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4 <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title>
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19 <h2 id="FS.i-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS.i.i">Q. . PROLOGUE</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q1">Q. 1. OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q2">Q. 2. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q3">Q. 3. WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q4">Q. 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q5">Q. 5. OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
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20 <div id="FS.i.i" class="div3">
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21 <h3 id="FS.i.i-p0.1">Q. . PROLOGUE</h3>
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22 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
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23 <p id="FS.i.i-p1"> Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies
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24 "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of
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25 those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image,
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26 i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
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27 </p>
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28 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II pr."><a name="33404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33404]
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29 Iª-IIae pr.</span></a> Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo
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30 factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem
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31 significatur <i>intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se
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32 potestativum</i>; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de
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33 Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius
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34 voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de
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35 homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi
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36 liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.</p></div></div></div>
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37 </div>
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38 <div id="FS_Q1" class="div3">
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39 <h3 id="FS_Q1-p0.1">Q. 1. OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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40 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
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41 <p id="FS_Q1-p2"> In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance
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42 towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end
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43 of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.
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44 </p><p id="FS_Q1-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q1-p4"><a href="#FS_Q1_A1"> (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p5"><a href="#FS_Q1_A2"> (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p6"><a href="#FS_Q1_A3"> (3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p7"><a href="#FS_Q1_A4"> (4) Whether there is any last end of human life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p8"><a href="#FS_Q1_A5"> (5) Whether one man can have several last ends?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p9"><a href="#FS_Q1_A6"> (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p10"><a href="#FS_Q1_A7"> (7) Whether all men have the same last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p11"><a href="#FS_Q1_A8"> (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?</a></p>
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45 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 pr."><a name="33405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33405]
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46 Iª-IIae q. 1 pr.</span></a> Ubi primo considerandum occurrit
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47 de ultimo fine humanae vitae; et deinde de his per quae homo ad
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48 hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab eo deviare, ex fine enim
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49 oportet accipere rationes eorum quae ordinantur ad finem. Et quia
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50 ultimus finis humanae vitae ponitur esse beatitudo, oportet primo
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51 considerare de ultimo fine in communi; deinde de beatitudine. Circa
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52 primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum hominis sit agere propter
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53 finem. Secundo, utrum hoc sit proprium rationalis naturae. Tertio,
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54 utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem a fine. Quarto, utrum sit
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55 aliquis ultimus finis humanae vitae. Quinto, utrum unius hominis
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56 possint esse plures ultimi fines. Sexto, utrum homo ordinet omnia
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57 in ultimum finem. Septimo, utrum idem sit finis ultimus omnium
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58 hominum. Octavo, utrum in illo ultimo fine omnes aliae creaturae
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59 conveniant.</p></div></div></div>
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60 <div id="FS_Q1_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A1-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 1. Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p2">
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61 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
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62 implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action;
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63 since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end.
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64 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33406] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
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65 sic proceditur. Videtur quod homini non conveniat agere propter
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66 finem. Causa enim naturaliter prior est. Sed finis habet rationem
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67 ultimi, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo finis non habet rationem causae.
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68 Sed propter illud agit homo, quod est causa actionis, cum haec
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69 praepositio propter designet habitudinem causae. Ergo homini non
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70 convenit agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p3">
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71 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
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72 states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
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73 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33407] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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74 illud quod est ultimus finis, non est propter finem. Sed in
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75 quibusdam actiones sunt ultimus finis; ut patet per philosophum in
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76 I Ethic. Ergo non omnia homo agit propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p4">
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77 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
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78 sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard,
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79 while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
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80 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33408] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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81 tunc videtur homo agere propter finem, quando deliberat. Sed multa
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82 homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil
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83 cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum aliis intentus,
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84 vel fricat barbam. Non ergo homo omnia agit propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p5">
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85 <b>On the contrary,</b> All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations,
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86 as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end.
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87 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33409] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
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88 omnia quae sunt in aliquo genere, derivantur a principio illius
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89 generis. Sed finis est principium in operabilibus ab homine; ut
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90 patet per philosophum in II Physic. Ergo homini convenit omnia
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91 agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p6">
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92 <b>I answer that,</b> Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational
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93 animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is
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94 master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty
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95 and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed
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96 from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly
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97 "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are
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98 caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore
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99 all human actions must be for an end.
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100 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 co."><a name="33410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33410] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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101 dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie
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102 dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo.
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103 Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod
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104 est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur
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105 proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus
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106 suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et liberum arbitrium
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107 esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones
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108 proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt.
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109 Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem
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110 hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis
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111 inquantum est homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae
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112 procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui
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113 obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet
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114 quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p7">
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115 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this
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116 way that it is a cause.
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117 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33411] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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118 dicendum quod finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen
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119 primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem
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120 causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p8">
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121 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is
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122 voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it
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123 is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will
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124 to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is
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125 color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible
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126 object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action
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127 be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing,
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128 is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action
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129 in which the last end consists.
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130 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33412] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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131 dicendum quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, oportet eam
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132 esse voluntariam, alias non esset humana, ut dictum est. Actio
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133 autem aliqua dupliciter dicitur voluntaria, uno modo, quia
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134 imperatur a voluntate, sicut ambulare vel loqui; alio modo, quia
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135 elicitur a voluntate, sicut ipsum velle. Impossibile autem est quod
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136 ipse actus a voluntate elicitus sit ultimus finis. Nam obiectum
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137 voluntatis est finis, sicut obiectum visus est color, unde sicut
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138 impossibile est quod primum visibile sit ipsum videre, quia omne
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139 videre est alicuius obiecti visibilis; ita impossibile est quod
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140 primum appetibile, quod est finis, sit ipsum velle. Unde
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141 relinquitur quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, quod ipsa
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142 sit imperata a voluntate. Et ita ibi aliqua actio hominis, ad minus
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143 ipsum velle, est propter finem. Quidquid ergo homo faciat, verum
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144 est dicere quod homo agit propter finem, etiam agendo actionem quae
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145 est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p9">
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146 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
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147 proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
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148 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33413] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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149 dicendum quod huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non
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150 procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est proprium principium
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151 humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem
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152 per rationem praestitutum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A2-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 2. Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p2">
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153 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,
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154 never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they
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155 are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as
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156 irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end.
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157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33414] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
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158 sic proceditur. Videtur quod agere propter finem sit proprium
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159 rationalis naturae. Homo enim, cuius est agere propter finem,
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160 nunquam agit propter finem ignotum. Sed multa sunt quae non
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161 cognoscunt finem, vel quia omnino carent cognitione, sicut
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162 creaturae insensibiles; vel quia non apprehendunt rationem finis,
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163 sicut bruta animalia. Videtur ergo proprium esse rationalis naturae
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164 agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p3">
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165 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong
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166 to things that lack reason.
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167 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33415] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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168 agere propter finem est ordinare suam actionem ad finem. Sed hoc
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169 est rationis opus. Ergo non convenit his quae ratione carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p4">
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170 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to
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171 act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature.
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172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33416] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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173 bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas in ratione
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174 est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo agere propter finem non est
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175 nisi rationalis naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p5">
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176 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end."
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177 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33417] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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178 est quod philosophus probat in II Physic., quod <i>non solum
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179 intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A2-p6">
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180 <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed,
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181 the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that
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182 matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act.
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183 But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not
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184 determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce
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185 a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as
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186 this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other
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187 things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."
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188 </p><p id="FS_Q1_A2-p7"> Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing,
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189 moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end
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190 through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason,
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191 move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
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192 "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by
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193 another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything
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194 to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument
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195 to the principal agent, as stated above (
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196 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 4;
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197 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">FP,
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198 Q[103], A[1]
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199 </a>, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the
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200 end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend
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201 the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.
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202 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 co."><a name="33418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33418] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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203 dicendum quod omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem.
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204 Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse
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205 est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa
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206 finalis. Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi
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207 secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia
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208 in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim
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209 agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret
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210 hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat,
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211 necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet
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212 rationem finis. Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura
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213 fit per rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis
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214 fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.
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215 Tamen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad
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216 finem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo;
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217 alio modo, sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit ad
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218 determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam
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219 actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa
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220 movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum
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221 arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quae
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222 ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi
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223 ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non cognoscant rationem
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224 finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem
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225 ab alio ordinantur. Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum
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226 sicut instrumentum ad agens principale, ut supra habitum est. Et
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227 ideo proprium est naturae rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se
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228 agens vel ducens ad finem, naturae vero irrationalis, quasi ab alio
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229 acta vel ducta, sive in finem apprehensum, sicut bruta animalia,
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230 sive in finem non apprehensum, sicut ea quae omnino cognitione
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231 carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p8">
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232 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he
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233 acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end.
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234 And it is thus with irrational creatures.
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235 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33419] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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236 dicendum quod homo, quando per seipsum agit propter finem,
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237 cognoscit finem, sed quando ab alio agitur vel ducitur, puta cum
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238 agit ad imperium alterius, vel cum movetur altero impellente, non
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239 est necessarium quod cognoscat finem. Et ita est in creaturis
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240 irrationalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p9">
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241 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that
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242 which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
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243 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33420] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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244 dicendum quod ordinare in finem est eius quod seipsum agit in
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245 finem. Eius vero quod ab alio in finem agitur, est ordinari in
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246 finem. Quod potest esse irrationalis naturae, sed ab aliquo
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247 rationem habente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p10">
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248 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
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249 reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite,
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250 determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor
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251 of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular
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252 departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some
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253 rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
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254 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33421] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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255 dicendum quod obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali.
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256 Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et
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257 intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale, sed est in eis
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258 appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum
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259 particulare. Manifestum autem est quod particulares causae moventur
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260 a causa universali, sicut rector civitatis, qui intendit bonum
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261 commune, movet suo imperio omnia particularia officia civitatis. Et
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262 ideo necesse est quod omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur in fines
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263 particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se extendit in
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264 bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A3-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 3. Whether human acts are specified by their end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p2">
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265 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified
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266 by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.
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267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33422] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
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268 sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humani non recipiant speciem a
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269 fine. Finis enim est causa extrinseca. Sed unumquodque habet
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270 speciem ab aliquo principio intrinseco. Ergo actus humani non
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271 recipiunt speciem a fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p3">
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272 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore
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273 a human act does not derive its species from the end.
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274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33423] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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275 illud quod dat speciem, oportet esse prius. Sed finis est posterior
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276 in esse. Ergo actus humanus non habet speciem a fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p4">
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277 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
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278 Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.
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279 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33424] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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280 idem non potest esse nisi in una specie. Sed eundem numero actum
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281 contingit ordinari ad diversos fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem
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282 actibus humanis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p5">
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283 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy
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284 of blame or praise."
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285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33425] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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286 est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de moribus Ecclesiae et
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287 Manichaeorum, <i>secundum quod finis est culpabilis vel laudabilis,
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288 secundum hoc sunt opera nostra culpabilia vel laudabilia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p6"> I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed
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289 of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper
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290 movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an
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291 act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the
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292 terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while
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293 heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature.
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294 And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For
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295 human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above
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296
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297 <a href="#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q1_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the
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298 end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is
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299 their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of
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300 the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog.
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301 super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral
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302 acts are the same as human acts.
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303 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 co."><a name="33426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33426] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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304 dicendum quod unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non
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305 secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et
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306 forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc
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307 etiam considerandum est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus
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308 quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum
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309 ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium
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310 agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus. Unde calefactio
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311 actio nihil aliud est quam motio quaedam a calore procedens,
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312 calefactio vero passio nihil aliud est quam motus ad calorem,
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313 definitio autem manifestat rationem speciei. Et utroque modo actus
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314 humani, sive considerentur per modum actionum, sive per modum
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315 passionum, a fine speciem sortiuntur. Utroque enim modo possunt
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316 considerari actus humani, eo quod homo movet seipsum, et movetur a
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317 seipso. Dictum est autem supra quod actus dicuntur humani,
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318 inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata. Obiectum autem
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319 voluntatis est bonum et finis. Et ideo manifestum est quod
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320 principium humanorum actuum, inquantum sunt humani, est finis. Et
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321 similiter est terminus eorundem, nam id ad quod terminatur actus
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322 humanus, est id quod voluntas intendit tanquam finem; sicut in
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323 agentibus naturalibus forma generati est conformis formae
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324 generantis. Et quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, <i>mores
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325 proprie dicuntur humani</i>, actus morales proprie speciem
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326 sortiuntur ex fine, nam idem sunt actus morales et actus
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327 humani.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p7">
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328 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just
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329 this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something,
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330 considered as passion.
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331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33427] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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332 dicendum quod finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu,
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333 quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum
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334 est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad
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335 actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p8">
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336 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus
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337 that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
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338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33428] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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339 dicendum quod finis secundum quod est prior in intentione, ut
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340 dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat
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341 speciem actui humano sive morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p9">
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342 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has
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343 its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however,
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344 that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill
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345 a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as
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346 to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts
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347 in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement
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348 does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus.
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349 Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.
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350 Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered
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351 in their moral species, and conversely.
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352 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33429] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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353 dicendum quod idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab
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354 agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet
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355 speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus
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356 est finis alterius. Possibile tamen est quod unus actus secundum
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357 speciem naturae, ordinetur ad diversos fines voluntatis, sicut hoc
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358 ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod est idem secundum speciem
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359 naturae, potest ordinari sicut in finem ad conservationem
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360 iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus
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361 secundum speciem moris, quia uno modo erit actus virtutis, alio
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362 modo erit actus vitii. Non enim motus recipit speciem ab eo quod
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363 est terminus per accidens, sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per
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364 se. Fines autem morales accidunt rei naturali; et e converso ratio
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365 naturalis finis accidit morali. Et ideo nihil prohibet actus qui
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366 sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse diversos secundum speciem
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367 moris, et e converso.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A4-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 4. Whether there is one last end of human life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p2">
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368 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive,
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369 as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse
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370 some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is
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371 an indefinite series of ends.
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372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33430] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
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373 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis ultimus finis humanae
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374 vitae, sed procedatur in finibus in infinitum. Bonum enim, secundum
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375 suam rationem, est diffusivum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap.
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376 de Div. Nom. Si ergo quod procedit ex bono, ipsum etiam est bonum,
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377 oportet quod illud bonum diffundat aliud bonum, et sic processus
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378 boni est in infinitum. Sed bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo in
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379 finibus est processus in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p3">
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380 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the
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381 same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire
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382 of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends.
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383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33431] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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384 ea quae sunt rationis, in infinitum multiplicari possunt, unde et
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385 mathematicae quantitates in infinitum augentur. Species etiam
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386 numerorum propter hoc sunt infinitae, quia, dato quolibet numero,
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387 ratio alium maiorem excogitare potest. Sed desiderium finis
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388 sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ergo videtur quod etiam in
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389 finibus procedatur in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p4">
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390 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for
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391 I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human
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392 will, and there is no last end of the human will.
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393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33432] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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394 bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas infinities
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395 potest reflecti supra seipsam, possum enim velle aliquid, et velle
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396 me velle illud, et sic in infinitum. Ergo in finibus humanae
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397 voluntatis proceditur in infinitum, et non est aliquis ultimus
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398 finis humanae voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p5">
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399 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good
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400 is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore
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401 it is necessary to fix one last end.
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402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33433] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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403 est quod philosophus dicit, II Metaphys., quod <i>qui infinitum
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404 faciunt, auferunt naturam boni</i>. Sed bonum est quod habet
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405 rationem finis. Ergo contra rationem finis est quod procedatur in
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406 infinitum. Necesse est ergo ponere unum ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A4-p6">
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407 <b>I answer that,</b> Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever
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408 things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must
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409 of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes
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410 of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
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411 the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order
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412 in ends---the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first.
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413 For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you
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414 remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein
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415 operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention
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416 is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently,
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417 on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any
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418 action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are
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419 ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.
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420 </p><p id="FS_Q1_A4-p7"> On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally;
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421 for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things
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422 ordained to the end.
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423 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 co."><a name="33434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33434] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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424 dicendum quod, per se loquendo, impossibile est in finibus
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425 procedere in infinitum, ex quacumque parte. In omnibus enim quae
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426 per se habent ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo,
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427 removeantur ea quae sunt ad primum. Unde philosophus probat, in
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428 VIII Physic., quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere
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429 in infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo subtracto alia
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430 movere non possunt, cum non moveant nisi per hoc quod moventur a
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431 primo movente. In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet
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432 ordo intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet
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433 esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis
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434 est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto principio,
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435 appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in
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436 executione, est unde incipit operatio, unde, isto principio
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437 subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari. Principium autem
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438 intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est
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439 primum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile
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440 est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil
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441 appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret
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442 intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad
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443 finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur
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444 consilium, sed in infinitum procederet. Ea vero quae non habent
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445 ordinem per se, sed per accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil
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446 prohibet infinitatem habere, causae enim per accidens
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447 indeterminatae sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem
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448 per accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8">
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449 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good
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450 has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that
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451 from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And
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452 this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is
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453 infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its
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454 effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the
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455 First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely
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456 but, as it is written (
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457 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
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458 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33435] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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459 dicendum quod de ratione boni est quod aliquid ab ipso effluat, non
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460 tamen quod ipsum ab alio procedat. Et ideo, cum bonum habeat
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461 rationem finis, et primum bonum sit ultimus finis, ratio ista non
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462 probat quod non sit ultimus finis; sed quod a fine primo supposito
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463 procedatur in infinitum inferius versus ea quae sunt ad finem. Et
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464 hoc quidem competeret, si consideraretur sola virtus primi boni,
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465 quae est infinita. Sed quia primum bonum habet diffusionem secundum
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466 intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam certam formam profluere in
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467 causata; aliquis certus modus adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo
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468 bono, a quo omnia alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et
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469 ideo diffusio bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur
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470 Sap. XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p9">
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471 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore
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472 the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process
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473 of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally
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474 connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is
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475 accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing
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476 hinders the reason from an indefinite process.
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477 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33436] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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478 dicendum quod in his quae sunt per se, ratio incipit a principiis
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479 naturaliter notis, et ad aliquem terminum progreditur. Unde
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480 philosophus probat, in I Poster., quod in demonstrationibus non est
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481 processus in infinitum, quia in demonstrationibus attenditur ordo
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482 aliquorum per se ad invicem connexorum, et non per accidens. In his
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483 autem quae per accidens connectuntur, nihil prohibet rationem in
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484 infinitum procedere. Accidit autem quantitati aut numero
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485 praeexistenti, inquantum huiusmodi, quod ei addatur quantitas aut
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486 unitas. Unde in huiusmodi nihil prohibet rationem procedere in
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487 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p10">
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488 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact
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489 that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times.
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490 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33437] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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491 dicendum quod illa multiplicatio actuum voluntatis reflexae supra
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492 seipsam, per accidens se habet ad ordinem finium. Quod patet ex
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493 hoc, quod circa unum et eundem finem indifferenter semel vel
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494 pluries supra seipsam voluntas reflectitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A5-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 5. Whether one man can have several last ends?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p2">
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495 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine
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496 says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of
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497 nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many
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498 things.
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499 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33438] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
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500 sic proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit voluntatem unius hominis
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501 in plura ferri simul, sicut in ultimos fines. Dicit enim
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502 Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod quidam ultimum hominis finem
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503 posuerunt in quatuor, scilicet <i>in voluptate, in quiete, in
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504 primis naturae, et in virtute</i>. Haec autem manifeste sunt plura.
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505 Ergo unus homo potest constituere ultimum finem suae voluntatis in
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506 multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p3">
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507 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition
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508 to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others.
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509 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33439] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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510 ea quae non opponuntur ad invicem, se invicem non excludunt. Sed
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511 multa inveniuntur in rebus quae sibi invicem non opponuntur. Ergo
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512 si unum ponatur ultimus finis voluntatis, non propter hoc alia
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513 excluduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p4">
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514 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its
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515 last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed
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516 his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's
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517 will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends.
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518 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33440] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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519 voluntas per hoc quod constituit ultimum finem in aliquo, suam
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520 liberam potentiam non amittit. Sed antequam constitueret ultimum
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521 finem suum in illo, puta in voluptate, poterat constituere finem
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522 suum ultimum in alio, puta in divitiis. Ergo etiam postquam
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523 constituit aliquis ultimum finem suae voluntatis in voluptate,
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524 potest simul constituere ultimum finem in divitiis. Ergo possibile
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525 est voluntatem unius hominis simul ferri in diversa, sicut in
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526 ultimos fines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5">
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527 <b>On the contrary,</b> That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life.
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528 Hence of gluttons it is written (
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529 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.19" target="asv">Phil. 3:19</a>): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to
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530 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv"> Mat. 6:24, </a> "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man
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531 to have several last ends not ordained to one another.
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532 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33441] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
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533 illud in quo quiescit aliquis sicut in ultimo fine, hominis
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534 affectui dominatur, quia ex eo totius vitae suae regulas accipit.
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535 Unde de gulosis dicitur Philipp. III, <i>quorum Deus venter
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536 est</i>, quia scilicet constituunt ultimum finem in deliciis
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537 ventris. Sed sicut dicitur Matth. VI, <i>nemo potest duobus dominis
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538 servire</i>, ad invicem scilicet non ordinatis. Ergo impossibile
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539 est esse plures ultimos fines unius hominis ad invicem non
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540 ordinatos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p6">
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541 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be
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542 assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which
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543 he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean
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544 now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be
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545 complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to
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546 desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite
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547 so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
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548 </p><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p7"> The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in
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549 the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must
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550 needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last
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551 end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one.
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552 </p><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p8"> The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above
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553 <a href="#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q1_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in
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554 a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus,
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555 the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle;
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556 and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the
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557 whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally
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558 one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
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559 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 co."><a name="33442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33442] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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560 dicendum quod impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se
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561 habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos fines. Cuius ratio potest
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562 triplex assignari. Prima est quia, cum unumquodque appetat suam
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563 perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit,
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564 ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus
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565 dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod
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566 consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit</i>.
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567 Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis
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568 appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse
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569 non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur.
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570 Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic tendat appetitus, ac si
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571 utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius. Secunda ratio est quia, sicut
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572 in processu rationis principium est id quod naturaliter
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573 cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est
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574 voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur.
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575 Hoc autem oportet esse unum, quia natura non tendit nisi ad unum.
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576 Principium autem in processu rationalis appetitus est ultimus
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577 finis. Unde oportet id in quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi
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578 finis, esse unum. Tertia ratio est quia, cum actiones voluntarie ex
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579 fine speciem sortiantur, sicut supra habitum est, oportet quod a
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580 fine ultimo, qui est communis, sortiantur rationem generis, sicut
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581 et naturalia ponuntur in genere secundum formalem rationem
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582 communem. Cum igitur omnia appetibilia voluntatis, inquantum
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583 huiusmodi, sint unius generis, oportet ultimum finem esse unum. Et
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584 praecipue quia in quolibet genere est unum primum principium,
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585 ultimus autem finis habet rationem primi principii, ut dictum est.
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586 Sicut autem se habet ultimus finis hominis simpliciter ad totum
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587 humanum genus, ita se habet ultimus finis huius hominis ad hunc
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588 hominem. Unde oportet quod, sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter
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589 unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine
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590 statuatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p9">
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591 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.
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592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33443] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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593 dicendum quod omnia illa plura accipiebantur in ratione unius boni
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594 perfecti ex his constituti, ab his qui in eis ultimum finem
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595 ponebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p10">
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596 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's
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597 perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.
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598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33444] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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599 dicendum quod, etsi plura accipi possint quae ad invicem
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600 oppositionem non habeant, tamen bono perfecto opponitur quod sit
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601 aliquid de perfectione rei extra ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p11">
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602 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend
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603 to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).
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604 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33445] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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605 dicendum quod potestas voluntatis non habet ut faciat opposita esse
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606 simul. Quod contingeret, si tenderet in plura disparata sicut in
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607 ultimos fines, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A6-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 6. Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p2">
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608 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are
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609 said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains
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610 not to the last end.
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611 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33446] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
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612 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quaecumque homo vult,
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613 propter ultimum finem velit. Ea enim quae ad finem ultimum
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614 ordinantur, seriosa dicuntur, quasi utilia. Sed iocosa a seriis
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615 distinguuntur. Ergo ea quae homo iocose agit, non ordinat in
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616 ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p3">
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617 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
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618 Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires,
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619 for the last end.
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620 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33447] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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621 philosophus dicit, in principio Metaphys., quod scientiae
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622 speculativae propter seipsas quaeruntur. Nec tamen potest dici quod
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623 quaelibet earum sit ultimus finis. Ergo non omnia quae homo
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624 appetit, appetit propter ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p4">
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625 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all
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626 that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.
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627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33448] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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628 quicumque ordinat aliquid in finem aliquem, cogitat de illo fine.
|
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629 Sed non semper homo cogitat de ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit
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630 aut facit. Non ergo omnia homo appetit aut facit propter ultimum
|
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631 finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p5">
|
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632 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we
|
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633 love it for its own sake."
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634 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33449] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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635 est quod dicit Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>illud est finis boni
|
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636 nostri, propter quod amantur cetera, illud autem propter
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637 seipsum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p6">
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638 <b>I answer that,</b> Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because
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639 whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last
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640 end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained
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641 to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art.
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642 Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly,
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643 because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is
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644 clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects
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645 of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
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646 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 co."><a name="33450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33450] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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647 dicendum quod necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat
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648 propter ultimum finem. Et hoc apparet duplici ratione. Primo
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649 quidem, quia quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni. Quod
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650 quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis,
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651 necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper
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652 inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet
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653 tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et
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654 ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem
|
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655 consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem. Secundo, quia ultimus
|
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656 finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in
|
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657 aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae
|
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658 secundae moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo
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659 movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in
|
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|
660 ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p7">
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|
661 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford
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|
662 him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.
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663 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33451] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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664 dicendum quod actiones ludicrae non ordinantur ad aliquem finem
|
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665 extrinsecum; sed tamen ordinantur ad bonum ipsius ludentis, prout
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|
666 sunt delectantes vel requiem praestantes. Bonum autem consummatum
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667 hominis est ultimus finis eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p8">
|
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|
668 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good,
|
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669 which is the ultimate end.
|
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670 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33452] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
|
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671 dicendum ad secundum, de scientia speculativa; quae appetitur ut
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672 bonum quoddam speculantis, quod comprehenditur sub bono completo et
|
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673 perfecto, quod est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p9">
|
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|
674 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention,
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675 which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts
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676 be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every
|
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677 step.
|
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678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33453] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
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|
679 dicendum quod non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine,
|
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680 quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae
|
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|
681 intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet
|
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682 appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non
|
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|
683 cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet
|
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|
684 passu cogitet de fine.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A7-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 7. Whether all men have the same last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p2">
|
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|
685 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end
|
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|
686 of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end.
|
|
|
687 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33454] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
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688 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium hominum sit unus finis
|
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|
689 ultimus. Maxime enim videtur hominis ultimus finis esse
|
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|
690 incommutabile bonum. Sed quidam avertuntur ab incommutabili bono,
|
|
|
691 peccando. Non ergo omnium hominum est unus ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p3">
|
|
|
692 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not
|
|
|
693 have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
|
|
|
694 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33455] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
695 secundum ultimum finem tota vita hominis regulatur. Si igitur esset
|
|
|
696 unus ultimus finis omnium hominum, sequeretur quod in hominibus non
|
|
|
697 essent diversa studia vivendi. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p4">
|
|
|
698 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature,
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|
699 yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end.
|
|
|
700 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33456] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
701 finis est actionis terminus. Actiones autem sunt singularium.
|
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|
702 Homines autem, etsi conveniant in natura speciei, tamen differunt
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|
703 secundum ea quae ad individua pertinent. Non ergo omnium hominum
|
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|
704 est unus ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p5">
|
|
|
705 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
|
|
|
706 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33457] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
707 est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., quod omnes homines
|
|
|
708 conveniunt in appetendo ultimum finem, qui est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p6">
|
|
|
709 <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing
|
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|
710 in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since
|
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|
711 all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated
|
|
|
712 above
|
|
|
713 <a href="#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q1_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But as to the thing in which this aspect is
|
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|
714 realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure;
|
|
|
715 others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to
|
|
|
716 others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in
|
|
|
717 which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed
|
|
|
718 affections desires for his last end.
|
|
|
719 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 co."><a name="33458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33458] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
720 dicendum quod de ultimo fine possumus loqui dupliciter, uno modo,
|
|
|
721 secundum rationem ultimi finis; alio modo, secundum id in quo finis
|
|
|
722 ultimi ratio invenitur. Quantum igitur ad rationem ultimi finis,
|
|
|
723 omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi, quia omnes appetunt suam
|
|
|
724 perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis, ut dictum est.
|
|
|
725 Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines
|
|
|
726 conveniunt in ultimo fine, nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam
|
|
|
727 consummatum bonum, quidam autem voluptatem, quidam vero quodcumque
|
|
|
728 aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile est dulce, sed quibusdam
|
|
|
729 maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini, quibusdam dulcedo mellis, aut
|
|
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730 alicuius talium. Illud tamen dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius
|
|
|
731 delectabile, in quo maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et
|
|
|
732 similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam
|
|
|
733 ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p7">
|
|
|
734 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the
|
|
|
735 last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
|
|
|
736 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33459] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
737 dicendum quod illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere
|
|
|
738 invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis
|
|
|
739 intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p8">
|
|
|
740 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
|
|
|
741 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33460] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
742 dicendum quod diversa studia vivendi contingunt in hominibus
|
|
|
743 propter diversas res in quibus quaeritur ratio summi boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p9">
|
|
|
744 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above
|
|
|
745
|
|
|
746 <a href="#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q1_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>.
|
|
|
747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33461] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
748 dicendum quod, etsi actiones sint singularium, tamen primum
|
|
|
749 principium agendi in eis est natura, quae tendit ad unum, ut dictum
|
|
|
750 est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A8-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 8. Whether other creatures concur in that last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p2">
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|
|
751 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e.
|
|
|
752 God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end.
|
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|
753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33462] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
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|
754 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in ultimo fine hominis etiam omnia
|
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|
755 alia conveniant. Finis enim respondet principio. Sed illud quod est
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|
756 principium hominum, scilicet Deus, est etiam principium omnium
|
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757 aliorum. Ergo in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia communicant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p3">
|
|
|
758 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's
|
|
|
759 last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things,
|
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|
760 too, concur in man's last end.
|
|
|
761 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33463] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
762 Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus convertit
|
|
|
763 omnia ad seipsum, tanquam ad ultimum finem</i>. Sed ipse est etiam
|
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|
764 ultimus finis hominis, quia solo ipso fruendum est, ut Augustinus
|
|
|
765 dicit. Ergo in fine ultimo hominis etiam alia conveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p4">
|
|
|
766 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of
|
|
|
767 all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.
|
|
|
768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33464] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
769 finis ultimus hominis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed obiectum
|
|
|
770 voluntatis est bonum universale, quod est finis omnium. Ergo
|
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771 necesse est quod in ultimo fine hominis omnia conveniant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p5">
|
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|
772 <b>On the contrary,</b> man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible
|
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773 for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end.
|
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|
774 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33465] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
775 est quod ultimus finis hominum est beatitudo; quam omnes appetunt,
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|
776 ut Augustinus dicit. <i>Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia
|
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|
777 ut beata sint</i>, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium
|
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778 quaest. Non ergo in ultimo fine hominis alia conveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p6">
|
|
|
779 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself
|
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780 in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of
|
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781 a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money
|
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782 as "thing," or possession of money as "use."
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783 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 co."><a name="33466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33466] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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784 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic. et in V
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|
785 Metaphys., finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo, idest
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786 ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius
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787 rei. Sicut si dicamus quod motus corporis gravis finis est vel
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788 locus inferior ut res, vel hoc quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut
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789 usus, et finis avari est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniae
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790 ut usus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p7"> If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end,
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791 since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of
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792 the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their
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793 last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in
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794 so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
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795 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam
|
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796 rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia
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|
797 conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum
|
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798 rerum. Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad
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799 consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant
|
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800 creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae
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801 consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non
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802 competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum
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803 participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel
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804 vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p8"> Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 ad arg."><a name="33467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33467] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
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805 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
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806 <div id="FS_Q2" class="div3">
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807 <h3 id="FS_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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808 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
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809 <p id="FS_Q2-p2"> We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.</p><p id="FS_Q2-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q2-p4"><a href="#FS_Q2_A1"> (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p5"><a href="#FS_Q2_A2"> (2) Whether in honor?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p6"><a href="#FS_Q2_A3"> (3) Whether in fame or glory?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p7"><a href="#FS_Q2_A4"> (4) Whether in power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p8"><a href="#FS_Q2_A5"> (5) Whether in any good of the body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p9"><a href="#FS_Q2_A6"> (6) Whether in pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p10"><a href="#FS_Q2_A7"> (7) Whether in any good of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p11"><a href="#FS_Q2_A8"> (8) Whether in any created good?</a></p>
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810 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 pr."><a name="33468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33468]
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811 Iª-IIae q. 2 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
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812 beatitudine, nam beatitudo nominat adeptionem ultimi finis. Primo
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813 quidem, in quibus sit; secundo, quid sit; tertio, qualiter eam
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814 consequi possimus. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum
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815 beatitudo consistat in divitiis. Secundo, utrum in honoribus.
|
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816 Tertio, utrum in fama, sive in gloria. Quarto, utrum in potestate.
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817 Quinto, utrum in aliquo corporis bono. Sexto, utrum in voluptate.
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818 Septimo, utrum in aliquo bono animae. Octavo, utrum in aliquo bono
|
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819 creato.</p></div></div></div>
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820 <div id="FS_Q2_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A1-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 1. Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2">
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821 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which
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822 has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (
|
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823 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv">Eccles. 10:19</a>): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth.
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824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33469] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
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825 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in divitiis
|
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826 consistat. Cum enim beatitudo sit ultimus finis hominis, in eo
|
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827 consistit quod maxime in hominis affectu dominatur. Huiusmodi autem
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828 sunt divitiae, dicitur enim Eccle. X, <i>pecuniae obediunt
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829 omnia</i>. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo hominis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p3">
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830 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good
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831 things." Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented,
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832 that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
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833 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33470] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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834 secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>beatitudo est status omnium
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835 bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed in pecuniis omnia possideri
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836 videntur, quia, ut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., ad hoc nummus est
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837 inventus, ut sit quasi fideiussor habendi pro eo quodcumque homo
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838 voluerit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4">
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839 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more
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840 than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" (
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841 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.9" target="asv">Eccles. 5:9</a>). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
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842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33471] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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843 desiderium summi boni, cum nunquam deficiat, videtur esse
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844 infinitum. Sed hoc maxime in divitiis invenitur, quia <i>avarus non
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845 implebitur pecunia</i>, ut dicitur Eccle. V. Ergo in divitiis
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846 beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p5">
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847 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines
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848 in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness
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849 does not consist in wealth.
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850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33472] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
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851 bonum hominis in retinendo beatitudinem magis consistit quam in
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852 emittendo ipsam. Sed sicut Boetius in II de Consol. dicit,
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853 <i>divitiae effundendo, magis quam coacervando, melius nitent,
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854 siquidem avaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit</i>. Ergo
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855 in divitiis beatitudo non consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p6">
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856 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),
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857 viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink,
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858 clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money,
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859 but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things
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860 salable.
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861 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of
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862 something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man
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863 as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to
|
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864 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."
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865 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p8"> And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because,
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866 by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of
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867 the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.
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868 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="33473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33473] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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869 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in divitiis
|
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870 consistere. Sunt enim duplices divitiae, ut philosophus dicit in I
|
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871 Polit., scilicet naturales, et artificiales. Naturales quidem
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872 divitiae sunt, quibus homini subvenitur ad defectus naturales
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873 tollendos, sicut cibus, potus, vestimenta, vehicula et habitacula,
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874 et alia huiusmodi. Divitiae autem artificiales sunt, quibus
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875 secundum se natura non iuvatur, ut denarii; sed ars humana eos
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876 adinvenit propter facilitatem commutationis, ut sint quasi mensura
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877 quaedam rerum venalium. Manifestum est autem quod in divitiis
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878 naturalibus beatitudo hominis esse non potest. Quaeruntur enim
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879 huiusmodi divitiae propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam
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880 hominis, et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis
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881 ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem. Unde in ordine naturae omnia
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882 huiusmodi sunt infra hominem, et propter hominem facta; secundum
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883 illud Psalmi VIII, <i>omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius</i>.
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884 Divitiae autem artificiales non quaeruntur nisi propter naturales,
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885 non enim quaererentur, nisi quia per eas emuntur res ad usum vitae
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886 necessariae. Unde multo minus habent rationem ultimi finis.
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887 Impossibile est igitur beatitudinem, quae est ultimus finis
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888 hominis, in divitiis esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p9">
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889 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which
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890 can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as
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891 it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
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892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33474] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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893 dicendum quod omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad
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894 multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae
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895 pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet
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896 sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus, sicut et iudicium de saporibus
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897 ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10">
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|
898 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (
|
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|
899 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.16" target="asv">Prov. 17:16</a>): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom."
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900 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33475] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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901 dicendum quod pecunia possunt haberi omnia venalia, non autem
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902 spiritualia, quae vendi non possunt. Unde dicitur Proverb. XVII,
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903 <i>quid prodest stulto divitias habere, cum sapientiam emere non
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904 possit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11">
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|
905 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial
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906 wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear
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907 (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly
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908 the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things
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909 despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (
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910 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is
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911 the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (
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912 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason
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913 of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect,
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914 and the sovereign good does not consist therein.
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915 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33476] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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916 dicendum quod appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus,
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917 quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus
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918 divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit
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919 concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per
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920 philosophum in I Polit. Aliter tamen est infinitum desiderium
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921 divitiarum, et desiderium summi boni. Nam summum bonum quanto
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922 perfectius possidetur, tanto ipsummet magis amatur, et alia
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923 contemnuntur, quia quanto magis habetur, magis cognoscitur. Et ideo
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924 dicitur Eccli. XXIV, <i>qui edunt me, adhuc esurient</i>. Sed in
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925 appetitu divitiarum, et quorumcumque temporalium bonorum, est e
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926 converso, nam quando iam habentur, ipsa contemnuntur, et alia
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927 appetuntur; secundum quod significatur Ioan. IV, cum dominus dicit,
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928 qui bibit <i>ex hac aqua</i>, per quam temporalia significantur,
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929 <i>sitiet iterum</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia eorum insufficientia magis
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930 cognoscitur cum habentur. Et ideo hoc ipsum ostendit eorum
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931 imperfectionem, et quod in eis summum bonum non consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A2-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 2. Whether man's happiness consists in honors?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p2">
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932 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher
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933 says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says
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934 (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
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935 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33477] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
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936 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in honoribus
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937 consistat. Beatitudo enim, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis,
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938 ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed honor maxime videtur esse id
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939 quod est virtutis praemium, ut philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Ergo
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940 in honore maxime consistit beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3">
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941 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect
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942 good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (
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943 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor.
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944 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33478] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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945 illud quod convenit Deo et excellentissimis, maxime videtur esse
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946 beatitudo, quae est bonum perfectum. Sed huiusmodi est honor, ut
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947 philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Et etiam I Tim. I, dicit apostolus,
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948 <i>soli Deo honor et gloria</i>. Ergo in honore consistit
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949 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p4">
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950 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers
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951 loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
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952 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33479] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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953 illud quod est maxime desideratum ab hominibus, est beatitudo. Sed
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954 nihil videtur esse magis desiderabile ab hominibus quam honor, quia
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955 homines patiuntur iacturam in omnibus aliis rebus ne patiantur
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956 aliquod detrimentum sui honoris. Ergo in honore beatitudo
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957 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p5">
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958 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the
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959 person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.
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960 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33480] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
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961 beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur,
|
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|
962 sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut
|
|
|
963 philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Ergo in honore beatitudo non
|
|
|
964 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p6">
|
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|
965 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
|
|
|
966 consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion,
|
|
|
967 especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share
|
|
|
968 of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot
|
|
|
969 principally consist therein.
|
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|
970 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="33481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33481] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
971 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem consistere in honore.
|
|
|
972 Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et
|
|
|
973 ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est
|
|
|
974 in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum
|
|
|
975 beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum; et secundum partes
|
|
|
976 eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis
|
|
|
977 participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem,
|
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|
978 sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p7">
|
|
|
979 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive
|
|
|
980 honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness
|
|
|
981 itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
|
|
|
982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33482] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
983 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, honor non est
|
|
|
984 praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt
|
|
|
985 honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, quasi a non habentibus aliquid
|
|
|
986 maius ad dandum. Verum autem praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo,
|
|
|
987 propter quam virtuosi operantur. Si autem propter honorem
|
|
|
988 operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p8">
|
|
|
989 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that
|
|
|
990 honor makes them excellent.
|
|
|
991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33483] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
992 dicendum quod honor debetur Deo et excellentissimis, in signum vel
|
|
|
993 testimonium excellentiae praeexistentis, non quod ipse honor faciat
|
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|
994 eos excellentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p9">
|
|
|
995 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated
|
|
|
996 above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or
|
|
|
997 happy.
|
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|
998 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33484] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
999 dicendum quod ex naturali desiderio beatitudinis, quam consequitur
|
|
|
1000 honor, ut dictum est, contingit quod homines maxime honorem
|
|
|
1001 desiderant. Unde quaerunt homines maxime honorari a sapientibus,
|
|
|
1002 quorum iudicio credunt se esse excellentes vel felices.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A3-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 3. Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1003 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints
|
|
|
1004 for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (
|
|
|
1005 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.18" target="asv">Rom. 8:18</a>): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore
|
|
|
1006 happiness consists in glory.
|
|
|
1007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33485] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1008 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in gloria.
|
|
|
1009 In eo enim videtur beatitudo consistere, quod redditur sanctis pro
|
|
|
1010 tribulationibus quas in mundo patiuntur. Huiusmodi autem est
|
|
|
1011 gloria, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, <i>non sunt condignae
|
|
|
1012 passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam, quae revelabitur in
|
|
|
1013 nobis</i>. Ergo beatitudo consistit in gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1014 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge
|
|
|
1015 of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory
|
|
|
1016 consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.
|
|
|
1017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33486] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1018 bonum est diffusivum sui, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div.
|
|
|
1019 Nom. Sed per gloriam bonum hominis maxime diffunditur in notitiam
|
|
|
1020 aliorum, quia gloria, ut Ambrosius dicit, nihil aliud est quam
|
|
|
1021 clara cum laude notitia. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in
|
|
|
1022 gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1023 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity
|
|
|
1024 after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your
|
|
|
1025 fame in future time." Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.
|
|
|
1026 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33487] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1027 beatitudo est stabilissimum bonorum. Hoc autem videtur esse fama
|
|
|
1028 vel gloria, quia per hanc quodammodo homines aeternitatem
|
|
|
1029 sortiuntur. Unde Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., <i>vos
|
|
|
1030 immortalitatem vobis propagare videmini, cum futuri famam temporis
|
|
|
1031 cogitatis</i>. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in fama seu
|
|
|
1032 gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1033 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe
|
|
|
1034 their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame,
|
|
|
1035 must needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
|
|
|
1036 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33488] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
1037 beatitudo est verum hominis bonum. Sed famam seu gloriam contingit
|
|
|
1038 esse falsam, ut enim dicit Boetius, in libro III de Consol.,
|
|
|
1039 <i>plures magnum saepe nomen falsis vulgi opinionibus abstulerunt.
|
|
|
1040 Quo quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur,
|
|
|
1041 suis ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant</i>. Non ergo beatitudo
|
|
|
1042 hominis consistit in fama seu gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1043 <b>I answer that,</b> Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [*Augustine,
|
|
|
1044 Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for
|
|
|
1045 human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection
|
|
|
1046 of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human
|
|
|
1047 knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness
|
|
|
1048 itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends
|
|
|
1049 on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God;
|
|
|
1050 according to
|
|
|
1051 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.15" target="asv"> Ps. 90:15,16</a>: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with
|
|
|
1052 length of days, and I will show him my salvation."
|
|
|
1053 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A3-p7"> Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts.
|
|
|
1054 For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it
|
|
|
1055 is written (
|
|
|
1056 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:18</a>): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth."
|
|
|
1057 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="33489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33489] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1058 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in fama seu
|
|
|
1059 gloria humana consistere. Nam gloria nihil aliud est quam clara
|
|
|
1060 notitia cum laude, ut Ambrosius dicit. Res autem cognita aliter
|
|
|
1061 comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem
|
|
|
1062 divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina
|
|
|
1063 cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum. Unde perfectio humani boni,
|
|
|
1064 quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed
|
|
|
1065 magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo
|
|
|
1066 causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta. Et
|
|
|
1067 ideo in fama vel in gloria non potest consistere hominis beatitudo.
|
|
|
1068 Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et
|
|
|
1069 ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut
|
|
|
1070 ex causa sua, secundum illud Psalmi XC, <i>eripiam eum, et
|
|
|
1071 glorificabo eum, longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam illi
|
|
|
1072 salutare meum</i>. Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana
|
|
|
1073 notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus
|
|
|
1074 contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter
|
|
|
1075 humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius
|
|
|
1076 gloria semper vera est. Propter quod dicitur, II ad Cor. X, <i>ille
|
|
|
1077 probatus est, quem Deus commendat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1078 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence
|
|
|
1079 it is written (
|
|
|
1080 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv">Mk. 8:38</a>): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins
|
|
|
1081 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv"> Mk. 8:38 </a>with
|
|
|
1082 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.8" target="asv"> Lk. 12:8 </a>owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory].
|
|
|
1083 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33490] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1084 dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de gloria quae est ab
|
|
|
1085 hominibus, sed de gloria quae est a Deo coram Angelis eius. Unde
|
|
|
1086 dicitur Marc. VIII, <i>filius hominis confitebitur eum in gloria
|
|
|
1087 patris sui, coram Angelis eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1088 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived
|
|
|
1089 from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false,
|
|
|
1090 it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that
|
|
|
1091 fame can nowise make man happy.
|
|
|
1092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33491] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1093 dicendum quod bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est
|
|
|
1094 in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod
|
|
|
1095 derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit
|
|
|
1096 beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam. Si autem cognitio falsa sit,
|
|
|
1097 non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama
|
|
|
1098 celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere
|
|
|
1099 hominem beatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p10">
|
|
|
1100 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But
|
|
|
1101 happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
|
|
|
1102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33492] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1103 dicendum quod fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de
|
|
|
1104 facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per
|
|
|
1105 accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A4-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 4. Whether man's happiness consists in power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1106 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first
|
|
|
1107 beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture
|
|
|
1108 they are called "gods" (
|
|
|
1109 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness consists in power.
|
|
|
1110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33493] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1111 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in potestate.
|
|
|
1112 Omnia enim appetunt assimilari Deo, tanquam ultimo fini et primo
|
|
|
1113 principio. Sed homines qui in potestatibus sunt, propter
|
|
|
1114 similitudinem potestatis, maxime videntur esse Deo conformes, unde
|
|
|
1115 et in Scriptura dii vocantur, ut patet Exod. XXII, <i>diis non
|
|
|
1116 detrahes</i>. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1117 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to
|
|
|
1118 those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
|
|
|
1119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33494] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1120 beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Sed perfectissimum est quod homo
|
|
|
1121 etiam alios regere possit, quod convenit his qui in potestatibus
|
|
|
1122 sunt constituti. Ergo beatitudo consistit in potestate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1123 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than
|
|
|
1124 aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
|
|
|
1125 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33495] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1126 beatitudo, cum sit maxime appetibilis, opponitur ei quod maxime est
|
|
|
1127 fugiendum. Sed homines maxime fugiunt servitutem, cui contraponitur
|
|
|
1128 potestas. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1129 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man cannot
|
|
|
1130 relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who
|
|
|
1131 is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?"
|
|
|
1132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33496] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
1133 beatitudo est perfectum bonum. Sed potestas est maxime imperfecta.
|
|
|
1134 Ut enim dicit Boetius, III de Consol., <i>potestas humana
|
|
|
1135 sollicitudinum morsus expellere, formidinum aculeos vitare nequit.
|
|
|
1136 Et postea, potentem censes cui satellites latus ambiunt qui quos
|
|
|
1137 terret, ipse plus metuit?</i> Non igitur beatitudo consistit in
|
|
|
1138 potestate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1139 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle,
|
|
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1140 as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good
|
|
|
1141 and evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power,
|
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1142 which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
|
|
|
1143 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A4-p7"> Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because,
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|
1144 since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and
|
|
|
1145 in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having
|
|
|
1146 gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may
|
|
|
1147 still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since
|
|
|
1148 happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written
|
|
|
1149 (
|
|
|
1150 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.12" target="asv">Eccles. 5:12</a>) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because
|
|
|
1151 man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained
|
|
|
1152 thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for
|
|
|
1153 which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
|
|
|
1154 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 co."><a name="33497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33497] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1155 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere,
|
|
|
1156 propter duo. Primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii,
|
|
|
1157 ut patet in V Metaphys. Beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi
|
|
|
1158 finis. Secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum.
|
|
|
1159 Beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum. Unde magis
|
|
|
1160 posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est
|
|
|
1161 per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate. Possunt autem quatuor
|
|
|
1162 generales rationes induci ad ostendendum quod in nullo praemissorum
|
|
|
1163 exteriorum bonorum beatitudo consistat. Quarum prima est quia, cum
|
|
|
1164 beatitudo sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod
|
|
|
1165 malum. Omnia autem praedicta possunt inveniri et in bonis et in
|
|
|
1166 malis. Secunda ratio est quia, cum de ratione beatitudinis sit quod
|
|
|
1167 sit per se sufficiens, ut patet in I Ethic., necesse est quod,
|
|
|
1168 beatitudine adepta, nullum bonum homini necessarium desit. Adeptis
|
|
|
1169 autem singulis praemissorum, possunt adhuc multa bona homini
|
|
|
1170 necessaria deesse, puta sapientia, sanitas corporis, et huiusmodi.
|
|
|
1171 Tertia, quia, cum beatitudo sit bonum perfectum, ex beatitudine non
|
|
|
1172 potest aliquod malum alicui provenire. Quod non convenit
|
|
|
1173 praemissis, dicitur enim Eccle. V, quod divitiae interdum
|
|
|
1174 conservantur in malum domini sui; et simile patet in aliis tribus.
|
|
|
1175 Quarta ratio est quia ad beatitudinem homo ordinatur per principia
|
|
|
1176 interiora, cum ad ipsam naturaliter ordinetur. Praemissa autem
|
|
|
1177 quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a
|
|
|
1178 fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in
|
|
|
1179 praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1180 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it
|
|
|
1181 is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
|
|
|
1182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33498] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1183 dicendum quod divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua
|
|
|
1184 potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur.
|
|
|
1185 Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo
|
|
|
1186 quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad
|
|
|
1187 bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p9">
|
|
|
1188 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes
|
|
|
1189 a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
|
|
|
1190 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33499] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1191 dicendum quod, sicut optimum est quod aliquis utatur bene potestate
|
|
|
1192 in regimine multorum, ita pessimum est si male utatur. Et ita
|
|
|
1193 potestas se habet et ad bonum et ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p10">
|
|
|
1194 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme
|
|
|
1195 good consists in power.
|
|
|
1196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33500] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1197 dicendum quod servitus est impedimentum boni usus potestatis, et
|
|
|
1198 ideo naturaliter homines eam fugiunt, et non quasi in potestate
|
|
|
1199 hominis sit summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A5-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 5. Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2">
|
|
|
1200 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (
|
|
|
1201 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:16</a>): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore
|
|
|
1202 it consists in the health of the body.
|
|
|
1203 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33501] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
1204 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in bonis
|
|
|
1205 corporis. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, <i>non est census supra censum
|
|
|
1206 salutis corporis</i>. Sed in eo quod est optimum, consistit
|
|
|
1207 beatitudo. Ergo consistit in corporis salute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p3">
|
|
|
1208 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows.
|
|
|
1209 But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it
|
|
|
1210 seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
|
|
|
1211 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33502] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1212 Dionysius dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod esse est melius quam
|
|
|
1213 vivere, et vivere melius quam alia quae consequuntur. Sed ad esse
|
|
|
1214 et vivere hominis requiritur salus corporis. Cum ergo beatitudo sit
|
|
|
1215 summum bonum hominis, videtur quod salus corporis maxime pertineat
|
|
|
1216 ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p4">
|
|
|
1217 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the
|
|
|
1218 greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so
|
|
|
1219 the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into
|
|
|
1220 all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that
|
|
|
1221 which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the
|
|
|
1222 health of the body.
|
|
|
1223 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33503] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1224 quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ab altiori principio dependet
|
|
|
1225 quia quanto causa est superior, tanto eius virtus ad plura se
|
|
|
1226 extendit. Sed sicut causalitas causae efficientis consideratur
|
|
|
1227 secundum influentiam, ita causalitas finis attenditur secundum
|
|
|
1228 appetitum. Ergo sicut prima causa efficiens est quae in omnia
|
|
|
1229 influit, ita ultimus finis est quod ab omnibus desideratur. Sed
|
|
|
1230 ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab omnibus. Ergo in his quae
|
|
|
1231 pertinent ad esse hominis, sicut est salus corporis, maxime
|
|
|
1232 consistit eius beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p5">
|
|
|
1233 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance,
|
|
|
1234 by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist
|
|
|
1235 in goods of the body.
|
|
|
1236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33504] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
1237 secundum beatitudinem homo excellit omnia alia animalia. Sed
|
|
|
1238 secundum bona corporis, a multis animalibus superatur, sicut ab
|
|
|
1239 elephante in diuturnitate vitae, a leone in fortitudine, a cervo in
|
|
|
1240 cursu. Ergo beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A5-p6">
|
|
|
1241 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a
|
|
|
1242 thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain
|
|
|
1243 does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as
|
|
|
1244 its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer
|
|
|
1245 its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to
|
|
|
1246 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14</a>: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to
|
|
|
1247 something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation
|
|
|
1248 of man's being.
|
|
|
1249 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A5-p7"> Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could not be said
|
|
|
1250 that the end of man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body
|
|
|
1251 depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (
|
|
|
1252 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q2_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts
|
|
|
1253 them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the
|
|
|
1254 soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
|
|
|
1255 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 co."><a name="33505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33505] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1256 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in bonis
|
|
|
1257 corporis consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia impossibile
|
|
|
1258 est quod illius rei quae ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, ultimus
|
|
|
1259 finis sit eiusdem conservatio in esse. Unde gubernator non
|
|
|
1260 intendit, sicut ultimum finem, conservationem navis sibi commissae;
|
|
|
1261 eo quod navis ad aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, scilicet ad
|
|
|
1262 navigandum. Sicut autem navis committitur gubernatori ad
|
|
|
1263 dirigendum, ita homo est suae voluntati et rationi commissus;
|
|
|
1264 secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit
|
|
|
1265 hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Manifestum est
|
|
|
1266 autem quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem, non enim homo
|
|
|
1267 est summum bonum. Unde impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis
|
|
|
1268 et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse. Secundo quia,
|
|
|
1269 dato quod finis rationis et voluntatis humanae esset conservatio
|
|
|
1270 humani esse, non tamen posset dici quod finis hominis esset aliquod
|
|
|
1271 corporis bonum. Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et
|
|
|
1272 quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae
|
|
|
1273 non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est; ipsumque corpus est
|
|
|
1274 propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumenta
|
|
|
1275 propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones exerceat. Unde omnia bona
|
|
|
1276 corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde
|
|
|
1277 impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae
|
|
|
1278 est ultimus hominis finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p8">
|
|
|
1279 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it
|
|
|
1280 is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good
|
|
|
1281 of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.
|
|
|
1282 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33506] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1283 dicendum quod, sicut corpus ordinatur ad animam sicut ad finem, ita
|
|
|
1284 bona exteriora ad ipsum corpus. Et ideo rationabiliter bonum
|
|
|
1285 corporis praefertur bonis exterioribus, quae per censum
|
|
|
1286 significantur, sicut et bonum animae praefertur omnibus bonis
|
|
|
1287 corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p9">
|
|
|
1288 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes
|
|
|
1289 all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which
|
|
|
1290 does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident
|
|
|
1291 that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent.
|
|
|
1292 Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than
|
|
|
1293 living things.
|
|
|
1294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33507] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1295 dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in
|
|
|
1296 se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus
|
|
|
1297 subsequentibus, sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia
|
|
|
1298 subsequentia. Et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur
|
|
|
1299 ipsum esse prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non
|
|
|
1300 capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum,
|
|
|
1301 sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum
|
|
|
1302 esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius
|
|
|
1303 ibidem dicit quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et
|
|
|
1304 intelligentia viventibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p10">
|
|
|
1305 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom
|
|
|
1306 every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living
|
|
|
1307 being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
|
|
|
1308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33508] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1309 dicendum quod, quia finis respondet principio, ex illa ratione
|
|
|
1310 probatur quod ultimus finis est primum principium essendi, in quo
|
|
|
1311 est omnis essendi perfectio, cuius similitudinem appetunt, secundum
|
|
|
1312 suam proportionem, quaedam quidem secundum esse tantum, quaedam
|
|
|
1313 secundum esse vivens, quaedam secundum esse vivens et intelligens
|
|
|
1314 et beatum. Et hoc paucorum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A6-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 6. Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p2">
|
|
|
1315 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something
|
|
|
1316 else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what
|
|
|
1317 is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.
|
|
|
1318 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33509] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
|
|
|
1319 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in voluptate
|
|
|
1320 consistat. Beatitudo enim, cum sit ultimus finis, non appetitur
|
|
|
1321 propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam. Sed hoc maxime convenit
|
|
|
1322 delectationi, <i>ridiculum est enim ab aliquo quaerere propter quid
|
|
|
1323 velit delectari</i>, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo beatitudo maxime
|
|
|
1324 in voluptate et delectatione consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p3">
|
|
|
1325 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the
|
|
|
1326 end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion
|
|
|
1327 of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes
|
|
|
1328 him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness,
|
|
|
1329 consists principally in pleasure.
|
|
|
1330 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33510] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a>
|
|
|
1331 <i>Praeterea, causa prima vehementius imprimit quam secunda</i>, ut
|
|
|
1332 dicitur in libro de causis. Influentia autem finis attenditur
|
|
|
1333 secundum eius appetitum. Illud ergo videtur habere rationem finis
|
|
|
1334 ultimi, quod maxime movet appetitum. Hoc autem est voluptas, cuius
|
|
|
1335 signum est quod delectatio intantum absorbet hominis voluntatem et
|
|
|
1336 rationem, quod alia bona contemnere facit. Ergo videtur quod
|
|
|
1337 ultimus finis hominis, qui est beatitudo, maxime in voluptate
|
|
|
1338 consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p4">
|
|
|
1339 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish,
|
|
|
1340 and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists
|
|
|
1341 in pleasure.
|
|
|
1342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33511] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1343 cum appetitus sit boni, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse
|
|
|
1344 optimum. Sed delectationem omnia appetunt, et sapientes et
|
|
|
1345 insipientes, et etiam ratione carentia. Ergo delectatio est
|
|
|
1346 optimum. Consistit ergo in voluptate beatitudo, quae est summum
|
|
|
1347 bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p5">
|
|
|
1348 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had
|
|
|
1349 a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy
|
|
|
1350 too."
|
|
|
1351 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33512] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1352 est quod Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., <i>tristes exitus esse
|
|
|
1353 voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget.
|
|
|
1354 Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes
|
|
|
1355 quoque beatae esse dicantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A6-p6">
|
|
|
1356 <b>I answer that,</b> Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13),
|
|
|
1357 although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains
|
|
|
1358 to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and
|
|
|
1359 another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper
|
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|
1360 accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has
|
|
|
1361 some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good,
|
|
|
1362 is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least
|
|
|
1363 apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness,
|
|
|
1364 but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
|
|
|
1365 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A6-p7"> But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense,
|
|
|
1366 which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense,
|
|
|
1367 cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which
|
|
|
1368 is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul
|
|
|
1369 which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form
|
|
|
1370 is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite.
|
|
|
1371 Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect,
|
|
|
1372 which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite
|
|
|
1373 number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through
|
|
|
1374 being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence
|
|
|
1375 it is written (
|
|
|
1376 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.9" target="asv">Wis. 7:9</a>) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor
|
|
|
1377 a proper accident of happiness.
|
|
|
1378 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 co."><a name="33513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33513] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1379 dicendum quod, <i>quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae
|
|
|
1380 sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum</i>, ut dicitur VII
|
|
|
1381 Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus
|
|
|
1382 tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit. Quia in unaquaque re
|
|
|
1383 aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium
|
|
|
1384 accidens ipsius, sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal
|
|
|
1385 rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile. Est igitur
|
|
|
1386 considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens
|
|
|
1387 quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex
|
|
|
1388 hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi
|
|
|
1389 conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria. Bonum
|
|
|
1390 autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis
|
|
|
1391 beatitudo si autem sit imperfectum est quaedam beatitudinis
|
|
|
1392 participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde
|
|
|
1393 manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio quae consequitur bonum
|
|
|
1394 perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis; sed quoddam consequens
|
|
|
1395 ad ipsam sicut per se accidens. Voluptas autem corporalis non
|
|
|
1396 potest etiam modo praedicto sequi bonum perfectum. Nam sequitur
|
|
|
1397 bonum quod apprehendit sensus, qui est virtus animae corpore utens.
|
|
|
1398 Bonum autem quod pertinet ad corpus, quod apprehenditur secundum
|
|
|
1399 sensum, non potest esse perfectum hominis bonum. Cum enim anima
|
|
|
1400 rationalis excedat proportionem materiae corporalis, pars animae
|
|
|
1401 quae est ab organo corporeo absoluta, quandam habet infinitatem
|
|
|
1402 respectu ipsius corporis et partium animae corpori concretarum,
|
|
|
1403 sicut immaterialia sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium,
|
|
|
1404 eo quod forma per materiam quodammodo contrahitur et finitur, unde
|
|
|
1405 forma a materia absoluta est quodammodo infinita. Et ideo sensus,
|
|
|
1406 qui est vis corporalis, cognoscit singulare, quod est determinatum
|
|
|
1407 per materiam, intellectus vero, qui est vis a materia absoluta,
|
|
|
1408 cognoscit universale, quod est abstractum a materia, et continet
|
|
|
1409 sub se infinita singularia. Unde patet quod bonum conveniens
|
|
|
1410 corpori, quod per apprehensionem sensus delectationem corporalem
|
|
|
1411 causat, non est perfectum bonum hominis, sed est minimum quiddam in
|
|
|
1412 comparatione ad bonum animae. Unde Sap. VII, dicitur quod <i>omne
|
|
|
1413 aurum, in comparatione sapientiae, arena est exigua</i>. Sic igitur
|
|
|
1414 neque voluptas corporalis est ipsa beatitudo, nec est per se
|
|
|
1415 accidens beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p8">
|
|
|
1416 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus
|
|
|
1417 it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as
|
|
|
1418 good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the
|
|
|
1419 final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight
|
|
|
1420 is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle,
|
|
|
1421 and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
|
|
|
1422 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33514] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1423 dicendum quod eiusdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod
|
|
|
1424 appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus
|
|
|
1425 in bono, sicut ex eadem virtute naturae est quod grave feratur
|
|
|
1426 deorsum, et quod ibi quiescat. Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum
|
|
|
1427 appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud
|
|
|
1428 appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam
|
|
|
1429 formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis
|
|
|
1430 propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis
|
|
|
1431 obiectum, et per consequens est principium eius, et dat ei formam,
|
|
|
1432 ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono
|
|
|
1433 desiderato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p9">
|
|
|
1434 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles
|
|
|
1435 of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
|
|
|
1436 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33515] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1437 dicendum quod vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit
|
|
|
1438 ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae
|
|
|
1439 cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus
|
|
|
1440 delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p10">
|
|
|
1441 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely,
|
|
|
1442 as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight
|
|
|
1443 results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.
|
|
|
1444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33516] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1445 dicendum quod eo modo omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et
|
|
|
1446 appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem appetunt ratione boni, et
|
|
|
1447 non e converso, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod delectatio
|
|
|
1448 sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio
|
|
|
1449 consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id
|
|
|
1450 quod est per se et maximum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A7-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 7. Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p2">
|
|
|
1451 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold:
|
|
|
1452 external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of
|
|
|
1453 the body, as shown above (
|
|
|
1454 <a href="#FS_Q2_A4" id="FS_Q2_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
|
|
|
1455 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33517] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
|
|
|
1456 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in aliquo bono
|
|
|
1457 animae. Beatitudo enim est quoddam hominis bonum. Hoc autem per
|
|
|
1458 tria dividitur, quae sunt bona exteriora, bona corporis, et bona
|
|
|
1459 animae. Sed beatitudo non consistit in bonis exterioribus, neque in
|
|
|
1460 bonis corporis, sicut supra ostensum est. Ergo consistit in bonis
|
|
|
1461 animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p3">
|
|
|
1462 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom
|
|
|
1463 we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself
|
|
|
1464 more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all
|
|
|
1465 else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not,
|
|
|
1466 however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
|
|
|
1467 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33518] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1468 illud cui appetimus aliquod bonum, magis amamus quam bonum quod ei
|
|
|
1469 appetimus, sicut magis amamus amicum cui appetimus pecuniam, quam
|
|
|
1470 pecuniam. Sed unusquisque quodcumque bonum sibi appetit. Ergo
|
|
|
1471 seipsum amat magis quam omnia alia bona. Sed beatitudo est quod
|
|
|
1472 maxime amatur, quod patet ex hoc quod propter ipsam omnia alia
|
|
|
1473 amantur et desiderantur. Ergo beatitudo consistit in aliquo bono
|
|
|
1474 ipsius hominis. Sed non in bonis corporis. Ergo in bonis
|
|
|
1475 animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p4">
|
|
|
1476 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness
|
|
|
1477 is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above
|
|
|
1478 <a href="#FS_Q2_A5" id="FS_Q2_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
|
|
|
1479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33519] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1480 perfectio est aliquid eius quod perficitur. Sed beatitudo est
|
|
|
1481 quaedam perfectio hominis. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid hominis. Sed
|
|
|
1482 non est aliquid corporis, ut ostensum est. Ergo beatitudo est
|
|
|
1483 aliquid animae. Et ita consistit in bonis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p5">
|
|
|
1484 <b>On the contrary,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake."
|
|
|
1485 But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists
|
|
|
1486 in no good of the soul.
|
|
|
1487 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33520] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
1488 sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., <i>id in quo
|
|
|
1489 constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est</i>. Sed homo
|
|
|
1490 non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est
|
|
|
1491 diligendum propter Deum. Ergo in nullo bono animae beatitudo
|
|
|
1492 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p6">
|
|
|
1493 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
1494 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q2_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession
|
|
|
1495 of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something
|
|
|
1496 belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing
|
|
|
1497 actually, from being potentially
|
|
|
1498 knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its
|
|
|
1499 fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last
|
|
|
1500 end.
|
|
|
1501 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p7"> In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is
|
|
|
1502 the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent
|
|
|
1503 to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.
|
|
|
1504 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p8"> But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself
|
|
|
1505 desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness
|
|
|
1506 through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy;
|
|
|
1507 but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something
|
|
|
1508 belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
|
|
|
1509 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 co."><a name="33521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33521] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1510 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur,
|
|
|
1511 scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio
|
|
|
1512 aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis
|
|
|
1513 quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem,
|
|
|
1514 impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel
|
|
|
1515 aliquid eius. Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in
|
|
|
1516 potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de
|
|
|
1517 potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter
|
|
|
1518 actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est
|
|
|
1519 secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis.
|
|
|
1520 Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius.
|
|
|
1521 Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive
|
|
|
1522 habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum
|
|
|
1523 perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est
|
|
|
1524 voluntas, est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens
|
|
|
1525 ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens
|
|
|
1526 particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus
|
|
|
1527 finis hominis. Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad
|
|
|
1528 ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei
|
|
|
1529 quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid
|
|
|
1530 hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem
|
|
|
1531 consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo
|
|
|
1532 beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit, sed huius rei adeptio
|
|
|
1533 vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid
|
|
|
1534 animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra
|
|
|
1535 animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p9">
|
|
|
1536 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or
|
|
|
1537 act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes
|
|
|
1538 happiness is a good of the soul.
|
|
|
1539 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33522] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1540 dicendum quod, secundum quod sub illa divisione comprehenduntur
|
|
|
1541 omnia bona quae homini sunt appetibilia, sic bonum animae dicitur
|
|
|
1542 non solum potentia aut habitus aut actus, sed etiam obiectum, quod
|
|
|
1543 est extrinsecum. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere id in quo
|
|
|
1544 beatitudo consistit, esse quoddam bonum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p10">
|
|
|
1545 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved
|
|
|
1546 as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both
|
|
|
1547 cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when
|
|
|
1548 we treat of Charity.
|
|
|
1549 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33523] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1550 dicendum, quantum ad propositum pertinet, quod beatitudo maxime
|
|
|
1551 amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui
|
|
|
1552 concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est
|
|
|
1553 eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiae aliquid
|
|
|
1554 homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi cum de caritate
|
|
|
1555 agetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p11">
|
|
|
1556 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness,
|
|
|
1557 viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.
|
|
|
1558 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33524] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1559 dicendum quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam
|
|
|
1560 animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod
|
|
|
1561 scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A8-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 8. Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p2">
|
|
|
1562 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites
|
|
|
1563 the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches
|
|
|
1564 the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature,
|
|
|
1565 as stated in
|
|
|
1566 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q2_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>, it seems that man's
|
|
|
1567 happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
|
|
|
1568 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33525] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
|
|
|
1569 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo
|
|
|
1570 bono creato. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod
|
|
|
1571 divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum, ex
|
|
|
1572 quo potest accipi quod summum inferioris naturae sit attingere
|
|
|
1573 infimum naturae superioris. Sed summum hominis bonum est beatitudo.
|
|
|
1574 Cum ergo Angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, ut in primo
|
|
|
1575 habitum est; videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in hoc quod
|
|
|
1576 aliquo modo attingit ad Angelum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p3">
|
|
|
1577 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for
|
|
|
1578 its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys.
|
|
|
1579 viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
|
|
|
1580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33526] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1581 ultimus finis cuiuslibet rei est in suo perfecto, unde pars est
|
|
|
1582 propter totum, sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas
|
|
|
1583 creaturarum, quae dicitur maior mundus, comparatur ad hominem, qui
|
|
|
1584 in VIII Physic. dicitur minor mundus, sicut perfectum ad
|
|
|
1585 imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in tota universitate
|
|
|
1586 creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p4">
|
|
|
1587 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good
|
|
|
1588 surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation,
|
|
|
1589 it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness.
|
|
|
1590 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33527] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1591 per hoc homo efficitur beatus, quod eius naturale desiderium
|
|
|
1592 quietat. Sed naturale desiderium hominis non extenditur ad maius
|
|
|
1593 bonum quam quod ipse capere potest. Cum ergo homo non sit capax
|
|
|
1594 boni quod excedit limites totius creaturae, videtur quod per
|
|
|
1595 aliquod bonum creatum homo beatus fieri possit. Et ita beatitudo
|
|
|
1596 hominis in aliquo bono creato consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5">
|
|
|
1597 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it
|
|
|
1598 is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (
|
|
|
1599 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv">Ps. 143:15</a>)."
|
|
|
1600 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33528] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1601 est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>ut vita carnis anima
|
|
|
1602 est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est; de quo dicitur, beatus
|
|
|
1603 populus cuius dominus Deus eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6">
|
|
|
1604 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite
|
|
|
1605 altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of
|
|
|
1606 man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that
|
|
|
1607 naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any
|
|
|
1608 creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will
|
|
|
1609 of man, according to the words of
|
|
|
1610 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.5" target="asv"> Ps. 102:5</a>: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.
|
|
|
1611 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 co."><a name="33529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33529] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1612 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo
|
|
|
1613 bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter
|
|
|
1614 quietat appetitum, alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc
|
|
|
1615 restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est
|
|
|
1616 appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus
|
|
|
1617 est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare
|
|
|
1618 voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in
|
|
|
1619 aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet
|
|
|
1620 bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere
|
|
|
1621 potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, <i>qui replet in bonis
|
|
|
1622 desiderium tuum</i>. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis
|
|
|
1623 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p7">
|
|
|
1624 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as
|
|
|
1625 in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the
|
|
|
1626 blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.
|
|
|
1627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33530] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1628 dicendum quod superius hominis attingit quidem infimum angelicae
|
|
|
1629 naturae per quandam similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in
|
|
|
1630 ultimo fine, sed procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fontem boni,
|
|
|
1631 qui est universale obiectum beatitudinis omnium beatorum, tanquam
|
|
|
1632 infinitum et perfectum bonum existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p8">
|
|
|
1633 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself,
|
|
|
1634 but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is
|
|
|
1635 ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.
|
|
|
1636 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33531] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1637 dicendum quod, si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed
|
|
|
1638 ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum
|
|
|
1639 totum, sed aliquid aliud. Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam
|
|
|
1640 comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed
|
|
|
1641 ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non
|
|
|
1642 est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p9">
|
|
|
1643 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is
|
|
|
1644 less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an
|
|
|
1645 angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
|
|
|
1646 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33532] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1647 dicendum quod bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est
|
|
|
1648 capax ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis, est tamen minus quam bonum
|
|
|
1649 cuius est capax ut obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod
|
|
|
1650 participatur ab Angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum et
|
|
|
1651 contractum.</p></div></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1652 <div id="FS_Q3" class="div3">
|
|
|
1653 <h3 id="FS_Q3-p0.1">Q. 3. WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1654 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
|
|
|
1655 <p id="FS_Q3-p2"> We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.</p><p id="FS_Q3-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q3-p4"><a href="#FS_Q3_A1"> (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p5"><a href="#FS_Q3_A2"> (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p6"><a href="#FS_Q3_A3"> (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p7"><a href="#FS_Q3_A4"> (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p8"><a href="#FS_Q3_A5"> (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p9"><a href="#FS_Q3_A6"> (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p10"><a href="#FS_Q3_A7"> (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p11"><a href="#FS_Q3_A8"> (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?</a></p>
|
|
|
1656 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 pr."><a name="33533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33533]
|
|
|
1657 Iª-IIae q. 3 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quid sit
|
|
|
1658 beatitudo; et quae requirantur ad ipsam. Circa primum quaeruntur
|
|
|
1659 octo. Primo, utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Secundo, si est
|
|
|
1660 aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio. Tertio, utrum sit operatio
|
|
|
1661 sensitivae partis, an intellectivae tantum. Quarto, si est operatio
|
|
|
1662 intellectivae partis, utrum sit operatio intellectus, an
|
|
|
1663 voluntatis. Quinto, si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio
|
|
|
1664 intellectus speculativi, aut practici. Sexto, si est operatio
|
|
|
1665 intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat in speculatione
|
|
|
1666 scientiarum speculativarum. Septimo, utrum consistat in
|
|
|
1667 speculatione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet Angelorum. Octavo,
|
|
|
1668 utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per essentiam videtur.</p></div></div></div>
|
|
|
1669 <div id="FS_Q3_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A1-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 1. Whether happiness is something uncreated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1670 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God
|
|
|
1671 is happiness itself."
|
|
|
1672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33534] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
1673 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Dicit
|
|
|
1674 enim Boetius, in III de Consol., <i>Deum esse ipsam beatitudinem
|
|
|
1675 necesse est confiteri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1676 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several
|
|
|
1677 supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.
|
|
|
1678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33535] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1679 beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum
|
|
|
1680 ergo non sint plura summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem
|
|
|
1681 quod Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1682 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an
|
|
|
1683 end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same
|
|
|
1684 as God.
|
|
|
1685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33536] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1686 beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter humana voluntas
|
|
|
1687 tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam in finem tendere debet
|
|
|
1688 nisi in Deum; quo solo fruendum est, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo
|
|
|
1689 beatitudo est idem quod Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1690 <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3):
|
|
|
1691 "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.
|
|
|
1692 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33537] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
1693 nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo hominis est aliquid
|
|
|
1694 factum, quia secundum Augustinum, I de Doctr. Christ., <i>illis
|
|
|
1695 rebus fruendum est, quae nos beatos faciunt</i>. Ergo beatitudo non
|
|
|
1696 est aliquid increatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1697 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
1698 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
|
|
|
1699 <a href="#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly
|
|
|
1700 there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser
|
|
|
1701 is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense,
|
|
|
1702 then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will.
|
|
|
1703 But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment
|
|
|
1704 or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause
|
|
|
1705 or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something
|
|
|
1706 created.
|
|
|
1707 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="33538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33538] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1708 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dicitur dupliciter.
|
|
|
1709 Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis
|
|
|
1710 pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut
|
|
|
1711 fruitio eius rei quae desideratur, sicut si dicatur quod possessio
|
|
|
1712 pecuniae est finis avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis
|
|
|
1713 intemperati. Primo ergo modo, ultimus hominis finis est bonum
|
|
|
1714 increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest
|
|
|
1715 voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo, ultimus
|
|
|
1716 finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est
|
|
|
1717 aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem finis
|
|
|
1718 vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum
|
|
|
1719 ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum, si autem
|
|
|
1720 consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est
|
|
|
1721 aliquid creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p7">
|
|
|
1722 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence.
|
|
|
1723 On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by
|
|
|
1724 participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.
|
|
|
1725 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33539] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1726 dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per
|
|
|
1727 adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed
|
|
|
1728 per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem dicit
|
|
|
1729 Boetius, per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem
|
|
|
1730 dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo
|
|
|
1731 dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1732 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.
|
|
|
1733 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33540] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1734 dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum hominis bonum, quia est
|
|
|
1735 adeptio vel fruitio summi boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1736 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.
|
|
|
1737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33541] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1738 dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus finis, per modum quo
|
|
|
1739 adeptio finis dicitur finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A2-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 2. Whether happiness is an operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1740 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (
|
|
|
1741 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv">Rom. 6:22</a>): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being
|
|
|
1742 of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation.
|
|
|
1743 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33542] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1744 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo non sit operatio. Dicit enim
|
|
|
1745 apostolus, Rom. VI, <i>habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem,
|
|
|
1746 finem vero vitam aeternam</i>. Sed vita non est operatio, sed ipsum
|
|
|
1747 esse viventium. Ergo ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo, non est
|
|
|
1748 operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1749 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But
|
|
|
1750 state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
|
|
|
1751 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33543] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1752 Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod <i>beatitudo est status
|
|
|
1753 omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed status non nominat
|
|
|
1754 operationem. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1755 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of
|
|
|
1756 operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness
|
|
|
1757 is not an operation.
|
|
|
1758 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33544] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1759 beatitudo significat aliquid in beato existens, cum sit ultima
|
|
|
1760 perfectio hominis. Sed operatio non significat ut aliquid existens
|
|
|
1761 in operante, sed magis ut ab ipso procedens. Ergo beatitudo non est
|
|
|
1762 operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1763 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
|
|
|
1764 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33545] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1765 beatitudo permanet in beato. Operatio autem non permanet, sed
|
|
|
1766 transit. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1767 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
|
|
|
1768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="33546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33546] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1769 unius hominis est una beatitudo. Operationes autem sunt multae.
|
|
|
1770 Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p7">
|
|
|
1771 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep,
|
|
|
1772 or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
|
|
|
1773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="33547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33547] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1774 beatitudo inest beato absque interruptione. Sed operatio humana
|
|
|
1775 frequenter interrumpitur puta somno, vel aliqua alia occupatione,
|
|
|
1776 vel quiete. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1777 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
|
|
|
1778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33548] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
1779 est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est
|
|
|
1780 operatio secundum virtutem perfectam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1781 <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness
|
|
|
1782 is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
|
|
|
1783 Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore
|
|
|
1784 the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has
|
|
|
1785 a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things,
|
|
|
1786 too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an
|
|
|
1787 operation.
|
|
|
1788 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="33549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33549] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
1789 dicendum quod, secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum
|
|
|
1790 in ipso existens necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit
|
|
|
1791 operatio. Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque
|
|
|
1792 autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine
|
|
|
1793 actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu
|
|
|
1794 hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus
|
|
|
1795 actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a philosopho nominatur, in
|
|
|
1796 II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans,
|
|
|
1797 sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis
|
|
|
1798 quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem,
|
|
|
1799 ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis
|
|
|
1800 operationem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10">
|
|
|
1801 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown
|
|
|
1802 (
|
|
|
1803 <a href="#FS_Q2_A5" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[2] , A[5]</a>) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that
|
|
|
1804 His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is
|
|
|
1805 made actual: thus we speak of active and
|
|
|
1806 contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from
|
|
|
1807 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God."
|
|
|
1808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33550] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1809 dicendum quod vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsum esse
|
|
|
1810 viventis. Et sic beatitudo non est vita, ostensum est enim quod
|
|
|
1811 esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, non est hominis beatitudo;
|
|
|
1812 solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Alio modo dicitur vita
|
|
|
1813 ipsa operatio viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum
|
|
|
1814 reducitur, et sic nominamus vitam activam, vel contemplativam, vel
|
|
|
1815 voluptuosam. Et hoc modo vita aeterna dicitur ultimus finis. Quod
|
|
|
1816 patet per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut
|
|
|
1817 cognoscant te, Deum verum unum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p11">
|
|
|
1818 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and
|
|
|
1819 he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that
|
|
|
1820 the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing
|
|
|
1821 by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of
|
|
|
1822 operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).
|
|
|
1823 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33551] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1824 dicendum quod Boetius, definiendo beatitudinem, consideravit ipsam
|
|
|
1825 communem beatitudinis rationem. Est enim communis ratio
|
|
|
1826 beatitudinis quod sit bonum commune perfectum; et hoc significavit
|
|
|
1827 cum dixit quod <i>est status omnium bonorum aggregatione
|
|
|
1828 perfectus</i>, per quod nihil aliud significatur nisi quod beatus
|
|
|
1829 est in statu boni perfecti. Sed Aristoteles expressit ipsam
|
|
|
1830 essentiam beatitudinis, ostendens per quid homo sit in huiusmodi
|
|
|
1831 statu, quia per operationem quandam. Et ideo in I Ethic. ipse etiam
|
|
|
1832 ostendit quod beatitudo est bonum perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p12">
|
|
|
1833 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to
|
|
|
1834 cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but
|
|
|
1835 rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel,
|
|
|
1836 to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the
|
|
|
1837 agent. And such an operation can be happiness.
|
|
|
1838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33552] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1839 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio. Una
|
|
|
1840 quae procedit ab operante in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et
|
|
|
1841 secare. Et talis operatio non potest esse beatitudo, nam talis
|
|
|
1842 operatio non est actio et perfectio agentis, sed magis patientis,
|
|
|
1843 ut ibidem dicitur. Alia est actio manens in ipso agente, ut
|
|
|
1844 sentire, intelligere et velle, et huiusmodi actio est perfectio et
|
|
|
1845 actus agentis. Et talis operatio potest esse beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13">
|
|
|
1846 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees
|
|
|
1847 of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His
|
|
|
1848 very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect
|
|
|
1849 of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this
|
|
|
1850 operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection
|
|
|
1851 is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently,
|
|
|
1852 is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect
|
|
|
1853 happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10),
|
|
|
1854 says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised
|
|
|
1855 us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (
|
|
|
1856 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>).
|
|
|
1857 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33553] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1858 dicendum quod, cum beatitudo dicat quandam ultimam perfectionem,
|
|
|
1859 secundum quod diversae res beatitudinis capaces ad diversos gradus
|
|
|
1860 perfectionis pertingere possunt, secundum hoc necesse est quod
|
|
|
1861 diversimode beatitudo dicatur. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per
|
|
|
1862 essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur
|
|
|
1863 alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio
|
|
|
1864 secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et
|
|
|
1865 haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem,
|
|
|
1866 secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum
|
|
|
1867 operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec
|
|
|
1868 continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia
|
|
|
1869 operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu
|
|
|
1870 praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest.
|
|
|
1871 Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac
|
|
|
1872 vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem
|
|
|
1873 dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta,
|
|
|
1874 quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII.
|
|
|
1875 Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam, cessat obiectio, quia
|
|
|
1876 una et continua et sempiterna operatione in illo beatitudinis statu
|
|
|
1877 mens hominis Deo coniungetur. Sed in praesenti vita, quantum
|
|
|
1878 deficimus ab unitate et continuitate talis operationis, tantum
|
|
|
1879 deficimus a beatitudinis perfectione. Est tamen aliqua participatio
|
|
|
1880 beatitudinis, et tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis
|
|
|
1881 continua et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa
|
|
|
1882 occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita
|
|
|
1883 contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum, idest circa veritatis
|
|
|
1884 contemplationem. Et si aliquando homo actu non operetur huiusmodi
|
|
|
1885 operationem, tamen quia in promptu habet eam semper operari; et
|
|
|
1886 quia etiam ipsam cessationem, puta somni vel occupationis alicuius
|
|
|
1887 naturalis, ad operationem praedictam ordinat; quasi videtur
|
|
|
1888 operatio continua esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p14"> Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will
|
|
|
1889 be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity
|
|
|
1890 and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness:
|
|
|
1891 and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,
|
|
|
1892 which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the
|
|
|
1893 contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn
|
|
|
1894 to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the
|
|
|
1895 latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident.
|
|
|
1896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="33554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33554] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Et per hoc
|
|
|
1897 patet solutio ad quintum, et ad sextum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A3-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 3. Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1898 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man
|
|
|
1899 than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive:
|
|
|
1900 since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses
|
|
|
1901 also.
|
|
|
1902 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33555] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1903 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat etiam in
|
|
|
1904 operatione sensus. Nulla enim operatio invenitur in homine nobilior
|
|
|
1905 operatione sensitiva, nisi intellectiva. Sed operatio intellectiva
|
|
|
1906 dependet in nobis ab operatione sensitiva, quia non possumus
|
|
|
1907 intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo
|
|
|
1908 beatitudo consistit etiam in operatione sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1909 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But
|
|
|
1910 some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses
|
|
|
1911 is needed for happiness.
|
|
|
1912 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33556] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
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1913 Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod <i>beatitudo est status
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1914 omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed quaedam bona sunt
|
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1915 sensibilia, quae attingimus per sensus operationem. Ergo videtur
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1916 quod operatio sensus requiratur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p4">
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1917 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected
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1918 thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation
|
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1919 is required for happiness.
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1920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33557] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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1921 beatitudo est bonum perfectum, ut probatur in I Ethic., quod non
|
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1922 esset, nisi homo perficeretur per ipsam secundum omnes partes suas.
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1923 Sed per operationes sensitivas quaedam partes animae perficiuntur.
|
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1924 Ergo operatio sensitiva requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p5">
|
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1925 <b>On the contrary,</b> Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore
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1926 happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
|
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1927 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33558] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
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1928 in operatione sensitiva communicant nobiscum bruta animalia. Non
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1929 autem in beatitudine. Ergo beatitudo non consistit in operatione
|
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1930 sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A3-p6">
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1931 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
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1932 sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated
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1933 Good, Which is his last end, as shown above
|
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1934 <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q[2], A[5]),
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1935 man's happiness
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1936 does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
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1937 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A3-p7"> Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect
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1938 of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation
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1939 of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very
|
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1940 happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a
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1941 certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of
|
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1942 the resurrection (SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.
|
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1943 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="33559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33559] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
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1944 dicendum quod ad beatitudinem potest aliquid pertinere tripliciter,
|
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1945 uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo, antecedenter; tertio modo,
|
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1946 consequenter. Essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio
|
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1947 sensus ad beatitudinem. Nam beatitudo hominis consistit
|
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1948 essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est
|
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1949 ultimus finis, ut supra ostensum est, cui homo coniungi non potest
|
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1950 per sensus operationem. Similiter etiam quia, sicut ostensum est,
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1951 in corporalibus bonis beatitudo hominis non consistit, quae tamen
|
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1952 sola per operationem sensus attingimus. Possunt autem operationes
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1953 sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter.
|
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1954 Antecedenter quidem, secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in
|
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1955 praesenti vita haberi potest, nam operatio intellectus praeexigit
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1956 operationem sensus. Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta
|
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1957 beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem, ex
|
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1958 ipsa beatitudine animae, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad
|
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1959 Dioscorum, <i>fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et in sensus
|
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1960 corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur</i>; ut infra
|
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1961 magis patebit, cum de resurrectione agetur. Non autem tunc operatio
|
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1962 qua mens humana Deo coniungetur, a sensu dependebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p8">
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1963 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had
|
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1964 in this life.
|
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1965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33560] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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1966 dicendum quod obiectio illa probat quod operatio sensus requiritur
|
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1967 antecedenter ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita haberi
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1968 potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p9">
|
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|
1969 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source
|
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1970 of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods
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1971 that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
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|
1972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33561] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
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|
1973 dicendum quod beatitudo perfecta, qualem Angeli habent, habet
|
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|
1974 congregationem omnium bonorum per coniunctionem ad universalem
|
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|
1975 fontem totius boni; non quod indigeat singulis particularibus
|
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1976 bonis. Sed in hac beatitudine imperfecta, requiritur congregatio
|
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|
1977 bonorum sufficientium ad perfectissimam operationem huius
|
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1978 vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p10">
|
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|
1979 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in
|
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|
1980 the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection
|
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|
1981 of the higher part.
|
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1982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33562] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
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|
1983 dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in
|
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|
1984 inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori. In beatitudine autem
|
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|
1985 imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris
|
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|
1986 partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A4-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 4. Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2">
|
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|
1987 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness
|
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|
1988 consists in peace; wherefore it is written (
|
|
|
1989 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.3" target="asv">Ps. 147:3</a>): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in
|
|
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1990 the will.
|
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|
1991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33563] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1992 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu
|
|
|
1993 voluntatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod beatitudo
|
|
|
1994 hominis in pace consistit, unde in Psalmo CXLVII, qui posuit fines
|
|
|
1995 tuos pacem. Sed pax ad voluntatem pertinet. Ergo beatitudo hominis
|
|
|
1996 in voluntate consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p3">
|
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|
1997 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation
|
|
|
1998 of the will.
|
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|
1999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33564] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2000 beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo
|
|
|
2001 beatitudo in operatione voluntatis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2002 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of
|
|
|
2003 the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers,
|
|
|
2004 as we shall state further on (
|
|
|
2005 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q3_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
|
|
|
2006 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33565] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2007 primo moventi respondet ultimus finis, sicut ultimus finis totius
|
|
|
2008 exercitus est victoria, quae est finis ducis, qui omnes movet. Sed
|
|
|
2009 primum movens ad operandum est voluntas, quia movet alias vires, ut
|
|
|
2010 infra dicetur. Ergo beatitudo ad voluntatem pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2011 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an
|
|
|
2012 act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares
|
|
|
2013 (
|
|
|
2014 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
|
|
|
2015 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="33566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33566] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2016 si beatitudo est aliqua operatio, oportet quod sit nobilissima
|
|
|
2017 operatio hominis. Sed nobilior operatio est dilectio Dei, quae est
|
|
|
2018 actus voluntatis, quam cognitio, quae est operatio intellectus, ut
|
|
|
2019 patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo videtur quod beatitudo
|
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|
2020 consistat in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2021 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And
|
|
|
2022 a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy,
|
|
|
2023 and such a man already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.
|
|
|
2024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="33567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33567] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2025 Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod <i>beatus est qui habet
|
|
|
2026 omnia quae vult, et nihil vult male</i>. Et post pauca subdit,
|
|
|
2027 <i>propinquat beato qui bene vult quodcumque vult, bona enim beatum
|
|
|
2028 faciunt, quorum bonorum iam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam
|
|
|
2029 voluntatem</i>. Ergo beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7">
|
|
|
2030 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
|
|
|
2031 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A[2],
|
|
|
2032 ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
|
|
|
2033 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33568] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2034 est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut
|
|
|
2035 cognoscant te, Deum verum unum</i>. Vita autem aeterna est ultimus
|
|
|
2036 finis, ut dictum est. Ergo beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei
|
|
|
2037 consistit, quae est actus intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p8">
|
|
|
2038 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that
|
|
|
2039 is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness,
|
|
|
2040 it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said (
|
|
|
2041 <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the
|
|
|
2042 attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when
|
|
|
2043 it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is
|
|
|
2044 not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present;
|
|
|
2045 and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present
|
|
|
2046 to
|
|
|
2047 him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.
|
|
|
2048 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p9"> This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the
|
|
|
2049 covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains
|
|
|
2050 it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible
|
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|
2051 end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to
|
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|
2052 us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.
|
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|
2053 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p10"> So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness
|
|
|
2054 pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy
|
|
|
2055 itself is the consummation of happiness.
|
|
|
2056 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="33569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33569] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2057 dicendum quod ad beatitudinem, sicut supra dictum est, duo
|
|
|
2058 requiruntur, unum quod est essentia beatitudinis; aliud quod est
|
|
|
2059 quasi per se accidens eius, scilicet delectatio ei adiuncta. Dico
|
|
|
2060 ergo quod, quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo,
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|
2061 impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis. Manifestum est
|
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2062 enim ex praemissis quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi.
|
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|
2063 Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis.
|
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|
2064 Voluntas enim fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et
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|
2065 praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur. Manifestum est
|
|
|
2066 autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est
|
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|
2067 motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod
|
|
|
2068 finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit
|
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|
2069 praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid
|
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|
2070 aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens
|
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|
2071 volenti. Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim
|
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|
2072 consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a principio
|
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|
2073 cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando vult eam habere. Sed a
|
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2074 principio quidem est absens ei; consequitur autem ipsam per hoc
|
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|
2075 quod manu ipsam apprehendit, vel aliquo huiusmodi; et tunc iam
|
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|
2076 delectatur in pecunia habita. Sic igitur et circa intelligibilem
|
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2077 finem contingit. Nam a principio volumus consequi finem
|
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|
2078 intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens
|
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|
2079 nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit
|
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2080 in fine iam adepto. Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu
|
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|
2081 intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio
|
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|
2082 beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X
|
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|
2083 Confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate; quia scilicet
|
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|
2084 ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p11">
|
|
|
2085 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent
|
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|
2086 thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent
|
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2087 inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.
|
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|
2088 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33570] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
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|
2089 dicendum quod pax pertinet ad ultimum hominis finem, non quasi
|
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|
2090 essentialiter sit ipsa beatitudo; sed quia antecedenter et
|
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|
2091 consequenter se habet ad ipsam. Antecedenter quidem, inquantum iam
|
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|
2092 sunt remota omnia perturbantia, et impedientia ab ultimo fine.
|
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|
2093 Consequenter vero, inquantum iam homo, adepto ultimo fine, remanet
|
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|
2094 pacatus, suo desiderio quietato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p12">
|
|
|
2095 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore,
|
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|
2096 from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it
|
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2097 as its act.
|
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|
2098 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33571] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
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2099 dicendum quod primum obiectum voluntatis non est actus eius sicut
|
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2100 nec primum obiectum visus est visio, sed visibile. Unde ex hoc ipso
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2101 quod beatitudo pertinet ad voluntatem tanquam primum obiectum eius,
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2102 sequitur quod non pertineat ad ipsam tanquam actus ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p13">
|
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2103 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the
|
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2104 will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
|
|
|
2105 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33572] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2106 dicendum quod finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas,
|
|
|
2107 tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati
|
|
|
2108 debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet
|
|
|
2109 delectatio vel fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p14">
|
|
|
2110 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known,"
|
|
|
2111 as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we
|
|
|
2112 first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.
|
|
|
2113 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="33573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33573] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
2114 dicendum quod dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed
|
|
|
2115 cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur
|
|
|
2116 nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin. Et ideo
|
|
|
2117 intelligibilem finem primo attingimus per actionem intellectus;
|
|
|
2118 sicut et finem sensibilem primo attingimus per actionem sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p15">
|
|
|
2119 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the
|
|
|
2120 act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will
|
|
|
2121 is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement
|
|
|
2122 is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus
|
|
|
2123 "quality."
|
|
|
2124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="33574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33574] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
2125 dicendum quod ille qui habet omnia quae vult, ex hoc est beatus,
|
|
|
2126 quod habet ea quae vult, quod quidem est per aliud quam per actum
|
|
|
2127 voluntatis. Sed nihil male velle requiritur ad beatitudinem sicut
|
|
|
2128 quaedam debita dispositio ad ipsam. Voluntas autem bona ponitur in
|
|
|
2129 numero bonorum quae beatum faciunt, prout est inclinatio quaedam in
|
|
|
2130 ipsa, sicut motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, ut alteratio ad
|
|
|
2131 qualitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A5-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 5. Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p2">
|
|
|
2132 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming
|
|
|
2133 like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative
|
|
|
2134 intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect
|
|
|
2135 rather than of the speculative.
|
|
|
2136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33575] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
2137 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in operatione
|
|
|
2138 intellectus practici. Finis enim ultimus cuiuslibet creaturae
|
|
|
2139 consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed homo magis assimilatur Deo
|
|
|
2140 per intellectum practicum, qui est causa rerum intellectarum, quam
|
|
|
2141 per intellectum speculativum, cuius scientia accipitur a rebus.
|
|
|
2142 Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus
|
|
|
2143 practici quam speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p3">
|
|
|
2144 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
|
|
|
2145 intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect,
|
|
|
2146 but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding.
|
|
|
2147 Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather
|
|
|
2148 than of the speculative.
|
|
|
2149 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33576] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2150 beatitudo est perfectum hominis bonum. Sed intellectus practicus
|
|
|
2151 magis ordinatur ad bonum quam speculativus, qui ordinatur ad verum.
|
|
|
2152 Unde et secundum perfectionem practici intellectus, dicimur boni,
|
|
|
2153 non autem secundum perfectionem speculativi intellectus, sed
|
|
|
2154 secundum eam dicimur scientes vel intelligentes. Ergo beatitudo
|
|
|
2155 hominis magis consistit in actu intellectus practici quam
|
|
|
2156 speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p4">
|
|
|
2157 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas
|
|
|
2158 the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's
|
|
|
2159 happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
|
|
|
2160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33577] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2161 beatitudo est quoddam bonum ipsius hominis. Sed speculativus
|
|
|
2162 intellectus occupatur magis circa ea quae sunt extra hominem,
|
|
|
2163 practicus autem intellectus occupatur circa ea quae sunt ipsius
|
|
|
2164 hominis, scilicet circa operationes et passiones eius. Ergo
|
|
|
2165 beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus
|
|
|
2166 practici quam intellectus speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p5">
|
|
|
2167 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
|
|
|
2168 perfection of our joys."
|
|
|
2169 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33578] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2170 est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod <i>contemplatio
|
|
|
2171 promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio
|
|
|
2172 gaudiorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p6">
|
|
|
2173 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons.
|
|
|
2174 First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is
|
|
|
2175 that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is
|
|
|
2176 the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative
|
|
|
2177 intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And
|
|
|
2178 since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation
|
|
|
2179 is most proper to man and most delightful to him.
|
|
|
2180 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p7"> Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical
|
|
|
2181 intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently
|
|
|
2182 it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.
|
|
|
2183 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p8"> Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above
|
|
|
2184 him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other
|
|
|
2185 animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.
|
|
|
2186 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p9"> Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect
|
|
|
2187 happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human
|
|
|
2188 actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.
|
|
|
2189 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="33579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33579] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2190 dicendum quod beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi
|
|
|
2191 intellectus quam practici. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex
|
|
|
2192 hoc quod, si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit
|
|
|
2193 optima operatio hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quae est
|
|
|
2194 optimae potentiae respectu optimi obiecti. Optima autem potentia
|
|
|
2195 est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod
|
|
|
2196 quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi. Unde
|
|
|
2197 in tali operatione, scilicet in contemplatione divinorum, maxime
|
|
|
2198 consistit beatitudo. <i>Et quia unusquisque videtur esse id quod
|
|
|
2199 est optimum in eo</i>, ut dicitur in IX et X Ethic., ideo talis
|
|
|
2200 operatio est maxime propria homini, et maxime delectabilis. Secundo
|
|
|
2201 apparet idem ex hoc quod contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter
|
|
|
2202 seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter
|
|
|
2203 seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad
|
|
|
2204 aliquem finem. Unde manifestum est quod ultimus finis non potest
|
|
|
2205 consistere in vita activa, quae pertinet ad intellectum practicum.
|
|
|
2206 Tertio idem apparet ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo
|
|
|
2207 communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus
|
|
|
2208 per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam
|
|
|
2209 activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant,
|
|
|
2210 licet imperfectae. Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae
|
|
|
2211 expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione.
|
|
|
2212 Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem
|
|
|
2213 et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in
|
|
|
2214 operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones
|
|
|
2215 humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p10">
|
|
|
2216 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in
|
|
|
2217 relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union
|
|
|
2218 and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known,
|
|
|
2219 which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative
|
|
|
2220 knowledge.
|
|
|
2221 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33580] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
2222 dicendum quod similitudo praedicta intellectus practici ad Deum,
|
|
|
2223 est secundum proportionalitatem; quia scilicet se habet ad suum
|
|
|
2224 cognitum, sicut Deus ad suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus
|
|
|
2225 speculativi ad Deum, est secundum unionem vel informationem; quae
|
|
|
2226 est multo maior assimilatio. Et tamen dici potest quod, respectu
|
|
|
2227 principalis cogniti, quod est sua essentia, non habet Deus
|
|
|
2228 practicam cognitionem, sed speculativam tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p11">
|
|
|
2229 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz.
|
|
|
2230 the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the
|
|
|
2231 practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
|
|
|
2232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33581] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2233 dicendum quod intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est
|
|
|
2234 extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso,
|
|
|
2235 scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit
|
|
|
2236 perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus, quod quidem
|
|
|
2237 intellectus practicus non habet sed ad illud ordinat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p12">
|
|
|
2238 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and
|
|
|
2239 passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by
|
|
|
2240 an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect
|
|
|
2241 rather than of the practical intellect.
|
|
|
2242 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33582] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2243 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsemet homo esset ultimus
|
|
|
2244 finis suus, tunc enim consideratio et ordinatio actuum et passionum
|
|
|
2245 eius esset eius beatitudo. Sed quia ultimus hominis finis est
|
|
|
2246 aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem
|
|
|
2247 intellectus speculativi attingimus; ideo magis beatitudo hominis in
|
|
|
2248 operatione intellectus speculativi consistit, quam in operatione
|
|
|
2249 intellectus practici.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A6-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 6. Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p2">
|
|
|
2250 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
|
|
|
2251 i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than
|
|
|
2252 three speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative
|
|
|
2253 sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
|
|
|
2254 sciences.
|
|
|
2255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33583] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
|
|
|
2256 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in
|
|
|
2257 consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Philosophus enim dicit,
|
|
|
2258 in libro Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam
|
|
|
2259 virtutem</i>. Et distinguens virtutes, non ponit speculativas nisi
|
|
|
2260 tres, scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum; quae omnes pertinent ad
|
|
|
2261 considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo ultima hominis
|
|
|
2262 beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
|
|
|
2263 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p3">
|
|
|
2264 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
|
|
|
2265 sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated
|
|
|
2266 that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
|
|
|
2267 sciences.
|
|
|
2268 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33584] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2269 illud videtur esse ultima hominis beatitudo, quod naturaliter
|
|
|
2270 desideratur ab omnibus propter seipsum. Sed huiusmodi est
|
|
|
2271 consideratio speculativarum scientiarum, quia, ut dicitur in I
|
|
|
2272 Metaphys., <i>omnes homines natura scire desiderant</i>; et post
|
|
|
2273 pauca subditur quod speculativae scientiae propter seipsas
|
|
|
2274 quaeruntur. Ergo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
|
|
|
2275 consistit beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p4">
|
|
|
2276 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to
|
|
|
2277 act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the
|
|
|
2278 consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
|
|
|
2279 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33585] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2280 beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem
|
|
|
2281 perficitur secundum quod reducitur de potentia in actum.
|
|
|
2282 Intellectus autem humanus reducitur in actum per considerationem
|
|
|
2283 scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo videtur quod in huiusmodi
|
|
|
2284 consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5">
|
|
|
2285 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2286 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv">Jer. 9:23</a>): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final
|
|
|
2287 happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.
|
|
|
2288 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33586] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2289 est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, <i>non glorietur sapiens in sapientia
|
|
|
2290 sua</i>; et loquitur de sapientia speculativarum scientiarum. Non
|
|
|
2291 ergo consistit in harum consideratione ultima hominis
|
|
|
2292 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A6-p6">
|
|
|
2293 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are
|
|
|
2294 to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto,
|
|
|
2295 but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to
|
|
|
2296 be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed
|
|
|
2297 of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
|
|
|
2298 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A6-p7"> Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we
|
|
|
2299 must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science:
|
|
|
2300 since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received
|
|
|
2301 through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at
|
|
|
2302 the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther
|
|
|
2303 than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge
|
|
|
2304 of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.
|
|
|
2305 Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not
|
|
|
2306 perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human
|
|
|
2307 intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which
|
|
|
2308 is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But
|
|
|
2309 it has been shown (
|
|
|
2310 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q3_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[88], A[2]</a>), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of
|
|
|
2311 separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
|
|
|
2312 consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances,
|
|
|
2313 so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.
|
|
|
2314 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="33587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33587] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2315 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis
|
|
|
2316 beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem
|
|
|
2317 intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram
|
|
|
2318 beatitudinis rationem, beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non
|
|
|
2319 attingit, sed participat quandam particularem beatitudinis
|
|
|
2320 similitudinem. Sicut perfecta prudentia invenitur in homine, apud
|
|
|
2321 quem est ratio rerum agibilium, imperfecta autem prudentia est in
|
|
|
2322 quibusdam animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares
|
|
|
2323 instinctus ad quaedam opera similia operibus prudentiae. Perfecta
|
|
|
2324 igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
|
|
|
2325 essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cuius evidentiam,
|
|
|
2326 considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se
|
|
|
2327 extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in
|
|
|
2328 principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima
|
|
|
2329 autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta;
|
|
|
2330 ut patet per philosophum in principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster.
|
|
|
2331 Unde tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra
|
|
|
2332 extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In cognitione
|
|
|
2333 autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo,
|
|
|
2334 quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab
|
|
|
2335 aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua
|
|
|
2336 participatio superioris. Manifestum est autem quod forma lapidis,
|
|
|
2337 vel cuiuslibet rei sensibilis, est inferior homine. Unde per formam
|
|
|
2338 lapidis non perficitur intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed
|
|
|
2339 inquantum in ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est
|
|
|
2340 supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel
|
|
|
2341 aliquid huiusmodi. Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad id
|
|
|
2342 quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per
|
|
|
2343 cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum.
|
|
|
2344 Ostensum est autem quod per sensibilia non potest deveniri in
|
|
|
2345 cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quae sunt supra intellectum
|
|
|
2346 humanum. Unde relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit
|
|
|
2347 esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in
|
|
|
2348 formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum
|
|
|
2349 substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est
|
|
|
2350 quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p8">
|
|
|
2351 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2],
|
|
|
2352 ad 4).
|
|
|
2353 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33588] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
2354 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur in libro Ethicorum de felicitate
|
|
|
2355 imperfecta, qualiter in hac vita haberi potest, ut supra dictum
|
|
|
2356 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p9">
|
|
|
2357 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.
|
|
|
2358 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33589] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2359 dicendum quod naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo,
|
|
|
2360 sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p10">
|
|
|
2361 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect
|
|
|
2362 act.
|
|
|
2363 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33590] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2364 dicendum quod per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum
|
|
|
2365 reducitur intellectus noster aliquo modo in actum, non autem in
|
|
|
2366 ultimum et completum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A7-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 7. Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p2">
|
|
|
2367 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in
|
|
|
2368 a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of
|
|
|
2369 angels"; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore
|
|
|
2370 it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels.
|
|
|
2371 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33591] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
|
|
|
2372 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in
|
|
|
2373 cognitione substantiarum separatarum, idest Angelorum. Dicit enim
|
|
|
2374 Gregorius, in quadam homilia, <i>nihil prodest interesse festis
|
|
|
2375 hominum, si non contingat interesse festis Angelorum</i>; per quod
|
|
|
2376 finalem beatitudinem designat. Sed festis Angelorum interesse
|
|
|
2377 possumus per eorum contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod in
|
|
|
2378 contemplatione Angelorum ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p3">
|
|
|
2379 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
|
|
|
2380 figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened,
|
|
|
2381 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
|
|
|
2382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33592] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2383 ultima perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est ut coniungatur suo
|
|
|
2384 principio, unde et circulus dicitur esse figura perfecta, quia
|
|
|
2385 habet idem principium et finem. Sed principium cognitionis humanae
|
|
|
2386 est ab ipsis Angelis, per quos homines illuminantur, ut dicit
|
|
|
2387 Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo perfectio humani intellectus
|
|
|
2388 est in contemplatione Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p4">
|
|
|
2389 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to
|
|
|
2390 the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection
|
|
|
2391 of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation.
|
|
|
2392 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33593] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2393 unaquaeque natura perfecta est, quando coniungitur superiori
|
|
|
2394 naturae, sicut ultima perfectio corporis est ut coniungatur naturae
|
|
|
2395 spirituali. Sed supra intellectum humanum, ordine naturae, sunt
|
|
|
2396 Angeli. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani est ut coniungatur
|
|
|
2397 per contemplationem ipsis Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5">
|
|
|
2398 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2399 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.24" target="asv">Jer. 9:24</a>): "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's final glory or happiness
|
|
|
2400 consists only in the knowledge of God.
|
|
|
2401 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33594] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2402 est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, <i>in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur,
|
|
|
2403 scire et nosse me</i>. Ergo ultima hominis gloria, vel beatitudo,
|
|
|
2404 non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6">
|
|
|
2405 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
|
|
|
2406 <a href="#FS_Q3_A6" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so
|
|
|
2407 by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of
|
|
|
2408 that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has
|
|
|
2409 participated truth, does not perfect the
|
|
|
2410 intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1);
|
|
|
2411 whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone
|
|
|
2412 is His Being His Essence, as shown in the
|
|
|
2413 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain
|
|
|
2414 imperfect happiness in the
|
|
|
2415 contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.
|
|
|
2416 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="33595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33595] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2417 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta hominis beatitudo non
|
|
|
2418 consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius
|
|
|
2419 participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale. Manifestum
|
|
|
2420 est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius
|
|
|
2421 potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius
|
|
|
2422 potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid
|
|
|
2423 ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit
|
|
|
2424 intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem eadem sit
|
|
|
2425 dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, ut dicitur in II
|
|
|
2426 Metaphys.; quaecumque sunt entia per participationem, sunt vera per
|
|
|
2427 participationem. Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius
|
|
|
2428 Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde
|
|
|
2429 relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius
|
|
|
2430 contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem
|
|
|
2431 imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione Angelorum; et
|
|
|
2432 etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum
|
|
|
2433 speculativarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p7">
|
|
|
2434 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself.
|
|
|
2435 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33596] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
2436 dicendum quod festis Angelorum intererimus non solum contemplantes
|
|
|
2437 Angelos, sed simul cum ipsis, Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8">
|
|
|
2438 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should
|
|
|
2439 consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as
|
|
|
2440 stated in
|
|
|
2441 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[3]</a>. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation
|
|
|
2442 of the soul and of its
|
|
|
2443 enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the
|
|
|
2444 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[2]</a>, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
|
|
|
2445 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33597] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2446 dicendum quod, secundum illos qui ponunt animas humanas esse ab
|
|
|
2447 Angelis creatas, satis conveniens videtur quod beatitudo hominis
|
|
|
2448 sit in contemplatione Angelorum, quasi in coniunctione ad suum
|
|
|
2449 principium. Sed hoc est erroneum, ut in primo dictum est. Unde
|
|
|
2450 ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per coniunctionem ad Deum,
|
|
|
2451 qui est primum principium et creationis animae et illuminationis
|
|
|
2452 eius. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in primo habitum
|
|
|
2453 est. Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem
|
|
|
2454 perveniat, non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p9">
|
|
|
2455 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's
|
|
|
2456 final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained
|
|
|
2457 by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object.
|
|
|
2458 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33598] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2459 dicendum quod attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit
|
|
|
2460 dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum potentiae participantis, et
|
|
|
2461 sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad
|
|
|
2462 contemplandum sicut Angeli contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum
|
|
|
2463 attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet
|
|
|
2464 potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui
|
|
|
2465 obiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p2">
|
|
|
2466 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol.
|
|
|
2467 i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which
|
|
|
2468 is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does
|
|
|
2469 not consist in God being seen in His Essence.
|
|
|
2470 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33599] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
|
|
|
2471 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione
|
|
|
2472 ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. Myst.
|
|
|
2473 Theol., quod per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo
|
|
|
2474 coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam,
|
|
|
2475 non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu
|
|
|
2476 beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam
|
|
|
2477 videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p3">
|
|
|
2478 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
|
|
|
2479 Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something
|
|
|
2480 less.
|
|
|
2481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33600] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2482 altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio
|
|
|
2483 divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima
|
|
|
2484 perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra
|
|
|
2485 subsistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4">
|
|
|
2486 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2487 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."
|
|
|
2488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33601] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2489 est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus,
|
|
|
2490 et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A8-p5">
|
|
|
2491 <b>I answer that,</b> Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
|
|
|
2492 must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly,
|
|
|
2493 that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing
|
|
|
2494 is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the
|
|
|
2495 intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of
|
|
|
2496 some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect
|
|
|
2497 cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause
|
|
|
2498 is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire
|
|
|
2499 to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning
|
|
|
2500 of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause,
|
|
|
2501 and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease
|
|
|
2502 until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
|
|
|
2503 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A8-p6"> If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the
|
|
|
2504 perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek
|
|
|
2505 the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very
|
|
|
2506 Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
|
|
|
2507 which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (
|
|
|
2508 <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,7; Q[2], A[8]).
|
|
|
2509 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="33602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33602] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2510 dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in
|
|
|
2511 visione divinae essentiae. Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda
|
|
|
2512 sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu
|
|
|
2513 restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est, quod
|
|
|
2514 uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui
|
|
|
2515 obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest
|
|
|
2516 essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit
|
|
|
2517 perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei.
|
|
|
2518 Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus,
|
|
|
2519 per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur
|
|
|
2520 de causa quid est; non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam
|
|
|
2521 simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an
|
|
|
2522 sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit
|
|
|
2523 effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid
|
|
|
2524 est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem,
|
|
|
2525 ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens
|
|
|
2526 eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua,
|
|
|
2527 quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista
|
|
|
2528 inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam
|
|
|
2529 causae. Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam
|
|
|
2530 alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum
|
|
|
2531 perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet
|
|
|
2532 ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est
|
|
|
2533 perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod
|
|
|
2534 intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic
|
|
|
2535 perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in
|
|
|
2536 quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p7">
|
|
|
2537 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.
|
|
|
2538 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33603] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
2539 dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in
|
|
|
2540 via, tendentes ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8">
|
|
|
2541 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
2542 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the
|
|
|
2543 end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (
|
|
|
2544 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower,
|
|
|
2545 according to their respective
|
|
|
2546 habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
|
|
|
2547 that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
|
|
|
2548 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33604] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2549 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi
|
|
|
2550 dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam quae desideratur, et hoc
|
|
|
2551 modo idem est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, immo omnium
|
|
|
2552 rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem
|
|
|
2553 huius rei, et sic diversus est finis superioris et inferioris
|
|
|
2554 naturae, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur
|
|
|
2555 altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis,
|
|
|
2556 quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.</p></div></div></div></div>
|
|
|
2557 <div id="FS_Q4" class="div3">
|
|
|
2558 <h3 id="FS_Q4-p0.1">Q. 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2559 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
|
|
|
2560 <p id="FS_Q4-p2"> We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q4-p3"><a href="#FS_Q4_A1"> (1) Whether delight is required for happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p4"><a href="#FS_Q4_A2"> (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p5"><a href="#FS_Q4_A3"> (3) Whether comprehension is required?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p6"><a href="#FS_Q4_A4"> (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p7"><a href="#FS_Q4_A5"> (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p8"><a href="#FS_Q4_A6"> (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p9"><a href="#FS_Q4_A7"> (7) Whether any external goods are necessary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p10"><a href="#FS_Q4_A8"> (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?</a></p>
|
|
|
2561 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 pr."><a name="33605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33605]
|
|
|
2562 Iª-IIae q. 4 pr.</span></a> Deinde, considerandum est de his
|
|
|
2563 quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo.
|
|
|
2564 Primo, utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem. Secundo, quid
|
|
|
2565 sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum delectatio vel visio.
|
|
|
2566 Tertio, utrum requiratur comprehensio. Quarto, utrum requiratur
|
|
|
2567 rectitudo voluntatis. Quinto, utrum ad beatitudinem hominis
|
|
|
2568 requiratur corpus. Sexto, utrum perfectio corporis. Septimo, utrum
|
|
|
2569 aliqua exteriora bona. Octavo, utrum requiratur societas
|
|
|
2570 amicorum.</p></div></div></div>
|
|
|
2571 <div id="FS_Q4_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A1-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 1. Whether delight is required for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2572 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward
|
|
|
2573 of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing
|
|
|
2574 besides vision is required for happiness.
|
|
|
2575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33606] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
2576 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non requiratur ad
|
|
|
2577 beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod <i>visio
|
|
|
2578 est tota merces fidei</i>. Sed id quod est praemium vel merces
|
|
|
2579 virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo
|
|
|
2580 nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2581 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which
|
|
|
2582 needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (
|
|
|
2583 <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q4_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.
|
|
|
2584 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33607] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2585 beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut philosophus dicit
|
|
|
2586 I Ethic. Quod autem eget aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens.
|
|
|
2587 Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut
|
|
|
2588 ostensum est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur
|
|
|
2589 delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2590 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of
|
|
|
2591 the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
|
|
|
2592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33608] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2593 operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non
|
|
|
2594 impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed delectatio impedit actionem
|
|
|
2595 intellectus corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in
|
|
|
2596 VI Ethic. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2597 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth."
|
|
|
2598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33609] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2599 est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod <i>beatitudo est
|
|
|
2600 gaudium de veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2601 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary
|
|
|
2602 for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
|
|
|
2603 without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat
|
|
|
2604 is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is
|
|
|
2605 caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of
|
|
|
2606 the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
|
|
|
2607 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="33610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33610] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2608 dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo,
|
|
|
2609 sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina
|
|
|
2610 requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut
|
|
|
2611 anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans
|
|
|
2612 extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto
|
|
|
2613 modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor
|
|
|
2614 requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad
|
|
|
2615 beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus
|
|
|
2616 requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam
|
|
|
2617 adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione
|
|
|
2618 concomitante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2619 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight.
|
|
|
2620 Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.
|
|
|
2621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33611] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
2622 dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas
|
|
|
2623 merentis requiescit, quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione
|
|
|
2624 mercedis redditae delectatio includitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2625 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
|
|
|
2626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33612] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2627 dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille
|
|
|
2628 qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2629 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in
|
|
|
2630 Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is
|
|
|
2631 extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we
|
|
|
2632 are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to
|
|
|
2633 one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is
|
|
|
2634 contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.
|
|
|
2635 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33613] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2636 dicendum quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus, non
|
|
|
2637 impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur, in X Ethic., ea
|
|
|
2638 enim quae delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius
|
|
|
2639 operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quandoque
|
|
|
2640 quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea
|
|
|
2641 in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et dum uni vehementer
|
|
|
2642 intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur. Quandoque
|
|
|
2643 autem etiam ex contrarietate, sicut delectatio sensus contraria
|
|
|
2644 rationi, impedit aestimationem prudentiae magis quam aestimationem
|
|
|
2645 speculativi intellectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2646 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4).
|
|
|
2647 But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
|
|
|
2648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33614] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2649 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in
|
|
|
2650 beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic.,
|
|
|
2651 est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili.
|
|
|
2652 Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est
|
|
|
2653 visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2654 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the
|
|
|
2655 delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation
|
|
|
2656 of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks
|
|
|
2657 before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.
|
|
|
2658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33615] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2659 illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est potius. Sed
|
|
|
2660 operationes appetuntur propter delectationem ipsarum, unde et
|
|
|
2661 natura operationibus necessariis ad conservationem individui et
|
|
|
2662 speciei, delectationem apposuit, ut huiusmodi operationes ab
|
|
|
2663 animalibus non negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in
|
|
|
2664 beatitudine quam operatio intellectus, quae est visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2665 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith,
|
|
|
2666 as the Apostle says (
|
|
|
2667 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.
|
|
|
2668 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33616] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2669 visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive fruitio, caritati.
|
|
|
2670 Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit apostolus I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo
|
|
|
2671 delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2672 <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
|
|
|
2673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33617] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
2674 causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo
|
|
|
2675 visio est potior quam delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2676 <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully,
|
|
|
2677 the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of
|
|
|
2678 the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes.
|
|
|
2679 If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness
|
|
|
2680 of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end,
|
|
|
2681 which has been disproved above (
|
|
|
2682 <a href="#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2;
|
|
|
2683 <a href="#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[3], A[4]</a>): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation
|
|
|
2684 in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
|
|
|
2685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="33618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33618] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2686 dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et
|
|
|
2687 eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex
|
|
|
2688 necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit
|
|
|
2689 potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam
|
|
|
2690 quietatione voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur,
|
|
|
2691 non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo
|
|
|
2692 voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis
|
|
|
2693 procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter
|
|
|
2694 quietationem, sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est
|
|
|
2695 contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione,
|
|
|
2696 quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius
|
|
|
2697 bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio
|
|
|
2698 voluntatis in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2699 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth.
|
|
|
2700 Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own
|
|
|
2701 species.
|
|
|
2702 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33619] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
2703 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, <i>delectatio
|
|
|
2704 perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem</i>, qui est ad
|
|
|
2705 iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio
|
|
|
2706 concomitans visionem; non sicut perfectio faciens visionem esse in
|
|
|
2707 sua specie perfectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2708 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And
|
|
|
2709 consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But
|
|
|
2710 the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed
|
|
|
2711 to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
|
|
|
2712 Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things
|
|
|
2713 not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.
|
|
|
2714 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33620] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2715 dicendum quod apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem
|
|
|
2716 rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est
|
|
|
2717 delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in
|
|
|
2718 animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed
|
|
|
2719 intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius
|
|
|
2720 consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum
|
|
|
2721 quam delectationem. Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est
|
|
|
2722 institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non
|
|
|
2723 est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem
|
|
|
2724 sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus
|
|
|
2725 intellectivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2726 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good
|
|
|
2727 gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made
|
|
|
2728 present to charity.
|
|
|
2729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33621] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2730 dicendum quod caritas non quaerit bonum dilectum propter
|
|
|
2731 delectationem, sed hoc est ei consequens, ut delectetur in bono
|
|
|
2732 adepto quod amat. Et sic delectatio non respondet ei ut finis, sed
|
|
|
2733 magis visio, per quam primo finis fit ei praesens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A3-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 3. Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2734 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm.
|
|
|
2735 xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is
|
|
|
2736 without comprehension.
|
|
|
2737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33622] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2738 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur
|
|
|
2739 comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Paulinam de videndo Deum,
|
|
|
2740 <i>attingere mente Deum magna est beatitudo, comprehendere autem
|
|
|
2741 est impossibile</i>. Ergo sine comprehensione est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2742 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
|
|
|
2743 and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will
|
|
|
2744 by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
|
|
|
2745 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33623] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2746 beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum intellectivam partem, in
|
|
|
2747 qua non sunt aliae potentiae quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in
|
|
|
2748 primo dictum est. Sed intellectus sufficienter perficitur per
|
|
|
2749 visionem Dei, voluntas autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non
|
|
|
2750 requiritur comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2751 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
|
|
|
2752 objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
|
|
|
2753 comprehension as a third.
|
|
|
2754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33624] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2755 beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes autem determinantur
|
|
|
2756 secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum,
|
|
|
2757 verum correspondet visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi.
|
|
|
2758 Ergo non requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2759 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
2760 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:24</a>): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (
|
|
|
2761 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.4.7" target="asv">2 Tim. 4:7,8</a>): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a
|
|
|
2762 crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2763 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33625] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2764 est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, <i>sic currite ut
|
|
|
2765 comprehendatis</i>. Sed spiritualis cursus terminatur ad
|
|
|
2766 beatitudinem, unde ipse dicit, II ad Tim. ult., <i>bonum certamen
|
|
|
2767 certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo reposita est
|
|
|
2768 mihi corona iustitiae</i>. Ergo comprehensio requiritur ad
|
|
|
2769 beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2770 <b>I answer that,</b> Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the
|
|
|
2771 way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly
|
|
|
2772 through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect:
|
|
|
2773 through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly,
|
|
|
2774 by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is
|
|
|
2775 present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it:
|
|
|
2776 and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the
|
|
|
2777 attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and
|
|
|
2778 this
|
|
|
2779 relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect
|
|
|
2780 knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight
|
|
|
2781 in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness;
|
|
|
2782 to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end;
|
|
|
2783 and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.
|
|
|
2784 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="33626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33626] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2785 dicendum quod, cum beatitudo consistat in consecutione ultimi
|
|
|
2786 finis, ea quae requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex
|
|
|
2787 ipso ordine hominis ad finem. Ad finem autem intelligibilem
|
|
|
2788 ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per
|
|
|
2789 voluntatem. Per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu
|
|
|
2790 praeexistit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem,
|
|
|
2791 primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in
|
|
|
2792 aliquid, secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum,
|
|
|
2793 quae quidem potest esse triplex. Quandoque enim amatum est praesens
|
|
|
2794 amanti, et tunc iam non quaeritur. Quandoque autem non est
|
|
|
2795 praesens, sed impossibile est ipsum adipisci, et tunc etiam non
|
|
|
2796 quaeritur. Quandoque autem possibile est ipsum adipisci, sed est
|
|
|
2797 elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis, ita ut statim haberi non
|
|
|
2798 possit, et haec est habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quae sola
|
|
|
2799 habitudo facit finis inquisitionem. Et istis tribus respondent
|
|
|
2800 aliqua in ipsa beatitudine. Nam perfecta cognitio finis respondet
|
|
|
2801 imperfectae; praesentia vero ipsius finis respondet habitudini
|
|
|
2802 spei; sed delectatio in fine iam praesenti consequitur dilectionem,
|
|
|
2803 ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria
|
|
|
2804 concurrere, scilicet visionem, quae est cognitio perfecta
|
|
|
2805 intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae importat praesentiam
|
|
|
2806 finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quae importat quietationem
|
|
|
2807 rei amantis in amato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p7">
|
|
|
2808 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
|
|
|
2809 the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means
|
|
|
2810 nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend
|
|
|
2811 [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense
|
|
|
2812 comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2813 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33627] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
2814 dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, inclusio
|
|
|
2815 comprehensi in comprehendente, et sic omne quod comprehenditur a
|
|
|
2816 finito, est finitum. Unde hoc modo Deus non potest comprehendi ab
|
|
|
2817 aliquo intellectu creato. Alio modo comprehensio nihil aliud
|
|
|
2818 nominat quam tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae,
|
|
|
2819 sicut aliquis consequens aliquem, dicitur eum comprehendere quando
|
|
|
2820 tenet eum. Et hoc modo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2821 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while
|
|
|
2822 not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
|
|
|
2823 therein.
|
|
|
2824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33628] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2825 dicendum quod, sicut ad voluntatem pertinet spes et amor, quia
|
|
|
2826 eiusdem est amare aliquid et tendere in illud non habitum; ita
|
|
|
2827 etiam ad voluntatem pertinet et comprehensio et delectatio, quia
|
|
|
2828 eiusdem est habere aliquid et quiescere in illo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2829 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision
|
|
|
2830 itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension.
|
|
|
2831 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33629] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2832 dicendum quod comprehensio non est aliqua operatio praeter
|
|
|
2833 visionem, sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem iam habitum. Unde etiam
|
|
|
2834 ipsa visio, vel res visa secundum quod praesentialiter adest, est
|
|
|
2835 obiectum comprehensionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A4-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 4. Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2836 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation
|
|
|
2837 of the intellect, as stated above (
|
|
|
2838 <a href="#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q4_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation
|
|
|
2839 of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none
|
|
|
2840 but the clean of
|
|
|
2841 heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude
|
|
|
2842 of the will is not necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
2843 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33630] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
2844 sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectitudo voluntatis non requiratur ad
|
|
|
2845 beatitudinem. Beatitudo enim essentialiter consistit in operatione
|
|
|
2846 intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ad perfectam intellectus
|
|
|
2847 operationem non requiritur rectitudo voluntatis, per quam homines
|
|
|
2848 mundi dicuntur, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Retract., <i>non
|
|
|
2849 approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus qui non nisi mundos verum scire
|
|
|
2850 voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa
|
|
|
2851 scire vera</i>. Ergo rectitudo voluntatis non requiritur ad
|
|
|
2852 beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2853 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the
|
|
|
2854 will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will.
|
|
|
2855 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33631] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2856 prius non dependet a posteriori. Sed operatio intellectus est prior
|
|
|
2857 quam operatio voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo, quae est perfecta
|
|
|
2858 operatio intellectus, non dependet a rectitudine voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2859 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,
|
|
|
2860 after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore,
|
|
|
2861 Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
|
|
|
2862 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33632] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2863 quod ordinatur ad aliquid tanquam ad finem, non est necessarium
|
|
|
2864 adepto iam fine, sicut navis postquam pervenitur ad portum. Sed
|
|
|
2865 rectitudo voluntatis, quae est per virtutem, ordinatur ad
|
|
|
2866 beatitudinem tanquam ad finem. Ergo, adepta beatitudine, non est
|
|
|
2867 necessaria rectitudo voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2868 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2869 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and (
|
|
|
2870 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."
|
|
|
2871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33633] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2872 est quod dicitur Matth. V, <i>beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum
|
|
|
2873 videbunt</i>. Et Heb. XII, <i>pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et
|
|
|
2874 sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2875 <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
|
|
|
2876 will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared
|
|
|
2877 to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except
|
|
|
2878 it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without
|
|
|
2879 rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (
|
|
|
2880 <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q4_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of
|
|
|
2881 him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him
|
|
|
2882 who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this
|
|
|
2883 is precisely what makes the will
|
|
|
2884 right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.
|
|
|
2885 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 co."><a name="33634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33634] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
2886 dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et
|
|
|
2887 antecedenter et concomitanter. Antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo
|
|
|
2888 voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum. Finis autem
|
|
|
2889 comparatur ad id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad materiam.
|
|
|
2890 Unde sicut materia non potest consequi formam, nisi sit debito modo
|
|
|
2891 disposita ad ipsam, ita nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit debito
|
|
|
2892 modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad beatitudinem
|
|
|
2893 pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis. Concomitanter
|
|
|
2894 autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo ultima consistit in
|
|
|
2895 visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et ita
|
|
|
2896 voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat,
|
|
|
2897 sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex
|
|
|
2898 necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam
|
|
|
2899 novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde
|
|
|
2900 manifestum est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta
|
|
|
2901 voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p7a"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b><!-- By HST,
|
|
|
2902 missing in original-->
|
|
|
2903 What's said by Augustine concerns cognition of a truth which is not
|
|
|
2904 the very essence of happiness.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33635] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
2905 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de cognitione veri quod non est
|
|
|
2906 ipsa essentia bonitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p7">
|
|
|
2907 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the
|
|
|
2908 intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of
|
|
|
2909 the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target.
|
|
|
2910 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33636] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
2911 dicendum quod omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu
|
|
|
2912 intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis
|
|
|
2913 actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum
|
|
|
2914 intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis
|
|
|
2915 praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad
|
|
|
2916 percussionem signi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p8">
|
|
|
2917 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection,
|
|
|
2918 such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order
|
|
|
2919 to the end is necessary.
|
|
|
2920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33637] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
2921 dicendum quod non omne quod ordinatur ad finem, cessat adveniente
|
|
|
2922 fine, sed id tantum quod se habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut
|
|
|
2923 motus. Unde instrumenta motus non sunt necessaria postquam
|
|
|
2924 pervenitur ad finem, sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A5-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 5. Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p2">
|
|
|
2925 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection
|
|
|
2926 of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of
|
|
|
2927 nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore
|
|
|
2928 the soul cannot be happy without the body.
|
|
|
2929 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33638] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
2930 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur corpus.
|
|
|
2931 Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae praesupponit perfectionem
|
|
|
2932 naturae. Sed beatitudo est perfectio virtutis et gratiae. Anima
|
|
|
2933 autem sine corpore non habet perfectionem naturae, cum sit pars
|
|
|
2934 naturaliter humanae naturae, omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo
|
|
|
2935 toto separata. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p3">
|
|
|
2936 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (
|
|
|
2937 <a href="#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q4_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[2]</a>,5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since,
|
|
|
2938 therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate
|
|
|
2939 from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.
|
|
|
2940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33639] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2941 beatitudo est operatio quaedam perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed
|
|
|
2942 operatio perfecta sequitur esse perfectum, quia nihil operatur nisi
|
|
|
2943 secundum quod est ens in actu. Cum ergo anima non habeat esse
|
|
|
2944 perfectum quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec aliqua pars
|
|
|
2945 quando separata est a toto; videtur quod anima sine corpore non
|
|
|
2946 possit esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p4">
|
|
|
2947 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in
|
|
|
2948 the soul separated from the body.
|
|
|
2949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33640] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2950 beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima sine corpore non est
|
|
|
2951 homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest esse in anima sine corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p5">
|
|
|
2952 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is
|
|
|
2953 "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the
|
|
|
2954 soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all
|
|
|
2955 its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the
|
|
|
2956 soul cannot be happy without the body.
|
|
|
2957 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="33641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33641] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2958 secundum philosophum, in VII Ethic., felicitatis operatio, in qua
|
|
|
2959 consistit beatitudo, est non impedita. Sed operatio animae
|
|
|
2960 separatae est impedita, quia, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad
|
|
|
2961 Litt., <i>inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi,
|
|
|
2962 quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in
|
|
|
2963 illud summum caelum</i>, idest in visionem essentiae divinae. Ergo
|
|
|
2964 anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p6">
|
|
|
2965 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires
|
|
|
2966 to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the
|
|
|
2967 body.
|
|
|
2968 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="33642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33642] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2969 beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat desiderium. Sed hoc non
|
|
|
2970 convenit animae separatae, quia adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut
|
|
|
2971 Augustinus dicit. Ergo anima separata a corpore non est beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p7">
|
|
|
2972 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine
|
|
|
2973 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
|
|
|
2974 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="33643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33643] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
2975 homo in beatitudine est Angelis aequalis. Sed anima sine corpore
|
|
|
2976 non aequatur Angelis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo non est beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8">
|
|
|
2977 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2978 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.13" target="asv">Apoc. 14:13</a>): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord."
|
|
|
2979 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33644] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
2980 est quod dicitur Apoc. XIV, <i>beati mortui qui in domino
|
|
|
2981 moriuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p9">
|
|
|
2982 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God.
|
|
|
2983 Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an
|
|
|
2984 operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without
|
|
|
2985 a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the
|
|
|
2986 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A6" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">FP,
|
|
|
2987 Q[84], AA[6]
|
|
|
2988 </a>,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness,
|
|
|
2989 which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and
|
|
|
2990 have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment,
|
|
|
2991 when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by
|
|
|
2992 reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (
|
|
|
2993 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we
|
|
|
2994 walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the
|
|
|
2995 vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are
|
|
|
2996 in God's presence; wherefore the text continues:
|
|
|
2997 "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is
|
|
|
2998 evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is
|
|
|
2999 true Happiness.
|
|
|
3000 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p10"> Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms,
|
|
|
3001 wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the
|
|
|
3002 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the
|
|
|
3003 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A3" id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[3]</a>. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the
|
|
|
3004 body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.
|
|
|
3005 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p11"> We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence
|
|
|
3006 thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body
|
|
|
3007 and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection
|
|
|
3008 of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the
|
|
|
3009 more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence,
|
|
|
3010 Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead
|
|
|
3011 separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either
|
|
|
3012 for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body."
|
|
|
3013 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 co."><a name="33645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33645] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3014 dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae habetur in
|
|
|
3015 hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in Dei visione consistit.
|
|
|
3016 Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de
|
|
|
3017 necessitate requiritur corpus. Est enim beatitudo huius vitae
|
|
|
3018 operatio intellectus, vel speculativi vel practici. Operatio autem
|
|
|
3019 intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non
|
|
|
3020 est nisi in organo corporeo, ut in primo habitum est. Et sic
|
|
|
3021 beatitudo quae in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex
|
|
|
3022 corpore. Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quae in Dei visione
|
|
|
3023 consistit, aliqui posuerunt quod non potest animae advenire sine
|
|
|
3024 corpore existenti; dicentes quod animae sanctorum a corporibus
|
|
|
3025 separatae, ad illam beatitudinem non perveniunt usque ad diem
|
|
|
3026 iudicii, quando corpora resument. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum
|
|
|
3027 et auctoritate, et ratione. Auctoritate quidem, quia apostolus
|
|
|
3028 dicit, II ad Cor. V, <i>quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a
|
|
|
3029 domino</i>; et quae sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens,
|
|
|
3030 <i>per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem</i>. Ex quo apparet
|
|
|
3031 quod quandiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per speciem, carens
|
|
|
3032 visione divinae essentiae, nondum est Deo praesens. Animae autem
|
|
|
3033 sanctorum a corporibus separatae, sunt Deo praesentes, unde
|
|
|
3034 subditur, <i>audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus peregrinari
|
|
|
3035 a corpore, et praesentes esse ad dominum</i>. Unde manifestum est
|
|
|
3036 quod animae sanctorum separatae a corporibus, ambulant per speciem,
|
|
|
3037 Dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo. Hoc etiam per
|
|
|
3038 rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget
|
|
|
3039 corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem
|
|
|
3040 intelligibilem contuetur, ut in primo dictum est. Manifestum est
|
|
|
3041 autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in
|
|
|
3042 primo ostensum est. Unde, cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta
|
|
|
3043 hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta
|
|
|
3044 hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata. Sed
|
|
|
3045 sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid
|
|
|
3046 pertinet. Uno modo, ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut anima
|
|
|
3047 requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad
|
|
|
3048 perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse eius, sicut pulchritudo
|
|
|
3049 corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis.
|
|
|
3050 Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae
|
|
|
3051 non pertineat, pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio
|
|
|
3052 dependeat ex natura rei, quando anima perfectior erit in sua
|
|
|
3053 natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua
|
|
|
3054 felicitas consistit. Unde Augustinus, in XII super Gen. ad Litt.,
|
|
|
3055 cum quaesivisset, <i>utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus
|
|
|
3056 possit summa illa beatitudo praeberi</i>, respondet quod <i>non sic
|
|
|
3057 possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti Angeli vident;
|
|
|
3058 sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia est in eis naturalis
|
|
|
3059 quidam appetitus corpus administrandi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p12">
|
|
|
3060 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs
|
|
|
3061 of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection
|
|
|
3062 in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the
|
|
|
3063 form of the body.
|
|
|
3064 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33646] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3065 dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio animae ex parte intellectus,
|
|
|
3066 secundum quem anima transcendit corporis organa, non autem secundum
|
|
|
3067 quod est forma naturalis corporis. Et ideo illa naturae perfectio
|
|
|
3068 manet secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur, licet non maneat illa
|
|
|
3069 naturae perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p13">
|
|
|
3070 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual
|
|
|
3071 part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when
|
|
|
3072 the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from
|
|
|
3073 that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the
|
|
|
3074 composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and
|
|
|
3075 this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the
|
|
|
3076 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q4_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a
|
|
|
3077 perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.
|
|
|
3078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33647] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3079 dicendum quod anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliae partes. Nam
|
|
|
3080 esse totius non est alicuius suarum partium, unde vel pars omnino
|
|
|
3081 desinit esse, destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo
|
|
|
3082 animali; vel, si remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars
|
|
|
3083 lineae habet aliud esse quam tota linea. Sed animae humanae remanet
|
|
|
3084 esse compositi post corporis destructionem, et hoc ideo, quia idem
|
|
|
3085 est esse formae et materia, et hoc est esse compositi. Anima autem
|
|
|
3086 subsistit in suo esse, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur
|
|
|
3087 quod post separationem a corpore perfectum esse habeat, unde et
|
|
|
3088 perfectam operationem habere potest; licet non habeat perfectam
|
|
|
3089 naturam speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p14">
|
|
|
3090 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness.
|
|
|
3091 Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
|
|
|
3092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33648] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3093 dicendum quod beatitudo est hominis secundum intellectum, et ideo,
|
|
|
3094 remanente intellectu, potest inesse ei beatitudo. Sicut dentes
|
|
|
3095 Aethiopis possunt esse albi, etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos
|
|
|
3096 Aethiops dicitur albus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p15">
|
|
|
3097 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such
|
|
|
3098 a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is
|
|
|
3099 hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible
|
|
|
3100 with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is
|
|
|
3101 that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence.
|
|
|
3102 For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And
|
|
|
3103 therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in
|
|
|
3104 such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.
|
|
|
3105 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="33649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33649] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
3106 dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, per
|
|
|
3107 modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris, et
|
|
|
3108 tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per
|
|
|
3109 modum cuiusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet
|
|
|
3110 quidquid ad omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur, et tale
|
|
|
3111 impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae
|
|
|
3112 perfectioni ipsius. Et sic separatio a corpore dicitur animam
|
|
|
3113 retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae essentiae.
|
|
|
3114 Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur
|
|
|
3115 ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile. Et ideo quandiu
|
|
|
3116 ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo
|
|
|
3117 quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum
|
|
|
3118 corpus pertingere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p16">
|
|
|
3119 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices
|
|
|
3120 its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that
|
|
|
3121 it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
|
|
|
3122 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="33650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33650] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
3123 dicendum quod desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex
|
|
|
3124 parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui
|
|
|
3125 sufficit. Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia
|
|
|
3126 illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet.
|
|
|
3127 Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed
|
|
|
3128 extensive.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p17">
|
|
|
3129 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is
|
|
|
3130 not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the
|
|
|
3131 higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion:
|
|
|
3132 because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever
|
|
|
3133 will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
|
|
|
3134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="33651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33651] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum
|
|
|
3135 dicendum quod id quod ibidem dicitur, quod <i>spiritus defunctorum
|
|
|
3136 non sic vident Deum sicut Angeli</i>, non est intelligendum
|
|
|
3137 secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis, quia etiam modo aliquae animae
|
|
|
3138 beatorum sunt assumptae ad superiores ordines Angelorum, clarius
|
|
|
3139 videntes Deum quam inferiores Angeli. Sed intelligitur secundum
|
|
|
3140 inaequalitatem proportionis, quia Angeli, etiam infimi, habent
|
|
|
3141 omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt habituri, non autem
|
|
|
3142 animae separatae sanctorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A6-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 6. Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p2">
|
|
|
3143 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily
|
|
|
3144 good. But it has been shown above (
|
|
|
3145 <a href="#FS_Q2" id="FS_Q4_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[2])</a> that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness.
|
|
|
3146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33652] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
|
|
|
3147 sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio corporis non requiratur ad
|
|
|
3148 beatitudinem hominis perfectam. Perfectio enim corporis est quoddam
|
|
|
3149 corporale bonum. Sed supra ostensum est quod beatitudo non
|
|
|
3150 consistit in corporalibus bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non
|
|
|
3151 requiritur aliqua perfecta dispositio corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p3">
|
|
|
3152 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not
|
|
|
3153 part in this operation, as shown above
|
|
|
3154 <a href="#FS_Q4_A5" id="FS_Q4_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3155 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33653] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3156 beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinae essentiae, ut
|
|
|
3157 ostensum est. Sed ad hanc operationem nihil exhibet corpus, ut
|
|
|
3158 dictum est. Ergo nulla dispositio corporis requiritur ad
|
|
|
3159 beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p4">
|
|
|
3160 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in
|
|
|
3161 the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore,
|
|
|
3162 in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33654] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3164 quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a corpore, tanto perfectius
|
|
|
3165 intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit in perfectissima operatione
|
|
|
3166 intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus modis animam esse abstractam a
|
|
|
3167 corpore. Nullo ergo modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad
|
|
|
3168 beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5">
|
|
|
3169 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written (
|
|
|
3170 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
|
|
|
3171 God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (
|
|
|
3172 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.66.14" target="asv">Is. 66:14</a>): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of
|
|
|
3173 the body is
|
|
|
3174 necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33655] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
3176 praemium virtutis est beatitudo, unde dicitur Ioan. XIII, <i>beati
|
|
|
3177 eritis, si feceritis ea</i>. Sed sanctis repromittitur pro praemio
|
|
|
3178 non solum visio Dei et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona
|
|
|
3179 dispositio, dicitur enim Isaiae ult., <i>videbitis, et gaudebit cor
|
|
|
3180 vestrum, et ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt</i>. Ergo bona
|
|
|
3181 dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p6">
|
|
|
3182 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
|
|
|
3183 required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect
|
|
|
3184 virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.
|
|
|
3185 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p7"> But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that
|
|
|
3186 it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words
|
|
|
3187 of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable.
|
|
|
3188 For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the
|
|
|
3189 soul to exclude its natural perfection.
|
|
|
3190 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p8"> Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that
|
|
|
3191 Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such,
|
|
|
3192 that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the
|
|
|
3193 mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no
|
|
|
3194 longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile
|
|
|
3195 was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this
|
|
|
3196 too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that
|
|
|
3197 from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature."
|
|
|
3198 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 co."><a name="33656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33656] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3199 dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac
|
|
|
3200 vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate
|
|
|
3201 requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo,
|
|
|
3202 secundum philosophum, in operatione virtutis perfectae. Manifestum
|
|
|
3203 est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione
|
|
|
3204 virtutis homo impediri potest. Sed si loquamur de beatitudine
|
|
|
3205 perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod non requiritur ad beatitudinem
|
|
|
3206 aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad eam ut omnino anima
|
|
|
3207 sit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus, XXII de Civ. Dei,
|
|
|
3208 introducit verba Porphyrii dicentis quod <i>ad hoc quod beata sit
|
|
|
3209 anima, omne corpus fugiendum est</i>. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Cum
|
|
|
3210 enim naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod
|
|
|
3211 perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat. Et ideo
|
|
|
3212 dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam,
|
|
|
3213 requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et antecedenter et
|
|
|
3214 consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII
|
|
|
3215 super Gen. ad Litt., <i>si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficilis et
|
|
|
3216 gravis administratio, sicut caro quae corrumpitur et aggravat
|
|
|
3217 animam, avertitur mens ab illa visione summi caeli</i>. Unde
|
|
|
3218 concludit quod, <i>cum hoc corpus iam non erit animale, sed
|
|
|
3219 spirituale, tunc Angelis adaequabitur, et erit ei ad gloriam, quod
|
|
|
3220 sarcinae fuit</i>. Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae
|
|
|
3221 fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur.
|
|
|
3222 Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Dioscorum, <i>tam potenti
|
|
|
3223 natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine
|
|
|
3224 redundet in inferiorem naturam incorruptionis vigor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p9">
|
|
|
3225 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.
|
|
|
3226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33657] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3227 dicendum quod in corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in
|
|
|
3228 obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem
|
|
|
3229 beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p10">
|
|
|
3230 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove
|
|
|
3231 a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
|
|
|
3232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33658] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3233 dicendum quod, etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem
|
|
|
3234 intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire.
|
|
|
3235 Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem
|
|
|
3236 mentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p11">
|
|
|
3237 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which
|
|
|
3238 weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall
|
|
|
3239 treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.).
|
|
|
3240 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33659] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3241 dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur
|
|
|
3242 quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat
|
|
|
3243 animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter
|
|
|
3244 spiritui subiectum, de quo in tertia parte huius operis
|
|
|
3245 dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A7-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 7. Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2">
|
|
|
3246 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs
|
|
|
3247 to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said
|
|
|
3248 (
|
|
|
3249 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.30" target="asv">Lk. 22:30</a>): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (
|
|
|
3250 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.20" target="asv">Mat. 6:20</a>): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (
|
|
|
3251 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.34" target="asv">Mat. 25:34</a>):
|
|
|
3252 "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3253 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33660] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
|
|
|
3254 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requirantur etiam
|
|
|
3255 exteriora bona. Quod enim in praemium sanctis promittitur, ad
|
|
|
3256 beatitudinem pertinet. Sed sanctis repromittuntur exteriora bona,
|
|
|
3257 sicut cibus et potus, divitiae et regnum, dicitur enim Luc. XXII,
|
|
|
3258 <i>ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo</i>; et
|
|
|
3259 Matth. VI, <i>thesaurizate vobis thesauros in caelo</i>; et Matth.
|
|
|
3260 XXV, <i>venite, benedicti patris mei, possidete regnum</i>. Ergo ad
|
|
|
3261 beatitudinem requiruntur exteriora bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p3">
|
|
|
3262 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things."
|
|
|
3263 But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore
|
|
|
3264 they too are necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3265 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33661] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3266 secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>beatitudo est status omnium
|
|
|
3267 bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed exteriora sunt aliqua
|
|
|
3268 hominis bona, licet minima, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo ipsa etiam
|
|
|
3269 requiruntur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4">
|
|
|
3270 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Our Lord said (
|
|
|
3271 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.12" target="asv">Mat. 5:12</a>): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place
|
|
|
3272 is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3273 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33662] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3274 dominus, Matth. V, dicit, <i>merces vestra multa est in caelis</i>.
|
|
|
3275 Sed esse in caelis significat esse in loco. Ergo saltem locus
|
|
|
3276 exterior requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5">
|
|
|
3277 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3278 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.25" target="asv">Ps. 72:25</a>): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"---"It
|
|
|
3279 is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33663] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
3281 est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXII, <i>quid enim mihi est in caelo?
|
|
|
3282 Et a te quid volui super terram?</i> Quasi dicat, nihil aliud volo
|
|
|
3283 nisi hoc quod sequitur, <i>mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est</i>. Ergo
|
|
|
3284 nihil aliud exterius ad beatitudinem requiritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A7-p6">
|
|
|
3285 <b>I answer that,</b> For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
|
|
|
3286 happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
|
|
|
3287 For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation
|
|
|
3288 of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to
|
|
|
3289 perform its operations.
|
|
|
3290 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A7-p7"> On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason
|
|
|
3291 of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations
|
|
|
3292 which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in
|
|
|
3293 seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no
|
|
|
3294 longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained
|
|
|
3295 to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than
|
|
|
3296 that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated
|
|
|
3297 in Ethic. x, 8.
|
|
|
3298 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 co."><a name="33664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33664] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3299 dicendum quod ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita
|
|
|
3300 potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia
|
|
|
3301 beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia
|
|
|
3302 beatitudini, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I
|
|
|
3303 Ethic. Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad
|
|
|
3304 operationem virtutis contemplativae quam etiam ad operationem
|
|
|
3305 virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus
|
|
|
3306 exerceat opera activae virtutis. Sed ad beatitudinem perfectam,
|
|
|
3307 quae in visione Dei consistit, nullo modo huiusmodi bona
|
|
|
3308 requiruntur. Cuius ratio est quia omnia huiusmodi bona exteriora
|
|
|
3309 vel requiruntur ad sustentationem animalis corporis; vel
|
|
|
3310 requiruntur ad aliquas operationes quas per animale corpus
|
|
|
3311 exercemus, quae humanae vitae conveniunt. Illa autem perfecta
|
|
|
3312 beatitudo quae in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine
|
|
|
3313 corpore; vel erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed
|
|
|
3314 spirituali. Et ideo nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur
|
|
|
3315 ad illam beatitudinem, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem. Et quia in
|
|
|
3316 hac vita magis accedit ad similitudinem illius perfectae
|
|
|
3317 beatitudinis felicitas contemplativa quam activa, utpote etiam Deo
|
|
|
3318 similior, ut ex dictis patet; ideo minus indiget huiusmodi bonis
|
|
|
3319 corporis, ut dicitur in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p8">
|
|
|
3320 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont
|
|
|
3321 to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire
|
|
|
3322 of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the
|
|
|
3323 sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of
|
|
|
3324 God.
|
|
|
3325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33665] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3326 dicendum quod omnes illae corporales promissiones quae in sacra
|
|
|
3327 Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendae, secundum
|
|
|
3328 quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari,
|
|
|
3329 <i>ut ex his quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita
|
|
|
3330 consurgamus</i>, sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Sicut per
|
|
|
3331 cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias,
|
|
|
3332 sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum, exaltatio
|
|
|
3333 hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p9">
|
|
|
3334 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists.
|
|
|
3335 Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things,
|
|
|
3336 we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
|
|
|
3337 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33666] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3338 dicendum quod bona ista deservientia animali vitae, non competunt
|
|
|
3339 vitae spirituali in qua beatitudo perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit
|
|
|
3340 in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni
|
|
|
3341 invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p10">
|
|
|
3342 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints,
|
|
|
3343 but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed
|
|
|
3344 to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.
|
|
|
3345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33667] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3346 dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte,
|
|
|
3347 merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis caelis, sed per
|
|
|
3348 caelos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. Nihilominus
|
|
|
3349 tamen locus corporeus, scilicet caelum Empyreum, aderit beatis, non
|
|
|
3350 propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam
|
|
|
3351 congruentiam et decorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A8-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 8. Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p2">
|
|
|
3352 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under
|
|
|
3353 the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends
|
|
|
3354 is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33668] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
|
|
|
3356 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii ad beatitudinem.
|
|
|
3357 Futura enim beatitudo in Scripturis frequenter nomine gloriae
|
|
|
3358 designatur. Sed gloria consistit in hoc quod bonum hominis ad
|
|
|
3359 notitiam multorum deducitur. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur
|
|
|
3360 societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3">
|
|
|
3361 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius [*Seneca,
|
|
|
3362 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 6</a>] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary
|
|
|
3363 for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.
|
|
|
3364 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33669] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3365 Boetius dicit quod <i>nullius boni sine consortio iucunda est
|
|
|
3366 possessio</i>. Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo
|
|
|
3367 etiam requiritur societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p4">
|
|
|
3368 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems
|
|
|
3369 that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33670] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3371 caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas se extendit ad
|
|
|
3372 dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem
|
|
|
3373 requiratur societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5">
|
|
|
3374 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3375 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently
|
|
|
3376 nothing else is necessary for Happiness.
|
|
|
3377 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33671] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
3378 est quod dicitur Sap. VII, <i>venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum
|
|
|
3379 illa</i>, scilicet cum divina sapientia, quae consistit in
|
|
|
3380 contemplatione Dei. Et sic ad beatitudinem nihil aliud
|
|
|
3381 requiritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A8-p6">
|
|
|
3382 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed,
|
|
|
3383 to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation
|
|
|
3384 of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do
|
|
|
3385 good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may
|
|
|
3386 do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.
|
|
|
3387 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A8-p7"> But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential
|
|
|
3388 to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being
|
|
|
3389 of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to
|
|
|
3390 happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
|
|
|
3391 without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship."
|
|
|
3392 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 co."><a name="33672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33672] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3393 dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut
|
|
|
3394 philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem
|
|
|
3395 propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter
|
|
|
3396 delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in
|
|
|
3397 operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis
|
|
|
3398 benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam
|
|
|
3399 ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene
|
|
|
3400 operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in
|
|
|
3401 operibus vitae contemplativae. Sed si loquamur de perfecta
|
|
|
3402 beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum
|
|
|
3403 de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem
|
|
|
3404 suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit
|
|
|
3405 societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt.,
|
|
|
3406 quod <i>creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi
|
|
|
3407 intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris.
|
|
|
3408 Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo
|
|
|
3409 adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in
|
|
|
3410 Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p8">
|
|
|
3411 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.
|
|
|
3412 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33673] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3413 dicendum quod gloria quae est essentialis beatitudini, est quam
|
|
|
3414 habet homo non apud hominem, sed apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p9">
|
|
|
3415 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question
|
|
|
3416 under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.
|
|
|
3417 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33674] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3418 dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod
|
|
|
3419 habetur, non est plena sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non
|
|
|
3420 potest, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p10">
|
|
|
3421 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore
|
|
|
3422 if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor
|
|
|
3423 to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect
|
|
|
3424 Happiness.
|
|
|
3425 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33675] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3426 dicendum quod perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini
|
|
|
3427 quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem
|
|
|
3428 proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non
|
|
|
3429 habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur
|
|
|
3430 dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter
|
|
|
3431 se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.</p></div></div></div></div>
|
|
|
3432 <div id="FS_Q5" class="div3">
|
|
|
3433 <h3 id="FS_Q5-p0.1">Q. 5. OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3434 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
|
|
|
3435 <p id="FS_Q5-p2"> We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q5-p3"><a href="#FS_Q5_A1"> (1) Whether man can attain Happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p4"><a href="#FS_Q5_A2"> (2) Whether one man can be happier than another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p5"><a href="#FS_Q5_A3"> (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p6"><a href="#FS_Q5_A4"> (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p7"><a href="#FS_Q5_A5"> (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p8"><a href="#FS_Q5_A6"> (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p9"><a href="#FS_Q5_A7"> (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p10"><a href="#FS_Q5_A8"> (8) Whether every man desires Happiness?</a></p>
|
|
|
3436 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 pr."><a name="33676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33676]
|
|
|
3437 Iª-IIae q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ipsa
|
|
|
3438 adeptione beatitudinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum
|
|
|
3439 homo possit consequi beatitudinem. Secundo, utrum unus homo possit
|
|
|
3440 esse alio beatior. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita
|
|
|
3441 beatus. Quarto, utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti. Quinto,
|
|
|
3442 utrum, homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem. Sexto,
|
|
|
3443 utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius
|
|
|
3444 superioris creaturae. Septimo, utrum requirantur opera hominis
|
|
|
3445 aliqua ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Octavo,
|
|
|
3446 utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem.</p></div></div></div>
|
|
|
3447 <div id="FS_Q5_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A1-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 1. Whether man can attain happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3448 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual
|
|
|
3449 is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have
|
|
|
3450 the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature,
|
|
|
3451 attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness.
|
|
|
3452 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33677] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
|
|
|
3453 sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit.
|
|
|
3454 Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem ita natura
|
|
|
3455 intellectualis est supra rationalem ut patet per Dionysium in libro
|
|
|
3456 de Div. Nom., in multis locis. Sed bruta animalia, quae habent
|
|
|
3457 naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem
|
|
|
3458 rationalis naturae. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturae,
|
|
|
3459 potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturae, qui est
|
|
|
3460 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3461 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material
|
|
|
3462 things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain
|
|
|
3463 Happiness.
|
|
|
3464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33678] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3465 beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui est veritas pura. Sed
|
|
|
3466 homini est connaturale ut veritatem intueatur in rebus
|
|
|
3467 materialibus, unde species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus
|
|
|
3468 intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non potest ad
|
|
|
3469 beatitudinem pervenire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3470 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle.
|
|
|
3471 Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that
|
|
|
3472 he cannot attain Happiness.
|
|
|
3473 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33679] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3474 beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest
|
|
|
3475 pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum
|
|
|
3476 et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo
|
|
|
3477 transcendere non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem
|
|
|
3478 adipisci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3479 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3480 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.12" target="asv">Ps. 93:12</a>): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord."
|
|
|
3481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33680] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
3482 est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>beatus homo quem tu erudieris,
|
|
|
3483 domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3484 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness.
|
|
|
3485 Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect
|
|
|
3486 good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that
|
|
|
3487 man is capable of seeing God, as stated in
|
|
|
3488 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A1" id="FS_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[1]</a>: in
|
|
|
3489 which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists.
|
|
|
3490 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="33681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33681] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3491 dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque
|
|
|
3492 ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire.
|
|
|
3493 Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et
|
|
|
3494 eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum,
|
|
|
3495 et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem
|
|
|
3496 adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis
|
|
|
3497 divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est; in qua quidem
|
|
|
3498 visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7">
|
|
|
3499 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds
|
|
|
3500 the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal,
|
|
|
3501 whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the
|
|
|
3502 same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth
|
|
|
3503 which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the
|
|
|
3504 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>;
|
|
|
3505 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A8" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can
|
|
|
3506 attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained
|
|
|
3507 it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after
|
|
|
3508 a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
|
|
|
3509 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33682] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3510 dicendum quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam, et
|
|
|
3511 aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura enim rationalis excedit
|
|
|
3512 sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis obiectum, quia sensus nullo modo
|
|
|
3513 potest cognoscere universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed
|
|
|
3514 intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum
|
|
|
3515 cognoscendi eandem intelligibilem veritatem, nam intellectualis
|
|
|
3516 natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per
|
|
|
3517 inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in primo
|
|
|
3518 dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per
|
|
|
3519 quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest
|
|
|
3520 beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio
|
|
|
3521 modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post
|
|
|
3522 principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam
|
|
|
3523 perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo
|
|
|
3524 pertingere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8">
|
|
|
3525 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this
|
|
|
3526 state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the
|
|
|
3527 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a> ;
|
|
|
3528 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q89_A1" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a>.
|
|
|
3529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33683] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3530 dicendum quod homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est
|
|
|
3531 connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per
|
|
|
3532 phantasmata. Sed post huius vitae statum, habet alium modum
|
|
|
3533 connaturalem, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p9">
|
|
|
3534 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation
|
|
|
3535 of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained
|
|
|
3536 it, he will be perfectly happy.
|
|
|
3537 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33684] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3538 dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere Angelos gradu naturae,
|
|
|
3539 ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior. Potest tamen eos
|
|
|
3540 transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid
|
|
|
3541 super Angelos esse, quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte
|
|
|
3542 consequetur, perfecte beatus erit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A2-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 2. Whether one man can be happier than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2">
|
|
|
3543 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
|
|
|
3544 (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (
|
|
|
3545 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.10" target="asv">Mat. 20:10</a>) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was equally
|
|
|
3546 rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier than another.
|
|
|
3547 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33685] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3548 sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse
|
|
|
3549 beatior. Beatitudo enim est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit
|
|
|
3550 in I Ethic. Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces
|
|
|
3551 redditur, dicitur enim Matth. XX, quod omnes qui operati sunt in
|
|
|
3552 vinea, acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius,
|
|
|
3553 <i>aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt</i>. Ergo
|
|
|
3554 unus non erit alio beatior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p3">
|
|
|
3555 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed
|
|
|
3556 by another's.
|
|
|
3557 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33686] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3558 beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo non potest esse aliquid
|
|
|
3559 maius. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia maior
|
|
|
3560 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p4">
|
|
|
3561 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire
|
|
|
3562 is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater
|
|
|
3563 good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.
|
|
|
3564 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33687] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3565 beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, desiderium
|
|
|
3566 hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum
|
|
|
3567 deest quod suppleri possit. Si autem nihil deest quod suppleri
|
|
|
3568 possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud maius bonum. Ergo vel homo
|
|
|
3569 non est beatus, vel, si est beatus, non potest alia maior beatitudo
|
|
|
3570 esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5">
|
|
|
3571 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3572 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.2" target="asv">Jn. 14:2</a>): "In My Father's house there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify "the diverse
|
|
|
3573 dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness
|
|
|
3574 itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
|
|
|
3575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33688] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
3576 est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, <i>in domo patris mei mansiones multae
|
|
|
3577 sunt</i>; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit, <i>diversae meritorum
|
|
|
3578 dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna</i>. Dignitas autem vitae
|
|
|
3579 aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt
|
|
|
3580 diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis
|
|
|
3581 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6">
|
|
|
3582 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
3583 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
|
|
|
3584 <a href="#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of
|
|
|
3585 that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another,
|
|
|
3586 since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or
|
|
|
3587 enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now,
|
|
|
3588 that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And
|
|
|
3589 in this sense one man can be happier than another.
|
|
|
3590 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="33689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33689] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3591 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in ratione beatitudinis duo
|
|
|
3592 includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum; et
|
|
|
3593 adeptio vel fruitio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod
|
|
|
3594 est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo
|
|
|
3595 alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus,
|
|
|
3596 cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem
|
|
|
3597 huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior,
|
|
|
3598 quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit
|
|
|
3599 autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius
|
|
|
3600 dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest
|
|
|
3601 aliquis alio beatior esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p7">
|
|
|
3602 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
|
|
|
3603 divers degrees of enjoyment.
|
|
|
3604 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33690] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3605 dicendum quod unitas denarii significat unitatem beatitudinis ex
|
|
|
3606 parte obiecti. Sed diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem
|
|
|
3607 beatitudinis secundum diversum gradum fruitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p8">
|
|
|
3608 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.
|
|
|
3609 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33691] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3610 dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum bonum, inquantum est
|
|
|
3611 summi boni perfecta possessio sive fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9">
|
|
|
3612 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good,"
|
|
|
3613 as Augustine says (Enarr. in
|
|
|
3614 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.134" target="asv">Ps. 134</a>). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other
|
|
|
3615 goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the
|
|
|
3616 happier for knowing them, but is happy for
|
|
|
3617 knowing Thee alone."
|
|
|
3618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33692] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3619 dicendum quod nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum, cum
|
|
|
3620 habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est bonum omnis boni, ut
|
|
|
3621 Augustinus dicit. Sed dicitur aliquis alio beatior, ex diversa
|
|
|
3622 eiusdem boni participatione. Additio autem aliorum bonorum non
|
|
|
3623 auget beatitudinem, unde Augustinus dicit, in V Confess., <i>qui te
|
|
|
3624 et alia novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum
|
|
|
3625 beatus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A3-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 3. Whether one can be happy in this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2">
|
|
|
3626 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (
|
|
|
3627 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.1" target="asv">Ps. 118:1</a>): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can
|
|
|
3628 be happy in this life.
|
|
|
3629 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33693] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3630 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi.
|
|
|
3631 Dicitur enim in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>beati immaculati in via, qui
|
|
|
3632 ambulant in lege domini</i>. Hoc autem in hac vita contingit. Ergo
|
|
|
3633 aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p3">
|
|
|
3634 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not
|
|
|
3635 be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly.
|
|
|
3636 Therefore man can be happy in this life.
|
|
|
3637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33694] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3638 imperfecta participatio summi boni non adimit rationem
|
|
|
3639 beatitudinis, alioquin unus non esset alio beatior. Sed in hac vita
|
|
|
3640 homines possunt participare summum bonum, cognoscendo et amando
|
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|
3641 Deum, licet imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse
|
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|
3642 beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4">
|
|
|
3643 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature
|
|
|
3644 does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from
|
|
|
3645 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv"> Ps. 143:15</a>: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy
|
|
|
3646 in this life.
|
|
|
3647 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33695] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3648 quod a pluribus dicitur, non potest totaliter falsum esse, videtur
|
|
|
3649 enim esse naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter
|
|
|
3650 deficit. Sed plures ponunt beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per
|
|
|
3651 illud Psalmi CXLIII, <i>beatum dixerunt populum cui haec sunt</i>,
|
|
|
3652 scilicet praesentis vitae bona. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest
|
|
|
3653 esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5">
|
|
|
3654 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3655 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.1" target="asv">Job 14:1</a>): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore
|
|
|
3656 man cannot be happy in this life.
|
|
|
3657 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33696] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
3658 est quod dicitur Iob XIV, <i>homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens
|
|
|
3659 tempore, repletur multis miseriis</i>. Sed beatitudo excludit
|
|
|
3660 miseriam. Ergo homo in hac vita non potest esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p6">
|
|
|
3661 <b>I answer that,</b> A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life.
|
|
|
3662 This may be seen from a twofold consideration.
|
|
|
3663 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p7"> First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil,
|
|
|
3664 and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable
|
|
|
3665 evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties
|
|
|
3666 on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire
|
|
|
3667 for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present
|
|
|
3668 life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man
|
|
|
3669 naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
|
|
|
3670 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p8"> Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot
|
|
|
3671 obtain in this life, as was shown in the
|
|
|
3672 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A11" id="FS_Q5_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
|
|
|
3673 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="33697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33697] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3674 dicendum quod aliqualis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita
|
|
|
3675 haberi potest, perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi
|
|
|
3676 in hac vita. Et hoc quidem considerari potest dupliciter. Primo
|
|
|
3677 quidem, ex ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione. Nam beatitudo, cum
|
|
|
3678 sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne
|
|
|
3679 desiderium implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum excludi.
|
|
|
3680 Multis enim malis praesens vita subiacet, quae vitari non possunt,
|
|
|
3681 et ignorantiae ex parte intellectus, et inordinatae affectioni ex
|
|
|
3682 parte appetitus, et multiplicibus poenalitatibus ex parte corporis;
|
|
|
3683 ut Augustinus diligenter prosequitur XIX de Civ. Dei. Similiter
|
|
|
3684 etiam desiderium boni in hac vita satiari non potest. Naturaliter
|
|
|
3685 enim homo desiderat permanentiam eius boni quod habet. Bona autem
|
|
|
3686 praesentis vitae transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transeat, quam
|
|
|
3687 naturaliter desideramus, et eam perpetuo permanere vellemus, quia
|
|
|
3688 naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est quod in hac
|
|
|
3689 vita vera beatitudo habeatur. Secundo, si consideretur id in quo
|
|
|
3690 specialiter beatitudo consistit, scilicet visio divinae essentiae,
|
|
|
3691 quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in primo ostensum
|
|
|
3692 est. Ex quibus manifeste apparet quod non potest aliquis in hac
|
|
|
3693 vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9">
|
|
|
3694 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according
|
|
|
3695 to
|
|
|
3696 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv"> Rom. 8:24</a>: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign
|
|
|
3697 Good.
|
|
|
3698 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33698] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3699 dicendum quod beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem
|
|
|
3700 beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura vita, secundum illud Rom. VIII,
|
|
|
3701 <i>spe salvi facti sumus</i>, vel propter aliquam participationem
|
|
|
3702 beatitudinis, secundum aliqualem summi boni fruitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p10">
|
|
|
3703 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which
|
|
|
3704 is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be
|
|
|
3705 on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however,
|
|
|
3706 in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not
|
|
|
3707 destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above (
|
|
|
3708 <a href="#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q5_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
|
|
|
3709 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33699] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3710 dicendum quod participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta
|
|
|
3711 dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius obiecti beatitudinis, quod
|
|
|
3712 quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur. Et talis imperfectio
|
|
|
3713 tollit rationem verae beatitudinis. Alio modo potest esse
|
|
|
3714 imperfecta ex parte ipsius participantis, qui quidem ad ipsum
|
|
|
3715 obiectum beatitudinis secundum seipsum attingit, scilicet Deum, sed
|
|
|
3716 imperfecte, per respectum ad modum quo Deus seipso fruitur. Et
|
|
|
3717 talis imperfectio non tollit veram rationem beatitudinis, quia, cum
|
|
|
3718 beatitudo sit operatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est, vera ratio
|
|
|
3719 beatitudinis, consideratur ex obiecto, quod dat speciem actui, non
|
|
|
3720 autem ex subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p11">
|
|
|
3721 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness.
|
|
|
3722 And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
|
|
|
3723 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33700] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3724 dicendum quod homines reputant in hac vita esse aliquam
|
|
|
3725 beatitudinem, propter aliquam similitudinem verae beatitudinis. Et
|
|
|
3726 sic non ex toto in sua aestimatione deficiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A4-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 4. Whether happiness once had can be lost?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p2">
|
|
|
3727 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
|
|
|
3728 to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in
|
|
|
3729 a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.
|
|
|
3730 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33701] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
3731 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit amitti. Beatitudo
|
|
|
3732 enim est perfectio quaedam. Sed omnis perfectio inest perfectibili
|
|
|
3733 secundum modum ipsius. Cum igitur homo secundum suam naturam sit
|
|
|
3734 mutabilis, videtur quod beatitudo mutabiliter ab homine
|
|
|
3735 participetur. Et ita videtur quod homo beatitudinem possit
|
|
|
3736 amittere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p3">
|
|
|
3737 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
|
|
|
3738 to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease
|
|
|
3739 to be happy.
|
|
|
3740 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33702] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3741 beatitudo consistit in actione intellectus, qui subiacet voluntati.
|
|
|
3742 Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo videtur quod possit
|
|
|
3743 desistere ab operatione qua homo beatificatur, et ita homo desinet
|
|
|
3744 esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p4">
|
|
|
3745 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore
|
|
|
3746 it seems that it has an end.
|
|
|
3747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33703] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3748 principio respondet finis. Sed beatitudo hominis habet principium,
|
|
|
3749 quia homo non semper fuit beatus. Ergo videtur quod habeat
|
|
|
3750 finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3751 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3752 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
|
|
|
3753 <a href="#FS_Q5_A2" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
|
|
|
3754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33704] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
3755 est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, de iustis, quod ibunt in vitam
|
|
|
3756 aeternam; quae, ut dictum est, est beatitudo sanctorum. Quod autem
|
|
|
3757 est aeternum, non deficit. Ergo beatitudo non potest amitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3758 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative
|
|
|
3759 happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
|
|
|
3760 occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
|
|
|
3761 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p7"> This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act
|
|
|
3762 that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like
|
|
|
3763 happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains
|
|
|
3764 an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this
|
|
|
3765 life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state
|
|
|
3766 (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
|
|
|
3767 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p8"> But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii,
|
|
|
3768 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.
|
|
|
3769 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p9"> This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the
|
|
|
3770 "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to
|
|
|
3771 hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of
|
|
|
3772 losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that
|
|
|
3773 man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never
|
|
|
3774 will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is
|
|
|
3775 the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly
|
|
|
3776 happy, if evil be in him.
|
|
|
3777 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p10"> Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (
|
|
|
3778 <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine
|
|
|
3779 Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient,
|
|
|
3780 something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience
|
|
|
3781 attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good
|
|
|
3782 things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written (
|
|
|
3783 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv">Ps. 16:15</a>): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and (
|
|
|
3784 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any
|
|
|
3785 inconvenience attached to it; because it is written
|
|
|
3786 of the contemplation of wisdom (
|
|
|
3787 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake
|
|
|
3788 Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since
|
|
|
3789 the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that
|
|
|
3790 sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
|
|
|
3791 will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above (
|
|
|
3792 <a href="#FS_Q4_A4" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.5" shape="rect">Q[4], A[4]</a>). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things:
|
|
|
3793 and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on,
|
|
|
3794 man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things
|
|
|
3795 as are subject to time and
|
|
|
3796 movement.
|
|
|
3797 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="33705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33705] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3798 dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, qualis in hac
|
|
|
3799 vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate
|
|
|
3800 contemplativa, quae amittitur vel per oblivionem, puta cum
|
|
|
3801 corrumpitur scientia ex aliqua aegritudine; vel etiam per aliquas
|
|
|
3802 occupationes, quibus totaliter abstrahitur aliquis a
|
|
|
3803 contemplatione. Patet etiam idem in felicitate activa, voluntas
|
|
|
3804 enim hominis transmutari potest, ut in vitium degeneret a virtute,
|
|
|
3805 in cuius actu principaliter consistit felicitas. Si autem virtus
|
|
|
3806 remaneat integra, exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem
|
|
|
3807 beatitudinem talem perturbare, inquantum impediunt multas
|
|
|
3808 operationes virtutum, non tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre, quia
|
|
|
3809 adhuc remanet operatio virtutis, dum ipsas adversitates homo
|
|
|
3810 laudabiliter sustinet. Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest,
|
|
|
3811 quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo philosophus
|
|
|
3812 dicit, in I Ethic., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non
|
|
|
3813 simpliciter, sed sicut homines quorum natura mutationi subiecta
|
|
|
3814 est. Si vero loquamur de beatitudine perfecta quae expectatur post
|
|
|
3815 hanc vitam, sciendum est quod Origenes posuit, quorundam
|
|
|
3816 Platonicorum errorem sequens, quod post ultimam beatitudinem homo
|
|
|
3817 potest fieri miser. Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum
|
|
|
3818 dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis. Cum
|
|
|
3819 enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod
|
|
|
3820 desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat. Naturaliter
|
|
|
3821 autem homo desiderat retinere bonum quod habet, et quod eius
|
|
|
3822 retinendi securitatem obtineat, alioquin necesse est quod timore
|
|
|
3823 amittendi, vel dolore de certitudine amissionis, affligatur.
|
|
|
3824 Requiritur igitur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat
|
|
|
3825 opinionem bonum quod habet, nunquam se amissurum. Quae quidem
|
|
|
3826 opinio si vera sit, consequens est quod beatitudinem nunquam
|
|
|
3827 amittet. Si autem falsa sit, hoc ipsum est quoddam malum, falsam
|
|
|
3828 opinionem habere, nam falsum est malum intellectus, sicut verum est
|
|
|
3829 bonum ipsius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non igitur iam vere erit
|
|
|
3830 beatus, si aliquod malum ei inest. Secundo idem apparet, si
|
|
|
3831 consideretur ratio beatitudinis in speciali. Ostensum est enim
|
|
|
3832 supra quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinae essentiae
|
|
|
3833 consistit. Est autem impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam
|
|
|
3834 essentiam, velit eam non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis
|
|
|
3835 carere vult, aut est insufficiens, et quaeritur aliquid
|
|
|
3836 sufficientius loco eius, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum,
|
|
|
3837 propter quod in fastidium venit. Visio autem divinae essentiae
|
|
|
3838 replet animam omnibus bonis, cum coniungat fonti totius bonitatis,
|
|
|
3839 unde dicitur in Psalmo XVI, <i>satiabor cum apparuerit gloria
|
|
|
3840 tua</i>; et Sap. VII, dicitur, <i>venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter
|
|
|
3841 cum illa</i>, scilicet cum contemplatione sapientiae. Similiter
|
|
|
3842 etiam non habet aliquod incommodum adiunctum, quia de
|
|
|
3843 contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, Sap. VIII, <i>non habet
|
|
|
3844 amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus eius</i>.
|
|
|
3845 Sic ergo patet quod propria voluntate beatus non potest
|
|
|
3846 beatitudinem deserere. Similiter etiam non potest eam perdere, Deo
|
|
|
3847 subtrahente. Quia, cum subtractio beatitudinis sit quaedam poena,
|
|
|
3848 non potest talis subtractio a Deo, iusto iudice, provenire, nisi
|
|
|
3849 pro aliqua culpa, in quam cadere non potest qui Dei essentiam
|
|
|
3850 videt, cum ad hanc visionem ex necessitate sequatur rectitudo
|
|
|
3851 voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec aliquod
|
|
|
3852 aliud agens potest eam subtrahere. Quia mens Deo coniuncta super
|
|
|
3853 omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab huiusmodi coniunctione nullum aliud
|
|
|
3854 agens potest ipsam excludere. Unde inconveniens videtur quod per
|
|
|
3855 quasdam alternationes temporum transeat homo de beatitudine ad
|
|
|
3856 miseriam, et e converso, quia huiusmodi temporales alternationes
|
|
|
3857 esse non possunt, nisi circa ea quae subiacent tempori et
|
|
|
3858 motui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p11">
|
|
|
3859 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it
|
|
|
3860 altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends
|
|
|
3861 all change.
|
|
|
3862 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33706] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3863 dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quae omnem
|
|
|
3864 defectum excludit a beato. Et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam
|
|
|
3865 habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quae hominem sublevat in
|
|
|
3866 participationem aeternitatis transcendentis omnem mutationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p12">
|
|
|
3867 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity,
|
|
|
3868 to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.
|
|
|
3869 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33707] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3870 dicendum quod voluntas ad opposita se habet in his quae ad finem
|
|
|
3871 ordinantur, sed ad ultimum finem naturali necessitate ordinatur.
|
|
|
3872 Quod patet ex hoc, quod homo non potest non velle esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p13">
|
|
|
3873 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the
|
|
|
3874 good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
|
|
|
3875 another.
|
|
|
3876 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33708] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3877 dicendum quod beatitudo habet principium ex conditione
|
|
|
3878 participantis, sed caret fine, propter conditionem boni cuius
|
|
|
3879 participatio facit beatum. Unde ab alio est initium beatitudinis;
|
|
|
3880 et ab alio est quod caret fine.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A5-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 5. Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p2">
|
|
|
3881 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing
|
|
|
3882 is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore
|
|
|
3883 man can attain Happiness by his natural powers.
|
|
|
3884 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33709] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
|
|
|
3885 sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per sua naturalia possit
|
|
|
3886 beatitudinem consequi. Natura enim non deficit in necessariis. Sed
|
|
|
3887 nihil est homini tam necessarium quam id per quod finem ultimum
|
|
|
3888 consequitur. Ergo hoc naturae humanae non deest. Potest igitur homo
|
|
|
3889 per sua naturalia beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p3">
|
|
|
3890 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational
|
|
|
3891 creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
|
|
|
3892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33710] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3893 homo, cum sit nobilior irrationalibus creaturis, videtur esse
|
|
|
3894 sufficientior. Sed irrationales creaturae per sua naturalia possunt
|
|
|
3895 consequi suos fines. Ergo multo magis homo per sua naturalia potest
|
|
|
3896 beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p4">
|
|
|
3897 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing
|
|
|
3898 belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning
|
|
|
3899 in human operations, is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain
|
|
|
3900 to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers.
|
|
|
3901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33711] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
3902 beatitudo est operatio perfecta, secundum philosophum. Eiusdem
|
|
|
3903 autem est incipere rem, et perficere ipsam. Cum igitur operatio
|
|
|
3904 imperfecta, quae est quasi principium in operationibus humanis,
|
|
|
3905 subdatur naturali hominis potestati, qua suorum actuum est dominus;
|
|
|
3906 videtur quod per naturalem potentiam possit pertingere ad
|
|
|
3907 operationem perfectam, quae est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5">
|
|
|
3908 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses
|
|
|
3909 the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (
|
|
|
3910 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them
|
|
|
3911 that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
|
|
|
3912 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33712] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
|
|
|
3913 homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et
|
|
|
3914 voluntatem. Sed ultima beatitudo sanctis praeparata, excedit
|
|
|
3915 intellectum hominis et voluntatem, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor.
|
|
|
3916 II, <i>oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis
|
|
|
3917 non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se</i>. Ergo homo
|
|
|
3918 per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p6">
|
|
|
3919 <b>I answer that,</b> Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue,
|
|
|
3920 in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above
|
|
|
3921 (Q[3], A[8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only
|
|
|
3922 of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the
|
|
|
3923 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A4" id="FS_Q5_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12],
|
|
|
3924 A[4]
|
|
|
3925 </a>. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence
|
|
|
3926 (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its
|
|
|
3927 substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine
|
|
|
3928 Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain
|
|
|
3929 final Happiness by his natural powers.
|
|
|
3930 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="33713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33713] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
3931 dicendum quod beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest,
|
|
|
3932 potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus,
|
|
|
3933 in cuius operatione consistit, de quo infra dicetur. Sed beatitudo
|
|
|
3934 hominis perfecta, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in visione
|
|
|
3935 divinae essentiae. Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra
|
|
|
3936 naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturae, ut in primo
|
|
|
3937 ostensum est. Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturae est
|
|
|
3938 secundum modum substantiae eius, sicut de intelligentia dicitur in
|
|
|
3939 libro de causis, quod <i>cognoscit ea quae sunt supra se, et ea
|
|
|
3940 quae sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiae suae</i>. Omnis
|
|
|
3941 autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit
|
|
|
3942 a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem
|
|
|
3943 substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest
|
|
|
3944 consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p7">
|
|
|
3945 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided
|
|
|
3946 other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did
|
|
|
3947 it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do.
|
|
|
3948 But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him
|
|
|
3949 happy. "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
|
|
|
3950 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33714] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
3951 dicendum quod, sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis,
|
|
|
3952 quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus
|
|
|
3953 quia dedit ei rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi
|
|
|
3954 conquirere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non
|
|
|
3955 daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc
|
|
|
3956 enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit
|
|
|
3957 converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. <i>Quae enim per amicos
|
|
|
3958 possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus</i>, ut dicitur in III
|
|
|
3959 Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p8">
|
|
|
3960 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition
|
|
|
3961 than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in
|
|
|
3962 order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect
|
|
|
3963 health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health,
|
|
|
3964 without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs
|
|
|
3965 the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this
|
|
|
3966 good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
|
|
|
3967 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33715] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
3968 dicendum quod nobilioris conditionis est natura quae potest
|
|
|
3969 consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc
|
|
|
3970 consequendum, quam natura quae non potest consequi perfectum bonum,
|
|
|
3971 sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem
|
|
|
3972 eius non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut philosophus dicit in II de
|
|
|
3973 caelo. Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi
|
|
|
3974 perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae; quam qui
|
|
|
3975 solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem, sine medicinae
|
|
|
3976 auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quae potest consequi
|
|
|
3977 perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est
|
|
|
3978 perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est
|
|
|
3979 capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae
|
|
|
3980 naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p9">
|
|
|
3981 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity,
|
|
|
3982 if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
|
|
|
3983 Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation
|
|
|
3984 which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its
|
|
|
3985 object. Consequently the argument does not prove.
|
|
|
3986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33716] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
3987 dicendum quod, quando imperfectum et perfectum sunt eiusdem
|
|
|
3988 speciei, ab eadem virtute causari possunt. Non autem hoc est
|
|
|
3989 necesse, si sunt alterius speciei, non enim quidquid potest causare
|
|
|
3990 dispositionem materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre.
|
|
|
3991 Imperfecta autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis
|
|
|
3992 potestati, non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta
|
|
|
3993 quae est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex
|
|
|
3994 obiecto. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A6-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 6. Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p2">
|
|
|
3995 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe
|
|
|
3996 a twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which
|
|
|
3997 is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order
|
|
|
3998 of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
|
|
|
3999 order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures
|
|
|
4000 acting on the lower, as stated in the
|
|
|
4001 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FS_Q5_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[109], A[2]</a>: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy,
|
|
|
4002 through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.
|
|
|
4003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33717] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
|
|
|
4004 sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit fieri beatus per actionem
|
|
|
4005 alicuius superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli. Cum enim duplex
|
|
|
4006 ordo inveniatur in rebus, unus partium universi ad invicem, alius
|
|
|
4007 totius universi ad bonum quod est extra universum; primus ordo
|
|
|
4008 ordinatur ad secundum sicut ad finem, ut dicitur XII Metaphys.;
|
|
|
4009 sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius
|
|
|
4010 exercitus ad ducem. Sed ordo partium universi ad invicem attenditur
|
|
|
4011 secundum quod superiores creaturae agunt in inferiores, ut in primo
|
|
|
4012 dictum est, beatitudo autem consistit in ordine hominis ad bonum
|
|
|
4013 quod est extra universum, quod est Deus. Ergo per actionem
|
|
|
4014 superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli, in hominem, homo beatus
|
|
|
4015 efficitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p3">
|
|
|
4016 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially
|
|
|
4017 hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually
|
|
|
4018 happy by an angel who is actually happy.
|
|
|
4019 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33718] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
4020 quod est in potentia tale, potest reduci in actum per id quod est
|
|
|
4021 actu tale, sicut quod est potentia calidum, fit actu calidum per id
|
|
|
4022 quod est actu calidum. Sed homo est in potentia beatus. Ergo potest
|
|
|
4023 fieri actu beatus per Angelum, qui est actu beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p4">
|
|
|
4024 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's
|
|
|
4025 intellect as shown in the
|
|
|
4026 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q5_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>. Therefore an angel can make a man happy.
|
|
|
4027 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33719] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
4028 beatitudo consistit in operatione intellectus, ut supra dictum est.
|
|
|
4029 Sed Angelus potest illuminare intellectum hominis, ut in primo
|
|
|
4030 habitum est. Ergo Angelus potest facere hominem beatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5">
|
|
|
4031 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
4032 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.12" target="asv">Ps. 83:12</a>): "The Lord will give grace and glory."
|
|
|
4033 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33720] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
4034 est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>gratiam et gloriam dabit
|
|
|
4035 dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p6">
|
|
|
4036 <b>I answer that,</b> Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
|
|
|
4037 surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above
|
|
|
4038 nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now
|
|
|
4039 it has been shown above
|
|
|
4040 <a href="#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q5_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a> that Happiness is a good surpassing
|
|
|
4041 created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man
|
|
|
4042 made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as
|
|
|
4043 of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
|
|
|
4044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="33721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33721] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
4045 dicendum quod, cum omnis creatura naturae legibus sit subiecta,
|
|
|
4046 utpote habens limitatam virtutem et actionem; illud quod excedit
|
|
|
4047 naturam creatam, non potest fieri virtute alicuius creaturae. Et
|
|
|
4048 ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit
|
|
|
4049 immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci, et
|
|
|
4050 cetera huiusmodi. Ostensum est autem quod beatitudo est quoddam
|
|
|
4051 bonum excedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod per
|
|
|
4052 actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur, sed homo beatus fit solo
|
|
|
4053 Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta. Si vero loquamur
|
|
|
4054 de beatitudine imperfecta, sic eadem ratio est de ipsa et de
|
|
|
4055 virtute, in cuius actu consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p7">
|
|
|
4056 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the
|
|
|
4057 last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to
|
|
|
4058 the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus,
|
|
|
4059 too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the
|
|
|
4060 attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself
|
|
|
4061 through the First Agent, which is God.
|
|
|
4062 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33722] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
4063 dicendum quod plerumque contingit in potentiis activis ordinatis,
|
|
|
4064 quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam,
|
|
|
4065 inferiores vero potentiae coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi
|
|
|
4066 finis disponendo, sicut ad artem gubernativam, quae praeest
|
|
|
4067 navifactivae, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit. Sic
|
|
|
4068 igitur et in ordine universi, homo quidem adiuvatur ab Angelis ad
|
|
|
4069 consequendum ultimum finem, secundum aliqua praecedentia, quibus
|
|
|
4070 disponitur ad eius consecutionem, sed ipsum ultimum finem
|
|
|
4071 consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p8">
|
|
|
4072 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance
|
|
|
4073 a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle
|
|
|
4074 whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white;
|
|
|
4075 nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something
|
|
|
4076 else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is
|
|
|
4077 in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently
|
|
|
4078 no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.
|
|
|
4079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33723] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
4080 dicendum quod, quando aliqua forma actu existit in aliquo secundum
|
|
|
4081 esse perfectum et naturale, potest esse principium actionis in
|
|
|
4082 alterum; sicut calidum per calorem calefacit. Sed si forma existit
|
|
|
4083 in aliquo imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest
|
|
|
4084 esse principium communicationis sui ad alterum, sicut intentio
|
|
|
4085 coloris quae est in pupilla, non potest facere album; neque etiam
|
|
|
4086 omnia quae sunt illuminata aut calefacta, possunt alia calefacere
|
|
|
4087 et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio at calefactio essent usque ad
|
|
|
4088 infinitum. Lumen autem gloriae, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo
|
|
|
4089 quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale, in qualibet autem
|
|
|
4090 creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel
|
|
|
4091 participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam
|
|
|
4092 beatitudinem alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p9">
|
|
|
4093 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as
|
|
|
4094 to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the
|
|
|
4095 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q5_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[106], A[1]</a>: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.
|
|
|
4096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33724] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
4097 dicendum quod Angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis, vel
|
|
|
4098 etiam inferioris Angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum
|
|
|
4099 operum non autem quantum ad visionem divinae essentiae, ut in primo
|
|
|
4100 dictum est. Ad eam enim videndam, omnes immediate illuminantur a
|
|
|
4101 Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A7-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 7. Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p2">
|
|
|
4102 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite
|
|
|
4103 power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But
|
|
|
4104 man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above
|
|
|
4105 <a href="#FS_Q5_A6" id="FS_Q5_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not
|
|
|
4106 require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
|
|
|
4107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33725] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
|
|
|
4108 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requirantur aliqua opera hominis
|
|
|
4109 ad hoc ut beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Deus enim, cum sit agens
|
|
|
4110 infinitae virtutis, non praeexigit in agendo materiam, aut
|
|
|
4111 dispositionem materiae, sed statim potest totum producere. Sed
|
|
|
4112 opera hominis, cum non requirantur ad beatitudinem eius sicut causa
|
|
|
4113 efficiens, ut dictum est, non possunt requiri ad eam nisi sicut
|
|
|
4114 dispositiones. Ergo Deus, qui dispositiones non praeexigit in
|
|
|
4115 agendo, beatitudinem sine praecedentibus operibus confert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p3">
|
|
|
4116 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established
|
|
|
4117 nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect
|
|
|
4118 forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works.
|
|
|
4119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33726] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
4120 sicut Deus est auctor beatitudinis immediate, ita et naturam
|
|
|
4121 immediate instituit. Sed in prima institutione naturae, produxit
|
|
|
4122 creaturas nulla dispositione praecedente vel actione creaturae; sed
|
|
|
4123 statim fecit unumquodque perfectum in sua specie. Ergo videtur quod
|
|
|
4124 beatitudinem conferat homini sine aliquibus operationibus
|
|
|
4125 praecedentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4">
|
|
|
4126 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
|
|
|
4127 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.6" target="asv">Rom. 4:6</a>) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining
|
|
|
4128 Happiness.
|
|
|
4129 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33727] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
4130 apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus
|
|
|
4131 confert iustitiam sine operibus. Non ergo requiruntur aliqua opera
|
|
|
4132 hominis ad beatitudinem consequendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5">
|
|
|
4133 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
4134 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.
|
|
|
4135 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33728] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
|
|
|
4136 est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, <i>si haec scitis, beati eritis si
|
|
|
4137 feceritis ea</i>. Ergo per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p6">
|
|
|
4138 <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right
|
|
|
4139 order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter,
|
|
|
4140 in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make
|
|
|
4141 a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as
|
|
|
4142 sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should
|
|
|
4143 not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one
|
|
|
4144 has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs
|
|
|
4145 to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not
|
|
|
4146 to be
|
|
|
4147 moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
|
|
|
4148 becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in
|
|
|
4149 the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained
|
|
|
4150 in the
|
|
|
4151 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A5" id="FS_Q5_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[62], A[5]</a>; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits.
|
|
|
4152 Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
|
|
|
4153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 co."><a name="33729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33729] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
|
|
|
4154 dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, requiritur
|
|
|
4155 ad beatitudinem, cum nihil aliud sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis
|
|
|
4156 ad ultimum finem; quae ita exigitur ad consecutionem ultimi finis,
|
|
|
4157 sicut debita dispositio materiae ad consecutionem formae. Sed ex
|
|
|
4158 hoc non ostenditur quod aliqua operatio hominis debeat praecedere
|
|
|
4159 eius beatitudinem, posset enim Deus simul facere voluntatem recte
|
|
|
4160 tendentem in finem, et finem consequentem; sicut quandoque simul
|
|
|
4161 materiam disponit, et inducit formam. Sed ordo divinae sapientiae
|
|
|
4162 exigit ne hoc fiat, ut enim dicitur in II de caelo, <i>eorum quae
|
|
|
4163 nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu,
|
|
|
4164 aliquid uno motu, aliquid pluribus</i>. Habere autem perfectum
|
|
|
4165 bonum sine motu, convenit ei quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere
|
|
|
4166 autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei
|
|
|
4167 proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam
|
|
|
4168 operationem praecedentem. Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam
|
|
|
4169 creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur
|
|
|
4170 absque motu operationis, per quam tendit in ipsam. Sed Angelus, qui
|
|
|
4171 est superior ordine naturae quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex
|
|
|
4172 ordine divinae sapientiae, uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in
|
|
|
4173 primo expositum est. Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis
|
|
|
4174 motibus operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam, secundum
|
|
|
4175 philosophum, beatitudo est praemium virtuosarum operationum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p7">
|
|
|
4176 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows
|
|
|
4177 Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
|
|
|
4178 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33730] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
4179 dicendum quod operatio hominis non praeexigitur ad consecutionem
|
|
|
4180 beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinae virtutis
|
|
|
4181 beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8">
|
|
|
4182 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the
|
|
|
4183 creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated
|
|
|
4184 to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who,"
|
|
|
4185 according to
|
|
|
4186 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.10" target="asv"> Heb. 2:10, </a> "had brought many children into glory";
|
|
|
4187 therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But
|
|
|
4188 this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits
|
|
|
4189 of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ.
|
|
|
4190 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33731] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
4191 dicendum quod primas creaturas statim Deus perfectas produxit,
|
|
|
4192 absque aliqua dispositione vel operatione creaturae praecedente,
|
|
|
4193 quia sic instituit prima individua specierum, ut per ea natura
|
|
|
4194 propagaretur ad posteros. Et similiter, quia per Christum, qui est
|
|
|
4195 Deus et homo, beatitudo erat ad alios derivanda, secundum illud
|
|
|
4196 apostoli ad Heb. II, <i>qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat</i>;
|
|
|
4197 statim a principio suae conceptionis, absque aliqua operatione
|
|
|
4198 meritoria praecedente, anima eius fuit beata. Sed hoc est singulare
|
|
|
4199 in ipso, nam pueris baptizatis subvenit meritum Christi ad
|
|
|
4200 beatitudinem consequendam, licet desint eis merita propria, eo quod
|
|
|
4201 per Baptismum sunt Christi membra effecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p9">
|
|
|
4202 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account
|
|
|
4203 of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends
|
|
|
4204 towards Happiness.
|
|
|
4205 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33732] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
4206 dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei, quae habetur
|
|
|
4207 per gratiam iustificantem, quae quidem non datur propter opera
|
|
|
4208 praecedentia. Non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo,
|
|
|
4209 sed magis est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A8-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 8. Whether every man desires happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p2">
|
|
|
4210 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
|
|
|
4211 of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine
|
|
|
4212 says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some
|
|
|
4213 in other things." Therefore not all desire Happiness.
|
|
|
4214 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33733] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
|
|
|
4215 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes appetant beatitudinem.
|
|
|
4216 Nullus enim potest appetere quod ignorat, cum bonum apprehensum sit
|
|
|
4217 obiectum appetitus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed multi nesciunt
|
|
|
4218 quid sit beatitudo, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIII de Trin.,
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4219 patet ex hoc, quod <i>quidam posuerunt beatitudinem in voluptate
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4220 corporis, quidam in virtute animi, quidam in aliis rebus</i>. Non
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4221 ergo omnes beatitudinem appetunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p3">
|
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4222 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above (
|
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4223 <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q5_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not
|
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4224 desire Happiness.
|
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4225 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33734] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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4226 essentia beatitudinis est visio essentiae divinae, ut dictum est.
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4227 Sed aliqui opinantur hoc esse impossibile, quod Deus per essentiam
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4228 ab homine videatur, unde hoc non appetunt. Ergo non omnes homines
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4229 appetunt beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p4">
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4230 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all
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4231 do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire
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4232 Happiness.
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4233 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33735] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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4234 Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin. quod <i>beatus est qui habet
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4235 omnia quae vult, et nihil male vult</i>. Sed non omnes hoc volunt,
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4236 quidam enim male aliqua volunt, et tamen volunt illa se velle. Non
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4237 ergo omnes volunt beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p5">
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4238 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he
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4239 would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
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4240 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33736] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
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4241 est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., <i>si minus dixisset,
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4242 omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis, dixisset aliquid
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4243 quod nullus in sua non cognosceret voluntate</i>. Quilibet ergo
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4244 vult esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p6">
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4245 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every
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4246 man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above (
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4247 <a href="#FS_Q5_A3" id="FS_Q5_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently
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4248 to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be
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4249 satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which
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4250 it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness;
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4251 because they know not in what thing the general notion of
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4252 happiness is found.
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4253 And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 co."><a name="33737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33737] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
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4254 dicendum quod beatitudo dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo,
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4255 secundum communem rationem beatitudinis. Et sic necesse est quod
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4256 omnis homo beatitudinem velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis
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4257 est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit
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4258 obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter
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4259 eius voluntati satisfacit. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud
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4260 est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur. Quod quilibet vult. Alio
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4261 modo possumus loqui de beatitudine secundum specialem rationem,
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4262 quantum ad id in quo beatitudo consistit. Et sic non omnes
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4263 cognoscunt beatitudinem, quia nesciunt cui rei communis ratio
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4264 beatitudinis conveniat. Et per consequens, quantum ad hoc, non
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4265 omnes eam volunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p7a">Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.
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4266 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33738] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet
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4267 responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p7">
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4268 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction,
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4269 there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired
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4270 in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general
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4271 notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
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4272 thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself,
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4273 or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.
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4274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33739] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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4275 dicendum quod, cum voluntas sequatur apprehensionem intellectus seu
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4276 rationis, sicut contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, quod
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4277 tamen est diversum secundum rationis considerationem; ita contingit
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4278 quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, et tamen uno modo appetitur,
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4279 alio modo non appetitur. Beatitudo ergo potest considerari sub
|
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4280 ratione finalis boni et perfecti, quae est communis ratio
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4281 beatitudinis, et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas in
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4282 illud tendit, ut dictum est. Potest etiam considerari secundum
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4283 alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius operationis,
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4284 vel ex parte potentiae operativae, vel ex parte obiecti, et sic non
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4285 ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p8">
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4286 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition of Happiness given by some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled"
|
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4287 is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of
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4288 all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing
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4289 satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if
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4290 we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to
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4291 Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such
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4292 things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that
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4293 are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to
|
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4294 include perfect Happiness---that he "desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit,
|
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4295 that "happy is he who has all he desires."
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4296 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33740] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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4297 dicendum quod ista definitio beatitudinis quam quidam posuerunt,
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4298 beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, vel, cui omnia optata
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4299 succedunt, quodam modo intellecta, est bona et sufficiens; alio
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4300 vero modo, est imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter de
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4301 omnibus quae vult homo naturali appetitu, sic verum est quod qui
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4302 habet omnia quae vult, est beatus, nihil enim satiat naturalem
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4303 hominis appetitum, nisi bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo. Si
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4304 vero intelligatur de his quae homo vult secundum apprehensionem
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4305 rationis, sic habere quaedam quae homo vult, non pertinet ad
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4306 beatitudinem, sed magis ad miseriam inquantum huiusmodi habita
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4307 impediunt hominem ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult, sicut
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4308 etiam ratio accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione
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4309 veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus addidit ad
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4310 perfectionem beatitudinis, quod nihil mali velit. Quamvis primum
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4311 posset sufficere, si recte intelligeretur, scilicet quod beatus est
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4312 qui habet omnia quae vult.</p></div></div></div></div>
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4313
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4314
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4315 `
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4316 </div>
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4317 </body>
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4318 </html>
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