitur aliquid non per potentiam passivam, sed solum per potentiam activam creantis, qui ex nihilo potest aliquid producere; ita cum dicitur aliquid vertibile in nihil, non importatur in creatura potentia ad non esse, sed in creatore potentia ad hoc quod esse non influat. Dicitur autem aliquid corruptibile per hoc, quod inest ei potentia ad non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on ( <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q75_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[89], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31495] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligere cum phantasmate est propria operatio animae secundum quod corpori est unita. Separata autem a corpore habebit alium modum intelligendi, similem aliis substantiis a corpore separatis, ut infra melius patebit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A7-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 7. Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel---namely, eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31496] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima et Angelus sint unius speciei. Unumquodque enim ordinatur ad proprium finem per naturam suae speciei, per quam habet inclinationem ad finem. Sed idem est finis animae et Angeli, scilicet beatitudo aeterna. Ergo sunt unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31497] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ultima differentia specifica est nobilissima, quia complet rationem speciei. Sed nihil est nobilius in Angelo et anima quam intellectuale esse. Ergo conveniunt anima et Angelus in ultima differentia specifica. Ergo sunt unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31498] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima ab Angelo differre non videtur nisi per hoc, quod est corpori unita. Corpus autem, cum sit extra essentiam animae, non videtur ad eius speciem pertinere. Ergo anima et Angelus sunt unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), "Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of Divine things from visible things." Subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31499] Iª q. 75 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quorum sunt diversae operationes naturales, ipsa differunt specie. Sed animae et Angeli sunt diversae operationes naturales, quia ut dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., <i>mentes angelicae simplices et beatos intellectus habent, non de visibilibus congregantes divinam cognitionem</i>; cuius contrarium postmodum de anima dicit. Anima igitur et Angelus non sunt unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above ( <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a "genus" are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the "principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," as is written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter---that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>, ad 1). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 co."><a name="31500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31500] Iª q. 75 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit omnes animas humanas et Angelos esse unius speciei. Et hoc ideo, quia posuit diversitatem gradus in huiusmodi substantiis inventam, accidentalem, utpote ex libero arbitrio provenientem, ut supra dictum est. Quod non potest esse, quia in substantiis incorporeis non potest esse diversitas secundum numerum absque diversitate secundum speciem, et absque naturali inaequalitate. Quia si non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sed sint formae subsistentes, manifestum est quod necesse erit in eis esse diversitatem in specie. Non enim potest intelligi quod aliqua forma separata sit nisi una unius speciei, sicut si esset albedo separata, non posset esse nisi una tantum; haec enim albedo non differt ab illa nisi per hoc, quod est huius vel illius. Diversitas autem secundum speciem semper habet diversitatem naturalem concomitantem, sicut in speciebus colorum unus est perfectior altero, et similiter in aliis. Et hoc ideo, quia differentiae dividentes genus sunt contrariae; contraria autem se habent secundum perfectum et imperfectum, quia principium contrarietatis est privatio et habitus ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Idem etiam sequeretur, si huiusmodi substantiae essent compositae ex materia et forma. Si enim materia huius distinguitur a materia illius, necesse est quod vel forma sit principium distinctionis materiae, ut scilicet materiae sint diversae propter habitudinem ad diversas formas, et tunc sequitur adhuc diversitas secundum speciem et inaequalitas naturalis. Vel materia erit principium distinctionis formarum; nec poterit dici materia haec alia ab illa, nisi secundum divisionem quantitativam, quae non habet locum in substantiis incorporeis, cuiusmodi sunt Angelus et anima. Unde non potest esse quod Angelus et anima sint unius speciei. Quomodo autem sint plures animae unius speciei infra ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31501] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fine proximo et naturali. Beatitudo autem aeterna est finis ultimus et supernaturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31502] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod differentia specifica ultima est nobilissima, inquantum est maxime determinata, per modum quo actus est nobilior potentia. Sic autem intellectuale non est nobilissimum, quia est indeterminatum et commune ad multos intellectualitatis gradus, sicut sensibile ad multos gradus in esse sensibili. Unde sicut non omnia sensibilia sunt unius speciei, ita nec omnia intellectualia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31503] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus non est de essentia animae, sed anima ex natura suae essentiae habet quod sit corpori unibilis. Unde nec proprie anima est in specie; sed compositum. Et hoc ipsum quod anima quodammodo indiget corpore ad suam operationem, ostendit quod anima tenet inferiorem gradum intellectualitatis quam Angelus, qui corpori non unitur.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q76" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q76-p0.1">Q. 76. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q76-p2"> We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q76-p3"><a href="#FP_Q76_A1"> (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p4"><a href="#FP_Q76_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for all men? </a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p5"><a href="#FP_Q76_A3"> (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p6"><a href="#FP_Q76_A4"> (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p7"><a href="#FP_Q76_A5"> (5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p8"><a href="#FP_Q76_A6"> (6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p9"><a href="#FP_Q76_A7"> (7) Whether by means of an accident?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p10"><a href="#FP_Q76_A8"> (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 pr."><a name="31504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31504] Iª q. 76 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de unione animae ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum intellectivum principium uniatur corpori ut forma. Secundo, utrum intellectivum principium numero multiplicetur secundum multiplicationem corporum; vel sit unus intellectus omnium hominum. Tertio, utrum in corpore cuius forma est principium intellectivum, sit aliqua alia anima. Quarto, utrum sit in eo aliqua alia forma substantialis. Quinto, quale debeat esse corpus cuius intellectivum principium est forma. Sexto, utrum tali corpori uniatur mediante aliquo alio corpore. Septimo, utrum mediante aliquo accidente. Octavo, utrum anima sit tota in qualibet parte corporis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q76_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A1-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 1. Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31505] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectivum principium non uniatur corpori ut forma. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus est separatus, et quod nullius corporis est actus. Non ergo unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>); which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31506] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis forma determinatur secundum naturam materiae cuius est forma, alioquin non requireretur proportio inter materiam et formam. Si ergo intellectus uniretur corpori ut forma, cum omne corpus habeat determinatam naturam, sequeretur quod intellectus haberet determinatam naturam. Et sic non esset omnium cognoscitivus, ut ex superioribus patet, quod est contra rationem intellectus. Non ergo intellectus unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31507] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quaecumque potentia receptiva est actus alicuius corporis, recipit formam materialiter et individualiter, quia receptum est in recipiente secundum modum recipientis. Sed forma rei intellectae non recipitur in intellectu materialiter et individualiter, sed magis immaterialiter et universaliter, alioquin intellectus non esset cognoscitivus immaterialium et universalium, sed singularium tantum, sicut et sensus. Intellectus ergo non unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as appears from above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form of a body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31508] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, eiusdem est potentia et actio, idem enim est quod potest agere, et quod agit. Sed actio intellectualis non est alicuius corporis, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo nec potentia intellectiva est alicuius corporis potentia. Sed virtus sive potentia non potest esse abstractior vel simplicior quam essentia a qua virtus vel potentia derivatur. Ergo nec substantia intellectus est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever has "per se" existence is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intellectual principle has "per se" existence and is subsistent, as was said above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31509] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, id quod per se habet esse, non unitur corpori ut forma, quia forma est quo aliquid est; et sic ipsum esse formae non est ipsius formae secundum se. Sed intellectivum principium habet secundum se esse, et est subsistens, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A6" id="FP_Q76_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[6]</a>), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="31510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31510] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, id quod inest alicui rei secundum se, semper inest ei. Sed formae secundum se inest uniri materiae, non enim per accidens aliquod, sed per essentiam suam est actus materiae; alioquin ex materia et forma non fieret unum substantialiter, sed accidentaliter. Forma ergo non potest esse sine propria materia. Sed intellectivum principium, cum sit incorruptibile, ut supra ostensum est, remanet corpori non unitum, corpore corrupto. Ergo intellectivum principium non unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31511] Iª q. 76 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, secundum philosophum, in VIII Metaphys., differentia sumitur a forma rei. Sed differentia constitutiva hominis est rationale; quod dicitur de homine ratione intellectivi principii. Intellectivum ergo principium est forma hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p9"> <b>I answer that,</b> We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2). </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p10"> But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A4" id="FP_Q76_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p11"> The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p12"> Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p13"> There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle---namely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p14"> The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p15"> But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p16"> It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the "primary animate," as was said above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q76_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 co."><a name="31512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31512] Iª q. 76 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuitur, sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et quo primo scit anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma corporis, et scientia animae. Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima, anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis. Et haec est demonstratio Aristotelis in II de anima. Si quis autem velit dicere animam intellectivam non esse corporis formam, oportet quod inveniat modum quo ista actio quae est intelligere, sit huius hominis actio, experitur enim unusquisque seipsum esse qui intelligit. Attribuitur autem aliqua actio alicui tripliciter, ut patet per philosophum, V Physic., dicitur enim movere aliquid aut agere vel secundum se totum, sicut medicus sanat; aut secundum partem, sicut homo videt per oculum; aut per accidens, sicut dicitur quod album aedificat, quia accidit aedificatori esse album. Cum igitur dicimus Socratem aut Platonem intelligere, manifestum est quod non attribuitur ei per accidens, attribuitur enim ei inquantum est homo, quod essentialiter praedicatur de ipso. Aut ergo oportet dicere quod Socrates intelligit secundum se totum, sicut Plato posuit, dicens hominem esse animam intellectivam, aut oportet dicere quod intellectus sit aliqua pars Socratis. Et primum quidem stare non potest, ut supra ostensum est, propter hoc quod ipse idem homo est qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire, sentire autem non est sine corpore, unde oportet corpus aliquam esse hominis partem. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectus quo Socrates intelligit, est aliqua pars Socratis ita quod intellectus aliquo modo corpori Socratis uniatur. Hanc autem unionem Commentator, in III de anima, dicit esse per speciem intelligibilem. Quae quidem habet duplex subiectum, unum scilicet intellectum possibilem; et aliud ipsa phantasmata quae sunt in organis corporeis. Et sic per speciem intelligibilem continuatur intellectus possibilis corpori huius vel illius hominis. Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit ad hoc quod actio intellectus sit actio Socratis. Et hoc patet per similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit ad considerandum ea quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se habent phantasmata ad intellectum, ut dicitur in III de anima, sicut colores ad visum. Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod ex hoc quod colores sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt in visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti, non enim dicimus quod paries videat, sed magis quod videatur. Ex hoc ergo quod species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili, non sequitur quod Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat; sed quod ipse, vel eius phantasmata intelligantur. Quidam autem dicere voluerunt quod intellectus unitur corpori ut motor; et sic ex intellectu et corpore fit unum, ut actio intellectus toti attribui possit. Sed hoc est multipliciter vanum. Primo quidem, quia intellectus non movet corpus nisi per appetitum, cuius motus praesupponit operationem intellectus. Non ergo quia movetur Socrates ab intellectu, ideo intelligit, sed potius e converso, quia intelligit, ideo ab intellectu movetur Socrates. Secundo quia, cum Socrates sit quoddam individuum in natura cuius essentia est una, composita ex materia et forma; si intellectus non sit forma eius, sequitur quod sit praeter essentiam eius; et sic intellectus comparabitur ad totum Socratem sicut motor ad motum. Intelligere autem est actio quiescens in agente, non autem transiens in alterum, sicut calefactio. Non ergo intelligere potest attribui Socrati propter hoc quod est motus ab intellectu. Tertio, quia actio motoris nunquam attribuitur moto nisi sicut instrumento, sicut actio carpentarii serrae. Si igitur intelligere attribuitur Socrati quia est actio motoris eius, sequitur quod attribuatur ei sicut instrumento. Quod est contra philosophum, qui vult quod intelligere non sit per instrumentum corporeum. Quarto quia, licet actio partis attribuatur toti, ut actio oculi homini; nunquam tamen attribuitur alii parti, nisi forte per accidens, non enim dicimus quod manus videat, propter hoc quod oculus videt. Si ergo ex intellectu et Socrate dicto modo fit unum, actio intellectus non potest attribui Socrati. Si vero Socrates est totum quod componitur ex unione intellectus ad reliqua quae sunt Socratis, et tamen intellectus non unitur aliis quae sunt Socratis nisi sicut motor; sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter, et per consequens nec ens simpliciter; sic enim aliquid est ens, quomodo et unum. Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit, quod hic homo intelligit, quia principium intellectivum est forma ipsius. Sic ergo ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet quod intellectivum principium unitur corpori ut forma. Potest etiam idem manifestari ex ratione speciei humanae. Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius operatione ostenditur. Propria autem operatio hominis, inquantum est homo, est intelligere, per hanc enim omnia animalia transcendit. Unde et Aristoteles, in libro Ethic., in hac operatione, sicut in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem constituit. Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem sortiatur, quod est huius operationis principium. Sortitur autem unumquodque speciem per propriam formam. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectivum principium sit propria hominis forma. Sed considerandum est quod, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto magis dominatur materiae corporali, et minus ei immergitur, et magis sua operatione vel virtute excedit eam. Unde videmus quod forma mixti corporis habet aliquam operationem quae non causatur ex qualitatibus elementaribus. Et quanto magis proceditur in nobilitate formarum, tanto magis invenitur virtus formae materiam elementarem excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus quam forma metalli, et anima sensibilis plus quam anima vegetabilis. Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis. Et haec virtus dicitur intellectus. Est autem attendendum quod, si quis poneret animam componi ex materia et forma, nullo modo posset dicere animam esse formam corporis. Cum enim forma sit actus, materia vero sit ens in potentia tantum; nullo modo id quod est ex materia et forma compositum, potest esse alterius forma secundum se totum. Si autem secundum aliquid sui sit forma, id quod est forma dicimus animam, et id cuius est forma dicimus primum animatum, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from matter." It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31513] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic., ultima formarum naturalium, ad quam terminatur consideratio philosophi naturalis, scilicet anima humana, est quidem separata, sed tamen in materia; quod ex hoc probat, quia homo ex materia generat hominem, et sol. Separata quidem est secundum virtutem intellectivam, quia virtus intellectiva non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi intelligere enim est actus qui non potest exerceri per organum corporale, sicut exercetur visio. Sed in materia est inquantum ipsa anima cuius est haec virtus, est corporis forma, et terminus generationis humanae. Sic ergo philosophus dicit in III de anima quod intellectus est separatus, quia non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p18"> <b>Reply to Objections 2 & 3:</b> From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31514] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum et tertium. Sufficit enim ad hoc quod homo possit intelligere omnia per intellectum, et ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat immaterialia et universalia, quod virtus intellectiva non est corporis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p19"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31515] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod humana anima non est forma in materia corporali immersa, vel ab ea totaliter comprehensa, propter suam perfectionem. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam eius virtutem non esse corporis actum; quamvis anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p20"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31516] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae. Quod non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore, non autem aliae formae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p21"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="31517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31517] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri, sicut secundum se convenit corpori levi esse sursum. Et sicut corpus leve manet quidem leve cum a loco proprio fuerit separatum, cum aptitudine tamen et inclinatione ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A2-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 2. Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but one intellect in all men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31518] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectivum principium non multiplicetur secundum multiplicationem corporum, sed sit unus intellectus in omnibus hominibus. Nulla enim substantia immaterialis multiplicatur secundum numerum in una specie. Anima autem humana est substantia immaterialis, non enim est composita ex materia et forma, ut supra ostensum est. Non ergo sunt multae in una specie. Sed omnes homines sunt unius speciei. Est ergo unus intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31519] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Si ergo secundum multiplicationem corporum multiplicarentur animae humanae, consequens videretur quod, remotis corporibus, multitudo animarum non remaneret, sed ex omnibus animabus remaneret aliquod unum solum. Quod est haereticum, periret enim differentia praemiorum et poenarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31520] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si intellectus meus est alius ab intellectu tuo, intellectus meus est quoddam individuum, et similiter intellectus tuus, particularia enim sunt quae differunt numero et conveniunt in una specie. Sed omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Ergo species rerum in intellectu meo et tuo reciperentur individualiter, quod est contra rationem intellectus, qui est cognoscitivus universalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="31521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31521] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, intellectum est in intellectu intelligente. Si ergo intellectus meus est alius ab intellectu tuo, oportet quod aliud sit intellectum a me, et aliud sit intellectum a te. Et ita erit individualiter numeratum, et intellectum in potentia tantum, et oportebit abstrahere intentionem communem ab utroque, quia a quibuslibet diversis contingit abstrahere aliquod commune intelligibile. Quod est contra rationem intellectus, quia sic non videretur distingui intellectus a virtute imaginativa. Videtur ergo relinqui quod sit unus intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="31522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31522] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, cum discipulus accipit scientiam a magistro, non potest dici quod scientia magistri generet scientiam in discipulo, quia sic etiam scientia esset forma activa, sicut calor; quod patet esse falsum. Videtur ergo quod eadem numero scientia quae est in magistro, communicetur discipulo. Quod esse non potest, nisi sit unus intellectus utriusque. Videtur ergo quod sit unus intellectus discipuli et magistri; et per consequens omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself." But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect of all men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="31523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31523] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de quantitate animae, <i>si plures tantum animas humanas dixerim, ipse me ridebo</i>. Sed maxime videtur anima esse una quantum ad intellectum. Ergo est unus intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of different species. Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31524] Iª q. 76 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod sicut se habent causae universales ad universalia, ita se habent causae particulares ad particularia. Sed impossibile est quod una anima secundum speciem, sit diversorum animalium secundum speciem. Ergo impossibile est quod anima intellectiva una numero, sit diversorum secundum numerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p9"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by something outside the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p10"> It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p11"> Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intellects and one sense---for instance, if two men had one eye---there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p12"> However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasms---that is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you---if the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 co."><a name="31525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31525] Iª q. 76 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod intellectum esse unum omnium hominum, omnino est impossibile. Et hoc quidem patet, si, secundum Platonis sententiam homo sit ipse intellectus. Sequeretur enim, si Socratis et Platonis est unus intellectus tantum, quod Socrates et Plato sint unus homo; et quod non distinguantur ab invicem nisi per hoc quod est extra essentiam utriusque. Et erit tunc distinctio Socratis et Platonis non alia quam hominis tunicati et cappati, quod est omnino absurdum. Similiter etiam patet hoc esse impossibile, si, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, intellectus ponatur pars, seu potentia, animae quae est hominis forma. Impossibile est enim plurium numero diversorum esse unam formam, sicut impossibile est quod eorum sit unum esse, nam forma est essendi principium. Similiter etiam patet hoc esse impossibile quocumque modo quis ponat unionem intellectus ad hunc et ad illum hominem. Manifestum est enim quod, si sit unum principale agens et duo instrumenta, dici poterit unum agens simpliciter, sed plures actiones, sicut si unus homo tangat diversa duabus manibus, erit unus tangens, sed duo tactus. Si vero e converso instrumentum sit unum et principales agentes diversi, dicentur quidem plures agentes, sed una actio, sicut si multi uno fune trahant navem, erunt multi trahentes, sed unus tractus. Si vero agens principale sit unum et instrumentum unum, dicetur unum agens et una actio, sicut cum faber uno martello percutit, est unus percutiens et una percussio. Manifestum est autem quod, qualitercumque intellectus seu uniatur seu copuletur huic vel illi homini, intellectus inter cetera quae ad hominem pertinent, principalitatem habet, obediunt enim vires sensitivae intellectui, et ei deserviunt. Si ergo poneretur quod essent plures intellectus et sensus unus duorum hominum, puta si duo homines haberent unum oculum; essent quidem plures videntes, sed una visio. Si vero intellectus est unus, quantumcumque diversificentur alia quibus omnibus intellectus utitur quasi instrumentis, nullo modo Socrates et Plato poterunt dici nisi unus intelligens. Et si addamus quod ipsum intelligere, quod est actio intellectus, non fit per aliquod aliud organum, nisi per ipsum intellectum; sequetur ulterius quod sit et agens unum et actio una; idest quod omnes homines sint unus intelligens, et unum intelligere; dico autem respectu eiusdem intelligibilis. Posset autem diversificari actio intellectualis mea et tua per diversitatem phantasmatum, quia scilicet aliud est phantasma lapidis in me et aliud in te, si ipsum phantasma, secundum quod est aliud in me et aliud in te, esset forma intellectus possibilis, quia idem agens secundum diversas formas producit diversas actiones, sicut secundum diversas formas rerum respectu eiusdem oculi sunt diversae visiones. Sed ipsum phantasma non est forma intellectus possibilis, sed species intelligibilis quae a phantasmatibus abstrahitur. In uno autem intellectu a phantasmatibus diversis eiusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi una species intelligibilis. Sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo possunt esse diversa phantasmata lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eis abstrahitur una species intelligibilis lapidis, per quam intellectus unius hominis operatione una intelligit naturam lapidis, non obstante diversitate phantasmatum. Si ergo unus intellectus esset omnium hominum, diversitas phantasmatum quae sunt in hoc et in illo, non posset causare diversitatem intellectualis operationis huius et illius hominis, ut Commentator fingit in III de anima. Relinquitur ergo quod omnino impossibile et inconveniens est ponere unum intellectum omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31526] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet anima intellectiva non habeat materiam ex qua sit, sicut nec Angelus, tamen est forma materiae alicuius; quod Angelo non convenit. Et ideo secundum divisionem materiae sunt multae animae unius speciei, multi autem Angeli unius speciei omnino esse non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Everything has unity in the same way that it has being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31527] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod unumquodque hoc modo habet unitatem, quo habet esse, et per consequens idem est iudicium de multiplicatione rei, et de esse ipsius. Manifestum est autem quod anima intellectualis, secundum suum esse, unitur corpori ut forma; et tamen, destructo corpore, remanet anima intellectualis in suo esse. Et eadem ratione multitudo animarum est secundum multitudinem corporum; et tamen, destructis corporibus, remanent animae in suo esse multiplicatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material---that is, not abstracted from material conditions---its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31528] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod individuatio intelligentis, aut speciei per quam intelligit, non excludit intelligentiam universalium, alioquin, cum intellectus separati sint quaedam substantiae subsistentes, et per consequens particulares, non possent universalia intelligere. Sed materialitas cognoscentis et speciei per quam cognoscitur, universalis cognitionem impedit. Sicut enim omnis actio est secundum modum formae qua agens agit, ut calefactio secundum modum caloris; ita cognitio est secundum modum speciei qua cognoscens cognoscit. Manifestum est autem quod natura communis distinguitur et multiplicatur secundum principia individuantia, quae sunt ex parte materiae. Si ergo forma per quam fit cognitio, sit materialis, non abstracta a conditionibus materiae, erit similitudo naturae speciei aut generis, secundum quod est distincta et multiplicata per principia individuantia, et ita non poterit cognosci natura rei in sua communitate. Si vero species sit abstracta a conditionibus materiae individualis, erit similitudo naturae absque iis quae ipsam distinguunt et multiplicant, et ita cognoscetur universale. Nec refert, quantum ad hoc, utrum sit unus intellectus vel plures, quia si etiam esset unus tantum, oporteret ipsum esse aliquem quendam, et speciem per quam intelligit esse aliquam quandam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence---that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul ---that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="31529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31529] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, sive intellectus sit unus sive plures, id quod intelligitur est unum. Id enim quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum se, sed secundum suam similitudinem, <i>lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra seipsum, alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus intelligibilibus. Contingit autem eidem rei diversa secundum diversas formas assimilari. Et quia cognitio fit secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, sequitur quod idem a diversis cognoscentibus cognosci contingit, ut patet in sensu, nam plures vident eundem colorem, secundum diversas similitudines. Et similiter plures intellectus intelligunt unam rem intellectam. Sed hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua particularitate, natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum modum essendi extra animam, secundum quem intelligitur. Intelligitur enim natura communis seclusis principiis individuantibus; non autem hunc modum essendi habet extra animam. Sed secundum sententiam Platonis, res intellecta eo modo est extra animam quo intelligitur, posuit enim naturas rerum a materia separatas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on ( <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q117_A1" id="FP_Q76_A2-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[117], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="31530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31530] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod scientia alia est in discipulo, et alia in magistro. Quomodo autem causetur, in sequentibus ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p18"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="31531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31531] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus intelligit animas non esse plures tantum, quin uniantur in una ratione speciei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A3-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 3. Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A6" id="FP_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[6]</a>). Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31532] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter animam intellectivam sint in homine aliae animae per essentiam differentes, scilicet sensitiva et nutritiva. Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile non sunt unius substantiae. Sed anima intellectiva est incorruptibilis; aliae vero animae, scilicet sensitiva et nutritiva, sunt corruptibiles, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo in homine non potest esse una essentia animae intellectivae et sensitivae et nutritivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same "genus." Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31533] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod anima sensitiva in homine est incorruptibilis, <i>contra, corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt secundum genus</i>, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed anima sensitiva in equo et leone et aliis brutis animalibus est corruptibilis. Si igitur in homine sit incorruptibilis, non erit eiusdem generis anima sensitiva in homine et bruto. Animal autem dicitur ex eo quod habet animam sensitivam. Neque ergo animal erit unum genus commune hominis et aliorum animalium. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p3a"><!-- Added by HST, missing in original, copied from http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques76.pdf --><b>Objection 3:</b> In <i>De Generatione Animalium</i> the Philosopher claims that the embryo is an animal before being a man. But this cannot be the case if the same essence belongs to both the sentient soul and the intellective soul, since something is an animal through the sentient soul and a man through the intellective soul. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the sentient and intellective souls have a single essence.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31534] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod embryo prius est animal quam homo. Sed hoc esse non posset, si esset eadem essentia animae sensitivae et intellectivae, est enim animal per animam sensitivam, homo vero per animam intellectivam. Non ergo in homine est una essentia animae sensitivae et intellectivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p4"><!-- labelled Objection 3 in the original --> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31535] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod genus sumitur a materia, differentia vero a forma. Sed rationale, quod est differentia constitutiva hominis, sumitur ab anima intellectiva; animal vero dicitur ex hoc quod habet corpus animatum anima sensitiva. Anima ergo intellectiva comparatur ad corpus animatum anima sensitiva, sicut forma ad materiam. Non ergo anima intellectiva est eadem per essentiam cum anima sensitiva in homine; sed praesupponit eam sicut materiale suppositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31536] Iª q. 76 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., <i>neque duas animas esse dicimus in homine uno, sicut Iacobus et alii Syrorum scribunt, unam animalem, qua animatur corpus, et immixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritualem, quae rationi ministret, sed dicimus unam et eandem esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificat, et semetipsam sua ratione disponit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only logically" distinct from the other parts of the soul, "or also locally." </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p7"> The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three different reasons. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p8"> In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, "a white man." If, therefore, man were 'living' by one form, the vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the sensitive soul, and "man" by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), "what contains them?"---that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p9"> Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another---or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal" is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p10"> Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p11"> We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another---since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal---so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 co."><a name="31537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31537] Iª q. 76 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Plato posuit diversas animas esse in corpore uno, etiam secundum organa distinctas, quibus diversa opera vitae attribuebat; dicens vim nutritivam esse in hepate, concupiscibilem in corde, cognoscitivam in cerebro. Quam quidem opinionem Aristoteles reprobat, in libro de anima, quantum ad illas animae partes quae corporeis organis in suis operibus utuntur, ex hoc quod in animalibus quae decisa vivunt, in qualibet parte inveniuntur diversae operationes animae, sicut sensus et appetitus. Hoc autem non esset, si diversa principia operationum animae, tanquam per essentiam diversae, diversis partibus corporis distributa essent. Sed de intellectiva sub dubio videtur relinquere utrum sit separata ab aliis partibus animae solum ratione, an etiam loco. Opinio autem Platonis sustineri utique posset, si poneretur quod anima unitur corpori, non ut forma, sed ut motor, ut posuit Plato. Nihil enim inconveniens sequitur, si idem mobile a diversis motoribus moveatur, praecipue secundum diversas partes. Sed si ponamus animam corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossibile videtur plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. Quod quidem triplici ratione manifestari potest. Primo quidem, quia animal non esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae plures. Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae denominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut homo albus. Si igitur homo ab alia forma haberet quod sit vivum, scilicet ab anima vegetabili; et ab alia forma quod sit animal, scilicet ab anima sensibili; et ab alia quod sit homo, scilicet ab anima rationali; sequeretur quod homo non esset unum simpliciter, sicut et Aristoteles argumentatur contra Platonem, in VIII Metaphys., quod si alia esset idea animalis, et alia bipedis, non esset unum simpliciter animal bipes. Et propter hoc, in I de anima, contra ponentes diversas animas in corpore, inquirit quid contineat illas, idest quid faciat ex eis unum. Et non potest dici quod uniantur per corporis unitatem, quia magis anima continet corpus, et facit ipsum esse unum, quam e converso. Secundo, hoc apparet impossibile ex modo praedicationis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis, praedicantur ad invicem vel per accidens, si formae non sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus quod album est dulce, vel, si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se, in secundo modo dicendi per se, quia subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Sicut superficies praeambula est ad colorem, si ergo dicamus quod corpus superficiatum est coloratum, erit secundus modus praedicationis per se. Si ergo alia forma sit a qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo, sequeretur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi per accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent; vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una animarum sit ad aliam praeambula. Utrumque autem horum est manifeste falsum, quia animal per se de homine praedicatur, non per accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis, sed e converso. Ergo oportet eandem formam esse per quam aliquid est animal, et per quam aliquid est homo, alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur. Tertio, apparet hoc esse impossibile per hoc, quod una operatio animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam. Quod nullo modo contingeret, nisi principium actionum esset per essentiam unum. Sic ergo dicendum quod eadem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva. Quomodo autem hoc contingat, de facili considerari potest, si quis differentias specierum et formarum attendat. Inveniuntur enim rerum species et formae differre ab invicem secundum perfectius et minus perfectum, sicut in rerum ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et homines animalibus brutis, et in singulis horum generum sunt gradus diversi. Et ideo Aristoteles, in VIII Metaphys., assimilat species rerum numeris, qui differunt specie secundum additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Et in II de anima, comparat diversas animas speciebus figurarum, quarum una continet aliam; sicut pentagonum continet tetragonum, et excedit. Sic igitur anima intellectiva continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, et nutritiva plantarum. Sicut ergo superficies quae habet figuram pentagonam, non per aliam figuram est tetragona, et per aliam pentagona; quia superflueret figura tetragona, ex quo in pentagona continetur; ita nec per aliam animam Socrates est homo, et per aliam animal, sed per unam et eandem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31538] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima sensitiva non habet incorruptibilitatem ex hoc quod est sensitiva, sed ex hoc quod est intellectiva, ei incorruptibilitas debetur. Quando ergo anima est sensitiva tantum, corruptibilis est, quando vero cum sensitivo intellectivum habet, est incorruptibilis. Licet enim sensitivum incorruptionem non det, tamen incorruptionem intellectivo auferre non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and the other animals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31539] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod formae non collocantur in genere vel in specie, sed composita. Homo autem corruptibilis est, sicut et alia animalia. Unde differentia secundum corruptibile et incorruptibile, quae est ex parte formarum, non facit hominem secundum genus ab aliis animalibus differre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on ( <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A2" id="FP_Q76_A3-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[118], A[2]</a>, ad 2). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31540] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod prius embryo habet animam quae est sensitiva tantum; qua abiecta, advenit perfectior anima, quae est simul sensitiva et intellectiva; ut infra plenius ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the "genus"; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence it gathers the "difference" of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31541] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere, quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur, ut dictum est, anima intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet, et adhuc amplius; potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad virtutem sensitivae, quasi quoddam imperfectum et materiale. Et quia hoc invenit commune homini et aliis animalibus, ex hoc rationem generis format. Id vero in quo anima intellectiva sensitiva excedit, accipit quasi formale et completivum, et ex eo format differentiam hominis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A4-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 4. Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially." Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31542] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in homine sit alia forma praeter animam intellectivam. Dicit enim philosophus, in II de anima, quod <i>anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis</i>. Comparatur igitur anima ad corpus, sicut forma ad materiam. Sed corpus habet aliquam formam substantialem per quam est corpus. Ergo ante animam praecedit in corpore aliqua forma substantialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31543] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, homo et quodlibet animal est movens seipsum. Omne autem movens seipsum dividitur in duas partes, quarum una est movens, et alia est mota, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Pars autem movens est anima. Ergo oportet quod alia pars sit talis quae possit esse mota. Sed materia prima non potest moveri, ut dicitur in V Physic., cum sit ens solum in potentia, quinimmo omne quod movetur est corpus. Ergo oportet quod in homine et in quolibet animali sit alia forma substantialis, per quam constituatur corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31544] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ordo in formis attenditur secundum habitudinem ad materiam primam, prius enim et posterius dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium. Si ergo non esset in homine alia forma substantialis praeter animam rationalem, sed immediate materiae primae inhaereret; sequeretur quod esset in ordine imperfectissimarum formarum, quae immediate inhaerent materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31545] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, corpus humanum est corpus mixtum. Mixtio autem non fit secundum materiam tantum, quia tunc esset corruptio sola. Oportet ergo quod remaneant formae elementorum in corpore mixto, quae sunt formae substantiales. Ergo in corpore humano sunt aliae formae substantiales praeter animam intellectivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31546] Iª q. 76 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, unius rei est unum esse substantiale. Sed forma substantialis dat esse substantiale. Ergo unius rei est una tantum forma substantialis. Anima autem est forma substantialis hominis. Ergo impossibile est quod in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis quam anima intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p8"> In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being---for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort---maintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly false. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p9"> Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 co."><a name="31547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31547] Iª q. 76 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, si poneretur anima intellectiva non uniri corpori ut forma, sed solum ut motor, ut Platonici posuerunt; necesse esset dicere quod in homine esset alia forma substantialis, per quam corpus ab anima mobile in suo esse constitueretur. Sed si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut supra iam diximus, impossibile est quod aliqua alia forma substantialis praeter eam inveniatur in homine. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. Et ideo cum advenit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri vel generari simpliciter, sed fieri tale aut aliquo modo se habens, et similiter cum recedit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid corrumpi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter, et ideo per eius adventum dicitur aliquid simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum simpliciter corrumpi. Et propter hoc antiqui naturales, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod ens actu, puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi, dixerunt quod nihil generatur aut corrumpitur simpliciter, sed omne fieri statuerunt alterari, ut dicitur in I Physic. Si igitur ita esset, quod praeter animam intellectivam praeexisteret quaecumque alia forma substantialis in materia, per quam subiectum animae esset ens actu; sequeretur quod anima non daret esse simpliciter; et per consequens quod non esset forma substantialis; et quod per adventum animae non esset generatio simpliciter, neque per eius abscessum corruptio simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid. Quae sunt manifeste falsa. Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul." Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not reject"---that is, does not exclude---the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31548] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Aristoteles non dicit animam esse actum corporis tantum, sed actum corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis, et quod talis potentia non abiicit animam. Unde manifestum est quod in eo cuius anima dicitur actus, etiam anima includitur; eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod calor est actus calidi, et lumen est actus lucidi; non quod seorsum sit lucidum sine luce, sed quia est lucidum per lucem. Et similiter dicitur quod anima est actus corporis etc., quia per animam et est corpus, et est organicum, et est potentia vitam habens. Sed actus primus dicitur in potentia respectu actus secundi, qui est operatio. Talis enim potentia est non abiiciens, idest non excludens, animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part moved. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31549] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod anima non movet corpus per esse suum, secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; sed per potentiam motivam, cuius actus praesupponit iam corpus effectum in actu per animam; ut sic anima secundum vim motivam sit pars movens, et corpus animatum sit pars mota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31550] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in materia considerantur diversi gradus perfectionis, sicut esse, vivere sentire et intelligere. Semper autem secundum superveniens priori, perfectius est. Forma ergo quae dat solum primum gradum perfectionis materiae, est imperfectissima, sed forma quae dat primum et secundum, et tertium, et sic deinceps, est perfectissima; et tamen materiae immediata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p14"> Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms, and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p15"> Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31551] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod Avicenna posuit formas substantiales elementorum integras remanere in mixto, mixtionem autem fieri secundum quod contrariae qualitates elementorum reducuntur ad medium. Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia diversae formae elementorum non possunt esse nisi in diversis partibus materiae; ad quarum diversitatem oportet intelligi dimensiones, sine quibus materia divisibilis esse non potest. Materia autem dimensioni subiecta non invenitur nisi in corpore. Diversa autem corpora non possunt esse in eodem loco. Unde sequitur quod elementa sint in mixto distincta secundum situm. Et ita non erit vera mixtio, quae est secundum totum, sed mixtio ad sensum, quae est secundum minima iuxta se posita. Averroes autem posuit, in III de caelo, quod formae elementorum, propter sui imperfectionem, sunt mediae inter formas accidentales et substantiales; et ideo recipiunt magis et minus; et ideo remittuntur in mixtione et ad medium reducuntur, et conflatur ex eis una forma. Sed hoc est etiam magis impossibile. Nam esse substantiale cuiuslibet rei in indivisibili consistit; et omnis additio et subtractio variat speciem, sicut in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Unde impossibile est quod forma substantialis quaecumque recipiat magis et minus. Nec minus est impossibile aliquid esse medium inter substantiam et accidens. Et ideo dicendum est, secundum philosophum in I de Generat., quod formae elementorum manent in mixto non actu, sed virtute. Manent enim qualitates propriae elementorum, licet remissae, in quibus est virtus formarum elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria dispositio ad formam substantialem corporis mixti, puta formam lapidis, vel animae cuiuscumque.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A5-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 5. Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31552] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva inconvenienter tali corpori uniatur. Materia enim debet esse proportionata formae. Sed anima intellectiva est forma incorruptibilis. Non ergo convenienter unitur corpori corruptibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31553] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima intellectiva est forma maxime immaterialis, cuius signum est, quod habet operationem in qua non communicat materia corporalis. Sed quanto corpus est subtilius, tanto minus habet de materia. Ergo anima deberet subtilissimo corpori uniri, puta igni; et non corpori mixto, et terrestri magis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31554] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum forma sit principium speciei, ab una forma non proveniunt diversae species. Sed anima intellectiva est una forma. Ergo non debet uniri corpori quod componitur ex partibus dissimilium specierum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="31555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31555] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, perfectioris formae debet esse perfectius susceptibile. Sed anima intellectiva est perfectissima animarum. Cum igitur aliorum animalium corpora habeant naturaliter insita tegumenta, puta pilorum loco vestium, et unguium loco calceamentorum; habeant etiam arma naturaliter sibi data, sicut ungues, dentes et cornua, ergo videtur quod anima intellectiva non debuerit uniri corpori imperfecto tanquam talibus auxiliis privato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31556] Iª q. 76 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, quod <i>anima est actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q76_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p8"> Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 co."><a name="31557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31557] Iª q. 76 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum forma non sit propter materiam, sed potius materia propter formam; ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia sit talis, et non e converso. Anima autem intellectiva, sicut supra habitum est, secundum naturae ordinem, infimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus tenet; intantum quod non habet naturaliter sibi inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut Angeli, sed oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus divisibilibus per viam sensus, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Natura autem nulli deest in necessariis, unde oportuit quod anima intellectiva non solum haberet virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi. Actio autem sensus non fit sine corporeo instrumento. Oportuit igitur animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, quod possit esse conveniens organum sensus. Omnes autem alii sensus fundantur supra tactum. Ad organum autem tactus requiritur quod sit medium inter contraria, quae sunt calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, et similia, quorum est tactus apprehensivus, sic enim est in potentia ad contraria, et potest ea sentire. Unde quanto organum tactus fuerit magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis, tanto perceptibilior erit tactus. Anima autem intellectiva habet completissime virtutem sensitivam, quia quod est inferioris praeexistit perfectius in superiori ut dicit Dionysius in libro de Div. Nom. Unde oportuit corpus cui unitur anima intellectiva, esse corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis. Et propter hoc homo inter omnia animalia melioris est tactus. Et inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt melioris intellectus. Cuius signum est, quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p10"> Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31558] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hanc obiectionem aliquis forte vellet evadere per hoc, quod diceret corpus hominis ante peccatum incorruptibile fuisse. Sed haec responsio non videtur sufficiens, quia corpus hominis ante peccatum immortale fuit non per naturam, sed per gratiae divinae donum; alioquin immortalitas eius per peccatum sublata non esset, sicut nec immortalitas Daemonis. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod in materia duplex conditio invenitur, una quae eligitur ad hoc quod sit conveniens formae; alia quae ex necessitate consequitur prioris dispositionis. Sicut artifex ad formam serrae eligit materiam ferream, aptam ad secandum dura; sed quod dentes serrae hebetari possint et rubiginem contrahere, sequitur ex necessitate materiae. Sic igitur et animae intellectivae debetur corpus quod sit aequalis complexionis, ex hoc autem de necessitate materiae sequitur quod sit corruptibile. Si quis vero dicat quod Deus potuit hanc necessitatem vitare, dicendum est quod in constitutione rerum naturalium non consideratur quid Deus facere possit, sed quid naturae rerum conveniat, ut Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt. Providit tamen Deus adhibendo remedium contra mortem per gratiae donum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31559] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod animae intellectivae non debetur corpus propter ipsam intellectualem operationem secundum se; sed propter sensitivam virtutem, quae requirit organum aequaliter complexionatum. Et ideo oportuit animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, et non simplici elemento, vel corpori mixto in quo excederet ignis secundum quantitatem, quia non posset esse aequalitas complexionis, propter excedentem ignis activam virtutem. Habet autem hoc corpus aequaliter complexionatum quandam dignitatem, per hoc quod est remotum a contrariis; in quo quodammodo assimilatur corpori caelesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31560] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod partes animalis, ut oculus, manus, caro et os, et huiusmodi, non sunt in specie, sed totum, et ideo non potest dici, proprie loquendo, quod sint diversarum specierum, sed quod sint diversarum dispositionum. Et hoc competit animae intellectivae, quae quamvis sit una secundum essentiam, tamen propter sui perfectionem est multiplex in virtute; et ideo, ad diversas operationes, indiget diversis dispositionibus in partibus corporis cui unitur. Et propter hoc videmus quod maior est diversitas partium in animalibus perfectis quam in imperfectis, et in his quam in plantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="31561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31561] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod anima intellectiva, quia est universalium comprehensiva, habet virtutem ad infinita. Et ideo non potuerunt sibi determinari a natura vel determinatae existimationes naturales, vel etiam determinata auxilia vel defensionum vel tegumentorum; sicut aliis animalibus, quorum animae habent apprehensionem et virtutem ad aliqua particularia determinata. Sed loco horum omnium, homo habet naturaliter rationem, et manus, quae sunt organa organorum, quia per eas homo potest sibi praeparare instrumenta infinitorum modorum, et ad infinitos effectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A6-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 6. Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31562] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva uniatur corpori mediantibus aliquibus dispositionibus accidentalibus. Omnis enim forma est in materia sibi propria et disposita. Sed dispositiones ad formam sunt accidentia quaedam. Ergo oportet praeintelligi accidentia aliqua in materia ante formam substantialem, et ita ante animam, cum anima sit quaedam substantialis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31563] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, diversae formae unius speciei requirunt diversas materiae partes. Partes autem materiae diversae non possunt intelligi nisi secundum divisionem dimensivarum quantitatum. Ergo oportet intelligere dimensiones in materia ante formas substantiales, quae sunt multae unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31564] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, spirituale applicatur corporali per contactum virtutis. Virtus autem animae est eius potentia. Ergo videtur quod anima unitur corpori mediante potentia, quae est quoddam accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial form. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31565] Iª q. 76 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod accidens est posterius substantia et tempore et ratione, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Non ergo forma accidentalis aliqua potest intelligi in materia ante animam, quae est forma substantialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A6-p7"> If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q76_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 co."><a name="31566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31566] Iª q. 76 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, si anima uniretur corpori solum ut motor, nihil prohiberet, immo magis necessarium esset esse aliquas dispositiones medias inter animam et corpus, potentiam scilicet ex parte animae, per quam moveret corpus; et aliquam habilitatem ex parte corporis, per quam corpus esset ab anima mobile. Sed si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut iam supra dictum est, impossibile est quod aliqua dispositio accidentalis cadat media inter corpus et animam, vel inter quamcumque formam substantialem et materiam suam. Et huius ratio est quia, cum materia sit in potentia ad omnes actus ordine quodam, oportet quod id quod est primum simpliciter in actibus, primo in materia intelligatur. Primum autem inter omnes actus est esse. Impossibile est ergo intelligere materiam prius esse calidam vel quantam, quam esse in actu. Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter, ut iam dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistant in materia ante formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As appears from what has been already said <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q76_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31567] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, forma perfectior virtute continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. Et ideo una et eadem existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus. Una enim et eadem forma est per essentiam, per quam homo est ens actu, et per quam est corpus, et per quam est vivum, et per quam est animal, et per quam est homo. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque genus consequuntur propria accidentia. Sicut ergo materia praeintelligitur perfecta secundum esse ante intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis; ita praeintelliguntur accidentia quae sunt propria entis, ante corporeitatem. Et sic praeintelliguntur dispositiones in materia ante formam, non quantum ad omnem eius effectum, sed quantum ad posteriorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when brought under the observation of reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31568] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod dimensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit. Unde materia iam intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest intelligi ut distincta in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas formas secundum ulteriores perfectionis gradus. Quamvis enim eadem forma sit secundum essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus materiae attribuit, ut dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem rationis differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31569] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod substantia spiritualis quae unitur corpori solum ut motor, unitur ei per potentiam vel virtutem. Sed anima intellectiva corpori unitur ut forma per suum esse. Administrat tamen ipsum et movet per suam potentiam et virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A7-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 7. Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31570] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima uniatur corpori animalis mediante aliquo corpore. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima per lucem, idest ignem, et aerem, <i>quae sunt similiora spiritui, corpus administrat</i>. Ignis autem et aer sunt corpora. Ergo anima unitur corpori humano mediante aliquo corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31571] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id quo subtracto solvitur unio aliquorum unitorum, videtur esse medium inter ea. Sed deficiente spiritu, anima a corpore separatur. Ergo spiritus, qui est quoddam corpus subtile, medium est in unione corporis et animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them together. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31572] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea quae sunt multum distantia, non uniuntur nisi per medium. Sed anima intellectiva distat a corpore et quia est incorporea, et quia est incorruptibilis. Ergo videtur quod uniatur ei mediante aliquo quod sit corpus incorruptibile. Et hoc videtur esse aliqua lux caelestis, quae conciliat elementa et redigit in unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31573] Iª q. 76 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod <i>non oportet quaerere si unum est anima et corpus, sicut neque ceram et figuram</i>. Sed figura unitur cerae nullo corpore mediante. Ergo et anima corpori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something nearer. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p7"> If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). </p><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p8"> From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 co."><a name="31574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31574] Iª q. 76 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod si anima, secundum Platonicos, corpori uniretur solum ut motor, conveniens esset dicere quod inter animam hominis, vel cuiuscumque animalis, et corpus aliqua alia corpora media intervenirent, convenit enim motori aliquid distans per media magis propinqua movere. Si vero anima unitur corpori ut forma, sicut iam dictum est, impossibile est quod uniatur ei aliquo corpore mediante. Cuius ratio est, quia sic dicitur aliquid unum, quomodo et ens. Forma autem per seipsam facit rem esse in actu, cum per essentiam suam sit actus; nec dat esse per aliquod medium. Unde unitas rei compositae ex materia et forma est per ipsam formam, quae secundum seipsam unitur materiae ut actus eius. Nec est aliquid aliud uniens nisi agens, quod facit materiam esse in actu, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Unde patet esse falsas opiniones eorum qui posuerunt aliqua corpora esse media inter animam et corpus hominis. Quorum quidam Platonici dixerunt quod anima intellectiva habet corpus incorruptibile sibi naturaliter unitum, a quo nunquam separatur, et eo mediante unitur corpori hominis corruptibili. Quidam vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante spiritu corporeo. Alii vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante luce, quam dicunt esse corpus, et de natura quintae essentiae, ita quod anima vegetabilis unitur corpori mediante luce caeli siderei; anima vero sensibilis, mediante luce caeli crystallini; anima vero intellectualis, mediante luce caeli Empyrei. Quod fictitium et derisibile apparet, tum quia lux non est corpus; tum quia quinta essentia non venit materialiter in compositionem corporis mixti, cum sit inalterabilis, sed virtualiter tantum; tum etiam quia anima immediate corpori unitur ut forma materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31575] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de anima inquantum movet corpus, unde utitur verbo administrationis. Et verum est quod partes grossiores corporis per subtiliores movet. Et primum instrumentum virtutis motivae est spiritus, ut dicit philosophus in libro de causa motus animalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of motion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31576] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, subtracto spiritu, deficit unio animae ad corpus, non quia sit medium; sed quia tollitur dispositio per quam corpus est dispositum ad talem unionem. Est tamen spiritus medium in movendo, sicut primum instrumentum motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, which is a being only in potentiality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31577] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod anima distat quidem a corpore plurimum, si utriusque conditiones seorsum considerentur, unde si utrumque ipsorum separatim esse haberet, oporteret quod multa media intervenirent. Sed inquantum anima est forma corporis, non habet esse seorsum ab esse corporis; sed per suum esse corpori unitur immediate. Sic enim et quaelibet forma, si consideretur ut actus, habet magnam distantiam a materia, quae est ens in potentia tantum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A8-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 8. Whether the soul is in each part of the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x): "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31578] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit tota in qualibet parte corporis. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de causa motus animalium, <i>non opus est in unaquaque corporis parte esse animam; sed in quodam principio corporis existente, alia vivere; eo quod simul nata sunt facere proprium motum per naturam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31579] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima est in corpore cuius est actus. Sed est actus corporis organici. Ergo non est nisi in corpore organico. Sed non quaelibet pars corporis hominis est corpus organicum. Ergo anima non est in qualibet parte corporis tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31580] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in II de anima dicitur quod sicut se habet pars animae ad partem corporis, ut visus ad pupillam, ita anima tota ad totum corpus animalis. Si igitur tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis, sequitur quod quaelibet pars corporis sit animal.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="31581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31581] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omnes potentiae animae in ipsa essentia animae fundantur. Si igitur anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis, sequitur quod omnes potentiae animae sint in qualibet corporis parte, et ita visus erit in aure, et auditus in oculo. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one part would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="31582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31582] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si in qualibet parte corporis esset tota anima, quaelibet pars corporis immediate dependeret ab anima. Non ergo una pars dependeret ab alia, nec una pars esset principalior quam alia, quod est manifeste falsum. Non ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31583] Iª q. 76 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod <i>anima in quocumque corpore et in toto est tota, et in qualibet eius parte tota est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said, if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p9"> That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle of operation. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p10"> Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface. </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p11"> Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 co."><a name="31584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31584] Iª q. 76 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in aliis iam dictum est, si anima uniretur corpori solum ut motor, posset dici quod non esset in qualibet parte corporis, sed in una tantum, per quam alias moveret. Sed quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et in qualibet parte corporis. Non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, sed substantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Cum enim totum consistat ex partibus, forma totius quae non dat esse singulis partibus corporis, est forma quae est compositio et ordo, sicut forma domus, et talis forma est accidentalis. Anima vero est forma substantialis, unde oportet quod sit forma et actus non solum totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Et ideo, recedente anima, sicut non dicitur animal et homo nisi aequivoce, quemadmodum et animal pictum vel lapideum; ita est de manu et oculo, aut carne et osse, ut philosophus dicit. Cuius signum est, quod nulla pars corporis habet proprium opus, anima recedente, cum tamen omne quod retinet speciem, retineat operationem speciei. Actus autem est in eo cuius est actus. Unde oportet animam esse in toto corpore, et in qualibet eius parte. Et quod tota sit in qualibet parte eius, hinc considerari potest, quia, cum totum sit quod dividitur in partes, secundum triplicem divisionem est triplex totalitas. Est enim quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, sicut tota linea vel totum corpus. Est etiam quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes rationis et essentiae; sicut definitum in partes definitionis, et compositum resolvitur in materiam et formam. Tertium autem totum est potentiale, quod dividitur in partes virtutis. Primus autem totalitatis modus non convenit formis, nisi forte per accidens; et illis solis formis, quae habent indifferentem habitudinem ad totum quantitativum et partes eius. Sicut albedo, quantum est de sui ratione, aequaliter se habet ut sit in tota superficie et in qualibet superficiei parte; et ideo, divisa superficie, dividitur albedo per accidens. Sed forma quae requirit diversitatem in partibus, sicut est anima, et praecipue animalium perfectorum, non aequaliter se habet ad totum et partes, unde non dividitur per accidens per divisionem quantitatis. Sic ergo totalitas quantitativa non potest attribui animae nec per se nec per accidens. Sed totalitas secunda, quae attenditur secundum rationis et essentiae perfectionem, proprie et per se convenit formis. Similiter autem et totalitas virtutis, quia forma est operationis principium. Si ergo quaereretur de albedine, utrum esset tota in tota superficie et in qualibet eius parte, distinguere oporteret. Quia si fiat mentio de totalitate quantitativa, quam habet albedo per accidens, non tota esset in qualibet parte superficiei. Et similiter dicendum est de totalitate virtutis magis enim potest movere visum albedo quae est in tota superficie, quam albedo quae est in aliqua eius particula. Sed si fiat mentio de totalitate speciei et essentiae, tota albedo est in qualibet superficiei parte. Sed quia anima totalitatem quantitativam non habet, nec per se nec per accidens, ut dictum est; sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem perfectionis et essentiae; non autem secundum totalitatem virtutis. Quia non secundum quamlibet suam potentiam est in qualibet parte corporis; sed secundum visum in oculo, secundum auditum in aure, et sic de aliis. Tamen attendendum est quod, quia anima requirit diversitatem in partibus, non eodem modo comparatur ad totum et ad partes, sed ad totum quidem primo et per se, sicut ad proprium et proportionatum perfectibile; ad partes autem per posterius, secundum quod habent ordinem ad totum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31585] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de potentia motiva animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31586] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod anima est actus corporis organici, sicut primi et proportionati perfectibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31587] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod animal est quod componitur ex anima et corpore toto, quod est primum et proportionatum eius perfectibile. Sic autem anima non est in parte. Unde non oportet quod pars animalis sit animal.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="31588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31588] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod potentiarum animae quaedam sunt in ea secundum quod excedit totam corporis capacitatem, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, unde huiusmodi potentiae in nulla parte corporis esse dicuntur. Aliae vero potentiae sunt communes animae et corpori, unde talium potentiarum non oportet quod quaelibet sit in quocumque est anima; sed solum in illa parte corporis quae est proportionata ad talis potentiae operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="31589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31589] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod una pars corporis dicitur esse principalior quam alia, propter potentias diversas quarum sunt organa partes corporis. Quae enim est principalioris potentiae organum, est principalior pars corporis, vel quae etiam eidem potentiae principalius deservit.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q77" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q77-p0.1">Q. 77. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q77-p2"> We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: </p><p id="FP_Q77-p3"><a href="#FP_Q77_A1"> (1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p4"><a href="#FP_Q77_A2"> (2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p5"><a href="#FP_Q77_A3"> (3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p6"><a href="#FP_Q77_A4"> (4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p7"><a href="#FP_Q77_A5"> (5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p8"><a href="#FP_Q77_A6"> (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p9"><a href="#FP_Q77_A7"> (7) Whether one power rises from another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p10"><a href="#FP_Q77_A8"> (8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 pr."><a name="31590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31590] Iª q. 77 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad potentias animae. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum essentia animae sit eius potentia. Secundo, utrum sit una tantum potentia animae, vel plures. Tertio, quomodo potentiae animae distinguantur. Quarto, de ordine ipsarum ad invicem. Quinto, utrum anima sit subiectum omnium potentiarum. Sexto, utrum potentiae fluant ab essentia animae. Septimo, utrum potentia una oriatur ex alia. Octavo, utrum omnes potentiae animae remaneant in ea post mortem.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q77_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A1-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 1. Whether the essence of the soul is its power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one essence." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31591] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ipsa essentia animae sit eius potentia. Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., quod <i>mens, notitia et amor sunt substantialiter in anima, vel, ut idem dicam, essentialiter</i>. Et in X dicit quod <i>memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its own power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31592] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima est nobilior quam materia prima. Sed materia prima est sua potentia. Ergo multo magis anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31593] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, forma substantialis est simplicior quam accidentalis, cuius signum est, quod forma substantialis non intenditur vel remittitur, sed in indivisibili consistit. Forma autem accidentalis est ipsa sua virtus. Ergo multo magis forma substantialis, quae est anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the soul is its own power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31594] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, potentia sensitiva est qua sentimus, et potentia intellectiva qua intelligimus. Sed id quo primo sentimus et intelligimus est anima, secundum philosophum, in II de anima. Ergo anima est suae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see OBJ 1) "are not in the soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other things" (De Trin. ix, 4). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31595] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod non est de essentia rei, est accidens. Si ergo potentia animae est praeter essentiam eius, sequitur quod sit accidens. Quod est contra Augustinum, in IX de Trin., ubi dicit quod <i>praedicta non sunt in anima sicut in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore, aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas, quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum in quo est; mens autem potest etiam alia amare et cognoscere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, " a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q77_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="31596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31596] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, forma simplex subiectum esse non potest. Anima autem est forma simplex, cum non sit composita ex materia et forma, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo potentia animae potest esse in ipsa sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p8"> <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 7"><a name="31597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31597] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, accidens non est principium substantialis differentiae. Sed sensibile et rationale sunt substantiales differentiae, et sumuntur a sensu et ratione, quae sunt potentiae animae. Ergo potentiae animae non sunt accidentia. Et ita videtur quod potentia animae sit eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p9"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more, then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31598] Iª q. 77 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, XI cap. Caelest. Hier., quod <i>caelestes spiritus dividuntur in essentiam, virtutem et operationem</i>. Multo igitur magis in anima aliud est essentia, et aliud virtus sive potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p10"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when speaking of the angels ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q54_A3" id="FP_Q77_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>). Secondly, this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul, that it is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which potentiality, however, "does not exclude the soul." Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of an act, as act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 co."><a name="31599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31599] Iª q. 77 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est dicere quod essentia animae sit eius potentia; licet hoc quidam posuerint. Et hoc dupliciter ostenditur, quantum ad praesens. Primo quia, cum potentia et actus dividant ens et quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus. Et ideo, si actus non est in genere substantiae, potentia quae dicitur ad illum actum, non potest esse in genere substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae; sed in solo Deo, cuius operatio est eius substantia. Unde Dei potentia, quae est operationis principium, est ipsa Dei essentia. Quod non potest esse verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua creatura; ut supra etiam de Angelo dictum est. Secundo, hoc etiam impossibile apparet in anima. Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae; sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum. Non enim, inquantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis. Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma; sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum. Invenitur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae. Unde etiam in definitione animae dicitur quod est actus corporis potentia vitam habentis, quae tamen potentia non abiicit animam. Relinquitur ergo quod essentia animae non est eius potentia. Nihil enim est in potentia secundum actum, inquantum est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are "one life, one mind, one essence." Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will are the one essence of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31600] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de mente secundum quod noscit se et amat se. Sic ergo notitia et amor, inquantum referuntur ad ipsam ut cognitam et amatam, substantialiter vel essentialiter sunt in anima, quia ipsa substantia vel essentia animae cognoscitur et amatur. Et similiter intelligendum est quod alibi dicit, quod sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia. Vel, sicut quidam dicunt, haec locutio verificatur secundum modum quo totum potestativum praedicatur de suis partibus, quod medium est inter totum universale et totum integrale. Totum enim universale adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini et equo, et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur. Totum vero integrale non est in qualibet parte, neque secundum totam essentiam, neque secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo nullo modo de singulis partibus praedicatur; sed aliquo modo, licet improprie, praedicatur de omnibus simul, ut si dicamus quod paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt domus. Totum vero potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo quodammodo potest praedicari de qualibet parte; sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale. Et per hunc modum Augustinus dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una animae essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31601] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod actus ad quem est in potentia materia prima, est substantialis forma. Et ideo potentia materiae non est aliud quam eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31602] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod actio est compositi, sicut et esse, existentis enim est agere. Compositum autem per formam substantialem habet esse substantialiter; per virtutem autem quae consequitur formam substantialem, operatur. Unde sic se habet forma accidentalis activa ad formam substantialem agentis (ut calor ad formam ignis), sicut se habet potentia animae ad animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we understand and sense." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31603] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis est primum actionis principium, sed non proximum. Et secundum hoc philosophus dicit quod <i>id quo intelligimus et sentimus, est anima</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31604] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod, si accidens accipiatur secundum quod dividitur contra substantiam, sic nihil potest esse medium inter substantiam et accidens, quia dividuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem, scilicet secundum esse in subiecto et non esse in subiecto. Et hoc modo, cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens, et est in secunda specie qualitatis. Si vero accipiatur accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens. Quia ad substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei, non autem quidquid est extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum id quod non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei. Proprium enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, quod notitia et amor non sunt in anima sicut accidentia in subiecto, intelligitur secundum modum praedictum, prout comparantur ad animam, non sicut ad amantem et cognoscentem; sed prout comparantur ad eam sicut ad amatam et cognitam. Et hoc modo procedit sua probatio, quia si amor esset in anima amata sicut in subiecto, sequeretur quod accidens transcenderet suum subiectum; cum etiam alia sint amata per animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q77_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="31605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31605] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod anima, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid de potentialitate admixtum ut supra dictum est. Et ideo potest esse subiectum accidentis. Propositio autem inducta locum habet in Deo, qui est actus purus, in qua materia Boetius eam introducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 7"><a name="31606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31606] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum dicendum quod rationale et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non sumuntur a potentiis sensus et rationis; sed ab ipsa anima sensitiva et rationali. Quia tamen formae substantiales, quae secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia; nihil prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum substantialium poni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A2-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 2. Whether there are several powers of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31607] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures potentiae animae. Anima enim intellectiva maxime ad divinam similitudinem accedit. Sed in Deo est una et simplex potentia. Ergo et in anima intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31608] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quanto virtus est superior, tanto est magis unita. Sed anima intellectiva excedit omnes alias formas in virtute. Ergo maxime debet habere unam virtutem seu potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q77_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[76], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31609] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, operari est existentis in actu. Sed per eandem essentiam animae homo habet esse secundum diversos gradus perfectionis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo per eandem potentiam animae operatur diversas operationes diversorum graduum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31610] Iª q. 77 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II de anima ponit plures animae potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence. </p><p id="FP_Q77_A2-p7"> There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers---because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 co."><a name="31611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31611] Iª q. 77 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere plures animae potentias. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II de caelo, quae sunt in rebus infima, non possunt consequi perfectam bonitatem, sed aliquam imperfectam consequuntur paucis motibus; superiora vero his adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus multis; his autem superiora sunt quae adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus paucis; summa vero perfectio invenitur in his quae absque motu perfectam possident bonitatem. Sicut infime est ad sanitatem dispositus qui non potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed aliquam modicam consequitur paucis remediis; melius autem dispositus est qui potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed remediis multis; et adhuc melius, qui remediis paucis; optime autem, qui absque remedio perfectam sanitatem habet. Dicendum est ergo quod res quae sunt infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur, et ideo quasdam paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem, quia potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo, et ideo multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana. Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam. Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31612] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in hoc ipso magis ad similitudinem Dei accedit anima intellectiva quam creaturae inferiores, quod perfectam bonitatem consequi potest; licet per multa et diversa; in quo deficit a superioribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31613] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus unita est superior, si ad aequalia se extendat. Sed virtus multiplicata est superior, si plura ei subiiciantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31614] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod unius rei est unum esse substantiale, sed possunt esse operationes plures. Et ideo est una essentia animae, sed potentiae plures.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A3-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 3. Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31615] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae non distinguantur per actus et obiecta. Nihil enim determinatur ad speciem per illud quod posterius, vel extrinsecum est. Actus autem est posterior potentia; obiectum autem est extrinsecum. Ergo per ea potentiae non distinguuntur secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31616] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, contraria sunt quae maxime differunt. Si igitur potentiae distinguerentur penes obiecta, sequeretur quod contrariorum non esset eadem potentia. Quod patet esse falsum fere in omnibus, nam potentia visiva eadem est albi et nigri, et gustus idem est dulcis et amari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the appetitive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31617] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Si igitur potentiarum differentia esset ex differentia obiectorum, idem obiectum non pertineret ad diversas potentias. Quod patet esse falsum, nam idem est quod potentia cognoscitiva cognoscit, et appetitiva appetit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference of their objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31618] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, id quod per se est causa alicuius, in omnibus causat illud. Sed quaedam obiecta diversa, quae pertinent ad diversas potentias, pertinent etiam ad aliquam unam potentiam, sicut sonus et color pertinent ad visum et auditum, quae sunt diversae potentiae; et tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam sensus communis. Non ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum differentiam obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts and operations precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites," that is their objects. Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31619] Iª q. 77 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, posteriora distinguuntur secundum priora. Sed philosophus dicit II de anima, quod <i>priores potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt</i>; et adhuc his priora sunt opposita, sive obiecta. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum actus et obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A3-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects. </p><p id="FP_Q77_A3-p8"> Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence "rational" and "irrational" are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers of the soul are not distinct. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 co."><a name="31620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31620] Iª q. 77 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur, et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus. Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae, vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis, sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti. Ex his autem duobus actio speciem recipit, scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine seu termino, differt enim calefactio ab infrigidatione, secundum quod haec quidem a calido, scilicet activo, ad calidum; illa autem a frigido ad frigidum procedit. Unde necesse est quod potentiae diversificentur secundum actus et obiecta. Sed tamen considerandum est quod ea quae sunt per accidens, non diversificant speciem. Quia enim coloratum accidit animali, non diversificantur species animalis per differentiam coloris, sed per differentiam eius quod per se accidit animali, per differentiam scilicet animae sensitivae, quae quandoque invenitur cum ratione, quandoque sine ratione. Unde rationale et irrationale sunt differentiae divisivae animalis, diversas eius species constituentes. Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas obiectorum diversificat potentias animae; sed differentia eius ad quod per se potentia respicit. Sicut sensus per se respicit passibilem qualitatem, quae per se dividitur in colorem, sonum et huiusmodi, et ideo alia potentia sensitiva est coloris, scilicet visus, et alia soni, scilicet auditus. Sed passibili qualitati, ut colorato accidit esse musicum vel grammaticum, vel magnum et parvum, aut hominem vel lapidem. Et ideo penes huiusmodi differentias potentiae animae non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and end. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31621] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus, licet sit posterior potentia in esse, est tamen prior in intentione et secundum rationem, sicut finis agente. Obiectum autem, licet sit extrinsecum, est tamen principium vel finis actionis. Principio autem et fini proportionantur ea quae sunt intrinseca rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31622] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, si potentia aliqua per se respiceret unum contrariorum sicut obiectum, oporteret quod contrarium ad aliam potentiam pertineret. Sed potentia animae non per se respicit propriam rationem contrarii, sed communem rationem utriusque contrariorum, sicut visus non respicit per se rationem albi, sed rationem coloris. Et hoc ideo, quia unum contrariorum est quodammodo ratio alterius, cum se habeant sicut perfectum et imperfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31623] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est subiecto idem esse diversum secundum rationem. Et ideo potest ad diversas potentias animae pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, however, are subject to one higher power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31624] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod potentia superior per se respicit universaliorem rationem obiecti, quam potentia inferior, quia quanto potentia est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo multa conveniunt in una ratione obiecti, quam per se respicit superior potentia, quae tamen differunt secundum rationes quas per se respiciunt inferiores potentiae. Et inde est quod diversa obiecta pertinent ad diversas inferiores potentias, quae tamen uni superiori potentiae subduntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A4-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 4. Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there is no order among them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31625] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis animae non sit ordo. In his enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, non est prius et posterius, sed sunt naturaliter simul. Sed potentiae animae contra se invicem dividuntur. Ergo inter eas non est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31626] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, potentiae animae comparantur ad obiecta, et ad ipsam animam. Sed ex parte animae, inter eas non est ordo, quia anima est una. Similiter etiam nec ex parte obiectorum, cum sint diversa et penitus disparata, ut patet de colore et sono. In potentiis ergo animae non est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31627] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in potentiis ordinatis hoc invenitur, quod operatio unius dependet ab operatione alterius. Sed actus unius potentiae animae non dependet ab actu alterius, potest enim visus exire in actum absque auditu, et e converso. Non ergo inter potentias animae est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among themselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31628] Iª q. 77 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II de anima, comparat partes sive potentias animae figuris. Sed figurae habent ordinem ad invicem. Ergo et potentiae animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to the order of generation and time; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul. </p><p id="FP_Q77_A4-p7"> In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 co."><a name="31629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31629] Iª q. 77 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab altera, tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem obiectorum. Dependentia autem unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum ordinem generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur. Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas et imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae. Secundum vero ordinem secundum, e converso se habet. Nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores, in via generationis, potentiis animae sensitivae, unde ad earum actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de potentiis sensitivis respectu intellectivarum. Secundum autem ordinem tertium, ordinantur quaedam vires sensitivae ad invicem, scilicet visus, auditus et olfactus. Nam visibile est prius naturaliter, quia est commune superioribus et inferioribus corporibus. Sonus autem audibilis fit in aere, qui est naturaliter prior commixtione elementorum, quam consequitur odor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31630] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod alicuius generis species se habent secundum prius et posterius, sicut numeri et figurae, quantum ad esse; licet simul esse dicantur inquantum suscipiunt communis generis praedicationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have said above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31631] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ordo iste potentiarum animae est et ex parte animae, quae secundum ordinem quendam habet aptitudinem ad diversos actus, licet sit una secundum essentiam; et ex parte obiectorum; et etiam ex parte actuum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31632] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de illis potentiis in quibus attenditur ordo solum secundum tertium modum. Illae autem potentiae quae ordinantur secundum alios duos modos, ita se habent quod actus unius dependet ab altera.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A5-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 5. Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31633] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae sint in anima sicut in subiecto. Sicut enim se habent potentiae corporis ad corpus, ita se habent potentiae animae ad animam. Sed corpus est subiectum corporalium potentiarum. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiarum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily." But the natural principles of the operations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31634] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, operationes potentiarum animae attribuuntur corpori propter animam, quia, ut dicitur in II de anima, <i>anima est quo sentimus et intelligimus primum</i>. Sed propria principia operationum animae sunt potentiae. Ergo potentiae per prius sunt in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar reason, of all the other powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31635] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima quaedam sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sentit per corpus. Sed si potentia sensitiva non esset in sola anima sicut in subiecto, nihil posset sine corpore sentire. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiae sensitivae; et pari ratione, omnium aliarum potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that "sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31636] Iª q. 77 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod <i>sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed coniuncti</i>. Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto sicut in subiecto. Non ergo sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum suarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], AA[2]</a>,3; <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1] </a>, ad 1), that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 co."><a name="31637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31637] Iª q. 77 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari, omne enim accidens denominat proprium subiectum. Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod eius sit potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia. Manifestum est autem ex supra dictis quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31638] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet quod tales operationes operari possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31639] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes huiusmodi potentiae per prius sunt in anima quam in coniuncto, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words "with the body or without the body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31640] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando. Tamen, quantum ad praesens pertinet, hoc quod dicitur anima quaedam sentire cum corpore et quaedam sine corpore, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod hoc quod dico cum corpore vel sine corpore, determinet actum sentiendi secundum quod exit a sentiente. Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale. Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod praedicta determinent actum sentiendi ex parte obiecti quod sentitur. Et sic quaedam sentit cum corpore, idest in corpore existentia, sicut cum sentit vulnus vel aliquid huiusmodi, quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, idest non existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut cum sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A6-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 6. Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31641] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae animae non fluant ab eius essentia. Ab uno enim simplici non procedunt diversa. Essentia autem animae est una et simplex. Cum ergo potentiae animae sint multae et diversae, non possunt procedere ab eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31642] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud a quo aliud procedit, est causa eius. Sed essentia animae non potest dici causa potentiarum; ut patet discurrenti per singula causarum genera. Ergo potentiae animae non fluunt ab eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31643] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, emanatio quendam motum nominat. Sed nihil movetur a seipso, ut probatur in VII libro Physic.; nisi forte ratione partis, sicut animal dicitur moveri a seipso, quia una pars eius est movens et alia mota. Neque etiam anima movetur, ut probatur in I de anima. Non ergo anima causat in se suas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31644] Iª q. 77 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Ergo potentiae animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. </p><p id="FP_Q77_A6-p7"> Now it is clear, from what has been said <a href="#FP_Q77_A5" id="FP_Q77_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (A[1], ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 co."><a name="31645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31645] Iª q. 77 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt autem in duobus. Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum. Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in actu. Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto. Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis, inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente, nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum. Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum. Compositum autem est in actu per animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio, quia iam dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31646] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium. Sic igitur ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae, tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum diversitatem organorum corporalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31647] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31648] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce color.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A7-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 7. Whether one power of the soul arises from another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31649] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una potentia animae non oriatur ab alia. Eorum enim quae simul esse incipiunt, unum non oritur ab alio. Sed omnes potentiae animae sunt simul animae concreatae. Ergo una earum ab alia non oritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31650] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, potentia animae oritur ab anima sicut accidens a subiecto. Sed una potentia animae non potest esse subiectum alterius, quia accidentis non est accidens. Ergo una potentia non oritur ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31651] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, oppositum non oritur a suo opposito, sed unumquodque oritur ex simili secundum speciem. Potentiae autem animae ex opposito dividuntur, sicut diversae species. Ergo una earum non procedit ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31652] Iª q. 77 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed actus unius potentiae causatur ab alio; sicut actus phantasiae ab actu sensus. Ergo una potentia animae causatur ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above <a href="#FP_Q77_A4" id="FP_Q77_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 co."><a name="31653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31653] Iª q. 77 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in his quae secundum ordinem naturalem procedunt ab uno, sicut primum est causa omnium, ita quod est primo propinquius, est quodammodo causa eorum quae sunt magis remota. Ostensum est autem supra quod inter potentias animae est multiplex ordo. Et ideo una potentia animae ab essentia animae procedit mediante alia. Sed quia essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel simul cum corpore; agens autem et finis est perfectius, susceptivum autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum, consequens est quod potentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum ordinem perfectionis et naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum finis et activi principii. Videmus enim quod sensus est propter intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens participatio intellectus, unde secundum naturalem originem quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto. Sed secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae imperfectiores inveniuntur principia respectu aliarum, sicut anima, secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, consideratur sicut subiectum et materiale quoddam respectu intellectus. Et propter hoc, imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis, prius enim animal generatur quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31654] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per transmutationem, sed per naturalem quandam resultationem, et est simul cum anima; ita est etiam de una potentia respectu alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31655] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis; sed unum accidens per prius recipitur in substantia quam aliud, sicut quantitas quam qualitas. Et hoc modo unum accidens dicitur esse subiectum alterius, ut superficies coloris, inquantum substantia uno accidente mediante recipit aliud. Et similiter potest dici de potentiis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31656] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod potentiae animae opponuntur ad invicem oppositione perfecti et imperfecti; sicut etiam species numerorum et figurarum. Haec autem oppositio non impedit originem unius ab alio, quia imperfecta naturaliter a perfectis procedunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A8-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 8. Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31657] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae remaneant in anima a corpore separata. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod <i>anima recedit a corpore, secum trahens sensum et imaginationem, rationem et intellectum et intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31658] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, potentiae animae sunt eius naturales proprietates. Sed proprium semper inest, et nunquam separatur ab eo cuius est proprium. Ergo potentiae animae sunt in ea etiam post mortem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31659] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, potentiae animae, etiam sensitivae, non debilitantur debilitato corpore, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, <i>si senex accipiat oculum iuvenis, videbit utique sicut et iuvenis</i>. Sed debilitas est via ad corruptionem. Ergo potentiae animae non corrumpuntur corrupto corpore, sed manent in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="31660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31660] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, memoria est potentia animae sensitivae, ut philosophus probat. Sed memoria manet in anima separata, dicitur enim, Luc. XVI, diviti epuloni in Inferno secundum animam existenti, <i>recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua</i>. Ergo memoria manet in anima separata; et per consequens aliae potentiae sensitivae partis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="31661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31661] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili, quae est potentia sensitivae partis. Manifestum est autem animas separatas tristari et gaudere de praemiis vel poenis quas habent. Ergo vis concupiscibilis manet in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 6"><a name="31662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31662] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod sicut anima, cum corpus iacet sine sensu nondum penitus mortuum, videt quaedam secundum imaginariam visionem; ita cum fuerit a corpore penitus separata per mortem. Sed imaginatio est potentia sensitivae partis. Ergo potentia sensitivae partis manet in anima separata; et per consequens omnes aliae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31663] Iª q. 77 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., <i>ex duabus tantum substantiis constat homo, anima cum ratione sua, et carne cum sensibus suis</i>. Ergo, defuncta carne, potentiae sensitivae non manent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A8-p9"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already ( <a href="#FP_Q77_A5" id="FP_Q77_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">AA[5]</a>,6,7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root. </p><p id="FP_Q77_A8-p10"> So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 co."><a name="31664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31664] Iª q. 77 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore destructo. Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae. Destructo autem subiecto, non potest accidens remanere. Unde, corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed virtute tantum manent in anima, sicut in principio vel radice. Et sic falsum est, quod quidam dicunt huiusmodi potentias in anima remanere etiam corpore corrupto. Et multo falsius, quod dicunt etiam actus harum potentiarum remanere in anima separata, quia talium potentiarum nulla est actio nisi per organum corporeum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31665] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod liber ille auctoritatem non habet. Unde quod ibi scriptum est, eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua dicitur. Tamen potest dici quod trahit secum anima huiusmodi potentias, non actu, sed virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31666] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi potentiae quas dicimus actu in anima separata non manere, non sunt proprietates solius animae, sed coniuncti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of these powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31667] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod dicuntur non debilitari huiusmodi potentiae debilitato corpore, quia anima manet immutabilis, quae est virtuale principium huiusmodi potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="31668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31668] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod illa recordatio accipitur eo modo quo Augustinus ponit memoriam in mente; non eo modo quo ponitur pars animae sensitivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="31669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31669] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod tristitia et gaudium sunt in anima separata, non secundum appetitum sensitivum, sed secundum appetitum intellectivum; sicut etiam in Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said there (Retrac. ii, 24). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 6"><a name="31670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31670] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi inquirendo, non asserendo. Unde quaedam ibi dicta retractat.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q78" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q78-p0.1">Q. 78. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q78-p2"> We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers. </p><p id="FP_Q78-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q78-p4"><a href="#FP_Q78_A1"> (1) The powers of the soul considered generally;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p5"><a href="#FP_Q78_A2"> (2) The various species of the vegetative part;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p6"><a href="#FP_Q78_A3"> (3) The exterior senses;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p7"><a href="#FP_Q78_A4"> (4) The interior senses.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 pr."><a name="31671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31671] Iª q. 78 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de potentiis animae in speciali. Ad considerationem autem theologi pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur. Sed quia cognitio harum potentiarum quodammodo dependet ex aliis, ideo nostra consideratio de potentiis animae in speciali erit tripartita, primo namque considerandum est de his quae sunt praeambula ad intellectum; secundo, de potentiis intellectivis; tertio, de potentiis appetitivis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de generibus potentiarum animae. Secundo, de speciebus vegetativae partis. Tertio, de sensibus exterioribus. Quarto, de sensibus interioribus.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described---namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above forces as powers of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31681] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes vegetativae assignentur, scilicet nutritivum, augmentativum, et generativum. Huiusmodi enim vires dicuntur naturales. Sed potentiae animae sunt supra vires naturales. Ergo huiusmodi vires non debent poni potentiae animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be classed as a power of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31682] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad id quod est commune viventibus et non viventibus, non debet aliqua potentia animae deputari. Sed generatio est communis omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, tam viventibus quam non viventibus. Ergo vis generativa non debet poni potentia animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31683] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima potentior est quam natura corporea. Sed natura corporea eadem virtute activa dat speciem et debitam quantitatem. Ergo multo magis anima. Non est ergo alia potentia animae augmentativa a generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing (De Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it." Therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="31684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31684] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unaquaeque res conservatur in esse per id per quod esse habet. Sed potentia generativa est per quam acquiritur esse viventis. Ergo per eandem res viva conservatur. Sed ad conservationem rei viventis ordinatur vis nutritiva, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim potentia potens salvare suscipiens ipsam. Non debet ergo distingui nutritiva potentia a generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf. De Anima iii, 9) "growth." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31685] Iª q. 78 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod opera huius animae sunt generare, et alimento uti, et iterum augmentum facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q78_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the "generative" power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the "augmentative" power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the "nutritive" power. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A2-p8"> We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce another like unto itself." And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 co."><a name="31686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31686] Iª q. 78 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod tres sunt potentiae vegetativae partis. Vegetativum enim, ut dictum est, habet pro obiecto ipsum corpus vivens per animam, ad quod quidem corpus triplex animae operatio est necessaria. Una quidem, per quam esse acquirat, et ad hoc ordinatur potentia generativa. Alia vero, per quam corpus vivum acquirit debitam quantitatem, et ad hoc ordinatur vis augmentativa. Alia vero, per quam corpus viventis salvatur et in esse, et in quantitate debita, et ad hoc ordinatur vis nutritiva. Est tamen quaedam differentia attendenda inter has potentias. Nam nutritiva et augmentativa habent suum effectum in eo in quo sunt, quia ipsum corpus unitum animae augetur et conservatur per vim augmentativam et nutritivam in eadem anima existentem. Sed vis generativa habet effectum suum, non in eodem corpore, sed in alio, quia nihil est generativum sui ipsius. Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquat ad dignitatem animae sensitivae, quae habet operationem in res exteriores, licet excellentiori modo et universaliori, supremum enim inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris, ut patet per Dionysium, in VII cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo inter istas tres potentias finalior et principalior et perfectior est generativa, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim rei iam perfectae facere alteram qualis ipsa est. Generativae autem deserviunt et augmentativa et nutritiva, augmentativae vero nutritiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31687] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi vires dicuntur naturales, tum quia habent effectum similem naturae, quae etiam dat esse et quantitatem et conservationem (licet hae vires habeant hoc altiori modo), tum quia hae vires exercent suas actiones instrumentaliter per qualitates activas et passivas, quae sunt naturalium actionum principia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31688] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio in rebus inanimatis est totaliter ab extrinseco. Sed generatio viventium est quodam altiori modo, per aliquid ipsius viventis, quod est semen, in quo est aliquod principium corporis formativum. Et ideo oportet esse aliquam potentiam rei viventis, per quam semen huiusmodi praeparetur, et haec est vis generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31689] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia generatio viventium est ex aliquo semine, oportet quod in principio animal generetur parvae quantitatis. Et propter hoc necesse est quod habeat potentiam animae, per quam ad debitam quantitatem perducatur. Sed corpus inanimatum generatur ex materia determinata ab agente extrinseco, et ideo simul recipit speciem et quantitatem secundum materiae conditionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As we have said above <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q78_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="31690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31690] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, operatio vegetativi principii completur mediante calore, cuius est humidum consumere. Et ideo, ad restaurationem humidi deperditi, necesse est habere potentiam nutritivam, per quam alimentum convertatur in substantiam corporis. Quod etiam est necessarium ad actum virtutis augmentativae et generativae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q78_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A3-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 3. Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31691] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur quinque sensus exteriores. Sensus enim est cognoscitivus accidentium. Sunt autem multa genera accidentium. Cum ergo potentiae distinguantur per obiecta, videtur quod sensus multiplicentur secundum numerum qui est in generibus accidentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called "common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31692] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magnitudo et figura, et alia quae dicuntur sensibilia communia, non sunt sensibilia per accidens, sed contra ea dividuntur in II de anima. Diversitas autem per se obiectorum diversificat potentias. Cum ergo plus differant magnitudo et figura a colore quam sonus; videtur quod multo magis debeat esse alia potentia sensitiva cognoscitiva magnitudinis aut figurae, quam coloris et soni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31693] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unus sensus est unius contrarietatis; sicut visus albi et nigri. Sed tactus est cognoscitivus plurium contrarietatum, scilicet calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci, et huiusmodi. Ergo non est sensus unus, sed plures. Ergo plures sensus sunt quam quinque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense of touch. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31694] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, species non dividitur contra genus. Sed gustus est tactus quidam. Ergo non debet poni alter sensus praeter tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is no other besides the five senses." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31695] Iª q. 78 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>non est alter sensus praeter quinque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p8"> The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and "per se." Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p9"> Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p10"> But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in "sight" while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of "hearing"; for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of "smelling"; for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place in "touch" and "taste"; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation unless indirectly. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p11"> Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 co."><a name="31696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31696] Iª q. 78 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod rationem distinctionis et numeri sensuum exteriorum quidam accipere voluerunt ex parte organorum, in quibus aliquod elementorum dominatur, vel aqua, vel aer, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quidam autem ex parte medii, quod est vel coniunctum, vel extrinsecum; et hoc vel aer, vel aqua, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quidam autem ex diversa natura sensibilium qualitatum, secundum quod est qualitas simplicis corporis, vel sequens complexionem. Sed nihil istorum conveniens est. Non enim potentiae sunt propter organa, sed organa propter potentias, unde non propter hoc sunt diversae potentiae, quia sunt diversa organa; sed ideo natura instituit diversitatem in organis, ut congruerent diversitati potentiarum. Et similiter diversa media diversis sensibus attribuit, secundum quod erat conveniens ad actus potentiarum. Naturas autem sensibilium qualitatum cognoscere non est sensus, sed intellectus. Accipienda est ergo ratio numeri et distinctionis exteriorum sensuum, secundum illud quod proprie et per se ad sensum pertinet. Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cuius diversitatem sensitivae potentiae distinguuntur. Est autem duplex immutatio, una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent dum alterantur. Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu. In quibusdam autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte obiecti tantum, vel etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte autem obiecti, invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in sono, qui est obiectum auditus, nam sonus ex percussione causatur et aeris commotione. Secundum alterationem vero, in odore, qui est obiectum olfactus, oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi, est immutatio naturalis in tactu et gustu, nam et manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero olfactus aut auditus nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque immutatione naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et communior. Et post hoc auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex parte obiecti. Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Tactus autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Et inde est quod alii tres sensus non fiunt per medium coniunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, ut accidit in his duobus sensibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because "the senses are affected by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31697] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnia accidentia habent vim immutativam secundum se; sed solae qualitates tertiae speciei, secundum quas contingit alteratio. Et ideo solae huiusmodi qualitates sunt obiecta sensuum, quia, ut dicitur in VII Physic., <i>secundum eadem alteratur sensus, secundum quae alterantur corpora inanimata</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper sensibles," which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided according to its proper subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31698] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualitates alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subiectum uno modo vel pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel localis distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis, et sic sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa. Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativae, ut superficies coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis; ut superficies ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione sensus. Alio enim modo immutatur sensus a magna superficie, et a parva, quia etiam ipsa albedo dicitur magna vel parva, et ideo dividitur secundum proprium subiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31699] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus videtur dicere in II de anima, sensus tactus est unus genere, sed dividitur in multos sensus secundum speciem; et propter hoc est diversarum contrarietatum. Qui tamen non separantur ab invicem secundum organum, sed per totum corpus se concomitantur; et ideo eorum distinctio non apparet. Gustus autem, qui est perceptivus dulcis et amari, concomitatur tactum in lingua, non autem per totum corpus; et ideo de facili a tactu distinguitur. Posset tamen dici quod omnes illae contrarietates, et singulae conveniunt in uno genere proximo, et omnes in uno genere communi, quod est obiectum tactus secundum rationem communem. Sed illud genus commune est innominatum; sicut etiam genus proximum calidi et frigidi est innominatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31700] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod sensus gustus, secundum dictum philosophi, est quaedam species tactus quae est in lingua tantum. Non autem distinguitur a tactu in genere, sed a tactu quantum ad illas species quae per totum corpus diffunduntur. Si vero tactus sit unus sensus tantum, propter unam rationem communem obiecti, dicendum erit quod secundum rationem diversam immutationis, distinguitur gustus a tactu. Nam tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et non solum spirituali, quantum ad organum suum, secundum qualitatem quae ei proprie obiicitur. Gustus autem organum non immutatur de necessitate naturali immutatione secundum qualitatem quae ei proprie obiicitur, ut scilicet lingua fiat dulcis vel amara; sed secundum praeambulam qualitatem, in qua fundatur sapor, scilicet secundum humorem, qui est obiectum tactus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q78_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A4-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 4. Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31701] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod interiores sensus inconvenienter distinguantur. Commune enim non dividitur contra proprium. Ergo sensus communis non debet enumerari inter vires interiores sensitivas, praeter sensus exteriores proprios.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power, called the common sense. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31702] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad id ad quod sufficit sensus proprius et exterior, non oportet ponere aliquam vim apprehensivam interiorem. Sed ad iudicandum de sensibilibus, sufficiunt sensus proprii et exteriores, unusquisque enim sensus iudicat de proprio obiecto. Similiter etiam videntur sufficere ad hoc quod percipiant suos actus, quia cum actio sensus sit quodammodo medium inter potentiam et obiectum, videtur quod multo magis visus possit suam visionem, tanquam sibi propinquiorem, percipere, quam colorem; et sic de aliis. Non ergo necessarium fuit ad hoc ponere interiorem potentiam, quae dicatur sensus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31703] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, secundum philosophum, phantasticum et memorativum sunt passiones primi sensitivi. Sed passio non dividitur contra subiectum. Ergo memoria et phantasia non debent poni aliae potentiae praeter sensum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that "those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the "estimative" power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31704] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, intellectus minus dependet a sensu, quam quaecumque potentia sensitivae partis. Sed intellectus nihil cognoscit nisi accipiendo a sensu, unde dicitur in I posteriorum, quod <i>quibus deest unus sensus, deficit una scientia</i>. Ergo multo minus debet poni una potentia sensitivae partis ad percipiendum intentiones quas non percipit sensus, quam vocant aestimativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="31705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31705] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, actus cogitativae, qui est conferre et componere et dividere, et actus reminiscitivae, qui est quodam syllogismo uti ad inquirendum, non minus distant ab actu aestimativae et memorativae, quam actus aestimativae ab actu phantasiae. Debent ergo vel cogitativa et reminiscitiva poni aliae vires praeter aestimativam et memorativam; vel aestimativa et memorativa non debent poni aliae vires praeter phantasiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="31706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31706] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ponit tria genera visionum, scilicet corporalem, quae fit per sensum; et spiritualem, quae fit per imaginationem sive phantasiam; et intellectualem, quae fit per intellectum. Non est ergo aliqua vis interior quae sit media inter sensum et intellectum, nisi imaginativa tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31707] Iª q. 78 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Avicenna, in suo libro de anima, ponit quinque potentias sensitivas interiores, scilicet sensum communem, phantasiam, imaginativam, aestimativam, et memorativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p9"> <b>I answer that,</b> As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p10"> Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p11"> Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p12"> Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper sense" and the "common sense" are appointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions. </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p13"> Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part---namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 co."><a name="31708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31708] Iª q. 78 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum natura non deficiat in necessariis, oportet esse tot actiones animae sensitivae, quot sufficiant ad vitam animalis perfecti. Et quaecumque harum actionum non possunt reduci in unum principium, requirunt diversas potentias, cum potentia animae nihil aliud sit quam proximum principium operationis animae. Est autem considerandum quod ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud eius absentiam. Alioquin, cum animalis motus et actio sequantur apprehensionem, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens; cuius contrarium apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae moventur motu processivo; moventur enim ad aliquid absens apprehensum. Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum recipiat species sensibilium, cum praesentialiter immutatur ab eis; sed etiam eas retineat et conservet. Recipere autem et retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa principia, nam humida bene recipiunt, et male retinent; e contrario autem est de siccis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, oportet esse aliam potentiam quae recipiat species sensibilium, et quae conservet. Rursus considerandum est quod, si animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum. Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens. Et ipsa ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur. Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis, est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium. Ex parte autem memorativae, non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum individuales intentiones. Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam, mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit formas imaginatas; ut patet cum ex forma imaginata auri et forma imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa. Cui etiam hanc actionem attribuit Averroes, in libro quodam quem fecit de sensu et sensibilibus. Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires interiores sensitivae partis, scilicet sensum communem et imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31709] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus interior non dicitur communis per praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31710] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus proprius iudicat de sensibili proprio, discernendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis iudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above ( <a href="#FP_Q77_A7" id="FP_Q78_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[7]</a>), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions of the "first sensitive." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31711] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut una potentia oritur ab anima, alia mediante, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam anima subiicitur alii potentiae, mediante alia. Et secundum hunc modum, phantasticum et memorativum dicuntur passiones primi sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31712] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p18"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="31713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31713] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis; sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed eaedem, perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p19"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that it is common to all interior apprehensions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="31714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31714] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus spiritualem visionem dicit esse, quae fit per similitudines corporum in absentia corporum. Unde patet quod communis est omnibus interioribus apprehensionibus.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q79" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q79-p0.1">Q. 79. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q79-p2"> The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q79-p3"><a href="#FP_Q79_A1"> (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p4"><a href="#FP_Q79_A2"> (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p5"><a href="#FP_Q79_A3"> (3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p6"><a href="#FP_Q79_A4"> (4) Whether it is something in the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p7"><a href="#FP_Q79_A5"> (5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p8"><a href="#FP_Q79_A6"> (6) Whether memory is in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p9"><a href="#FP_Q79_A7"> (7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p10"><a href="#FP_Q79_A8"> (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p11"><a href="#FP_Q79_A9"> (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p12"><a href="#FP_Q79_A10"> (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p13"><a href="#FP_Q79_A11"> (11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p14"><a href="#FP_Q79_A12"> (12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p15"><a href="#FP_Q79_A13"> (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 pr."><a name="31715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31715] Iª q. 79 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de potentiis intellectivis. Circa quod quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum intellectus sit potentia animae, vel eius essentia. Secundo, si est potentia, utrum sit potentia passiva. Tertio, si est potentia passiva, utrum sit ponere aliquem intellectum agentem. Quarto, utrum sit aliquid animae. Quinto, utrum intellectus agens sit unus omnium. Sexto, utrum memoria sit in intellectu. Septimo, utrum sit alia potentia ab intellectu. Octavo, utrum ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. Nono, utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae. Decimo, utrum intelligentia sit alia potentia praeter intellectum. Undecimo, utrum intellectus speculativus et practicus sint diversae potentiae. Duodecimo, utrum synderesis sit aliqua potentia intellectivae partis. Tertiodecimo, utrum conscientia sit aliqua potentia intellectivae partis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q79_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A1-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 1. Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31716] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit aliqua potentia animae, sed sit ipsa eius essentia. Intellectus idem enim videtur esse quod mens. Sed mens non est potentia animae sed essentia, dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., <i>mens et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant</i>. Ergo intellectus est ipsa essentia animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31717] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, diversa genera potentiarum animae non uniuntur in aliqua potentia una, sed in sola essentia animae. Appetitivum autem et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, ut dicitur in II de anima; conveniunt autem in mente, quia Augustinus, X de Trin., ponit intelligentiam et voluntatem in mente. Ergo mens et intellectus est ipsa essentia animae, et non aliqua eius potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31718] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, in homilia ascensionis, homo intelligit cum Angelis. Sed Angeli dicuntur mentes et intellectus. Ergo mens et intellectus hominis non est aliqua potentia animae, sed ipsa anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31719] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ex hoc convenit alicui substantiae quod sit intellectiva, quia est immaterialis. Sed anima est immaterialis per suam essentiam. Ergo videtur quod anima per suam essentiam sit intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31720] Iª q. 79 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus ponit intellectivum potentiam animae, ut patet in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> In accordance with what has been already shown ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q54_A3" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>; <a href="#FP_Q77_A1" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[77], A[1]</a>) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 co."><a name="31721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31721] Iª q. 79 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, secundum praemissa, quod intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia. Tunc enim solum immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei operantis, quando ipsa operatio est eius esse, sicut enim potentia se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad esse. In solo Deo autem idem est intelligere quod suum esse. Unde in solo Deo intellectus est eius essentia, in aliis autem creaturis intellectualibus intellectus est quaedam potentia intelligentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31722] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus accipitur aliquando pro potentia, aliquando vero pro ipsa anima sensitiva, denominatur enim anima sensitiva nomine principalioris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et similiter anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine intellectus, quasi a principaliori sua virtute; sicut dicitur in I de anima, quod intellectus est substantia quaedam. Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus dicit quod mens est spiritus, vel essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31723] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod appetitivum et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, secundum diversas rationes obiectorum. Sed appetitivum partim convenit cum intellectivo, et partim cum sensitivo, quantum ad modum operandi per organum corporale, vel sine huiusmodi organo, nam appetitus sequitur apprehensionem. Et secundum hoc Augustinus ponit voluntatem in mente, et philosophus in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31724] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in Angelis non est alia vis nisi intellectiva, et voluntas, quae ad intellectum consequitur. Et propter hoc Angelus dicitur mens vel intellectus, quia tota virtus sua in hoc consistit. Anima autem habet multas alias vires, sicut sensitivas et nutritivas, et ideo non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31725] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod ipsa immaterialitas substantiae intelligentis creatae non est eius intellectus; sed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad intelligendum. Unde non oportet quod intellectus sit substantia animae, sed eius virtus et potentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A2-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 2. Whether the intellect is a passive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31726] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva. Patitur enim unumquodque secundum materiam; sed agit ratione formae. Sed virtus intellectiva consequitur immaterialitatem substantiae intelligentis. Ergo videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31727] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, potentia intellectiva est incorruptibilis, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus si est passivus, est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo potentia intellectiva non est passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31728] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, agens est nobilius patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt., et Aristoteles in III de anima. Potentiae autem vegetativae partis omnes sunt activae, quae tamen sunt infimae inter potentias animae. Ergo multo magis potentiae intellectivae, quae sunt supremae, omnes sunt activae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is in a way to be passive." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31729] Iª q. 79 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>intelligere est pati quoddam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q79_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[1]</a>), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act. </p><p id="FP_Q79_A2-p7"> Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly bodies ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A1" id="FP_Q79_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[1]</a>). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 co."><a name="31730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31730] Iª q. 79 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod pati tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo, propriissime, scilicet quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi secundum naturam, aut secundum propriam inclinationem; sicut cum aqua frigiditatem amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur. Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid ab ipso abiicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens. Et secundum hoc dicitur pati non solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui sanatur; non solum qui tristatur, sed etiam qui laetatur; vel quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel moveatur. Tertio modo, dicitur aliquid pati communiter, ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiiciatur. Secundum quem modum, omne quod exit de potentia in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati. Quod quidem hac ratione apparet. Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa ens in universali. Considerari ergo potest utrum intellectus sit in actu vel potentia, ex hoc quod consideratur quomodo intellectus se habeat ad ens universale. Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus qui ad ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis, et talis est intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et virtualiter totum ens praeexistit sicut in prima causa. Et ideo intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed est actus purus. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu totius entis universalis, quia sic oporteret quod esset ens infinitum. Unde omnis intellectus creatus, per hoc ipsum quod est, non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ipsa intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum. Potentia autem dupliciter se habet ad actum. Est enim quaedam potentia quae semper est perfecta per actum; sicut diximus de materia corporum caelestium. Quaedam autem potentia est, quae non semper est in actu, sed de potentia procedit in actum; sicut invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Intellectus igitur angelicus semper est in actu suorum intelligibilium, propter propinquitatem ad primum intellectum, qui est actus purus, ut supra dictum est. Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Quod manifeste apparet ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu. Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31731] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de primo et secundo modo passionis, qui sunt proprii materiae primae. Tertius autem modus passionis est cuiuscumque in potentia existentis quod in actum reducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31732] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus passivus secundum quosdam dicitur appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animae passiones; qui etiam in I Ethic. dicitur rationalis per participationem, quia obedit rationi. Secundum alios autem intellectus passivus dicitur virtus cogitativa, quae nominatur ratio particularis. Et utroque modo passivum accipi potest secundum primos duos modos passionis, inquantum talis intellectus sic dictus, est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Sed intellectus qui est in potentia ad intelligibilia, quem Aristoteles ob hoc nominat intellectum possibilem, non est passivus nisi tertio modo, quia non est actus organi corporalis. Et ideo est incorruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31733] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et passio referantur, non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi passivum esse nobilius tali activo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A3-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 3. Whether there is an active intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31734] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit ponere intellectum agentem. Sicut enim se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus noster ad intelligibilia. Sed quia sensus est in potentia ad sensibilia non ponitur sensus agens, sed sensus patiens tantum. Ergo, cum intellectus noster sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, videtur quod non debeat poni intellectus agens, sed possibilis tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31735] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si dicatur quod in sensu etiam est aliquod agens, sicut lumen, contra, lumen requiritur ad visum inquantum facit medium lucidum in actu, nam color ipse secundum se est motivus lucidi. Sed in operatione intellectus non ponitur aliquod medium quod necesse sit fieri in actu. Ergo non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually intelligible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31736] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, similitudo agentis recipitur in patiente secundum modum patientis. Sed intellectus possibilis est virtus immaterialis. Ergo immaterialitas eius sufficit ad hoc quod recipiantur in eo formae immaterialiter. Sed ex hoc ipso aliqua forma est intelligibilis in actu, quod est immaterialis. Ergo nulla necessitas est ponere intellectum agentem, ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an active intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31737] Iª q. 79 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>sicut in omni natura ita et in anima est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere</i>. Est ergo ponere intellectum agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q79_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 co."><a name="31738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31738] Iª q. 79 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicetur. Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale. Et huiusmodi vocabat species, sive ideas, ex quarum participatione dicebat etiam materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua naturaliter constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus nostros, ad hoc quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31739] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31740] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter idem, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum. Secundum alios vero, lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter colores, ut fiant actu visibiles; sed ut medium fiat actu lucidum, ut Commentator dicit in II de anima. Et secundum hoc, similitudo qua Aristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc est necessarium ad videndum, ita illud ad intelligendum; sed non propter idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31741] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, supposito agente, bene contingit diversimode recipi eius similitudinem in diversis propter eorum dispositionem diversam. Sed si agens non praeexistit, nihil ad hoc faciet dispositio recipientis. Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A4-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 4. Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9, </a> "He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31742] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae nostrae. Intellectus enim agentis effectus est illuminare ad intelligendum. Sed hoc fit per aliquid quod est altius anima; secundum illud Ioan. I, <i>erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>. Ergo videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31743] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit intellectui agenti quod non aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Sed anima nostra non semper intelligit; sed aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Ergo intellectus agens non est aliquid animae nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a man would always be able to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31744] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, agens et patiens sufficiunt ad agendum. Si igitur intellectus possibilis est aliquid animae nostrae, qui est virtus passiva, et similiter intellectus agens, qui est virtus activa; sequitur quod homo semper poterit intelligere cum voluerit, quod patet esse falsum. Non est ergo intellectus agens aliquid animae nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31745] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est substantia actu ens. Nihil autem est respectu eiusdem in actu et in potentia. Si ergo intellectus possibilis, qui est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, est aliquid animae nostrae; videtur impossibile quod intellectus agens sit aliquid animae nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="31746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31746] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae, oportet quod sit aliqua potentia. Non est enim nec passio nec habitus, nam habitus et passiones non habent rationem agentis respectu passionum animae; sed magis passio est ipsa actio potentiae passivae, habitus autem est aliquid quod ex actibus consequitur. Omnis autem potentia fluit ab essentia animae. Sequeretur ergo quod intellectus agens ab essentia animae procederet. Et sic non inesset animae per participationem ab aliquo superiori intellectu, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active intellect, "to be in the soul." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31747] Iª q. 79 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, III de anima quod <i>necesse est in anima has esse differentias</i>, scilicet intellectum possibilem, et agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A4-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand. </p><p id="FP_Q79_A4-p9"> Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on ( <a href="#FP_Q90_A3" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>; FS, <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.3" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv"> Ps. 4:7, </a> "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 co."><a name="31748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31748] Iª q. 79 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus agens de quo philosophus loquitur, est aliquid animae. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod supra animam intellectivam humanam necesse est ponere aliquem superiorem intellectum, a quo anima virtutem intelligendi obtineat. Semper enim quod participat aliquid, et quod est mobile, et quod est imperfectum, praeexigit ante se aliquid quod est per essentiam suam tale, et quod est immobile et perfectum. Anima autem humana intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, cuius signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam intelligentiam, tum quia non omnia intelligit; tum quia in his quae intelligit, de potentia procedit ad actum. Oportet ergo esse aliquem altiorem intellectum, quo anima iuvetur ad intelligendum. Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum secundum substantiam separatum, esse intellectum agentem, qui quasi illustrando phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia actu. Sed, dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit intelligibilia in actu. Sicut et in aliis rebus naturalibus perfectis, praeter universales causas agentes, sunt propriae virtutes inditae singulis rebus perfectis, ab universalibus agentibus derivatae, non enim solus sol generat hominem, sed est in homine virtus generativa hominis; et similiter in aliis animalibus perfectis. Nihil autem est perfectius in inferioribus rebus anima humana. Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare. Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia. Nulla autem actio convenit alicui rei, nisi per aliquod principium formaliter ei inhaerens; ut supra dictum est, cum de intellectu possibili ageretur. Ergo oportet virtutem quae est principium huius actionis, esse aliquid in anima. Et ideo Aristoteles comparavit intellectum agentem lumini, quod est aliquid receptum in aere. Plato autem intellectum separatum imprimentem in animas nostras, comparavit soli; ut Themistius dicit in commentario tertii de anima. Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31749] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: "Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31750] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus illa verba non dicit de intellectu agente, sed de intellectu in actu. Unde supra de ipso praemiserat, idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei. Vel, si intelligatur de intellectu agente, hoc dicitur quia non est ex parte intellectus agentis hoc quod quandoque intelligimus et quandoque non intelligimus; sed ex parte intellectus qui est in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31751] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia intelligeremus, cum intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur, praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentia phantasmatum, et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones. Et quantum ad hoc, non differt utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, vel aliquid separatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31752] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="31753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31753] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum essentia animae sit immaterialis, a supremo intellectu creata, nihil prohibet virtutem quae a supremo intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahit a materia, ab essentia ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A5-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 5. Whether the active intellect is one in all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31754] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens sit unus in omnibus. Nihil enim quod est separatum a corpore, multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem corporum. Sed intellectus agens est separatus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non multiplicatur in multis corporibus hominum, sed est unus in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31755] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, intellectus agens facit universale, quod est unum in multis. Sed illud quod est causa unitatis, magis est unum. Ergo intellectus agens est unus in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree in one active intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31756] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnes homines conveniunt in primis conceptionibus intellectus. His autem assentiunt per intellectum agentem. Ergo conveniunt omnes in uno intellectu agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31757] Iª q. 79 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est sicut lumen. Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis. Ergo non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The truth about this question depends on what we have already said <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 co."><a name="31758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31758] Iª q. 79 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod veritas huius quaestionis dependet ex praemissis. Si enim intellectus agens non esset aliquid animae, sed esset quaedam substantia separata, unus esset intellectus agens omnium hominum. Et hoc intelligunt qui ponunt unitatem intellectus agentis. Si autem intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, ut quaedam virtus ipsius, necesse est dicere quod sint plures intellectus agentes, secundum pluralitatem animarum, quae multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Non enim potest esse quod una et eadem virtus numero sit diversarum substantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a separate substance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31759] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus probat intellectum agentem esse separatum, per hoc quod possibilis est separatus; quia, ut ipse dicit, agens est honorabilius patiente. Intellectus autem possibilis dicitur separatus, quia non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et secundum hunc modum etiam intellectus agens dicitur separatus, non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31760] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus agens causat universale abstrahendo a materia. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod sit unus in omnibus habentibus intellectum, sed quod sit unus in omnibus secundum habitudinem ad omnia a quibus abstrahit universale, respectu quorum universale est unum. Et hoc competit intellectui agenti inquantum est immaterialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31761] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia quae sunt unius speciei, communicant in actione consequente naturam speciei, et per consequens in virtute, quae est actionis principium, non quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Cognoscere autem prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute quae est principium huius actionis, et haec est virtus intellectus agentis. Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus, demonstrat unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli; non autem unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A6-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 6. Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory." Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31762] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod memoria non sit in parte intellectiva animae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod ad partem superiorem animae pertinent quae non sunt hominibus pecoribusque communia. Sed memoria est hominibus pecoribusque communis, dicit enim ibidem quod <i>possunt pecora sentire per corporis sensus corporalia, et ea mandare memoriae</i>. Ergo memoria non pertinet ad partem animae intellectivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31763] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, memoria praeteritorum est. Sed praeteritum dicitur secundum aliquod determinatum tempus. Memoria igitur est cognoscitiva alicuius sub determinato tempore; quod est cognoscere aliquid sub hic et nunc. Hoc autem non est intellectus, sed sensus. Memoria igitur non est in parte intellectiva, sed solum in parte sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31764] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in memoria conservantur species rerum quae actu non cogitantur. Sed hoc non est possibile accidere in intellectu, quia intellectus fit in actu per hoc quod informatur specie intelligibili; intellectum autem esse in actu, est ipsum intelligere in actu; et sic intellectus omnia intelligit in actu, quorum species apud se habet. Non ergo memoria est in parte intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31765] Iª q. 79 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., quod <i>memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part. </p><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p7"> But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding---namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration. </p><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p8"> The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 co."><a name="31766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31766] Iª q. 79 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum de ratione memoriae sit conservare species rerum quae actu non apprehenduntur, hoc primum considerari oportet, utrum species intelligibiles sic in intellectu conservari possint. Posuit enim Avicenna hoc esse impossibile. In parte enim sensitiva dicebat hoc accidere, quantum ad aliquas potentias, inquantum sunt actus organorum corporalium, in quibus conservari possunt aliquae species absque actuali apprehensione. In intellectu autem, qui caret organo corporali, nihil existit nisi intelligibiliter. Unde oportet intelligi in actu illud cuius similitudo in intellectu existit. Sic ergo, secundum ipsum, quam cito aliquis actu desinit intelligere aliquam rem, desinit esse illius rei species in intellectu, sed oportet, si denuo vult illam rem intelligere, quod convertat se ad intellectum agentem, quem ponit substantiam separatam, ut ab illo effluant species intelligibiles in intellectum possibilem. Et ex exercitio et usu convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, relinquitur, secundum ipsum, quaedam habilitas in intellectu possibili convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, quam dicebat esse habitum scientiae. Secundum igitur hanc positionem, nihil conservatur in parte intellectiva, quod non actu intelligatur. Unde non poterit poni memoria in parte intellectiva, secundum hunc modum. Sed haec opinio manifeste repugnat dictis Aristotelis. Dicit enim, in III de anima, quod, cum intellectus possibilis <i>sic fiat singula ut sciens, dicitur qui secundum actum; et quod hoc accidit cum possit operari per seipsum. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut ante addiscere aut invenire</i>. Dicitur autem intellectus possibilis fieri singula, secundum quod recipit species singulorum. Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species intelligibilium, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem quod semper operetur, quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, licet aliter quam ante intelligere; eo scilicet modo quo sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu. Repugnat etiam praedicta positio rationi. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis stabilis naturae et immobilis, quam materia corporalis. Si ergo materia corporalis formas quas recipit, non solum tenet dum per eas agit in actu, sed etiam postquam agere per eas cessaverit; multo fortius intellectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species intelligibiles, sive a sensibilibus acceptas, sive etiam ab aliquo superiori intellectu effluxas. Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse in intellectiva parte. Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod eius obiectum sit praeteritum, ut praeteritum; memoria in parte intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quae est apprehensiva particularium. Praeteritum enim, ut praeteritum, cum significet esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31767] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod memoria, secundum quod est conservativa specierum, non est nobis pecoribusque communis. Species enim conservantur non in parte animae sensitiva tantum, sed magis in coniuncto; cum vis memorativa sit actus organi cuiusdam. Sed intellectus secundum seipsum est conservativus specierum, praeter concomitantiam organi corporalis. Unde philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>anima est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition of past may be referred to two things---namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q79_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here" and "now." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31768] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad obiectum quod cognoscitur; et ad cognitionis actum. Quae quidem duo simul coniunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva alicuius per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili, unde simul animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse quoddam praeteritum sensibile. Sed quantum ad partem intellectivam pertinet, praeteritio accidit, et non per se convenit, ex parte obiecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum est homo, homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in praesenti vel in praeterito vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus, praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut in sensu. Quia intelligere animae nostrae est quidam particularis actus, in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur homo intelligere nunc vel heri vel cras. Et hoc non repugnat intellectualitati, quia huiusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam particulare, tamen est immaterialis actus, ut supra de intellectu dictum est; et ideo sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus, ita intelligit suum intelligere, quod est singularis actus vel in praeterito vel in praesenti vel in futuro existens. Sic igitur salvatur ratio memoriae, quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum, in intellectu, secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum quod intelligit praeteritum, prout est hic et nunc.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31769] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod species intelligibilis aliquando est in intellectu in potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia. Aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc intelligit actu. Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum, et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc modum intellectus conservat species, etiam quando actu non intelligit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A7-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 7. Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31770] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod alia potentia sit memoria intellectiva, et alia intellectus. Augustinus enim, in X de Trin., ponit in mente memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Manifestum est autem quod memoria est alia potentia a voluntate. Ergo similiter est alia ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31771] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eadem ratio distinctionis est potentiarum sensitivae partis et intellectivae. Sed memoria in parte sensitiva est alia potentia a sensu, ut supra dictum est. Ergo memoria partis intellectivae est alia potentia ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31772] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt sibi invicem aequalia, et unum eorum ab alio oritur. Hoc autem esse non posset, si memoria esset eadem potentia cum intellectu. Non est ergo eadem potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (A[6], ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31773] Iª q. 79 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, de ratione memoriae est, quod sit thesaurus vel locus conservativus specierum. Hoc autem philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit intellectui, ut dictum est. Non ergo in parte intellectiva est alia potentia memoria ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As has been said above ( <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A4" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality." Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 co."><a name="31774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31774] Iª q. 79 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, potentiae animae distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes obiectorum; eo quod ratio cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est eius obiectum. Dictum est etiam supra quod, si aliqua potentia secundum propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem obiecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum diversitates particularium differentiarum, sicut potentia visiva, quae respicit suum obiectum secundum rationem colorati, non diversificatur per diversitatem albi et nigri. Intellectus autem respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri. Unde secundum nullam differentiam entium, diversificatur differentia intellectus possibilis. Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente. Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu. Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in intellectu esse potest, nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu, ad rationem enim potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31775] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis in III dist. I Sent. dicatur quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires; tamen hoc non est secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit in XIV de Trin., quod <i>si accipiatur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum quod semper praesto sunt animae, sive cogitentur sive non cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit</i>. Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus pro tribus potentiis; sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animae retentione, intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus, voluntatem autem pro actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31776] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod praeteritum et praesens possunt esse propriae differentiae potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativae; non autem potentiarum intellectivarum, ratione supra dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31777] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex habitu. Et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei; non autem sicut potentia potentiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A8-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 8. Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31778] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. In libro enim de spiritu et anima dicitur, <i>cum ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, deinde intellectus</i>. Est ergo alia potentia ratio ab intellectu, sicut imaginatio a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31779] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., quod intellectus comparatur ad rationem sicut aeternitas ad tempus. Sed non est eiusdem virtutis esse in aeternitate et esse in tempore. Ergo non est eadem potentia ratio et intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31780] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, homo communicat cum Angelis in intellectu, cum brutis vero in sensu. Sed ratio, quae est propria hominis, qua animal rationale dicitur, est alia potentia a sensu. Ergo pari ratione est alia potentia ab intellectu, qui proprie convenit Angelis, unde et intellectuales dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31781] Iª q. 79 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>illud quo homo irrationabilibus animalibus antecellit, est ratio, vel mens, vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur</i>. Ratio ergo et intellectus et mens sunt una potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood---namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 co."><a name="31782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31782] Iª q. 79 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ratio et intellectus in homine non possunt esse diversae potentiae. Quod manifeste cognoscitur, si utriusque actus consideretur. Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam. Et ideo Angeli, qui perfecte possident, secundum modum suae naturae, cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis, non habent necesse procedere de uno ad aliud; sed simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum apprehendunt, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Homines autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt, procedendo de uno ad aliud, ut ibidem dicitur, et ideo rationales dicuntur. Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam et eandem, etiam in naturalibus rebus, quia per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. Multo ergo magis per eandem potentiam intelligimus et ratiocinamur. Et sic patet quod in homine eadem potentia est ratio et intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great authority. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31783] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa enumeratio fit secundum ordinem actuum, non secundum distinctionem potentiarum. Quamvis liber ille non sit magnae auctoritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31784] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. Aeternitas enim comparatur ad tempus, sicut immobile ad mobile. Et ideo Boetius comparavit intellectum aeternitati, rationem vero tempori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31785] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod alia animalia sunt ita infra hominem, quod non possunt attingere ad cognoscendam veritatem, quam ratio inquirit. Homo vero attingit ad cognoscendam intelligibilem veritatem, quam Angeli cognoscunt; sed imperfecte. Et ideo vis cognoscitiva Angelorum non est alterius generis a vi cognoscitiva rationis, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut perfectum ad imperfectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A9-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 9. Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="31786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31786] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod imago Trinitatis est in superiori parte rationis, non autem in inferiori. Sed partes animae sunt ipsae eius potentiae. Ergo duae potentiae sunt ratio superior et inferior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="31787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31787] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil oritur a seipso. Sed ratio inferior oritur a superiori, et ab ea regulatur et dirigitur. Ergo ratio superior est alia potentia ab inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this from the principle that for those things which are "generically different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the Philosopher calls the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="31788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31788] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod scientificum animae quo cognoscit anima necessaria, est aliud principium et alia pars animae ab opinativo et ratiocinativo, quo cognoscit contingentia. Et hoc probat per hoc, quia <i>ad ea quae sunt genere altera, altera genere particula animae</i> ordinatur; contingens autem et necessarium sunt altera genere, sicut corruptibile et incorruptibile. Cum autem idem sit necessarium quod aeternum, et temporale idem quod contingens; videtur quod idem sit quod philosophus vocat scientificum, et superior pars rationis, quae secundum Augustinum intendit aeternis conspiciendis et consulendis; et quod idem sit quod philosophus vocat ratiocinativum vel opinativum, et inferior ratio, quae secundum Augustinum intendit temporalibus disponendis. Est ergo alia potentia animae ratio superior, et ratio inferior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision." Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 4"><a name="31789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31789] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod <i>ex imaginatione fit opinio; deinde mens, diiudicans opinionem sive vera sit sive falsa, diiudicat veritatem; unde et mens dicitur a metiendo. De quibus igitur iudicatum est iam et determinatum vere, dicitur intellectus</i>. Sic igitur opinativum, quod est ratio inferior, est aliud a mente et intellectu, per quod potest intelligi ratio superior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they are not two powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 s. c."><a name="31790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31790] Iª q. 79 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod ratio superior et inferior non nisi per officia distinguuntur. Non ergo sunt duae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A9-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two---namely, eternal and temporal ---are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made": while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things. </p><p id="FP_Q79_A9-p8"> But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science---for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 co."><a name="31791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31791] Iª q. 79 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ratio superior et inferior, secundum quod ab Augustino accipiuntur, nullo modo duae potentiae animae esse possunt. Dicit enim quod ratio superior est quae intendit aeternis conspiciendis aut consulendis, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod ea in seipsis speculatur; consulendis vero, secundum quod ex eis accipit regulas agendorum. Ratio vero inferior ab ipso dicitur, quae intendit temporalibus rebus. Haec autem duo, scilicet temporalia et aeterna, comparantur ad cognitionem nostram hoc modo, quod unum eorum est medium ad cognoscendum alterum. Nam secundum viam inventionis, per res temporales in cognitionem devenimus aeternorum, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>, in via vero iudicii, per aeterna iam cognita de temporalibus iudicamus, et secundum rationes aeternorum temporalia disponimus. Potest autem contingere quod medium, et id ad quod per medium pervenitur, ad diversos habitus pertineant, sicut principia prima indemonstrabilia pertinent ad habitum intellectus, conclusiones vero ex his deductae ad habitum scientiae. Et ideo ex principiis geometriae contingit aliquid concludere in alia scientia, puta in perspectiva. Sed eadem potentia rationis est, ad quam pertinet et medium et ultimum. Est enim actus rationis quasi quidam motus de uno in aliud perveniens, idem autem est mobile quod pertransiens medium pertingit ad terminum. Unde una et eadem potentia rationis est ratio superior et inferior. Sed distinguuntur, secundum Augustinum, per officia actuum, et secundum diversos habitus, nam superiori rationi attribuitur sapientia, inferiori vero scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="31792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31792] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum quamcumque rationem partitionis potest pars dici. Inquantum ergo ratio dividitur secundum diversa officia, ratio superior et inferior partitiones dicuntur, et non quia sunt diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="31793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31793] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio inferior dicitur a superiori deduci, vel ab ea regulari, inquantum principia quibus utitur inferior ratio, deducuntur et diriguntur a principiis superioris rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect---namely, under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul---namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="31794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31794] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod scientificum de quo philosophus loquitur non est idem quod ratio superior, nam necessaria scibilia inveniuntur etiam in rebus temporalibus, de quibus est scientia naturalis et mathematica. Opinativum autem et ratiocinativum in minus est quam ratio inferior, quia est contingentium tantum. Nec tamen est simpliciter dicendum quod sit alia potentia qua intellectus cognoscit necessaria, et alia qua cognoscit contingentia, quia utraque cognoscit secundum eandem rationem obiecti, scilicet secundum rationem entis et veri. Unde et necessaria, quae habent perfectum esse in veritate, perfecte cognoscit; utpote ad eorum quidditatem pertingens, per quam propria accidentia de his demonstrat. Contingentia vero imperfecte cognoscit; sicut et habent imperfectum esse et veritatem. Perfectum autem et imperfectum in actu non diversificant potentiam; sed diversificant actus quantum ad modum agendi, et per consequens principia actuum et ipsos habitus. Et ideo philosophus posuit duas particulas animae, scientificum et ratiocinativum, non quia sunt duae potentiae; sed quia distinguuntur secundum diversam aptitudinem ad recipiendum diversos habitus, quorum diversitatem ibi inquirere intendit. Contingentia enim et necessaria, etsi differant secundum propria genera, conveniunt tamen in communi ratione entis, quam respicit intellectus, ad quam diversimode se habent secundum perfectum et imperfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For "opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or "measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 4"><a name="31795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31795] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod illa distinctio Damasceni est secundum diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Opinio enim significat actum intellectus qui fertur in unam partem contradictionis cum formidine alterius. Diiudicare vero, vel mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad examinationem propositorum. Et ex hoc sumitur nomen mentis. Intelligere autem est cum quadam approbatione diiudicatis inhaerere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A10-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 10. Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="31796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31796] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia ab intellectu. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod <i>cum ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, postea intellectus, et postea intelligentia</i>. Sed imaginatio et sensus sunt diversae potentiae. Ergo et intellectus et intelligentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="31797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31797] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in V de Consol., quod <i>ipsum hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia intuetur</i>. Sed intellectus est eadem potentia cum ratione. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia quam intellectus; sicut ratio est alia potentia quam imaginatio et sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="31798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31798] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, actus sunt praevii potentiis, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed intelligentia est quidam actus ab aliis actibus qui attribuuntur intellectui divisus. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>primus motus intelligentia dicitur; quae vero circa aliquid est intelligentia, intentio vocatur; quae permanens et figurans animam ad id quod intelligitur, excogitatio dicitur; excogitatio vero in eodem manens, et seipsam examinans et diiudicans, phronesis dicitur</i> (idest sapientia); <i>phronesis autem dilatata facit cogitationem, idest interius dispositum sermonem; ex quo aiunt provenire sermonem per linguam enarratum</i>. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit quaedam specialis potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that "intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false." But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 s. c."><a name="31799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31799] Iª q. 79 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>intelligentia indivisibilium est, in quibus non est falsum</i>. Sed huiusmodi cognoscere pertinet ad intellectum. Ergo intelligentia non est alia potentia praeter intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> This word "intelligence" properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds." Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects---namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 co."><a name="31800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31800] Iª q. 79 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen intelligentia proprie significat ipsum actum intellectus qui est intelligere. In quibusdam tamen libris de Arabico translatis, substantiae separatae quas nos Angelos dicimus, intelligentiae vocantur; forte propter hoc, quod huiusmodi substantiae semper actu intelligunt. In libris tamen de Graeco translatis, dicuntur intellectus seu mentes. Sic ergo intelligentia ab intellectu non distinguitur sicut potentia a potentia; sed sicut actus a potentia. Invenitur enim talis divisio etiam a philosophis. Quandoque enim ponunt quatuor intellectus, scilicet intellectum agentem, possibilem, et in habitu, et adeptum. Quorum quatuor intellectus agens et possibilis sunt diversae potentiae; sicut et in omnibus est alia potentia activa, et alia passiva. Alia vero tria distinguuntur secundum tres status intellectus possibilis, qui quandoque est in potentia tantum, et sic dicitur possibilis; quandoque autem in actu primo, qui est scientia, et sic dicitur intellectus in habitu; quandoque autem in actu secundo, qui est considerare, et sic dicitur intellectus in actu, sive intellectus adeptus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act against power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="31801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31801] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si recipi debet illa auctoritas, intelligentia ponitur pro actu intellectus. Et sic dividitur contra intellectum, sicut actus contra potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="31802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31802] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Boetius accipit intelligentiam pro actu intellectus qui transcendit actum rationis. Unde ibidem dicit quod <i>ratio tantum humani generis est, sicut intelligentia sola divini</i>, proprium enim Dei est quod absque omni investigatione omnia intelligat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power---namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence." Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention." When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech." For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A10-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="31803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31803] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes illi actus quos Damascenus enumerat, sunt unius potentiae, scilicet intellectivae. Quae primo quidem simpliciter aliquid apprehendit, et hic actus dicitur intelligentia. Secundo vero, id quod apprehendit, ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum vel operandum, et hic vocatur intentio. Dum vero persistit in inquisitione illius quod intendit, vocatur excogitatio. Dum vero id quod est excogitatum examinat ad aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel sapere; quod est phronesis, vel sapientiae, nam sapientiae est iudicare, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Ex quo autem habet aliquid pro certo, quasi examinatum, cogitat quomodo possit illud aliis manifestare, et haec est dispositio interioris sermonis; ex qua procedit exterior locutio. Non enim omnis differentia actuum potentias diversificat; sed solum illa quae non potest reduci in idem principium, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A11-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 11. Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="31804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31804] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus speculativus et practicus sint diversae potentiae. Apprehensivum enim et motivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum, ut patet in II de anima. Sed intellectus speculativus est apprehensivus tantum, intellectus autem practicus est motivus. Ergo sunt diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="31805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31805] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, diversa ratio obiecti diversificat potentiam. Sed obiectum speculativi intellectus est verum, practici autem bonum; quae differunt ratione. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus sunt diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A11-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="31806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31806] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in parte intellectiva intellectus practicus comparatur ad speculativum, sicut aestimativa ad imaginativam in parte sensitiva. Sed aestimativa differt ab imaginativa sicut potentia a potentia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et intellectus practicus a speculativo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 s. c."><a name="31807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31807] Iª q. 79 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical---i.e. operative. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 co."><a name="31808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31808] Iª q. 79 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae potentiae. Cuius ratio est quia, ut supra dictum est, id quod accidentaliter se habet ad obiecti rationem quam respicit aliqua potentia, non diversificat potentiam, accidit enim colorato quod sit homo, aut magnum aut parvum; unde omnia huiusmodi eadem visiva potentia apprehenduntur. Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus. Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem, practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod <i>speculativus differt a practico, fine</i>. Unde et a fine denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, idest operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="31809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31809] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum suae apprehensionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="31810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31810] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod verum et bonum se invicem includunt, nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur obiectum appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni, sicut cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere; ita obiectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut et speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (A[7] , ad 2; <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A11-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>, ad 4). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="31811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31811] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod multae differentiae diversificant sensitivas potentias, quae non diversificant potentias intellectivas, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A12-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 12. Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A12-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:6, </a> "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore "synderesis" is a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="31812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31812] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod synderesis sit quaedam specialis potentia ab aliis distincta. Ea enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed in Glossa Hieronymi Ezech. I, dividitur synderesis contra irascibilem et concupiscibilem et rationalem; quae sunt quaedam potentiae. Ergo synderesis est quaedam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But "synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because "synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that 'synderesis' is a power just as sensuality is. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="31813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31813] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, opposita sunt unius generis. Sed synderesis et sensualitas opponi videntur, quia synderesis semper inclinat ad bonum, sensualitas autem semper ad malum; unde per serpentem significatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII de Trin. Videtur ergo quod synderesis sit potentia, sicut et sensualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is the same as reason: and thus it is a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="31814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31814] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod in naturali iudicatorio adsunt quaedam <i>regulae et semina virtutum et vera et incommutabilia</i>, haec autem dicimus synderesim. Cum ergo regulae incommutabiles quibus iudicamus, pertineant ad rationem secundum sui superiorem partem, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin.; videtur quod synderesis sit idem quod ratio. Et ita est quaedam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), "rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 s. c."><a name="31815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31815] Iª q. 79 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> <i>Sed contra, potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita</i>, secundum philosophum. Synderesis autem non se habet ad opposita, sed ad bonum tantum inclinat. Ergo synderesis non est potentia. Si enim esset potentia, oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia, non enim invenitur in brutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q[73]] said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q79_A12-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things---namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle---and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call "synderesis." Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 co."><a name="31816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31816] Iª q. 79 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus, licet quidam posuerint synderesim esse quandam potentiam ratione altiorem; quidam vero dixerint eam esse ipsam rationem, non ut est ratio, sed ut est natura. Ad huius autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili, et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando invenimus. Constat autem quod, sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus. Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita, sicut principia speculabilium, ita et principia operabilium. Prima autem principia speculabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad aliquam specialem potentiam; sed ad quendam specialem habitum, qui dicitur intellectus principiorum, ut patet in VI Ethic. Unde et principia operabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad specialem potentiam; sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus synderesim. Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et iudicamus inventa. Patet ergo quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to one power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="31817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31817] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa divisio Hieronymi attenditur secundum diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Diversi autem actus possunt esse unius potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to "syneresis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="31818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31818] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod similiter oppositio sensualitatis et synderesis attenditur secundum oppositionem actuum; non sicut diversarum specierum unius generis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="31819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31819] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi incommutabiles rationes sunt prima principia operabilium, circa quae non contingit errare; et attribuuntur rationi sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui. Unde et utroque, scilicet ratione et synderesi, naturaliter iudicamus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A13-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 13. Whether conscience be a power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says [*Commentary on <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.15" target="asv"> Rom. 2:15</a>] that "conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a power---either the mind itself, according to the text ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.13" target="asv">Eph. 4:13</a>), "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"---or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="31820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31820] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertiumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conscientia sit quaedam potentia. Dicit enim Origenes quod <i>conscientia est spiritus corrector et paedagogus animae sociatus, quo separatur a malis et adhaeret bonis</i>. Sed spiritus in anima nominat potentiam aliquam, vel ipsam mentem, secundum illud Ephes. IV, <i>renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae</i>; vel ipsam imaginationem; unde et imaginaria visio spiritualis vocatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Est ergo conscientia quaedam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that "their mind and conscience are defiled" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.15" target="asv">Titus 1:15</a>). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="31821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31821] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil est peccati subiectum nisi potentia animae. Sed conscientia est subiectum peccati, dicitur enim ad Tit. I, de quibusdam, quod <i>inquinatae sunt eorum mens et conscientia</i>. Ergo videtur quod conscientia sit potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="31822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31822] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, necesse est quod conscientia sit vel actus, vel habitus, vel potentia. Sed non est actus, quia non semper maneret in homine. Nec est habitus, non enim esset unum quid conscientia, sed multa; per multos enim habitus cognoscitivos dirigimur in agendis. Ergo conscientia est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 s. c."><a name="31823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31823] Iª q. 79 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia. Ergo conscientia non est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A13-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. </p><p id="FP_Q79_A13-p7"> The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.23" target="asv">Eccles. 7:23</a>), and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit---namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls 'synderesis' conscience (Gloss. <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:6</a>); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22] says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 co."><a name="31824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31824] Iª q. 79 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod conscientia, proprie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus. Et hoc patet tum ex ratione nominis, tum etiam ex his quae secundum communem usum loquendi, conscientiae attribuuntur. Conscientia enim, secundum proprietatem vocabuli, importat ordinem scientiae ad aliquid, nam conscientia dicitur cum alio scientia. Applicatio autem scientiae ad aliquid fit per aliquem actum. Unde ex ista ratione nominis patet quod conscientia sit actus. Idem autem apparet ex his quae conscientiae attribuuntur. Dicitur enim conscientia testificari, ligare vel instigare, et etiam accusare vel remordere sive reprehendere. Et haec omnia consequuntur applicationem alicuius nostrae cognitionis vel scientiae ad ea quae agimus. Quae quidem applicatio fit tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod recognoscimus aliquid nos fecisse vel non fecisse, secundum illud Eccle. VII, <i>scit conscientia tua te crebro maledixisse aliis</i>, et secundum hoc, conscientia dicitur testificari. Alio modo applicatur secundum quod per nostram conscientiam iudicamus aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum, et secundum hoc, dicitur conscientia instigare vel ligare. Tertio modo applicatur secundum quod per conscientiam iudicamus quod aliquid quod est factum, sit bene factum vel non bene factum, et secundum hoc, conscientia dicitur excusare vel accusare, seu remordere. Patet autem quod omnia haec consequuntur actualem applicationem scientiae ad ea quae agimus. Unde proprie loquendo, conscientia nominat actum. Quia tamen habitus est principium actus, quandoque nomen conscientiae attribuitur primo habitui naturali, scilicet synderesi, sicut Hieronymus, in Glossa Ezech. I, synderesim conscientiam nominat; et Basilius naturale iudicatorium; et Damascenus dicit quod est lex intellectus nostri. Consuetum enim est quod causae et effectus per invicem nominentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="31825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31825] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod conscientia dicitur spiritus, secundum quod spiritus pro mente ponitur, quia est quoddam mentis dictamen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is defiled. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="31826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31826] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod inquinatio dicitur esse in conscientia, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut cognitum in cognitione, inquantum scilicet aliquis scit se esse inquinatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="31827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31827] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod actus, etsi non semper maneat in se, semper tamen manet in sua causa, quae est potentia et habitus. Habitus autem ex quibus conscientia informatur, etsi multi sint, omnes tamen efficaciam habent ab uno primo, scilicet ab habitu primorum principiorum, qui dicitur synderesis. Unde specialiter hic habitus interdum conscientia nominatur, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q80" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q80-p0.1">Q. 80. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q80-p2"> Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry: </p><p id="FP_Q80-p3"><a href="#FP_Q80_A1"> (1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q80-p4"><a href="#FP_Q80_A2"> (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 pr."><a name="31828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31828] Iª q. 80 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de potentiis appetitivis. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de appetitivo in communi; secundo, de sensualitate; tertio, de voluntate; quarto, de libero arbitrio. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum debeat poni appetitus aliqua specialis potentia animae. Secundo, utrum appetitus dividatur in appetitum sensitivum et intellectivum, sicut in potentias diversas.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q80_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q80_A1-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 1. Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31829] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus non sit aliqua specialis animae potentia. Ad ea enim quae sunt communia animatis et inanimatis, non est aliqua potentia animae assignanda. Sed appetere est commune animatis et inanimatis quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo appetitus non est specialis potentia animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31830] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, potentiae distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed idem est quod cognoscimus et appetimus. Ergo vim appetitivam non oportet esse aliam praeter vim apprehensivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing---namely its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31831] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, commune non distinguitur contra proprium. Sed quaelibet potentia animae appetit quoddam particulare appetibile, scilicet obiectum sibi conveniens. Ergo respectu huius obiecti quod est appetibile in communi, non oportet accipi aliquam potentiam ab aliis distinctam, quae appetitiva dicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31832] Iª q. 80 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II de anima, distinguit appetitivum ab aliis potentiis. Damascenus etiam, in II libro distinguit vires appetitivas a cognitivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q80_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being---that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). </p><p id="FP_Q80_A1-p7"> Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 co."><a name="31833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31833] Iª q. 80 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio, sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur. In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum, sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant, in quo omnia praeexistunt, sicut Dionysius dicit. Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31834] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetere invenitur in habentibus cognitionem, supra modum communem quo invenitur in omnibus, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportet ad hoc determinari aliquam potentiam animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31835] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in obiectis requiritur ad diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31836] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu. Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q81" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q81-p0.1">Q. 81. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q81-p2"> Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q81-p3"><a href="#FP_Q81_A1"> (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q81-p4"><a href="#FP_Q81_A2"> (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q81-p5"><a href="#FP_Q81_A3"> (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 pr."><a name="31845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31845] Iª q. 81 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de sensualitate. Circa quam quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum sensualitas sit vis appetitiva tantum. Secundo, utrum dividatur sensualitas in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in diversas potentias. Tertio, utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediant rationi.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q81_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A1-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 1. Whether sensuality is only appetitive?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31846] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sensualitas non solum sit appetitiva, sed etiam cognitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod <i>sensualis animae motus, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, nobis pecoribusque communis est</i>. Sed corporis sensus sub vi cognitiva continentur. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31847] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quae cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed Augustinus, in XII de Trin., dividit sensualitatem contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem; quae ad cognitionem pertinent. Ergo sensualitas etiam est vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31848] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sensualitas in tentatione hominis tenet locum serpentis. Sed serpens in tentatione primorum parentum se habuit ut nuntians et proponens peccatum; quod est vis cognitivae. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31849] Iª q. 81 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod sensualitas definitur esse <i>appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 co."><a name="31850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31850] Iª q. 81 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo Augustinus loquitur XII de Trin., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen potentiae, ut a visione visus. Motus autem sensualis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus, nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem. Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti, operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui. Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31851] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per hoc quod dicit Augustinus quod sensualis animae motus intenditur in corporis sensus, non datur intelligi quod corporis sensus sub sensualitate comprehendantur, sed magis quod motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corporis, dum scilicet appetimus ea quae per corporis sensus apprehenduntur. Et sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi praeambuli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31852] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod sensualitas dividitur contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem, inquantum communicant in actu motionis, vis enim cognitiva, ad quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva, sicut et appetitiva, ad quam pertinet sensualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31853] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod serpens non solum ostendit et proposuit peccatum, sed etiam, inclinavit in effectum peccati. Et quantum ad hoc, sensualitas per serpentem significatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q81_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A2-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 2. Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31854] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus sensitivus non distinguatur in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in potentias diversas. Eadem enim potentia animae est unius contrarietatis, ut visus albi et nigri, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed conveniens et nocivum sunt contraria. Cum ergo concupiscibilis respiciat conveniens, irascibilis vero nocivum, videtur quod eadem potentia animae sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31855] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, appetitus sensitivus non est nisi convenientium secundum sensum. Sed conveniens secundum sensum est obiectum concupiscibilis. Ergo nullus appetitus sensitivus est a concupiscibili differens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv">Mat. 13:33</a>: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31856] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, odium est in irascibili, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Matth., <i>possideamus in irascibili odium vitiorum</i>. Sed odium, cum contrarietur amori, est in concupiscibili. Ergo eadem vis est concupiscibilis et irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31857] Iª q. 81 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt duas vires, irascibilem et concupiscibilem, partes appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite---the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers---one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible---namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.]. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 co."><a name="31858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31858] Iª q. 81 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerari oportet quod in rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus, non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad consequendum convenientia et refugiendum nociva; sed etiam ad resistendum corrumpentibus et contrariis, quae convenientibus impedimentum praebent et ingerunt nocumenta. Sicut ignis habet naturalem inclinationem non solum ut recedat ab inferiori loco, qui sibi non convenit, et tendat in locum superiorem sibi convenientem; sed etiam quod resistat corrumpentibus et impedientibus. Quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem; necesse est quod in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. Unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est arduum, quia scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis. Hae autem duae inclinationes non reducuntur in unum principium, quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit, contra inclinationem concupiscibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet contraria. Unde etiam passiones irascibilis repugnare videntur passionibus concupiscibilis, nam concupiscentia accensa minuit iram, et ira accensa minuit concupiscentiam, ut in pluribus. Patet etiam ex hoc, quod irascibilis est quasi propugnatrix et defensatrix concupiscibilis, dum insurgit contra ea quae impediunt convenientia, quae concupiscibilis appetit, et ingerunt nociva, quae concupiscibilis refugit. Et propter hoc, omnes passiones irascibilis incipiunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in eas terminantur; sicut ira nascitur ex illata tristitia, et vindictam inferens, in laetitiam terminatur. Propter hoc etiam pugnae animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis, ut dicitur in VIII de animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31859] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vis concupiscibilis est et convenientis et inconvenientis. Sed irascibilis est ad resistendum inconvenienti quod impugnat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A2" id="FP_Q81_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[2]</a>); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31860] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quae est perceptiva eorum quae sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in appetitu sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali ad suam defensionem. Et haec est vis irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31861] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod odium simpliciter pertinet ad concupiscibilem; sed ratione impugnationis quae ex odio causatur, potest ad irascibilem pertinere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q81_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A3-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 3. Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31862] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediant rationi. Irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis sunt partes sensualitatis. Sed sensualitas non obedit rationi, unde per serpentem significatur, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Trin. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q81_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31863] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod obedit alicui, non repugnat ei. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis repugnant rationi; secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31864] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut rationali parte animae inferior est vis appetitiva, ita etiam et vis sensitiva. Sed sensitiva pars animae non obedit rationi, non enim audimus nec videmus quando volumus. Ergo similiter neque vires sensitivi appetitus, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31865] Iª q. 81 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>obediens et persuasibile rationi dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q81_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited. </p><p id="FP_Q81_A3-p7"> To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 co."><a name="31866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31866] Iª q. 81 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt superiori parti, in qua est intellectus sive ratio et voluntas, dupliciter, uno modo quidem, quantum ad rationem; alio vero modo, quantum ad voluntatem. Rationi quidem obediunt quantum ad ipsos suos actus. Cuius ratio est, quia appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timet. Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem universalem, unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit. Et quia deducere universalia principia in conclusiones singulares, non est opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis; ideo irascibilis et concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire rationi, quam intellectui. Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam instigatur. Voluntati etiam subiacet appetitus sensitivus, quantum ad executionem, quae fit per vim motivam. In aliis enim animalibus statim ad appetitum concupiscibilis et irascibilis sequitur motus sicut ovis, timens lupum statim fugit, quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus qui repugnet. Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, quod est appetitus superior. In omnibus enim potentiis motivis ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi virtute primi moventis, unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus superior consentiat. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem, sicut sphaera superior inferiorem</i>. Hoc ergo modo irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31867] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensualitas significatur per serpentem, quantum ad id quod est proprium sibi ex parte sensitivae partis. Irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis magis nominant sensitivum appetitum ex parte actus, ad quem inducuntur ex ratione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31868] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I politicorum, <i>est quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali</i>. Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis principatur servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent. Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio. Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis. Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, quam dirigit universalis ratio; sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non excluditur quin ei obediant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31869] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus exteriores indigent ad suos actus exterioribus sensibilibus, quibus immutentur, quorum praesentia non est in potestate rationis. Sed vires interiores, tam appetitivae quam apprehensivae, non indigent exterioribus rebus. Et ideo subduntur imperio rationis, quae potest non solum instigare vel mitigare affectus appetitivae virtutis, sed etiam formare imaginativae virtutis phantasmata.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q82" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q82-p0.1">Q. 82. OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q82-p2"> We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q82-p3"><a href="#FP_Q82_A1"> (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p4"><a href="#FP_Q82_A2"> (2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p5"><a href="#FP_Q82_A3"> (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p6"><a href="#FP_Q82_A4"> (4) Whether the will moves the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p7"><a href="#FP_Q82_A5"> (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 pr."><a name="31870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31870] Iª q. 82 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de voluntate. Circa quam quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum voluntas aliquid ex necessitate appetat. Secundo, utrum omnia ex necessitate appetat. Tertio, utrum sit eminentior potentia quam intellectus. Quarto, utrum voluntas moveat intellectum. Quinto, utrum voluntas distinguatur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q82_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A1-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 1. Whether the will desires something of necessity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31871] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas nihil ex necessitate appetat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid est necessarium, non est voluntarium. Sed omne quod voluntas appetit, est voluntarium. Ergo nihil quod voluntas appetit, est necessario desideratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31872] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, potestates rationales, secundum philosophum, se habent ad opposita. Sed voluntas est potestas rationalis, quia, ut dicitur in III de anima, voluntas in ratione est. Ergo voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ad nihil ergo de necessitate determinatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31873] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, secundum voluntatem sumus domini nostrorum actuum. Sed eius quod ex necessitate est, non sumus domini. Ergo actus voluntatis non potest de necessitate esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31874] Iª q. 82 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod <i>beatitudinem omnes una voluntate appetunt</i>. Si autem non esset necessarium sed contingens, deficeret ad minus in paucioribus. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate aliquid vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle---either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible---or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is "natural" and "absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity of coercion." </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p7"> Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary. </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p8"> But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship. </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p9"> In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 co."><a name="31875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31875] Iª q. 82 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necessitas dicitur multipliciter. Necesse est enim quod non potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit alicui, uno modo ex principio intrinseco, sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta. Alio modo convenit alicui quod non possit non esse, ex aliquo extrinseco, vel fine vel agente. Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem, ut cibus dicitur necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter. Et haec vocatur necessitas finis; quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis. Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat voluntati. Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid naturale quia est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossibile est quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale; ita impossibile est quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum sive violentum, et voluntarium. Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo, sicut ex voluntate transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem. Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo, finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum, quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away the liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31876] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum de necessario necessitate coactionis. Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis, ut ipsemet in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31877] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas secundum quod aliquid naturaliter vult, magis respondet intellectui naturalium principiorum, quam rationi, quae ad opposita se habet. Unde secundum hoc, magis est intellectualis quam rationalis potestas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31878] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A2-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 2. Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31879] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate omnia velit quaecumque vult. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV de Div. Nom., quod malum est praeter voluntatem. Ex necessitate ergo voluntas tendit in bonum sibi propositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31880] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, obiectum voluntatis comparatur ad ipsam sicut movens ad mobile. Sed motus mobilis necessario consequitur ex movente. Ergo videtur quod obiectum voluntatis ex necessitate moveat ipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31881] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut apprehensum secundum sensum est obiectum appetitus sensitivi, ita apprehensum secundum intellectum est obiectum intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed apprehensum secundum sensum ex necessitate movet appetitum sensitivum, dicit enim Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur visis. Ergo videtur quod apprehensum secundum intellectum ex necessitate moveat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31882] Iª q. 82 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, quod <i>voluntas est qua peccatur et recte vivitur</i>, et sic se habet ad opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 co."><a name="31883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31883] Iª q. 82 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod sicut intellectus naturaliter et ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ultimo fini, ut iam dictum est. Sunt autem quaedam intelligibilia quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad prima principia; sicut contingentes propositiones, ad quarum remotionem non sequitur remotio primorum principiorum. Et talibus non ex necessitate assentit intellectus. Quaedam autem propositiones sunt necessariae, quae habent connexionem necessariam cum primis principiis; sicut conclusiones demonstrabiles, ad quarum remotionem sequitur remotio primorum principiorum. Et his intellectus ex necessitate assentit, cognita connexione necessaria conclusionum ad principia per demonstrationis deductionem, non autem ex necessitate assentit antequam huiusmodi necessitatem connexionis per demonstrationem cognoscat. Similiter etiam est ex parte voluntatis. Sunt enim quaedam particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quia sine his potest aliquis esse beatus, et huiusmodi voluntas non de necessitate inhaeret. Sunt autem quaedam habentia necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quibus scilicet homo Deo inhaeret, in quo solo vera beatitudo consistit. Sed tamen antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas huiusmodi connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret, nec his quae Dei sunt. Sed voluntas videntis Deum per essentiam, de necessitate inhaeret Deo, sicut nunc ex necessitate volumus esse beati. Patet ergo quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31884] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas in nihil potest tendere nisi sub ratione boni. Sed quia bonum est multiplex, propter hoc non ex necessitate determinatur ad unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31885] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota eius possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiicitur eius possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex necessitate movetur ab illo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appetite---that is, the will---may be moved; but not of necessity from one thing. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31886] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est collativa plurium, et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A3-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 3. Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31887] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas sit altior potentia quam intellectus. Bonum enim et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed finis est prima et altissima causarum. Ergo voluntas est prima et altissima potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31888] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res naturales inveniuntur procedere de imperfectis ad perfecta. Et hoc etiam in potentiis animae apparet, proceditur enim de sensu ad intellectum, qui est nobilior. Sed naturalis processus est de actu intellectus in actum voluntatis. Ergo voluntas est perfectior et nobilior potentia quam intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will---namely, charity---is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>): "If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31889] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, habitus sunt proportionati potentiis, sicut perfectiones perfectibilibus. Sed habitus quo perficitur voluntas, scilicet caritas, est nobilior habitibus quibus perficitur intellectus, dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, <i>si noverim mysteria omnia, et si habuero omnem fidem, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil sum</i>. Ergo voluntas est altior potentia quam intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31890] Iª q. 82 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in X Ethic., ponit altissimam potentiam animae esse intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[1]</a>; <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27_A4" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a>), the action of the intellect consists in this---that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this---that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 co."><a name="31891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31891] Iª q. 82 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod eminentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale, secundum quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum. Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate. Secundum quid autem, et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas invenitur interdum altior intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re invenitur quam obiectum intellectus. Sicut si dicerem auditum esse secundum quid nobiliorem visu, inquantum res aliqua cuius est sonus, nobilior est aliqua re cuius est color, quamvis color sit nobilior et simplicior sono. Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis, sunt in rebus; verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sunt in mente. Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam; tunc etiam per comparationem ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio, e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31892] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio causae accipitur secundum comparationem unius ad alterum, et in tali comparatione ratio boni principalior invenitur, sed verum dicitur magis absolute, et ipsius boni rationem significat. Unde et bonum quoddam verum est. Sed rursus et ipsum verum est quoddam bonum; secundum quod intellectus res quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius. Et inter alios fines iste finis est excellentior; sicut intellectus inter alias potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31893] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est imperfectius, quia in uno et eodem potentia tempore praecedit actum, et imperfectio perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31894] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de voluntate secundum comparationem ad id quod supra animam est. Virtus enim caritatis est qua Deum amamus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A4-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 4. Whether the will moves the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q82_A3" id="FP_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31895] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat intellectum. Movens enim est nobilius et prius moto, quia movens est agens; agens autem est nobilius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt., et philosophus in III de anima. Sed intellectus est prior et nobilior voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas non movet intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31896] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, movens non movetur a moto, nisi forte per accidens. Sed intellectus movet voluntatem, quia appetibile apprehensum per intellectum est movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum. Ergo intellectus non movetur a voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31897] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nihil velle possumus nisi sit intellectum. Si igitur ad intelligendum movet voluntas volendo intelligere, oportebit quod etiam illud velle praecedat aliud intelligere, et illud intelligere aliud velle, et sic in infinitum, quod est impossibile. Non ergo voluntas movet intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31898] Iª q. 82 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>in nobis est percipere quamcumque volumus artem, et non percipere</i>. In nobis autem est aliquid per voluntatem; percipimus autem artes per intellectum. Voluntas ergo movet intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 co."><a name="31899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31899] Iª q. 82 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum finis; sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires; ut Anselmus dicit in libro de similitudinibus. Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. Caelum enim, quod agit ad universalem conservationem generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora corpora, quorum unumquodque agit ad conservationem propriae speciei, vel etiam individui. Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens; sicut visus ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object---that is to say, as appetitive of universal good---and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q82_A3" id="FP_Q82_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31900] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam res, et particularis potentia habens determinatum actum. Et similiter voluntas dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum communitatem sui obiecti, prout scilicet est appetitiva boni communis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam determinata animae potentia habens determinatum actum. Si ergo comparentur intellectus et voluntas secundum rationem communitatis obiectorum utriusque, sic dictum est supra quod intellectus est simpliciter altior et nobilior voluntate. Si autem consideretur intellectus secundum communitatem sui obiecti, et voluntas secundum quod est quaedam determinata potentia, sic iterum intellectus est altior et prior voluntate, quia sub ratione entis et veri, quam apprehendit intellectus, continetur voluntas ipsa, et actus eius, et obiectum ipsius. Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri. Si vero consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et potest ipsum movere. Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt, quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Et simili ratione bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam verum intellectum; et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est quoddam bonum desideratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31901] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus alio modo movet voluntatem, quam voluntas intellectum, ut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect ---namely, God---as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31902] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio, sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Eudemicae, et per hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A5-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 5. Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to desire], and the irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv">Wis. 6:21</a>): "The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv"> Mat. 13:33 </a>warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31903] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui debeant in appetitu superiori, qui est voluntas. Vis enim concupiscibilis dicitur a concupiscendo; et irascibilis ab irascendo. Sed aliqua concupiscentia est quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, sed solum ad intellectivum, qui est voluntas; sicut concupiscentia sapientiae, de qua dicitur Sap. VI, <i>concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum</i>. Est etiam quaedam ira quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, sed intellectivum tantum; sicut cum irascimur contra vitia. Unde et Hieronymus, super Matth., monet ut <i>odium vitiorum possideamus in irascibili</i>. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui debent in appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intellectual part. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31904] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, secundum quod communiter dicitur, caritas est in concupiscibili, spes autem in irascibili. Non autem possunt esse in appetitu sensitivo, quia non sunt sensibilium obiectorum, sed intelligibilium. Ergo concupiscibilis et irascibilis sunt ponenda in parte intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul has these powers"---namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational---"before it is united to the body." But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A5" id="FP_Q82_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[78], AA[5]</a>,8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31905] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in libro de spiritu et anima dicitur quod has potentias (scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et rationalem) <i>habet anima antequam corpori misceatur</i>. Sed nulla potentia sensitivae partis est animae tantum, sed coniuncti, ut supra dictum est. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt in voluntate, quae est appetitus intellectivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31906] Iª q. 82 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus, dicit, quod irrationalis pars animae dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum; et idem dicit Damascenus, in libro II. Et philosophus dicit, in III de anima quod <i>voluntas in ratione est, in irrationali autem parte animae concupiscentia et ira, vel desiderium et animus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said above ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A4" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>; <a href="#FP_Q79_A7" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[7]</a>), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 co."><a name="31907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31907] Iª q. 82 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa ratione communi contentas. Sicut quia visus respicit visibile secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum est nigrum. Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p7"> Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31908] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31909] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis. Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus. Sic etiam potest intelligi quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt animae antequam uniatur corpori (ut tamen intelligatur ordo naturae, et non temporis), licet non sit necessarium verbis illius libri fidem adhibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection is clear. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31910] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q83" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q83-p0.1">Q. 83. OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q83-p2"> We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q83-p3"><a href="#FP_Q83_A1"> (1) Whether man has free-will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p4"><a href="#FP_Q83_A2"> (2) What is free-will---a power, an act, or a habit?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p5"><a href="#FP_Q83_A3"> (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p6"><a href="#FP_Q83_A4"> (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 pr."><a name="31911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31911] Iª q. 83 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de libero arbitrio. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo sit liberi arbitrii. Secundo, quid sit liberum arbitrium, utrum sit potentia, vel actus, vel habitus. Tertio si est potentia, utrum sit appetitiva, vel cognitiva. Quarto, si est appetitiva, utrum sit eadem potentia cum voluntate, vel alia.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q83_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A1-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 1. Whether man has free-will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31912] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit liberi arbitrii. Quicumque enim est liberi arbitrii, facit quod vult. Sed homo non facit quod vult, dicitur enim Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio</i>. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv">Rom. 9:16</a>): "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31913] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque est liberi arbitrii, eius est velle et non velle, operari et non operari. Sed hoc non est hominis, dicitur enim ad Rom. IX, non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv">Prov. 21:1</a>): "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it" and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31914] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, liberum est quod sui causa est</i>, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Quod ergo movetur ab alio, non est liberum. Sed Deus movet voluntatem, dicitur enim Prov. XXI, <i>cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud</i>; et Philipp. II, <i>Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere</i>. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.23" target="asv">Jer. 10:23</a>): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk." Therefore man has not free-will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31915] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque est liberi arbitrii, est dominus suorum actuum. Sed homo non est dominus suorum actuum, quia, ut dicitur Ierem. X, <i>non est in homine via eius, nec viri est ut dirigat gressus suos</i>. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31916] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., <i>qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei</i>. Sed non est in potestate nostra aliquales esse, sed hoc nobis est a natura. Ergo naturale est nobis quod aliquem finem sequamur. Non ergo ex libero arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss adds: "That is of his free-will." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31917] Iª q. 83 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Glossa, idest in libertate arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 co."><a name="31918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31918] Iª q. 83 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quaedam agunt absque iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia. Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut animalia bruta. Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero, quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes---namely, "not to desire against reason," as Augustine says. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31919] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus, etsi obediat rationi, tamen potest in aliquo repugnare, concupiscendo contra illud quod ratio dictat. Hoc ergo est bonum quod homo non facit cum vult, scilicet non concupiscere contra rationem, ut Glossa Augustini ibidem dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31920] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud apostoli non sic est intelligendum quasi homo non velit et non currat libero arbitrio, sed quia liberum arbitrium ad hoc non est sufficiens, nisi moveatur et iuvetur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31921] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31922] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod dicitur non esse in homine via eius, quantum ad executiones electionum, in quibus homo impediri potest, velit nolit. Electiones autem ipsae sunt in nobis, supposito tamen divino auxilio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q83_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q83_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[82], AA[1]</a>,2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said ( <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q83_A1-p13.2" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will. </p><p id="FP_Q83_A1-p14"> The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31923] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod qualitas hominis est duplex, una naturalis, et alia superveniens. Naturalis autem qualitas accipi potest vel circa partem intellectivam; vel circa corpus et virtutes corpori annexas. Ex eo igitur quod homo est aliqualis qualitate naturali quae attenditur secundum intellectivam partem, naturaliter homo appetit ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem. Qui quidem appetitus naturalis est, et non subiacet libero arbitrio, ut ex supradictis patet. Ex parte vero corporis et virtutum corpori annexarum, potest esse homo aliqualis naturali qualitate, secundum quod est talis complexionis, vel talis dispositionis, ex quacumque impressione corporearum causarum, quae non possunt in intellectivam partem imprimere, eo quod non est alicuius corporis actus. Sic igitur qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem, talis finis videtur ei, quia ex huiusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid vel repudiandum. Sed istae inclinationes subiacent iudicio rationis, cui obedit inferior appetitus, ut dictum est. Unde per hoc libertati arbitrii non praeiudicatur. Qualitates autem supervenientes sunt sicut habitus et passiones, secundum quae aliquis magis inclinatur in unum quam in alterum. Tamen istae etiam inclinationes subiacent iudicio rationis. Et huiusmodi etiam qualitates ei subiacent, inquantum in nobis est tales qualitates acquirere, vel causaliter vel dispositive, vel a nobis excludere. Et sic nihil est quod libertati arbitrii repugnet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A2-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 2. Whether free-will is a power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31924] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia. Arbitrium enim liberum nihil est aliud quam liberum iudicium. Iudicium autem non nominat potentiam, sed actum. Ergo liberum arbitrium non est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31925] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, liberum arbitrium dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis. Facultas autem nominat facilitatem potestatis, quae quidem est per habitum. Ergo liberum arbitrium est habitus. Bernardus etiam dicit quod liberum arbitrium est habitus animae liber sui. Non ergo est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is not a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31926] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulla potentia naturalis tollitur per peccatum. Sed liberum arbitrium tollitur per peccatum, Augustinus enim dicit quod <i>homo male utens libero arbitrio, et se perdit et ipsum</i>. Ergo liberum arbitrium non est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31927] Iª q. 83 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod nihil est subiectum habitus, ut videtur, nisi potentia. Sed liberum arbitrium est subiectum gratiae; qua sibi assistente, bonum eligit. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q83_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium---i.e. free judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits---for instance, to assent to first principles: while those things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness ( <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[82], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit. </p><p id="FP_Q83_A2-p7"> Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 co."><a name="31928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31928] Iª q. 83 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, quamvis liberum arbitrium nominet quendam actum secundum propriam significationem vocabuli; secundum tamen communem usum loquendi, liberum arbitrium dicimus id quod est huius actus principium, scilicet quo homo libere iudicat. Principium autem actus in nobis est et potentia et habitus, dicimur enim aliquid cognoscere et per scientiam, et per intellectivam potentiam. Oportet ergo quod liberum arbitrium vel sit potentia, vel sit habitus, vel sit potentia cum aliquo habitu. Quod autem non sit habitus, neque potentia cum habitu, manifeste apparet ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia si est habitus, oportet quod sit habitus naturalis, hoc enim est naturale homini, quod sit liberi arbitrii. Nullus autem habitus naturalis adest nobis ad ea quae subsunt libero arbitrio, quia ad ea respectu quorum habemus habitus naturales, naturaliter inclinamur, sicut ad assentiendum primis principiis; ea autem ad quae naturaliter inclinamur, non subsunt libero arbitrio, sicut dictum est de appetitu beatitudinis. Unde contra propriam rationem liberi arbitrii est, quod sit habitus naturalis. Contra naturalitatem autem eius est, quod sit habitus non naturalis. Et sic relinquitur quod nullo modo sit habitus. Secundo hoc apparet, quia habitus dicuntur secundum quos <i>nos habemus ad passiones vel ad actus bene vel male</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic., nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad concupiscentias, per intemperantiam autem male; per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum intellectus, dum verum cognoscimus per habitum autem contrarium male. Liberum autem arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male. Unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus. Relinquitur ergo quod sit potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31929] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consuetum est potentiam significari nomine actus. Et sic per hunc actum qui est liberum iudicium, nominatur potentia quae est huius actus principium. Alioquin, si liberum arbitrium nominaret actum, non semper maneret in homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31930] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod facultas nominat quandoque potestatem expeditam ad operandum. Et sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii. Bernardus autem accipit habitum non secundum quod dividitur contra potentiam, sed secundum quod significat habitudinem quandam, qua aliquo modo se aliquis habet ad actum. Quod quidem est tam per potentiam quam per habitum, nam per potentiam homo se habet ut potens operari, per habitum autem ut aptus ad operandum bene vel male.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work (FS, Q[85], seqq.; <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109" id="FP_Q83_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[109])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31931] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod homo peccando liberum arbitrium dicitur perdidisse, non quantum ad libertatem naturalem, quae est a coactione; sed quantum ad libertatem quae est a culpa et a miseria. De qua infra in tractatu moralium dicetur, in secunda parte huius operis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A3-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 3. Whether free-will is an appetitive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that "free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31932] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia appetitiva, sed cognitiva. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>cum rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium</i>. Sed ratio est potentia cognitiva. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31933] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, liberum arbitrium dicitur quasi liberum iudicium. Sed iudicare est actus cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est cognitiva potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31934] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad liberum arbitrium praecipue pertinet electio. Sed electio videtur ad cognitionem pertinere, quia electio importat quandam comparationem unius ad alterum, quod est proprium cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31935] Iª q. 83 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio est desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis</i>. Sed desiderium est actus appetitivae virtutis. Ergo et electio. Liberum autem arbitrium est secundum quod eligimus. Ergo liberum arbitrium est virtus appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 co."><a name="31936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31936] Iª q. 83 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod proprium liberi arbitrii est electio, ex hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione considerare oportet. Ad electionem autem concurrit aliquid ex parte cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae, ex parte quidem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur quod appetendo acceptetur id quod per consilium diiudicatur. Et ideo Aristoteles in VI Ethic. sub dubio derelinquit utrum principalius pertineat electio ad vim appetitivam, vel ad vim cognitivam, dicit enim quod electio vel est intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus. Sed in III Ethic. in hoc magis declinat quod sit appetitus intellectivus, nominans electionem desiderium consiliabile. Et huius ratio est, quia proprium obiectum electionis est illud quod est ad finem, hoc autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni quod dicitur utile, unde cum bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum appetitus, sequitur quod electio sit principaliter actus appetitivae virtutis. Et sic liberum arbitrium est appetitiva potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31937] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentiae appetitivae concomitantur apprehensivas. Et secundum hoc dicit Damascenus quod <i>cum rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31938] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio consilii. Determinatur autem consilium, primo quidem per sententiam rationis, et secundo per acceptationem appetitus, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>ex consiliari iudicantes desideramus secundum consilium</i>. Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam iudicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31939] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ista collatio quae importatur in nomine electionis, pertinet ad consilium praecedens, quod est rationis. Appetitus enim, quamvis non sit collativus, tamen inquantum a vi cognitiva conferente movetur, habet quandam collationis similitudinem, dum unum alteri praeoptat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A4-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 4. Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} is one thing and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while {boulesis} seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31940] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate. Dicit enim Damascenus, in libro II, quod aliud est thelesis, aliud vero bulesis, thelesis autem est voluntas; bulesis autem videtur arbitrium liberum, quia bulesis, secundum ipsum, est voluntas quae est circa aliquid quasi unius per comparationem ad alterum. Ergo videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because "the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31941] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed electio, quae est actus liberi arbitrii, est aliud a voluntate, ut dicitur in III Ethic., <i>quia voluntas est de fine, electio autem de iis quae sunt ad finem</i>. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia a voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers---the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31942] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, voluntas est appetitus intellectivus. Sed ex parte intellectus sunt duae potentiae, scilicet agens et possibilis. Ergo etiam ex parte appetitus intellectivi debet esse alia potentia praeter voluntatem. Et haec non videtur esse nisi liberum arbitrium. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia praeter voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31943] Iª q. 83 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod liberum arbitrium nihil aliud est quam voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q64_A2" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[64], A[2]</a>). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of "understanding" implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[8]</a>) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 co."><a name="31944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31944] Iª q. 83 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod potentias appetitivas oportet esse proportionatas potentiis apprehensivis, ut supra dictum est. Sicut autem ex parte apprehensionis intellectivae se habent intellectus et ratio, ita ex parte appetitus intellectivi se habent voluntas et liberum arbitrium, quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva. Et hoc patet ex habitudine obiectorum et actuum. Nam intelligere importat simplicem acceptionem alicuius rei, unde intelligi dicuntur proprie principia, quae sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur. Ratiocinari autem proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem alterius, unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex principiis innotescunt. Similiter ex parte appetitus, velle importat simplicem appetitum alicuius rei, unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. Eligere autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sicut autem se habet in cognitivis principium ad conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimus; ita in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem appetuntur. Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> {Boulesis} is distinct from {thelesis} on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31945] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bulesis distinguitur a thelesi, non propter diversitatem potentiarum, sed propter differentiam actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Choice and will---that is, the act of willing ---are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31946] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod electio et voluntas, idest ipsum velle, sunt diversi actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam, sicut etiam intelligere et ratiocinari, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31947] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q84" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q84-p0.1">Q. 84. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q84-p2"> We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now. </p><p id="FP_Q84-p3"> In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom. </p><p id="FP_Q84-p4"> The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it. </p><p id="FP_Q84-p5"> In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them? (2) How and in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them? </p><p id="FP_Q84-p6"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q84-p7"><a href="#FP_Q84_A1"> (1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p8"><a href="#FP_Q84_A2"> (2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p9"><a href="#FP_Q84_A3"> (3) If through some species, whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p10"><a href="#FP_Q84_A4"> (4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p11"><a href="#FP_Q84_A5"> (5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p12"><a href="#FP_Q84_A6"> (6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p13"><a href="#FP_Q84_A7"> (7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms? </a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p14"><a href="#FP_Q84_A8"> (8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 pr."><a name="31948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31948] Iª q. 84 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de actibus animae, quantum ad potentias intellectivas et appetitivas, aliae enim animae potentiae non pertinent directe ad considerationem theologi. Actus autem appetitivae partis ad considerationem moralis scientiae pertinent, et ideo in secunda parte huius operis de eis tractabitur, in qua considerandum erit de morali materia. Nunc autem de actibus intellectivae partis agetur. In consideratione vero actuum, hoc modo procedemus, primo namque considerandum est quomodo intelligit anima corpori coniuncta; secundo, quomodo intelligit a corpore separata. Prima autem consideratio erit tripartita, primo namque considerabitur quomodo anima intelligit corporalia, quae sunt infra ipsam; secundo, quomodo intelligit seipsam, et ea quae in ipsa sunt; tertio, quomodo intelligit substantias immateriales, quae sunt supra ipsam. Circa cognitionem vero corporalium, tria consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem per quid ea cognoscit; secundo, quomodo et quo ordine; tertio, quid in eis cognoscit. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum anima cognoscat corpora per intellectum. Secundo, utrum intelligat ea per essentiam suam, vel per aliquas species. Tertio, si per aliquas species, utrum species omnium intelligibilium sint ei naturaliter innatae. Quarto, utrum effluant in ipsam ab aliquibus formis immaterialibus separatis. Quinto, utrum anima nostra omnia quae intelligit, videat in rationibus aeternis. Sexto, utrum cognitionem intelligibilem acquirat a sensu. Septimo, utrum intellectus possit actu intelligere per species intelligibiles quas penes se habet, non convertendo se ad phantasmata. Octavo, utrum iudicium intellectus impediatur per impedimentum sensitivarum virtutum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q84_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A1-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 1. Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies cannot be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses." He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31949] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non cognoscat corpora per intellectum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II Soliloq. quod <i>corpora intellectu comprehendi non possunt; nec aliquod corporeum nisi sensibus videri potest</i>. Dicit etiam, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt per essentiam suam in anima. Huiusmodi autem non sunt corpora. Ergo anima per intellectum corpora cognoscere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31950] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad intelligibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad sensibilia. Sed anima per sensum nullo modo potest cognoscere spiritualia, quae sunt intelligibilia. Ergo nullo modo per intellectum potest cognoscere corpora, quae sunt sensibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31951] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, intellectus est necessariorum et semper eodem modo se habentium. Sed corpora omnia sunt mobilia, et non eodem modo se habentia. Anima ergo per intellectum corpora cognoscere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31952] Iª q. 84 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod scientia est in intellectu. Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit corpora, sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus. Et sic peribit scientia naturalis, quae est de corpore mobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It should be said in order to elucidate this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things, thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that "it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent," as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5). </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p7"> After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings he called "species" or "ideas," by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so that according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p8"> Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because, since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration through moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they differ from them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p9"> Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p10"> But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 co."><a name="31953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31953] Iª q. 84 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum, ad evidentiam huius quaestionis, quod primi philosophi qui de naturis rerum inquisiverunt, putaverunt nihil esse in mundo praeter corpus. Et quia videbant omnia corpora mobilia esse, et putabant ea in continuo fluxu esse, aestimaverunt quod nulla certitudo de rerum veritate haberi posset a nobis. Quod enim est in continuo fluxu, per certitudinem apprehendi non potest, quia prius labitur quam mente diiudicetur, sicut Heraclitus dixit quod <i>non est possibile aquam fluvii currentis bis tangere</i>, ut recitat philosophus in IV Metaphys. His autem superveniens Plato, ut posset salvare certam cognitionem veritatis a nobis per intellectum haberi, posuit praeter ista corporalia aliud genus entium a materia et motu separatum, quod nominabat species sive ideas, per quarum participationem unumquodque istorum singularium et sensibilium dicitur vel homo vel equus vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sic ergo dicebat scientias et definitiones et quidquid ad actum intellectus pertinet, non referri ad ista corpora sensibilia, sed ad illa immaterialia et separata; ut sic anima non intelligat ista corporalia, sed intelligat horum corporalium species separatas. Sed hoc dupliciter apparet falsum. Primo quidem quia, cum illae species sint immateriales et immobiles, excluderetur a scientiis cognitio motus et materiae (quod est proprium scientiae naturalis) et demonstratio per causas moventes et materiales. Secundo autem, quia derisibile videtur ut, dum rerum quae nobis manifestae sunt notitiam quaerimus, alia entia in medium afferamus, quae non possunt esse earum substantiae, cum ab eis differant secundum esse, et sic, illis substantiis separatis cognitis, non propter hoc de istis sensibilibus iudicare possemus. Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviasse a veritate, quia, cum aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicuius similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in cognito. Consideravit autem quod forma rei intellectae est in intellectu universaliter et immaterialiter et immobiliter, quod ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet, qui intelligit universaliter et per modum necessitatis cuiusdam; modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis. Et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter et immobiliter. Hoc autem necessarium non est. Quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero, puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio remissior, et in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine dulcedine. Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro. Et similiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31954] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quantum ad ea quibus intellectus cognoscit, non autem quantum ad ea quae cognoscit. Cognoscit enim corpora intelligendo, sed non per corpora, neque per similitudines materiales et corporeas; sed per species immateriales et intelligibiles, quae per sui essentiam in anima esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power; whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31955] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXII de Civit. Dei, non est dicendum quod, sicut sensus cognoscit sola corporalia, ita intellectus cognoscit sola spiritualia, quia sequeretur quod Deus et Angeli corporalia non cognoscerent. Huius autem diversitatis ratio est, quia inferior virtus non se extendit ad ea quae sunt superioris virtutis; sed virtus superior ea quae sunt inferioris virtutis, excellentiori modo operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31956] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis motus supponit aliquid immobile, cum enim transmutatio fit secundum qualitatem, remanet substantia immobilis; et cum transmutatur forma substantialis, remanet materia immobilis. Rerum etiam mutabilium sunt immobiles habitudines, sicut Socrates etsi non semper sedeat, tamen immobiliter est verum quod, quandocumque sedet, in uno loco manet. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet de rebus mobilibus immobilem scientiam habere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A2-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 2. Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul "collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance." But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, and from which it forms them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31957] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima per essentiam suam corporalia intelligat. Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Trin., quod <i>anima imagines corporum convolvit et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa, dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae</i>. Sed per similitudines corporum corpora intelligit. Ergo per essentiam suam, quam dat formandis talibus similitudinibus, et de qua eas format, cognoscit corporalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that "the soul, after a fashion, is everything." Since, therefore, like is known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31958] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>anima quodammodo est omnia</i>. Cum ergo simile simili cognoscatur, videtur quod anima per seipsam corporalia cognoscat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31959] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima est superior corporalibus creaturis. Inferiora autem sunt in superioribus eminentiori modo quam in seipsis, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo omnes creaturae corporeae nobiliori modo existunt in ipsa substantia animae quam in seipsis. Per suam ergo substantiam potest creaturas corporeas cognoscere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses." But the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31960] Iª q. 84 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., quod <i>mens corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit</i>. Ipsa autem anima non est cognoscibilis per corporis sensus. Non ergo cognoscit corporea per suam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that "like is known by like." But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that things known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And because the nature of a result is determined by its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence of our four material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p7"> But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown Metaph. ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known except through its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we further admit in the soul natures and forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i, 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p8"> We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no power of knowledge whatever---such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have remarked above ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A3" id="FP_Q84_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[3]</a>): while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p9"> It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 co."><a name="31961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31961] Iª q. 84 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi posuerunt quod anima per suam essentiam cognoscit corpora. Hoc enim animis omnium communiter inditum fuit, quod simile simili cognoscitur. Existimabant autem quod forma cogniti sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in re cognita. E contrario tamen Platonici posuerunt. Plato enim, quia perspexit intellectualem animam immaterialem esse et immaterialiter cognoscere, posuit formas rerum cognitarum immaterialiter subsistere. Priores vero naturales, quia considerabant res cognitas esse corporeas et materiales, posuerunt oportere res cognitas etiam in anima cognoscente materialiter esse. Et ideo, ut animae attribuerent omnium cognitionem, posuerunt eam habere naturam communem cum omnibus. Et quia natura principiatorum ex principiis constituitur, attribuerunt animae naturam principii, ita quod qui dixit principium omnium esse ignem, posuit animam esse de natura ignis; et similiter de aere et aqua. Empedocles autem, qui posuit quatuor elementa materialia et duo moventia, ex his etiam dixit animam esse constitutam. Et ita, cum res materialiter in anima ponerent, posuerunt omnem cognitionem animae materialem esse, non discernentes inter intellectum et sensum. Sed haec opinio improbatur. Primo quidem, quia in materiali principio, de quo loquebantur, non existunt principiata nisi in potentia. Non autem cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod est in potentia, sed solum secundum quod est actu, ut patet in IX Metaphys., unde nec ipsa potentia cognoscitur nisi per actum. Sic igitur non sufficeret attribuere animae principiorum naturam ad hoc quod omnia cognosceret, nisi inessent ei naturae et formae singulorum effectuum, puta ossis et carnis et aliorum huiusmodi; ut Aristoteles contra Empedoclem argumentatur in I de anima. Secundo quia, si oporteret rem cognitam materialiter in cognoscente existere, nulla ratio esset quare res quae materialiter extra animam subsistunt, cognitione carerent, puta, si anima igne cognoscit ignem, et ignis etiam qui est extra animam, ignem cognosceret. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet materialia cognita in cognoscente existere non materialiter, sed magis immaterialiter. Et huius ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra cognoscentem, cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt. Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid unum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad rationem materialitatis. Et ideo quae non recipiunt formas nisi materialiter, nullo modo sunt cognoscitiva, sicut plantae; ut dicitur in II libro de anima. Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Unde et intellectus, qui abstrahit speciem non solum a materia, sed etiam a materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit quam sensus, qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, sed cum materialibus conditionibus. Et inter ipsos sensus, visus est magis cognoscitivus, quia est minus materialis, ut supra dictum est. Et inter ipsos intellectus, tanto quilibet est perfectior, quanto immaterialior. Ex his ergo patet quod, si aliquis intellectus est qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet quod essentia eius habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut antiqui posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex principiis omnium materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc autem est proprium Dei, ut sua essentia sit immaterialiter comprehensiva omnium, prout effectus virtute praeexistunt in causa. Solus igitur Deus per essentiam suam omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque etiam Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we say that a body is made into something colored because of its being informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul "keeps something"---namely, not informed with such image---"which is able freely to judge of the species of these images": and that this is the "mind" or "intellect." And he says that the part which is informed with these images---namely, the imagination---is "common to us and beasts." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31962] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de visione imaginaria, quae fit per imagines corporum. Quibus imaginibus formandis dat anima aliquid suae substantiae, sicut subiectum datur ut informetur per aliquam formam. Et sic de seipsa facit huiusmodi imagines, non quod anima vel aliquid animae convertatur, ut sit haec vel illa imago; sed sicut dicitur de corpore fieri aliquid coloratum, prout informatur colore. Et hic sensus apparet ex his quae sequuntur. Dicit enim quod servat aliquid, scilicet non formatum tali imagine, quod libere de specie talium imaginum iudicet, et hoc dicit esse mentem vel intellectum. Partem autem quae informatur huiusmodi imaginibus scilicet imaginativam, dicit esse communem nobis et bestiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all---through the senses, to all things sensible---through the intellect, to all things intelligible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31963] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu compositam ex omnibus, sicut antiqui naturales; sed dixit quodammodo animam esse omnia, inquantum est in potentia ad omnia; per sensum quidem ad sensibilia, per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every creature has a finite and determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being the universal principle of all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31964] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod quaelibet creatura habet esse finitum et determinatum. Unde essentia superioris creaturae, etsi habeat quandam similitudinem inferioris creaturae prout communicant in aliquo genere, non tamen complete habet similitudinem illius, quia determinatur ad aliquam speciem, praeter quam est species inferioris creaturae. Sed essentia Dei est perfecta similitudo omnium quantum ad omnia quae in rebus inveniuntur, sicut universale principium omnium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A3-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 3. Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul understands all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), that "man has understanding in common with the angels." But angels understand all things through innate species: wherefore in the book De Causis it is said that "every intelligence is full of forms." Therefore the soul also has innate species of things, by means of which it understands corporeal things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31965] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intelligat omnia per species sibi naturaliter inditas. Dicit enim Gregorius, in homilia ascensionis quod <i>homo habet commune cum Angelis intelligere</i>. Sed Angeli intelligunt omnia per formas naturaliter inditas, unde in libro de causis dicitur quod <i>omnis intelligentia est plena formis</i>. Ergo et anima habet species rerum naturaliter inditas, quibus corporalia intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31966] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima intellectiva est nobilior quam materia prima corporalis. Sed materia prima est creata a Deo sub formis ad quas est in potentia. Ergo multo magis anima intellectiva est creata a Deo sub speciebus intelligibilibus. Et sic anima intelligit corporalia per species sibi naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through innate species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31967] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nullus potest verum respondere nisi de eo quod scit. Sed aliquis etiam idiota, non habens scientiam acquisitam, respondet verum de singulis, si tamen ordinate interrogetur, ut narratur in Menone Platonis de quodam. Ergo antequam aliquis acquirat scientiam, habet rerum cognitionem. Quod non esset nisi anima haberet species naturaliter inditas. Intelligit igitur anima res corporeas per species naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31968] Iª q. 84 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, de intellectu loquens, quod est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act---through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation---by instruction or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A3-p7"> But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established above ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q84_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76] , A[1]</a>): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 co."><a name="31969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31969] Iª q. 84 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum forma sit principium actionis, oportet ut eo modo se habeat aliquid ad formam quae est actionis principium, quo se habet ad actionem illam, sicut si moveri sursum est ex levitate, oportet quod in potentia tantum sursum fertur, esse leve solum in potentia, quod autem actu sursum fertur, esse leve in actu. Videmus autem quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum, tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum. Et de tali potentia in actum reducitur, ut sentiat quidem, per actiones sensibilium in sensum; ut intelligat autem, per disciplinam aut inventionem. Unde oportet dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt principia intelligendi. Et propter hoc Aristoteles posuit quod intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter inditas, sed est in principio in potentia ad huiusmodi species omnes. Sed quia id quod habet actu formam, interdum non potest agere secundum formam propter aliquod impedimentum, sicut leve si impediatur sursum ferri; propter hoc Plato posuit quod intellectus hominis naturaliter est plenus omnibus speciebus intelligibilibus, sed per unionem corporis impeditur ne possit in actum exire. Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum. Primo quidem quia, si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere, nullus enim homo obliviscitur ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum sit maius sua parte, et alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur inconveniens, si ponatur esse animae naturale corpori uniri, ut supra habitum est, inconveniens enim est quod naturalis operatio alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum naturam. Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum, quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus natus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si animae essent naturaliter inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima non cognoscit corporalia per species naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades of bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above ( <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A2" id="FP_Q84_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[2]</a>). In the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31970] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo quidem convenit cum Angelis in intelligendo, deficit tamen ab eminentia intellectus eorum, sicut et corpora inferiora, quae tantum existunt secundum Gregorium, deficiunt ab existentia superiorum corporum. Nam materia inferiorum corporum non est completa totaliter per formam, sed est in potentia ad formas quas non habet, materia autem caelestium corporum est totaliter completa per formam, ita quod non est in potentia ad aliam formam, ut supra habitum est. Et similiter intellectus Angeli est perfectus per species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam, intellectus autem humanus est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Primary matter has substantial being through its form, consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no comparison. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31971] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod materia prima habet esse substantiale per formam, et ideo oportuit quod crearetur sub aliqua forma, alioquin non esset in actu. Sub una tamen forma existens, est in potentia ad alias. Intellectus autem non habet esse substantiale per speciem intelligibilem; et ideo non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31972] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ordinata interrogatio procedit ex principiis communibus per se notis, ad propria. Per talem autem processum scientia causatur in anima addiscentis. Unde cum verum respondet de his de quibus secundo interrogatur, hoc non est quia prius ea noverit; sed quia tunc ea de novo addiscit. Nihil enim refert utrum ille qui docet, proponendo vel interrogando procedat de principiis communibus ad conclusiones, utrobique enim animus audientis certificatur de posterioribus per priora.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A4-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 4. Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by some separate forms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31973] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod species intelligibiles effluant in animam ab aliquibus formis separatis. Omne enim quod per participationem est tale, causatur ab eo quod est per essentiam tale; sicut quod est ignitum reducitur sicut in causam in ignem. Sed anima intellectiva, secundum quod est actu intelligens, participat ipsa intelligibilia, intellectus enim in actu, quodammodo est intellectum in actu. Ergo ea quae secundum se et per essentiam suam sunt intellecta in actu, sunt causae animae intellectivae quod actu intelligat. Intellecta autem in actu per essentiam suam, sunt formae sine materia existentes. Species igitur intelligibiles quibus anima intelligit, causantur a formis aliquibus separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31974] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, intelligibilia se habent ad intellectum, sicut sensibilia ad sensum. Sed sensibilia quae sunt in actu extra animam, sunt causae specierum sensibilium quae sunt in sensu, quibus sentimus. Ergo species intelligibiles quibus intellectus noster intelligit, causantur ab aliquibus actu intelligibilibus extra animam existentibus. Huiusmodi autem non sunt nisi formae a materia separatae. Formae igitur intelligibiles intellectus nostri effluunt ab aliquibus substantiis separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, are caused by some separate substances. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31975] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per id quod est actu. Si ergo intellectus noster, prius in potentia existens, postmodum actu intelligat, oportet quod hoc causetur ab aliquo intellectu qui semper est in actu. Hic autem est intellectus separatus. Ergo ab aliquibus substantiis separatis causantur species intelligibiles quibus actu intelligimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31976] Iª q. 84 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia secundum hoc sensibus non indigeremus ad intelligendum. Quod patet esse falsum ex hoc praecipue quod qui caret uno sensu, nullo modo potest habere scientiam de sensibilibus illius sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q84_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called "per se" man, and the form or idea of a horse which is called "per se" horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q84_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p7"> But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways (Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which he called the "active intelligence," from which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the "active intelligence." They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas remain immovably in the soul. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p8"> But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p9"> But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body: and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p10"> And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the "active intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to understand through species derived from the "active intelligence," it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 co."><a name="31977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31977] Iª q. 84 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt species intelligibiles nostri intellectus procedere ab aliquibus formis vel substantiis separatis. Et hoc dupliciter. Plato enim, sicut dictum est, posuit formas rerum sensibilium per se sine materia subsistentes; sicut formam hominis, quam nominabat per se hominem, et formam vel ideam equi, quam nominabat per se equum, et sic de aliis. Has ergo formas separatas ponebat participari et ab anima nostra, et a materia corporali; ab anima quidem nostra ad cognoscendum, a materia vero corporali ad essendum; ut sicut materia corporalis per hoc quod participat ideam lapidis, fit hic lapis, ita intellectus noster per hoc quod participat ideam lapidis, fit intelligens lapidem. Participatio autem ideae fit per aliquam similitudinem ipsius ideae in participante ipsam, per modum quo exemplar participatur ab exemplato. Sicut igitur ponebat formas sensibiles quae sunt in materia corporali, effluere ab ideis sicut quasdam earum similitudines; ita ponebat species intelligibiles nostri intellectus esse similitudines quasdam idearum ab eis effluentes. Et propter hoc, ut supra dictum est, scientias et definitiones ad ideas referebat. Sed quia contra rationem rerum sensibilium est quod earum formae subsistant absque materiis, ut Aristoteles multipliciter probat; ideo Avicenna, hac positione remota, posuit omnium rerum sensibilium intelligibiles species, non quidem per se subsistere absque materia, sed praeexistere immaterialiter in intellectibus separatis; a quorum primo derivantur huiusmodi species in sequentem, et sic de aliis usque ad ultimum intellectum separatum, quem nominat intellectum agentem; a quo, ut ipse dicit, effluunt species intelligibiles in animas nostras, et formae sensibiles in materiam corporalem. Et sic in hoc Avicenna cum Platone concordat, quod species intelligibiles nostri intellectus effluunt a quibusdam formis separatis, quas tamen Plato dicit per se subsistere, Avicenna vero ponit eas in intelligentia agente. Differunt etiam quantum ad hoc, quod Avicenna ponit species intelligibiles non remanere in intellectu nostro postquam desinit actu intelligere; sed indiget ut iterato se convertat ad recipiendum de novo. Unde non ponit scientiam animae naturaliter inditam, sicut Plato, qui ponit participationes idearum immobiliter in anima permanere. Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio assignari non posset quare anima nostra corpori uniretur. Non enim potest dici quod anima intellectiva corpori uniatur propter corpus, quia nec forma est propter materiam, nec motor propter mobile, sed potius e converso. Maxime autem videtur corpus esse necessarium animae intellectivae ad eius propriam operationem, quae est intelligere, quia secundum esse suum a corpore non dependet. Si autem anima species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam apta nata esset recipere per influentiam aliquorum separatorum principiorum tantum, et non acciperet eas ex sensibus, non indigeret corpore ad intelligendum, unde frustra corpori uniretur. Si autem dicatur quod indiget anima nostra sensibus ad intelligendum, quibus quodammodo excitetur ad consideranda ea quorum species intelligibiles a principiis separatis recipit; hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia huiusmodi excitatio non videtur necessaria animae nisi inquantum est consopita, secundum Platonicos, quodammodo et obliviosa propter unionem ad corpus, et sic sensus non proficerent animae intellectivae nisi ad tollendum impedimentum quod animae provenit ex corporis unione. Remanet igitur quaerendum quae sit causa unionis animae ad corpus. Si autem dicatur, secundum Avicennam, quod sensus sunt animae necessarii, quia per eos excitatur ut convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem, a qua recipit species; hoc quidem non sufficit. Quia si in natura animae est ut intelligat per species ab intelligentia agente effluxas, sequeretur quod quandoque anima possit se convertere ad intelligentiam agentem ex inclinatione suae naturae, vel etiam excitata per alium sensum, ut convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem ad recipiendum species sensibilium quorum sensum aliquis non habet. Et sic caecus natus posset habere scientiam de coloribus, quod est manifeste falsum. Unde dicendum est quod species intelligibiles quibus anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible---namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31978] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod species intelligibiles quas participat noster intellectus, reducuntur sicut in primam causam in aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, scilicet in Deum. Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium, a quibus scientiam colligimus, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31979] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod res materiales, secundum esse quod habent extra animam, possunt esse sensibiles actu; non autem actu intelligibiles. Unde non est simile de sensu et intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q84_A4-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31980] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est, non autem per aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte sicut per causam remotam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A6-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 6. Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be perceived." Secondly, because, "whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit." And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31987] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectiva cognitio non accipiatur a rebus sensibilibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>non est expectanda sinceritas veritatis a corporis sensibus</i>. Et hoc probat dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod <i>omne quod corporeus sensus attingit, sine ulla intermissione temporis commutatur, quod autem non manet, percipi non potest</i>. Alio modo, per hoc quod <i>omnia quae per corpus sentimus, etiam cum non adsunt sensibus, imagines tamen eorum patimur, ut in somno vel furore; non autem sensibus discernere valemus utrum ipsa sensibilia, vel imagines eorum falsas sentiamus. Nihil autem percipi potest quod a falso non discernitur</i>. Et sic concludit quod non est expectanda veritas a sensibus. Sed cognitio intellectualis est apprehensiva veritatis. Non ergo cognitio intellectualis est expectanda a sensibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): "We must not thing that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's action; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that which it acts on." Whence he concludes that "the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself." Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31988] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>non est putandum facere aliquid corpus in spiritum, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti materiae vice subdatur, omni enim modo praestantior est qui facit, ea re de qua aliquid facit</i>. Unde concludit quod <i>imaginem corporis non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in seipso facit</i>. Non ergo intellectualis cognitio a sensibilibus derivatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31989] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, effectus non se extendit ultra virtutem suae causae. Sed intellectualis cognitio se extendit ultra sensibilia, intelligimus enim quaedam quae sensu percipi non possunt. Intellectualis ergo cognitio non derivatur a rebus sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31990] Iª q. 84 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus probat, I Metaphys., et in fine Poster., quod principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by a "discharge of images." And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p7"> Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A4" id="FP_Q84_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a> ,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that the "body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is announced from without." Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p8"> Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the "composite," Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A3" id="FP_Q84_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[79], AA[3]</a>,4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p9"> According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 co."><a name="31991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31991] Iª q. 84 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod circa istam quaestionem triplex fuit philosophorum opinio. Democritus enim posuit quod <i>nulla est alia causa cuiuslibet nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his corporibus quae cogitamus, veniunt atque intrant imagines in animas nostras</i>; ut Augustinus dicit in epistola sua ad Dioscorum. Et Aristoteles etiam dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod Democritus posuit cognitionem fieri per idola et defluxiones. Et huius positionis ratio fuit, quia tam ipse Democritus quam alii antiqui naturales non ponebant intellectum differre a sensu, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de anima. Et ideo, quia sensus immutatur a sensibili, arbitrabantur omnem nostram cognitionem fieri per solam immutationem a sensibilibus. Quam quidem immutationem Democritus asserebat fieri per imaginum defluxiones. Plato vero e contrario posuit intellectum differre a sensu; et intellectum quidem esse virtutem immaterialem organo corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum non potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio intellectualis non fit per immutationem intellectus a sensibilibus, sed per participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut dictum est. Sensum etiam posuit virtutem quandam per se operantem. Unde nec ipse sensus, cum sit quaedam vis spiritualis, immutatur a sensibilibus, sed organa sensuum a sensibilibus immutantur, ex qua immutatione anima quodammodo excitatur ut in se species sensibilium formet. Et hanc opinionem tangere videtur Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ubi dicit quod <i>corpus non sentit, sed anima per corpus, quo velut nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod extrinsecus nuntiatur</i>. Sic igitur secundum Platonis opinionem, neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilis totaliter a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant animam intellectivam ad intelligendum. Aristoteles autem media via processit. Posuit enim cum Platone intellectum differre a sensu. Sed sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine communicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiter posuit de omnibus operationibus sensitivae partis. Quia igitur non est inconveniens quod sensibilia quae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc Aristoteles cum Democrito concordavit, quod operationes sensitivae partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum, non per modum defluxionis, ut Democritus posuit, sed per quandam operationem. Nam et Democritus omnem actionem fieri posuit per influxionem atomorum, ut patet in I de Generat. Intellectum vero posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit. Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their likeness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31992] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per verba illa Augustini datur intelligi quod veritas non sit totaliter a sensibus expectanda. Requiritur enim lumen intellectus agentis, per quod immutabiliter veritatem in rebus mutabilibus cognoscamus, et discernamus ipsas res a similitudinibus rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must be separate, namely, because "the agent is more noble than the patient." And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination, is an action of the "composite," there is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored is compared to the pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is through the agency of the sensible, since "fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31993] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi non loquitur de intellectuali cognitione, sed de imaginaria. Et quia, secundum Platonis opinionem, vis imaginaria habet operationem quae est animae solius; eadem ratione usus est Augustinus ad ostendendum quod corpora non imprimunt suas similitudines in vim imaginariam, sed hoc facit ipsa anima, qua utitur Aristoteles ad probandum intellectum agentem esse aliquid separatum, quia scilicet agens est honorabilius patiente. Et procul dubio oportet, secundum hanc positionem, in vi imaginativa ponere non solum potentiam passivam, sed etiam activam. Sed si ponamus, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, quod actio virtutis imaginativae sit coniuncti, nulla sequitur difficultas, quia corpus sensibile est nobilius organo animalis, secundum hoc quod comparatur ad ipsum ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, sicut coloratum in actu ad pupillam, quae colorata est in potentia. Posset tamen dici quod, quamvis prima immutatio virtutis imaginariae sit per motum sensibilium, quia phantasia est motus factus secundum sensum, ut dicitur in libro de anima; tamen est quaedam operatio animae in homine quae dividendo et componendo format diversas rerum imagines, etiam quae non sunt a sensibus acceptae. Et quantum ad hoc possunt accipi verba Augustini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31994] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis cognitionis. Et ideo non est mirum si intellectualis cognitio ultra sensitivam se extendit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A7-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 7. Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31995] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus possit actu intelligere per species intelligibiles quas penes se habet, non convertendo se ad phantasmata. Intellectus enim fit in actu per speciem intelligibilem qua informatur. Sed intellectum esse in actu, est ipsum intelligere. Ergo species intelligibiles sufficiunt ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, absque hoc quod ad phantasmata se convertat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31996] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magis dependet imaginatio a sensu, quam intellectus ab imaginatione. Sed imaginatio potest imaginari actu, absentibus sensibilibus. Ergo multo magis intellectus potest intelligere actu, non convertendo se ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the angels. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31997] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, incorporalium non sunt aliqua phantasmata, quia imaginatio tempus et continuum non transcendit. Si ergo intellectus noster non posset aliquid intelligere in actu nisi converteretur ad phantasmata, sequeretur quod non posset intelligere incorporeum aliquid. Quod patet esse falsum, intelligimus enim veritatem ipsam, et Deum et Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31998] Iª q. 84 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>nihil sine phantasmate intelligit anima</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding. </p><p id="FP_Q84_A7-p7"> Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 co."><a name="31999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31999] Iª q. 84 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indiciis apparet. Primo quidem quia, cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad eius actum actus alicuius potentiae utentis organo corporali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam. Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quod, impedito actu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phreneticis; et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtutis, ut in lethargicis; impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam praeaccepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum. Huius autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata; et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali, sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem. Si autem proprium obiectum intellectus nostri esset forma separata; vel si naturae rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos; non oporteret quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q84_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32000] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod species conservatae in intellectu possibili, in eo existunt habitualiter quando actu non intelligit, sicut supra dictum est. Unde ad hoc quod intelligamus in actu, non sufficit ipsa conservatio specierum; sed oportet quod eis utamur secundum quod convenit rebus quarum sunt species, quae sunt naturae in particularibus existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect does. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32001] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam ipsum phantasma est similitudo rei particularis, unde non indiget imaginatio aliqua alia similitudine particularis, sicut indiget intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32002] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A8-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 8. Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32003] Iª q. 84 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudicium intellectus non impediatur per ligamentum sensus. Superius enim non dependet ab inferiori. Sed iudicium intellectus est supra sensum. Ergo iudicium intellectus non impeditur per ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vigil. i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32004] Iª q. 84 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, syllogizare est actus intellectus. In somno autem ligatur sensus, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vig.; contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis dormiens syllogizat. Ergo non impeditur iudicium intellectus per ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p4"> <b>On the contrary,</b> What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32005] Iª q. 84 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod in dormiendo ea quae contra licitos mores contingunt, non imputantur ad peccatum; ut Augustinus in XII super Gen. ad Litt. dicit. Hoc autem non esset si homo in dormiendo liberum usum rationis et intellectus haberet. Ergo impeditur rationis usus per ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q84_A8-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>, our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 co."><a name="32006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32006] Iª q. 84 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur, et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii. Dicit autem philosophus, in III de caelo, quod <i>sicut finis factivae scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum</i>, faber enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et similiter naturalis non quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes eorum quae videntur secundum sensum. Manifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret, et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p6"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32007] Iª q. 84 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis intellectus sit superior sensu, accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius obiecta prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur. Et ideo necesse est quod impediatur iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in De Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things, and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32008] Iª q. 84 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus ligatur in dormientibus propter evaporationes quasdam et fumositates resolutas, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vig. Et ideo secundum dispositionem huiusmodi evaporationum, contingit esse ligamentum sensus maius vel minus. Quando enim multus fuerit motus vaporum, ligatur non solum sensus, sed etiam imaginatio, ita ut nulla appareant phantasmata; sicut praecipue accidit cum aliquis incipit dormire post multum cibum et potum. Si vero motus vaporum aliquantulum fuerit remissior, apparent phantasmata, sed distorta et inordinata; sicut accidit in febricitantibus. Si vero adhuc magis motus sedetur, apparent phantasmata ordinata; sicut maxime solet contingere in fine dormitionis, et in hominibus sobriis et habentibus fortem imaginationem. Si autem motus vaporum fuerit modicus, non solum imaginatio remanet libera, sed etiam ipse sensus communis ex parte solvitur; ita quod homo iudicat interdum in dormiendo ea quae videt somnia esse, quasi diiudicans inter res et rerum similitudines. Sed tamen ex aliqua parte remanet sensus communis ligatus; et ideo, licet aliquas similitudines discernat a rebus, tamen semper in aliquibus decipitur. Sic igitur per modum quo sensus solvitur et imaginatio in dormiendo, liberatur et iudicium intellectus, non tamen ex toto. Unde illi qui dormiendo syllogizant, cum excitantur, semper recognoscunt se in aliquo defecisse.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q85" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q85-p0.1">Q. 85. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q85-p2"> We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q85-p3"><a href="#FP_Q85_A1"> (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p4"><a href="#FP_Q85_A2"> (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands? </a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p5"><a href="#FP_Q85_A3"> (3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p6"><a href="#FP_Q85_A4"> (4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p7"><a href="#FP_Q85_A5"> (5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p8"><a href="#FP_Q85_A6"> (6) Whether the intellect can err?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p9"><a href="#FP_Q85_A7"> (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p10"><a href="#FP_Q85_A8"> (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 pr."><a name="32009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32009] Iª q. 85 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de modo et ordine intelligendi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum intellectus noster intelligat abstrahendo species a phantasmatibus. Secundo, utrum species intelligibiles abstractae a phantasmatibus, se habeant ad intellectum nostrum ut quod intelligitur, vel sicut id quo intelligitur. Tertio, utrum intellectus noster naturaliter intelligat prius magis universale. Quarto, utrum intellectus noster possit multa simul intelligere. Quinto, utrum intellectus noster intelligat componendo et dividendo. Sexto, utrum intellectus possit errare. Septimo, utrum unus possit eandem rem melius intelligere quam alius. Octavo, utrum intellectus noster per prius cognoscat indivisibile quam divisibile.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q85_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A1-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 1. Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32010] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat res corporeas et materiales per abstractionem a phantasmatibus. Quicumque enim intellectus intelligit rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Formae autem rerum materialium non sunt abstractae a particularibus, quorum similitudines sunt phantasmata. Si ergo intelligamus res materiales per abstractionem specierum a phantasmatibus, erit falsitas in intellectu nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32011] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res materiales sunt res naturales, in quarum definitione cadit materia. Sed nihil potest intelligi sine eo quod cadit in definitione eius. Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi sine materia. Sed materia est individuationis principium. Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi per abstractionem universalis a particulari, quod est abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32012] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in III de anima dicitur quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam sicut colores ad visum. Sed visio non fit per abstractionem aliquarum specierum a coloribus, sed per hoc quod colores imprimunt in visum. Ergo nec intelligere contingit per hoc quod aliquid abstrahatur a phantasmatibus, sed per hoc quod phantasmata imprimunt in intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul---the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32013] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ut dicitur in III de anima, in intellectiva anima sunt duo, scilicet intellectus possibilis, et agens. Sed abstrahere a phantasmatibus species intelligibiles non pertinet ad intellectum possibilem, sed recipere species iam abstractas. Sed nec etiam videtur pertinere ad intellectum agentem, qui se habet ad phantasmata sicut lumen ad colores, quod non abstrahit aliquid a coloribus, sed magis eis influit. Ergo nullo modo intelligimus abstrahendo a phantasmatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not, therefore, by abstraction. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32014] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus, in III de anima, dicit quod <i>intellectus intelligit species in phantasmatibus</i>. Non ergo eas abstrahendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter." Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32015] Iª q. 85 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa intellectum sunt</i>. Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q85_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial. </p><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p9"> But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q85_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[84] , A[1]</a>). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 co."><a name="32016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32016] Iª q. 85 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae. Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae virtutis. Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens, etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet vel in seipsis vel in Deo. Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet, non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra Angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt. Plato vero, attendens solum ad immaterialitatem intellectus humani, non autem ad hoc quod est corpori quodammodo unitus, posuit obiectum intellectus ideas separatas; et quod intelligimus, non quidem abstrahendo, sed magis abstracta participando, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider color and its properties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore color can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word "otherwise" refers to the thing understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32017] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alio, vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum simplicis et absolutae considerationis; sicut cum intelligimus unum, nihil considerando de alio. Abstrahere igitur per intellectum ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta, secundum primum modum abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate. Sed secundo modo abstrahere per intellectum quae non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet falsitatem; ut in sensibilibus manifeste apparet. Si enim intelligamus vel dicamus colorem non inesse corpori colorato, vel esse separatum ab eo, erit falsitas in opinione vel in oratione. Si vero consideremus colorem et proprietates eius, nihil considerantes de pomo colorato; vel quod sic intelligimus, etiam voce exprimamus; erit absque falsitate opinionis et orationis. Pomum enim non est de ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibet colorem intelligi, nihil intelligendo de pomo. Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur. Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui intelligit rem aliter quam sit, verum est si ly aliter referatur ad rem intellectam. Tunc enim intellectus est falsus, quando intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit. Unde falsus esset intellectus, si sic abstraheret speciem lapidis a materia, ut intelligeret eam non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit. Non est autem verum quod proponitur, si ly aliter accipiatur ex parte intelligentis. Est enim absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo, quia intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter, per modum intellectus; non autem materialiter, per modum rei materialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and "signate" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from "this flesh and these bones," which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect form "flesh and bones." </p><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p12"> Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as "being," "unity," "power," "act," and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32018] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit forma solum, et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum hoc, in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis, communis quidem, ut caro et os; individualis autem, ut hae carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys.; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus. Species autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia sensibili non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali. Materia enim sensibilis dicitur materia corporalis secundum quod subiacet qualitatibus sensibilibus, scilicet calido et frigido, duro et molli, et huiusmodi. Materia vero intelligibilis dicitur substantia secundum quod subiacet quantitati. Manifestum est autem quod quantitas prius inest substantiae quam qualitates sensibiles. Unde quantitates, ut numeri et dimensiones et figurae, quae sunt terminationes quantitatum, possunt considerari absque qualitatibus sensibilibus, quod est eas abstrahi a materia sensibili, non tamen possunt considerari sine intellectu substantiae quantitati subiectae, quod esset eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili communi. Possunt tamen considerari sine hac vel illa substantia; quod est eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili individuali. Quaedam vero sunt quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi, quae etiam esse possunt absque omni materia, ut patet in substantiis immaterialibus. Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32019] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod colores habent eundem modum existendi prout sunt in materia corporali individuali, sicut et potentia visiva, et ideo possunt imprimere suam similitudinem in visum. Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute imprimere in intellectum possibilem. Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus, non quod aliqua eadem numero forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et transfertur ad alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32020] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et iterum ab eis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur quidem, quia, sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur. Abstrahit autem intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus, secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A1-p15.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32021] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A2-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 2. Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32022] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstractae, se habeant ad intellectum nostrum sicut id quod intelligitur. Intellectum enim in actu est in intelligente, quia intellectum in actu est ipse intellectus in actu. Sed nihil de re intellecta est in intellectu actu intelligente, nisi species intelligibilis abstracta. Ergo huiusmodi species est ipsum intellectum in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32023] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, intellectum in actu oportet in aliquo esse, alioquin nihil esset. Sed non est in re quae est extra animam, quia, cum res extra animam sit materialis, nihil quod est in ea, potest esse intellectum in actu. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectum in actu sit in intellectu. Et ita nihil est aliud quam species intelligibilis praedicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words are signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul---viz. the intelligible species, are what is actually understood. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32024] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in I Periherm., quod <i>voces sunt notae earum quae sunt in anima passionum</i>. Sed voces significant res intellectas, id enim voce significamus quod intelligimus. Ergo ipsae passiones animae, scilicet species intelligibiles, sunt ea quae intelliguntur in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32025] Iª q. 85 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, sicut species sensibilis ad sensum. Sed species sensibilis non est illud quod sentitur, sed magis id quo sensus sentit. Ergo species intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id quo intelligit intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. </p><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p7"> This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [* <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q85_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[1]</a>]. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" [*Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension. </p><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 co."><a name="32026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32026] Iª q. 85 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod vires cognoscitivae quae sunt in nobis, nihil cognoscunt nisi proprias passiones; puta quod sensus non sentit nisi passionem sui organi. Et secundum hoc, intellectus nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, idest speciem intelligibilem in se receptam. Et secundum hoc, species huiusmodi est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed haec opinio manifeste apparet falsa ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia eadem sunt quae intelligimus, et de quibus sunt scientiae. Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima; sicut secundum Platonicos omnes scientiae sunt de ideis, quas ponebant esse intellecta in actu. Secundo, quia sequeretur error antiquorum dicentium quod <i>omne quod videtur est verum</i>; et sic quod contradictoriae essent simul verae. Si enim potentia non cognoscit nisi propriam passionem, de ea solum iudicat. Sic autem videtur aliquid, secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva afficitur. Semper ergo iudicium potentiae cognoscitivae erit de eo quod iudicat, scilicet de propria passione, secundum quod est; et ita omne iudicium erit verum. Puta si gustus non sentit nisi propriam passionem, cum aliquis habens sanum gustum iudicat mel esse dulce, vere iudicabit; et similiter si ille qui habet gustum infectum, iudicet mel esse amarum, vere iudicabit, uterque enim iudicat secundum quod gustus eius afficitur. Et sic sequitur quod omnis opinio aequaliter erit vera, et universaliter omnis acceptio. Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre et intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti; similiter forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in agente, est similitudo obiecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo. Et hoc etiam patet ex antiquorum opinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci. Ponebant enim quod anima per terram quae in ipsa erat, cognosceret terram quae extra ipsam erat; et sic de aliis. Si ergo accipiamus speciem terrae loco terrae, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, qui dicit quod <i>lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis</i>; sequetur quod anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32027] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectum est in intelligente per suam similitudinem. Et per hunc modum dicitur quod intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu, inquantum similitudo rei intellectae est forma intellectus; sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus in actu. Unde non sequitur quod species intelligibilis abstracta sit id quod actu intelligitur, sed quod sit similitudo eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In these words "the thing actually understood" there is a double implication---the thing which is understood, and the fact that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal" imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32028] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur intellectum in actu, duo importantur, scilicet res quae intelligitur, et hoc quod est ipsum intelligi. Et similiter cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, est in intellectu. Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim videt colorem pomi sine eius odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color qui videtur sine odore manifestum est quod color qui videtur, non est nisi in pomo; sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, inquantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non odoris. Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine, sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitatis secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non individualium principiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32029] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A3-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 3. Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is first which does not involve the existence of its correlative" (Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32030] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis universalia non sint priora in nostra cognitione intellectuali. Quia ea quae sunt priora et notiora secundum naturam, sunt posteriora et minus nota secundum nos. Sed universalia sunt priora secundum naturam, quia prius est a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia. Ergo universalia sunt posteriora in cognitione nostri intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known secondarily by us. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32031] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, composita sunt priora quoad nos quam simplicia. Sed universalia sunt simpliciora. Ergo sunt posterius nota quoad nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. But the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore the universals are secondarily known by us. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32032] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in I Physic. quod definitum prius cadit in cognitione nostra quam partes definitionis. Sed universaliora sunt partes definitionis minus universalium, sicut animal est pars definitionis hominis. Ergo universalia sunt posterius nota quoad nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known by us. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32033] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, per effectus devenimus in causas et principia. Sed universalia sunt quaedam principia. Ergo universalia sunt posterius nota quoad nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> "We must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual" (Phys. i, 1) </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32034] Iª q. 85 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in I Physic., quod <i>ex universalibus in singularia oportet devenire</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal"; whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as "rational" or "irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows "animal" before it knows man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal. </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p8"> Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore "children at first call men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows "genus" is in a state of potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act. </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p9"> We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the less common. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 co."><a name="32035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32035] Iª q. 85 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in cognitione nostri intellectus duo oportet considerare. Primo quidem, quod cognitio intellectiva aliquo modo a sensitiva primordium sumit. Et quia sensus est singularium, intellectus autem universalium; necesse est quod cognitio singularium, quoad nos, prior sit quam universalium cognitio. Secundo oportet considerare quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit. Omne autem quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perfectum. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus, est scientia completa, per quam distincte et determinate res cognoscuntur. Actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per quam sciuntur res indistincte sub quadam confusione, quod enim sic cognoscitur, secundum quid cognoscitur in actu, et quodammodo in potentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Physic., quod <i>sunt primo nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis; posterius autem cognoscimus distinguendo distincte principia et elementa</i>. Manifestum est autem quod cognoscere aliquid in quo plura continentur, sine hoc quod habeatur propria notitia uniuscuiusque eorum quae continentur in illo, est cognoscere aliquid sub confusione quadam. Sic autem potest cognosci tam totum universale, in quo partes continentur in potentia, quam etiam totum integrale, utrumque enim totum potest cognosci in quadam confusione, sine hoc quod partes distincte cognoscantur. Cognoscere autem distincte id quod continetur in toto universali, est habere cognitionem de re minus communi. Sicut cognoscere animal indistincte, est cognoscere animal inquantum est animal, cognoscere autem animal distincte, est cognoscere animal inquantum est animal rationale vel irrationale, quod est cognoscere hominem vel leonem. Prius igitur occurrit intellectui nostro cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem, et eadem ratio est si comparemus quodcumque magis universale ad minus universale. Et quia sensus exit de potentia in actum sicut et intellectus, idem etiam ordo cognitionis apparet in sensu. Nam prius secundum sensum diiudicamus magis commune quam minus commune, et secundum locum et secundum tempus. Secundum locum quidem, sicut, cum aliquid videtur a remotis, prius deprehenditur esse corpus, quam deprehendatur esse animal; et prius deprehenditur esse animal, quam deprehendatur esse homo; et prius homo, quam Socrates vel Plato. Secundum tempus autem, quia puer a principio prius distinguit hominem a non homine, quam distinguat hunc hominem ab alio homine; et ideo <i>pueri a principio appellant omnes viros patres, posterius autem determinant unumquemque</i>, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et huius ratio manifesta est. Quia qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut sciat distinctionis principium; sicut qui scit genus, est in potentia ut sciat differentiam. Et sic patet quod cognitio indistincta media est inter potentiam et actum. Est ergo dicendum quod cognitio singularium est prior quoad nos quam cognitio universalium, sicut cognitio sensitiva quam cognitio intellectiva. Sed tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum, cognitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality. And since the intention of universality---viz. the relation of one and the same to many---is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas. </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p11"> Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself---for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for "the animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32036] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod universale dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit posterius. Unde in I de anima dicitur quod <i>animal universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est</i>. Sed secundum Platonem, qui posuit universalia subsistentia, secundum hanc considerationem universale esset prius quam particularia, quae secundum eum non sunt nisi per participationem universalium subsistentium, quae dicuntur ideae. Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam naturam, scilicet animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus. Et sic dicendum est quod duplex est ordo naturae. Unus secundum viam generationis et temporis, secundum quam viam, ea quae sunt imperfecta et in potentia, sunt priora. Et hoc modo magis commune est prius secundum naturam, quod apparet manifeste in generatione hominis et animalis; nam prius generatur animal quam homo, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Alius est ordo perfectionis, sive intentionis naturae; sicut actus simpliciter est prius secundum naturam quam potentia, et perfectum prius quam imperfectum. Et per hunc modum, minus commune est prius secundum naturam quam magis commune, ut homo quam animal, naturae enim intentio non sistit in generatione animalis, sed intendit generare hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more common universal may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained not only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more; as "man" contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore "animal" in itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man" comes before "animal" considered as part of the same idea. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32037] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod universale magis commune comparatur ad minus commune ut totum et ut pars. Ut totum quidem, secundum quod in magis universali non solum continetur in potentia minus universale, sed etiam alia; ut sub animali non solum homo, sed etiam equus. Ut pars autem, secundum quod minus commune continet in sui ratione non solum magis commune, sed etiam alia; ut homo non solum animal, sed etiam rationale. Sic igitur animal consideratum in se, prius est in nostra cognitione quam homo; sed homo est prius in nostra cognitione quam quod animal sit pars rationis eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32038] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod pars aliqua dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo absolute, secundum quod in se est, et sic nihil prohibet prius cognoscere partes quam totum, ut lapides quam domum. Alio modo, secundum quod sunt partes huius totius, et sic necesse est quod prius cognoscamus totum quam partes; prius enim cognoscimus domum quadam confusa cognitione, quam distinguamus singulas partes eius. Sic igitur dicendum est quod definientia, absolute considerata, sunt prius nota quam definitum, alioquin non notificaretur definitum per ea. Sed secundum quod sunt partes definitionis, sic sunt posterius nota, prius enim cognoscimus hominem quadam confusa cognitione, quam sciamus distinguere omnia quae sunt de hominis ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32039] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod universale, secundum quod accipitur cum intentione universalitatis, est quidem quodammodo principium cognoscendi, prout intentio universalitatis consequitur modum intelligendi qui est per abstractionem. Non autem est necesse quod omne quod est principium cognoscendi, sit principium essendi, ut Plato existimavit, cum quandoque cognoscamus causam per effectum, et substantiam per accidentia. Unde universale sic acceptum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, non est principium essendi, neque substantia, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Si autem consideremus ipsam naturam generis et speciei prout est in singularibus, sic quodammodo habet rationem principii formalis respectu singularium, nam singulare est propter materiam, ratio autem speciei sumitur ex forma. Sed natura generis comparatur ad naturam speciei magis per modum materialis principii, quia natura generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, ratio vero speciei ab eo quod est formale; sicut ratio animalis a sensitivo, ratio vero hominis ab intellectivo. Et inde est quod ultima naturae intentio est ad speciem, non autem ad individuum, neque ad genus, quia forma est finis generationis, materia vero est propter formam. Non autem oportet quod cuiuslibet causae vel principii cognitio sit posterior quoad nos, cum quandoque cognoscamus per causas sensibiles, effectus ignotos; quandoque autem e converso.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A4-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 4. Whether we can understand many things at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we can understand many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the same time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32040] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod possimus multa simul intelligere. Intellectus enim est supra tempus. Sed prius et posterius ad tempus pertinent. Ergo intellectus non intelligit diversa secundum prius et posterius, sed simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the same time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32041] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil prohibet diversas formas non oppositas simul eidem actu inesse, sicut odorem et colorem pomo. Sed species intelligibiles non sunt oppositae. Ergo nihil prohibet intellectum unum simul fieri in actu secundum diversas species intelligibiles et sic potest multa simul intelligere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore the intellect understands many things at the same time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32042] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, intellectus simul intelligit aliquod totum, ut hominem vel domum. Sed in quolibet toto continentur multae partes. Ergo intellectus simul multa intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the same is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it knows many things at the same time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32043] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non potest cognosci differentia unius ad alterum, nisi simul utrumque apprehendatur, ut dicitur in libro de anima, et eadem ratio est de quacumque alia comparatione. Sed intellectus noster cognoscit differentiam et comparationem unius ad alterum. Ergo cognoscit multa simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that "understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32044] Iª q. 85 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro Topic., quod <i>intelligere est unum solum, scire vero multa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by "one" but not by "many" intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things which the species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 co."><a name="32045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32045] Iª q. 85 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum unius, non autem multa per modum multorum, dico autem per modum unius vel multorum, per unam vel plures species intelligibiles. Nam modus cuiusque actionis consequitur formam quae est actionis principium. Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, simul intelligere potest, et inde est quod Deus omnia simul videt, quia omnia videt per unum, quod est essentia sua. Quaecumque vero intellectus per diversas species intelligit, non simul intelligit. Et huius ratio est, quia impossibile est idem subiectum perfici simul pluribus formis unius generis et diversarum specierum, sicut impossibile est quod idem corpus secundum idem simul coloretur diversis coloribus, vel figuretur diversis figuris. Omnes autem species intelligibiles sunt unius generis, quia sunt perfectiones unius intellectivae potentiae; licet res quarum sunt species, sint diversorum generum. Impossibile est ergo quod idem intellectus simul perficiatur diversis speciebus intelligibilibus, ad intelligendum diversa in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32046] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus est supra tempus quod est numerus motus corporalium rerum. Sed ipsa pluralitas specierum intelligibilium causat vicissitudinem quandam intelligibilium operationum, secundum quam una operatio est prior altera. Et hanc vicissitudinem Augustinus nominat tempus, cum dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32047] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non solum oppositae formae non possunt esse simul in eodem subiecto, sed nec quaecumque formae eiusdem generis, licet non sint oppositae, sicut patet per exemplum inductum de coloribus et figuris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its species; and so they are not understood at the same time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32048] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod partes possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sub quadam confusione, prout sunt in toto, et sic cognoscuntur per unam formam totius, et sic simul cognoscuntur. Alio modo, cognitione distincta, secundum quod quaelibet cognoscitur per suam speciem, et sic non simul intelliguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32049] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod quando intellectus intelligit differentiam vel comparationem unius ad alterum, cognoscit utrumque differentium vel comparatorum sub ratione ipsius comparationis vel differentiae; sicut dictum est quod cognoscit partes sub ratione totius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A5-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 5. Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32050] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat componendo et dividendo. Compositio enim et divisio non est nisi multorum. Sed intellectus non potest simul multa intelligere. Ergo non potest intelligere componendo et dividendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32051] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omni compositioni et divisioni adiungitur tempus praesens, praeteritum vel futurum. Sed intellectus abstrahit a tempore, sicut etiam ab aliis particularibus conditionibus. Ergo intellectus non intelligit componendo et dividendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32052] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, intellectus intelligit per assimilationem ad res. Sed compositio et divisio nihil est in rebus, nihil enim invenitur in rebus nisi res quae significatur per praedicatum et subiectum, quae est una et eadem si compositio est vera; homo enim est vere id quod est animal. Ergo intellectus non componit et dividit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32053] Iª q. 85 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, voces significant conceptiones intellectus, ut dicit philosophus in I Periherm. Sed in vocibus est compositio et divisio; ut patet in propositionibus affirmativis et negativis. Ergo intellectus componit et dividit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning. </p><p id="FP_Q85_A5-p7"> But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 co."><a name="32054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32054] Iª q. 85 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et dividendo. Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari. Intellectus autem angelicus et divinus se habet sicut res incorruptibiles, quae statim a principio habent suam totam perfectionem. Unde intellectus angelicus et divinus statim perfecte totam rei cognitionem habet. Unde in cognoscendo quidditatem rei, cognoscit de re simul quidquid nos cognoscere possumus componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando. Et ideo intellectus humanus cognoscit componendo et dividendo, sicut et ratiocinando. Intellectus autem divinus et angelicus cognoscunt quidem compositionem et divisionem et ratiocinationem, non componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando, sed per intellectum simplicis quidditatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32055] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod compositio et divisio intellectus secundum quandam differentiam vel comparationem fit. Unde sic intellectus cognoscit multa componendo et dividendo, sicut cognoscendo differentiam vel comparationem rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we have said <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32056] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus et abstrahit a phantasmatibus; et tamen non intelligit actu nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut supra dictum est. Et ex ea parte qua se ad phantasmata convertit, compositioni et divisioni intellectus adiungitur tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form with matter; and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white." Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" and "whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white," means that "the man is something having whiteness": and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter; and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32057] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod similitudo rei recipitur in intellectu secundum modum intellectus, et non secundum modum rei. Unde compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei; tamen non eodem modo se habet in re, sicut in intellectu. Intellectus enim humani proprium obiectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae sub sensu et imaginatione cadit. Invenitur autem duplex compositio in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur; nam genus sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero completiva speciei a forma, particulare vero a materia individuali. Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est albus. Tamen differt compositio intellectus a compositione rei, nam ea quae componuntur in re, sunt diversa; compositio autem intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur. Non enim intellectus sic componit, ut dicat quod homo est albedo; sed dicit quod homo est albus, idest habens albedinem, idem autem est subiecto quod est homo, et quod est habens albedinem. Et simile est de compositione formae et materiae, nam animal significat id quod habet naturam sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet naturam intellectivam, homo vero quod habet utrumque, Socrates vero quod habet omnia haec cum materia individuali; et secundum hanc identitatis rationem, intellectus noster unum componit alteri praedicando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A8-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1) that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32074] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster per prius cognoscat indivisibile quam divisibile. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Physic., quod <i>intelligimus et scimus ex principiorum et elementorum cognitione</i>. Sed indivisibilia sunt principia et elementa divisibilium. Ergo per prius sunt nobis nota indivisibilia quam divisibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more known," as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points"; also unity comes into the definition of number, for "number is multitude measured by one," as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32075] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per prius cognoscitur a nobis, quia definitio est ex prioribus et notioribus, ut dicitur in VI Topic. Sed indivisibile ponitur in definitione divisibilis, sicut <i>linea enim</i>, ut Euclides dicit, <i>est longitudo sine latitudine, cuius extremitates sunt duo puncta</i>. Et unitas ponitur in definitione numeri, quia numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo intellectus noster per prius intelligit indivisibile quam divisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the intellect is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32076] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, simile simili cognoscitur. Sed indivisibile est magis simile intellectui quam divisibile, quia intellectus est simplex, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus noster prius cognoscit indivisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible is expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily. Therefore likewise is the indivisible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32077] Iª q. 85 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>indivisibile monstratur sicut privatio</i>. Sed privatio per posterius cognoscitur. Ergo et indivisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A8-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said De Anima iii, 6. First, the continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q85_A3" id="FP_Q85_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as we have said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of privation "as that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect. </p><p id="FP_Q85_A8-p7"> But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated by things. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 co."><a name="32078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32078] Iª q. 85 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quidditas rei materialis, quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex praemissis patet. Et quia id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium eius obiectum, considerari potest quo ordine indivisibile intelligatur a nobis, ex eius habitudine ad huiusmodi quidditatem. Dicitur autem indivisibile tripliciter, ut dicitur in III de anima. Uno modo, sicut continuum est indivisibile, quia est indivisum in actu, licet sit divisibile in potentia. Et huiusmodi indivisibile prius est intellectum a nobis quam eius divisio, quae est in partes, quia cognitio confusa est prior quam distincta, ut dictum est. Alio modo dicitur indivisibile secundum speciem, sicut ratio hominis est quoddam indivisibile. Et hoc etiam modo indivisibile est prius intellectum quam divisio eius in partes rationis, ut supra dictum est, et iterum prius quam intellectus componat et dividat, affirmando vel negando. Et huius ratio est, quia huiusmodi duplex indivisibile intellectus secundum se intelligit, sicut proprium obiectum. Tertio modo dicitur indivisibile quod est omnino indivisibile, ut punctus et unitas, quae nec actu nec potentia dividuntur. Et huiusmodi indivisibile per posterius cognoscitur, per privationem divisibilis. Unde punctum privative definitur, punctum est cuius pars non est, et similiter ratio unius est quod sit indivisibile, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Et huius ratio est, quia tale indivisibile habet quandam oppositionem ad rem corporalem, cuius quidditatem primo et per se intellectus accipit. Si autem intellectus noster intelligeret per participationem indivisibilium separatorum, ut Platonici posuerunt, sequeretur quod indivisibile huiusmodi esset primo intellectum, quia secundum Platonicos, priora prius participantur a rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider that we know, when we can resolve principles into their causes." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32079] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in accipiendo scientiam, non semper principia et elementa sunt priora, quia quandoque ex effectibus sensibilibus devenimus in cognitionem principiorum et causarum intelligibilium. Sed in complemento scientiae, semper scientia effectuum dependet ex cognitione principiorum et elementorum, quia, ut ibidem dicit philosophus, <i>tunc opinamur nos scire, cum principiata possumus in causas resolvere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point is not included in the definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the definition of the divisible, but rather conversely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32080] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod punctum non ponitur in definitione lineae communiter sumptae, manifestum est enim quod in linea infinita, et etiam in circulari, non est punctum nisi in potentia. Sed Euclides definit lineam finitam rectam, et ideo posuit punctum in definitione lineae, sicut terminum in definitione terminati. Unitas vero est mensura numeri, et ideo ponitur in definitione numeri mensurati. Non autem ponitur in definitione divisibilis, sed magis e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather than color. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32081] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod similitudo per quam intelligimus, est species cogniti in cognoscente. Et ideo non secundum similitudinem naturae ad potentiam cognoscitivam est aliquid prius cognitum, sed per convenientiam ad obiectum, alioquin magis visus cognosceret auditum quam colorem.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q86" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q86-p0.1">Q. 86. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q86-p2"> We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q86-p3"><a href="#FP_Q86_A1"> (1) Whether it knows singulars?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p4"><a href="#FP_Q86_A2"> (2) Whether it knows the infinite?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p5"><a href="#FP_Q86_A3"> (3) Whether it knows contingent things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p6"><a href="#FP_Q86_A4"> (4) Whether it knows future things?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 pr."><a name="32082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32082] Iª q. 86 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quid intellectus noster in rebus materialibus cognoscat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cognoscat singularia. Secundo, utrum cognoscat infinita. Tertio, utrum cognoscat contingentia. Quarto, utrum cognoscat futura.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether our intellect can know the infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as we have said above ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[1]</a>). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32093] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster possit cognoscere infinita. Deus enim excedit omnia infinita. Sed intellectus noster potest cognoscere Deum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis potest cognoscere omnia alia infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and "species." But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32094] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, intellectus noster natus est cognoscere genera et species. Sed quorundam generum sunt infinitae species, sicut numeri, proportionis et figurae. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32095] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si unum corpus non impediret aliud ab existendo in uno et eodem loco, nihil prohiberet infinita corpora in uno loco esse. Sed una species intelligibilis non prohibet aliam ab existendo simul in eodem intellectu, contingit enim multa scire in habitu. Ergo nihil prohibet intellectum nostrum infinitorum scientiam habere in habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32096] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, intellectus, cum non sit virtus materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est, videtur esse potentia infinita. Sed virtus infinita potest super infinita. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered as such, is unknown." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32097] Iª q. 86 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in I Physic., quod <i>infinitum, inquantum est infinitum, est ignotum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more. </p><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p8"> On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible. </p><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p9"> For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration: since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained above. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 co."><a name="32098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32098] Iª q. 86 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum potentia proportionetur suo obiecto, oportet hoc modo se habere intellectum ad infinitum, sicut se habet eius obiectum, quod est quidditas rei materialis. In rebus autem materialibus non invenitur infinitum in actu, sed solum in potentia, secundum quod unum succedit alteri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Et ideo in intellectu nostro invenitur infinitum in potentia, in accipiendo scilicet unum post aliud, quia nunquam intellectus noster tot intelligit, quin possit plura intelligere. Actu autem vel habitu non potest cognoscere infinita intellectus noster. Actu quidem non, quia intellectus noster non potest simul actu cognoscere nisi quod per unam speciem cognoscit. Infinitum autem non habet unam speciem, alioquin haberet rationem totius et perfecti. Et ideo non potest intelligi nisi accipiendo partem post partem, ut ex eius definitione patet in III Physic., <i>est enim infinitum cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid extra accipere</i>, et sic infinitum cognosci non posset actu, nisi omnes partes eius numerarentur, quod est impossibile. Et eadem ratione non possumus intelligere infinita in habitu. In nobis enim habitualis cognitio causatur ex actuali consideratione, intelligendo enim efficimur scientes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde non possemus habere habitum infinitorum secundum distinctam cognitionem, nisi consideravissemus omnia infinita, numerando ea secundum cognitionis successionem, quod est impossibile. Et ita nec actu nec habitu intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita, sed in potentia tantum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the term 'infinite' is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32099] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus dicitur infinitus sicut forma quae non est terminata per aliquam materiam, in rebus autem materialibus aliquid dicitur infinitum per privationem formalis terminationis. Et quia forma secundum se nota est, materia autem sine forma ignota, inde est quod infinitum materiale est secundum se ignotum. Infinitum autem formale, quod est Deus, est secundum se notum, ignotum autem quoad nos, propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui secundum statum praesentis vitae habet naturalem aptitudinem ad materialia cognoscenda. Et ideo in praesenti Deum cognoscere non possumus nisi per materiales effectus. In futuro autem tolletur defectus intellectus nostri per gloriam, et tunc ipsum Deum in sua essentia videre poterimus, tamen absque comprehensione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles; and this is to know them potentially and confusedly. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32100] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus noster natus est cognoscere species per abstractionem a phantasmatibus. Et ideo illas species numerorum et figurarum quas quis non est imaginatus, non potest cognoscere nec actu nec habitu, nisi forte in genere et in principiis universalibus; quod est cognoscere in potentia et confuse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32101] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si duo corpora essent in uno loco, vel plura, non oporteret quod successive subintrarent locum, ut sic per ipsam subintrationis successionem numerarentur locata. Sed species intelligibiles ingrediuntur intellectum nostrum successive, quia non multa simul actu intelliguntur. Et ideo oportet numeratas, et non infinitas species esse in intellectu nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infinite number of individuals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32102] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod sicut intellectus noster est infinitus virtute, ita infinitum cognoscit. Est enim virtus eius infinita, secundum quod non terminatur per materiam corporalem. Et est cognoscitivus universalis, quod est abstractum a materia individuali, et per consequens non finitur ad aliquod individuum, sed, quantum est de se, ad infinita individua se extendit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q86_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A3-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 3. Whether our intellect can know contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32103] Iª q. 86 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit cognoscitivus contingentium. Quia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., intellectus et sapientia et scientia non sunt contingentium, sed necessariorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32104] Iª q. 86 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., <i>ea quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt, tempore mensurantur</i>. Intellectus autem a tempore abstrahit, sicut et ab aliis conditionibus materiae. Cum igitur proprium contingentium sit quandoque esse et quandoque non esse, videtur quod contingentia non cognoscantur ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p4"> <b>On the contrary,</b> All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32105] Iª q. 86 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnis scientia est in intellectu. Sed quaedam scientiae sunt de contingentibus; sicut scientiae morales, quae sunt de actibus humanis subiectis libero arbitrio; et etiam scientiae naturales, quantum ad partem quae tractat de generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Ergo intellectus est cognoscitivus contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid down above <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 co."><a name="32106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32106] Iª q. 86 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod contingentia dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod contingentia sunt. Alio modo, secundum quod in eis aliquid necessitatis invenitur, nihil enim est adeo contingens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. Sicut hoc ipsum quod est Socratem currere, in se quidem contingens est; sed habitudo cursus ad motum est necessaria, necessarium enim est Socratem moveri, si currit. Est autem unumquodque contingens ex parte materiae, quia contingens est quod potest esse et non esse; potentia autem pertinet ad materiam. Necessitas autem consequitur rationem formae, quia ea quae consequuntur ad formam, ex necessitate insunt. Materia autem est individuationis principium, ratio autem universalis accipitur secundum abstractionem formae a materia particulari. Dictum autem est supra quod per se et directe intellectus est universalium; sensus autem singularium, quorum etiam indirecte quodammodo est intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur contingentia, prout sunt contingentia, cognoscuntur directe quidem sensu, indirecte autem ab intellectu, rationes autem universales et necessariae contingentium cognoscuntur per intellectum. Unde si attendantur rationes universales scibilium, omnes scientiae sunt de necessariis. Si autem attendantur ipsae res, sic quaedam scientia est de necessariis, quaedam vero de contingentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p6"> From which the replies to the objections are clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="32107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32107] Iª q. 86 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q86_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A4-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 4. Whether our intellect can know the future?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32108] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat futura. Intellectus enim noster cognoscit per species intelligibiles, quae abstrahunt ab hic et nunc, et ita se habent indifferenter ad omne tempus. Sed potest cognoscere praesentia. Ergo potest cognoscere futura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32109] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, homo quando alienatur a sensibus, aliqua futura cognoscere potest; ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Sed quando alienatur a sensibus, magis viget intellectu. Ergo intellectus, quantum est de se, est cognoscitivus futurorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32110] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cognitio intellectiva hominis efficacior est quam cognitio quaecumque brutorum animalium. Sed quaedam animalia sunt quae cognoscunt quaedam futura; sicut corniculae frequenter crocitantes significant pluviam mox futuram. Ergo multo magis intellectus humanus potest futura cognoscere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q86_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.8.6" target="asv">Eccles. 8:6,7</a>), "There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32111] Iª q. 86 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. VIII, <i>multa hominis afflictio, qui ignorat praeterita, et futura nullo potest scire nuntio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above <a href="#FP_Q86_A3" id="FP_Q86_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflection only, as stated above <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science. </p><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p7"> Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A13" id="FP_Q86_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[13]</a>). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 co."><a name="32112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32112] Iª q. 86 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod de cognitione futurorum eodem modo distinguendum est, sicut de cognitione contingentium. Nam ipsa futura ut sub tempore cadunt, sunt singularia, quae intellectus humanus non cognoscit nisi per reflexionem, ut supra dictum est. Rationes autem futurorum possunt esse universales, et intellectu perceptibiles, et de eis etiam possunt esse scientiae. Ut tamen communiter de cognitione futurorum loquamur, sciendum est quod futura dupliciter cognosci possunt, uno modo, in seipsis; alio modo, in suis causis. In seipsis quidem futura cognosci non possunt nisi a Deo; cui etiam sunt praesentia dum in cursu rerum sunt futura, inquantum eius aeternus intuitus simul fertur supra totum temporis cursum, ut supra dictum est cum de Dei scientia ageretur. Sed prout sunt in suis causis, cognosci possunt etiam a nobis. Et si quidem in suis causis sint ut ex quibus ex necessitate proveniant, cognoscuntur per certitudinem scientiae; sicut astrologus praecognoscit eclipsim futuram. Si autem sic sint in suis causis ut ab eis proveniant ut in pluribus, sic cognosci possunt per quandam coniecturam vel magis vel minus certam, secundum quod causae sunt vel magis vel minus inclinatae ad effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, according to the order of the effects to the cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32113] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de cognitione quae fit per rationes universales causarum, ex quibus futura cognosci possunt secundum modum ordinis effectus ad causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii. 13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future. </p><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p10"> But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q57_A3" id="FP_Q86_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[3]</a>). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii.], "impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32114] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII Confess., anima habet quandam vim sortis, ut ex sui natura possit futura cognoscere, et ideo quando retrahitur a corporeis sensibus, et quodammodo revertitur ad seipsam, fit particeps notitiae futurorum. Et haec quidem opinio rationabilis esset, si poneremus quod anima acciperet cognitionem rerum secundum participationem idearum, sicut Platonici posuerunt, quia sic anima ex sui natura cognosceret universales causas omnium effectuum, sed impeditur per corpus; unde quando a corporis sensibus abstrahitur, futura cognoscit. Sed quia iste modus cognoscendi non est connaturalis intellectui nostro, sed magis ut cognitionem a sensibus accipiat; ideo non est secundum naturam animae quod futura cognoscat cum a sensibus alienatur; sed magis per impressionem aliquarum causarum superiorum spiritualium et corporalium. Spiritualium quidem, sicut cum virtute divina ministerio Angelorum intellectus humanus illuminatur, et phantasmata ordinantur ad futura aliqua cognoscenda; vel etiam cum per operationem Daemonum fit aliqua commotio in phantasia ad praesignandum aliqua futura quae Daemones cognoscunt, ut supra dictum est. Huiusmodi autem impressiones spiritualium causarum magis nata est anima humana suscipere cum a sensibus alienatur, quia per hoc propinquior fit substantiis spiritualibus, et magis libera ab exterioribus inquietudinibus. Contingit autem et hoc per impressionem superiorum causarum corporalium. Manifestum est enim quod corpora superiora imprimunt in corpora inferiora. Unde cum vires sensitivae sint actus corporalium organorum, consequens est quod ex impressione caelestium corporum immutetur quodammodo phantasia. Unde cum caelestia corpora sint causa multorum futurorum, fiunt in imaginatione aliqua signa quorundam futurorum. Haec autem signa magis percipiuntur in nocte et a dormientibus, quam de die et a vigilantibus, quia, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vigil., <i>quae deferuntur de die, dissolvuntur magis; plus est enim sine turbatione aer noctis, eo quod silentiores sunt noctes. Et in corpore faciunt sensum propter somnum, quia parvi motus interiores magis sentiuntur a dormientibus quam a vigilantibus. Hi vero motus faciunt phantasmata, ex quibus praevidentur futura</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain and the like, may be known rather from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that "some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32115] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod animalia bruta non habent aliquid supra phantasiam quod ordinet phantasmata, sicut habent homines rationem; et ideo phantasia brutorum animalium totaliter sequitur impressionem caelestem. Et ideo ex motibus huiusmodi animalium magis possunt cognosci quaedam futura, ut pluvia et huiusmodi, quam ex motibus hominum, qui moventur per consilium rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod <i>quidam imprudentissimi sunt maxime praevidentes, nam intelligentia horum non est curis affecta, sed tanquam deserta et vacua ab omnibus, et mota secundum movens ducitur</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q87" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q87-p0.1">Q. 87. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q87-p2"> We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: </p><p id="FP_Q87-p3"><a href="#FP_Q87_A1"> (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p4"><a href="#FP_Q87_A2"> (2) Whether it knows its own habits?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p5"><a href="#FP_Q87_A3"> (3) How does the intellect know its own act?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p6"><a href="#FP_Q87_A4"> (4) How does it know the act of the will?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 pr."><a name="32116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32116] Iª q. 87 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima intellectiva cognoscat seipsam, et ea quae in se sunt. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cognoscat seipsam per suam essentiam. Secundo, quomodo cognoscat habitus in se existentes. Tertio, quomodo intellectus cognoscat proprium actum. Quarto, quomodo cognoscat actum voluntatis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q87_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A1-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 1. Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32117] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva seipsam cognoscat per suam essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., quod <i>mens seipsam novit per seipsam, quoniam est incorporea</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32118] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Angelus et anima humana conveniunt in genere intellectualis substantiae. Sed Angelus intelligit seipsum per essentiam suam. Ergo et anima humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q87_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32119] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur</i>, ut dicitur III de anima. Sed mens humana est sine materia, non enim est actus corporis alicuius, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in mente humana est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur. Ergo intelligit se per essentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32120] Iª q. 87 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>intellectus intelligit seipsum sicut et alia</i>. Sed alia non intelligit per essentias eorum, sed per eorum similitudines. Ergo neque se intelligit per essentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q87_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence. </p><p id="FP_Q87_A1-p7"> Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as "act," but not as a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called "possible" [*Possibilis---elsewhere in this translation rendered "passive"---Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A5" id="FP_Q87_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[5]</a>). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"---i.e. to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its essence and nature. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 co."><a name="32121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32121] Iª q. 87 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., sic enim aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub cognitione cadit, prout actu est. Et hoc quidem manifeste apparet in rebus sensibilibus, non enim visus percipit coloratum in potentia, sed solum coloratum in actu. Et similiter intellectus manifestum est quod, inquantum est cognoscitivus rerum materialium, non cognoscit nisi quod est actu, et inde est quod non cognoscit materiam primam nisi secundum proportionem ad formam, ut dicitur in I Physic. Unde et in substantiis immaterialibus, secundum quod unaquaeque earum se habet ad hoc quod sit in actu per essentiam suam, ita se habet ad hoc quod sit per suam essentiam intelligibilis. Essentia igitur Dei, quae est actus purus et perfectus, est simpliciter et perfecte secundum seipsam intelligibilis. Unde Deus per suam essentiam non solum seipsum, sed etiam omnia intelligit. Angeli autem essentia est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus, non tamen ut actus purus neque completus. Unde eius intelligere non completur per essentiam suam, etsi enim per essentiam suam se intelligat Angelus, tamen non omnia potest per essentiam suam cognoscere, sed cognoscit alia a se per eorum similitudines. Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium, unde possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus, se habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde ex seipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu. Sic enim etiam Platonici posuerunt ordinem entium intelligibilium supra ordinem intellectuum, quia intellectus non intelligit nisi per participationem intelligibilis; participans autem est infra participatum, secundum eos. Si igitur intellectus humanus fieret actu per participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut Platonici posuerunt per huiusmodi participationem rerum incorporearum intellectus humanus seipsum intelligeret. Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro, secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra dictum est; consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus. Sed verum est quod iudicium et efficacia huius cognitionis per quam naturam animae cognoscimus, competit nobis secundum derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate divina, in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur, sicut supra dictum est. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in IX de Trin., <i>intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definimus non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat</i>. Est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam, sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo mens percipit seipsam. Et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam, non sufficit eius praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio. Unde et multi naturam animae ignorant, et multi etiam circa naturam animae erraverunt. Propter quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., de tali inquisitione mentis, <i>non velut absentem se quaerat mens cernere; sed praesentem quaerat discernere</i>, idest cognoscere differentiam suam ab aliis rebus, quod est cognoscere quidditatem et naturam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32122] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mens seipsam per seipsam novit, quia tandem in sui ipsius cognitionem pervenit, licet per suum actum, ipsa enim est quae cognoscitur, quia ipsa seipsam amat, ut ibidem subditur. Potest enim aliquid dici per se notum dupliciter, vel quia per nihil aliud in eius notitiam devenitur, sicut dicuntur prima principia per se nota; vel quia non sunt cognoscibilia per accidens, sicut color est per se visibilis, substantia autem per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things---as is the passive intellect---or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms---as is the active intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32123] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia Angeli est sicut actus in genere intelligibilium, et ideo se habet et ut intellectus, et ut intellectum. Unde Angelus suam essentiam per seipsum apprehendit. Non autem intellectus humanus, qui vel est omnino in potentia respectu intelligibilium, sicut intellectus possibilis; vel est actus intelligibilium quae abstrahuntur a phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus agens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same." For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things are immaterial---as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32124] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi universaliter verum est in omni intellectu. Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile, propter similitudinem sensibilis, quae est forma sensus in actu; ita intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, propter similitudinem rei intellectae, quae est forma intellectus in actu. Et ideo intellectus humanus, qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, per eandem speciem intelligitur, sicut per formam suam. Idem autem est dicere quod in his <i>quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur</i>, ac si diceretur quod in his quae sunt intellecta in actu, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu, quod est sine materia. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia quorundam essentiae sunt sine materia, sicut substantiae separatae quas Angelos dicimus, quarum unaquaeque et est intellecta et est intelligens, sed quaedam res sunt quarum essentiae non sunt sine materia, sed solum similitudines ab eis abstractae. Unde et Commentator dicit, in III de anima, quod propositio inducta non habet veritatem nisi in substantiis separatis, verificatur enim quodammodo in eis quod non verificatur in aliis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A2-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 2. Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence"; and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by themselves. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32125] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat habitus animae per essentiam eorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIII de Trin., <i>non sic videtur fides in corde in quo est, sicut anima alterius hominis ex motibus corporis videtur; sed eam tenet certissima scientia, clamatque conscientia</i>. Et eadem ratio est de aliis habitibus animae. Ergo habitus animae non cognoscuntur per actus, sed per seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32126] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res materiales, quae sunt extra animam, cognoscuntur per hoc quod similitudines earum sunt praesentialiter in anima; et ideo dicuntur per suas similitudines cognosci. Sed habitus animae praesentialiter per suam essentiam sunt in anima. Ergo per suam essentiam cognoscuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32127] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis</i>. Sed res aliae cognoscuntur ab anima propter habitus et species intelligibiles. Ergo ista magis per seipsa ab anima cognoscuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32128] Iª q. 87 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, habitus sunt principia actuum, sicut et potentiae. Sed sicut dicitur II de anima, <i>priores potentiis, secundum rationem, actus et operationes sunt</i>. Ergo eadem ratione sunt priores habitibus. Et ita habitus per actus cognoscuntur, sicut et potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 co."><a name="32129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32129] Iª q. 87 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod habitus quodammodo est medium inter potentiam puram et purum actum. Iam autem dictum est quod nihil cognoscitur nisi secundum quod est actu. Sic ergo inquantum habitus deficit ab actu perfecto, deficit ab hoc, ut non sit per seipsum cognoscibilis, sed necesse est quod per actum suum cognoscatur, sive dum aliquis percipit se habere habitum, per hoc quod percipit se producere actum proprium habitus; sive dum aliquis inquirit naturam et rationem habitus, ex consideratione actus. Et prima quidem cognitio habitus fit per ipsam praesentiam habitus, quia ex hoc ipso quod est praesens, actum causat, in quo statim percipitur. Secunda autem cognitio habitus fit per studiosam inquisitionem, sicut supra dictum est de mente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32130] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, etsi fides non cognoscatur per exteriores corporis motus, percipitur tamen etiam ab eo in quo est, per interiorem actum cordis. Nullus enim fidem se habere scit, nisi per hoc quod se credere percipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the nature of a material thing as stated above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), but as that by which it understands. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32131] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus sunt praesentes in intellectu nostro, non sicut obiecta intellectus (quia obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natura rei materialis, ut supra dictum est); sed sunt praesentes in intellectu ut quibus intellectus intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32132] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur, <i>propter quod unumquodque, illud magis</i>, veritatem habet, si intelligatur in his quae sunt unius ordinis, puta in uno genere causae, puta si dicatur quod sanitas est propter vitam, sequitur quod vita sit magis desiderabilis. Si autem accipiantur ea quae sunt diversorum ordinum, non habet veritatem, ut si dicatur quod sanitas est propter medicinam, non ideo sequitur quod medicina sit magis desiderabilis, quia sanitas est in ordine finium, medicina autem in ordine causarum efficientium. Sic igitur si accipiamus duo, quorum utrumque sit per se in ordine obiectorum cognitionis; illud propter quod aliud cognoscitur, erit magis notum, sicut principia conclusionibus. Sed habitus non est de ordine obiectorum, inquantum est habitus; nec propter habitum aliqua cognoscuntur sicut propter obiectum cognitum, sed sicut propter dispositionem vel formam qua cognoscens cognoscit, et ideo ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A3-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 3. Whether our intellect knows its own act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32133] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non cognoscat proprium actum. Illud enim proprie cognoscitur, quod est obiectum cognoscitivae virtutis. Sed actus differt ab obiecto. Ergo intellectus non cognoscit suum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32134] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quidquid cognoscitur, aliquo actu cognoscitur. Si igitur intellectus cognoscit actum suum, aliquo actu cognoscit illum; et iterum illum actum alio actu. Erit ergo procedere in infinitum, quod videtur impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32135] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad actum suum, ita et intellectus. Sed sensus proprius non sentit actum suum, sed hoc pertinet ad sensum communem, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo neque intellectus intelligit actum suum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I understand." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32136] Iª q. 87 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>intelligo me intelligere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A1" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[1] </a>), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 co."><a name="32137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32137] Iª q. 87 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. Ultima autem perfectio intellectus est eius operatio, non enim est sicut actio tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut perfectio et actus eius, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Hoc igitur est primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum eius intelligere. Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se habent. Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est ipsum suum intelligere. Et sic in Deo idem est quod intelligat se intelligere et quod intelligat suam essentiam, quia sua essentia est suum intelligere. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere, sicut supra dictum est, sed tamen primum obiectum sui intelligere est eius essentia. Unde etsi aliud sit in Angelo, secundum rationem, quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam, tamen simul et uno actu utrumque intelligit, quia hoc quod est intelligere suam essentiam, est propria perfectio suae essentiae; simul autem et uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum intelligere. Et ideo philosophus dicit quod obiecta praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as considered in material things, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32138] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, scilicet ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere. Sed non primo, quia nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained above ( <a href="#FP_Q86_A2" id="FP_Q87_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[2]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32139] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsum intelligere humanum non est actus et perfectio naturae intellectae materialis, ut sic possit uno actu intelligi natura rei materialis et ipsum intelligere, sicut uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Unde alius est actus quo intellectus intelligit lapidem, et alius est actus quo intelligit se intelligere lapidem, et sic inde. Nec est inconveniens in intellectu esse infinitum in potentia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there is no comparison. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32140] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus proprius sentit secundum immutationem materialis organi a sensibili exteriori. Non est autem possibile quod aliquid materiale immutet seipsum; sed unum immutatur ab alio. Et ideo actus sensus proprii percipitur per sensum communem. Sed intellectus non intelligit per materialem immutationem organi, et ideo non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A4-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 4. Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32141] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non intelligat actum voluntatis. Nihil enim cognoscitur ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquo modo praesens in intellectu. Sed actus voluntatis non est praesens in intellectu, cum sint diversae potentiae. Ergo actus voluntatis non cognoscitur ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32142] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actus habet speciem ab obiecto. Sed obiectum voluntatis differt ab obiecto intellectus. Ergo et actus voluntatis speciem habet diversam ab obiecto intellectus. Non ergo cognoscitur ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such affections of the soul as the acts of the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32143] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro X Confess., attribuit affectionibus animae quod cognoscuntur neque per imagines, sicut corpora; <i>neque per praesentiam, sicut artes, sed per quasdam notiones</i>. Non videtur autem quod possint esse aliae notiones rerum in anima nisi vel essentiae rerum cognitarum, vel earum similitudines. Ergo impossibile videtur quod intellectus cognoscat affectiones animae, quae sunt actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I will." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32144] Iª q. 87 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>intelligo me velle</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A1" id="FP_Q87_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[1]</a>), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)---that "the will is in the reason." Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 co."><a name="32145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32145] Iª q. 87 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem. Inclinatio autem cuiuslibet rei est in ipsa re per modum eius. Unde inclinatio naturalis est naturaliter in re naturali; et inclinatio quae est appetitus sensibilis, est sensibiliter in sentiente; et similiter inclinatio intelligibilis, quae est actus voluntatis, est intelligibiliter in intelligente, sicut in principio et in proprio subiecto. Unde et philosophus hoc modo loquendi utitur in III de anima, quod voluntas in ratione est. Quod autem intelligibiliter est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur. Unde actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et inquantum aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam huius actus, et per consequens naturam eius principii, quod est habitus vel potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32146] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si voluntas et intellectus, sicut sunt diversae potentiae, ita etiam subiecto differrent, sic enim quod est in voluntate, esset absens ab intellectu. Nunc autem, cum utrumque radicetur in una substantia animae, et unum sit quodammodo principium alterius, consequens est ut quod est in voluntate, sit etiam quodammodo in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q82_A4" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>, ad 1; <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A4" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[16], A[4]</a>, ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32147] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum et verum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis et intellectus, differunt quidem ratione, verumtamen unum eorum continetur sub alio, ut supra dictum est, nam verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et ideo quae sunt voluntatis cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus possunt cadere sub voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32148] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod affectus animae non sunt in intellectu neque per similitudinem tantum, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam ut in subiecto, sicut artes; sed sicut principiatum in principio, in quo habetur notio principiati. Et ideo Augustinus dicit affectus animae esse in memoria per quasdam notiones.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q88" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q88-p0.1">Q. 88. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q88-p2"> We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: </p><p id="FP_Q88-p3"><a href="#FP_Q88_A1"> (1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?</a></p><p id="FP_Q88-p4"><a href="#FP_Q88_A2"> (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q88-p5"><a href="#FP_Q88_A3"> (3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 pr."><a name="32149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32149] Iª q. 88 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima humana cognoscat ea quae supra se sunt, scilicet immateriales substantias. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum anima humana, secundum statum praesentis vitae, possit intelligere substantias immateriales quas Angelos dicimus, per seipsas. Secundo, utrum possit ad earum notitiam pervenire per cognitionem rerum materialium. Tertio, utrum Deus sit id quod primo a nobis cognoscitur.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q88_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A1-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 1. Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine (De Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things." But these are the immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial substances. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32150] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana, secundum statum vitae praesentis, possit intelligere substantias immateriales per seipsas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., <i>mens ipsa, sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum rerum per semetipsam</i>. Huiusmodi autem sunt substantiae immateriales. Ergo mens substantias immateriales intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q88_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able to understand immaterial things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32151] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, simile simili cognoscitur. Sed magis assimilatur mens humana rebus immaterialibus quam materialibus, cum ipsa mens sit immaterialis, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum ergo mens nostra intelligat res materiales, multo magis intelligit res immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De Anima iii, 4. Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32152] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod ea quae sunt secundum se maxime sensibilia, non maxime sentiantur a nobis, provenit ex hoc quod excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt sensum. Sed excellentiae intelligibilium non corrumpunt intellectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo ea quae sunt secundum se maxime intelligibilia, sunt etiam maxime intelligibilia nobis. Sed cum res materiales non sint intelligibiles nisi quia facimus eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo a materia; manifestum est quod magis sint secundum se intelligibiles substantiae quae secundum suam naturam sunt immateriales. Ergo multo magis intelliguntur a nobis quam res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature would be frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract substances, "because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be understood at all." But in nature nothing is idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32153] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Commentator dicit, in II Metaphys., quod si substantiae abstractae non possent intelligi a nobis, <i>tunc natura otiose egisset, quia fecit illud quod est naturaliter in se intellectum, non intellectum ab aliquo</i>. Sed nihil est otiosum sive frustra in natura. Ergo substantiae immateriales possunt intelligi a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the superior and immaterial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32154] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia. Sed visus noster potest videre omnia corpora, sive sint superiora et incorruptibilia, sive sint inferiora et corruptibilia. Ergo intellectus noster potest intelligere omnes substantias intelligibiles, et superiores et immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.16" target="asv">Wis. 9:16</a>): "The things that are in heaven, who shall search out?" But these substances are said to be in heaven, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv"> Mat. 18:10, </a> "Their angels in heaven," etc. Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32155] Iª q. 88 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. IX, <i>quae in caelis sunt, quis investigabit?</i> In caelis autem dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae esse; secundum illud Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in caelis</i> et cetera. Ergo non possunt substantiae immateriales per investigationem humanam cognosci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called "Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus first and "per se" understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things. </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p9"> But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q88_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and "per se" be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have. </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p10"> Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which he calls the "active intellect," and which, being a separate substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can understand material things. Now he said that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand separate substances (because according to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by means of the active intellect. </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p11"> This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its actuality, as was said of the passive intellect ( <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q70_A1" id="FP_Q88_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[70], A[1]</a>). Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated in things understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its light only is united to us, that we may see the colors. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects together do not equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances. </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p12"> Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a "kind of common good, communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of the species. </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p13"> Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united to the active intellect as some imagined. </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p14"> Sixthly, as was shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q88_A1-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>), the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is "all things potentially," and the active intellect is "all things in act." Therefore both intellects, according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 co."><a name="32156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32156] Iª q. 88 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod secundum opinionem Platonis, substantiae immateriales non solum a nobis intelliguntur, sed etiam sunt prima a nobis intellecta. Posuit enim Plato formas immateriales subsistentes, quas ideas vocabat, esse propria obiecta nostri intellectus, et ita primo et per se intelliguntur a nobis. Applicatur tamen animae cognitio rebus materialibus, secundum quod intellectui permiscetur phantasia et sensus. Unde quanto magis intellectus fuerit depuratus, tanto magis percipit immaterialium intelligibilem veritatem. Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam, quam magis experimur, intellectus noster, secundum statum praesentis vitae, naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium; unde nihil intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic manifestum est quod substantias immateriales, quae sub sensu et imaginatione non cadunt, primo et per se, secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum, intelligere non possumus. Sed tamen Averroes, in Comment. tertii de anima, ponit quod in fine in hac vita homo pervenire potest ad hoc quod intelligat substantias separatas, per continuationem vel unionem cuiusdam substantiae separatae nobis, quam vocat intellectum agentem, qui quidem, cum sit substantia separata, naturaliter substantias separatas intelligit. Unde cum fuerit nobis perfecte unitus, sic ut per eum perfecte intelligere possimus, intelligemus et nos substantias separatas; sicut nunc per intellectum possibilem nobis unitum intelligimus res materiales. Ponit autem intellectum agentem sic nobis uniri. Cum enim nos intelligamus per intellectum agentem et per intelligibilia speculata, ut patet cum conclusiones intelligimus per principia intellecta; necesse est quod intellectus agens comparetur ad intellecta speculata vel sicut agens principale ad instrumenta, vel sicut forma ad materiam. His enim duobus modis attribuitur actio aliqua duobus principiis, principali quidem agenti et instrumento, sicut sectio artifici et serrae; formae autem et subiecto, sicut calefactio calori et igni. Sed utroque modo intellectus agens comparabitur ad intelligibilia speculata sicut perfectio ad perfectibile, et actus ad potentiam. Simul autem recipitur in aliquo perfectum et perfectio; sicut visibile in actu et lumen in pupilla. Simul igitur in intellectu possibili recipiuntur intellecta speculata et intellectus agens. Et quanto plura intellecta speculata recipimus, tanto magis appropinquamus ad hoc quod intellectus agens perfecte uniatur nobis. Ita quod cum omnia intellecta speculata cognoverimus, intellectus agens perfecte unietur nobis; et poterimus per eum omnia cognoscere materialia et immaterialia. Et in hoc ponit ultimam hominis felicitatem. Nec refert, quantum ad propositum pertinet, utrum in illo statu felicitatis intellectus possibilis intelligat substantias separatas per intellectum agentem, ut ipse sentit, vel, ut ipse imponit Alexandro, intellectus possibilis nunquam intelligat substantias separatas (propter hoc quod ponit intellectum possibilem corruptibilem), sed homo intelligat substantias separatas per intellectum agentem. Sed praedicta stare non possunt. Primo quidem quia, si intellectus agens est substantia separata, impossibile est quod per ipsam formaliter intelligamus, quia id quo formaliter agens agit, est forma et actus agentis; cum omne agens agat inquantum est actu. Sicut etiam supra dictum est circa intellectum possibilem. Secundo quia, secundum modum praedictum, intellectus agens, si est substantia separata, non uniretur nobis secundum suam substantiam; sed solum lumen eius, secundum quod participatur in intellectis speculatis; et non quantum ad alias actiones intellectus agentis, ut possimus per hoc intelligere substantias immateriales. Sicut dum videmus colores illuminatos a sole, non unitur nobis substantia solis, ut possimus actiones solis agere; sed solum nobis unitur lumen solis ad visionem colorum. Tertio, quia dato quod secundum modum praedictum uniretur nobis substantia intellectus agentis, tamen ipsi non ponunt quod intellectus agens totaliter uniatur nobis secundum unum intelligibile vel duo, sed secundum omnia intellecta speculata. Sed omnia intellecta speculata deficiunt a virtute intellectus agentis, quia multo plus est intelligere substantias separatas, quam intelligere omnia materialia. Unde manifestum est quod etiam intellectis omnibus materialibus, non sic uniretur intellectus agens nobis, ut possemus intelligere per eum substantias separatas. Quarto, quia intelligere omnia intellecta materialia vix contingit alicui in hoc mundo; et sic nullus, vel pauci ad felicitatem pervenirent. Quod est contra philosophum, in I Ethic., qui dicit quod <i>felicitas est quoddam bonum commune, quod potest pervenire omnibus non orbatis ad virtutem</i>. Est etiam contra rationem quod finem alicuius speciei ut in paucioribus consequantur ea quae continentur sub specie. Quinto, quia philosophus dicit expresse, in I Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam virtutem</i>. Et enumeratis multis virtutibus, in decimo, concludit quod felicitas ultima, consistens in cognitione maximorum intelligibilium, est secundum virtutem sapientiae, quam posuerat in sexto esse caput scientiarum speculativarum. Unde patet quod Aristoteles posuit ultimam felicitatem hominis in cognitione substantiarum separatarum, qualis potest haberi per scientias speculativas, et non per continuationem intellectus agentis a quibusdam confictam. Sexto, quia supra ostensum est quod intellectus agens non est substantia separata, sed virtus quaedam animae, ad eadem active se extendens, ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilis receptive, quia, ut dicitur in III de anima, intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, intellectus agens quo est omnia facere. Uterque ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ad materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, et recipiuntur in intellectu possibili. Unde secundum statum praesentis vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, neque per intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere substantias immateriales secundum seipsas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32157] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini haberi potest quod illud quod mens nostra de cognitione incorporalium rerum accipere potest, per seipsam cognoscere possit. Et hoc adeo verum est, ut etiam apud philosophos dicatur quod scientia de anima est principium quoddam ad cognoscendum substantias separatas. Per hoc enim quod anima nostra cognoscit seipsam, pertingit ad cognitionem aliquam habendam de substantiis incorporeis, qualem eam contingit habere, non quod simpliciter et perfecte eas cognoscat, cognoscendo seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true ---that the soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial substances. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32158] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo naturae non est ratio sufficiens ad cognitionem, alioquin oporteret dicere quod Empedocles dixit, quod anima esset de natura omnium, ad hoc quod omnia cognosceret. Sed requiritur ad cognoscendum, ut sit similitudo rei cognitae in cognoscente quasi quaedam forma ipsius. Intellectus autem noster possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natus informari similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis, et ideo cognoscit magis materialia quam substantias immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our present state of life, so that it cannot understand them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32159] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod requiritur aliqua proportio obiecti ad potentiam cognoscitivam, ut activi ad passivum, et perfectionis ad perfectibile. Unde quod excellentia sensibilia non capiantur a sensu, non sola ratio est quia corrumpunt organa sensibilia; sed etiam quia sunt improportionata potentiis sensitivis. Et hoc modo substantiae immateriales sunt improportionatae intellectui nostro, secundum praesentem statum, ut non possint ab eo intelligi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p18"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another. </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p19"> Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood by us at all. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32160] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod illa ratio Commentatoris multipliciter deficit. Primo quidem, quia non sequitur quod, si substantiae separatae non intelliguntur a nobis, non intelligantur ab aliquo intellectu, intelliguntur enim a seipsis, et a se invicem. Secundo, quia non est finis substantiarum separatarum ut intelligantur a nobis. Illud autem otiose et frustra esse dicitur, quod non consequitur finem ad quem est. Et sic non sequitur substantias immateriales esse frustra, etiam si nullo modo intelligerentur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p20"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way. The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32161] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod eodem modo sensus cognoscit et superiora et inferiora corpora, scilicet per immutationem organi a sensibili. Non autem eodem modo intelliguntur a nobis substantiae materiales, quae intelliguntur per modum abstractionis; et substantiae immateriales, quae non possunt sic a nobis intelligi, quia non sunt earum aliqua phantasmata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q88_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A2-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 2. Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature." Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial substances. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32162] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster per cognitionem rerum materialium possit pervenire ad intelligendum substantias immateriales. Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>non est possibile humanae menti ad immaterialem illam sursum excitari caelestium hierarchiarum contemplationem, nisi secundum se materiali manuductione utatur</i>. Relinquitur ergo quod per materialia manuduci possumus ad intelligendum substantias immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32163] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, scientia est in intellectu. Sed scientiae et definitiones sunt de substantiis immaterialibus, definit enim Damascenus Angelum; et de Angelis aliqua documenta traduntur tam in theologicis quam in philosophicis disciplinis. Ergo substantiae immateriales intelligi possunt a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which it understands material things. Therefore also other material substances can be understood by us, through their material effects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32164] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima humana est de genere substantiarum immaterialium. Sed ipsa intelligi potest a nobis per actum suum, quo intelligit materialia. Ergo et aliae substantiae immateriales intelligi possunt a nobis per suos effectus in rebus materialibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32165] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illa sola causa per suos effectus comprehendi non potest, quae in infinitum distat a suis effectibus. Hoc autem solius Dei est proprium. Ergo aliae substantiae immateriales creatae intelligi possunt a nobis per res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32166] Iª q. 88 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>sensibilibus intelligibilia, et compositis simplicia, et corporalibus incorporalia apprehendi non possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher named Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught that by the understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and as the process of abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and this would be the understanding of immaterial substance. </p><p id="FP_Q88_A2-p8"> Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms and species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances through material substances. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 co."><a name="32167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32167] Iª q. 88 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Averroes narrat in III de anima, quidam Avempace nomine, posuit quod per intellectum substantiarum materialium pervenire possumus, secundum vera philosophiae principia, ad intelligendum substantias immateriales. Cum enim intellectus noster natus sit abstrahere quidditatem rei materialis a materia, si iterum in illa quidditate sit aliquid materiae, poterit iterato abstrahere, et cum hoc in infinitum non procedat, tandem pervenire poterit ad intelligendum aliquam quidditatem quae sit omnino sine materia. Et hoc est intelligere substantiam immaterialem. Quod quidem efficaciter diceretur, si substantiae immateriales essent formae et species horum materialium, ut Platonici posuerunt. Hoc autem non posito, sed supposito quod substantiae immateriales sint omnino alterius rationis a quidditatibus materialium rerum; quantumcumque intellectus noster abstrahat quidditatem rei materialis a materia, nunquam perveniet ad aliquid simile substantiae immateriali. Et ideo per substantias materiales non possumus perfecte substantias immateriales intelligere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32168] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex rebus materialibus ascendere possumus in aliqualem cognitionem immaterialium rerum, non tamen in perfectam, quia non est sufficiens comparatio rerum materialium ad immateriales, sed similitudines si quae a materialibus accipiuntur ad immaterialia intelligenda, sunt multum dissimiles, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. Cael. Hier.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to material things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32169] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod de superioribus rebus in scientiis maxime tractatur per viam remotionis, sic enim corpora caelestia notificat Aristoteles per negationem proprietatum inferiorum corporum. Unde multo magis immateriales substantiae a nobis cognosci non possunt, ut earum quidditates apprehendamus, sed de eis nobis in scientiis documenta traduntur per viam remotionis et alicuius habitudinis ad res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such act, nor through any other material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32170] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam. Sed neque per hoc, neque per alia quae in rebus materialibus inveniuntur, perfecte cognosci potest immaterialium substantiarum virtus et natura, quia huiusmodi non adaequant earum virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q88_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32171] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod substantiae immateriales creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae, conveniunt tamen cum eis in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in praedicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non sit earum esse. Sed Deus non convenit cum rebus materialibus neque secundum genus naturale, neque secundum genus logicum, quia Deus nullo modo est in genere, ut supra dictum est. Unde per similitudines rerum materialium aliquid affirmative potest cognosci de Angelis secundum rationem communem, licet non secundum rationem speciei; de Deo autem nullo modo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q88_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A3-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 3. Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is the first object known by the human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi; [*Confess. xii, 25]). Therefore God is the first object known to us. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32172] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit primum quod a mente humana cognoscitur. Illud enim in quo omnia alia cognoscuntur, et per quod de aliis iudicamus, est primo cognitum a nobis; sicut lux ab oculo, et principia prima ab intellectu. Sed omnia in luce primae veritatis cognoscimus, et per eam de omnibus iudicamus; ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Trin., et in libro de vera Relig. Ergo Deus est id quod primo cognoscitur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv">Jn. 1:9</a>). Therefore God is our first and most known object. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32173] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed Deus est causa omnis nostrae cognitionis, ipse enim est <i>lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ergo Deus est id quod primo et maxime est cognitum nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32174] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id quod primo cognoscitur in imagine, est exemplar quo imago formatur. Sed in mente nostra est Dei imago, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo id quod primo cognoscitur in mente nostra est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man hath seen God at any time" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv">Jn. 1:18</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32175] Iª q. 88 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made": while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>; <a href="#FP_Q85_A8" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[85], A[8]</a>; <a href="#FP_Q87_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[87], A[2]</a>, ad 2) </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 co."><a name="32176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32176] Iª q. 88 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum intellectus humanus, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non possit intelligere substantias immateriales creatas, ut dictum est; multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae increatae. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum praesentis vitae, est quidditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus obiectum, ut multoties supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[2]</a>). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much less can it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32177] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in luce primae veritatis omnia intelligimus et iudicamus, inquantum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri, sive naturale sive gratuitum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio veritatis primae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri non se habeat ad intellectum nostrum sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur; multo minus Deus est id quod primo a nostro intellectu intelligitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so," must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, as explained above ( <a href="#FP_Q81_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>, ad 3). Other things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32178] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod propter quod unumquodque, illud magis, intelligendum est in his quae sunt unius ordinis, ut supra dictum est. Propter Deum autem alia cognoscuntur, non sicut propter primum cognitum, sed sicut propter primam cognoscitivae virtutis causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not prove. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32179] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si in anima nostra esset perfecta imago Dei, sicut filius est perfecta imago patris, statim mens nostra intelligeret Deum. Est autem imago imperfecta. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q89" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q89-p0.1">Q. 89. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q89-p2"> We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q89-p3"><a href="#FP_Q89_A1"> (1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p4"><a href="#FP_Q89_A2"> (2) Whether it understands separate substances?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p5"><a href="#FP_Q89_A3"> (3) Whether it understands all natural things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p6"><a href="#FP_Q89_A4"> (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p7"><a href="#FP_Q89_A5"> (5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p8"><a href="#FP_Q89_A6"> (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p9"><a href="#FP_Q89_A7"> (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p10"><a href="#FP_Q89_A8"> (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 pr."><a name="32180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32180] Iª q. 89 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de cognitione animae separatae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum anima separata a corpore possit intelligere. Secundo, utrum intelligat substantias separatas. Tertio, utrum intelligat omnia naturalia. Quarto, utrum cognoscat singularia. Quinto, utrum habitus scientiae hic acquisitae remaneat in anima separata. Sexto, utrum possit uti habitu scientiae hic acquisitae. Septimo, utrum distantia localis impediat cognitionem animae separatae. Octavo, utrum animae separatae a corporibus cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[1]</a>). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32189] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata non intelligat substantias separatas. Perfectior enim est anima corpori coniuncta, quam a corpore separata, cum anima sit naturaliter pars humanae naturae; quaelibet autem pars perfectior est in suo toto. Sed anima coniuncta corpori non intelligit substantias separatas, ut supra habitum est. Ergo multo minus cum fuerit a corpore separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32190] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur, vel cognoscitur per sui praesentiam, vel per suam speciem. Sed substantiae separatae non possunt cognosci ab anima per suam praesentiam, quia nihil illabitur animae nisi solus Deus. Neque etiam per aliquas species quas anima ab Angelo abstrahere possit, quia Angelus simplicior est quam anima. Ergo nullo modo anima separata potest cognoscere substantias separatas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be reasonably be said. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32191] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quidam philosophi posuerunt in cognitione separatarum substantiarum consistere ultimam hominis felicitatem. Si ergo anima separata potest intelligere substantias separatas, ex sola sua separatione consequitur felicitatem. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.23" target="asv">Lk. 16:23</a>). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32192] Iª q. 89 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod animae separatae cognoscunt alias animas separatas; sicut dives in Inferno positus vidit Lazarum et Abraham, Luc. XVI. Ergo vident etiam et Daemones et Angelos animae separatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"---i.e. by knowing itself ( <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[1]</a>, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now it was said above <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[87], A[1]</a>). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 co."><a name="32193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32193] Iª q. 89 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in IX de Trin., <i>mens nostra cognitionem rerum incorporearum per seipsam accipit</i>, idest cognoscendo seipsam, sicut supra dictum est. Per hoc ergo quod anima separata cognoscit seipsam, accipere possumus qualiter cognoscit alias substantias separatas. Dictum est autem quod quandiu anima corpori est unita, intelligit convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et ideo nec seipsam potest intelligere nisi inquantum fit actu intelligens per speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam, sic enim per actum suum intelligit seipsam, ut supra dictum est. Sed cum fuerit a corpore separata, intelliget non convertendo se ad phantasmata, sed ad ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, unde seipsam per seipsam intelliget. Est autem commune omni substantiae separatae quod intelligat id quod est supra se, et id quod est infra se, per modum suae substantiae, sic enim intelligitur aliquid secundum quod est in intelligente; est autem aliquid in altero per modum eius in quo est. Modus autem substantiae animae separatae est infra modum substantiae angelicae, sed est conformis modo aliarum animarum separatarum. Et ideo de aliis animabus separatis perfectam cognitionem habet; de Angelis autem imperfectam et deficientem, loquendo de cognitione naturali animae separatae. De cognitione autem gloriae est alia ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32194] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima separata est quidem imperfectior, si consideretur natura qua communicat cum natura corporis, sed tamen quodammodo est liberior ad intelligendum, inquantum per gravedinem et occupationem corporis a puritate intelligentiae impeditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32195] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod anima separata intelligit Angelos per similitudines divinitus impressas. Quae tamen deficiunt a perfecta repraesentatione eorum, propter hoc quod animae natura est inferior quam Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness---not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32196] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in cognitione substantiarum separatarum non quarumcumque, consistit ultima hominis felicitas, sed solius Dei, qui non potest videri nisi per gratiam. In cognitione vero aliarum substantiarum separatarum est magna felicitas, etsi non ultima, si tamen perfecte intelligantur. Sed anima separata naturali cognitione non perfecte eas intelligit, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A3-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 3. Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32197] Iª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata omnia naturalia cognoscat. In substantiis enim separatis sunt rationes omnium rerum naturalium. Sed animae separatae cognoscunt substantias separatas. Ergo cognoscunt omnia naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32198] Iª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, qui intelligit magis intelligibile, multo magis potest intelligere minus intelligibile. Sed anima separata intelligit substantias separatas, quae sunt maxima intelligibilium. Ergo multo magis potest intelligere omnia naturalia, quae sunt minus intelligibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p4"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things. </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 1"><a name="32199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32199] Iª q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, in Daemonibus magis viget naturalis cognitio quam in anima separata. Sed Daemones non omnia naturalia cognoscunt; sed multa addiscunt per longi temporis experientiam, ut Isidorus dicit. Ergo neque animae separatae omnia naturalia cognoscunt.</p><p title="I q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 2"><a name="32200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32200] Iª q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si anima statim cum est separata, omnia naturalia cognosceret, frustra homines studerent ad rerum scientiam capessendam. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Non ergo anima separata omnia naturalia cognoscit.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q89_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 co."><a name="32201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32201] Iª q. 89 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, anima separata intelligit per species quas recipit ex influentia divini luminis, sicut et Angeli, sed tamen, quia natura animae est infra naturam Angeli, cui iste modus cognoscendi est connaturalis, anima separata per huiusmodi species non accipit perfectam rerum cognitionem, sed quasi in communi et confusam. Sicut igitur se habent Angeli ad perfectam cognitionem rerum naturalium per huiusmodi species, ita animae separatae ad imperfectam et confusam. Angeli autem per huiusmodi species cognoscunt cognitione perfecta omnia naturalia, quia omnia quae Deus fecit in propriis naturis, fecit in intelligentia angelica, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt. Unde et animae separatae de omnibus naturalibus cognitionem habent, non certam et propriam, sed communem et confusam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p6"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above ( <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q89_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[87], A[1]</a>). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32202] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nec ipse Angelus per suam substantiam cognoscit omnia naturalia, sed per species quasdam, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non propter hoc sequitur quod anima cognoscat omnia naturalia, quia cognoscit quoquo modo substantiam separatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32203] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut anima separata non perfecte intelligit substantias separatas ita nec omnia naturalia perfecte cognoscit, sed sub quadam confusione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32204] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Isidorus loquitur de cognitione futurorum; quae nec Angeli nec Daemones nec animae separatae cognoscunt, nisi vel in suis causis, vel per revelationem divinam. Nos autem loquimur de cognitione naturalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order to learn is useless. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32205] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod cognitio quae acquiritur hic per studium, est propria et perfecta; illa autem est confusa. Unde non sequitur quod studium addiscendi sit frustra.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A4-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 4. Whether the separated soul knows singulars?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above ( <a href="#FP_Q77_A8" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[8]</a>). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown ( <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32206] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata non cognoscat singularia. Nulla enim potentia cognoscitiva remanet in anima separata nisi intellectus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed intellectus non est cognoscitivus singularium, ut supra habitum est. Ergo anima separata singularia non cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32207] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magis est determinata cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquid in singulari, quam illa qua cognoscitur aliquid in universali. Sed anima separata non habet determinatam cognitionem de speciebus rerum naturalium. Multo igitur minus cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32208] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si cognoscit singularia, et non per sensum, pari ratione omnia singularia cognosceret. Sed non cognoscit omnia singularia. Ergo nulla cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.28" target="asv">Lk. 16:28</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32209] Iª q. 89 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dives in Inferno positus dixit, habeo quinque fratres, ut habetur Luc. XVI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above ( <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 co."><a name="32210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32210] Iª q. 89 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod animae separatae aliqua singularia cognoscunt, sed non omnia, etiam quae sunt praesentia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duplex est modus intelligendi. Unus per abstractionem a phantasmatibus, et secundum istum modum singularia per intellectum cognosci non possunt directe, sed indirecte, sicut supra dictum est. Alius modus intelligendi est per influentiam specierum a Deo, et per istum modum intellectus potest singularia cognoscere. Sicut enim ipse Deus per suam essentiam, inquantum est causa universalium et individualium principiorum, cognoscit omnia et universalia et singularia, ut supra dictum est; ita substantiae separatae per species, quae sunt quaedam participatae similitudines illius divinae essentiae, possunt singularia cognoscere. In hoc tamen est differentia inter Angelos et animas separatas, quia Angeli per huiusmodi species habent perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus, animae vero separatae confusam. Unde Angeli, propter efficaciam sui intellectus per huiusmodi species non solum naturas rerum in speciali cognoscere possunt, sed etiam singularia sub speciebus contenta. Animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere per huiusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae quodammodo determinantur, vel per praecedentem cognitionem, vel per aliquam affectionem, vel per naturalem habitudinem, vel per divinam ordinationem, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, determinatur in eo secundum modum recipientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32211] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus per viam abstractionis non est cognoscitivus singularium. Sic autem anima separata non intelligit, sed sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as we have said. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32212] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ad illarum rerum species vel individua cognitio animae separatae determinatur, ad quae anima separata habet aliquam determinatam habitudinem, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32213] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod anima separata non se habet aequaliter ad omnia singularia, sed ad quaedam habet aliquam habitudinem quam non habet ad alia. Et ideo non est aequalis ratio ut omnia singularia cognoscat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A5-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 5. Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32214] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae non remaneat in anima separata. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, scientia destruetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; which seems unreasonable. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32215] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quidam minus boni in hoc mundo scientia pollent, aliis magis bonis carentibus scientia. Si ergo habitus scientiae permaneret etiam post mortem in anima, sequeretur quod aliqui minus boni etiam in futuro statu essent potiores aliquibus magis bonis. Quod videtur inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which cannot be. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32216] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, animae separatae habebunt scientiam per influentiam divini luminis. Si igitur scientia hic acquisita in anima separata remaneat, sequetur quod duae erunt formae unius speciei in eodem subiecto. Quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that "a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32217] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in libro Praedicament., quod <i>habitus est qualitas difficile mobilis; sed ab aegritudine, vel ab aliquo huiusmodi, quandoque corrumpitur scientia</i>. Sed nulla est ita fortis immutatio in hac vita, sicut immutatio quae est per mortem. Ergo videtur quod habitus scientiae per mortem corrumpatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32218] Iª q. 89 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinum, <i>discamus in terris, quorum scientia nobis perseveret in caelo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed. </p><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p8"> But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit. </p><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p9"> Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q89_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 co."><a name="32219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32219] Iª q. 89 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt habitum scientiae non esse in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus sensitivis, scilicet imaginativa, cogitativa et memorativa; et quod species intelligibiles non conservantur in intellectu possibili. Et si haec opinio vera esset, sequeretur quod, destructo corpore, totaliter habitus scientiae hic acquisitae destrueretur. Sed quia scientia est in intellectu, qui est locus specierum, ut dicitur in III de anima; oportet quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae partim sit in praedictis viribus sensitivis, et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiae acquiritur, nam <i>habitus sunt similes actibus ex quibus acquiruntur</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in praesenti vita scientia acquiritur, sunt per conversionem intellectus ad phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas quaedam ad considerandum per species susceptas; et in praedictis inferioribus viribus acquiritur quaedam habilitas ut facilius per conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari. Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu. Quantum ergo ad id quod aliquis praesentis scientiae habet in inferioribus viribus, non remanebit in anima separata, sed quantum ad id quod habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat. Quia, ut dicitur in libro de longitudine et brevitate vitae, dupliciter corrumpitur aliqua forma, uno modo, per se, quando corrumpitur a suo contrario, ut calidum a frigido; alio modo, per accidens, scilicet per corruptionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem quod per corruptionem subiecti, scientia quae est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non potest, cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec per contrarium corrumpi possunt species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili, quia intentioni intelligibili nihil est contrarium; et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est. Sed quantum ad operationem qua intellectus componit et dividit, vel etiam ratiocinatur, sic invenitur contrarietas in intellectu, secundum quod falsum in propositione vel in argumentatione est contrarium vero. Et hoc modo interdum scientia corrumpitur per contrarium, dum scilicet aliquis per falsam argumentationem abducitur a scientia veritatis. Et ideo philosophus, in libro praedicto, ponit duos modos quibus scientia per se corrumpitur, scilicet oblivionem, ex parte memorativae, et deceptionem, ex parte argumentationis falsae. Sed hoc non habet locum in anima separata. Unde dicendum est quod habitus scientiae, secundum quod est in intellectu manet in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion quoted, "Now, I know in part." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32220] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de scientia quantum ad habitum, sed quantum ad cognitionis actum. Unde ad huius probationem inducit, nunc cognosco ex parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32221] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut secundum staturam corporis aliquis minus bonus erit maior aliquo magis bono; ita nihil prohibet aliquem minus bonum habere aliquem scientiae habitum in futuro, quem non habet aliquis magis bonus. Sed tamen hoc quasi nullius momenti est in comparatione ad alias praerogativas quas meliores habebunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32222] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod utraque scientia non est unius rationis. Unde nullum inconveniens sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32223] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de corruptione scientiae quantum ad id quod habet ex parte sensitivarum virium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A6-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 6. Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32224] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus scientiae hic acquisitae non maneat in anima separata. Dicit enim philosophus, in I de anima, quod corrupto corpore, anima neque reminiscitur neque amat. Sed considerare ea quae prius aliquis novit, est reminisci. Ergo anima separata non potest habere actum scientiae quam hic acquisivit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q89_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32225] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, species intelligibiles non erunt potentiores in anima separata quam sint in anima corpori unita. Sed per species intelligibiles non possumus modo intelligere, nisi convertendo nos super phantasmata, sicut supra habitum est. Ergo nec anima separata hoc poterit. Et ita nullo modo per species intelligibiles hic acquisitas anima separata intelligere poterit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32226] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>habitus similes actus reddunt actibus per quos acquiruntur</i>. Sed habitus scientiae hic acquiritur per actus intellectus convertentis se supra phantasmata. Ergo non potest alios actus reddere. Sed tales actus non competunt animae separatae. Ergo anima separata non habebit aliquem actum scientiae hic acquisitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Dives in hell ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>): "Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32227] Iª q. 89 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Luc. XVI, dicitur ad divitem in Inferno positum, <i>recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Action offers two things for our consideration---its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above <a href="#FP_Q89_A5" id="FP_Q89_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 co."><a name="32228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32228] Iª q. 89 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis. Sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis quae est in oculo, sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva oculi. Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in anima separata, sicut dictum est; status autem animae separatae non sit idem sicut modo est, sequitur quod secundum species intelligibiles hic acquisitas, anima separata intelligere possit quae prius intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae. Et ita manet quidem in anima separata actus scientiae hic acquisitae, sed non secundum eundem modum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as explained above ( <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q89_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32229] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de reminiscentia, secundum quod memoria pertinet ad partem sensitivam, non autem secundum quod memoria est quodammodo in intellectu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32230] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversa virtute specierum, sed ex diverso statu animae intelligentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32231] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari iusta, sed non iuste, idest delectabiliter, causat habitum iustitiae politicae, per quem delectabiliter operamur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A7-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 7. Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that "the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here." But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32232] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod distantia localis impediat cognitionem animae separatae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, quod <i>animae mortuorum ibi sunt, ubi ea quae hic fiunt scire non possunt</i>. Sciunt autem ea quae apud eos aguntur. Ergo distantia localis impedit cognitionem animae separatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the demon's rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon's. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32233] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de divinatione Daemonum, quod <i>Daemones, propter celeritatem motus, aliqua nobis ignota denuntiant</i>. Sed agilitas motus ad hoc nihil faceret, si distantia localis cognitionem Daemonis non impediret. Multo igitur magis distantia localis impedit cognitionem animae separatae, quae est inferior secundum naturam quam Daemon.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32234] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut distat aliquis secundum locum, ita secundum tempus sed distantia temporis impedit cognitionem animae separatae, non enim cognoscunt futura. Ergo videtur quod etiam distantia secundum locum animae separatae cognitionem impediat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.23" target="asv">Lk. 16:23</a>), that Dives, "lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32235] Iª q. 89 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XVI, quod <i>dives cum esset in tormentis, elevans oculos suos, vidit Abraham a longe</i>. Ergo distantia localis non impedit animae separatae cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 co."><a name="32236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32236] Iª q. 89 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod anima separata cognosceret singularia abstrahendo a sensibilibus. Quod si esset verum, posset dici quod distantia localis impediret animae separatae cognitionem, requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam separatam, vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum ad utrumque, requireretur distantia determinata. Sed praedicta positio est impossibilis, quia abstractio specierum a sensibilibus fit mediantibus sensibus et aliis potentiis sensitivis, quae in anima separata actu non manent. Intelligit autem anima separata singularia per influxum specierum ex divino lumine, quod quidem lumen aequaliter se habet ad propinquum et distans. Unde distantia localis nullo modo impedit animae separatae cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are 'there,' as if impeded by local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain <a href="#FP_Q89_A8" id="FP_Q89_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32237] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus non dicit quod propter hoc quod ibi sunt animae mortuorum, ea quae hic sunt videre non possunt, ut localis distantia huius ignorantiae causa esse credatur, sed hoc potest propter aliquid aliud contingere, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32238] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum opinionem illam qua aliqui posuerunt quod Daemones habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita, secundum quam positionem, etiam potentias sensitivas habere possunt, ad quarum cognitionem requiritur determinata distantia. Et hanc opinionem etiam in eodem libro Augustinus expresse tangit, licet eam magis recitando quam asserendo tangere videatur, ut patet per ea quae dicit XXI libro de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32239] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod futura, quae distant secundum tempus, non sunt entia in actu. Unde in seipsis non sunt cognoscibilia, quia sicut deficit aliquid ab entitate, ita deficit a cognoscibilitate. Sed ea quae sunt distantia secundum locum, sunt entia in actu, et secundum se cognoscibilia. Unde non est eadem ratio de distantia locali, et de distantia temporis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A8-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 8. Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.27" target="asv">Lk. 16:27,28</a>), "I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments." Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32240] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod animae separatae cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur. Nisi enim ea cognoscerent, de eis curam non haberent. Sed habent curam de his quae hic aguntur; secundum illud Luc. XVI, <i>habeo quinque fratres, ut testificetur illis, ne et ipsi veniant in hunc locum tormentorum</i>. Ergo animae separatae cognoscunt ea quae hic aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to Saul ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.28.11" target="asv">1 Kings 28:11</a>). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32241] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, frequenter mortui vivis apparent, vel dormientibus vel vigilantibus, et eos admonent de iis quae hic aguntur; sicut Samuel apparuit Sauli, ut habetur I Reg. XXVIII. Sed hoc non esset si ea quae hic sunt non cognoscerent. Ergo ea quae hic aguntur cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false <a href="#FP_Q89_A7" id="FP_Q89_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32242] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, animae separatae cognoscunt ea quae apud eas aguntur. Si ergo quae apud nos aguntur non cognoscerent, impediretur earum cognitio per localem distantiam. Quod supra negatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.21" target="asv">Job 14:21</a>): "He will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32243] Iª q. 89 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob XIV, <i>sive fuerint filii eius nobiles, sive ignobiles, non intelliget</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q89_A8-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid down <a href="#FP_Q89_A4" id="FP_Q89_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living." </p><p id="FP_Q89_A8-p7"> Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the passage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: "The dead, even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss quotes on the text, "Abraham hath not known us" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.16" target="asv">Is. 63:16</a>). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 22:20</a>). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed, seems to be the more probable one---that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 co."><a name="32244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32244] Iª q. 89 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum naturalem cognitionem, de qua nunc hic agitur, animae mortuorum nesciunt quae hic aguntur. Et huius ratio ex dictis accipi potest. Quia anima separata cognoscit singularia per hoc quod quodammodo determinata est ad illa, vel per vestigium alicuius praecedentis cognitionis seu affectionis, vel per ordinationem divinam. Animae autem mortuorum, secundum ordinationem divinam, et secundum modum essendi, segregatae sunt a conversatione viventium, et coniunctae conversationi spiritualium substantiarum quae sunt a corpore separatae. Unde ea quae apud nos aguntur ignorant. Et hanc rationem assignat Gregorius in XII Moralium, dicens, <i>mortui vita in carne viventium post eos, qualiter disponatur, nesciunt, quia vita spiritus longe est a vita carnis; et sicut corporea atque incorporea diversa sunt genere, ita sunt distincta cognitione</i>. Et hoc etiam Augustinus videtur tangere in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, dicens quod <i>animae mortuorum rebus viventium non intersunt</i>. Sed quantum ad animas beatorum, videtur esse differentia inter Gregorium et Augustinum. Nam Gregorius ibidem subdit, <i>quod tamen de animabus sanctis sentiendum non est, quia quae intus omnipotentis Dei claritatem vident, nullo modo credendum est quod sit foris aliquid quod ignorent</i>. Augustinus vero, in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, expresse dicit quod <i>nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant vivi et eorum filii</i>, ut habetur in Glossa, super illud, <i>Abraham nescivit nos</i>, Isaiae LXIII. Quod quidem confirmat per hoc quod a matre sua non visitabatur, nec in tristitiis consolabatur, sicut quando vivebat; nec est probabile ut sit facta vita feliciore crudelior. Et per hoc quod dominus promisit Iosiae regi quod prius moreretur ne videret mala quae erant populo superventura, ut habetur IV Reg. XXII. Sed Augustinus hoc dubitando dicit, unde praemittit, <i>ut volet, accipiat quisque quod dicam</i>. Gregorius autem assertive, quod patet per hoc quod dicit, <i>nullo modo credendum est</i>. Magis tamen videtur, secundum sententiam Gregorii, quod animae sanctorum Deum videntes, omnia praesentia quae hic aguntur cognoscant. Sunt enim Angelis aequales, de quibus etiam Augustinus asserit quod ea quae apud vivos aguntur non ignorant. Sed quia sanctorum animae sunt perfectissime iustitiae divinae coniunctae, nec tristantur, nec rebus viventium se ingerunt, nisi secundum quod iustitiae divinae dispositio exigit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by "the revelation of the Holy Ghost," as Augustine says in the same book. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32245] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod animae mortuorum possunt habere curam de rebus viventium, etiam si ignorent eorum statum; sicut nos curam habemus de mortuis, eis suffragia impendendo, quamvis eorum statum ignoremus. Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos cognoscere, sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt; vel per Angelos seu Daemones; vel etiam spiritu Dei revelante, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living---and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.46.23" target="asv"> Ecclus. 46:23, </a> "he slept, and told the king the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32246] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod mortui viventibus apparent qualitercumque, vel contingit per specialem Dei dispensationem, ut animae mortuorum rebus viventium intersint, et est inter divina miracula computandum. Vel huiusmodi apparitiones fiunt per operationes Angelorum bonorum vel malorum, etiam ignorantibus mortuis, sicut etiam vivi ignorantes aliis viventibus apparent in somnis, ut Augustinus dicit in libro praedicto. Unde et de Samuele dici potest quod ipse apparuit per revelationem divinam; secundum hoc quod dicitur Eccli. XLVI, quod <i>dormivit, et notum fecit regi finem vitae suae</i>. Vel illa apparitio fuit procurata per Daemones, si tamen Ecclesiastici auctoritas non recipiatur, propter hoc quod inter canonicas Scripturas apud Hebraeos non habetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32247] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ignorantia huiusmodi non contingit ex locali distantia, sed propter causam praedictam.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q90" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q90-p0.1">Q. 90. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q90-p2"> After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of man's soul; (2) the production of man's body; (3) the production of the woman. </p><p id="FP_Q90-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q90-p4"><a href="#FP_Q90_A1"> (1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p5"><a href="#FP_Q90_A2"> (2) Whether, if made, it was created?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p6"><a href="#FP_Q90_A3"> (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p7"><a href="#FP_Q90_A4"> (4) Whether it was made before the body?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 pr."><a name="32248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32248] Iª q. 90 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa considerandum est de prima hominis productione. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, primo considerandum est de productione ipsius hominis; secundo, de fine productionis; tertio, de statu et conditione hominis primo producti; quarto, de loco eius. Circa productionem autem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de productione hominis quantum ad animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus viri; tertio, quantum ad productionem mulieris. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum anima humana sit aliquid factum, vel sit de substantia ipsius Dei. Secundo, supposito quod sit facta, utrum sit creata. Tertio, utrum sit facta mediantibus Angelis. Quarto, utrum sit facta ante corpus.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q90_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A1-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 1. Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's substance. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32249] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit facta, sed sit de substantia Dei. Dicitur enim Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem</i>. Sed ille qui spirat, aliquid a se emittit. Ergo anima qua homo vivit, est aliquid de substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q90_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32250] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut supra habitum est, anima est forma simplex. Sed forma est actus. Ergo anima est actus purus, quod est solius Dei. Ergo anima est de substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32251] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quaecumque sunt, et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et mens sunt, et nullo modo differunt, quia oporteret quod aliquibus differentiis differrent, et sic essent composita. Ergo Deus et mens humana idem sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32252] Iª q. 90 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de origine animae, enumerat quaedam quae dicit esse multum aperteque perversa, et fidei Catholicae adversa; inter quae primum est, quod quidam dixerunt <i>Deum animam non de nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said ( <a href="#FP_Q77_A2" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77] , A[2]</a>; <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>; <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[6]</a>), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence ---acquires its knowledge somehow from things---and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act---receives nothing from any other---and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[1]</a>,7; <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p7"> This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body. </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p8"> Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]) So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p9"> But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[1]</a>,8; and <a href="#FP_Q75_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 co."><a name="32253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32253] Iª q. 90 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei, manifestam improbabilitatem continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quae omnia aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem habens, ut supra probatum est. Sed hic error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus antiquorum. Primi enim qui naturas rerum considerare incoeperunt, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, nihil praeter corpora esse posuerunt. Et ideo Deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, quod aliorum corporum iudicabant esse principium. Et quia animam ponebant esse de natura illius corporis quod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur in I de anima, per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de natura Dei. Iuxta quam positionem etiam Manichaei, Deum esse quandam lucem corpoream existimantes, quandam partem illius lucis animam esse posuerunt corpori alligatam. Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc, quod aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt, non tamen a corpore separatum, sed corporis formam. Unde et Varro dixit quod <i>Deus est anima mundum motu et ratione gubernans</i>; ut Augustinus narrat, VII de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur illius totalis animae partem aliqui posuerunt animam hominis, sicut homo est pars totius mundi; non valentes intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos spiritualium substantiarum gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones corporum. Haec autem omnia sunt impossibilia, ut supra probatum est. Unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32254] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inspirare non est accipiendum corporaliter, sed idem est Deum inspirare, quod spiritum facere. Quamvis et homo corporaliter spirans non emittat aliquid de sua substantia, sed de natura extranea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q90_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32255] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod anima, etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per participationem; ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo non est actus purus, sicut Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32256] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod differens, proprie acceptum, aliquo differt, unde ibi quaeritur differentia, ubi est convenientia. Et propter hoc oportet differentia esse composita quodammodo, cum in aliquo differant, et in aliquo conveniant. Sed secundum hoc, licet omne differens sit diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens; ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Nam simplicia diversa sunt seipsis, non autem differunt aliquibus differentiis, ex quibus componantur. Sicut homo et asinus differunt rationali et irrationali differentia, de quibus non est dicere quod ulterius aliis differentiis differant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A2-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 2. Whether the soul was produced by creation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32257] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit producta in esse per creationem. Quod enim in se habet aliquid materiale, fit ex materia. Sed anima habet in se aliquid materiale, cum non sit actus purus. Ergo anima est facta ex materia. Non ergo est creata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32258] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis actus materiae alicuius videtur educi de potentia materiae, cum enim materia sit in potentia ad actum, actus quilibet praeexistit in materia in potentia. Sed anima est actus materiae corporalis, ut ex eius definitione apparet. Ergo anima educitur de potentia materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32259] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima est forma quaedam. Si igitur anima fit per creationem, pari ratione omnes aliae formae. Et sic nulla forma exibit in esse per generationem. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>): "God created man to His own image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32260] Iª q. 90 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam</i>. Est autem homo ad imaginem Dei secundum animam. Ergo anima exivit in esse per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q90_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter---whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being---or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 co."><a name="32261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32261] Iª q. 90 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem, quod non est verum de aliis formis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt. Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente, neque corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae; neque spirituali, quia sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32262] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum, quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam. Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia caelestis corporis, alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia praeiacente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q90_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32263] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est; propterea non educitur de potentia materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32264] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile de anima rationali, et de aliis formis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A3-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 3. Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32265] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis non sit producta a Deo immediate, sed mediantibus Angelis. Maior enim ordo est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Sed corpora inferiora producuntur per corpora superiora, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo et inferiores spiritus, qui sunt animae rationales, producuntur per spiritus superiores, qui sunt Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the higher," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32266] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, finis rerum respondet principio, Deus enim est principium et finis rerum. Ergo et exitus rerum a principio respondet reductioni rerum in finem. Sed infima reducuntur per prima, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo et infima procedunt in esse per prima, scilicet animae per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32267] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere</i>, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed spirituales substantiae sunt multo magis perfectae quam corporales. Cum ergo corpora faciant sibi similia secundum speciem, multo magis Angeli poterunt facere aliquid infra se secundum speciem naturae, scilicet animam rationalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>) that God Himself "breathed into the face of man the breath of life." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32268] Iª q. 90 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, quod <i>Deus ipse inspiravit in faciem hominis spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q90_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[3] </a>): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 co."><a name="32269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32269] Iª q. 90 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod Angeli, secundum quod operantur in virtute Dei, causant animas rationales. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile, et a fide alienum. Ostensum est enim quod anima rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem. Solus autem Deus potest creare. Quia solius primi agentis est agere, nullo praesupposito, cum semper agens secundum praesupponat aliquid a primo agente, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem agit aliquid ex aliquo praesupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens agit nisi transmutando; sed solus Deus agit creando. Et quia anima rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicuius materiae, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p7"> Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the inferior---all these things are effected through a certain transmutation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32270] Iª q. 90 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. Nam quod corpora causant vel sibi similia vel inferiora, et quod superiora reducunt inferiora, totum hoc provenit per quandam transmutationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A4-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 4. Whether the human soul was produced before the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above ( <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A1" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a>; <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q70_A1" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[70], A[1]</a>). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32271] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. Opus enim creationis praecessit opus distinctionis et ornatus, ut supra habitum est. Sed anima producta est in esse per creationem; corpus autem factum est in fine ornatus. Ergo anima hominis producta est ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32272] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima rationalis magis convenit cum Angelis quam cum animalibus brutis. Sed Angeli creati fuerunt ante corpora, vel statim a principio cum corporali materia; corpus autem hominis formatum est sexto die, quando et bruta animalia sunt producta. Ergo anima hominis fuit creata ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32273] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed anima in fine remanet post corpus. Ergo et in principio fuit creata ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32274] Iª q. 90 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod actus proprius fit in potentia propria. Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them---namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies---are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken ( <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q90_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>); and so we need say nothing about it here. </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p7"> Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created." </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p8"> Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p9"> Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days ( <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q74_A2" id="FP_Q90_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[2]</a>), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 co."><a name="32275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32275] Iª q. 90 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit non solum animam primi hominis, sed animas omnium hominum ante corpora simul cum Angelis creatas; propter hoc quod credidit omnes spirituales substantias, tam animas quam Angelos, aequales esse secundum suae naturae conditionem, sed solum merito distare; sic ut quaedam earum corporibus alligarentur, quae sunt animae hominum vel caelestium corporum; quaedam vero in sui puritate, secundum diversos ordines, remanerent. De qua opinione supra iam diximus, et ideo relinquatur ad praesens. Augustinus vero, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod anima primi hominis ante corpus cum Angelis est creata, propter aliam rationem. Quia scilicet ponit quod corpus hominis in illis operibus sex dierum non fuit productum in actu, sed solum secundum causales rationes, quod non potest de anima dici; quia nec ex aliqua materia corporali aut spirituali praeexistente facta fuit, nec ex aliqua virtute creata produci potuit. Et ideo videtur quod ipsamet anima in operibus sex dierum, in quibus omnia facta fuerunt, simul cum Angelis fuerit creata; et quod postmodum propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad corpus administrandum. Sed hoc non dicit asserendo, ut eius verba demonstrant. Dicit enim, <i>credatur, si nulla Scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi, anima vero iam ipsa crearetur</i>. Posset autem hoc utique tolerari secundum eos qui ponunt quod anima habet per se speciem et naturam completam, et quod non unitur corpori ut forma, sed solum ad ipsum administrandum. Si autem anima unitur corpori ut forma, et est naturaliter pars humanae naturae, hoc omnino esse non potest. Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfecto statu suae naturae, secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei species exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari. Sustinendo ergo opinionem Augustini de operibus sex dierum, dici poterit quod anima humana praecessit in operibus sex dierum secundum quandam similitudinem generis, prout convenit cum Angelis in intellectuali natura; ipsa vero fuit creata simul cum corpore. Secundum alios vero sanctos, tam anima quam corpus primi hominis in operibus sex dierum sunt producta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32276] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si natura animae haberet integram speciem, ita quod secundum se crearetur, ratio illa procederet, ut per se in principio crearetur. Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32277] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter est dicendum ad secundum. Nam anima si per se speciem haberet, magis conveniret cum Angelis. Sed inquantum est forma corporis, pertinet ad genus animalium, ut formale principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32278] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod animam remanere post corpus, accidit per defectum corporis, qui est mors. Qui quidem defectus in principio creationis animae, esse non debuit.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q91" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q91-p0.1">Q. 91. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q91-p2"> We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q91-p3"><a href="#FP_Q91_A1"> (1) The matter from which it was produced;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p4"><a href="#FP_Q91_A2"> (2) The author by whom it was produced;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p5"><a href="#FP_Q91_A3"> (3) The disposition it received in its production;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p6"><a href="#FP_Q91_A4"> (4) The mode and order of its production.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 pr."><a name="32279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32279] Iª q. 91 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de productione corporis primi hominis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de materia ex qua productum est. Secundo, de auctore a quo productum est. Tertio, de dispositione quae ei per productionem est attributa. Quarto, de modo et ordine productionis ipsius.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q91_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A1-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 1. Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32280] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus primi hominis non sit factum de limo terrae. Maioris enim virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex aliquo, quia plus distat ab actu non ens quam ens in potentia. Sed cum homo sit dignissima creaturarum inferiorum, decuit ut virtus Dei maxime ostenderetur in productione corporis eius. Ergo non debuit fieri ex limo terrae, sed ex nihilo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32281] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, corpora caelestia sunt nobiliora terrenis. Sed corpus humanum habet maximam nobilitatem, cum perficiatur a nobilissima forma, quae est anima rationalis. Ergo non debuit fieri de corpore terrestri, sed magis de corpore caelesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32282] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ignis et aer sunt nobiliora corpora quam terra et aqua, quod ex eorum subtilitate apparet. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit dignissimum, magis debuit fieri ex igne et ex aere quam ex limo terrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four elements. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32283] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, corpus humanum est compositum ex quatuor elementis. Non ergo est factum ex limo terrae, sed ex omnibus elementis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God made man of the slime of the earth." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32284] Iª q. 91 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called 'a little world,' because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 co."><a name="32285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32285] Iª q. 91 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum Deus perfectus sit, operibus suis perfectionem dedit secundum eorum modum; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, <i>Dei perfecta sunt opera</i>. Ipse autem simpliciter perfectus est, ex hoc quod omnia in se praehabet, non per modum compositionis, sed simpliciter et unite, ut Dionysius dicit, eo modo quo diversi effectus praeexistunt in causa, secundum unam eius essentiam. Ista autem perfectio ad Angelos quidem derivatur, secundum quod omnia sunt in eorum cognitione quae sunt a Deo in natura producta, per formas diversas. Ad hominem vero derivatur inferiori modo huiusmodi perfectio. Non enim in sua cognitione naturali habet omnium naturalium notitiam; sed est ex rebus omnibus quodammodo compositus, dum de genere spiritualium substantiarum habet in se animam rationalem, de similitudine vero caelestium corporum habet elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis, elementa vero secundum substantiam. Ita tamen quod superiora elementa praedominantur in eo secundum virtutem, scilicet ignis et aer, quia vita praecipue consistit in calido, quod est ignis, et humido, quod est aeris. Inferiora vero elementa abundant in eo secundum substantiam, aliter enim non posset esse mixtionis aequalitas, nisi inferiora elementa, quae sunt minoris virtutis, secundum quantitatem in homine abundarent. Et ideo dicitur corpus hominis de limo terrae formatum, quia limus dicitur terra aquae permixta. Et propter hoc homo dicitur minor mundus, quia omnes creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32286] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus Dei creantis manifestata est in corpore hominis, dum eius materia est per creationem producta. Oportuit autem ut ex materia quatuor elementorum fieret corpus humanum, ut homo haberet convenientiam cum inferioribus corporibus, quasi medium quoddam existens inter spirituales et corporales substantias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false---that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32287] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis corpus caeleste sit simpliciter nobilius terrestri corpore, tamen quantum ad actus animae rationalis, est minus conveniens. Nam anima rationalis accipit notitiam veritatis quodammodo per sensus; quorum organa formari non possunt ex corpore caelesti, cum sit impassibile. Nec est verum quod quidam dicunt aliquid de quinta essentia materialiter ad compositionem humani corporis advenire, ponentes animam uniri corpori mediante quadam luce. Primo enim, falsum est quod dicunt, lucem esse corpus. Secundo vero, impossibile est aliquid de quinta essentia vel a corpore caelesti dividi, vel elementis permisceri, propter caelestis corporis impassibilitatem. Unde non venit in compositionem mixtorum corporum, nisi secundum suae virtutis effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such contraries---thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense---or so that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32288] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si ignis et aer, quae sunt maioris virtutis in agendo, etiam secundum quantitatem in compositione humani corporis abundarent, omnino ad se traherent alia, et non posset fieri aequalitas commixtionis, quae est necessaria in compositione hominis ad bonitatem sensus tactus, qui est fundamentum sensuum aliorum. Oportet enim organum cuiuslibet sensus non habere in actu contraria quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed in potentia tantum. Vel ita quod omnino careat toto genere contrariorum, sicut pupilla caret colore, ut sit in potentia ad omnes colores, quod in organo tactus non erat possibile, cum sit compositum ex elementis, quorum qualitates percipit tactus. Vel ita quod organum sit medium inter contraria, ut necesse est in tactu accidere, medium enim est quodammodo in potentia ad extrema.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32289] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod in limo terrae est terra, et aqua conglutinans partes terrae. De aliis autem elementis Scriptura mentionem non fecit, tum quia minus abundant secundum quantitatem in corpore hominis, ut dictum est; tum etiam quia in tota rerum productione, de igne et aere, quae sensu non percipiuntur a rudibus mentionem non fecit Scriptura, quae rudi populo tradebatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A2-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 2. Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above <a href="#FP_Q91_A1" id="FP_Q91_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32290] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus humanum non sit immediate a Deo productum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod corporalia disponuntur a Deo per angelicam creaturam. Sed corpus humanum formatum fuit ex materia corporali, ut dictum est. Ergo debuit produci mediantibus Angelis, et non immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32291] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod fieri potest virtute creata, non est necessarium quod immediate producatur a Deo. Sed corpus humanum produci potest per virtutem creatam caelestis corporis, nam et quaedam animalia ex putrefactione generantur per virtutem activam corporis caelestis; et Albumasar dicit quod in locis in quibus nimis abundat calor aut frigus, homines non generantur, sed in locis temperatis tantum. Ergo non oportuit quod immediate corpus humanum formaretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32292] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nihil fit ex materia corporali nisi per aliquam materiae transmutationem. Sed omnis transmutatio corporalis causatur ex motu caelestis corporis, qui est primus motuum. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit productum ex materia corporali, videtur quod ad eius formationem aliquid operatum fuerit corpus caeleste.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32293] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod homo factus est secundum corpus, in operibus sex dierum, secundum causales rationes quas Deus inseruit creaturae corporali; postmodum vero fuit formatum in actu. Sed quod praeexistit in corporali creatura secundum causales rationes, per aliquam virtutem corpoream produci potest. Ergo corpus humanum productum est aliqua virtute creata, et non immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:1</a>): "God created man out of the earth." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32294] Iª q. 91 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, <i>Deus de terra creavit hominem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained ( <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A4" id="FP_Q91_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[4]</a>); and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 co."><a name="32295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32295] Iª q. 91 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod prima formatio humani corporis non potuit esse per aliquam virtutem creatam, sed immediate a Deo. Posuerunt siquidem aliqui formas quae sunt in materia corporali, a quibusdam formis immaterialibus derivari. Sed hanc opinionem repellit philosophus, in VII Metaphys., per hoc quod formis non competit per se fieri, sed composito, ut supra expositum est; et quia oportet agens esse simile facto non convenit quod forma pura, quae est sine materia, producat formam quae est in materia, quae non fit nisi per hoc quod compositum fit. Et ideo oportet quod forma quae est in materia, sit causa formae quae est in materia, secundum quod compositum a composito generatur. Deus autem, quamvis omnino sit immaterialis, tamen solus est qui sua virtute materiam producere potest creando. Unde ipsius solius est formam producere in materia absque adminiculo praecedentis formae materialis. Et propter hoc, Angeli non possunt transmutare corpora ad formam aliquam, nisi adhibitis seminibus quibusdam, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Quia igitur corpus humanum nunquam formatum fuerat, cuius virtute per viam generationis aliud simile in specie formaretur, necesse fuit quod primum corpus hominis immediate formaretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32296] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, etsi Angeli aliquod ministerium Deo exhibeant in his quae circa corpora operatur; aliqua tamen Deus in creatura corporea facit, quae nullo modo Angeli facere possunt; sicut quod suscitat mortuos, et illuminat caecos. Secundum quam virtutem etiam corpus primi hominis de limo terrae formavit. Potuit tamen fieri ut aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis Angeli exhiberent; sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres colligendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), "man and the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32297] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod animalia perfecta, quae generantur ex semine, non possunt generari per solam virtutem caelestis corporis, ut Avicenna fingit; licet ad eorum generationem naturalem cooperetur virtus caelestis corporis, prout philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod <i>homo generat hominem ex materia, et sol</i>. Et exinde est quod exigitur locus temperatus ad generationem hominum et aliorum animalium perfectorum. Sufficit autem virtus caelestium corporum ad generandum quaedam animalia imperfectiora ex materia disposita, manifestum est enim quod plura requiruntur ad productionem rei perfectae, quam ad productionem rei imperfectae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32298] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod motus caeli est causa transmutationum naturalium, non tamen transmutationum quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, et sola virtute divina, sicut quod mortui resuscitantur, quod caeci illuminantur. Quibus est simile quod homo ex limo terrae formatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their causal virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32299] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum rationes causales in creaturis dicitur aliquid praeexistere dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum potentiam activam et passivam, ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri possit, sed etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere possit. Alio modo, secundum potentiam passivam tantum, ut scilicet de materia praeexistenti fieri possit a Deo. Et hoc modo, secundum Augustinum, corpus hominis praeextitit in operibus productis secundum causales rationes.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A3-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 3. Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32300] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus hominis non habuerit convenientem dispositionem. Cum enim homo sit nobilissimum animalium, corpus hominis debuit esse dispositum optime ad ea quae sunt propria animalis, scilicet ad sensum et motum. Sed quaedam animalia inveniuntur acutioris sensus quam homo, et velocioris motus; sicut canes melius odorant, et aves velocius moventur. Ergo corpus hominis non est convenienter dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32301] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, perfectum est cui nihil deest. Sed plura desunt humano corpori quam corporibus aliorum animalium, quae habent tegumenta et arma naturalia ad sui protectionem, quae homini desunt. Ergo corpus humanum est imperfectissime dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32302] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, homo plus distat a plantis quam ab animalibus brutis. Sed plantae habent staturam rectam; animalia autem bruta pronam. Ergo homo non debuit habere staturam rectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>): "God made man right." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32303] Iª q. 91 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. VII, <i>Deus fecit hominem rectum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance." </p><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p7"> Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 co."><a name="32304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32304] Iª q. 91 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina, unde sunt quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet autem artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimam inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad finem. Et si talis dispositio habet secum adiunctum aliquem defectum, artifex non curat. Sicut artifex qui facit serram ad secandum, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad secandum; nec curat eam facere ex vitro, quae est pulchrior materia, quia talis pulchritudo esset impedimentum finis. Sic igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., <i>et quia dignius est sic, non tamen simpliciter, sed ad uniuscuiusque substantiam</i>. Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius, materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta propter actiones agentis. Dico ergo quod Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad talem formam et ad tales operationes. Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad ea quae requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animae operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32305] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tactus, qui est fundamentum aliorum sensuum, est perfectior in homine quam in aliquo alio animali, et propter hoc oportuit quod homo haberet temperatissimam complexionem inter omnia animalia. Praecedit etiam homo omnia alia animalia, quantum ad vires sensitivas interiores; sicut ex supra dictis apparet. Ex quadam autem necessitate contingit quod, quantum ad aliquos exteriores sensus, homo ab aliis animalibus deficiat. Sicut homo, inter omnia animalia, habet pessimum olfactum. Necessarium enim fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum, tum ut liberius in eo perficerentur operationes interiorum virium sensitivarum, quae sunt necessariae ad intellectus operationem, ut supra dictum est; tum etiam ut frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis, quem necesse est in homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit rectae staturae. Magnitudo autem cerebri, propter eius humiditatem, est impedimentum olfactus, qui requirit siccitatem. Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare quaedam animalia sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam homo, propter impedimentum horum sensuum quod necesse est consequi in homine ex perfecta complexionis aequalitate. Et eadem etiam ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quaedam animalia sunt homine velociora, cui excellentiae velocitatis repugnat aequalitas humanae complexionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ of organs." Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32306] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo pilorum aut plumarum, quae sunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiae terrestris elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et teneritudini complexionis humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis. Unde et manus, in III de anima, dicitur organum organorum. Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi parandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation. </p><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p11"> Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32307] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter quatuor. Primo quidem, quia sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad cognoscendum. Unde, cum cetera animalia non delectentur in sensibilibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et venerea, solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et ideo, quia sensus praecipue vigent in facie, alia animalia habent faciem pronam ad terram, quasi ad cibum quaerendum et providendum sibi de victu, homo vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et praecipue per visum, qui est subtilior et plures differentias rerum ostendit, libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere, et caelestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat veritatem. Secundo, ut interiores vires liberius suas operationes habeant, dum cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perficiuntur, non est depressum, sed super omnes partes corporis elevatum. Tertio, quia oporteret quod, si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum. Et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret. Quarto, quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum caperet ore. Et ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis. Et tamen homo staturam rectam habens, maxime distat a plantis. Nam homo habet superius sui, idest caput, versus superius mundi, et inferius sui versus inferius mundi, et ideo est optime dispositus secundum dispositionem totius. Plantae vero habent superius sui versus inferius mundi (nam radices sunt ori proportionales), inferius autem sui versus superius mundi. Animalia vero bruta medio modo, nam superius animalis est pars qua accipit alimentum, inferius autem est pars qua emittit superfluum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A4-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 4. Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made." Therefore the same should have been said of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32308] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter corporis humani productio in Scriptura describatur. Sicut enim corpus humanum est factum a Deo, ita et alia opera sex dierum. Sed in aliis operibus dicitur, <i>dixit Deus, fiat, et factum est</i>. Ergo similiter dici debuit de hominis productione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above <a href="#FP_Q91_A2" id="FP_Q91_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us make man." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32309] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, corpus humanum a Deo immediate est factum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur, faciamus hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into him the breath of life." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32310] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, forma humani corporis est ipsa anima, quae est spiraculum vitae. Inconvenienter ergo, postquam dixerat, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae</i>, subiunxit, <i>et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32311] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, anima, quae est spiraculum vitae, est in toto corpore, et principaliter in corde. Non ergo debuit dicere, quod <i>inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: "To His image He made them," he should not have added, "male and female He created them." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="32312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32312] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, sexus masculinus et femininus pertinent ad corpus, imago vero Dei ad animam. Sed anima, secundum Augustinum, fuit facta ante corpus. Inconvenienter ergo cum dixisset, <i>ad imaginem suam fecit illum</i>, addidit, <i>masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Is the authority of Scripture. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32313] Iª q. 91 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> In contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though He did not make other things; since it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.101.26" target="asv">Ps. 101:26</a>), "The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.94.5" target="asv">Ps. 94:5</a>), "His hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32314] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Respondeo dicendum ad primum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in VI super Gen. ad Litt., non in hoc praeeminet homo aliis rebus, quod Deus ipse fecit hominem, quasi alia ipse non fecerit; cum scriptum sit, <i>opera manuum tuarum sunt caeli</i>, et alibi, <i>aridam fundaverunt manus eius</i>, sed in hoc quod ad imaginem Dei factus est homo. Utitur tamen Scriptura in productione hominis speciali modo loquendi, ad ostendendum quod alia propter hominem facta sunt. Ea enim quae principaliter intendimus, cum maiori deliberatione et studio consuevimus facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32315] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non est intelligendum Deum Angelis dixisse, faciamus hominem; ut quidam perverse intellexerunt. Sed hoc dicitur ad significandum pluralitatem divinarum personarum, quarum imago expressius invenitur in homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. </p><p id="FP_Q91_A4-p11"> To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man," must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of life," should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22</a>). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, "And man was made a living soul"; which words the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.45" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:45</a>) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, "He breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32316] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt corpus hominis prius tempore formatum, et postmodum Deum formato iam corpori animam infudisse. Sed contra rationem perfectionis primae institutionis rerum est, quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel animam sine corpore fecerit, cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae. Et hoc etiam est magis inconveniens de corpore, quod dependet ex anima, et non e converso. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum, quidam posuerunt quod, cum dicitur, formavit Deus hominem, intelligitur productio corporis simul cum anima; quod autem additur, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, intelligitur de spiritu sancto; sicut et dominus insufflavit in apostolos, dicens, accipite spiritum sanctum, Ioan. XX. Sed haec expositio, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civ. Dei, excluditur per verba Scripturae. Nam subditur ad praedicta, <i>et factus est homo in animam viventem</i>, quod apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, non ad vitam spiritualem, sed ad vitam animalem refert. Per spiraculum ergo vitae intelligitur anima, ut sic quod dicitur, <i>inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae</i>, sit quasi expositio eius quod praemiserat; nam anima est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32317] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, quia operationes vitae magis manifestantur in facie hominis, propter sensus ibi existentes; ideo dicit in faciem hominis inspiratum esse spiraculum vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="32318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32318] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, omnia opera sex dierum simul sunt facta. Unde animam primi hominis, quam ponit simul factam cum Angelis, non ponit factam ante sextum diem; sed in ipso sexto die ponit esse factam et animam primi hominis in actu, et corpus eius secundum rationes causales. Alii vero doctores ponunt et animam et corpus hominis factum sexto die in actu.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q92" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q92-p0.1">Q. 92. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q92-p2"> We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q92-p3"><a href="#FP_Q92_A1"> (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p4"><a href="#FP_Q92_A2"> (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p5"><a href="#FP_Q92_A3"> (3) Whether of man's rib?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p6"><a href="#FP_Q92_A4"> (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 pr."><a name="32319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32319] Iª q. 92 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de productione mulieris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum in illa rerum productione debuerit mulier produci. Secundo, utrum debuerit fieri de viro. Tertio, utrum de costa viri. Quarto, utrum facta fuerit immediate a Deo.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q92_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A1-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 1. Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32320] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit produci in prima rerum productione. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod <i>femina est mas occasionatus</i>. Sed nihil occasionatum et deficiens debuit esse in prima rerum institutione. Ergo in illa prima rerum institutione mulier producenda non fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>): "Thou shalt be under the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32321] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, subiectio et minoratio ex peccato est subsecuta, nam, ad mulierem dictum est post peccatum, Gen. III, <i>sub viri potestate eris</i>; et Gregorius dicit quod, <i>ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares sumus</i>. Sed mulier naturaliter est minoris virtutis et dignitatis quam vir, semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non debuit mulier produci in prima rerum productione ante peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32322] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, occasiones peccatorum sunt amputandae. Sed Deus praescivit quod mulier esset futura viro in occasionem peccati. Ergo non debuit mulierem producere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv">Gn. 2:18</a>): "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32323] Iª q. 92 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be two in one flesh" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 co."><a name="32324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32324] Iª q. 92 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in adiutorium viri, non quidem in adiutorium alicuius alterius operis, ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius iuvari possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem; sed in adiutorium generationis. Quod manifestius videri potest, si in viventibus modus generationis consideretur. Sunt enim quaedam viventia, quae in seipsis non habent virtutem activam generationis, sed ab agente alterius speciei generantur; sicut plantae et animalia quae generantur sine semine ex materia convenienti per virtutem activam caelestium corporum. Quaedam vero habent virtutem generationis activam et passivam coniunctam; sicut accidit in plantis quae generantur ex semine. Non enim est in plantis aliquod nobilius opus vitae quam generatio, unde convenienter omni tempore in eis virtuti passivae coniungitur virtus activa generationis. Animalibus vero perfectis competit virtus activa generationis secundum sexum masculinum, virtus vero passiva secundum sexum femininum. Et quia est aliquod opus vitae nobilius in animalibus quam generatio, ad quod eorum vita principaliter ordinatur; ideo non omni tempore sexus masculinus feminino coniungitur in animalibus perfectis, sed solum tempore coitus; ut imaginemur per coitum sic fieri unum ex mare et femina, sicut in planta omni tempore coniunguntur vis masculina et feminina, etsi in quibusdam plus abundet una harum, in quibusdam plus altera. Homo autem adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere. Et ideo adhuc in homine debuit esse maiori ratione distinctio utriusque virtutis, ut seorsum produceretur femina a mare, et tamen carnaliter coniungerentur in unum ad generationis opus. Et ideo statim post formationem mulieris, dicitur Gen. II, <i>erunt duo in carne una</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32325] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est aliquid deficiens et occasionatum. Quia virtus activa quae est in semine maris, intendit producere sibi simile perfectum, secundum masculinum sexum, sed quod femina generetur, hoc est propter virtutis activae debilitatem, vel propter aliquam materiae indispositionem, vel etiam propter aliquam transmutationem ab extrinseco, puta a ventis Australibus, qui sunt humidi, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Sed per comparationem ad naturam universalem, femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata. Intentio autem naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor naturae. Et ideo instituendo naturam, non solum marem, sed etiam feminam produxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove ( <a href="#FP_Q96_A3" id="FP_Q92_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[3]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32326] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est subiectio. Una servilis, secundum quam praesidens utitur subiecto ad sui ipsius utilitatem et talis subiectio introducta est post peccatum. Est autem alia subiectio oeconomica vel civilis, secundum quam praesidens utitur subiectis ad eorum utilitatem et bonum. Et ista subiectio fuisset etiam ante peccatum, defuisset enim bonum ordinis in humana multitudine, si quidam per alios sapientiores gubernati non fuissent. Et sic ex tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis. Nec inaequalitas hominum excluditur per innocentiae statum, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32327] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi, Deus subtraxisset a mundo, remansisset universum imperfectum. Nec debuit bonum commune tolli, ut vitaretur particulare malum, praesertim cum Deus sit adeo potens, ut quodlibet malum possit ordinare in bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A2-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 2. Whether woman should have been made from man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32328] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit fieri ex viro. Sexus enim communis est homini et aliis animalibus. Sed in aliis animalibus feminae non sunt factae ex maribus. Ergo nec in homine fieri debuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32329] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eorum quae sunt eiusdem speciei, eadem est materia. Sed mas et femina sunt eiusdem speciei. Cum igitur vir fuerit factus ex limo terrae, ex eodem debuit fieri femina, et non ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.6" target="asv">Lev. 18:6</a>). Therefore woman should not have been made from man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32330] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mulier facta est in adiutorium viro ad generationem. Sed nimia propinquitas reddit personam ad hoc ineptam, unde personae propinquae a matrimonio excluduntur, ut patet Levit. XVIII. Ergo mulier non debuit fieri ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:5</a>): "He created of him," that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32331] Iª q. 92 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, creavit ex ipso, scilicet viro, adiutorium sibi simile, idest mulierem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that "God made the whole human race from one" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.26" target="asv">Acts 17:26 </a>). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.23" target="asv">Gn. 2:23,24</a>): "She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." This was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.32" target="asv">Eph. 5:32 </a>): "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 co."><a name="32332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32332] Iª q. 92 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit mulierem, in prima rerum institutione, ex viro formari, magis quam in aliis animalibus. Primo quidem, ut in hoc quaedam dignitas primo homini servaretur, ut, secundum Dei similitudinem, esset ipse principium totius suae speciei, sicut Deus est principium totius universi. Unde et Paulus dicit, Act. XVII, quod <i>Deus fecit ex uno omne genus hominum</i>. Secundo, ut vir magis diligeret mulierem, et ei inseparabilius inhaereret, dum cognosceret eam ex se esse productam. Unde dicitur Gen. II, <i>de viro sumpta est, quamobrem relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae</i>. Et hoc maxime necessarium fuit in specie humana, in qua mas et femina commanent per totam vitam, quod non contingit in aliis animalibus. Tertio quia, ut philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., mas et femina coniunguntur in hominibus non solum propter necessitatem generationis, ut in aliis animalibus; sed etiam propter domesticam vitam, in qua sunt alia opera viri et feminae, et in qua vir est caput mulieris. Unde convenienter ex viro formata est femina, sicut ex suo principio. Quarto est ratio sacramentalis; figuratur enim per hoc quod Ecclesia a Christo sumit principium. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, <i>sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p7"> Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32333] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32334] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod materia est ex qua aliquid fit. Natura autem creata habet determinatum principium; et, cum sit determinata ad unum, etiam habet determinatum processum, unde ex determinata materia producit aliquid in determinata specie. Sed virtus divina, cum sit infinita, potest idem secundum speciem ex quacumque materia facere; sicut virum ex limo terrae, et mulierem ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this argument does not prove. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32335] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ex naturali generatione contrahitur quaedam propinquitas quae matrimonium impedit. Sed mulier non est producta a viro per naturalem generationem, sed sola virtute divina, unde Eva non dicitur filia Adae. Et propter hoc, ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A4-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 4. Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32344] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non fuerit immediate formata a Deo. Nullum enim individuum ex simili secundum speciem productum, fit immediate a Deo. Sed mulier facta est de viro, qui est eiusdem speciei cum ipsa. Ergo non est facta immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32345] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod corporalia dispensantur a Deo per Angelos. Sed corpus mulieris ex materia corporali est formatum. Ergo est factum per ministerium Angelorum, et non immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32346] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea quae praeextiterunt in creaturis secundum rationes causales, producuntur virtute alicuius creaturae, et non immediate a Deo. Sed secundum causales rationes corpus mulieris in primis operibus productum fuit, ut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non fuit producta mulier immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from the man's rib." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32347] Iª q. 92 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, <i>formare vel aedificare costam ut mulier esset, non potuit nisi Deus, a quo universa natura subsistit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (A[2], ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 co."><a name="32348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32348] Iª q. 92 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, uniuscuiusque speciei generatio naturalis est ex determinata materia. Materia autem ex qua naturaliter generatur homo, est semen humanum viri vel feminae. Unde ex alia quacumque materia individuum humanae speciei generari non potest naturaliter. Solus autem Deus, qui est naturae institutor, potest praeter naturae ordinem res in esse producere. Et ideo solus Deus potuit vel virum de limo terrae, vel mulierem de costa viri formare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32349] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quando individuum generatur ex simili secundum speciem, generatione naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man's rib. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32350] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., an ministerium Angeli exhibuerint Deo in formatione mulieris, nescimus, certum tamen est quod, sicut corpus viri de limo non fuit formatum per Angelos, ita nec corpus mulieris de costa viri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32351] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit, <i>non habuit prima rerum conditio ut femina omnino sic fieret; sed tantum hoc habuit, ut sic fieri posset</i>. Et ideo secundum causales rationes praeextitit corpus mulieris in primis operibus, non secundum potentiam activam, sed secundum potentiam passivam tantum, in ordine ad potentiam activam creatoris.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q93" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q93-p0.1">Q. 93. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q93-p2"> We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." There are under this head nine points of inquiry: </p><p id="FP_Q93-p3"><a href="#FP_Q93_A1"> (1) Whether the image of God is in man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p4"><a href="#FP_Q93_A2"> (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p5"><a href="#FP_Q93_A3"> (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p6"><a href="#FP_Q93_A4"> (4) Whether the image of God is in every man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p7"><a href="#FP_Q93_A5"> (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p8"><a href="#FP_Q93_A6"> (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p9"><a href="#FP_Q93_A7"> (7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and acts?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p10"><a href="#FP_Q93_A8"> (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p11"><a href="#FP_Q93_A9"> (9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 pr."><a name="32352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32352] Iª q. 93 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de fine sive termino productionis hominis, prout dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem. Primo, utrum in homine sit imago Dei. Secundo, utrum imago Dei sit in irrationalibus creaturis. Tertio, utrum imago Dei sit magis in Angelo quam in homine. Quarto, utrum imago Dei sit in omni homine. Quinto, utrum in homine sit imago Dei per comparationem ad essentiam, vel ad personas divinas omnes, aut unam earum. Sexto, utrum imago Dei inveniatur in homine solum secundum mentem. Septimo, utrum imago Dei sit in homine secundum potentias, aut secundum habitus, aut actus. Octavo, utrum per comparationem ad omnia obiecta. Nono, de differentia imaginis et similitudinis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q93_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A1-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 1. Whether the image of God is in man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?" </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32353] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine. Dicitur enim Isaiae XL, <i>cui similem fecistis Deum; aut quam imaginem ponetis ei?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.15" target="asv">Col. 1:15</a>): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32354] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, esse Dei imaginem est proprium primogeniti, de quo dicit apostolus, ad Colos. I, <i>qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae</i>. Non ergo in homine invenitur Dei imago.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.]) that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32355] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., quod <i>imago est eius rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens</i>; et iterum dicit quod <i>imago est rei ad rem coaequandam indiscreta et unita similitudo</i>. Sed non est species indifferens Dei et hominis; nec potest esse aequalitas hominis ad Deum. Ergo in homine non potest esse imago Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32356] Iª q. 93 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness---namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. </p><p id="FP_Q93_A1-p7"> But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 co."><a name="32357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32357] Iª q. 93 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est similitudo, non continuo est imago</i>. Ex quo patet quod similitudo est de ratione imaginis, et quod imago aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum, imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius. Unde ovum, quantumcumque sit alteri ovo simile et aequale, quia tamen non est expressum ex illo, non dicitur imago eius. Aequalitas autem non est de ratione imaginis, quia, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit, <i>ubi est imago, non continuo est aequalitas</i>; ut patet in imagine alicuius in speculo relucente. Est tamen de ratione perfectae imaginis, nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est. Manifestum est autem quod in homine invenitur aliqua Dei similitudo, quae deducitur a Deo sicut ab exemplari, non tamen est similitudo secundum aequalitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale exemplatum. Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen perfecta, sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, praepositio enim ad accessum quendam significat, qui competit rei distanti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But God made a spiritual image to Himself in man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32358] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod propheta loquitur de corporalibus imaginibus ab homine fabricatis, et ideo signanter dicit, <i>quam imaginem ponetis ei?</i> Sed Deus ipse sibi in homine posuit spiritualem imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32359] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod primogenitus omnis creaturae est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cuius imago est, et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago; et propter imperfectionem similitudinis, dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest esse nisi in identitate naturae, imago Dei est in filio suo primogenito sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo; ut patet per Augustinum in libro de decem chordis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect image. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32360] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid non solum numero aut specie aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quandam, et sic est unitas vel convenientia creaturae ad Deum. Quod autem dicit rei ad rem coaequandam, pertinet ad rationem perfectae imaginis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A2-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 2. Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32361] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei inveniatur in irrationalibus creaturis. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., <i>habent causata causarum suarum contingentes imagines</i>. Sed Deus est causa non solum rationalium creaturarum, sed etiam irrationalium. Ergo imago Dei invenitur in irrationalibus creaturis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32362] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quanto est expressior similitudo in aliquo, tanto magis accedit ad rationem imaginis. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod radius solaris maxime habet similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Ergo est ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called "very good" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32363] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis perfectum in bonitate, tanto magis est Deo simile. Sed totum universum est perfectius in bonitate quam homo, quia etsi bona sint singula, tamen simul omnia dicuntur valde bona, Gen. I. Ergo totum universum est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32364] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Boetius in libro de Consol., dicit de Deo, <i>mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans</i>. Ergo totus mundus est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum rationalis creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's image. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32365] Iª q. 93 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, VI super Gen. ad Litt., <i>hoc excellit in homine, quia Deus ad imaginem suam hominem fecit, propter hoc quod dedit ei mentem intellectualem, qua praestat pecoribus</i>. Ea ergo quae non habent intellectum, non sunt ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species." </p><p id="FP_Q93_A2-p8"> Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 co."><a name="32366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32366] Iª q. 93 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod non quaelibet similitudo, etiam si sit expressa ex altero, sufficit ad rationem imaginis. Si enim similitudo sit secundum genus tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter hoc dicetur aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius, non enim posset dici quod vermis qui oritur ex homine, sit imago hominis propter similitudinem generis; neque iterum potest dici quod, si aliquid fiat album ad similitudinem alterius, quod propter hoc sit ad eius imaginem, quia album est accidens commune pluribus speciebus. Requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo, vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et praecipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius dicit quod imago est species indifferens. Manifestum est autem quod similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam. Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, inquantum sunt; secundo vero, inquantum vivunt; tertio vero, inquantum sapiunt vel intelligunt. Quae, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>ita sunt Deo similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius</i>. Sic ergo patet quod solae intellectuales creaturae, proprie loquendo, sunt ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32367] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne imperfectum est quaedam participatio perfecti. Et ideo etiam ea quae deficiunt a ratione imaginis, inquantum tamen aliqualem Dei similitudinem habent, participant aliquid de ratione imaginis. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod causata habent causarum contingentes imagines, idest quantum contingit ea habere, et non simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32368] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Dionysius assimilat radium solarem divinae bonitati quantum ad causalitatem; non secundum dignitatem naturae, quae requiritur ad rationem imaginis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32369] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis creatura extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni. Vel dicendum quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem. Unde cum dicitur quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, non excluditur quin universum, secundum aliquam sui partem, sit ad imaginem Dei; sed excluduntur aliae partes universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32370] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod imago accipitur a Boetio secundum rationem similitudinis qua artificiatum imitatur speciem artis quae est in mente artificis, sic autem quaelibet creatura est imago rationis exemplaris quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem in natura; prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum sunt entia; et primae vitae inquantum sunt viventia; et summae sapientiae, inquantum sunt intelligentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A3-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 3. Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32371] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de imagine, quod Deus nulli alii creaturae dedit quod sit ad imaginem suam, nisi homini. Non ergo verum est quod Angelus magis dicatur ad imaginem Dei quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32372] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>homo ita est ad imaginem Dei, ut, nulla interposita creatura, formetur a Deo. Et ideo nihil est illi coniunctius</i>. Sed imago Dei dicitur aliqua creatura, inquantum Deo coniungitur. Ergo Angelus non est magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32373] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, creatura dicitur ad imaginem Dei, inquantum est intellectualis naturae. Sed intellectualis natura non intenditur nec remittitur, non enim est de genere accidentis, cum sit in genere substantiae. Ergo Angelus non est magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is called a "seal of resemblance" [ <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.12" target="asv">Ezech. 28:12</a>] because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32374] Iª q. 93 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius, in quadam homilia, quod <i>Angelus dicitur signaculum similitudinis, quia in eo similitudo divinae imaginis magis insinuatur expressa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>; <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[8]</a>). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 co."><a name="32375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32375] Iª q. 93 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod de imagine Dei loqui dupliciter possumus. Uno modo, quantum ad id in quo primo consideratur ratio imaginis, quod est intellectualis natura. Et sic imago Dei est magis in Angelis quam sit in hominibus, quia intellectualis natura perfectior est in eis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Secundo potest considerari imago Dei in homine, quantum ad id in quo secundario consideratur, prout scilicet in homine invenitur quaedam Dei imitatio, inquantum scilicet homo est de homine, sicut Deus de Deo; et inquantum anima hominis est tota in toto corpore eius, et iterum tota in qualibet parte ipsius, sicut Deus se habet ad mundum. Et secundum haec et similia, magis invenitur Dei imago in homine quam in Angelo. Sed quantum ad hoc non attenditur per se ratio divinae imaginis in homine, nisi praesupposita prima imitatione, quae est secundum intellectualem naturam, alioquin etiam animalia bruta essent ad imaginem Dei. Et ideo, cum quantum ad intellectualem naturam Angelus sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo, simpliciter concedendum est Angelum magis esse ad imaginem Dei; hominem autem secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32376] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus excludit a Dei imagine alias inferiores creaturas intellectu carentes, non autem Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32377] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ignis dicitur esse subtilissimum corporum secundum suam speciem, cum tamen unus ignis sit alio subtilior; ita dicitur quod nihil est coniunctius Deo quam mens humana, secundum genus intellectualis naturae; quia, sicut ipse supra praemiserat, <i>quae sapiunt, ita sunt illi similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius</i>. Unde per hoc non excluditur quin Angelus sit magis ad Dei imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32378] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod substantia non recipit magis et minus, non intelligitur quod una species substantiae non sit perfectior quam alia, sed quod unum et idem individuum non participet suam speciem quandoque magis, quandoque minus. Nec etiam a diversis individuis participatur species substantiae secundum magis et minus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A4-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 4. Whether the image of God is found in every man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is the image [Vulg. glory] of man" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32379] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in quolibet homine. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod <i>vir est imago Dei, mulier autem est imago viri</i>. Cum ergo mulier sit individuum humanae speciei, non cuilibet individuo convenit esse imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32380] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, quod <i>illos quos Deus praescivit conformes fieri imagini filii sui, hos praedestinavit</i>. Sed non omnes homines praedestinati sunt. Ergo non omnes homines habent conformitatem imaginis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32381] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, similitudo est de ratione imaginis, ut supra dictum est. Sed per peccatum fit homo Deo dissimilis. Ergo amittit Dei imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.38.7" target="asv">Ps. 38:7</a>): "Surely man passeth as an image." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32382] Iª q. 93 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXVIII, <i>veruntamen in imagine pertransit homo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of "creation," of "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 co."><a name="32383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32383] Iª q. 93 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum, et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte, et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae. Unde super illud Psalmi IV, <i>signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine</i>, Glossa distinguit triplicem imaginem, scilicet creationis, recreationis et similitudinis. Prima ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is added, "Male and female He created them" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>). Moreover it is said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man," he adds his reason for saying this: "For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32384] Iª q. 93 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tam in viro quam in muliere invenitur Dei imago quantum ad id in quo principaliter ratio imaginis consistit, scilicet quantum ad intellectualem naturam. Unde Gen. I, cum dixisset, <i>ad imaginem Dei creavit illum</i>, scilicet hominem, subdidit, <i>masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>, et dixit pluraliter eos, ut Augustinus dicit, ne intelligatur in uno individuo uterque sexus fuisse coniunctus. Sed quantum ad aliquid secundario imago Dei invenitur in viro, secundum quod non invenitur in muliere, nam vir est principium mulieris et finis, sicut Deus est principium et finis totius creaturae. Unde cum apostolus dixisset quod <i>vir imago et gloria est Dei, mulier autem est gloria viri</i>; ostendit quare hoc dixerit, subdens, <i>non enim vir est ex muliere, sed mulier ex viro; et vir non est creatus propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p8"> Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32385] Iª q. 93 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum et tertium dicendum quod illae rationes procedunt de imagine quae est secundum conformitatem gratiae et gloriae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A5-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 5. Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made." And Hilary (De Trin. v) says: "Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity." Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32386] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in homine non sit imago Dei quantum ad Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, <i>una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter divinitas, et imago ad quam factus est homo</i>. Et Hilarius, in V de Trin., dicit quod <i>homo fit ad communem Trinitatis imaginem</i>. Est ergo in homine imago Dei quantum ad essentiam, et non quantum ad Trinitatem personarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that "man was made to the image of God, it means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32387] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in libro de Eccles. Dogmat. dicitur quod imago Dei attenditur in homine secundum aeternitatem. Damascenus etiam dicit quod <i>hominem esse ad imaginem Dei, significat intellectuale, et arbitrio liberum, et per se potestativum</i>. Gregorius etiam Nyssenus dicit quod, cum Scriptura dixit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, <i>aequale est ac si diceret humanam naturam omnis boni factam esse participem; bonitatis enim plenitudo divinitas est</i>. Haec autem omnia non pertinent ad distinctionem personarum, sed magis ad essentiae unitatem. Ergo in homine est imago Dei, non secundum Trinitatem personarum, sed secundum essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above ( <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q93_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32388] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago ducit in cognitionem eius cuius est imago. Si igitur in homine est imago Dei secundum Trinitatem personarum, cum homo per naturalem rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2) that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32389] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, nomen imaginis non cuilibet trium personarum convenit, sed soli filio, dicit enim Augustinus, in VI de Trin., quod <i>solus filius est imago patris</i>. Si igitur in homine attenderetur Dei imago secundum personam, non esset in homine imago totius Trinitatis, sed filii tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of God." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32390] Iª q. 93 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Hilarius, in IV de Trin., per hoc quod homo dicitur ad imaginem Dei factus, ostendit pluralitatem divinarum personarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> as we have seen ( <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q40_A2" id="FP_Q93_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[2]</a>), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 co."><a name="32391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32391] Iª q. 93 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, distinctio divinarum personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae, aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, atque aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Unde esse ad imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinae naturae, non excludit hoc quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repraesentationem trium personarum; sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur. Sic igitur dicendum est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad Trinitatem personarum, nam et in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p8"> Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32392] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32393] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine perfecte repraesentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in XV de Trin., maxima est differentia huius Trinitatis quae est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, <i>Trinitatem quae in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse Trinitatem, credimus potius quam videmus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but "to Thy image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of God," the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this preposition "to" points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made (like) to that one." Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32394] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dixerunt in homine esse solum imaginem filii. Sed hoc improbat Augustinus, in XII de Trin. Primo quidem, per hoc quod, cum secundum aequalitatem essentiae filius sit patri similis, necesse est, si homo sit factus ad similitudinem filii, quod sit factus ad similitudinem patris. Secundo quia, si homo esset factus solum ad imaginem filii, non diceret pater, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>, sed tuam. Cum ergo dicitur, ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, non est intelligendum quod pater fecerit hominem solum ad imaginem filii, qui est Deus, ut quidam exposuerunt, sed intelligendum est quod Deus Trinitas fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, idest totius Trinitatis. Cum autem dicitur quod Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod haec praepositio ad designet terminum factionis, ut sit sensus, faciamus hominem taliter, ut sit in eo imago. Alio modo, haec praepositio ad potest designare causam exemplarem; sicut cum dicitur, iste liber est factus ad illum. Et sic imago Dei est ipsa essentia divina, quae abusive imago dicitur, secundum quod imago ponitur pro exemplari. Vel, secundum quod quidam dicunt, divina essentia dicitur imago, quia secundum eam una persona aliam imitatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A6-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 6. Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>) that "the man is the image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32395] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine solum secundum mentem. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei. Sed vir non est solum mens. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur solum secundum mentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>): "God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32396] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Gen. I, <i>creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>. Sed distinctio masculi et feminae est secundum corpus. Ergo etiam secundum corpus attenditur Dei imago in homine, et non secundum mentem tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32397] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago praecipue videtur attendi secundum figuram. Sed figura ad corpus pertinet. Ergo imago Dei attenditur in homine etiam secundum corpus, et non secundum mentem tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="32398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32398] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., triplex visio invenitur in nobis, scilicet corporalis, spiritualis sive imaginaria, et intellectualis. Si ergo secundum visionem intellectualem, quae ad mentem pertinet, est aliqua Trinitas in nobis, secundum quam sumus ad imaginem Dei; pari ratione et in aliis visionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv">Eph. 4:23,24</a>): "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv">Col. 3:10</a>): "Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32399] Iª q. 93 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Eph. IV, <i>renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem</i>, ex quo datur intelligi quod renovatio nostra, quae fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad mentem pertinet. Sed ad Col. III, dicit, <i>induentes novum hominem, qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum</i>, ubi renovationem quae est secundum novi hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem Dei pertinet solum ad mentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we have explained above ( <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. </p><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p8"> Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen ( <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q28_A3" id="FP_Q93_A6-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[28], A[3]</a>); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 co."><a name="32400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32400] Iª q. 93 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum imaginis, ut supra dictum est, in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii. Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem. In aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, invenitur similitudo vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur. Cuius ratio manifeste cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repraesentat vestigium, et quo repraesentat imago. Imago enim repraesentat secundum similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repraesentat per modum effectus qui sic repraesentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingit, impressiones enim quae ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia; et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis; et desolatio terrae, vestigium hostilis exercitus. Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatae. Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio consideretur. Similiter, cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam repraesentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur principium verbi, et verbum, et amor; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producente. Nam hoc ipsum quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam, demonstrat quod sit a quodam principio; species vero eius demonstrat verbum facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis; ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut usus aedificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis secundum mentem; sed secundum alias partes eius, per modum vestigii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32401] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; sicut denarius dicitur imago Caesaris, inquantum habet Caesaris imaginem. Unde non oportet quod secundum quamlibet partem hominis accipiatur Dei imago.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv">Col. 3:10</a>), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [*these words are in reality from <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv"> Gal. 3:28</a>] (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew"). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32402] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin., quidam imaginem Trinitatis in homine posuerunt, non secundum unum individuum, sed secundum plura; dicentes quod <i>vir patris personam intimat; filii vero personam, quod de viro ita processit ut de illo nasceretur; atque ita tertiam personam, velut spiritum sanctum, dicunt esse mulierem, quae ita de viro processit ut non ipsa esset filius aut filia</i>. Quod prima facie absurdum videtur. Primo quidem, quia sequeretur quod spiritus sanctus esset principium filii, sicut mulier est principium prolis quae nascitur de viro. Secundo, quia unus homo non esset nisi ad imaginem unius personae. Tertio, quia secundum hoc Scriptura de imagine Dei in homine mentionem facere non debuisset, nisi producta iam prole. Et ideo dicendum est quod Scriptura, postquam dixerat, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, non ut imago Dei secundum distinctiones sexuum attendatur; sed quia imago Dei utrique sexui est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio sexuum. Unde apostolus, ad Col. III, postquam dixerat, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum, subdit, ubi non est masculus et femina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32403] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream, tamen <i>corpus hominis, quia solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est ut ad contemplandum caelum sit aptius, magis in hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cetera corpora animalium, factum iure videri potest</i>; ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei, sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repraesentat imaginem Dei in anima, per modum vestigii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen. </p><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p13"> Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="32404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32404] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod tam in visione corporali quam in visione imaginaria invenitur quaedam Trinitas, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trin. In visione enim corporali est quidem primo species exterioris corporis; secundo vero ipsa visio, quae fit per impressionem cuiusdam similitudinis praedictae speciei in visum; tertio est ibi intentio voluntatis applicans visum ad videndum, et eum in re visa detinens. Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo quidem species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, quae provenit ex hoc quod acies animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, informatur secundum praedictam speciem; tertio vero invenitur intentio voluntatis coniungens utrumque. Sed utraque Trinitas deficit a ratione divinae imaginis. Nam ipsa species exterioris corporis est extra naturam animae, species autem quae est in memoria, etsi non sit extra animam, est tamen adventitia animae, et ita utrobique deficit repraesentatio connaturalitatis et coaeternitatis divinarum personarum. Visio vero corporalis non procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a sensu videntis, et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a specie quae in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute imaginativa, et ita per hoc non repraesentatur convenienter processio filii a solo patre. Intentio vero voluntatis, quae coniungit duo praedicta, non ex eis procedit, neque in visione corporea neque in spirituali, unde non convenienter repraesentatur processio spiritus sancti a patre et filio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A7-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 7. Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32405] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in anima secundum actus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, quod homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod <i>sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id esse ac nosse diligimus</i>. Sed esse non significat actum. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things---mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32406] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus, in IX de Trin., assignat imaginem Dei in anima secundum haec tria, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. Mens autem non significat actum; sed magis potentiam, vel etiam essentiam intellectivae animae. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur secundum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32407] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus, X de Trin., assignat imaginem Trinitatis in anima secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Sed haec tria sunt vires naturales animae, ut Magister dicit, III distinctione I libri Sent. Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="32408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32408] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, imago Trinitatis semper manet in anima. Sed actus non semper manet. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual vision. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32409] Iª q. 93 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XI de Trin., assignat Trinitatem in inferioribus animae partibus secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam. Ergo et Trinitas quae est in mente, secundum quam homo est ad imaginem Dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 co."><a name="32410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32410] Iª q. 93 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet aliqualis repraesentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinae debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad repraesentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinae autem personae distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32411] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse nostrum ad imaginem Dei pertinet, quod est nobis proprium supra alia animalia; quod quidem esse competit nobis inquantum mentem habemus. Et ideo eadem est haec Trinitas cum illa quam Augustinus ponit in IX de Trin., quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself---namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves---De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32412] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus hanc Trinitatem primo adinvenit in mente. Sed quia mens, etsi se totam quodammodo cognoscat, etiam quodammodo se ignorat, prout scilicet est ab aliis distincta; et sic etiam se quaerit, ut Augustinus consequenter probat in X de Trin., ideo, quasi notitia non totaliter menti coaequetur, accipit in anima tria quaedam propria mentis, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae nullus ignorat se habere, et in istis tribus potius imaginem Trinitatis assignat, quasi prima assignatio sit quodammodo deficiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. <a href="#FP_Q79_A7" id="FP_Q93_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[7]</a>, ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32413] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat XIV de Trin., intelligere dicimur et velle seu amare aliqua, et quando de his cogitamus, et quando de his non cogitamus. Sed quando sine cogitatione sunt, ad solam memoriam pertinent; quae nihil est aliud, secundum ipsum, quam habitualis retentio notitiae et amoris. Sed quia, ut ipse dicit, <i>verbum ibi esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiori verbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit</i>. Ex quo patet quod imaginem divinae Trinitatis potius ponit in intelligentia et voluntate actuali, quam secundum quod sunt in habituali retentione memoriae, licet etiam quantum ad hoc, aliquo modo sit imago Trinitatis in anima, ut ibidem dicitur. Et sic patet quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas non sunt tres vires, ut in sententiis dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="32414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32414] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquis respondere posset per hoc quod Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin., quod <i>mens semper sui meminit, semper se intelligit et amat</i>. Quod quidam sic intelligunt, quasi animae adsit actualis intelligentia et amor sui ipsius. Sed hunc intellectum excludit per hoc quod subdit, quod <i>non semper se cogitat discretam ab his quae non sunt quod ipsa</i>. Et sic patet quod anima semper intelligit et amat se, non actualiter, sed habitualiter. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod, percipiendo actum suum, seipsam intelligit quandocumque aliquid intelligit. Sed quia non semper est actu intelligens, ut patet in dormiente, ideo oportet dicere quod actus, etsi non semper maneant in seipsis, manent tamen semper in suis principiis, scilicet potentiis et habitibus. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., <i>si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem Dei anima rationalis, quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intelligendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, ab initio quo esse coepit, fuit in ea Dei imago</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A8-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 8. Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above <a href="#FP_Q93_A7" id="FP_Q93_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>, according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32415] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago divinae Trinitatis sit in anima non solum per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus. Imago enim divinae Trinitatis invenitur in anima, sicut dictum est, secundum quod verbum in nobis procedit a dicente et amor ab utroque. Sed hoc invenitur in nobis secundum quodcumque obiectum. Ergo secundum quodcumque obiectum invenitur in mente nostra imago divinae Trinitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32416] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., quod <i>cum quaerimus in anima Trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum</i>. Ergo etiam secundum temporalia obiecta invenitur imago Trinitatis in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32417] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod Deum intelligamus et amemus, convenit nobis secundum gratiae donum. Si igitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem seu dilectionem Dei, attendatur imago Trinitatis in anima, non erit imago Dei in homine secundum naturam, sed secundum gratiam. Et sic non erit omnibus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:18</a>): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="32418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32418] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sancti qui sunt in patria, maxime conformantur imagini Dei secundum gloriae visionem, unde dicitur, II ad Cor. III, <i>in eandem imaginem transformamur, a claritate in claritatem</i>. Sed secundum visionem gloriae temporalia cognoscuntur. Ergo etiam per comparationem ad temporalia, Dei imago attenditur in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less, therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32419] Iª q. 93 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod <i>non propterea est Dei imago in mente, quia sui meminit, et intelligit et diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse, intelligere et amare Deum, a quo facta est</i>. Multo igitur minus secundum alia obiecta attenditur imago Dei in mente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q93_A6" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">AA[6]</a>,7), are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 co."><a name="32420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32420] Iª q. 93 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, imago importat similitudinem utcumque pertingentem ad speciei repraesentationem. Unde oportet quod imago divinae Trinitatis attendatur in anima secundum aliquid quod repraesentat divinas personas repraesentatione speciei, sicut est possibile creaturae. Distinguuntur autem divinae personae, ut dictum est, secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque. Verbum autem Dei nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ipsius, et amor procedit a Deo secundum quod seipsum amat. Manifestum est autem quod diversitas obiectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris, non enim idem est specie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et de equo, nec idem specie amor. Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum. Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum. Fertur autem in aliquid mens dupliciter, uno modo, directe et immediate; alio modo, indirecte et mediate, sicut cum aliquis, videndo imaginem hominis in speculo, dicitur ferri in ipsum hominem. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod <i>mens meminit sui, intelligit se, et diligit se, hoc si cernimus, cernimus Trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei</i>. Sed hoc est, non quia fertur mens in seipsam absolute, sed prout per hoc ulterius potest ferri in Deum; ut patet per auctoritatem supra inductam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32421] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad rationem imaginis, non solum oportet attendere quod aliquid procedat ab aliquo; sed etiam quid a quo procedat, scilicet quod verbum Dei procedit a notitia de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there," as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32422] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod in tota quidem anima invenitur aliqua Trinitas, non quidem ita quod praeter actionem temporalium et contemplationem aeternorum, <i>quaeratur aliquod tertium quo Trinitas impleatur</i>, prout ibidem subditur. Sed in illa parte rationis quae derivatur a parte temporalium, etsi <i>Trinitas inveniri possit, non tamen imago Dei potest inveniri</i>, ut postea dicitur, quia huiusmodi temporalium notitia adventitia est animae. Et habitus etiam ipsi quibus temporalia cognoscuntur, non semper adsunt; sed quandoque quidem praesentialiter adsunt, quandoque autem secundum memoriam tantum, etiam postquam adesse incipiunt. Sicut patet de fide, quae temporaliter nobis advenit in praesenti, in statu autem futurae beatitudinis iam non erit fides, sed memoria fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above ( <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>; <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A3" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>; <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q60_A5" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.3" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32423] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod meritoria Dei cognitio et dilectio non est nisi per gratiam. Est tamen aliqua Dei cognitio et dilectio naturalis, ut supra habitum est. Et hoc etiam ipsum naturale est, quod mens ad intelligendum Deum ratione uti potest, secundum quod imaginem Dei semper diximus permanere in mente, sive haec imago Dei ita sit obsoleta, quasi obumbrata, ut pene nulla sit, ut in his qui non habent usum rationis; sive sit obscura atque deformis, ut in peccatoribus; sive sit clara et pulchra, ut in iustis, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="32424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32424] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum visionem gloriae, temporalia videbuntur in ipso Deo; et ideo huiusmodi temporalium visio ad Dei imaginem pertinebit. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod <i>in illa natura cui mens feliciter adhaerebit, immutabile videbit omne quod viderit</i>. Nam et in ipso verbo increato sunt rationes omnium creaturarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A9-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 9. Whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." For "genus" is not properly distinguished from "species." Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness" is not properly to be distinguished from "image." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="32425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32425] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur. Genus enim non convenienter distinguitur a specie. Sed similitudo comparatur ad imaginem, ut genus ad speciem, quia <i>ubi est imago, ibi est continuo similitudo, sed non convertitur</i>, ut dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo inconvenienter similitudo ab imagine distinguitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="32426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32426] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ratio imaginis attenditur non solum secundum repraesentationem divinarum personarum, sed etiam secundum repraesentationem divinae essentiae, ad quam repraesentationem pertinet immortalitas et indivisibilitas. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod <i>similitudo est in essentia, quia est immortalis et indivisibilis; imago autem in aliis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the image of God in man is threefold---the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained <a href="#FP_Q93_A4" id="FP_Q93_A9-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="32427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32427] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago Dei in homine est triplex, scilicet naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut supra habitum est. Sed innocentia et iustitia ad gratiam pertinent. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod <i>imago accipitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; similitudo autem secundum innocentiam et iustitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 4"><a name="32428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32428] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, cognitio veritatis ad intelligentiam pertinet, amor autem virtutis ad voluntatem, quae sunt duae partes imaginis. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod <i>imago sit in cognitione veritatis, similitudo in dilectione virtutis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and "likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 s. c."><a name="32429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32429] Iª q. 93 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>sunt qui non frustra intelligunt duo dicta esse ad imaginem et similitudinem; cum, si una res esset, unum nomen sufficere potuisset</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 co."><a name="32430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32430] Iª q. 93 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod similitudo quaedam unitas est, unum enim in qualitate similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Unum autem, cum sit de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus, et ad singula potest aptari; sicut et bonum et verum. Unde, sicut bonum alicui rei particulari potest comparari ut praeambulum ad ipsam, et ut subsequens, prout designat aliquam perfectionem ipsius; ita etiam est de comparatione similitudinis ad imaginem. Est enim bonum praeambulum ad hominem, secundum quod homo est quoddam particulare bonum, et rursus bonum subsequitur ad hominem, inquantum aliquem hominem specialiter dicimus esse bonum, propter perfectionem virtutis. Et similiter similitudo consideratur ut praeambulum ad imaginem, inquantum est communius quam imago, ut supra dictum est, consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat quandam imaginis perfectionem; dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel imperfecte repraesentat ipsum. Sic ergo similitudo potest ab imagine distingui dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est praeambula ad ipsam, et in pluribus existens. Et sic similitudo attenditur secundum ea quae sunt communiora proprietatibus naturae intellectualis, secundum quas proprie attenditur imago. Et secundum hoc dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod spiritus, idest mens, ad imaginem Dei, nullo dubitante, factus est, cetera autem hominis, scilicet quae pertinent ad inferiores partes animae, vel etiam ad ipsum corpus, ad similitudinem facta esse aliqui volunt. Secundum hoc etiam in libro de quantitate animae dicitur quod similitudo Dei attenditur in anima, inquantum est incorruptibilis, nam corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt differentiae entis communis. Alio modo potest considerari similitudo, secundum quod significat imaginis expressionem et perfectionem. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod <i>id quod est secundum imaginem, intellectuale significat, et arbitrio liberum per se potestativum, quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est inesse, similitudinem</i>. Et ad idem refertur quod similitudo dicitur ad dilectionem virtutis pertinere, non enim est virtus sine dilectione virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea of "image." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="32431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32431] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum communem rationem similitudinis (sic enim includitur in ratione ipsius imaginis), sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a ratione imaginis, vel etiam est imaginis perfectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="32432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32432] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad imaginem, prout repraesentat divinam essentiam secundum ea quae sunt propria intellectualis naturae, non autem secundum conditiones consequentes ens in communi, ut est esse simplicem et indissolubilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="32433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32433] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam virtutes quaedam naturaliter insunt animae, ad minus secundum quaedam earum semina, et secundum has posset attendi similitudo naturalis. Quamvis non sit inconveniens ut id quod secundum assignationem unam dicitur imago, secundum aliam dicatur similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as virtue itself belongs to likeness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 4"><a name="32434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32434] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinet ad rationem imaginis, sed dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem, sicut et virtus.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q94" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q94-p0.1">Q. 94. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q94-p2"> We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as to his will. </p><p id="FP_Q94-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q94-p4"><a href="#FP_Q94_A1"> (1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p5"><a href="#FP_Q94_A2"> (2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p6"><a href="#FP_Q94_A3"> (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p7"><a href="#FP_Q94_A4"> (4) Whether he could err or be deceived?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 pr."><a name="32435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32435] Iª q. 94 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de statu vel conditione primi hominis. Et primo, quantum ad animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus. Circa primum consideranda sunt duo, primo, de conditione hominis quantum ad intellectum; secundo, de conditione hominis quantum ad voluntatem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum primus homo viderit Deum per essentiam. Secundo, utrum videre potuerit substantias separatas, idest Angelos. Tertio, utrum habuerit omnium scientiam. Quarto, utrum potuerit errare vel decipi.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q94_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A1-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 1. Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the first man in paradise saw God through His Essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32436] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo per essentiam Deum viderit. Beatitudo enim hominis in visione divinae essentiae consistit. Sed primus homo, in Paradiso conversans, beatam et omnium divitem habuit vitam, ut Damascenus dicit in II libro. Et Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>si homines habebant affectus suos quales nunc habemus, quomodo erant beati in illo inenarrabilis beatitudinis loco, idest Paradiso?</i> Ergo primus homo in Paradiso vidit Deum per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that "the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32437] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>primo homini non aberat quidquam quod bona voluntas adipisceretur</i>. Sed nihil melius bona voluntas adipisci potest quam divinae essentiae visionem. Ergo homo per essentiam Deum videbat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the vision of God is His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence "saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God through His Essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32438] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, visio Dei per essentiam est qua videtur Deus sine medio et sine aenigmate. Sed homo in statu innocentiae vidit Deum sine medio; ut Magister dicit in I distinctione IV libri Sent. Vidit etiam sine aenigmate, quia aenigma obscuritatem importat, ut Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin.; obscuritas autem introducta est per peccatum. Ergo homo in primo statu vidit Deum per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.46" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:46</a>): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32439] Iª q. 94 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, quod <i>non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale</i>. Sed maxime spirituale est videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo primus homo, in primo statu animalis vitae, Deum per essentiam non vidit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.21" target="asv">Gn. 2:21</a>). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence. </p><p id="FP_Q94_A1-p7"> Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>): "God made man right." And man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 co."><a name="32440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32440] Iª q. 94 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod primus homo Deum per essentiam non vidit, secundum communem statum illius vitae; nisi forte dicatur quod viderit eum in raptu, quando Deus immisit soporem in Adam, ut dicitur Gen. II. Et huius ratio est quia, cum divina essentia sit ipsa beatitudo, hoc modo se habet intellectus videntis divinam essentiam ad Deum, sicut se habet quilibet homo ad beatitudinem. Manifestum est autem quod nullus homo potest per voluntatem a beatitudine averti, naturaliter enim, et ex necessitate, homo vult beatitudinem, et fugit miseriam. Unde nullus videns Deum per essentiam, potest voluntate averti a Deo, quod est peccare. Et propter hoc, omnes videntes Deum per essentiam, sic in amore Dei stabiliuntur, quod in aeternum peccare non possunt. Cum ergo Adam peccaverit, manifestum est quod Deum per essentiam non videbat. Cognoscebat tamen Deum quadam altiori cognitione quam nos cognoscamus, et sic quodammodo eius cognitio media erat inter cognitionem praesentis status, et cognitionem patriae, qua Deus per essentiam videtur. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod visio Dei per essentiam dividitur contra visionem Dei per creaturam. Quanto autem aliqua creatura est altior et Deo similior, tanto per eam Deus clarius videtur, sicut homo perfectius videtur per speculum in quo expressius imago eius resultat. Et sic patet quod multo eminentius videtur Deus per intelligibiles effectus, quam per sensibiles et corporeos. A consideratione autem plena et lucida intelligibilium effectuum impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a sensibilibus, et circa ea occupatur. Sed, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, Deus fecit hominem rectum. Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderentur, et superiora ab inferioribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non impediebatur per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplatione intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita. Unde dicit Augustinus, in XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>fortassis Deus primis hominibus antea loquebatur, sicut cum Angelis loquitur, ipsa incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum; etsi non tanta participatione divinae essentiae, quantam capiunt Angeli</i>. Sic igitur per huiusmodi intelligibiles effectus Dei, Deum clarius cognoscebat quam modo cognoscamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32441] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo in Paradiso beatus fuit, non illa perfecta beatitudine in quam transferendus erat, quae in divinae essentiae visione consistit, habebat tamen beatam vitam secundum quendam modum, ut Augustinus dicit XI super Gen. ad Litt., inquantum habebat integritatem et perfectionem quandam naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32442] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bona voluntas est ordinata voluntas. Non autem fuisset primi hominis ordinata voluntas, si in statu meriti habere voluisset quod ei promittebatur pro praemio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32443] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est medium. Quoddam, in quo simul videtur quod per medium videri dicitur; sicut cum homo videtur per speculum, et simul videtur cum ipso speculo. Aliud medium est, per cuius notitiam in aliquid ignotum devenimus; sicut est medium demonstrationis. Et sine tali medio Deus videbatur, non tamen sine primo medio. Non enim oportebat primum hominem pervenire in Dei cognitionem per demonstrationem sumptam ab aliquo effectu, sicut nobis est necessarium; sed simul in effectibus, praecipue intelligibilibus, suo modo Deum cognoscebat. Similiter etiam est considerandum quod obscuritas quae importatur in nomine aenigmatis, dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo, secundum quod quaelibet creatura est quoddam obscurum, si comparetur ad immensitatem divinae claritatis, et sic Adam videbat Deum in aenigmate, quia videbat Deum per effectum creatum. Alio modo potest accipi obscuritas quae consecuta est ex peccato, prout scilicet impeditur homo a consideratione intelligibilium per sensibilium occupationem, et secundum hoc, non vidit Deum in aenigmate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A3-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 3. Whether the first man knew all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32452] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non habuerit scientiam omnium. Aut enim habuit talem scientiam per species acquisitas, aut per species connaturales, aut per species infusas. Non autem per species acquisitas, huiusmodi enim cognitio ab experientia causatur, ut dicitur in I Metaphys.; ipse autem non tunc fuerat omnia expertus. Similiter etiam nec per species connaturales, quia erat eiusdem naturae nobiscum; anima autem nostra est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Si autem per species infusas, ergo scientia eius quam habebat de rebus, non erat eiusdem rationis cum scientia nostra, quam a rebus acquirimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things when he was first created. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32453] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei est idem modus consequendi perfectionem. Sed alii homines non statim in sui principio habent omnium scientiam, sed eam per temporis successionem acquirunt secundum suum modum. Ergo nec Adam, statim formatus, habuit omnium scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32454] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, status praesentis vitae homini conceditur ut in eo proficiat anima et quantum ad cognitionem, et quantum ad meritum; propter hoc enim anima corpori videtur esse unita. Sed homo in statu illo profecisset quantum ad meritum. Ergo etiam profecisset quantum ad cognitionem rerum. Non ergo habuit omnium rerum scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Man named the animals ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.20" target="asv">Gn. 2:20</a>). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32455] Iª q. 94 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod ipse imposuit nomina animalibus, ut dicitur Gen. II. Nomina autem debent naturis rerum congruere. Ergo Adam scivit naturas omnium animalium, et pari ratione, habuit omnium aliorum scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others. </p><p id="FP_Q94_A3-p7"> Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 co."><a name="32456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32456] Iª q. 94 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod naturali ordine perfectum praecedit imperfectum, sicut et actus potentiam, quia ea quae sunt in potentia, non reducuntur ad actum nisi per aliquod ens actu. Et quia res primitus a Deo institutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut essent aliorum principia; ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse principium alterius non solum per generationem corporalem, sed etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo, sicut primus homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare; ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et haec sunt omnia illa quae virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quaecumque scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt. Ad gubernationem autem vitae propriae et aliorum, non solum requiritur cognitio eorum quae naturaliter sciri possunt, sed etiam cognitio eorum quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt; eo quod vita hominis ordinatur ad quendam finem supernaturalem; sicut nobis, ad gubernationem vitae nostrae, necessarium est cognoscere quae fidei sunt. Unde et de his supernaturalibus tantam cognitionem primus homo accepit, quanta erat necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae secundum statum illum. Alia vero, quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli iaceant in flumine, et alia huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32457] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod primus homo habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo infusas. Nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra; sicut nec oculi quos caeco nato Christus dedit, fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To Adam, as being the first man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above explained. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32458] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Adam debebat aliquid habere perfectionis, inquantum erat primus homo, quod ceteris hominibus non competit; ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32459] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Adam in scientia naturalium scibilium non profecisset quantum ad numerum scitorum, sed quantum ad modum sciendi, quia quae sciebat intellectualiter, scivisset postmodum per experimentum. Quantum vero ad supernaturalia cognita, profecisset etiam quantum ad numerum, per novas revelationes; sicut et Angeli proficiunt per novas illuminationes. Nec tamen est simile de profectu meriti, et scientiae, quia unus homo non est alteri principium merendi, sicut est sciendi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A4-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 4. Whether man in his first state could be deceived?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14</a>) that "the woman being seduced was in the transgression." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32460] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in primo statu decipi potuisset. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32461] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXI dist. II Sent., quod <i>ideo mulier non horruit serpentem loquentem, quia officium loquendi eum accepisse a Deo putavit</i>. Sed hoc falsum erat. Ergo mulier decepta fuit ante peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32462] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, naturale est quod quanto aliquid remotius videtur, tanto minus videtur. Sed natura oculi non est contracta per peccatum. Ergo hoc idem in statu innocentiae contigisset. Fuisset ergo homo deceptus circa quantitatem rei visae, sicut et modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32463] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod in somno adhaeret anima similitudini tanquam ipsi rei. Sed homo in statu innocentiae comedisset, et per consequens dormivisset et somniasset. Ergo deceptus fuisset, adhaerendo similitudinibus tanquam rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above <a href="#FP_Q94_A3" id="FP_Q94_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="32464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32464] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, primus homo nescivisset cogitationes hominum et futura contingentia, ut dictum est. Si igitur aliquis super his sibi falsum diceret, deceptus fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment of man condemned." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32465] Iª q. 94 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, <i>approbare vera pro falsis, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without the assent of belief---or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed. </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p9"> Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion. </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p10"> This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded ( <a href="#FP_Q85_A6" id="FP_Q94_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[6]</a>), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 co."><a name="32466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32466] Iª q. 94 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod in nomine deceptionis duo possunt intelligi, scilicet qualiscumque existimatio levis, qua aliquis adhaeret falso tanquam vero, sine assensu credulitatis; et iterum firma credulitas. Quantum ergo ad ea quorum scientiam Adam habebat, neutro istorum modorum homo decipi poterat ante peccatum. Sed quantum ad ea quorum scientiam non habebat, decipi poterat, large accepta deceptione pro existimatione qualicumque sine assensu credulitatis. Quod ideo dicunt, quia existimare falsum in talibus, non est noxium homini; et ex quo temere assensus non adhibetur, non est culpabile. Sed haec positio non convenit integritati primi status, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civit. Dei, <i>in illo statu erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente, nullum malum omnino esse poterat</i>. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum eius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat; ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi. Quod etiam ex ipsa rectitudine primi status apparet, secundum quam, quandiu anima maneret Deo subdita, tandiu in homine inferiora superioribus subderentur, nec superiora per inferiora impedirentur. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus est. Unde ex seipso nunquam decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo huiusmodi. Unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est ligatum, non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando ligatur, ut patet in dormientibus. Unde manifestum est quod rectitudo primi status non compatiebatur aliquam deceptionem circa intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32467] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>mulier verbis serpentis non crederet, nisi iam inesset menti eius amor propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32468] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod mulier putavit serpentem hoc accepisse loquendi officium, non per naturam, sed aliqua supernaturali operatione. Quamvis non sit necessarium auctoritatem Magistri sententiarum sequi in hac parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32469] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si aliquid repraesentatum fuisset sensui vel phantasiae primi hominis aliter quam sit in rerum natura, non tamen deciperetur, quia per rationem veritatem diiudicaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper action. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32470] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod id quod accidit in somno, non imputatur homini, quia non habet usum rationis, qui est proprius hominis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion. </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p16"> It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend. </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p17"> If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="32471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32471] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod alicui dicenti falsum de contingentibus futuris vel cogitationibus cordium, homo in statu innocentiae non credidisset ita esse, sed credidisset quod hoc esset possibile, et hoc non esset existimare falsum. Vel potest dici quod divinitus ei subventum fuisset, ne deciperetur in his quorum scientiam non habebat. Nec est instantia, quam quidam afferunt, quod in tentatione non fuit ei subventum ne deciperetur, licet tunc maxime indigeret. Quia iam praecesserat peccatum in animo, et ad divinum auxilium recursum non habuit.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q95" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q95-p0.1">Q. 95. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q95-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. </p><p id="FP_Q95-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q95-p4"><a href="#FP_Q95_A1"> (1) Whether the first man was created in grace?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p5"><a href="#FP_Q95_A2"> (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p6"><a href="#FP_Q95_A3"> (3) Whether he had all virtues?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p7"><a href="#FP_Q95_A4"> (4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 pr."><a name="32472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32472] Iª q. 95 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad voluntatem primi hominis. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt duo, primo quidem, de gratia et iustitia primi hominis; secundo, de usu iustitiae quantum ad dominium super alia. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum primus homo creatus fuerit in gratia. Secundo, utrum in statu innocentiae habuerit animae passiones. Tertio, utrum habuit virtutes omnes. Quarto, utrum opera eius fuissent aeque efficacia ad merendum, sicut modo sunt.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q95_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A1-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 1. Whether the first man was created in grace?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.45" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:45</a>): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32473] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non fuerit creatus in gratia. Apostolus enim, I Cor. XV, distinguens Adam a Christo, dicit, <i>factus est primus Adam in animam viventem; novissimus autem in spiritum vivificantem</i>. Sed vivificatio spiritus est per gratiam. Ergo hoc est proprium Christi, quod fuerit factus in gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32474] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaestionibus veteris et novi testamenti, quod <i>Adam non habuit spiritum sanctum</i>. Sed quicumque habet gratiam, habet spiritum sanctum. Ergo Adam non fuit creatus in gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32475] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, quod <i>Deus sic ordinavit Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut prius in eis ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, iustitiaeque iudicium</i>. Primo ergo condidit hominem et Angelum in sola naturali arbitrii libertate, et postmodum eis gratiam contulit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32476] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Magister dicit, in XXIV distinctione libri II Sent., quod <i>homini in creatione datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat, sed non poterat proficere</i>. Quicumque autem habet gratiam, potest proficere per meritum. Ergo primus homo non fuit creatus in gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32477] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte recipientis, cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale inter Deum et animam. Sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi prius existentis. Ergo homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti suae creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="32478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32478] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, natura plus distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est aliud quam gratia consummata. Sed in homine gratia praecessit gloriam. Ergo multo magis natura praecessit gratiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): "God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32479] Iª q. 95 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, homo et Angelus aequaliter ordinantur ad gratiam. Sed Angelus est creatus in gratia, dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>Deus simul erat in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam</i>. Ergo et homo creatus fuit in gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A1-p9"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence. </p><p id="FP_Q95_A1-p10"> But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:30, </a> "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 co."><a name="32480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32480] Iª q. 95 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit quidem creatus in gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia fuit sibi collata antequam peccasset, plurimae enim sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem in statu innocentiae gratiam habuisse. Sed quod etiam fuerit conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. VII, <i>Deus fecit hominem rectum</i>. Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit. Manifestum est autem quod illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom. Unde manifestum est quod et illa prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae, non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae</i>. Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32481] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus illa verba inducit ad ostendendum esse corpus spirituale, si est corpus animale, quia vita spiritualis corporis incoepit in Christo, qui est primogenitus ex mortuis, sicut vita corporis animalis incoepit in Adam. Non ergo ex verbis apostoli habetur quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam; sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32482] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in eodem loco, non negatur quin aliquo modo fuerit in Adam spiritus sanctus, sicut et in aliis iustis, sed quod non sic fuerit in eo, sicut nunc est in fidelibus, qui admittuntur ad perceptionem haereditatis aeternae statim post mortem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32483] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non habetur quod Angelus vel homo prius fuerit creatus in naturali libertate arbitrii, quam habuisset gratiam, sed quod prius ostendit quid in eis posset liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem, et quid postmodum consecuti sunt per auxilium gratiae confirmantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32484] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum qui posuerunt hominem non esse creatum in gratia, sed in naturalibus tantum. Vel potest dici quod, etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32485] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="32486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32486] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum naturae. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A2-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 2. Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.7" target="asv">Gal. 5:7</a>). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32487] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in primo homine non fuerint animae passiones. Secundum enim passiones animae contingit quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed hoc non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erant animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32488] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima Adae erat nobilior quam corpus. Sed corpus Adae fuit impassibile. Ergo nec in anima eius fuerunt passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32489] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, per virtutem moralem comprimuntur animae passiones. Sed in Adam fuit virtus moralis perfecta. Ergo totaliter passiones excludebantur ab eo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32490] Iª q. 95 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod erat in eis amor imperturbatus in Deum, et quaedam aliae animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 co."><a name="32491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32491] Iª q. 95 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensuali, cuius obiectum est bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri boni ut suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae. Aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32492] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per hoc quod passiones rationi repugnant, quod in statu innocentiae non erat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on ( <a href="#FP_Q97_A2" id="FP_Q95_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[2]</a>); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32493] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus humanum in statu innocentiae erat impassibile quantum ad passiones quae removent dispositionem naturalem, ut infra dicetur. Et similiter anima fuit impassibilis quantum ad passiones quae impediunt rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32494] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit passiones, sed ordinat eas, <i>temperati enim est concupiscere sicut oportet, et quae oportet</i>, ut dicitur in III Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A3-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 3. Whether Adam had all the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32495] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam non habuerit omnes virtutes. Quaedam enim virtutes ordinantur ad refraenandam immoderantiam passionum; sicut per temperantiam refraenatur immoderata concupiscentia, et per fortitudinem immoderatus timor. Sed immoderantia passionum non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo nec dictae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above <a href="#FP_Q95_A2" id="FP_Q95_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither did those virtues exist then. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32496] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quaedam virtutes sunt circa passiones respicientes malum; ut mansuetudo circa iras, et fortitudo circa timores. Sed tales passiones non erant in statu innocentiae, ut dictum est. Ergo nec huiusmodi virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32497] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, poenitentia est quaedam virtus respiciens peccatum prius commissum. Misericordia etiam est quaedam virtus respiciens miseriam. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat peccatum nec miseria. Ergo neque huiusmodi virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32498] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, perseverantia est quaedam virtus. Sed hanc Adam non habuit; ut sequens peccatum ostendit. Ergo non habuit omnes virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="32499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32499] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, fides quaedam virtus est. Sed haec in statu innocentiae non fuit, importat enim aenigmaticam cognitionem, quae perfectioni primi status repugnare videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32500] Iª q. 95 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in quadam homilia, <i>princeps vitiorum devicit Adam de limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia armatum, temperantia compositum, claritate splendidum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A3-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For it was shown above <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q95_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (FS, <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q63_A2" id="FP_Q95_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. </p><p id="FP_Q95_A3-p9"> It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 co."><a name="32501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32501] Iª q. 95 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes. Et hoc ex dictis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra quod talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subiecta, inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, et inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis; ut magis patebit cum de virtutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet. Sed considerandum est quod virtutum quaedam sunt, quae de sui ratione nullam imperfectionem important, ut caritas et iustitia. Et huiusmodi virtutes fuerunt in statu innocentiae simpliciter, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quaedam vero sunt, quae de sui ratione imperfectionem important, vel ex parte actus vel ex parte materiae. Et si huiusmodi imperfectio non repugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus huiusmodi virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur, et spes, quae est eorum quae non habentur. Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Si vero imperfectio quae est de ratione virtutis alicuius, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat huiusmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, ut patet de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena; perfectioni enim primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro posse repelleret. Sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, <i>contingit studioso solum sub conditione, est enim sic dispositus, quod verecundaretur si turpe aliquid committeret</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se' competent to moderate the passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32502] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod accidit temperantiae et fortitudini quod superabundantiam passionum repellat, inquantum invenit passiones superabundantes in subiecto. Sed per se convenit huiusmodi virtutibus passiones moderari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32503] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod illae passiones ad malum ordinatae, repugnant perfectioni primi status, quae habent respectum ad malum in ipso qui afficitur passione, ut timor et dolor. Sed passiones quae respiciunt malum in altero, non repugnant perfectioni primi status, poterat enim homo in primo statu habere odio malitiam Daemonum, sicut et diligere bonitatem Dei. Unde et virtutes quae circa tales passiones essent, possent esse in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quae vero sunt circa passiones respicientes malum in eodem subiecto, si circa huiusmodi solas passiones sunt, non poterant esse in primo statu secundum actum, sed solum secundum habitum; sicut de poenitentia et misericordia dictum est. Sed sunt quaedam virtutes quae non sunt circa has passiones solum, sed etiam circa alias; sicut temperantia, quae non solum est circa tristitias, sed etiam circa delectationes; et fortitudo, quae non solum est circa timores, sed etiam circa audaciam et spem. Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive spei; non autem secundum quod moderantur tristitiam et timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> appears from what has been said above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32504] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32505] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod perseverantia dupliciter sumitur. Uno modo, prout est quaedam virtus, et sic significat quendam habitum, quo quis eligit perseverare in bono. Et sic Adam perseverantiam habuit. Alio modo, prout est circumstantia virtutis, et sic significat continuationem quandam virtutis absque interruptione. Et hoc modo Adam perseverantiam non habuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> appears from what has been said above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="32506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32506] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A4-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 4. Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32507] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod opera primi hominis fuerint minus efficacia ad merendum quam opera nostra. Gratia enim ex Dei misericordia datur, quae magis indigentibus subvenit magis. Sed nos indigemus magis gratia quam primus homo in statu innocentiae. Ergo copiosius infunditur nobis gratia. Quae cum sit radix meriti, opera nostra efficaciora ad merendum redduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:5</a>): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32508] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad meritum requiritur pugna quaedam et difficultas. Dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, <i>non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus est circa difficile et bonum</i>. Sed nunc est maior pugna et difficultas. Ergo et maior efficacia ad merendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32509] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXIV distinctione II libri Sent., quod <i>homo non meruisset, tentationi resistendo; nunc autem meretur qui tentationi resistit</i>. Ergo efficaciora sunt opera nostra ad merendum quam in primo statu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32510] Iª q. 95 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia secundum hoc, homo esset melioris conditionis post peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good. </p><p id="FP_Q95_A4-p7"> We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 co."><a name="32511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32511] Iª q. 95 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quantitas meriti ex duobus potest pensari. Uno modo, ex radice caritatis et gratiae. Et talis quantitas meriti respondet praemio essentiali, quod consistit in Dei fruitione, qui enim ex maiori caritate aliquid facit, perfectius Deo fruetur. Alio modo pensari potest quantitas meriti ex quantitate operis. Quae quidem est duplex, scilicet absoluta, et proportionalis. Vidua enim quae misit duo aera minuta in gazophylacium; minus opus fecit quantitate absoluta, quam illi qui magna munera posuerunt, sed quantitate proportionali vidua plus fecit, secundum sententiam domini, quia magis eius facultatem superabat. Utraque tamen quantitas meriti respondet praemio accidentali; quod est gaudium de bono creato. Sic igitur dicendum quod efficaciora fuissent hominis opera ad merendum in statu innocentiae quam post peccatum, si attendatur quantitas meriti ex parte gratiae; quae tunc copiosior fuisset, nullo obstaculo in natura humana invento. Similiter etiam, si consideretur absoluta quantitas operis, quia, cum homo esset maioris virtutis, maiora opera fecisset. Sed si consideretur quantitas proportionalis, maior invenitur ratio meriti post peccatum, propter hominis imbecillitatem, magis enim excedit parvum opus potestatem eius qui cum difficultate operatur illud, quam opus magnum potestatem eius qui sine difficultate operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32512] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo post peccatum ad plura indiget gratia quam ante peccatum, sed non magis. Quia homo, etiam ante peccatum, indigebat gratia ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quae est principalis necessitas gratiae. Sed homo post peccatum, super hoc, indiget gratia etiam ad peccati remissionem, et infirmitatis sustentationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32513] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod difficultas et pugna pertinent ad quantitatem meriti, secundum quantitatem operis proportionalem, ut dictum est. Et est signum promptitudinis voluntatis, quae conatur ad id quod est sibi difficile, promptitudo autem voluntatis causatur ex magnitudine caritatis. Et tamen potest contingere quod aliquis ita prompta voluntate faciat opus aliquod facile, sicut alius difficile, quia paratus esset facere etiam quod sibi esset difficile. Difficultas tamen actualis, inquantum est poenalis, habet etiam quod sit satisfactoria pro peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32514] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod resistere tentationi primo homini non fuisset meritorium, secundum opinionem ponentium quod gratiam non haberet; sicut nec modo est meritorium non habenti gratiam. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia in primo statu nihil erat interius impellens ad malum, sicut modo est, unde magis tunc poterat homo resistere tentationi sine gratia, quam modo.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q96" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q96-p0.1">Q. 96. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q96-p2"> We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: </p><p id="FP_Q96-p3"><a href="#FP_Q96_A1"> (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p4"><a href="#FP_Q96_A2"> (2) Whether he was master over all creatures?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p5"><a href="#FP_Q96_A3"> (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p6"><a href="#FP_Q96_A4"> (4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 pr."><a name="32515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32515] Iª q. 96 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de dominio quod competebat homini in statu innocentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae animalibus dominaretur. Secundo, utrum dominaretur omni creaturae. Tertio, utrum in statu innocentiae omnes homines fuissent aequales. Quarto, utrum in illo statu homo hominibus dominaretur.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q96_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A1-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 1. Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32516] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiae animalibus non dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX super Gen. ad Litt., quod ministerio Angelorum animalia sunt adducta ad Adam, ut eis nomina imponeret. Non autem fuisset ibi necessarium Angelorum ministerium, si homo per seipsum animalibus dominabatur. Non ergo in statu innocentiae habuit dominium homo super alia animalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32517] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea quae ad invicem discordant, non recte sub uno dominio congregantur. Sed multa animalia naturaliter ad invicem discordant, sicut ovis et lupus. Ergo omnia animalia sub hominis dominio non continebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St. Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv"> Gn. 1:26</a>]: "God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man." Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32518] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod <i>homini ante peccatum non indigenti, Deus animalium dominationem dedit, praesciebat enim hominem adminiculo animalium adiuvandum fore post lapsum</i>. Ergo ad minus usus dominii super animalia non competebat homini ante peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32519] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, proprium domini esse videtur praecipere. Sed praeceptum non recte fertur nisi ad habentem rationem. Ergo homo non habebat dominium super animalia irrationalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth" [Vulg."and the whole earth"]. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32520] Iª q. 96 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, <i>praesit piscibus maris, et volatilibus caeli, et bestiis terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q96_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 co."><a name="32521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32521] Iª q. 96 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, inobedientia ad hominem eorum quae ei debent esse subiecta, subsecuta est in poenam eius, eo quod ipse fuit inobediens Deo. Et ideo in statu innocentiae, ante inobedientiam praedictam, nihil ei repugnabat quod naturaliter deberet ei esse subiectum. Omnia autem animalia sunt homini naturaliter subiecta. Quod apparet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex ipso naturae processu. Sicut enim in generatione rerum intelligitur quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecto ad perfectum (nam materia est propter formam, et forma imperfectior propter perfectiorem), ita etiam est in usu rerum naturalium, nam imperfectiora cedunt in usum perfectorum; plantae enim utuntur terra ad sui nutrimentum, animalia vero plantis, et homines plantis et animalibus. Unde naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in I Politic., quod venatio sylvestrium animalium est iusta et naturalis, quia per eam homo vindicat sibi quod est naturaliter suum. Secundo apparet hoc ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae semper inferiora per superiora gubernat. Unde, cum homo sit supra cetera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter eius gubernationi alia animalia subduntur. Tertio apparet idem ex proprietate hominis, et aliorum animalium. In aliis enim animalibus invenitur, secundum aestimationem naturalem, quaedam participatio prudentiae ad aliquos particulares actus, in homine autem invenitur universalis prudentia, quae est ratio omnium agibilium. Omne autem quod est per participationem, subditur ei quod est per essentiam et universaliter. Unde patet quod naturalis est subiectio aliorum animalium ad hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32522] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in subiectos multa potest facere superior potestas, quae non potest facere inferior. Angelus autem est naturaliter superior homine. Unde aliquis effectus poterat fieri circa animalia virtute angelica, qui non poterat fieri potestate humana; scilicet quod statim omnia animalia congregarentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.30" target="asv">Gn. 1:30</a>, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32523] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod animalia quae nunc sunt ferocia et occidunt alia animalia, in statu illo fuissent mansueta non solum circa hominem, sed etiam circa alia animalia. Sed hoc est omnino irrationabile. Non enim per peccatum hominis natura animalium est mutata, ut quibus nunc naturale est comedere aliorum animalium carnes, tunc vixissent de herbis, sicut leones et falcones. Nec Glossa Bedae dicit, Gen. I, quod ligna et herbae datae sunt omnibus animalibus et avibus in cibum, sed quibusdam. Fuisset ergo naturalis discordia inter quaedam animalia. Nec tamen propter hoc subtraherentur dominio hominis; sicut nec nunc propter hoc subtrahuntur dominio Dei, cuius providentia hoc totum dispensatur. Et huius providentiae homo executor fuisset, ut etiam nunc apparet in animalibus domesticis, ministrantur enim falconibus domesticis per homines gallinae in cibum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals---neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence---nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise---nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32524] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod homines in statu innocentiae non indigebant animalibus ad necessitatem corporalem, neque ad tegumentum, quia nudi erant, et non erubescebant, nullo instante inordinatae concupiscentiae motu; neque ad cibum, quia lignis Paradisi vescebantur; neque ad vehiculum, propter corporis robur. Indigebant tamen eis ad experimentalem cognitionem sumendam de naturis eorum. Quod significatum est per hoc, quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, ut eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas designant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32525] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod alia animalia habent quandam participationem prudentiae et rationis secundum aestimationem naturalem; ex qua contingit quod grues sequuntur ducem, et apes obediunt regi. Et sic tunc omnia animalia per seipsa homini obedivissent, sicut nunc quaedam domestica ei obediunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q96_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A2-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 2. Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels." Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32526] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non habuisset dominium super omnes alias creaturas. Angelus enim naturaliter est maioris potestatis quam homo. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus III de Trin., <i>materia corporalis non obedivisset ad nutum etiam sanctis Angelis</i>. Ergo multo minus homini in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32527] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in plantis non sunt de viribus animae nisi nutritiva et augmentativa et generativa. Hae autem non sunt natae obedire rationi; ut in uno et eodem homine apparet. Ergo, cum dominium competat homini secundum rationem, videtur quod plantis homo in statu innocentiae non dominaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32528] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque dominatur alicui rei, potest illam rem mutare. Sed homo non potuisset mutare cursum caelestium corporum, hoc enim solius Dei est, ut Dionysius dicit in epistola ad Polycarpum. Ergo non dominabatur eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "That he may have dominion over . . . every creature." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32529] Iª q. 96 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, <i>praesit universae creaturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his "reason," which makes him like to the angels'; his "sensitive powers," whereby he is like the animals; his "natural forces," which liken him to the plants; and "the body itself," wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 co."><a name="32530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32530] Iª q. 96 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia, et ideo secundum modum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei dominari aliis. Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum Angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis. Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis, et non subiecti dominio. Unde homo Angelis non dominabatur in primo statu, et quod dicitur omni creaturae, intelligitur quae non est ad imaginem Dei. Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut irascibili et concupiscibili, quae aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima imperando. Unde et in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per imperium dominabatur. Viribus autem naturalibus, et ipsi corpori, homo dominatur non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo in statu innocentiae dominabatur plantis et rebus inanimatis, non per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimento utendo eorum auxilio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p7"> The answers to the objections appear from the above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="32531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32531] Iª q. 96 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q96_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A3-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 3. Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32532] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines in statu innocentiae omnes fuissent aequales. Dicit enim Gregorius quod, <i>ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares sumus</i>. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat delictum. Ergo omnes erant pares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19, </a> "Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32533] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, similitudo et aequalitas est ratio mutuae dilectionis; secundum illud Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile, sic et omnis homo proximum sibi</i>. In illo autem statu inter homines abundabat dilectio, quae est vinculum pacis. Ergo omnes fuissent pares in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32534] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cessante causa, cessat effectus. Sed causa inaequalitatis inter homines videtur nunc esse, ex parte quidem Dei, quod quosdam pro meritis praemiat, quosdam vero punit, ex parte vero naturae, quia propter naturae defectum quidam nascuntur debiles et orbati, quidam autem fortes et perfecti. Quae in primo statu non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "The things which are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of God"]. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place." Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32535] Iª q. 96 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. XIII, <i>quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt</i>. Ordo autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio</i>. Ergo in primo statu, qui decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile. </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p7"> Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p8"> There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life. </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p9"> So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 co."><a name="32536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32536] Iª q. 96 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu fuisse, ad minus quantum ad sexum, quia sine diversitate sexus, generatio non fuisset. Similiter etiam quantum ad aetatem, sic enim quidam ex aliis nascebantur; nec illi qui miscebantur, steriles erant. Sed et secundum animam diversitas fuisset, et quantum ad iustitiam et quantum ad scientiam. Non enim ex necessitate homo operabatur, sed per liberum arbitrium; ex quo homo habet quod possit magis et minus animum applicare ad aliquid faciendum vel volendum vel cognoscendum. Unde quidam magis profecissent in iustitia et scientia quam alii. Ex parte etiam corporis, poterat esse disparitas. Non enim erat exemptum corpus humanum totaliter a legibus naturae, quin ex exterioribus agentibus aliquod commodum aut auxilium reciperet magis et minus, cum etiam et cibis eorum vita sustentaretur. Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum diversam dispositionem aeris et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et maiores et pulchriores et melius complexionati. Ita tamen quod in illis qui excederentur, nullus esset defectus sive peccatum, sive circa animam sive circa corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32537] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius per verba illa intendit excludere disparitatem quae est secundum differentiam iustitiae et peccati; ex qua contingit quod aliqui poenaliter sunt sub aliis coercendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32538] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod aequalitas est causa quod dilectio mutua sit aequalis. Sed tamen inter inaequales potest esse maior dilectio quam inter aequales, licet non aequaliter utrinque respondeat. Pater enim plus diligit filium naturaliter, quam frater fratrem; licet filius non tantundem diligat patrem, sicut ab eo diligitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32539] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod causa disparitatis poterat esse et ex parte Dei, non quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam praemiaret; sed ut quosdam plus, quosdam minus sublimaret, ut pulchritudo ordinis magis in hominibus reluceret. Et etiam ex parte naturae poterat disparitas causari secundum praedictum modum, absque aliquo defectu naturae.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q97" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q97-p0.1">Q. 97. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q97-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species. </p><p id="FP_Q97-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q97-p4"><a href="#FP_Q97_A1"> (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p5"><a href="#FP_Q97_A2"> (2) Whether he was impassible?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p6"><a href="#FP_Q97_A3"> (3) Whether he stood in need of food?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p7"><a href="#FP_Q97_A4"> (4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 pr."><a name="32546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32546] Iª q. 97 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad statum primi hominis secundum corpus. Et primo, quantum ad conservationem individui; secundo, quantum ad conservationem speciei. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae esset immortalis. Secundo, utrum esset impassibilis. Tertio, utrum indigeret cibis. Quarto, utrum per lignum vitae immortalitatem consequeretur.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q97_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A1-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32547] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non erat immortalis. Mortale enim ponitur in definitione hominis. Sed remota definitione, aufertur definitum. Ergo si homo erat, non poterat esse immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32548] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, corruptibile et incorruptibile genere differunt, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed eorum quae differunt genere, non est transmutatio in invicem. Si ergo primus homo fuit incorruptibilis, non posset homo in statu isto esse corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.10.2" target="asv"> Wis. 10:2</a>: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32549] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si homo in statu innocentiae fuit immortalis, aut hoc habuit per naturam, aut per gratiam. Sed non per naturam, quia, cum natura eadem maneat secundum speciem, nunc quoque esset immortalis. Similiter nec per gratiam, quia primus homo gratiam per poenitentiam recuperavit, secundum illud Sap. X, <i>eduxit illum a delicto suo</i>; ergo immortalitatem recuperasset; quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo homo erat immortalis in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv"> Apoc. 21:4</a>: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32550] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, immortalitas promittitur homini in praemium; secundum illud Apoc. XXI, <i>mors ultra non erit</i>. Sed homo non fuit conditus in statu praemii, sed ut praemium mereretur. Ergo homo in statu innocentiae non fuit immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By sin death came into the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32551] Iª q. 97 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Rom. V, quod <i>per peccatum intravit mors in mundum</i>. Ergo ante peccatum homo erat immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter---that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q97_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 co."><a name="32552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32552] Iª q. 97 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte materiae, eo scilicet quod vel non habet materiam, sicut Angelus; vel habet materiam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut corpus caeleste. Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile. Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte formae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur. Et hoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Dioscorum, <i>tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis</i>, idest incorruptionis vigor. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., <i>Deus hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut ipse sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam aut ad mortem</i>. Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est. Conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservare posset supra naturam corporalis materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p8"> Reply OBJ 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32553] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo et secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de incorruptibili et immortali per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (TP, <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A4" id="FP_Q97_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[14] , A[4]</a>, ad 1). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32554] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae. Et quamvis gratiam recuperaverit ad remissionem culpae et meritum gloriae, non tamen ad amissae immortalitatis effectum. Hoc enim reservabatur Christo, per quem naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32555] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod differt immortalitas gloriae, quae promittitur in praemium, ab immortalitate quae fuit homini collata in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q97_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A2-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32556] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae fuisset passibilis. Sentire enim est pati quoddam. Sed homo in statu innocentiae fuisset sensibilis. Ergo fuisset passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.21" target="asv"> Gn. 2:21, </a> "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32557] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, somnus passio quaedam est. Sed homo in statu innocentiae dormivisset; secundum illud Gen. II, <i>immisit Deus soporem in Adam</i>. Ergo fuisset passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32558] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ibidem subditur quod tulit unam de costis eius. Ergo fuisset passibilis etiam per abscissionem partis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32559] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, corpus hominis molle fuit. Sed molle naturaliter passivum est a duro. Ergo si corpori primi hominis obvium fuisset aliquod corpus durum, ab eo passum fuisset. Et sic primus homo fuit passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive suffering wastes the very substance." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32560] Iª q. 97 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia, si fuit passibilis, fuit etiam corruptibilis, quia passio, magis facta, abiicit a substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 co."><a name="32561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32561] Iª q. 97 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie, et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est effectus actionis, in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis, poterat enim passionem prohibere, sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p8"> Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32562] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima. Nam sentire et dormire non removent hominem a naturali dispositione, sed ad bonum naturae ordinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As already explained ( <a href="#FP_Q92_A3" id="FP_Q97_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32563] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, costa illa fuit in Adam, inquantum erat principium humani generis; sicut semen est in homine, inquantum est principium per generationem. Sicut igitur decisio seminis non est cum passione quae removeat hominem a naturali dispositione, ita etiam est dicendum de separatione illius costae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32564] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro, partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q97_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A3-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 3. Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32565] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non indigebat cibis. Cibus enim necessarius est homini ad restaurationem deperditi. Sed in corpore Adae, ut videtur, nulla fiebat deperditio, quia incorruptibile erat. Ergo non erat ei cibus necessarius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does not appear how food could be needful to him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32566] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cibus est necessarius ad nutriendum. Sed nutritio non est sine passione. Cum ergo corpus hominis esset impassibile, non erat ei cibus necessarius, ut videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did not require food. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32567] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cibus dicitur esse nobis necessarius ad vitae conservationem. Sed Adam aliter vitam poterat conservare, quia si non peccaret, non moreretur. Ergo cibus non erat ei necessarius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32568] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ad sumptionem cibi sequitur emissio superfluitatum, quae habent quandam turpitudinem non convenientem dignitati primi status. Ergo videtur quod homo in primo statu cibis non uteretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.16" target="asv">Gn. 2:16</a>): "Of every tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32569] Iª q. 97 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso, comedetis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q97_A3-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls---that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "Man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power. </p><p id="FP_Q97_A3-p8"> Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called "animal" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.44" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:44 </a>seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 co."><a name="32570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32570] Iª q. 97 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae habuit vitam animalem cibis indigentem; post resurrectionem vero habebit vitam spiritualem cibis non indigentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod anima rationalis et anima est et spiritus. Dicitur autem esse anima secundum illud quod est sibi commune et aliis animabus, quod est vitam corpori dare, unde dicitur Gen. II, <i>factus est homo in animam viventem</i>, idest vitam corpori dantem. Sed spiritus dicitur secundum illud quod est proprium sibi et non aliis animabus, quod scilicet habeat virtutem intellectivam immaterialem. In primo igitur statu anima rationalis communicabat corpori id quod competit ei inquantum est anima, et ideo corpus illud dicebatur animale, inquantum scilicet habebat vitam ab anima. Primum autem principium vitae in istis inferioribus, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est anima vegetabilis, cuius opera sunt alimento uti et generare et augeri. Et ideo haec opera homini in primo statu competebant. In ultimo vero statu post resurrectionem, anima communicabit quodammodo corpori ea quae sunt sibi propria inquantum est spiritus, immortalitatem quidem, quantum ad omnes; impassibilitatem vero et gloriam et virtutem, quantum ad bonos, quorum corpora spiritualia dicentur. Unde post resurrectionem homines cibis non indigebunt, sed in statu innocentiae eis indigebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For we have explained <a href="#FP_Q97_A1" id="FP_Q97_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32571] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., <i>quomodo immortale corpus habebat, quod cibo sustentabatur? Immortale enim non eget esca neque potu</i>. Dictum est enim supra quod immortalitas primi status erat secundum vim quandam supernaturalem in anima residentem; non autem secundum aliquam dispositionem corpori inhaerentem. Unde per actionem caloris aliquid de humido illius corporis poterat deperdi; et ne totaliter consumeretur, necesse erat per assumptionem cibi homini subveniri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32572] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod in nutritione est quaedam passio et alteratio, scilicet ex parte alimenti, quod convertitur in substantiam eius quod alitur. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod corpus hominis fuerit passibile, sed quod cibus assumptus erat passibilis. Quamvis etiam talis passio esset ad perfectionem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32573] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si homo sibi non subveniret de cibo, peccaret; sicut peccavit sumendo vetitum cibum. Simul enim sibi praeceptum fuit ut a ligno scientiae boni et mali abstineret, et ut de omni alio ligno Paradisi vesceretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32574] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod homo in statu innocentiae non assumpsisset de cibo nisi quantum fuisset ei necessarium, unde non fuisset ibi superfluitatum emissio. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur, quod in cibo assumpto non esset aliqua faeculentia, quae non esset apta ut converteretur in hominis nutrimentum. Unde oportebat superfluitates emitti. Tamen fuisset divinitus provisum ut nulla ex hoc indecentia esset.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q98" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q98-p0.1">Q. 98. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q98-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: </p><p id="FP_Q98-p3"><a href="#FP_Q98_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q98-p4"><a href="#FP_Q98_A2"> (2) Whether generation would have been through coition?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 pr."><a name="32582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32582] Iª q. 98 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad conservationem speciei. Et primo, de ipsa generatione; secundo, de conditione prolis genitae. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio. Secundo, utrum fuisset generatio per coitum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q98_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q98_A1-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, "corruption is contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32583] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio. Generationi enim corruptio est contraria, ut dicitur in V Physic. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. In statu autem innocentiae non fuisset corruptio. Ergo neque generatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32584] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, generatio ordinatur ad hoc quod conservetur in specie quod secundum individuum conservari non potest, unde et in illis individuis quae in perpetuum durant, generatio non invenitur. Sed in statu innocentiae homo in perpetuum absque morte vixisset. Ergo in statu innocentiae generatio, non fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32585] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, per generationem homines multiplicantur. Sed multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri possessionum divisionem, ad evitandam confusionem dominii. Ergo, cum homo sit institutus dominus animalium, facta multiplicatione humani generis per generationem, secuta fuisset divisio dominii. Quod videtur esse contrarium iuri naturali, secundum quod omnia sunt communia, ut Isidorus dicit. Non ergo fuisset generatio in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.28" target="asv">Gn. 1:28</a>): "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32586] Iª q. 98 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>crescite et multiplicamini, et replete terram</i>. Huiusmodi autem multiplicatio absque nova generatione fieri non potuisset, cum duo tantum fuerint primitus instituti. Ergo in primo statu generatio fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become void. </p><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p7"> Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature. </p><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p8"> Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 co."><a name="32587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32587] Iª q. 98 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem humani generis, alioquin peccatum hominis fuisset valde necessarium, ex quo tantum bonum consecutum est. Est ergo considerandum quod homo, secundum suam naturam, est constitutus quasi medium quoddam inter creaturas corruptibiles et incorruptibiles, nam anima eius est naturaliter incorruptibilis, corpus vero naturaliter corruptibile. Est autem considerandum quod alio modo intentio naturae fertur ad corruptibiles, et incorruptibiles creaturas. Id enim per se videtur esse de intentione naturae, quod est semper et perpetuum. Quod autem est solum secundum aliquod tempus, non videtur esse principaliter de intentione naturae, sed quasi ad aliud ordinatum, alioquin, eo corrupto, naturae intentio cassaretur. Quia igitur in rebus corruptibilibus nihil est perpetuum et semper manens nisi species, bonum speciei est de principali intentione naturae, ad cuius conservationem naturalis generatio ordinatur. Substantiae vero incorruptibiles manent semper non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individua, et ideo etiam ipsa individua sunt de principali intentione naturae. Sic igitur homini ex parte corporis, quod corruptibile est secundum naturam suam, competit generatio. Ex parte vero animae, quae incorruptibilis est, competit ei quod multitudo individuorum sit per se intenta a natura, vel potius a naturae auctore, qui solus est humanarum animarum creator. Et ideo, ad multiplicationem humani generis, generationem in humano genere statuit, etiam in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32588] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per animam. Et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur corruptibilibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32589] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio in statu innocentiae, etsi non fuisset propter conservationem speciei, fuisset tamen propter multiplicationem individuorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those things of which they were masters---a state of things to be observed even now among many good men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32590] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros observetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q98_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q98_A2-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was "like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as is written <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32591] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Quia, ut Damascenus dicit, primus homo erat in Paradiso terrestri sicut Angelus quidam. Sed in futuro resurrectionis statu, quando erunt homines Angelis similes, neque nubent neque nubentur, ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Ergo neque in Paradiso fuisset generatio per coitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv">Gn. 4:1</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32592] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, primi homines in perfecta aetate conditi fuerunt. Si igitur in eis ante peccatum generatio fuisset per coitum, fuissent etiam in Paradiso carnaliter coniuncti. Quod patet esse falsum, secundum Scripturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.13" target="asv"> Ps. 48:13</a>: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them." Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32593] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in coniunctione carnali maxime efficitur homo similis bestiis, propter vehementiam delectationis, unde etiam continentia laudatur, per quam homines ab huiusmodi delectationibus abstinent. Sed bestiis homo comparatur propter peccatum, secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, <i>homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis</i>. Ergo ante peccatum non fuisset maris et feminae carnalis coniunctio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32594] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset corruptio. Sed per coitum corrumpitur integritas virginalis. Ergo coitus in statu innocentiae non fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> God made man and woman before sin ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">2</a>). But nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv">Gn. 2:18</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.20" target="asv">20</a>). But she is not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation also in the state of innocence. </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 1"><a name="32595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32595] Iª q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est quod Deus ante peccatum masculum et feminam fecit, ut dicitur Gen. I et II. Nihil autem est frustra in operibus Dei. Ergo etiam si homo non peccasset, fuisset coitus, ad quem distinctio sexuum ordinatur.</p><p title="I q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 2"><a name="32596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32596] Iª q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Gen. II, dicitur mulier esse facta in adiutorium viri. Sed non ad aliud nisi ad generationem quae fit per coitum, quia ad quodlibet aliud opus, convenientius adiuvari posset vir per virum quam per feminam. Ergo etiam in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio per coitum.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q98_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q97_A3" id="FP_Q98_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[3]</a>), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin. </p><p id="FP_Q98_A2-p8"> Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 co."><a name="32597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32597] Iª q. 98 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam antiquorum doctorum, considerantes concupiscentiae foeditatem quae invenitur in coitu in isto statu, posuerunt quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit in libro quem fecit de homine, quod in Paradiso aliter fuisset multiplicatum genus humanum, sicut multiplicati sunt Angeli, absque concubitu, per operationem divinae virtutis. Et dicit quod Deus ante peccatum fecit masculum et feminam, respiciens ad modum generationis qui futurus erat post peccatum, cuius Deus praescius erat. Sed hoc non dicitur rationabiliter. Ea enim quae sunt naturalia homini, neque subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod homini, secundum animalem vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, ut supra dictum est, naturale est generare per coitum, sicut et ceteris animalibus perfectis. Et hoc declarant naturalia membra ad hunc usum deputata. Et ideo non est dicendum quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non fuisset ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum. Sunt igitur in coitu duo consideranda, secundum praesentem statum. Unum quod naturae est, scilicet coniunctio maris et feminae ad generandum. In omni enim generatione requiritur virtus activa et passiva. Unde, cum in omnibus in quibus est distinctio sexuum, virtus activa sit in mare, virtus vero passiva in femina; naturae ordo exigit ut ad generandum conveniant per coitum mas et femina. Aliud autem quod considerari potest, est quaedam deformitas immoderatae concupiscentiae. Quae in statu innocentiae non fuisset quando inferiores vires omnino rationi subdebantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32598] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32599] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., ideo primi parentes in Paradiso non coierunt, quia, formata muliere, post modicum propter peccatum de Paradiso eiecti sunt, vel quia expectabatur divina auctoritas ad determinatum tempus commixtionis, a qua acceperunt universale mandatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32600] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest. Sed in statu innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt (fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non immoderate delectationi inhaereat; et dico immoderate, praeter mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit. Et hoc sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state "intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32601] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>in illo statu nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Ita enim potuit utero coniugis, salva integritate feminei genitalis, virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest, eadem integritate salva, ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret; sic ad concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque coniungeret</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q99" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q99-p0.1">Q. 99. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q99-p2"> We must now consider the condition of the offspring---first, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: </p><p id="FP_Q99-p3"><a href="#FP_Q99_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?</a></p><p id="FP_Q99-p4"><a href="#FP_Q99_A2"> (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 pr."><a name="32602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32602] Iª q. 99 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis generandae. Et primo, quantum ad corpus; secundo, quantum ad iustitiam; tertio, quantum ad scientiam. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae pueri mox geniti habuissent perfectam virtutem corpoream. Secundo, utrum omnes fuissent nati in sexu masculino.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q99_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q99_A2-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 2. Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32613] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in primo statu feminae natae non fuissent. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro II de Generat. Animal., quod femina est mas occasionatus, quasi praeter intentionem naturae proveniens. Sed in statu illo nihil evenisset innaturale in hominis generatione. Ergo feminae natae non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always have been born. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32614] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne agens generat sibi simile, nisi impediatur vel propter defectum virtutis, vel propter indispositionem materiae, sicut parvus ignis non potest comburere ligna viridia. In generatione autem vis activa est in mare. Cum igitur in statu innocentiae nullus fuisset defectus virtutis ex parte maris, nec indispositio materiae ex parte feminae, videtur quod semper masculi nati fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32615] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in statu innocentiae generatio ad multiplicationem hominum ordinabatur. Sed sufficienter homines multiplicari potuissent per primum hominem et per primam feminam, ex quo in perpetuum victuri erant. Ergo non fuit necessarium quod in statu innocentiae feminae nascerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But established male and female in human nature, as it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">2</a>). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32616] Iª q. 99 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod sic natura processisset in generando, sicut eam Deus instituit. Sed Deus instituit marem et feminam in natura humana, ut dicitur Gen. I et II. Ergo etiam in statu illo fuissent mares et feminae generati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 co."><a name="32617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32617] Iª q. 99 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod nihil eorum quae ad complementum humanae naturae pertinent, in statu innocentiae defuisset. Sicut autem ad perfectionem universi pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita etiam diversitas sexus est ad perfectionem humanae naturae. Et ideo in statu innocentiae uterque sexus per generationem productus fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q92_A1" id="FP_Q99_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[1]</a>, ad 2). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32618] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod femina dicitur mas occasionatus, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem naturae universalis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32619] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio feminae non solum contingit ex defectu virtutis activae vel indispositione materiae, ut obiectio tangit. Sed quandoque quidem ex aliquo accidenti extrinseco; sicut philosophus dicit, in libro de animalibus, quod <i>ventus Septentrionalis coadiuvat ad generationem masculorum, Australis vero ad generationem feminarum</i>. Quandoque etiam ex conceptione animae, ad quam de facili immutatur corpus. Et praecipue in statu innocentiae hoc esse poterat, quando corpus magis erat animae subiectum; ut scilicet secundum voluntatem generantis, distingueretur sexus in prole.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32620] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod proles fuisset genita vivens vita animali, ad quam sicut pertinet alimento uti, sic etiam generare. Unde conveniebat quod omnes generarent, et non solum primi parentes. Ad quod consequens videtur quod tot fuissent generatae feminae, quot et mares.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q100" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q100-p0.1">Q. 100. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q100-p2"> We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q100-p3"><a href="#FP_Q100_A1"> (1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?</a></p><p id="FP_Q100-p4"><a href="#FP_Q100_A2"> (2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 pr."><a name="32621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32621] Iª q. 100 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis generandae quantum ad iustitiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum homines fuissent nati cum iustitia. Secundo, utrum nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q100_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q100_A1-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 1. Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32622] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non fuissent cum iustitia nati. Dicit enim Hugo de sancto Victore quod <i>primus homo ante peccatum generaret quidem filios sine peccato, sed non paternae iustitiae haeredes</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.16" target="asv">Rom. 5:16</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.21" target="asv">21</a>). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32623] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, iustitia est per gratiam, ut apostolus dicit ad Rom. V. Sed gratia non transfunditur, quia sic esset naturalis; sed a solo Deo infunditur. Ergo pueri cum iustitia nati non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents, to the children. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32624] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, iustitia in anima est. Sed anima non est ex traduce. Ergo nec iustitia traducta fuisset a parentibus in filios.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32625] Iª q. 100 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu Virg., <i>quod simul cum rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si non peccaret</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 co."><a name="32626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32626] Iª q. 100 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Unde quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset. In accidentibus autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti naturae. Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros. Et propter hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad originalem iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32627] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Hugonis est intelligendum non quantum ad habitum iustitiae, sed quantum ad executionem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace ( <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32628] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia originali. Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus. Non tamen fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est dispositum infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex traduce.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p9"> From this the reply to the third objection is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32629] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q100_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q100_A2-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the words of <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.3.13" target="asv"> Job 3:13</a>: "For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten "children of hell"; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer." Therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32630] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae nati fuissent in iustitia confirmati. Dicit enim Gregorius, IV Moralium, super illud, <i>somno meo requiescerem etc., si parentem primum nulla putredo peccati corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios Gehennae generaret; sed hi qui nunc per redemptorem salvandi sunt, soli ab illo electi nascerentur</i>. Ergo nascerentur omnes in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32631] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro cur Deus homo, quod <i>si primi parentes sic vixissent ut tentati non peccassent, ita confirmarentur cum omni propagine sua, ut ultra peccare non possent</i>. Ergo pueri nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32632] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum est potentius quam malum. Sed propter peccatum primi hominis consecuta est necessitas peccandi in his qui nascuntur ex eo. Ergo si primus homo in iustitia perstitisset, derivaretur ad posteros necessitas observandi iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32633] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Angelus adhaerens Deo aliis peccantibus, statim est in iustitia confirmatus, ut ulterius peccare non posset. Ergo similiter et homo, si tentationi restitisset, confirmatus fuisset. Sed qualis ipse fuit, tales alios generasset. Ergo et eius filii confirmati in iustitia nascerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they---that is our first parents---had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32634] Iª q. 100 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>tam felix universa esset humana societas si nec illi</i>, scilicet primi parentes, <i>malum quod in posteros traiicerent, nec quisquam ex stirpe eorum iniquitatem committeret, quae damnationem reciperet</i>. Ex quo datur intelligi quod, etiam si primi homines non peccassent, aliqui ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere. Non ergo nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 co."><a name="32635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32635] Iª q. 100 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod non videtur possibile quod pueri in statu innocentiae nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. Manifestum est enim quod pueri in sua nativitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum parentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quandiu generassent, non fuissent confirmati in iustitia. Ex hoc enim creatura rationalis in iustitia confirmatur, quod efficitur beata per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non potest non inhaerere, cum ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, a qua nullus potest averti, cum nihil desideretur et ametur nisi sub ratione boni. Et hoc dico secundum legem communem, quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali secus accidere potest, sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei. Quam cito autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem pervenisset quod Deum per essentiam videret, efficeretur spiritualis et mente et corpore, et animalis vita cessaret, in qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde manifestum est quod parvuli non nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32636] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si Adam non peccasset, non generaret ex se filios Gehennae, ita scilicet quod ab ipso peccatum contraherent, quod est causa Gehennae. Possent tamen fieri filii Gehennae per liberum arbitrium peccando. Vel, si filii Gehennae non fierent per peccatum, hoc non esset propter hoc, quia essent in iustitia confirmati; sed propter divinam providentiam, per quam a peccato conservarentur immunes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: "It seems that if they had lived, etc." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32637] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Anselmus hoc non dicit asserendo, sed opinando. Quod patet ex ipso modo loquendi, cum dicit, videtur quod, si vixissent et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32638] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio ista non est efficax, quamvis per eam Anselmus motus fuisse videatur, ut ex eius verbis apparet. Non enim sic per peccatum primi parentis eius posteri necessitatem peccandi incurrunt, ut ad iustitiam redire non possint, quod est tantum in damnatis. Unde nec ita necessitatem non peccandi transmisisset ad posteros, quod omnino peccare non possent, quod est tantum in beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q64_A2" id="FP_Q100_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[64], A[2]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32639] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod non est simile de homine et Angelo. Nam homo habet liberum arbitrium vertibile et ante electionem et post, non autem Angelus, sicut supra dictum est, cum de Angelis ageretur.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q101" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q101-p0.1">Q. 101. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q101-p2"> We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q101-p3"><a href="#FP_Q101_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q101-p4"><a href="#FP_Q101_A2"> (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 pr."><a name="32640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32640] Iª q. 101 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis generandae quantum ad scientiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum pueri nascerentur in scientia perfecti. Secundo, utrum statim post nativitatem habuissent perfectum usum rationis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q101_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q101_A1-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge ( <a href="#FP_Q94_A3" id="FP_Q101_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[94], A[3]</a>). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32641] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae pueri nati fuissent in scientia perfecti. Qualis enim fuit Adam, tales filios generasset. Sed Adam fuit in scientia perfectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo filii nascerentur ab eo in scientia perfecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. FS, <a href="#FP_Q85_A3" id="FP_Q101_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[3]</a>). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32642] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ignorantia ex peccato causatur, ut Beda dicit. Sed ignorantia est privatio scientiae. Ergo ante peccatum pueri mox nati omnem scientiam habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32643] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, pueri mox nati iustitiam habuissent. Sed ad iustitiam requiritur scientia, quae dirigit in agendis. Ergo etiam scientiam habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32644] Iª q. 101 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod anima nostra per naturam est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed eadem animae natura est modo, quae tunc fuisset. Ergo animae puerorum in principio scientia caruissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>; <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[6]</a>); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 co."><a name="32645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32645] Iª q. 101 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia; sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32646] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non generabat filios similes sibi; sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32647] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ignorantia est privatio scientiae quae debet haberi pro tempore illo. Quod in pueris mox natis non fuisset, habuissent enim scientiam quae eis competebat secundum tempus illud. Unde ignorantia in eis non fuisset, sed nescientia respectu aliquorum. Quam etiam Dionysius ponit in Angelis sanctis, in VII Cael. Hier.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32648] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q101_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q101_A2-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 2. Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q101_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv">Wis. 9:15</a>). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32649] Iª q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae mox nati habuissent perfectum usum rationis. Nunc enim pueri perfectum usum rationis non habent propter hoc, quod anima per corpus aggravatur. Hoc autem tunc non erat, quia, ut dicitur Sap. IX, <i>corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam</i>. Ergo ante peccatum et corruptionem a peccato subsecutam, pueri mox nati perfectum usum rationis habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32650] Iª q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quaedam alia animalia mox nata habent naturalis industriae usum, sicut agnus statim fugit lupum. Multo ergo magis homines in statu innocentiae mox nati habuissent usum perfectum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p4"> <b>On the contrary,</b> In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32651] Iª q. 101 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus generatis. Ergo pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum usum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs ( <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 co."><a name="32652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32652] Iª q. 101 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Vires autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus. In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium, propter nimiam humiditatem cerebri. Et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate. Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p6"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32653] Iª q. 101 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above ( <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32654] Iª q. 101 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis generibus animalium inveniuntur. Et tamen in homine est speciale impedimentum propter abundantiam humiditatis cerebri, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q102" class="div3"> <h3 id="FP_Q102-p0.1">Q. 102. OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FP_Q102-p2"> We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q102-p3"><a href="#FP_Q102_A1"> (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p4"><a href="#FP_Q102_A2"> (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p5"><a href="#FP_Q102_A3"> (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p6"><a href="#FP_Q102_A4"> (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 pr."><a name="32655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32655] Iª q. 102 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de loco hominis, qui est Paradisus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Paradisus sit locus corporeus. Secundo, utrum sit conveniens locus habitationis humanae. Tertio, ad quid homo in Paradiso positus fuit. Quarto, utrum in Paradiso debuit fieri.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FP_Q102_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A1-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 1. Whether paradise is a corporeal place?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv"> Gn. 2:8</a>] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32656] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non sit locus corporeus. Dicit enim Beda quod <i>Paradisus pertingit usque ad lunarem circulum</i>. Sed nullus locus terrenus talis esse potest, tum quia contra naturam terrae esset quod tantum elevaretur; tum etiam quia sub globo lunari est regio ignis, qui terram consumeret. Non est ergo Paradisus locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.10" target="asv">Gn. 2:10</a>). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32657] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Scriptura commemorat quatuor flumina in Paradiso oriri, ut patet Gen. II. Illa autem flumina quae ibi nominantur, alibi habent manifestas origines; ut patet etiam per philosophum in libro Meteor. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32658] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, aliqui diligentissime inquisierunt omnia loca terrae habitabilis, qui tamen nullam mentionem faciunt de loco Paradisi. Ergo non videtur esse locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.18" target="asv">Prov. 3:18</a>). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32659] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in Paradiso describitur lignum vitae esse. Sed lignum vitae est aliquid spirituale, dicitur enim Prov. III, de sapientia, quod est lignum vitae his qui apprehendunt eam. Ergo et Paradisus non est locus corporeus, sed spiritualis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32660] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si Paradisus est locus corporalis, oportet quod et ligna Paradisi sint corporalia. Sed hoc non videtur, cum corporalia ligna sint producta tertio die; de plantatione autem lignorum Paradisi legitur Gen. II, post opera sex dierum. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32661] Iª q. 102 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>tres sunt de Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 co."><a name="32662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32662] Iª q. 102 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, <i>quae commode dici possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur</i>. Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones fabricandae. Est ergo Paradisus, ut Isidorus dicit in libro Etymol., <i>locus in orientis partibus constitutus, cuius vocabulum a Graeco in Latinum vertitur hortus</i>. Convenienter autem in parte Orientali dicitur situs. Quia credendum est quod in nobilissimo loco totius terrae sit constitutus. Cum autem oriens sit dextera caeli, ut patet per philosophum in II de caelo; dextera autem est nobilior quam sinistra; conveniens fuit ut in Orientali parte Paradisus terrenus institueretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon---that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32663] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Bedae verbum non est verum, si secundum sensum manifestum intelligatur. Potest tamen exponi quod usque ad locum lunaris globi ascendit, non secundum situs eminentiam, sed secundum similitudinem, quia est ibi perpetua aeris temperies, ut Isidorus dicit, et in hoc assimilatur corporibus caelestibus, quae sunt absque contrarietate. Magis tamen fit mentio de lunari globo quam de aliis sphaeris, quia lunaris globus est terminus caelestium corporum versus nos; et luna etiam est magis terrae affinis inter omnia corpora caelestia; unde et quasdam tenebras nebulosas habet, quasi accedens ad opacitatem. Quidam autem dicunt quod Paradisus pertingebat usque ad lunarem globum, idest usque ad medium aeris interstitium, in quo generantur pluviae et venti et huiusmodi, quia dominium super huiusmodi evaporationes maxime attribuitur lunae. Sed secundum hoc, locus ille non esset conveniens habitationi humanae, tum quia ibi est maxima intemperies; tum quia non est contemperatus complexioni humanae, sicut aer inferior magis terrae vicinus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams?" </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32664] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>credendum est, quoniam locus Paradisi a cognitione hominum est remotissimus, flumina, quorum fontes noti esse dicuntur, alicubi isse sub terras, et post tractus prolixarum regionum, locis aliis erupisse. Nam hoc solere nonnullas aquas facere, quis ignorat?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32665] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[97] , A[4]</a>). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32666] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra dictum est. Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv">Gn. 2:8</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32667] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam aliae in actu. Secundum alios vero sanctos, oportet dicere quod omnes plantae productae sunt in actu tertio die, et etiam ligna Paradisi, sed quod dicitur de plantatione lignorum Paradisi post opera sex dierum, intelligitur per recapitulationem esse dictum. Unde littera nostra habet, <i>plantaverat dominus Deus Paradisum voluptatis a principio</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A2-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 2. Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed---that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32668] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non fuerit locus conveniens habitationi humanae. Homo enim et Angelus similiter ad beatitudinem ordinantur. Sed Angelus statim a principio factus est habitator loci beatorum, scilicet caeli Empyrei. Ergo etiam ibi debuit institui habitatio hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32669] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si locus aliquis debetur homini, aut debetur ei ratione animae, aut ratione corporis. Si ratione animae, debetur ei pro loco caelum, qui videtur esse locus naturalis animae, cum omnibus insitus sit appetitus caeli. Ratione autem corporis, non debetur ei alius locus quam aliis animalibus. Ergo Paradisus nullo modo fuit locus conveniens habitationi humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32670] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, frustra est locus in quo nullum locatum continetur. Sed post peccatum Paradisus non est locus habitationis humanae. Ergo, si est locus habitationi humanae congruus, in vanum videtur a Deo institutus fuisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator---a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32671] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, homini, cum sit temperatae complexionis congruus est locus temperatus. Sed locus Paradisi non est locus temperatus, dicitur enim esse sub aequinoctiali circulo, qui locus videtur esse calidissimus, cum bis in anno sol pertranseat super summitatem capitum eorum qui ibi habitant. Ergo Paradisus non est locus congruus habitationi humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32672] Iª q. 102 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit de Paradiso, quod <i>est divina regio, et digna eius qui secundum imaginem Dei erat, conversatio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( <a href="#FP_Q97_A1" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[1]</a>), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained ( <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[97], A[4]</a>), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 co."><a name="32673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32673] Iª q. 102 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris. In Paradiso autem utrumque invenitur, quia, ut Damascenus dicit, <i>est locus temperato et tenuissimo et purissimo aere circumfulgens, plantis semper floridis comatus</i>. Unde manifestum est quod Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, secundum primae immortalitatis statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32674] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., <i>Deus regit creaturam corporalem per spiritualem</i>; unde conveniens est quod spiritualis natura sit supra omnem corporalem constituta, sicut ei praesidens. Quantum autem ad secundum, convenit statui beatitudinis, qui est firmatus in summa stabilitate. Sic igitur locus beatitudinis congruit Angelo secundum naturam suam, unde ibi creatus est. Non autem congruit homini secundum suam naturam, cum non praesideat toti corporali creaturae per modum gubernationis, sed competit ei solum ratione beatitudinis. Unde non est positus a principio in caelo Empyreo; sed illuc transferendus erat in statu finalis beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul---that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32675] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, <i>in Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat</i>, licet ex quadam dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32676] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat. Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in illo Paradiso habitent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32677] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod illi qui dicunt Paradisum esse sub circulo aequinoctiali, opinantur sub circulo illo esse locum temperatissimum, propter aequalitatem dierum et noctium omni tempore; et quia sol nunquam multum ab eis elongatur, ut sit apud eos superabundantia frigoris; nec iterum est apud eos, ut dicunt, superabundantia caloris, quia etsi sol pertranseat super eorum capita, non tamen diu moratur ibi in hac dispositione. Aristoteles tamen, in libro Meteor., expresse dicit quod regio illa est inhabitabilis propter aestum. Quod videtur probabilius, quia terrae per quas nunquam sol pertransit in directum capitis, sunt intemperatae in calore propter solam vicinitatem solis. Quidquid autem de hoc sit, credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A3-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 3. Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. 3:17</a>). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32678] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum. Quod enim introductum est in poenam peccati, non fuisset in Paradiso in statu innocentiae. Sed agricultura introducta est in poenam peccati, ut dicitur Gen. III. Ergo homo non fuit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32679] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, custodia non est necessaria, ubi non timetur violentus invasor. Sed in Paradiso nullus timebatur violentus invasor. Ergo non erat necessarium ut Paradisum custodiret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32680] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si homo positus est in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret ipsum, videtur sequi quod homo factus sit propter Paradisum, et non e converso, quod videtur esse falsum. Ergo homo non est positus in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.15" target="asv">Gn. 2: 15</a>): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32681] Iª q. 102 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret illum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 co."><a name="32682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32682] Iª q. 102 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., verbum istud Genesis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo sic, quod Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem, operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo. Alio modo potest intelligi, ut homo operaretur et custodiret Paradisum. Nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis naturae. Custodia etiam illa non esset contra invasores, sed esset ad hoc quod homo sibi Paradisum custodiret, ne ipsum peccando amitteret. Et hoc totum in bonum hominis cedebat, et sic Paradisus ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p7"> Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="32683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32683] Iª q. 102 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A4-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 4. Whether man was created in paradise?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place---namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32684] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo factus fuerit in Paradiso. Angelus enim in loco suae habitationis creatus fuit, scilicet in caelo Empyreo. Sed Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae ante peccatum. Ergo videtur quod in Paradiso homo debuit fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created ( <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[4]</a>). Therefore he was created in paradise. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32685] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, alia animalia conservantur in loco suae generationis; sicut pisces in aquis, et animalia gressibilia in terra, unde producta sunt. Homo autem conservatus fuisset in Paradiso, ut dictum est. Ergo in Paradiso fieri debuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32686] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mulier in Paradiso facta fuit. Sed vir dignior est muliere. Ergo multo magis vir debuit fieri in Paradiso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.15" target="asv">Gn. 2:15</a>): "God took man and placed him in paradise." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32687] Iª q. 102 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in Paradiso</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 co."><a name="32688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32688] Iª q. 102 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad incorruptionem primi status. Incorruptio autem illa non erat hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono. Ut ergo hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae, Deus hominem extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32689] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est locus congruus Angelis etiam quantum ad eorum naturam, et ideo ibi sunt creati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p8"> In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32690] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter dicendum ad secundum. Loca enim illa congruunt animalibus secundum suam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32691] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in quo parentes iam erant positi.</p></div></div></div></div> ` </div> </body> </html>