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4 <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title>
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19 <h2 id="FS.i-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS.i.i">Q. . PROLOGUE</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q1">Q. 1. OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q2">Q. 2. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q3">Q. 3. WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q4">Q. 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q5">Q. 5. OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
20 <div id="FS.i.i" class="div3">
21 <h3 id="FS.i.i-p0.1">Q. . PROLOGUE</h3>
22 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
23 <p id="FS.i.i-p1"> Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies
24 "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of
25 those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image,
26 i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
27 </p>
28 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II pr."><a name="33404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33404]
29 Iª-IIae pr.</span></a> Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo
30 factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem
31 significatur <i>intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se
32 potestativum</i>; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de
33 Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius
34 voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de
35 homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi
36 liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.</p></div></div></div>
37 </div>
38 <div id="FS_Q1" class="div3">
39 <h3 id="FS_Q1-p0.1">Q. 1. OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
40 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
41 <p id="FS_Q1-p2"> In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance
42 towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end
43 of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.
44 </p><p id="FS_Q1-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q1-p4"><a href="#FS_Q1_A1"> (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p5"><a href="#FS_Q1_A2"> (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p6"><a href="#FS_Q1_A3"> (3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p7"><a href="#FS_Q1_A4"> (4) Whether there is any last end of human life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p8"><a href="#FS_Q1_A5"> (5) Whether one man can have several last ends?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p9"><a href="#FS_Q1_A6"> (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p10"><a href="#FS_Q1_A7"> (7) Whether all men have the same last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q1-p11"><a href="#FS_Q1_A8"> (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?</a></p>
45 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 pr."><a name="33405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33405]
46 Iª-IIae q. 1 pr.</span></a> Ubi primo considerandum occurrit
47 de ultimo fine humanae vitae; et deinde de his per quae homo ad
48 hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab eo deviare, ex fine enim
49 oportet accipere rationes eorum quae ordinantur ad finem. Et quia
50 ultimus finis humanae vitae ponitur esse beatitudo, oportet primo
51 considerare de ultimo fine in communi; deinde de beatitudine. Circa
52 primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum hominis sit agere propter
53 finem. Secundo, utrum hoc sit proprium rationalis naturae. Tertio,
54 utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem a fine. Quarto, utrum sit
55 aliquis ultimus finis humanae vitae. Quinto, utrum unius hominis
56 possint esse plures ultimi fines. Sexto, utrum homo ordinet omnia
57 in ultimum finem. Septimo, utrum idem sit finis ultimus omnium
58 hominum. Octavo, utrum in illo ultimo fine omnes aliae creaturae
59 conveniant.</p></div></div></div>
60 <div id="FS_Q1_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A1-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 1. Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p2">
61 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
62 implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action;
63 since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end.
64 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33406] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
65 sic proceditur. Videtur quod homini non conveniat agere propter
66 finem. Causa enim naturaliter prior est. Sed finis habet rationem
67 ultimi, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo finis non habet rationem causae.
68 Sed propter illud agit homo, quod est causa actionis, cum haec
69 praepositio propter designet habitudinem causae. Ergo homini non
70 convenit agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p3">
71 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
72 states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
73 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33407] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
74 illud quod est ultimus finis, non est propter finem. Sed in
75 quibusdam actiones sunt ultimus finis; ut patet per philosophum in
76 I Ethic. Ergo non omnia homo agit propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p4">
77 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
78 sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard,
79 while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
80 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33408] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
81 tunc videtur homo agere propter finem, quando deliberat. Sed multa
82 homo agit absque deliberatione, de quibus etiam quandoque nihil
83 cogitat; sicut cum aliquis movet pedem vel manum aliis intentus,
84 vel fricat barbam. Non ergo homo omnia agit propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p5">
85 <b>On the contrary,</b> All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations,
86 as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end.
87 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33409] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
88 omnia quae sunt in aliquo genere, derivantur a principio illius
89 generis. Sed finis est principium in operabilibus ab homine; ut
90 patet per philosophum in II Physic. Ergo homini convenit omnia
91 agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p6">
92 <b>I answer that,</b> Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational
93 animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is
94 master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty
95 and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed
96 from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly
97 "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are
98 caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore
99 all human actions must be for an end.
100 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 co."><a name="33410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33410] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
101 dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie
102 dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo.
103 Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod
104 est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur
105 proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus
106 suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et liberum arbitrium
107 esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones
108 proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt.
109 Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem
110 hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis
111 inquantum est homo. Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae
112 procedunt ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui
113 obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde oportet
114 quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p7">
115 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this
116 way that it is a cause.
117 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33411] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
118 dicendum quod finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen
119 primus in intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem
120 causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p8">
121 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is
122 voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it
123 is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will
124 to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is
125 color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible
126 object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action
127 be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing,
128 is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action
129 in which the last end consists.
130 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33412] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
131 dicendum quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, oportet eam
132 esse voluntariam, alias non esset humana, ut dictum est. Actio
133 autem aliqua dupliciter dicitur voluntaria, uno modo, quia
134 imperatur a voluntate, sicut ambulare vel loqui; alio modo, quia
135 elicitur a voluntate, sicut ipsum velle. Impossibile autem est quod
136 ipse actus a voluntate elicitus sit ultimus finis. Nam obiectum
137 voluntatis est finis, sicut obiectum visus est color, unde sicut
138 impossibile est quod primum visibile sit ipsum videre, quia omne
139 videre est alicuius obiecti visibilis; ita impossibile est quod
140 primum appetibile, quod est finis, sit ipsum velle. Unde
141 relinquitur quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, quod ipsa
142 sit imperata a voluntate. Et ita ibi aliqua actio hominis, ad minus
143 ipsum velle, est propter finem. Quidquid ergo homo faciat, verum
144 est dicere quod homo agit propter finem, etiam agendo actionem quae
145 est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A1-p9">
146 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
147 proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
148 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33413] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
149 dicendum quod huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non
150 procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est proprium principium
151 humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem
152 per rationem praestitutum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A2-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 2. Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p2">
153 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,
154 never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they
155 are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as
156 irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end.
157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33414] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
158 sic proceditur. Videtur quod agere propter finem sit proprium
159 rationalis naturae. Homo enim, cuius est agere propter finem,
160 nunquam agit propter finem ignotum. Sed multa sunt quae non
161 cognoscunt finem, vel quia omnino carent cognitione, sicut
162 creaturae insensibiles; vel quia non apprehendunt rationem finis,
163 sicut bruta animalia. Videtur ergo proprium esse rationalis naturae
164 agere propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p3">
165 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong
166 to things that lack reason.
167 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33415] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
168 agere propter finem est ordinare suam actionem ad finem. Sed hoc
169 est rationis opus. Ergo non convenit his quae ratione carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p4">
170 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to
171 act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature.
172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33416] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
173 bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas in ratione
174 est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo agere propter finem non est
175 nisi rationalis naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p5">
176 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end."
177 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33417] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
178 est quod philosophus probat in II Physic., quod <i>non solum
179 intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A2-p6">
180 <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed,
181 the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that
182 matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act.
183 But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not
184 determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce
185 a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as
186 this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other
187 things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."
188 </p><p id="FS_Q1_A2-p7"> Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing,
189 moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end
190 through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason,
191 move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
192 "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by
193 another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything
194 to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument
195 to the principal agent, as stated above (
196 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 4;
197 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A1" id="FS_Q1_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">FP,
198 Q[103], A[1]
199 </a>, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the
200 end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend
201 the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.
202 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 co."><a name="33418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33418] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
203 dicendum quod omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem.
204 Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse
205 est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa
206 finalis. Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi
207 secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia
208 in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim
209 agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret
210 hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat,
211 necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet
212 rationem finis. Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura
213 fit per rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis
214 fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.
215 Tamen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad
216 finem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo;
217 alio modo, sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit ad
218 determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam
219 actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa
220 movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum
221 arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quae
222 ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi
223 ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non cognoscant rationem
224 finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem
225 ab alio ordinantur. Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum
226 sicut instrumentum ad agens principale, ut supra habitum est. Et
227 ideo proprium est naturae rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se
228 agens vel ducens ad finem, naturae vero irrationalis, quasi ab alio
229 acta vel ducta, sive in finem apprehensum, sicut bruta animalia,
230 sive in finem non apprehensum, sicut ea quae omnino cognitione
231 carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p8">
232 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he
233 acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end.
234 And it is thus with irrational creatures.
235 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33419] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
236 dicendum quod homo, quando per seipsum agit propter finem,
237 cognoscit finem, sed quando ab alio agitur vel ducitur, puta cum
238 agit ad imperium alterius, vel cum movetur altero impellente, non
239 est necessarium quod cognoscat finem. Et ita est in creaturis
240 irrationalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p9">
241 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that
242 which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
243 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33420] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
244 dicendum quod ordinare in finem est eius quod seipsum agit in
245 finem. Eius vero quod ab alio in finem agitur, est ordinari in
246 finem. Quod potest esse irrationalis naturae, sed ab aliquo
247 rationem habente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A2-p10">
248 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
249 reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite,
250 determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor
251 of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular
252 departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some
253 rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
254 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33421] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
255 dicendum quod obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali.
256 Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et
257 intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale, sed est in eis
258 appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum
259 particulare. Manifestum autem est quod particulares causae moventur
260 a causa universali, sicut rector civitatis, qui intendit bonum
261 commune, movet suo imperio omnia particularia officia civitatis. Et
262 ideo necesse est quod omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur in fines
263 particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se extendit in
264 bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A3-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 3. Whether human acts are specified by their end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p2">
265 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified
266 by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.
267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33422] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
268 sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humani non recipiant speciem a
269 fine. Finis enim est causa extrinseca. Sed unumquodque habet
270 speciem ab aliquo principio intrinseco. Ergo actus humani non
271 recipiunt speciem a fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p3">
272 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore
273 a human act does not derive its species from the end.
274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33423] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
275 illud quod dat speciem, oportet esse prius. Sed finis est posterior
276 in esse. Ergo actus humanus non habet speciem a fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p4">
277 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
278 Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.
279 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33424] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
280 idem non potest esse nisi in una specie. Sed eundem numero actum
281 contingit ordinari ad diversos fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem
282 actibus humanis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p5">
283 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy
284 of blame or praise."
285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33425] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
286 est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de moribus Ecclesiae et
287 Manichaeorum, <i>secundum quod finis est culpabilis vel laudabilis,
288 secundum hoc sunt opera nostra culpabilia vel laudabilia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p6"> I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed
289 of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper
290 movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an
291 act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the
292 terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while
293 heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature.
294 And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For
295 human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above
296
297 <a href="#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q1_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the
298 end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is
299 their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of
300 the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog.
301 super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral
302 acts are the same as human acts.
303 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 co."><a name="33426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33426] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
304 dicendum quod unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non
305 secundum potentiam, unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et
306 forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc
307 etiam considerandum est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus
308 quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum
309 ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium
310 agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus. Unde calefactio
311 actio nihil aliud est quam motio quaedam a calore procedens,
312 calefactio vero passio nihil aliud est quam motus ad calorem,
313 definitio autem manifestat rationem speciei. Et utroque modo actus
314 humani, sive considerentur per modum actionum, sive per modum
315 passionum, a fine speciem sortiuntur. Utroque enim modo possunt
316 considerari actus humani, eo quod homo movet seipsum, et movetur a
317 seipso. Dictum est autem supra quod actus dicuntur humani,
318 inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata. Obiectum autem
319 voluntatis est bonum et finis. Et ideo manifestum est quod
320 principium humanorum actuum, inquantum sunt humani, est finis. Et
321 similiter est terminus eorundem, nam id ad quod terminatur actus
322 humanus, est id quod voluntas intendit tanquam finem; sicut in
323 agentibus naturalibus forma generati est conformis formae
324 generantis. Et quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, <i>mores
325 proprie dicuntur humani</i>, actus morales proprie speciem
326 sortiuntur ex fine, nam idem sunt actus morales et actus
327 humani.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p7">
328 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just
329 this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something,
330 considered as passion.
331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33427] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
332 dicendum quod finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu,
333 quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum
334 est de ratione actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad
335 actionem, et ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p8">
336 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus
337 that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33428] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
339 dicendum quod finis secundum quod est prior in intentione, ut
340 dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat
341 speciem actui humano sive morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A3-p9">
342 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has
343 its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however,
344 that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill
345 a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as
346 to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts
347 in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement
348 does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus.
349 Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.
350 Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered
351 in their moral species, and conversely.
352 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33429] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
353 dicendum quod idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab
354 agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet
355 speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus
356 est finis alterius. Possibile tamen est quod unus actus secundum
357 speciem naturae, ordinetur ad diversos fines voluntatis, sicut hoc
358 ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod est idem secundum speciem
359 naturae, potest ordinari sicut in finem ad conservationem
360 iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus
361 secundum speciem moris, quia uno modo erit actus virtutis, alio
362 modo erit actus vitii. Non enim motus recipit speciem ab eo quod
363 est terminus per accidens, sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per
364 se. Fines autem morales accidunt rei naturali; et e converso ratio
365 naturalis finis accidit morali. Et ideo nihil prohibet actus qui
366 sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse diversos secundum speciem
367 moris, et e converso.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A4-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 4. Whether there is one last end of human life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p2">
368 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive,
369 as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse
370 some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is
371 an indefinite series of ends.
372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33430] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
373 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis ultimus finis humanae
374 vitae, sed procedatur in finibus in infinitum. Bonum enim, secundum
375 suam rationem, est diffusivum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap.
376 de Div. Nom. Si ergo quod procedit ex bono, ipsum etiam est bonum,
377 oportet quod illud bonum diffundat aliud bonum, et sic processus
378 boni est in infinitum. Sed bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo in
379 finibus est processus in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p3">
380 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the
381 same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire
382 of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends.
383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33431] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
384 ea quae sunt rationis, in infinitum multiplicari possunt, unde et
385 mathematicae quantitates in infinitum augentur. Species etiam
386 numerorum propter hoc sunt infinitae, quia, dato quolibet numero,
387 ratio alium maiorem excogitare potest. Sed desiderium finis
388 sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ergo videtur quod etiam in
389 finibus procedatur in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p4">
390 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for
391 I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human
392 will, and there is no last end of the human will.
393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33432] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
394 bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed voluntas infinities
395 potest reflecti supra seipsam, possum enim velle aliquid, et velle
396 me velle illud, et sic in infinitum. Ergo in finibus humanae
397 voluntatis proceditur in infinitum, et non est aliquis ultimus
398 finis humanae voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p5">
399 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good
400 is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore
401 it is necessary to fix one last end.
402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33433] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
403 est quod philosophus dicit, II Metaphys., quod <i>qui infinitum
404 faciunt, auferunt naturam boni</i>. Sed bonum est quod habet
405 rationem finis. Ergo contra rationem finis est quod procedatur in
406 infinitum. Necesse est ergo ponere unum ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A4-p6">
407 <b>I answer that,</b> Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever
408 things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must
409 of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes
410 of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
411 the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order
412 in ends---the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first.
413 For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you
414 remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein
415 operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention
416 is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently,
417 on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any
418 action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are
419 ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.
420 </p><p id="FS_Q1_A4-p7"> On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally;
421 for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things
422 ordained to the end.
423 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 co."><a name="33434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33434] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
424 dicendum quod, per se loquendo, impossibile est in finibus
425 procedere in infinitum, ex quacumque parte. In omnibus enim quae
426 per se habent ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo,
427 removeantur ea quae sunt ad primum. Unde philosophus probat, in
428 VIII Physic., quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere
429 in infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo subtracto alia
430 movere non possunt, cum non moveant nisi per hoc quod moventur a
431 primo movente. In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet
432 ordo intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet
433 esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis
434 est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto principio,
435 appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in
436 executione, est unde incipit operatio, unde, isto principio
437 subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari. Principium autem
438 intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est
439 primum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile
440 est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil
441 appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret
442 intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad
443 finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur
444 consilium, sed in infinitum procederet. Ea vero quae non habent
445 ordinem per se, sed per accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil
446 prohibet infinitatem habere, causae enim per accidens
447 indeterminatae sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem
448 per accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8">
449 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good
450 has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that
451 from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And
452 this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is
453 infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its
454 effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the
455 First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely
456 but, as it is written (
457 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
458 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33435] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
459 dicendum quod de ratione boni est quod aliquid ab ipso effluat, non
460 tamen quod ipsum ab alio procedat. Et ideo, cum bonum habeat
461 rationem finis, et primum bonum sit ultimus finis, ratio ista non
462 probat quod non sit ultimus finis; sed quod a fine primo supposito
463 procedatur in infinitum inferius versus ea quae sunt ad finem. Et
464 hoc quidem competeret, si consideraretur sola virtus primi boni,
465 quae est infinita. Sed quia primum bonum habet diffusionem secundum
466 intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam certam formam profluere in
467 causata; aliquis certus modus adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo
468 bono, a quo omnia alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et
469 ideo diffusio bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur
470 Sap. XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p9">
471 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore
472 the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process
473 of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally
474 connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is
475 accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing
476 hinders the reason from an indefinite process.
477 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33436] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
478 dicendum quod in his quae sunt per se, ratio incipit a principiis
479 naturaliter notis, et ad aliquem terminum progreditur. Unde
480 philosophus probat, in I Poster., quod in demonstrationibus non est
481 processus in infinitum, quia in demonstrationibus attenditur ordo
482 aliquorum per se ad invicem connexorum, et non per accidens. In his
483 autem quae per accidens connectuntur, nihil prohibet rationem in
484 infinitum procedere. Accidit autem quantitati aut numero
485 praeexistenti, inquantum huiusmodi, quod ei addatur quantitas aut
486 unitas. Unde in huiusmodi nihil prohibet rationem procedere in
487 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A4-p10">
488 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact
489 that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times.
490 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33437] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
491 dicendum quod illa multiplicatio actuum voluntatis reflexae supra
492 seipsam, per accidens se habet ad ordinem finium. Quod patet ex
493 hoc, quod circa unum et eundem finem indifferenter semel vel
494 pluries supra seipsam voluntas reflectitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A5-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 5. Whether one man can have several last ends?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p2">
495 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine
496 says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of
497 nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many
498 things.
499 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33438] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
500 sic proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit voluntatem unius hominis
501 in plura ferri simul, sicut in ultimos fines. Dicit enim
502 Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod quidam ultimum hominis finem
503 posuerunt in quatuor, scilicet <i>in voluptate, in quiete, in
504 primis naturae, et in virtute</i>. Haec autem manifeste sunt plura.
505 Ergo unus homo potest constituere ultimum finem suae voluntatis in
506 multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p3">
507 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition
508 to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others.
509 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33439] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
510 ea quae non opponuntur ad invicem, se invicem non excludunt. Sed
511 multa inveniuntur in rebus quae sibi invicem non opponuntur. Ergo
512 si unum ponatur ultimus finis voluntatis, non propter hoc alia
513 excluduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p4">
514 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its
515 last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed
516 his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's
517 will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends.
518 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33440] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
519 voluntas per hoc quod constituit ultimum finem in aliquo, suam
520 liberam potentiam non amittit. Sed antequam constitueret ultimum
521 finem suum in illo, puta in voluptate, poterat constituere finem
522 suum ultimum in alio, puta in divitiis. Ergo etiam postquam
523 constituit aliquis ultimum finem suae voluntatis in voluptate,
524 potest simul constituere ultimum finem in divitiis. Ergo possibile
525 est voluntatem unius hominis simul ferri in diversa, sicut in
526 ultimos fines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5">
527 <b>On the contrary,</b> That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life.
528 Hence of gluttons it is written (
529 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.19" target="asv">Phil. 3:19</a>): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to
530 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q1_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv"> Mat. 6:24, </a> "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man
531 to have several last ends not ordained to one another.
532 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33441] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
533 illud in quo quiescit aliquis sicut in ultimo fine, hominis
534 affectui dominatur, quia ex eo totius vitae suae regulas accipit.
535 Unde de gulosis dicitur Philipp. III, <i>quorum Deus venter
536 est</i>, quia scilicet constituunt ultimum finem in deliciis
537 ventris. Sed sicut dicitur Matth. VI, <i>nemo potest duobus dominis
538 servire</i>, ad invicem scilicet non ordinatis. Ergo impossibile
539 est esse plures ultimos fines unius hominis ad invicem non
540 ordinatos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p6">
541 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be
542 assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which
543 he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean
544 now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be
545 complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to
546 desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite
547 so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
548 </p><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p7"> The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in
549 the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must
550 needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last
551 end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one.
552 </p><p id="FS_Q1_A5-p8"> The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above
553 <a href="#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q1_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in
554 a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus,
555 the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle;
556 and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the
557 whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally
558 one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
559 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 co."><a name="33442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33442] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
560 dicendum quod impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se
561 habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos fines. Cuius ratio potest
562 triplex assignari. Prima est quia, cum unumquodque appetat suam
563 perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit,
564 ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus
565 dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod
566 consumatur ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit</i>.
567 Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis
568 appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse
569 non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur.
570 Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic tendat appetitus, ac si
571 utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius. Secunda ratio est quia, sicut
572 in processu rationis principium est id quod naturaliter
573 cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis appetitus, qui est
574 voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod naturaliter desideratur.
575 Hoc autem oportet esse unum, quia natura non tendit nisi ad unum.
576 Principium autem in processu rationalis appetitus est ultimus
577 finis. Unde oportet id in quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi
578 finis, esse unum. Tertia ratio est quia, cum actiones voluntarie ex
579 fine speciem sortiantur, sicut supra habitum est, oportet quod a
580 fine ultimo, qui est communis, sortiantur rationem generis, sicut
581 et naturalia ponuntur in genere secundum formalem rationem
582 communem. Cum igitur omnia appetibilia voluntatis, inquantum
583 huiusmodi, sint unius generis, oportet ultimum finem esse unum. Et
584 praecipue quia in quolibet genere est unum primum principium,
585 ultimus autem finis habet rationem primi principii, ut dictum est.
586 Sicut autem se habet ultimus finis hominis simpliciter ad totum
587 humanum genus, ita se habet ultimus finis huius hominis ad hunc
588 hominem. Unde oportet quod, sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter
589 unus finis ultimus, ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine
590 statuatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p9">
591 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.
592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33443] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
593 dicendum quod omnia illa plura accipiebantur in ratione unius boni
594 perfecti ex his constituti, ab his qui in eis ultimum finem
595 ponebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p10">
596 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's
597 perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.
598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33444] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
599 dicendum quod, etsi plura accipi possint quae ad invicem
600 oppositionem non habeant, tamen bono perfecto opponitur quod sit
601 aliquid de perfectione rei extra ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A5-p11">
602 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend
603 to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).
604 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33445] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
605 dicendum quod potestas voluntatis non habet ut faciat opposita esse
606 simul. Quod contingeret, si tenderet in plura disparata sicut in
607 ultimos fines, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A6-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 6. Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p2">
608 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are
609 said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains
610 not to the last end.
611 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33446] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
612 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quaecumque homo vult,
613 propter ultimum finem velit. Ea enim quae ad finem ultimum
614 ordinantur, seriosa dicuntur, quasi utilia. Sed iocosa a seriis
615 distinguuntur. Ergo ea quae homo iocose agit, non ordinat in
616 ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p3">
617 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
618 Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires,
619 for the last end.
620 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33447] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
621 philosophus dicit, in principio Metaphys., quod scientiae
622 speculativae propter seipsas quaeruntur. Nec tamen potest dici quod
623 quaelibet earum sit ultimus finis. Ergo non omnia quae homo
624 appetit, appetit propter ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p4">
625 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all
626 that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.
627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33448] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
628 quicumque ordinat aliquid in finem aliquem, cogitat de illo fine.
629 Sed non semper homo cogitat de ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit
630 aut facit. Non ergo omnia homo appetit aut facit propter ultimum
631 finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p5">
632 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we
633 love it for its own sake."
634 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33449] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
635 est quod dicit Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>illud est finis boni
636 nostri, propter quod amantur cetera, illud autem propter
637 seipsum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p6">
638 <b>I answer that,</b> Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because
639 whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last
640 end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained
641 to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art.
642 Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly,
643 because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is
644 clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects
645 of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
646 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 co."><a name="33450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33450] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
647 dicendum quod necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat
648 propter ultimum finem. Et hoc apparet duplici ratione. Primo
649 quidem, quia quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni. Quod
650 quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis,
651 necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper
652 inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet
653 tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et
654 ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem
655 consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem. Secundo, quia ultimus
656 finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in
657 aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae
658 secundae moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo
659 movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in
660 ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p7">
661 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford
662 him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.
663 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33451] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
664 dicendum quod actiones ludicrae non ordinantur ad aliquem finem
665 extrinsecum; sed tamen ordinantur ad bonum ipsius ludentis, prout
666 sunt delectantes vel requiem praestantes. Bonum autem consummatum
667 hominis est ultimus finis eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p8">
668 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good,
669 which is the ultimate end.
670 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33452] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
671 dicendum ad secundum, de scientia speculativa; quae appetitur ut
672 bonum quoddam speculantis, quod comprehenditur sub bono completo et
673 perfecto, quod est ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A6-p9">
674 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention,
675 which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts
676 be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every
677 step.
678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33453] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
679 dicendum quod non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine,
680 quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae
681 intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet
682 appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non
683 cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet
684 passu cogitet de fine.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A7-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 7. Whether all men have the same last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p2">
685 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end
686 of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end.
687 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33454] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
688 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium hominum sit unus finis
689 ultimus. Maxime enim videtur hominis ultimus finis esse
690 incommutabile bonum. Sed quidam avertuntur ab incommutabili bono,
691 peccando. Non ergo omnium hominum est unus ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p3">
692 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not
693 have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
694 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33455] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
695 secundum ultimum finem tota vita hominis regulatur. Si igitur esset
696 unus ultimus finis omnium hominum, sequeretur quod in hominibus non
697 essent diversa studia vivendi. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p4">
698 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature,
699 yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end.
700 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33456] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
701 finis est actionis terminus. Actiones autem sunt singularium.
702 Homines autem, etsi conveniant in natura speciei, tamen differunt
703 secundum ea quae ad individua pertinent. Non ergo omnium hominum
704 est unus ultimus finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p5">
705 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
706 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33457] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
707 est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., quod omnes homines
708 conveniunt in appetendo ultimum finem, qui est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p6">
709 <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing
710 in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since
711 all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated
712 above
713 <a href="#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q1_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But as to the thing in which this aspect is
714 realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure;
715 others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to
716 others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in
717 which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed
718 affections desires for his last end.
719 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 co."><a name="33458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33458] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
720 dicendum quod de ultimo fine possumus loqui dupliciter, uno modo,
721 secundum rationem ultimi finis; alio modo, secundum id in quo finis
722 ultimi ratio invenitur. Quantum igitur ad rationem ultimi finis,
723 omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi, quia omnes appetunt suam
724 perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis, ut dictum est.
725 Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines
726 conveniunt in ultimo fine, nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam
727 consummatum bonum, quidam autem voluptatem, quidam vero quodcumque
728 aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile est dulce, sed quibusdam
729 maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini, quibusdam dulcedo mellis, aut
730 alicuius talium. Illud tamen dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius
731 delectabile, in quo maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et
732 similiter illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam
733 ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p7">
734 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the
735 last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
736 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33459] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
737 dicendum quod illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere
738 invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis
739 intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p8">
740 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
741 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33460] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
742 dicendum quod diversa studia vivendi contingunt in hominibus
743 propter diversas res in quibus quaeritur ratio summi boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A7-p9">
744 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above
745
746 <a href="#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q1_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>.
747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33461] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
748 dicendum quod, etsi actiones sint singularium, tamen primum
749 principium agendi in eis est natura, quae tendit ad unum, ut dictum
750 est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q1_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q1_A8-p0.1">Q. 1. A. 8. Whether other creatures concur in that last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p2">
751 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e.
752 God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end.
753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33462] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
754 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in ultimo fine hominis etiam omnia
755 alia conveniant. Finis enim respondet principio. Sed illud quod est
756 principium hominum, scilicet Deus, est etiam principium omnium
757 aliorum. Ergo in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia communicant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p3">
758 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's
759 last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things,
760 too, concur in man's last end.
761 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33463] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
762 Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus convertit
763 omnia ad seipsum, tanquam ad ultimum finem</i>. Sed ipse est etiam
764 ultimus finis hominis, quia solo ipso fruendum est, ut Augustinus
765 dicit. Ergo in fine ultimo hominis etiam alia conveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p4">
766 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of
767 all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.
768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33464] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
769 finis ultimus hominis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed obiectum
770 voluntatis est bonum universale, quod est finis omnium. Ergo
771 necesse est quod in ultimo fine hominis omnia conveniant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p5">
772 <b>On the contrary,</b> man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible
773 for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end.
774 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33465] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
775 est quod ultimus finis hominum est beatitudo; quam omnes appetunt,
776 ut Augustinus dicit. <i>Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia
777 ut beata sint</i>, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium
778 quaest. Non ergo in ultimo fine hominis alia conveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p6">
779 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself
780 in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of
781 a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money
782 as "thing," or possession of money as "use."
783 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 co."><a name="33466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33466] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
784 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic. et in V
785 Metaphys., finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo, idest
786 ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius
787 rei. Sicut si dicamus quod motus corporis gravis finis est vel
788 locus inferior ut res, vel hoc quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut
789 usus, et finis avari est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniae
790 ut usus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p7"> If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end,
791 since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of
792 the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their
793 last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in
794 so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
795 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam
796 rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia
797 conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum
798 rerum. Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad
799 consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant
800 creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae
801 consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non
802 competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum
803 participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel
804 vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q1_A8-p8"> Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 1 a. 8 ad arg."><a name="33467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33467] Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
805 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
806 <div id="FS_Q2" class="div3">
807 <h3 id="FS_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
808 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
809 <p id="FS_Q2-p2"> We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.</p><p id="FS_Q2-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q2-p4"><a href="#FS_Q2_A1"> (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p5"><a href="#FS_Q2_A2"> (2) Whether in honor?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p6"><a href="#FS_Q2_A3"> (3) Whether in fame or glory?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p7"><a href="#FS_Q2_A4"> (4) Whether in power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p8"><a href="#FS_Q2_A5"> (5) Whether in any good of the body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p9"><a href="#FS_Q2_A6"> (6) Whether in pleasure?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p10"><a href="#FS_Q2_A7"> (7) Whether in any good of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q2-p11"><a href="#FS_Q2_A8"> (8) Whether in any created good?</a></p>
810 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 pr."><a name="33468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33468]
811 Iª-IIae q. 2 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
812 beatitudine, nam beatitudo nominat adeptionem ultimi finis. Primo
813 quidem, in quibus sit; secundo, quid sit; tertio, qualiter eam
814 consequi possimus. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum
815 beatitudo consistat in divitiis. Secundo, utrum in honoribus.
816 Tertio, utrum in fama, sive in gloria. Quarto, utrum in potestate.
817 Quinto, utrum in aliquo corporis bono. Sexto, utrum in voluptate.
818 Septimo, utrum in aliquo bono animae. Octavo, utrum in aliquo bono
819 creato.</p></div></div></div>
820 <div id="FS_Q2_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A1-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 1. Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2">
821 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which
822 has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (
823 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv">Eccles. 10:19</a>): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth.
824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33469] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
825 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in divitiis
826 consistat. Cum enim beatitudo sit ultimus finis hominis, in eo
827 consistit quod maxime in hominis affectu dominatur. Huiusmodi autem
828 sunt divitiae, dicitur enim Eccle. X, <i>pecuniae obediunt
829 omnia</i>. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo hominis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p3">
830 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good
831 things." Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented,
832 that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
833 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33470] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
834 secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>beatitudo est status omnium
835 bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed in pecuniis omnia possideri
836 videntur, quia, ut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., ad hoc nummus est
837 inventus, ut sit quasi fideiussor habendi pro eo quodcumque homo
838 voluerit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4">
839 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more
840 than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" (
841 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.9" target="asv">Eccles. 5:9</a>). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33471] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
843 desiderium summi boni, cum nunquam deficiat, videtur esse
844 infinitum. Sed hoc maxime in divitiis invenitur, quia <i>avarus non
845 implebitur pecunia</i>, ut dicitur Eccle. V. Ergo in divitiis
846 beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p5">
847 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines
848 in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness
849 does not consist in wealth.
850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33472] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
851 bonum hominis in retinendo beatitudinem magis consistit quam in
852 emittendo ipsam. Sed sicut Boetius in II de Consol. dicit,
853 <i>divitiae effundendo, magis quam coacervando, melius nitent,
854 siquidem avaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit</i>. Ergo
855 in divitiis beatitudo non consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p6">
856 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),
857 viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink,
858 clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money,
859 but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things
860 salable.
861 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of
862 something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man
863 as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to
864 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."
865 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A1-p8"> And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because,
866 by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of
867 the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.
868 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="33473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33473] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
869 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in divitiis
870 consistere. Sunt enim duplices divitiae, ut philosophus dicit in I
871 Polit., scilicet naturales, et artificiales. Naturales quidem
872 divitiae sunt, quibus homini subvenitur ad defectus naturales
873 tollendos, sicut cibus, potus, vestimenta, vehicula et habitacula,
874 et alia huiusmodi. Divitiae autem artificiales sunt, quibus
875 secundum se natura non iuvatur, ut denarii; sed ars humana eos
876 adinvenit propter facilitatem commutationis, ut sint quasi mensura
877 quaedam rerum venalium. Manifestum est autem quod in divitiis
878 naturalibus beatitudo hominis esse non potest. Quaeruntur enim
879 huiusmodi divitiae propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam
880 hominis, et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis
881 ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem. Unde in ordine naturae omnia
882 huiusmodi sunt infra hominem, et propter hominem facta; secundum
883 illud Psalmi VIII, <i>omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius</i>.
884 Divitiae autem artificiales non quaeruntur nisi propter naturales,
885 non enim quaererentur, nisi quia per eas emuntur res ad usum vitae
886 necessariae. Unde multo minus habent rationem ultimi finis.
887 Impossibile est igitur beatitudinem, quae est ultimus finis
888 hominis, in divitiis esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p9">
889 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which
890 can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as
891 it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33474] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
893 dicendum quod omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad
894 multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae
895 pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet
896 sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus, sicut et iudicium de saporibus
897 ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10">
898 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (
899 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.16" target="asv">Prov. 17:16</a>): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom."
900 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33475] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
901 dicendum quod pecunia possunt haberi omnia venalia, non autem
902 spiritualia, quae vendi non possunt. Unde dicitur Proverb. XVII,
903 <i>quid prodest stulto divitias habere, cum sapientiam emere non
904 possit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11">
905 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial
906 wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear
907 (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly
908 the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things
909 despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (
910 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is
911 the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (
912 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A1-p11.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason
913 of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect,
914 and the sovereign good does not consist therein.
915 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33476] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
916 dicendum quod appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus,
917 quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus
918 divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit
919 concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per
920 philosophum in I Polit. Aliter tamen est infinitum desiderium
921 divitiarum, et desiderium summi boni. Nam summum bonum quanto
922 perfectius possidetur, tanto ipsummet magis amatur, et alia
923 contemnuntur, quia quanto magis habetur, magis cognoscitur. Et ideo
924 dicitur Eccli. XXIV, <i>qui edunt me, adhuc esurient</i>. Sed in
925 appetitu divitiarum, et quorumcumque temporalium bonorum, est e
926 converso, nam quando iam habentur, ipsa contemnuntur, et alia
927 appetuntur; secundum quod significatur Ioan. IV, cum dominus dicit,
928 qui bibit <i>ex hac aqua</i>, per quam temporalia significantur,
929 <i>sitiet iterum</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia eorum insufficientia magis
930 cognoscitur cum habentur. Et ideo hoc ipsum ostendit eorum
931 imperfectionem, et quod in eis summum bonum non consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A2-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 2. Whether man's happiness consists in honors?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p2">
932 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher
933 says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says
934 (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
935 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33477] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
936 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in honoribus
937 consistat. Beatitudo enim, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis,
938 ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed honor maxime videtur esse id
939 quod est virtutis praemium, ut philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Ergo
940 in honore maxime consistit beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3">
941 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect
942 good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (
943 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor.
944 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33478] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
945 illud quod convenit Deo et excellentissimis, maxime videtur esse
946 beatitudo, quae est bonum perfectum. Sed huiusmodi est honor, ut
947 philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Et etiam I Tim. I, dicit apostolus,
948 <i>soli Deo honor et gloria</i>. Ergo in honore consistit
949 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p4">
950 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers
951 loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
952 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33479] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
953 illud quod est maxime desideratum ab hominibus, est beatitudo. Sed
954 nihil videtur esse magis desiderabile ab hominibus quam honor, quia
955 homines patiuntur iacturam in omnibus aliis rebus ne patiantur
956 aliquod detrimentum sui honoris. Ergo in honore beatitudo
957 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p5">
958 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the
959 person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.
960 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33480] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
961 beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur,
962 sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut
963 philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Ergo in honore beatitudo non
964 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p6">
965 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
966 consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion,
967 especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share
968 of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot
969 principally consist therein.
970 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="33481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33481] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
971 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem consistere in honore.
972 Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et
973 ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est
974 in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum
975 beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum; et secundum partes
976 eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis
977 participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem,
978 sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p7">
979 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive
980 honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness
981 itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33482] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
983 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, honor non est
984 praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt
985 honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, quasi a non habentibus aliquid
986 maius ad dandum. Verum autem praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo,
987 propter quam virtuosi operantur. Si autem propter honorem
988 operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p8">
989 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that
990 honor makes them excellent.
991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33483] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
992 dicendum quod honor debetur Deo et excellentissimis, in signum vel
993 testimonium excellentiae praeexistentis, non quod ipse honor faciat
994 eos excellentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A2-p9">
995 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated
996 above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or
997 happy.
998 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33484] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
999 dicendum quod ex naturali desiderio beatitudinis, quam consequitur
1000 honor, ut dictum est, contingit quod homines maxime honorem
1001 desiderant. Unde quaerunt homines maxime honorari a sapientibus,
1002 quorum iudicio credunt se esse excellentes vel felices.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A3-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 3. Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2">
1003 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints
1004 for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (
1005 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.18" target="asv">Rom. 8:18</a>): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore
1006 happiness consists in glory.
1007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33485] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
1008 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in gloria.
1009 In eo enim videtur beatitudo consistere, quod redditur sanctis pro
1010 tribulationibus quas in mundo patiuntur. Huiusmodi autem est
1011 gloria, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, <i>non sunt condignae
1012 passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam, quae revelabitur in
1013 nobis</i>. Ergo beatitudo consistit in gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p3">
1014 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge
1015 of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory
1016 consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.
1017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33486] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1018 bonum est diffusivum sui, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div.
1019 Nom. Sed per gloriam bonum hominis maxime diffunditur in notitiam
1020 aliorum, quia gloria, ut Ambrosius dicit, nihil aliud est quam
1021 clara cum laude notitia. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in
1022 gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p4">
1023 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity
1024 after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your
1025 fame in future time." Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.
1026 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33487] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1027 beatitudo est stabilissimum bonorum. Hoc autem videtur esse fama
1028 vel gloria, quia per hanc quodammodo homines aeternitatem
1029 sortiuntur. Unde Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., <i>vos
1030 immortalitatem vobis propagare videmini, cum futuri famam temporis
1031 cogitatis</i>. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in fama seu
1032 gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p5">
1033 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe
1034 their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame,
1035 must needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
1036 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33488] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1037 beatitudo est verum hominis bonum. Sed famam seu gloriam contingit
1038 esse falsam, ut enim dicit Boetius, in libro III de Consol.,
1039 <i>plures magnum saepe nomen falsis vulgi opinionibus abstulerunt.
1040 Quo quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur,
1041 suis ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant</i>. Non ergo beatitudo
1042 hominis consistit in fama seu gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A3-p6">
1043 <b>I answer that,</b> Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [*Augustine,
1044 Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for
1045 human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection
1046 of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human
1047 knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness
1048 itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends
1049 on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God;
1050 according to
1051 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.15" target="asv"> Ps. 90:15,16</a>: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with
1052 length of days, and I will show him my salvation."
1053 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A3-p7"> Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts.
1054 For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it
1055 is written (
1056 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:18</a>): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth."
1057 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="33489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33489] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1058 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in fama seu
1059 gloria humana consistere. Nam gloria nihil aliud est quam clara
1060 notitia cum laude, ut Ambrosius dicit. Res autem cognita aliter
1061 comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem
1062 divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina
1063 cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum. Unde perfectio humani boni,
1064 quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed
1065 magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo
1066 causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta. Et
1067 ideo in fama vel in gloria non potest consistere hominis beatitudo.
1068 Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et
1069 ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut
1070 ex causa sua, secundum illud Psalmi XC, <i>eripiam eum, et
1071 glorificabo eum, longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam illi
1072 salutare meum</i>. Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana
1073 notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus
1074 contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter
1075 humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius
1076 gloria semper vera est. Propter quod dicitur, II ad Cor. X, <i>ille
1077 probatus est, quem Deus commendat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8">
1078 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence
1079 it is written (
1080 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv">Mk. 8:38</a>): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins
1081 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.8.38" target="asv"> Mk. 8:38 </a>with
1082 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A3-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.8" target="asv"> Lk. 12:8 </a>owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory].
1083 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33490] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1084 dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de gloria quae est ab
1085 hominibus, sed de gloria quae est a Deo coram Angelis eius. Unde
1086 dicitur Marc. VIII, <i>filius hominis confitebitur eum in gloria
1087 patris sui, coram Angelis eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p9">
1088 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived
1089 from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false,
1090 it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that
1091 fame can nowise make man happy.
1092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33491] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1093 dicendum quod bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est
1094 in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod
1095 derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit
1096 beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam. Si autem cognitio falsa sit,
1097 non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama
1098 celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere
1099 hominem beatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A3-p10">
1100 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But
1101 happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
1102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33492] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1103 dicendum quod fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de
1104 facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per
1105 accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A4-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 4. Whether man's happiness consists in power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2">
1106 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first
1107 beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture
1108 they are called "gods" (
1109 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness consists in power.
1110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33493] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
1111 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in potestate.
1112 Omnia enim appetunt assimilari Deo, tanquam ultimo fini et primo
1113 principio. Sed homines qui in potestatibus sunt, propter
1114 similitudinem potestatis, maxime videntur esse Deo conformes, unde
1115 et in Scriptura dii vocantur, ut patet Exod. XXII, <i>diis non
1116 detrahes</i>. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p3">
1117 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to
1118 those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
1119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33494] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1120 beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Sed perfectissimum est quod homo
1121 etiam alios regere possit, quod convenit his qui in potestatibus
1122 sunt constituti. Ergo beatitudo consistit in potestate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p4">
1123 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than
1124 aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
1125 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33495] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1126 beatitudo, cum sit maxime appetibilis, opponitur ei quod maxime est
1127 fugiendum. Sed homines maxime fugiunt servitutem, cui contraponitur
1128 potestas. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p5">
1129 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man cannot
1130 relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who
1131 is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?"
1132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33496] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1133 beatitudo est perfectum bonum. Sed potestas est maxime imperfecta.
1134 Ut enim dicit Boetius, III de Consol., <i>potestas humana
1135 sollicitudinum morsus expellere, formidinum aculeos vitare nequit.
1136 Et postea, potentem censes cui satellites latus ambiunt qui quos
1137 terret, ipse plus metuit?</i> Non igitur beatitudo consistit in
1138 potestate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A4-p6">
1139 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle,
1140 as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good
1141 and evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power,
1142 which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
1143 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A4-p7"> Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because,
1144 since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and
1145 in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having
1146 gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may
1147 still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since
1148 happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written
1149 (
1150 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.12" target="asv">Eccles. 5:12</a>) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because
1151 man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained
1152 thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for
1153 which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
1154 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 co."><a name="33497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33497] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1155 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere,
1156 propter duo. Primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii,
1157 ut patet in V Metaphys. Beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi
1158 finis. Secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum.
1159 Beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum. Unde magis
1160 posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est
1161 per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate. Possunt autem quatuor
1162 generales rationes induci ad ostendendum quod in nullo praemissorum
1163 exteriorum bonorum beatitudo consistat. Quarum prima est quia, cum
1164 beatitudo sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod
1165 malum. Omnia autem praedicta possunt inveniri et in bonis et in
1166 malis. Secunda ratio est quia, cum de ratione beatitudinis sit quod
1167 sit per se sufficiens, ut patet in I Ethic., necesse est quod,
1168 beatitudine adepta, nullum bonum homini necessarium desit. Adeptis
1169 autem singulis praemissorum, possunt adhuc multa bona homini
1170 necessaria deesse, puta sapientia, sanitas corporis, et huiusmodi.
1171 Tertia, quia, cum beatitudo sit bonum perfectum, ex beatitudine non
1172 potest aliquod malum alicui provenire. Quod non convenit
1173 praemissis, dicitur enim Eccle. V, quod divitiae interdum
1174 conservantur in malum domini sui; et simile patet in aliis tribus.
1175 Quarta ratio est quia ad beatitudinem homo ordinatur per principia
1176 interiora, cum ad ipsam naturaliter ordinetur. Praemissa autem
1177 quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a
1178 fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in
1179 praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p8">
1180 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it
1181 is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
1182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33498] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1183 dicendum quod divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua
1184 potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur.
1185 Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo
1186 quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad
1187 bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p9">
1188 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes
1189 a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
1190 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33499] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1191 dicendum quod, sicut optimum est quod aliquis utatur bene potestate
1192 in regimine multorum, ita pessimum est si male utatur. Et ita
1193 potestas se habet et ad bonum et ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A4-p10">
1194 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme
1195 good consists in power.
1196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33500] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1197 dicendum quod servitus est impedimentum boni usus potestatis, et
1198 ideo naturaliter homines eam fugiunt, et non quasi in potestate
1199 hominis sit summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A5-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 5. Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2">
1200 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (
1201 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:16</a>): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore
1202 it consists in the health of the body.
1203 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33501] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
1204 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in bonis
1205 corporis. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, <i>non est census supra censum
1206 salutis corporis</i>. Sed in eo quod est optimum, consistit
1207 beatitudo. Ergo consistit in corporis salute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p3">
1208 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows.
1209 But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it
1210 seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
1211 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33502] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1212 Dionysius dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod esse est melius quam
1213 vivere, et vivere melius quam alia quae consequuntur. Sed ad esse
1214 et vivere hominis requiritur salus corporis. Cum ergo beatitudo sit
1215 summum bonum hominis, videtur quod salus corporis maxime pertineat
1216 ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p4">
1217 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the
1218 greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so
1219 the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into
1220 all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that
1221 which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the
1222 health of the body.
1223 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33503] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1224 quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ab altiori principio dependet
1225 quia quanto causa est superior, tanto eius virtus ad plura se
1226 extendit. Sed sicut causalitas causae efficientis consideratur
1227 secundum influentiam, ita causalitas finis attenditur secundum
1228 appetitum. Ergo sicut prima causa efficiens est quae in omnia
1229 influit, ita ultimus finis est quod ab omnibus desideratur. Sed
1230 ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab omnibus. Ergo in his quae
1231 pertinent ad esse hominis, sicut est salus corporis, maxime
1232 consistit eius beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p5">
1233 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance,
1234 by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist
1235 in goods of the body.
1236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33504] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1237 secundum beatitudinem homo excellit omnia alia animalia. Sed
1238 secundum bona corporis, a multis animalibus superatur, sicut ab
1239 elephante in diuturnitate vitae, a leone in fortitudine, a cervo in
1240 cursu. Ergo beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A5-p6">
1241 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a
1242 thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain
1243 does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as
1244 its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer
1245 its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to
1246 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14</a>: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to
1247 something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation
1248 of man's being.
1249 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A5-p7"> Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could not be said
1250 that the end of man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body
1251 depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (
1252 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q2_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts
1253 them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the
1254 soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
1255 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 co."><a name="33505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33505] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1256 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in bonis
1257 corporis consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia impossibile
1258 est quod illius rei quae ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, ultimus
1259 finis sit eiusdem conservatio in esse. Unde gubernator non
1260 intendit, sicut ultimum finem, conservationem navis sibi commissae;
1261 eo quod navis ad aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, scilicet ad
1262 navigandum. Sicut autem navis committitur gubernatori ad
1263 dirigendum, ita homo est suae voluntati et rationi commissus;
1264 secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit
1265 hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Manifestum est
1266 autem quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem, non enim homo
1267 est summum bonum. Unde impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis
1268 et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse. Secundo quia,
1269 dato quod finis rationis et voluntatis humanae esset conservatio
1270 humani esse, non tamen posset dici quod finis hominis esset aliquod
1271 corporis bonum. Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et
1272 quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae
1273 non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est; ipsumque corpus est
1274 propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumenta
1275 propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones exerceat. Unde omnia bona
1276 corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde
1277 impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae
1278 est ultimus hominis finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p8">
1279 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it
1280 is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good
1281 of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.
1282 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33506] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1283 dicendum quod, sicut corpus ordinatur ad animam sicut ad finem, ita
1284 bona exteriora ad ipsum corpus. Et ideo rationabiliter bonum
1285 corporis praefertur bonis exterioribus, quae per censum
1286 significantur, sicut et bonum animae praefertur omnibus bonis
1287 corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p9">
1288 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes
1289 all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which
1290 does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident
1291 that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent.
1292 Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than
1293 living things.
1294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33507] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1295 dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in
1296 se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus
1297 subsequentibus, sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia
1298 subsequentia. Et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur
1299 ipsum esse prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non
1300 capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum,
1301 sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum
1302 esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius
1303 ibidem dicit quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et
1304 intelligentia viventibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A5-p10">
1305 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom
1306 every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living
1307 being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
1308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33508] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1309 dicendum quod, quia finis respondet principio, ex illa ratione
1310 probatur quod ultimus finis est primum principium essendi, in quo
1311 est omnis essendi perfectio, cuius similitudinem appetunt, secundum
1312 suam proportionem, quaedam quidem secundum esse tantum, quaedam
1313 secundum esse vivens, quaedam secundum esse vivens et intelligens
1314 et beatum. Et hoc paucorum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A6-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 6. Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p2">
1315 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something
1316 else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what
1317 is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.
1318 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33509] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
1319 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in voluptate
1320 consistat. Beatitudo enim, cum sit ultimus finis, non appetitur
1321 propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam. Sed hoc maxime convenit
1322 delectationi, <i>ridiculum est enim ab aliquo quaerere propter quid
1323 velit delectari</i>, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo beatitudo maxime
1324 in voluptate et delectatione consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p3">
1325 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the
1326 end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion
1327 of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes
1328 him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness,
1329 consists principally in pleasure.
1330 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33510] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a>
1331 <i>Praeterea, causa prima vehementius imprimit quam secunda</i>, ut
1332 dicitur in libro de causis. Influentia autem finis attenditur
1333 secundum eius appetitum. Illud ergo videtur habere rationem finis
1334 ultimi, quod maxime movet appetitum. Hoc autem est voluptas, cuius
1335 signum est quod delectatio intantum absorbet hominis voluntatem et
1336 rationem, quod alia bona contemnere facit. Ergo videtur quod
1337 ultimus finis hominis, qui est beatitudo, maxime in voluptate
1338 consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p4">
1339 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish,
1340 and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists
1341 in pleasure.
1342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33511] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1343 cum appetitus sit boni, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse
1344 optimum. Sed delectationem omnia appetunt, et sapientes et
1345 insipientes, et etiam ratione carentia. Ergo delectatio est
1346 optimum. Consistit ergo in voluptate beatitudo, quae est summum
1347 bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p5">
1348 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had
1349 a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy
1350 too."
1351 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33512] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1352 est quod Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., <i>tristes exitus esse
1353 voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget.
1354 Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes
1355 quoque beatae esse dicantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A6-p6">
1356 <b>I answer that,</b> Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13),
1357 although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains
1358 to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and
1359 another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper
1360 accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has
1361 some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good,
1362 is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least
1363 apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness,
1364 but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
1365 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A6-p7"> But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense,
1366 which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense,
1367 cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which
1368 is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul
1369 which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form
1370 is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite.
1371 Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect,
1372 which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite
1373 number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through
1374 being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence
1375 it is written (
1376 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.9" target="asv">Wis. 7:9</a>) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor
1377 a proper accident of happiness.
1378 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 co."><a name="33513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33513] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1379 dicendum quod, <i>quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae
1380 sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum</i>, ut dicitur VII
1381 Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus
1382 tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit. Quia in unaquaque re
1383 aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium
1384 accidens ipsius, sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal
1385 rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile. Est igitur
1386 considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens
1387 quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex
1388 hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi
1389 conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria. Bonum
1390 autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis
1391 beatitudo si autem sit imperfectum est quaedam beatitudinis
1392 participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde
1393 manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio quae consequitur bonum
1394 perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis; sed quoddam consequens
1395 ad ipsam sicut per se accidens. Voluptas autem corporalis non
1396 potest etiam modo praedicto sequi bonum perfectum. Nam sequitur
1397 bonum quod apprehendit sensus, qui est virtus animae corpore utens.
1398 Bonum autem quod pertinet ad corpus, quod apprehenditur secundum
1399 sensum, non potest esse perfectum hominis bonum. Cum enim anima
1400 rationalis excedat proportionem materiae corporalis, pars animae
1401 quae est ab organo corporeo absoluta, quandam habet infinitatem
1402 respectu ipsius corporis et partium animae corpori concretarum,
1403 sicut immaterialia sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium,
1404 eo quod forma per materiam quodammodo contrahitur et finitur, unde
1405 forma a materia absoluta est quodammodo infinita. Et ideo sensus,
1406 qui est vis corporalis, cognoscit singulare, quod est determinatum
1407 per materiam, intellectus vero, qui est vis a materia absoluta,
1408 cognoscit universale, quod est abstractum a materia, et continet
1409 sub se infinita singularia. Unde patet quod bonum conveniens
1410 corpori, quod per apprehensionem sensus delectationem corporalem
1411 causat, non est perfectum bonum hominis, sed est minimum quiddam in
1412 comparatione ad bonum animae. Unde Sap. VII, dicitur quod <i>omne
1413 aurum, in comparatione sapientiae, arena est exigua</i>. Sic igitur
1414 neque voluptas corporalis est ipsa beatitudo, nec est per se
1415 accidens beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p8">
1416 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus
1417 it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as
1418 good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the
1419 final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight
1420 is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle,
1421 and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
1422 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33514] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1423 dicendum quod eiusdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod
1424 appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus
1425 in bono, sicut ex eadem virtute naturae est quod grave feratur
1426 deorsum, et quod ibi quiescat. Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum
1427 appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud
1428 appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam
1429 formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis
1430 propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis
1431 obiectum, et per consequens est principium eius, et dat ei formam,
1432 ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono
1433 desiderato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p9">
1434 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles
1435 of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
1436 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33515] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1437 dicendum quod vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit
1438 ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae
1439 cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus
1440 delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A6-p10">
1441 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely,
1442 as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight
1443 results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.
1444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33516] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1445 dicendum quod eo modo omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et
1446 appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem appetunt ratione boni, et
1447 non e converso, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod delectatio
1448 sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio
1449 consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id
1450 quod est per se et maximum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A7-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 7. Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p2">
1451 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold:
1452 external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of
1453 the body, as shown above (
1454 <a href="#FS_Q2_A4" id="FS_Q2_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
1455 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33517] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
1456 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in aliquo bono
1457 animae. Beatitudo enim est quoddam hominis bonum. Hoc autem per
1458 tria dividitur, quae sunt bona exteriora, bona corporis, et bona
1459 animae. Sed beatitudo non consistit in bonis exterioribus, neque in
1460 bonis corporis, sicut supra ostensum est. Ergo consistit in bonis
1461 animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p3">
1462 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom
1463 we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself
1464 more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all
1465 else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not,
1466 however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
1467 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33518] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1468 illud cui appetimus aliquod bonum, magis amamus quam bonum quod ei
1469 appetimus, sicut magis amamus amicum cui appetimus pecuniam, quam
1470 pecuniam. Sed unusquisque quodcumque bonum sibi appetit. Ergo
1471 seipsum amat magis quam omnia alia bona. Sed beatitudo est quod
1472 maxime amatur, quod patet ex hoc quod propter ipsam omnia alia
1473 amantur et desiderantur. Ergo beatitudo consistit in aliquo bono
1474 ipsius hominis. Sed non in bonis corporis. Ergo in bonis
1475 animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p4">
1476 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness
1477 is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above
1478 <a href="#FS_Q2_A5" id="FS_Q2_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
1479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33519] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1480 perfectio est aliquid eius quod perficitur. Sed beatitudo est
1481 quaedam perfectio hominis. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid hominis. Sed
1482 non est aliquid corporis, ut ostensum est. Ergo beatitudo est
1483 aliquid animae. Et ita consistit in bonis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p5">
1484 <b>On the contrary,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake."
1485 But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists
1486 in no good of the soul.
1487 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33520] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1488 sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., <i>id in quo
1489 constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est</i>. Sed homo
1490 non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est
1491 diligendum propter Deum. Ergo in nullo bono animae beatitudo
1492 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p6">
1493 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
1494 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q2_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession
1495 of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something
1496 belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing
1497 actually, from being potentially
1498 knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its
1499 fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last
1500 end.
1501 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p7"> In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is
1502 the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent
1503 to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.
1504 </p><p id="FS_Q2_A7-p8"> But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself
1505 desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness
1506 through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy;
1507 but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something
1508 belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
1509 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 co."><a name="33521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33521] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1510 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur,
1511 scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio
1512 aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis
1513 quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem,
1514 impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel
1515 aliquid eius. Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in
1516 potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de
1517 potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter
1518 actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est
1519 secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis.
1520 Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius.
1521 Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive
1522 habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum
1523 perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est
1524 voluntas, est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens
1525 ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens
1526 particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus
1527 finis hominis. Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad
1528 ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei
1529 quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid
1530 hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem
1531 consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo
1532 beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit, sed huius rei adeptio
1533 vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid
1534 animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra
1535 animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p9">
1536 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or
1537 act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes
1538 happiness is a good of the soul.
1539 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33522] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1540 dicendum quod, secundum quod sub illa divisione comprehenduntur
1541 omnia bona quae homini sunt appetibilia, sic bonum animae dicitur
1542 non solum potentia aut habitus aut actus, sed etiam obiectum, quod
1543 est extrinsecum. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere id in quo
1544 beatitudo consistit, esse quoddam bonum animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p10">
1545 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved
1546 as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both
1547 cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when
1548 we treat of Charity.
1549 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33523] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1550 dicendum, quantum ad propositum pertinet, quod beatitudo maxime
1551 amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui
1552 concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est
1553 eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiae aliquid
1554 homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi cum de caritate
1555 agetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A7-p11">
1556 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness,
1557 viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.
1558 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33524] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1559 dicendum quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam
1560 animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod
1561 scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q2_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q2_A8-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 8. Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p2">
1562 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites
1563 the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches
1564 the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature,
1565 as stated in
1566 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q2_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>, it seems that man's
1567 happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
1568 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33525] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
1569 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo
1570 bono creato. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod
1571 divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum, ex
1572 quo potest accipi quod summum inferioris naturae sit attingere
1573 infimum naturae superioris. Sed summum hominis bonum est beatitudo.
1574 Cum ergo Angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, ut in primo
1575 habitum est; videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in hoc quod
1576 aliquo modo attingit ad Angelum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p3">
1577 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for
1578 its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys.
1579 viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
1580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33526] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1581 ultimus finis cuiuslibet rei est in suo perfecto, unde pars est
1582 propter totum, sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas
1583 creaturarum, quae dicitur maior mundus, comparatur ad hominem, qui
1584 in VIII Physic. dicitur minor mundus, sicut perfectum ad
1585 imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in tota universitate
1586 creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p4">
1587 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good
1588 surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation,
1589 it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness.
1590 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33527] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1591 per hoc homo efficitur beatus, quod eius naturale desiderium
1592 quietat. Sed naturale desiderium hominis non extenditur ad maius
1593 bonum quam quod ipse capere potest. Cum ergo homo non sit capax
1594 boni quod excedit limites totius creaturae, videtur quod per
1595 aliquod bonum creatum homo beatus fieri possit. Et ita beatitudo
1596 hominis in aliquo bono creato consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5">
1597 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it
1598 is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (
1599 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv">Ps. 143:15</a>)."
1600 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33528] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1601 est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>ut vita carnis anima
1602 est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est; de quo dicitur, beatus
1603 populus cuius dominus Deus eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6">
1604 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite
1605 altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of
1606 man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that
1607 naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any
1608 creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will
1609 of man, according to the words of
1610 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q2_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.5" target="asv"> Ps. 102:5</a>: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.
1611 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 co."><a name="33529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33529] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1612 dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo
1613 bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter
1614 quietat appetitum, alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc
1615 restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est
1616 appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus
1617 est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare
1618 voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in
1619 aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet
1620 bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere
1621 potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, <i>qui replet in bonis
1622 desiderium tuum</i>. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis
1623 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p7">
1624 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as
1625 in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the
1626 blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.
1627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33530] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1628 dicendum quod superius hominis attingit quidem infimum angelicae
1629 naturae per quandam similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in
1630 ultimo fine, sed procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fontem boni,
1631 qui est universale obiectum beatitudinis omnium beatorum, tanquam
1632 infinitum et perfectum bonum existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p8">
1633 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself,
1634 but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is
1635 ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.
1636 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33531] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1637 dicendum quod, si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed
1638 ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum
1639 totum, sed aliquid aliud. Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam
1640 comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed
1641 ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non
1642 est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q2_A8-p9">
1643 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is
1644 less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an
1645 angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
1646 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 2 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33532] Iª-IIae q. 2 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1647 dicendum quod bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est
1648 capax ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis, est tamen minus quam bonum
1649 cuius est capax ut obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod
1650 participatur ab Angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum et
1651 contractum.</p></div></div></div></div>
1652 <div id="FS_Q3" class="div3">
1653 <h3 id="FS_Q3-p0.1">Q. 3. WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
1654 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
1655 <p id="FS_Q3-p2"> We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.</p><p id="FS_Q3-p3"> Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q3-p4"><a href="#FS_Q3_A1"> (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p5"><a href="#FS_Q3_A2"> (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p6"><a href="#FS_Q3_A3"> (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p7"><a href="#FS_Q3_A4"> (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p8"><a href="#FS_Q3_A5"> (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p9"><a href="#FS_Q3_A6"> (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p10"><a href="#FS_Q3_A7"> (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?</a></p><p id="FS_Q3-p11"><a href="#FS_Q3_A8"> (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?</a></p>
1656 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 pr."><a name="33533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33533]
1657 Iª-IIae q. 3 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quid sit
1658 beatitudo; et quae requirantur ad ipsam. Circa primum quaeruntur
1659 octo. Primo, utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Secundo, si est
1660 aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio. Tertio, utrum sit operatio
1661 sensitivae partis, an intellectivae tantum. Quarto, si est operatio
1662 intellectivae partis, utrum sit operatio intellectus, an
1663 voluntatis. Quinto, si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio
1664 intellectus speculativi, aut practici. Sexto, si est operatio
1665 intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat in speculatione
1666 scientiarum speculativarum. Septimo, utrum consistat in
1667 speculatione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet Angelorum. Octavo,
1668 utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per essentiam videtur.</p></div></div></div>
1669 <div id="FS_Q3_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A1-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 1. Whether happiness is something uncreated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p2">
1670 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God
1671 is happiness itself."
1672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33534] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
1673 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Dicit
1674 enim Boetius, in III de Consol., <i>Deum esse ipsam beatitudinem
1675 necesse est confiteri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p3">
1676 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several
1677 supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.
1678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33535] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1679 beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum
1680 ergo non sint plura summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem
1681 quod Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p4">
1682 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an
1683 end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same
1684 as God.
1685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33536] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1686 beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter humana voluntas
1687 tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam in finem tendere debet
1688 nisi in Deum; quo solo fruendum est, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo
1689 beatitudo est idem quod Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p5">
1690 <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3):
1691 "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.
1692 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33537] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1693 nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo hominis est aliquid
1694 factum, quia secundum Augustinum, I de Doctr. Christ., <i>illis
1695 rebus fruendum est, quae nos beatos faciunt</i>. Ergo beatitudo non
1696 est aliquid increatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6">
1697 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
1698 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
1699 <a href="#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q3_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly
1700 there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser
1701 is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense,
1702 then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will.
1703 But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment
1704 or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause
1705 or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something
1706 created.
1707 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="33538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33538] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1708 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dicitur dupliciter.
1709 Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis
1710 pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut
1711 fruitio eius rei quae desideratur, sicut si dicatur quod possessio
1712 pecuniae est finis avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis
1713 intemperati. Primo ergo modo, ultimus hominis finis est bonum
1714 increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest
1715 voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo, ultimus
1716 finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est
1717 aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem finis
1718 vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum
1719 ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum, si autem
1720 consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est
1721 aliquid creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p7">
1722 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence.
1723 On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by
1724 participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.
1725 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33539] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1726 dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per
1727 adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed
1728 per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem dicit
1729 Boetius, per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem
1730 dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo
1731 dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p8">
1732 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.
1733 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33540] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1734 dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum hominis bonum, quia est
1735 adeptio vel fruitio summi boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A1-p9">
1736 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.
1737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33541] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1738 dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus finis, per modum quo
1739 adeptio finis dicitur finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A2-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 2. Whether happiness is an operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2">
1740 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (
1741 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv">Rom. 6:22</a>): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being
1742 of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation.
1743 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33542] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
1744 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo non sit operatio. Dicit enim
1745 apostolus, Rom. VI, <i>habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem,
1746 finem vero vitam aeternam</i>. Sed vita non est operatio, sed ipsum
1747 esse viventium. Ergo ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo, non est
1748 operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p3">
1749 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But
1750 state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
1751 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33543] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1752 Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod <i>beatitudo est status
1753 omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed status non nominat
1754 operationem. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p4">
1755 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of
1756 operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness
1757 is not an operation.
1758 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33544] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1759 beatitudo significat aliquid in beato existens, cum sit ultima
1760 perfectio hominis. Sed operatio non significat ut aliquid existens
1761 in operante, sed magis ut ab ipso procedens. Ergo beatitudo non est
1762 operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p5">
1763 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
1764 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33545] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
1765 beatitudo permanet in beato. Operatio autem non permanet, sed
1766 transit. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p6">
1767 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
1768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="33546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33546] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
1769 unius hominis est una beatitudo. Operationes autem sunt multae.
1770 Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p7">
1771 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep,
1772 or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
1773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="33547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33547] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
1774 beatitudo inest beato absque interruptione. Sed operatio humana
1775 frequenter interrumpitur puta somno, vel aliqua alia occupatione,
1776 vel quiete. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p8">
1777 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
1778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33548] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
1779 est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est
1780 operatio secundum virtutem perfectam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p9">
1781 <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness
1782 is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
1783 Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore
1784 the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has
1785 a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things,
1786 too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an
1787 operation.
1788 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="33549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33549] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1789 dicendum quod, secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum
1790 in ipso existens necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit
1791 operatio. Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque
1792 autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine
1793 actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu
1794 hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus
1795 actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a philosopho nominatur, in
1796 II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans,
1797 sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis
1798 quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem,
1799 ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis
1800 operationem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10">
1801 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown
1802 (
1803 <a href="#FS_Q2_A5" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[2] , A[5]</a>) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that
1804 His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is
1805 made actual: thus we speak of active and
1806 contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from
1807 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God."
1808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33550] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1809 dicendum quod vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsum esse
1810 viventis. Et sic beatitudo non est vita, ostensum est enim quod
1811 esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, non est hominis beatitudo;
1812 solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Alio modo dicitur vita
1813 ipsa operatio viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum
1814 reducitur, et sic nominamus vitam activam, vel contemplativam, vel
1815 voluptuosam. Et hoc modo vita aeterna dicitur ultimus finis. Quod
1816 patet per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut
1817 cognoscant te, Deum verum unum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p11">
1818 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and
1819 he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that
1820 the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing
1821 by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of
1822 operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).
1823 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33551] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1824 dicendum quod Boetius, definiendo beatitudinem, consideravit ipsam
1825 communem beatitudinis rationem. Est enim communis ratio
1826 beatitudinis quod sit bonum commune perfectum; et hoc significavit
1827 cum dixit quod <i>est status omnium bonorum aggregatione
1828 perfectus</i>, per quod nihil aliud significatur nisi quod beatus
1829 est in statu boni perfecti. Sed Aristoteles expressit ipsam
1830 essentiam beatitudinis, ostendens per quid homo sit in huiusmodi
1831 statu, quia per operationem quandam. Et ideo in I Ethic. ipse etiam
1832 ostendit quod beatitudo est bonum perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p12">
1833 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to
1834 cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but
1835 rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel,
1836 to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the
1837 agent. And such an operation can be happiness.
1838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33552] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1839 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio. Una
1840 quae procedit ab operante in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et
1841 secare. Et talis operatio non potest esse beatitudo, nam talis
1842 operatio non est actio et perfectio agentis, sed magis patientis,
1843 ut ibidem dicitur. Alia est actio manens in ipso agente, ut
1844 sentire, intelligere et velle, et huiusmodi actio est perfectio et
1845 actus agentis. Et talis operatio potest esse beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13">
1846 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees
1847 of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His
1848 very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect
1849 of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this
1850 operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection
1851 is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently,
1852 is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect
1853 happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10),
1854 says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised
1855 us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (
1856 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>).
1857 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33553] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
1858 dicendum quod, cum beatitudo dicat quandam ultimam perfectionem,
1859 secundum quod diversae res beatitudinis capaces ad diversos gradus
1860 perfectionis pertingere possunt, secundum hoc necesse est quod
1861 diversimode beatitudo dicatur. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per
1862 essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur
1863 alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio
1864 secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et
1865 haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem,
1866 secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum
1867 operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec
1868 continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia
1869 operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu
1870 praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest.
1871 Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac
1872 vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem
1873 dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta,
1874 quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII.
1875 Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam, cessat obiectio, quia
1876 una et continua et sempiterna operatione in illo beatitudinis statu
1877 mens hominis Deo coniungetur. Sed in praesenti vita, quantum
1878 deficimus ab unitate et continuitate talis operationis, tantum
1879 deficimus a beatitudinis perfectione. Est tamen aliqua participatio
1880 beatitudinis, et tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis
1881 continua et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa
1882 occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita
1883 contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum, idest circa veritatis
1884 contemplationem. Et si aliquando homo actu non operetur huiusmodi
1885 operationem, tamen quia in promptu habet eam semper operari; et
1886 quia etiam ipsam cessationem, puta somni vel occupationis alicuius
1887 naturalis, ad operationem praedictam ordinat; quasi videtur
1888 operatio continua esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A2-p14"> Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will
1889 be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity
1890 and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness:
1891 and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,
1892 which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the
1893 contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn
1894 to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the
1895 latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident.
1896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="33554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33554] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Et per hoc
1897 patet solutio ad quintum, et ad sextum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A3-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 3. Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p2">
1898 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man
1899 than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive:
1900 since "we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses
1901 also.
1902 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33555] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
1903 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat etiam in
1904 operatione sensus. Nulla enim operatio invenitur in homine nobilior
1905 operatione sensitiva, nisi intellectiva. Sed operatio intellectiva
1906 dependet in nobis ab operatione sensitiva, quia non possumus
1907 intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo
1908 beatitudo consistit etiam in operatione sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p3">
1909 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But
1910 some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses
1911 is needed for happiness.
1912 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33556] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1913 Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod <i>beatitudo est status
1914 omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed quaedam bona sunt
1915 sensibilia, quae attingimus per sensus operationem. Ergo videtur
1916 quod operatio sensus requiratur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p4">
1917 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected
1918 thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation
1919 is required for happiness.
1920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33557] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1921 beatitudo est bonum perfectum, ut probatur in I Ethic., quod non
1922 esset, nisi homo perficeretur per ipsam secundum omnes partes suas.
1923 Sed per operationes sensitivas quaedam partes animae perficiuntur.
1924 Ergo operatio sensitiva requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p5">
1925 <b>On the contrary,</b> Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore
1926 happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
1927 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33558] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1928 in operatione sensitiva communicant nobiscum bruta animalia. Non
1929 autem in beatitudine. Ergo beatitudo non consistit in operatione
1930 sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A3-p6">
1931 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
1932 sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated
1933 Good, Which is his last end, as shown above
1934 <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q[2], A[5]),
1935 man's happiness
1936 does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
1937 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A3-p7"> Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect
1938 of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation
1939 of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, "from the very
1940 happiness of the soul," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a
1941 certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of
1942 the resurrection (SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.
1943 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="33559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33559] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
1944 dicendum quod ad beatitudinem potest aliquid pertinere tripliciter,
1945 uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo, antecedenter; tertio modo,
1946 consequenter. Essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio
1947 sensus ad beatitudinem. Nam beatitudo hominis consistit
1948 essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est
1949 ultimus finis, ut supra ostensum est, cui homo coniungi non potest
1950 per sensus operationem. Similiter etiam quia, sicut ostensum est,
1951 in corporalibus bonis beatitudo hominis non consistit, quae tamen
1952 sola per operationem sensus attingimus. Possunt autem operationes
1953 sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter.
1954 Antecedenter quidem, secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in
1955 praesenti vita haberi potest, nam operatio intellectus praeexigit
1956 operationem sensus. Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta
1957 beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem, ex
1958 ipsa beatitudine animae, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad
1959 Dioscorum, <i>fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et in sensus
1960 corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur</i>; ut infra
1961 magis patebit, cum de resurrectione agetur. Non autem tunc operatio
1962 qua mens humana Deo coniungetur, a sensu dependebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p8">
1963 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had
1964 in this life.
1965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33560] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1966 dicendum quod obiectio illa probat quod operatio sensus requiritur
1967 antecedenter ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita haberi
1968 potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p9">
1969 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source
1970 of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods
1971 that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
1972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33561] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1973 dicendum quod beatitudo perfecta, qualem Angeli habent, habet
1974 congregationem omnium bonorum per coniunctionem ad universalem
1975 fontem totius boni; non quod indigeat singulis particularibus
1976 bonis. Sed in hac beatitudine imperfecta, requiritur congregatio
1977 bonorum sufficientium ad perfectissimam operationem huius
1978 vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A3-p10">
1979 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in
1980 the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection
1981 of the higher part.
1982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33562] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1983 dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in
1984 inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori. In beatitudine autem
1985 imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris
1986 partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A4-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 4. Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2">
1987 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness
1988 consists in peace; wherefore it is written (
1989 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.3" target="asv">Ps. 147:3</a>): "Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in
1990 the will.
1991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33563] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
1992 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu
1993 voluntatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod beatitudo
1994 hominis in pace consistit, unde in Psalmo CXLVII, qui posuit fines
1995 tuos pacem. Sed pax ad voluntatem pertinet. Ergo beatitudo hominis
1996 in voluntate consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p3">
1997 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation
1998 of the will.
1999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33564] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2000 beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo
2001 beatitudo in operatione voluntatis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p4">
2002 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of
2003 the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers,
2004 as we shall state further on (
2005 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q3_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
2006 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33565] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2007 primo moventi respondet ultimus finis, sicut ultimus finis totius
2008 exercitus est victoria, quae est finis ducis, qui omnes movet. Sed
2009 primum movens ad operandum est voluntas, quia movet alias vires, ut
2010 infra dicetur. Ergo beatitudo ad voluntatem pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5">
2011 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an
2012 act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares
2013 (
2014 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
2015 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="33566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33566] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
2016 si beatitudo est aliqua operatio, oportet quod sit nobilissima
2017 operatio hominis. Sed nobilior operatio est dilectio Dei, quae est
2018 actus voluntatis, quam cognitio, quae est operatio intellectus, ut
2019 patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo videtur quod beatitudo
2020 consistat in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p6">
2021 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And
2022 a little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy,
2023 and such a man already possesses some good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.
2024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="33567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33567] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
2025 Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod <i>beatus est qui habet
2026 omnia quae vult, et nihil vult male</i>. Et post pauca subdit,
2027 <i>propinquat beato qui bene vult quodcumque vult, bona enim beatum
2028 faciunt, quorum bonorum iam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam
2029 voluntatem</i>. Ergo beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7">
2030 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
2031 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A[2],
2032 ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
2033 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33568] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2034 est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut
2035 cognoscant te, Deum verum unum</i>. Vita autem aeterna est ultimus
2036 finis, ut dictum est. Ergo beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei
2037 consistit, quae est actus intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p8">
2038 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that
2039 is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness,
2040 it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said (
2041 <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the
2042 attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when
2043 it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is
2044 not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present;
2045 and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present
2046 to
2047 him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.
2048 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p9"> This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the
2049 covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains
2050 it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible
2051 end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to
2052 us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.
2053 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A4-p10"> So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness
2054 pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy
2055 itself is the consummation of happiness.
2056 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="33569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33569] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2057 dicendum quod ad beatitudinem, sicut supra dictum est, duo
2058 requiruntur, unum quod est essentia beatitudinis; aliud quod est
2059 quasi per se accidens eius, scilicet delectatio ei adiuncta. Dico
2060 ergo quod, quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo,
2061 impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis. Manifestum est
2062 enim ex praemissis quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi.
2063 Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis.
2064 Voluntas enim fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et
2065 praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur. Manifestum est
2066 autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est
2067 motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod
2068 finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit
2069 praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid
2070 aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens
2071 volenti. Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim
2072 consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a principio
2073 cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando vult eam habere. Sed a
2074 principio quidem est absens ei; consequitur autem ipsam per hoc
2075 quod manu ipsam apprehendit, vel aliquo huiusmodi; et tunc iam
2076 delectatur in pecunia habita. Sic igitur et circa intelligibilem
2077 finem contingit. Nam a principio volumus consequi finem
2078 intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens
2079 nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit
2080 in fine iam adepto. Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu
2081 intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio
2082 beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X
2083 Confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate; quia scilicet
2084 ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p11">
2085 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent
2086 thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent
2087 inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.
2088 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33570] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2089 dicendum quod pax pertinet ad ultimum hominis finem, non quasi
2090 essentialiter sit ipsa beatitudo; sed quia antecedenter et
2091 consequenter se habet ad ipsam. Antecedenter quidem, inquantum iam
2092 sunt remota omnia perturbantia, et impedientia ab ultimo fine.
2093 Consequenter vero, inquantum iam homo, adepto ultimo fine, remanet
2094 pacatus, suo desiderio quietato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p12">
2095 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore,
2096 from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it
2097 as its act.
2098 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33571] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2099 dicendum quod primum obiectum voluntatis non est actus eius sicut
2100 nec primum obiectum visus est visio, sed visibile. Unde ex hoc ipso
2101 quod beatitudo pertinet ad voluntatem tanquam primum obiectum eius,
2102 sequitur quod non pertineat ad ipsam tanquam actus ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p13">
2103 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the
2104 will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
2105 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33572] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2106 dicendum quod finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas,
2107 tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati
2108 debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet
2109 delectatio vel fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p14">
2110 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known,"
2111 as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we
2112 first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.
2113 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="33573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33573] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
2114 dicendum quod dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed
2115 cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur
2116 nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin. Et ideo
2117 intelligibilem finem primo attingimus per actionem intellectus;
2118 sicut et finem sensibilem primo attingimus per actionem sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A4-p15">
2119 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the
2120 act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will
2121 is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement
2122 is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus
2123 "quality."
2124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="33574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33574] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
2125 dicendum quod ille qui habet omnia quae vult, ex hoc est beatus,
2126 quod habet ea quae vult, quod quidem est per aliud quam per actum
2127 voluntatis. Sed nihil male velle requiritur ad beatitudinem sicut
2128 quaedam debita dispositio ad ipsam. Voluntas autem bona ponitur in
2129 numero bonorum quae beatum faciunt, prout est inclinatio quaedam in
2130 ipsa, sicut motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, ut alteratio ad
2131 qualitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A5-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 5. Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p2">
2132 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming
2133 like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative
2134 intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect
2135 rather than of the speculative.
2136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33575] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
2137 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in operatione
2138 intellectus practici. Finis enim ultimus cuiuslibet creaturae
2139 consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed homo magis assimilatur Deo
2140 per intellectum practicum, qui est causa rerum intellectarum, quam
2141 per intellectum speculativum, cuius scientia accipitur a rebus.
2142 Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus
2143 practici quam speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p3">
2144 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
2145 intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect,
2146 but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding.
2147 Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather
2148 than of the speculative.
2149 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33576] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2150 beatitudo est perfectum hominis bonum. Sed intellectus practicus
2151 magis ordinatur ad bonum quam speculativus, qui ordinatur ad verum.
2152 Unde et secundum perfectionem practici intellectus, dicimur boni,
2153 non autem secundum perfectionem speculativi intellectus, sed
2154 secundum eam dicimur scientes vel intelligentes. Ergo beatitudo
2155 hominis magis consistit in actu intellectus practici quam
2156 speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p4">
2157 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas
2158 the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's
2159 happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
2160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33577] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2161 beatitudo est quoddam bonum ipsius hominis. Sed speculativus
2162 intellectus occupatur magis circa ea quae sunt extra hominem,
2163 practicus autem intellectus occupatur circa ea quae sunt ipsius
2164 hominis, scilicet circa operationes et passiones eius. Ergo
2165 beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus
2166 practici quam intellectus speculativi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p5">
2167 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
2168 perfection of our joys."
2169 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33578] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2170 est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod <i>contemplatio
2171 promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio
2172 gaudiorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p6">
2173 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons.
2174 First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is
2175 that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is
2176 the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative
2177 intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And
2178 since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation
2179 is most proper to man and most delightful to him.
2180 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p7"> Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical
2181 intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently
2182 it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.
2183 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p8"> Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above
2184 him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other
2185 animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.
2186 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A5-p9"> Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect
2187 happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human
2188 actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.
2189 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="33579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33579] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2190 dicendum quod beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi
2191 intellectus quam practici. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex
2192 hoc quod, si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit
2193 optima operatio hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quae est
2194 optimae potentiae respectu optimi obiecti. Optima autem potentia
2195 est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod
2196 quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi. Unde
2197 in tali operatione, scilicet in contemplatione divinorum, maxime
2198 consistit beatitudo. <i>Et quia unusquisque videtur esse id quod
2199 est optimum in eo</i>, ut dicitur in IX et X Ethic., ideo talis
2200 operatio est maxime propria homini, et maxime delectabilis. Secundo
2201 apparet idem ex hoc quod contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter
2202 seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter
2203 seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad
2204 aliquem finem. Unde manifestum est quod ultimus finis non potest
2205 consistere in vita activa, quae pertinet ad intellectum practicum.
2206 Tertio idem apparet ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo
2207 communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus
2208 per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam
2209 activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant,
2210 licet imperfectae. Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae
2211 expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione.
2212 Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem
2213 et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in
2214 operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones
2215 humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p10">
2216 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in
2217 relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union
2218 and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known,
2219 which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative
2220 knowledge.
2221 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33580] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2222 dicendum quod similitudo praedicta intellectus practici ad Deum,
2223 est secundum proportionalitatem; quia scilicet se habet ad suum
2224 cognitum, sicut Deus ad suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus
2225 speculativi ad Deum, est secundum unionem vel informationem; quae
2226 est multo maior assimilatio. Et tamen dici potest quod, respectu
2227 principalis cogniti, quod est sua essentia, non habet Deus
2228 practicam cognitionem, sed speculativam tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p11">
2229 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz.
2230 the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the
2231 practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
2232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33581] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2233 dicendum quod intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est
2234 extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso,
2235 scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit
2236 perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus, quod quidem
2237 intellectus practicus non habet sed ad illud ordinat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A5-p12">
2238 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and
2239 passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by
2240 an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect
2241 rather than of the practical intellect.
2242 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33582] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2243 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsemet homo esset ultimus
2244 finis suus, tunc enim consideratio et ordinatio actuum et passionum
2245 eius esset eius beatitudo. Sed quia ultimus hominis finis est
2246 aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem
2247 intellectus speculativi attingimus; ideo magis beatitudo hominis in
2248 operatione intellectus speculativi consistit, quam in operatione
2249 intellectus practici.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A6-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 6. Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p2">
2250 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
2251 i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than
2252 three speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative
2253 sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
2254 sciences.
2255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33583] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
2256 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in
2257 consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Philosophus enim dicit,
2258 in libro Ethic., quod <i>felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam
2259 virtutem</i>. Et distinguens virtutes, non ponit speculativas nisi
2260 tres, scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum; quae omnes pertinent ad
2261 considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo ultima hominis
2262 beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
2263 consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p3">
2264 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
2265 sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated
2266 that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
2267 sciences.
2268 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33584] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2269 illud videtur esse ultima hominis beatitudo, quod naturaliter
2270 desideratur ab omnibus propter seipsum. Sed huiusmodi est
2271 consideratio speculativarum scientiarum, quia, ut dicitur in I
2272 Metaphys., <i>omnes homines natura scire desiderant</i>; et post
2273 pauca subditur quod speculativae scientiae propter seipsas
2274 quaeruntur. Ergo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
2275 consistit beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p4">
2276 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to
2277 act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the
2278 consideration of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
2279 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33585] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2280 beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem
2281 perficitur secundum quod reducitur de potentia in actum.
2282 Intellectus autem humanus reducitur in actum per considerationem
2283 scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo videtur quod in huiusmodi
2284 consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5">
2285 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2286 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv">Jer. 9:23</a>): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final
2287 happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.
2288 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33586] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2289 est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, <i>non glorietur sapiens in sapientia
2290 sua</i>; et loquitur de sapientia speculativarum scientiarum. Non
2291 ergo consistit in harum consideratione ultima hominis
2292 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A6-p6">
2293 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are
2294 to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto,
2295 but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to
2296 be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed
2297 of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
2298 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A6-p7"> Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we
2299 must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science:
2300 since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received
2301 through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at
2302 the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther
2303 than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge
2304 of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.
2305 Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not
2306 perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human
2307 intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which
2308 is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But
2309 it has been shown (
2310 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q3_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[88], A[2]</a>), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of
2311 separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
2312 consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances,
2313 so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.
2314 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="33587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33587] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2315 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis
2316 beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem
2317 intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram
2318 beatitudinis rationem, beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non
2319 attingit, sed participat quandam particularem beatitudinis
2320 similitudinem. Sicut perfecta prudentia invenitur in homine, apud
2321 quem est ratio rerum agibilium, imperfecta autem prudentia est in
2322 quibusdam animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares
2323 instinctus ad quaedam opera similia operibus prudentiae. Perfecta
2324 igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum
2325 essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cuius evidentiam,
2326 considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se
2327 extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in
2328 principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima
2329 autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta;
2330 ut patet per philosophum in principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster.
2331 Unde tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra
2332 extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In cognitione
2333 autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo,
2334 quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab
2335 aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua
2336 participatio superioris. Manifestum est autem quod forma lapidis,
2337 vel cuiuslibet rei sensibilis, est inferior homine. Unde per formam
2338 lapidis non perficitur intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed
2339 inquantum in ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est
2340 supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel
2341 aliquid huiusmodi. Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad id
2342 quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per
2343 cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum.
2344 Ostensum est autem quod per sensibilia non potest deveniri in
2345 cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quae sunt supra intellectum
2346 humanum. Unde relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit
2347 esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in
2348 formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum
2349 substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est
2350 quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p8">
2351 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2],
2352 ad 4).
2353 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33588] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2354 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur in libro Ethicorum de felicitate
2355 imperfecta, qualiter in hac vita haberi potest, ut supra dictum
2356 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p9">
2357 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.
2358 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33589] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2359 dicendum quod naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo,
2360 sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A6-p10">
2361 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect
2362 act.
2363 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33590] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2364 dicendum quod per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum
2365 reducitur intellectus noster aliquo modo in actum, non autem in
2366 ultimum et completum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A7-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 7. Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p2">
2367 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in
2368 a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of
2369 angels"; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore
2370 it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels.
2371 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33591] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
2372 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in
2373 cognitione substantiarum separatarum, idest Angelorum. Dicit enim
2374 Gregorius, in quadam homilia, <i>nihil prodest interesse festis
2375 hominum, si non contingat interesse festis Angelorum</i>; per quod
2376 finalem beatitudinem designat. Sed festis Angelorum interesse
2377 possumus per eorum contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod in
2378 contemplatione Angelorum ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p3">
2379 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
2380 figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened,
2381 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
2382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33592] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2383 ultima perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est ut coniungatur suo
2384 principio, unde et circulus dicitur esse figura perfecta, quia
2385 habet idem principium et finem. Sed principium cognitionis humanae
2386 est ab ipsis Angelis, per quos homines illuminantur, ut dicit
2387 Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo perfectio humani intellectus
2388 est in contemplatione Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p4">
2389 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to
2390 the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection
2391 of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation.
2392 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33593] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2393 unaquaeque natura perfecta est, quando coniungitur superiori
2394 naturae, sicut ultima perfectio corporis est ut coniungatur naturae
2395 spirituali. Sed supra intellectum humanum, ordine naturae, sunt
2396 Angeli. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani est ut coniungatur
2397 per contemplationem ipsis Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5">
2398 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2399 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.24" target="asv">Jer. 9:24</a>): "Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's final glory or happiness
2400 consists only in the knowledge of God.
2401 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33594] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2402 est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, <i>in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur,
2403 scire et nosse me</i>. Ergo ultima hominis gloria, vel beatitudo,
2404 non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6">
2405 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
2406 <a href="#FS_Q3_A6" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so
2407 by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of
2408 that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has
2409 participated truth, does not perfect the
2410 intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1);
2411 whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone
2412 is His Being His Essence, as shown in the
2413 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q3_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain
2414 imperfect happiness in the
2415 contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.
2416 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="33595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33595] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2417 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta hominis beatitudo non
2418 consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius
2419 participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale. Manifestum
2420 est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius
2421 potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius
2422 potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid
2423 ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit
2424 intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem eadem sit
2425 dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, ut dicitur in II
2426 Metaphys.; quaecumque sunt entia per participationem, sunt vera per
2427 participationem. Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius
2428 Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde
2429 relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius
2430 contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem
2431 imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione Angelorum; et
2432 etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum
2433 speculativarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p7">
2434 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself.
2435 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33596] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2436 dicendum quod festis Angelorum intererimus non solum contemplantes
2437 Angelos, sed simul cum ipsis, Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8">
2438 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should
2439 consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as
2440 stated in
2441 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[3]</a>. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation
2442 of the soul and of its
2443 enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the
2444 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q3_A7-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[2]</a>, ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
2445 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33597] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2446 dicendum quod, secundum illos qui ponunt animas humanas esse ab
2447 Angelis creatas, satis conveniens videtur quod beatitudo hominis
2448 sit in contemplatione Angelorum, quasi in coniunctione ad suum
2449 principium. Sed hoc est erroneum, ut in primo dictum est. Unde
2450 ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per coniunctionem ad Deum,
2451 qui est primum principium et creationis animae et illuminationis
2452 eius. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in primo habitum
2453 est. Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem
2454 perveniat, non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A7-p9">
2455 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's
2456 final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained
2457 by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object.
2458 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33598] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2459 dicendum quod attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit
2460 dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum potentiae participantis, et
2461 sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad
2462 contemplandum sicut Angeli contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum
2463 attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet
2464 potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui
2465 obiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p2">
2466 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol.
2467 i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which
2468 is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does
2469 not consist in God being seen in His Essence.
2470 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33599] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
2471 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione
2472 ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. Myst.
2473 Theol., quod per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo
2474 coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam,
2475 non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu
2476 beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam
2477 videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p3">
2478 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
2479 Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something
2480 less.
2481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33600] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2482 altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio
2483 divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima
2484 perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra
2485 subsistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4">
2486 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2487 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q3_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."
2488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33601] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2489 est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus,
2490 et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q3_A8-p5">
2491 <b>I answer that,</b> Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
2492 must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly,
2493 that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing
2494 is," i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the
2495 intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of
2496 some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect
2497 cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause
2498 is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire
2499 to know about the cause, "what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning
2500 of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause,
2501 and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease
2502 until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
2503 </p><p id="FS_Q3_A8-p6"> If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the
2504 perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek
2505 the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very
2506 Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
2507 which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (
2508 <a href="#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q3_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,7; Q[2], A[8]).
2509 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="33602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33602] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2510 dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in
2511 visione divinae essentiae. Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda
2512 sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu
2513 restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est, quod
2514 uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui
2515 obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest
2516 essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit
2517 perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei.
2518 Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus,
2519 per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur
2520 de causa quid est; non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam
2521 simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an
2522 sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit
2523 effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid
2524 est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem,
2525 ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens
2526 eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua,
2527 quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista
2528 inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam
2529 causae. Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam
2530 alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum
2531 perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet
2532 ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est
2533 perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod
2534 intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic
2535 perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in
2536 quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p7">
2537 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.
2538 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33603] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2539 dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in
2540 via, tendentes ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8">
2541 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
2542 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the
2543 end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (
2544 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q3_A8-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower,
2545 according to their respective
2546 habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
2547 that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
2548 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33604] Iª-IIae q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2549 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi
2550 dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam quae desideratur, et hoc
2551 modo idem est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, immo omnium
2552 rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem
2553 huius rei, et sic diversus est finis superioris et inferioris
2554 naturae, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur
2555 altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis,
2556 quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.</p></div></div></div></div>
2557 <div id="FS_Q4" class="div3">
2558 <h3 id="FS_Q4-p0.1">Q. 4. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
2559 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
2560 <p id="FS_Q4-p2"> We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q4-p3"><a href="#FS_Q4_A1"> (1) Whether delight is required for happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p4"><a href="#FS_Q4_A2"> (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p5"><a href="#FS_Q4_A3"> (3) Whether comprehension is required?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p6"><a href="#FS_Q4_A4"> (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p7"><a href="#FS_Q4_A5"> (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p8"><a href="#FS_Q4_A6"> (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p9"><a href="#FS_Q4_A7"> (7) Whether any external goods are necessary?</a></p><p id="FS_Q4-p10"><a href="#FS_Q4_A8"> (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?</a></p>
2561 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 pr."><a name="33605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33605]
2562 Iª-IIae q. 4 pr.</span></a> Deinde, considerandum est de his
2563 quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo.
2564 Primo, utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem. Secundo, quid
2565 sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum delectatio vel visio.
2566 Tertio, utrum requiratur comprehensio. Quarto, utrum requiratur
2567 rectitudo voluntatis. Quinto, utrum ad beatitudinem hominis
2568 requiratur corpus. Sexto, utrum perfectio corporis. Septimo, utrum
2569 aliqua exteriora bona. Octavo, utrum requiratur societas
2570 amicorum.</p></div></div></div>
2571 <div id="FS_Q4_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A1-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 1. Whether delight is required for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p2">
2572 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward
2573 of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing
2574 besides vision is required for happiness.
2575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33606] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
2576 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non requiratur ad
2577 beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod <i>visio
2578 est tota merces fidei</i>. Sed id quod est praemium vel merces
2579 virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo
2580 nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p3">
2581 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which
2582 needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (
2583 <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q4_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.
2584 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33607] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2585 beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut philosophus dicit
2586 I Ethic. Quod autem eget aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens.
2587 Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut
2588 ostensum est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur
2589 delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p4">
2590 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of
2591 the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
2592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33608] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2593 operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non
2594 impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed delectatio impedit actionem
2595 intellectus corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in
2596 VI Ethic. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p5">
2597 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth."
2598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33609] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2599 est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod <i>beatitudo est
2600 gaudium de veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p6">
2601 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary
2602 for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
2603 without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat
2604 is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is
2605 caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of
2606 the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
2607 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="33610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33610] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2608 dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo,
2609 sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina
2610 requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut
2611 anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans
2612 extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto
2613 modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor
2614 requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad
2615 beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus
2616 requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam
2617 adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione
2618 concomitante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p7">
2619 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight.
2620 Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.
2621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33611] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2622 dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas
2623 merentis requiescit, quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione
2624 mercedis redditae delectatio includitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p8">
2625 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
2626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33612] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2627 dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille
2628 qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A1-p9">
2629 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in
2630 Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is
2631 extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we
2632 are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to
2633 one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is
2634 contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.
2635 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33613] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2636 dicendum quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus, non
2637 impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur, in X Ethic., ea
2638 enim quae delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius
2639 operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quandoque
2640 quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea
2641 in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et dum uni vehementer
2642 intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur. Quandoque
2643 autem etiam ex contrarietate, sicut delectatio sensus contraria
2644 rationi, impedit aestimationem prudentiae magis quam aestimationem
2645 speculativi intellectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p2">
2646 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4).
2647 But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
2648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33614] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
2649 sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in
2650 beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic.,
2651 est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili.
2652 Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est
2653 visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p3">
2654 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the
2655 delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation
2656 of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks
2657 before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.
2658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33615] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2659 illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est potius. Sed
2660 operationes appetuntur propter delectationem ipsarum, unde et
2661 natura operationibus necessariis ad conservationem individui et
2662 speciei, delectationem apposuit, ut huiusmodi operationes ab
2663 animalibus non negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in
2664 beatitudine quam operatio intellectus, quae est visio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4">
2665 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith,
2666 as the Apostle says (
2667 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.
2668 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33616] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2669 visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive fruitio, caritati.
2670 Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit apostolus I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo
2671 delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p5">
2672 <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
2673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33617] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
2674 causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo
2675 visio est potior quam delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6">
2676 <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully,
2677 the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of
2678 the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes.
2679 If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness
2680 of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end,
2681 which has been disproved above (
2682 <a href="#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2;
2683 <a href="#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q4_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[3], A[4]</a>): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation
2684 in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
2685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="33618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33618] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2686 dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et
2687 eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex
2688 necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit
2689 potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam
2690 quietatione voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur,
2691 non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo
2692 voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis
2693 procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter
2694 quietationem, sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est
2695 contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione,
2696 quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius
2697 bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio
2698 voluntatis in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p7">
2699 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth.
2700 Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own
2701 species.
2702 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33619] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2703 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, <i>delectatio
2704 perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem</i>, qui est ad
2705 iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio
2706 concomitans visionem; non sicut perfectio faciens visionem esse in
2707 sua specie perfectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p8">
2708 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And
2709 consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But
2710 the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed
2711 to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
2712 Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things
2713 not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.
2714 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33620] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2715 dicendum quod apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem
2716 rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est
2717 delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in
2718 animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed
2719 intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius
2720 consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum
2721 quam delectationem. Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est
2722 institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non
2723 est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem
2724 sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus
2725 intellectivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A2-p9">
2726 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good
2727 gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made
2728 present to charity.
2729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33621] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2730 dicendum quod caritas non quaerit bonum dilectum propter
2731 delectationem, sed hoc est ei consequens, ut delectetur in bono
2732 adepto quod amat. Et sic delectatio non respondet ei ut finis, sed
2733 magis visio, per quam primo finis fit ei praesens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A3-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 3. Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p2">
2734 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm.
2735 xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is
2736 without comprehension.
2737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33622] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
2738 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur
2739 comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Paulinam de videndo Deum,
2740 <i>attingere mente Deum magna est beatitudo, comprehendere autem
2741 est impossibile</i>. Ergo sine comprehensione est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p3">
2742 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
2743 and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will
2744 by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
2745 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33623] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2746 beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum intellectivam partem, in
2747 qua non sunt aliae potentiae quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in
2748 primo dictum est. Sed intellectus sufficienter perficitur per
2749 visionem Dei, voluntas autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non
2750 requiritur comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p4">
2751 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
2752 objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
2753 comprehension as a third.
2754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33624] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2755 beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes autem determinantur
2756 secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum,
2757 verum correspondet visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi.
2758 Ergo non requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5">
2759 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
2760 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:24</a>): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (
2761 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.4.7" target="asv">2 Tim. 4:7,8</a>): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a
2762 crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
2763 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33625] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2764 est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, <i>sic currite ut
2765 comprehendatis</i>. Sed spiritualis cursus terminatur ad
2766 beatitudinem, unde ipse dicit, II ad Tim. ult., <i>bonum certamen
2767 certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo reposita est
2768 mihi corona iustitiae</i>. Ergo comprehensio requiritur ad
2769 beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p6">
2770 <b>I answer that,</b> Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the
2771 way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly
2772 through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect:
2773 through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly,
2774 by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is
2775 present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it:
2776 and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the
2777 attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and
2778 this
2779 relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect
2780 knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight
2781 in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness;
2782 to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end;
2783 and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.
2784 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="33626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33626] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2785 dicendum quod, cum beatitudo consistat in consecutione ultimi
2786 finis, ea quae requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex
2787 ipso ordine hominis ad finem. Ad finem autem intelligibilem
2788 ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per
2789 voluntatem. Per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu
2790 praeexistit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem,
2791 primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in
2792 aliquid, secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum,
2793 quae quidem potest esse triplex. Quandoque enim amatum est praesens
2794 amanti, et tunc iam non quaeritur. Quandoque autem non est
2795 praesens, sed impossibile est ipsum adipisci, et tunc etiam non
2796 quaeritur. Quandoque autem possibile est ipsum adipisci, sed est
2797 elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis, ita ut statim haberi non
2798 possit, et haec est habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quae sola
2799 habitudo facit finis inquisitionem. Et istis tribus respondent
2800 aliqua in ipsa beatitudine. Nam perfecta cognitio finis respondet
2801 imperfectae; praesentia vero ipsius finis respondet habitudini
2802 spei; sed delectatio in fine iam praesenti consequitur dilectionem,
2803 ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria
2804 concurrere, scilicet visionem, quae est cognitio perfecta
2805 intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae importat praesentiam
2806 finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quae importat quietationem
2807 rei amantis in amato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p7">
2808 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
2809 the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means
2810 nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend
2811 [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense
2812 comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
2813 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33627] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2814 dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, inclusio
2815 comprehensi in comprehendente, et sic omne quod comprehenditur a
2816 finito, est finitum. Unde hoc modo Deus non potest comprehendi ab
2817 aliquo intellectu creato. Alio modo comprehensio nihil aliud
2818 nominat quam tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae,
2819 sicut aliquis consequens aliquem, dicitur eum comprehendere quando
2820 tenet eum. Et hoc modo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p8">
2821 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while
2822 not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
2823 therein.
2824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33628] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2825 dicendum quod, sicut ad voluntatem pertinet spes et amor, quia
2826 eiusdem est amare aliquid et tendere in illud non habitum; ita
2827 etiam ad voluntatem pertinet et comprehensio et delectatio, quia
2828 eiusdem est habere aliquid et quiescere in illo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A3-p9">
2829 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision
2830 itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension.
2831 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33629] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2832 dicendum quod comprehensio non est aliqua operatio praeter
2833 visionem, sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem iam habitum. Unde etiam
2834 ipsa visio, vel res visa secundum quod praesentialiter adest, est
2835 obiectum comprehensionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A4-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 4. Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p2">
2836 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation
2837 of the intellect, as stated above (
2838 <a href="#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q4_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation
2839 of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none
2840 but the clean of
2841 heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude
2842 of the will is not necessary for Happiness.
2843 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33630] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
2844 sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectitudo voluntatis non requiratur ad
2845 beatitudinem. Beatitudo enim essentialiter consistit in operatione
2846 intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ad perfectam intellectus
2847 operationem non requiritur rectitudo voluntatis, per quam homines
2848 mundi dicuntur, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Retract., <i>non
2849 approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus qui non nisi mundos verum scire
2850 voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa
2851 scire vera</i>. Ergo rectitudo voluntatis non requiritur ad
2852 beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p3">
2853 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the
2854 will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will.
2855 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33631] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2856 prius non dependet a posteriori. Sed operatio intellectus est prior
2857 quam operatio voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo, quae est perfecta
2858 operatio intellectus, non dependet a rectitudine voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p4">
2859 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,
2860 after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore,
2861 Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
2862 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33632] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2863 quod ordinatur ad aliquid tanquam ad finem, non est necessarium
2864 adepto iam fine, sicut navis postquam pervenitur ad portum. Sed
2865 rectitudo voluntatis, quae est per virtutem, ordinatur ad
2866 beatitudinem tanquam ad finem. Ergo, adepta beatitudine, non est
2867 necessaria rectitudo voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5">
2868 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2869 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and (
2870 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."
2871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33633] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2872 est quod dicitur Matth. V, <i>beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum
2873 videbunt</i>. Et Heb. XII, <i>pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et
2874 sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p6">
2875 <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
2876 will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared
2877 to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except
2878 it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without
2879 rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (
2880 <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q4_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of
2881 him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him
2882 who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this
2883 is precisely what makes the will
2884 right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.
2885 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 co."><a name="33634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33634] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
2886 dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et
2887 antecedenter et concomitanter. Antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo
2888 voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum. Finis autem
2889 comparatur ad id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad materiam.
2890 Unde sicut materia non potest consequi formam, nisi sit debito modo
2891 disposita ad ipsam, ita nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit debito
2892 modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad beatitudinem
2893 pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis. Concomitanter
2894 autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo ultima consistit in
2895 visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et ita
2896 voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat,
2897 sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex
2898 necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam
2899 novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde
2900 manifestum est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta
2901 voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p7a"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b><!-- By HST,
2902 missing in original-->
2903 What's said by Augustine concerns cognition of a truth which is not
2904 the very essence of happiness.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33635] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2905 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de cognitione veri quod non est
2906 ipsa essentia bonitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p7">
2907 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the
2908 intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of
2909 the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target.
2910 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33636] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2911 dicendum quod omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu
2912 intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis
2913 actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum
2914 intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis
2915 praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad
2916 percussionem signi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A4-p8">
2917 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection,
2918 such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order
2919 to the end is necessary.
2920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33637] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2921 dicendum quod non omne quod ordinatur ad finem, cessat adveniente
2922 fine, sed id tantum quod se habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut
2923 motus. Unde instrumenta motus non sunt necessaria postquam
2924 pervenitur ad finem, sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A5-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 5. Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p2">
2925 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection
2926 of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of
2927 nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore
2928 the soul cannot be happy without the body.
2929 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33638] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
2930 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur corpus.
2931 Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae praesupponit perfectionem
2932 naturae. Sed beatitudo est perfectio virtutis et gratiae. Anima
2933 autem sine corpore non habet perfectionem naturae, cum sit pars
2934 naturaliter humanae naturae, omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo
2935 toto separata. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p3">
2936 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (
2937 <a href="#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q4_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[2]</a>,5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since,
2938 therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate
2939 from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.
2940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33639] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2941 beatitudo est operatio quaedam perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed
2942 operatio perfecta sequitur esse perfectum, quia nihil operatur nisi
2943 secundum quod est ens in actu. Cum ergo anima non habeat esse
2944 perfectum quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec aliqua pars
2945 quando separata est a toto; videtur quod anima sine corpore non
2946 possit esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p4">
2947 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in
2948 the soul separated from the body.
2949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33640] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2950 beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima sine corpore non est
2951 homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest esse in anima sine corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p5">
2952 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is
2953 "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the
2954 soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all
2955 its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the
2956 soul cannot be happy without the body.
2957 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="33641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33641] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
2958 secundum philosophum, in VII Ethic., felicitatis operatio, in qua
2959 consistit beatitudo, est non impedita. Sed operatio animae
2960 separatae est impedita, quia, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad
2961 Litt., <i>inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi,
2962 quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in
2963 illud summum caelum</i>, idest in visionem essentiae divinae. Ergo
2964 anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p6">
2965 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires
2966 to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the
2967 body.
2968 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="33642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33642] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
2969 beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat desiderium. Sed hoc non
2970 convenit animae separatae, quia adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut
2971 Augustinus dicit. Ergo anima separata a corpore non est beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p7">
2972 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine
2973 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
2974 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="33643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33643] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
2975 homo in beatitudine est Angelis aequalis. Sed anima sine corpore
2976 non aequatur Angelis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo non est beata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8">
2977 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2978 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.13" target="asv">Apoc. 14:13</a>): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord."
2979 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33644] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
2980 est quod dicitur Apoc. XIV, <i>beati mortui qui in domino
2981 moriuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p9">
2982 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God.
2983 Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an
2984 operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without
2985 a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the
2986 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A6" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">FP,
2987 Q[84], AA[6]
2988 </a>,7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness,
2989 which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and
2990 have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment,
2991 when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by
2992 reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (
2993 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we
2994 walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the
2995 vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are
2996 in God's presence; wherefore the text continues:
2997 "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is
2998 evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is
2999 true Happiness.
3000 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p10"> Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms,
3001 wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the
3002 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the
3003 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A3" id="FS_Q4_A5-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[3]</a>. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the
3004 body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.
3005 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A5-p11"> We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence
3006 thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body
3007 and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection
3008 of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the
3009 more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence,
3010 Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead
3011 separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either
3012 for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body."
3013 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 co."><a name="33645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33645] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3014 dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae habetur in
3015 hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in Dei visione consistit.
3016 Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de
3017 necessitate requiritur corpus. Est enim beatitudo huius vitae
3018 operatio intellectus, vel speculativi vel practici. Operatio autem
3019 intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non
3020 est nisi in organo corporeo, ut in primo habitum est. Et sic
3021 beatitudo quae in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex
3022 corpore. Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quae in Dei visione
3023 consistit, aliqui posuerunt quod non potest animae advenire sine
3024 corpore existenti; dicentes quod animae sanctorum a corporibus
3025 separatae, ad illam beatitudinem non perveniunt usque ad diem
3026 iudicii, quando corpora resument. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum
3027 et auctoritate, et ratione. Auctoritate quidem, quia apostolus
3028 dicit, II ad Cor. V, <i>quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a
3029 domino</i>; et quae sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens,
3030 <i>per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem</i>. Ex quo apparet
3031 quod quandiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per speciem, carens
3032 visione divinae essentiae, nondum est Deo praesens. Animae autem
3033 sanctorum a corporibus separatae, sunt Deo praesentes, unde
3034 subditur, <i>audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus peregrinari
3035 a corpore, et praesentes esse ad dominum</i>. Unde manifestum est
3036 quod animae sanctorum separatae a corporibus, ambulant per speciem,
3037 Dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo. Hoc etiam per
3038 rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget
3039 corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem
3040 intelligibilem contuetur, ut in primo dictum est. Manifestum est
3041 autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in
3042 primo ostensum est. Unde, cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta
3043 hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta
3044 hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata. Sed
3045 sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid
3046 pertinet. Uno modo, ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut anima
3047 requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad
3048 perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse eius, sicut pulchritudo
3049 corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis.
3050 Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae
3051 non pertineat, pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio
3052 dependeat ex natura rei, quando anima perfectior erit in sua
3053 natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua
3054 felicitas consistit. Unde Augustinus, in XII super Gen. ad Litt.,
3055 cum quaesivisset, <i>utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus
3056 possit summa illa beatitudo praeberi</i>, respondet quod <i>non sic
3057 possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti Angeli vident;
3058 sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia est in eis naturalis
3059 quidam appetitus corpus administrandi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p12">
3060 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs
3061 of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection
3062 in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the
3063 form of the body.
3064 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33646] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3065 dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio animae ex parte intellectus,
3066 secundum quem anima transcendit corporis organa, non autem secundum
3067 quod est forma naturalis corporis. Et ideo illa naturae perfectio
3068 manet secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur, licet non maneat illa
3069 naturae perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p13">
3070 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual
3071 part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when
3072 the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from
3073 that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the
3074 composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and
3075 this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the
3076 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q4_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a
3077 perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.
3078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33647] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3079 dicendum quod anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliae partes. Nam
3080 esse totius non est alicuius suarum partium, unde vel pars omnino
3081 desinit esse, destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo
3082 animali; vel, si remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars
3083 lineae habet aliud esse quam tota linea. Sed animae humanae remanet
3084 esse compositi post corporis destructionem, et hoc ideo, quia idem
3085 est esse formae et materia, et hoc est esse compositi. Anima autem
3086 subsistit in suo esse, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur
3087 quod post separationem a corpore perfectum esse habeat, unde et
3088 perfectam operationem habere potest; licet non habeat perfectam
3089 naturam speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p14">
3090 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness.
3091 Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
3092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33648] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3093 dicendum quod beatitudo est hominis secundum intellectum, et ideo,
3094 remanente intellectu, potest inesse ei beatitudo. Sicut dentes
3095 Aethiopis possunt esse albi, etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos
3096 Aethiops dicitur albus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p15">
3097 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such
3098 a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is
3099 hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible
3100 with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is
3101 that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence.
3102 For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And
3103 therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in
3104 such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.
3105 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="33649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33649] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
3106 dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, per
3107 modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris, et
3108 tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per
3109 modum cuiusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet
3110 quidquid ad omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur, et tale
3111 impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae
3112 perfectioni ipsius. Et sic separatio a corpore dicitur animam
3113 retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae essentiae.
3114 Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur
3115 ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile. Et ideo quandiu
3116 ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo
3117 quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum
3118 corpus pertingere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p16">
3119 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices
3120 its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that
3121 it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
3122 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="33650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33650] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
3123 dicendum quod desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex
3124 parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui
3125 sufficit. Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia
3126 illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet.
3127 Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed
3128 extensive.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A5-p17">
3129 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is
3130 not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the
3131 higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion:
3132 because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever
3133 will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
3134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="33651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33651] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum
3135 dicendum quod id quod ibidem dicitur, quod <i>spiritus defunctorum
3136 non sic vident Deum sicut Angeli</i>, non est intelligendum
3137 secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis, quia etiam modo aliquae animae
3138 beatorum sunt assumptae ad superiores ordines Angelorum, clarius
3139 videntes Deum quam inferiores Angeli. Sed intelligitur secundum
3140 inaequalitatem proportionis, quia Angeli, etiam infimi, habent
3141 omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt habituri, non autem
3142 animae separatae sanctorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A6-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 6. Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p2">
3143 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily
3144 good. But it has been shown above (
3145 <a href="#FS_Q2" id="FS_Q4_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[2])</a> that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness.
3146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33652] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
3147 sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio corporis non requiratur ad
3148 beatitudinem hominis perfectam. Perfectio enim corporis est quoddam
3149 corporale bonum. Sed supra ostensum est quod beatitudo non
3150 consistit in corporalibus bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non
3151 requiritur aliqua perfecta dispositio corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p3">
3152 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not
3153 part in this operation, as shown above
3154 <a href="#FS_Q4_A5" id="FS_Q4_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
3155 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33653] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3156 beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinae essentiae, ut
3157 ostensum est. Sed ad hanc operationem nihil exhibet corpus, ut
3158 dictum est. Ergo nulla dispositio corporis requiritur ad
3159 beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p4">
3160 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in
3161 the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore,
3162 in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
3163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33654] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3164 quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a corpore, tanto perfectius
3165 intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit in perfectissima operatione
3166 intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus modis animam esse abstractam a
3167 corpore. Nullo ergo modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad
3168 beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5">
3169 <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written (
3170 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
3171 God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (
3172 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.66.14" target="asv">Is. 66:14</a>): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of
3173 the body is
3174 necessary for Happiness.
3175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33655] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
3176 praemium virtutis est beatitudo, unde dicitur Ioan. XIII, <i>beati
3177 eritis, si feceritis ea</i>. Sed sanctis repromittitur pro praemio
3178 non solum visio Dei et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona
3179 dispositio, dicitur enim Isaiae ult., <i>videbitis, et gaudebit cor
3180 vestrum, et ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt</i>. Ergo bona
3181 dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p6">
3182 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
3183 required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect
3184 virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.
3185 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p7"> But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that
3186 it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words
3187 of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable.
3188 For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the
3189 soul to exclude its natural perfection.
3190 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A6-p8"> Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that
3191 Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such,
3192 that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the
3193 mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no
3194 longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile
3195 was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this
3196 too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that
3197 from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature."
3198 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 co."><a name="33656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33656] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3199 dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac
3200 vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate
3201 requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo,
3202 secundum philosophum, in operatione virtutis perfectae. Manifestum
3203 est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione
3204 virtutis homo impediri potest. Sed si loquamur de beatitudine
3205 perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod non requiritur ad beatitudinem
3206 aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad eam ut omnino anima
3207 sit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus, XXII de Civ. Dei,
3208 introducit verba Porphyrii dicentis quod <i>ad hoc quod beata sit
3209 anima, omne corpus fugiendum est</i>. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Cum
3210 enim naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod
3211 perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat. Et ideo
3212 dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam,
3213 requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et antecedenter et
3214 consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII
3215 super Gen. ad Litt., <i>si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficilis et
3216 gravis administratio, sicut caro quae corrumpitur et aggravat
3217 animam, avertitur mens ab illa visione summi caeli</i>. Unde
3218 concludit quod, <i>cum hoc corpus iam non erit animale, sed
3219 spirituale, tunc Angelis adaequabitur, et erit ei ad gloriam, quod
3220 sarcinae fuit</i>. Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae
3221 fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur.
3222 Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Dioscorum, <i>tam potenti
3223 natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine
3224 redundet in inferiorem naturam incorruptionis vigor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p9">
3225 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.
3226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33657] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3227 dicendum quod in corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in
3228 obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem
3229 beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p10">
3230 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove
3231 a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
3232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33658] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3233 dicendum quod, etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem
3234 intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire.
3235 Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem
3236 mentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A6-p11">
3237 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which
3238 weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall
3239 treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.).
3240 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33659] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3241 dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur
3242 quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat
3243 animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter
3244 spiritui subiectum, de quo in tertia parte huius operis
3245 dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A7-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 7. Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2">
3246 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs
3247 to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said
3248 (
3249 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.30" target="asv">Lk. 22:30</a>): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (
3250 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.20" target="asv">Mat. 6:20</a>): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (
3251 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.34" target="asv">Mat. 25:34</a>):
3252 "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.
3253 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33660] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
3254 sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requirantur etiam
3255 exteriora bona. Quod enim in praemium sanctis promittitur, ad
3256 beatitudinem pertinet. Sed sanctis repromittuntur exteriora bona,
3257 sicut cibus et potus, divitiae et regnum, dicitur enim Luc. XXII,
3258 <i>ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo</i>; et
3259 Matth. VI, <i>thesaurizate vobis thesauros in caelo</i>; et Matth.
3260 XXV, <i>venite, benedicti patris mei, possidete regnum</i>. Ergo ad
3261 beatitudinem requiruntur exteriora bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p3">
3262 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things."
3263 But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore
3264 they too are necessary for Happiness.
3265 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33661] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3266 secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>beatitudo est status omnium
3267 bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed exteriora sunt aliqua
3268 hominis bona, licet minima, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo ipsa etiam
3269 requiruntur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4">
3270 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Our Lord said (
3271 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.12" target="asv">Mat. 5:12</a>): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place
3272 is necessary for Happiness.
3273 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33662] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3274 dominus, Matth. V, dicit, <i>merces vestra multa est in caelis</i>.
3275 Sed esse in caelis significat esse in loco. Ergo saltem locus
3276 exterior requiritur ad beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5">
3277 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3278 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.25" target="asv">Ps. 72:25</a>): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"---"It
3279 is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
3280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33663] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3281 est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXII, <i>quid enim mihi est in caelo?
3282 Et a te quid volui super terram?</i> Quasi dicat, nihil aliud volo
3283 nisi hoc quod sequitur, <i>mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est</i>. Ergo
3284 nihil aliud exterius ad beatitudinem requiritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A7-p6">
3285 <b>I answer that,</b> For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
3286 happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
3287 For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation
3288 of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to
3289 perform its operations.
3290 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A7-p7"> On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason
3291 of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations
3292 which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in
3293 seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no
3294 longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained
3295 to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than
3296 that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated
3297 in Ethic. x, 8.
3298 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 co."><a name="33664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33664] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3299 dicendum quod ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita
3300 potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia
3301 beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia
3302 beatitudini, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I
3303 Ethic. Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad
3304 operationem virtutis contemplativae quam etiam ad operationem
3305 virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus
3306 exerceat opera activae virtutis. Sed ad beatitudinem perfectam,
3307 quae in visione Dei consistit, nullo modo huiusmodi bona
3308 requiruntur. Cuius ratio est quia omnia huiusmodi bona exteriora
3309 vel requiruntur ad sustentationem animalis corporis; vel
3310 requiruntur ad aliquas operationes quas per animale corpus
3311 exercemus, quae humanae vitae conveniunt. Illa autem perfecta
3312 beatitudo quae in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine
3313 corpore; vel erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed
3314 spirituali. Et ideo nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur
3315 ad illam beatitudinem, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem. Et quia in
3316 hac vita magis accedit ad similitudinem illius perfectae
3317 beatitudinis felicitas contemplativa quam activa, utpote etiam Deo
3318 similior, ut ex dictis patet; ideo minus indiget huiusmodi bonis
3319 corporis, ut dicitur in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p8">
3320 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont
3321 to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire
3322 of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the
3323 sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of
3324 God.
3325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33665] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3326 dicendum quod omnes illae corporales promissiones quae in sacra
3327 Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendae, secundum
3328 quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari,
3329 <i>ut ex his quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita
3330 consurgamus</i>, sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Sicut per
3331 cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias,
3332 sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum, exaltatio
3333 hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p9">
3334 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists.
3335 Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things,
3336 we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
3337 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33666] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3338 dicendum quod bona ista deservientia animali vitae, non competunt
3339 vitae spirituali in qua beatitudo perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit
3340 in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni
3341 invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A7-p10">
3342 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints,
3343 but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed
3344 to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.
3345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33667] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3346 dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte,
3347 merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis caelis, sed per
3348 caelos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. Nihilominus
3349 tamen locus corporeus, scilicet caelum Empyreum, aderit beatis, non
3350 propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam
3351 congruentiam et decorem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q4_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q4_A8-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 8. Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p2">
3352 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under
3353 the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends
3354 is necessary for Happiness.
3355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33668] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
3356 sic proceditur. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii ad beatitudinem.
3357 Futura enim beatitudo in Scripturis frequenter nomine gloriae
3358 designatur. Sed gloria consistit in hoc quod bonum hominis ad
3359 notitiam multorum deducitur. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur
3360 societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3">
3361 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius [*Seneca,
3362 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 6</a>] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary
3363 for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.
3364 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33669] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3365 Boetius dicit quod <i>nullius boni sine consortio iucunda est
3366 possessio</i>. Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo
3367 etiam requiritur societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p4">
3368 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems
3369 that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
3370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33670] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3371 caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas se extendit ad
3372 dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem
3373 requiratur societas amicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5">
3374 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3375 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q4_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently
3376 nothing else is necessary for Happiness.
3377 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33671] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3378 est quod dicitur Sap. VII, <i>venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum
3379 illa</i>, scilicet cum divina sapientia, quae consistit in
3380 contemplatione Dei. Et sic ad beatitudinem nihil aliud
3381 requiritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q4_A8-p6">
3382 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed,
3383 to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation
3384 of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do
3385 good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may
3386 do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.
3387 </p><p id="FS_Q4_A8-p7"> But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential
3388 to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being
3389 of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to
3390 happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
3391 without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship."
3392 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 co."><a name="33672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33672] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3393 dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut
3394 philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem
3395 propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter
3396 delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in
3397 operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis
3398 benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam
3399 ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene
3400 operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in
3401 operibus vitae contemplativae. Sed si loquamur de perfecta
3402 beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum
3403 de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem
3404 suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit
3405 societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt.,
3406 quod <i>creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi
3407 intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris.
3408 Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo
3409 adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in
3410 Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p8">
3411 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.
3412 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33673] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3413 dicendum quod gloria quae est essentialis beatitudini, est quam
3414 habet homo non apud hominem, sed apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p9">
3415 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question
3416 under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.
3417 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33674] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3418 dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod
3419 habetur, non est plena sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non
3420 potest, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q4_A8-p10">
3421 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore
3422 if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor
3423 to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect
3424 Happiness.
3425 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 4 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33675] Iª-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3426 dicendum quod perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini
3427 quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem
3428 proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non
3429 habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur
3430 dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter
3431 se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.</p></div></div></div></div>
3432 <div id="FS_Q5" class="div3">
3433 <h3 id="FS_Q5-p0.1">Q. 5. OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
3434 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
3435 <p id="FS_Q5-p2"> We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q5-p3"><a href="#FS_Q5_A1"> (1) Whether man can attain Happiness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p4"><a href="#FS_Q5_A2"> (2) Whether one man can be happier than another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p5"><a href="#FS_Q5_A3"> (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p6"><a href="#FS_Q5_A4"> (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p7"><a href="#FS_Q5_A5"> (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p8"><a href="#FS_Q5_A6"> (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p9"><a href="#FS_Q5_A7"> (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q5-p10"><a href="#FS_Q5_A8"> (8) Whether every man desires Happiness?</a></p>
3436 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 pr."><a name="33676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33676]
3437 Iª-IIae q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ipsa
3438 adeptione beatitudinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum
3439 homo possit consequi beatitudinem. Secundo, utrum unus homo possit
3440 esse alio beatior. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita
3441 beatus. Quarto, utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti. Quinto,
3442 utrum, homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem. Sexto,
3443 utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius
3444 superioris creaturae. Septimo, utrum requirantur opera hominis
3445 aliqua ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Octavo,
3446 utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem.</p></div></div></div>
3447 <div id="FS_Q5_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A1-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 1. Whether man can attain happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p2">
3448 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual
3449 is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have
3450 the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature,
3451 attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness.
3452 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33677] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
3453 sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit.
3454 Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem ita natura
3455 intellectualis est supra rationalem ut patet per Dionysium in libro
3456 de Div. Nom., in multis locis. Sed bruta animalia, quae habent
3457 naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem
3458 rationalis naturae. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturae,
3459 potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturae, qui est
3460 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p3">
3461 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material
3462 things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain
3463 Happiness.
3464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33678] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3465 beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui est veritas pura. Sed
3466 homini est connaturale ut veritatem intueatur in rebus
3467 materialibus, unde species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus
3468 intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non potest ad
3469 beatitudinem pervenire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p4">
3470 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle.
3471 Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that
3472 he cannot attain Happiness.
3473 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33679] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3474 beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest
3475 pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum
3476 et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo
3477 transcendere non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem
3478 adipisci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5">
3479 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3480 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.12" target="asv">Ps. 93:12</a>): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord."
3481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33680] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3482 est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>beatus homo quem tu erudieris,
3483 domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p6">
3484 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness.
3485 Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect
3486 good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that
3487 man is capable of seeing God, as stated in
3488 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A1" id="FS_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[1]</a>: in
3489 which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists.
3490 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="33681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33681] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3491 dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque
3492 ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire.
3493 Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et
3494 eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum,
3495 et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem
3496 adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis
3497 divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est; in qua quidem
3498 visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7">
3499 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds
3500 the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal,
3501 whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the
3502 same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth
3503 which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the
3504 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>;
3505 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A8" id="FS_Q5_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can
3506 attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained
3507 it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after
3508 a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
3509 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33682] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3510 dicendum quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam, et
3511 aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura enim rationalis excedit
3512 sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis obiectum, quia sensus nullo modo
3513 potest cognoscere universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed
3514 intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum
3515 cognoscendi eandem intelligibilem veritatem, nam intellectualis
3516 natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per
3517 inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in primo
3518 dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per
3519 quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest
3520 beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio
3521 modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post
3522 principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam
3523 perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo
3524 pertingere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8">
3525 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this
3526 state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the
3527 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a> ;
3528 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q89_A1" id="FS_Q5_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a>.
3529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33683] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3530 dicendum quod homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est
3531 connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per
3532 phantasmata. Sed post huius vitae statum, habet alium modum
3533 connaturalem, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A1-p9">
3534 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation
3535 of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained
3536 it, he will be perfectly happy.
3537 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33684] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3538 dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere Angelos gradu naturae,
3539 ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior. Potest tamen eos
3540 transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid
3541 super Angelos esse, quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte
3542 consequetur, perfecte beatus erit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A2-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 2. Whether one man can be happier than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2">
3543 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
3544 (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (
3545 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.10" target="asv">Mat. 20:10</a>) that all who labor in the vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), "each was equally
3546 rewarded with eternal life." Therefore one man cannot be happier than another.
3547 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33685] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
3548 sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse
3549 beatior. Beatitudo enim est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit
3550 in I Ethic. Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces
3551 redditur, dicitur enim Matth. XX, quod omnes qui operati sunt in
3552 vinea, acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius,
3553 <i>aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt</i>. Ergo
3554 unus non erit alio beatior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p3">
3555 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed
3556 by another's.
3557 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33686] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3558 beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo non potest esse aliquid
3559 maius. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia maior
3560 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p4">
3561 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire
3562 is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater
3563 good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.
3564 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33687] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3565 beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, desiderium
3566 hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum
3567 deest quod suppleri possit. Si autem nihil deest quod suppleri
3568 possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud maius bonum. Ergo vel homo
3569 non est beatus, vel, si est beatus, non potest alia maior beatitudo
3570 esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5">
3571 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3572 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.2" target="asv">Jn. 14:2</a>): "In My Father's house there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify "the diverse
3573 dignities of merits in the one eternal life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness
3574 itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
3575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33688] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3576 est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, <i>in domo patris mei mansiones multae
3577 sunt</i>; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit, <i>diversae meritorum
3578 dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna</i>. Dignitas autem vitae
3579 aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt
3580 diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis
3581 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6">
3582 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
3583 <a href="#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
3584 <a href="#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q5_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of
3585 that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another,
3586 since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or
3587 enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now,
3588 that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And
3589 in this sense one man can be happier than another.
3590 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="33689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33689] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3591 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in ratione beatitudinis duo
3592 includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum; et
3593 adeptio vel fruitio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod
3594 est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo
3595 alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus,
3596 cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem
3597 huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior,
3598 quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit
3599 autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius
3600 dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest
3601 aliquis alio beatior esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p7">
3602 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
3603 divers degrees of enjoyment.
3604 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33690] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3605 dicendum quod unitas denarii significat unitatem beatitudinis ex
3606 parte obiecti. Sed diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem
3607 beatitudinis secundum diversum gradum fruitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p8">
3608 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.
3609 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33691] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3610 dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum bonum, inquantum est
3611 summi boni perfecta possessio sive fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9">
3612 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all good,"
3613 as Augustine says (Enarr. in
3614 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.134" target="asv">Ps. 134</a>). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other
3615 goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the
3616 happier for knowing them, but is happy for
3617 knowing Thee alone."
3618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33692] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3619 dicendum quod nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum, cum
3620 habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est bonum omnis boni, ut
3621 Augustinus dicit. Sed dicitur aliquis alio beatior, ex diversa
3622 eiusdem boni participatione. Additio autem aliorum bonorum non
3623 auget beatitudinem, unde Augustinus dicit, in V Confess., <i>qui te
3624 et alia novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum
3625 beatus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A3-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 3. Whether one can be happy in this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2">
3626 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (
3627 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.1" target="asv">Ps. 118:1</a>): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can
3628 be happy in this life.
3629 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33693] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
3630 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi.
3631 Dicitur enim in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>beati immaculati in via, qui
3632 ambulant in lege domini</i>. Hoc autem in hac vita contingit. Ergo
3633 aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p3">
3634 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not
3635 be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly.
3636 Therefore man can be happy in this life.
3637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33694] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3638 imperfecta participatio summi boni non adimit rationem
3639 beatitudinis, alioquin unus non esset alio beatior. Sed in hac vita
3640 homines possunt participare summum bonum, cognoscendo et amando
3641 Deum, licet imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse
3642 beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4">
3643 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature
3644 does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from
3645 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.143.15" target="asv"> Ps. 143:15</a>: "They have called the people happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy
3646 in this life.
3647 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33695] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3648 quod a pluribus dicitur, non potest totaliter falsum esse, videtur
3649 enim esse naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter
3650 deficit. Sed plures ponunt beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per
3651 illud Psalmi CXLIII, <i>beatum dixerunt populum cui haec sunt</i>,
3652 scilicet praesentis vitae bona. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest
3653 esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5">
3654 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3655 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.1" target="asv">Job 14:1</a>): "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore
3656 man cannot be happy in this life.
3657 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33696] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3658 est quod dicitur Iob XIV, <i>homo natus de muliere, brevi vivens
3659 tempore, repletur multis miseriis</i>. Sed beatitudo excludit
3660 miseriam. Ergo homo in hac vita non potest esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p6">
3661 <b>I answer that,</b> A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life.
3662 This may be seen from a twofold consideration.
3663 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p7"> First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil,
3664 and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable
3665 evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties
3666 on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire
3667 for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present
3668 life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man
3669 naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
3670 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A3-p8"> Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot
3671 obtain in this life, as was shown in the
3672 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A11" id="FS_Q5_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
3673 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="33697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33697] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3674 dicendum quod aliqualis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita
3675 haberi potest, perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi
3676 in hac vita. Et hoc quidem considerari potest dupliciter. Primo
3677 quidem, ex ipsa communi beatitudinis ratione. Nam beatitudo, cum
3678 sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne
3679 desiderium implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum excludi.
3680 Multis enim malis praesens vita subiacet, quae vitari non possunt,
3681 et ignorantiae ex parte intellectus, et inordinatae affectioni ex
3682 parte appetitus, et multiplicibus poenalitatibus ex parte corporis;
3683 ut Augustinus diligenter prosequitur XIX de Civ. Dei. Similiter
3684 etiam desiderium boni in hac vita satiari non potest. Naturaliter
3685 enim homo desiderat permanentiam eius boni quod habet. Bona autem
3686 praesentis vitae transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transeat, quam
3687 naturaliter desideramus, et eam perpetuo permanere vellemus, quia
3688 naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est quod in hac
3689 vita vera beatitudo habeatur. Secundo, si consideretur id in quo
3690 specialiter beatitudo consistit, scilicet visio divinae essentiae,
3691 quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in primo ostensum
3692 est. Ex quibus manifeste apparet quod non potest aliquis in hac
3693 vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9">
3694 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according
3695 to
3696 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv"> Rom. 8:24</a>: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign
3697 Good.
3698 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33698] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3699 dicendum quod beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem
3700 beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura vita, secundum illud Rom. VIII,
3701 <i>spe salvi facti sumus</i>, vel propter aliquam participationem
3702 beatitudinis, secundum aliqualem summi boni fruitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p10">
3703 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which
3704 is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be
3705 on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however,
3706 in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not
3707 destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above (
3708 <a href="#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q5_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
3709 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33699] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3710 dicendum quod participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta
3711 dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius obiecti beatitudinis, quod
3712 quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur. Et talis imperfectio
3713 tollit rationem verae beatitudinis. Alio modo potest esse
3714 imperfecta ex parte ipsius participantis, qui quidem ad ipsum
3715 obiectum beatitudinis secundum seipsum attingit, scilicet Deum, sed
3716 imperfecte, per respectum ad modum quo Deus seipso fruitur. Et
3717 talis imperfectio non tollit veram rationem beatitudinis, quia, cum
3718 beatitudo sit operatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est, vera ratio
3719 beatitudinis, consideratur ex obiecto, quod dat speciem actui, non
3720 autem ex subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A3-p11">
3721 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness.
3722 And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
3723 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33700] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3724 dicendum quod homines reputant in hac vita esse aliquam
3725 beatitudinem, propter aliquam similitudinem verae beatitudinis. Et
3726 sic non ex toto in sua aestimatione deficiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A4-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 4. Whether happiness once had can be lost?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p2">
3727 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
3728 to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in
3729 a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.
3730 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33701] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
3731 sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit amitti. Beatitudo
3732 enim est perfectio quaedam. Sed omnis perfectio inest perfectibili
3733 secundum modum ipsius. Cum igitur homo secundum suam naturam sit
3734 mutabilis, videtur quod beatitudo mutabiliter ab homine
3735 participetur. Et ita videtur quod homo beatitudinem possit
3736 amittere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p3">
3737 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
3738 to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease
3739 to be happy.
3740 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33702] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3741 beatitudo consistit in actione intellectus, qui subiacet voluntati.
3742 Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo videtur quod possit
3743 desistere ab operatione qua homo beatificatur, et ita homo desinet
3744 esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p4">
3745 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore
3746 it seems that it has an end.
3747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33703] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3748 principio respondet finis. Sed beatitudo hominis habet principium,
3749 quia homo non semper fuit beatus. Ergo videtur quod habeat
3750 finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5">
3751 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3752 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
3753 <a href="#FS_Q5_A2" id="FS_Q5_A4-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
3754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33704] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
3755 est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, de iustis, quod ibunt in vitam
3756 aeternam; quae, ut dictum est, est beatitudo sanctorum. Quod autem
3757 est aeternum, non deficit. Ergo beatitudo non potest amitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p6">
3758 <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative
3759 happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
3760 occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
3761 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p7"> This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act
3762 that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like
3763 happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains
3764 an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this
3765 life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state
3766 (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
3767 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p8"> But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii,
3768 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.
3769 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p9"> This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the
3770 "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to
3771 hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of
3772 losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that
3773 man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never
3774 will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is
3775 the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly
3776 happy, if evil be in him.
3777 </p><p id="FS_Q5_A4-p10"> Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (
3778 <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine
3779 Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient,
3780 something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience
3781 attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good
3782 things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written (
3783 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv">Ps. 16:15</a>): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and (
3784 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.11" target="asv">Wis. 7:11</a>): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any
3785 inconvenience attached to it; because it is written
3786 of the contemplation of wisdom (
3787 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake
3788 Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since
3789 the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that
3790 sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
3791 will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above (
3792 <a href="#FS_Q4_A4" id="FS_Q5_A4-p10.5" shape="rect">Q[4], A[4]</a>). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things:
3793 and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on,
3794 man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things
3795 as are subject to time and
3796 movement.
3797 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="33705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33705] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3798 dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, qualis in hac
3799 vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate
3800 contemplativa, quae amittitur vel per oblivionem, puta cum
3801 corrumpitur scientia ex aliqua aegritudine; vel etiam per aliquas
3802 occupationes, quibus totaliter abstrahitur aliquis a
3803 contemplatione. Patet etiam idem in felicitate activa, voluntas
3804 enim hominis transmutari potest, ut in vitium degeneret a virtute,
3805 in cuius actu principaliter consistit felicitas. Si autem virtus
3806 remaneat integra, exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem
3807 beatitudinem talem perturbare, inquantum impediunt multas
3808 operationes virtutum, non tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre, quia
3809 adhuc remanet operatio virtutis, dum ipsas adversitates homo
3810 laudabiliter sustinet. Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest,
3811 quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo philosophus
3812 dicit, in I Ethic., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non
3813 simpliciter, sed sicut homines quorum natura mutationi subiecta
3814 est. Si vero loquamur de beatitudine perfecta quae expectatur post
3815 hanc vitam, sciendum est quod Origenes posuit, quorundam
3816 Platonicorum errorem sequens, quod post ultimam beatitudinem homo
3817 potest fieri miser. Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum
3818 dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis. Cum
3819 enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod
3820 desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat. Naturaliter
3821 autem homo desiderat retinere bonum quod habet, et quod eius
3822 retinendi securitatem obtineat, alioquin necesse est quod timore
3823 amittendi, vel dolore de certitudine amissionis, affligatur.
3824 Requiritur igitur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat
3825 opinionem bonum quod habet, nunquam se amissurum. Quae quidem
3826 opinio si vera sit, consequens est quod beatitudinem nunquam
3827 amittet. Si autem falsa sit, hoc ipsum est quoddam malum, falsam
3828 opinionem habere, nam falsum est malum intellectus, sicut verum est
3829 bonum ipsius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non igitur iam vere erit
3830 beatus, si aliquod malum ei inest. Secundo idem apparet, si
3831 consideretur ratio beatitudinis in speciali. Ostensum est enim
3832 supra quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinae essentiae
3833 consistit. Est autem impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam
3834 essentiam, velit eam non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis
3835 carere vult, aut est insufficiens, et quaeritur aliquid
3836 sufficientius loco eius, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum,
3837 propter quod in fastidium venit. Visio autem divinae essentiae
3838 replet animam omnibus bonis, cum coniungat fonti totius bonitatis,
3839 unde dicitur in Psalmo XVI, <i>satiabor cum apparuerit gloria
3840 tua</i>; et Sap. VII, dicitur, <i>venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter
3841 cum illa</i>, scilicet cum contemplatione sapientiae. Similiter
3842 etiam non habet aliquod incommodum adiunctum, quia de
3843 contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, Sap. VIII, <i>non habet
3844 amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus eius</i>.
3845 Sic ergo patet quod propria voluntate beatus non potest
3846 beatitudinem deserere. Similiter etiam non potest eam perdere, Deo
3847 subtrahente. Quia, cum subtractio beatitudinis sit quaedam poena,
3848 non potest talis subtractio a Deo, iusto iudice, provenire, nisi
3849 pro aliqua culpa, in quam cadere non potest qui Dei essentiam
3850 videt, cum ad hanc visionem ex necessitate sequatur rectitudo
3851 voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec aliquod
3852 aliud agens potest eam subtrahere. Quia mens Deo coniuncta super
3853 omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab huiusmodi coniunctione nullum aliud
3854 agens potest ipsam excludere. Unde inconveniens videtur quod per
3855 quasdam alternationes temporum transeat homo de beatitudine ad
3856 miseriam, et e converso, quia huiusmodi temporales alternationes
3857 esse non possunt, nisi circa ea quae subiacent tempori et
3858 motui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p11">
3859 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it
3860 altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends
3861 all change.
3862 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33706] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3863 dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quae omnem
3864 defectum excludit a beato. Et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam
3865 habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quae hominem sublevat in
3866 participationem aeternitatis transcendentis omnem mutationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p12">
3867 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity,
3868 to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.
3869 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33707] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3870 dicendum quod voluntas ad opposita se habet in his quae ad finem
3871 ordinantur, sed ad ultimum finem naturali necessitate ordinatur.
3872 Quod patet ex hoc, quod homo non potest non velle esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A4-p13">
3873 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the
3874 good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
3875 another.
3876 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33708] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3877 dicendum quod beatitudo habet principium ex conditione
3878 participantis, sed caret fine, propter conditionem boni cuius
3879 participatio facit beatum. Unde ab alio est initium beatitudinis;
3880 et ab alio est quod caret fine.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A5-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 5. Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p2">
3881 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing
3882 is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore
3883 man can attain Happiness by his natural powers.
3884 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33709] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
3885 sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per sua naturalia possit
3886 beatitudinem consequi. Natura enim non deficit in necessariis. Sed
3887 nihil est homini tam necessarium quam id per quod finem ultimum
3888 consequitur. Ergo hoc naturae humanae non deest. Potest igitur homo
3889 per sua naturalia beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p3">
3890 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational
3891 creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
3892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33710] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3893 homo, cum sit nobilior irrationalibus creaturis, videtur esse
3894 sufficientior. Sed irrationales creaturae per sua naturalia possunt
3895 consequi suos fines. Ergo multo magis homo per sua naturalia potest
3896 beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p4">
3897 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing
3898 belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning
3899 in human operations, is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain
3900 to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers.
3901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33711] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3902 beatitudo est operatio perfecta, secundum philosophum. Eiusdem
3903 autem est incipere rem, et perficere ipsam. Cum igitur operatio
3904 imperfecta, quae est quasi principium in operationibus humanis,
3905 subdatur naturali hominis potestati, qua suorum actuum est dominus;
3906 videtur quod per naturalem potentiam possit pertingere ad
3907 operationem perfectam, quae est beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5">
3908 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses
3909 the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (
3910 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them
3911 that love Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
3912 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33712] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
3913 homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et
3914 voluntatem. Sed ultima beatitudo sanctis praeparata, excedit
3915 intellectum hominis et voluntatem, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor.
3916 II, <i>oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis
3917 non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se</i>. Ergo homo
3918 per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p6">
3919 <b>I answer that,</b> Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue,
3920 in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above
3921 (Q[3], A[8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only
3922 of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the
3923 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A4" id="FS_Q5_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12],
3924 A[4]
3925 </a>. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence
3926 (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its
3927 substance." But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine
3928 Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain
3929 final Happiness by his natural powers.
3930 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="33713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33713] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
3931 dicendum quod beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest,
3932 potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus,
3933 in cuius operatione consistit, de quo infra dicetur. Sed beatitudo
3934 hominis perfecta, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in visione
3935 divinae essentiae. Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra
3936 naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturae, ut in primo
3937 ostensum est. Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturae est
3938 secundum modum substantiae eius, sicut de intelligentia dicitur in
3939 libro de causis, quod <i>cognoscit ea quae sunt supra se, et ea
3940 quae sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiae suae</i>. Omnis
3941 autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit
3942 a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem
3943 substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest
3944 consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p7">
3945 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided
3946 other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did
3947 it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do.
3948 But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him
3949 happy. "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
3950 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33714] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3951 dicendum quod, sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis,
3952 quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus
3953 quia dedit ei rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi
3954 conquirere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non
3955 daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc
3956 enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit
3957 converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. <i>Quae enim per amicos
3958 possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus</i>, ut dicitur in III
3959 Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p8">
3960 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition
3961 than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in
3962 order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect
3963 health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health,
3964 without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs
3965 the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this
3966 good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
3967 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33715] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3968 dicendum quod nobilioris conditionis est natura quae potest
3969 consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc
3970 consequendum, quam natura quae non potest consequi perfectum bonum,
3971 sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem
3972 eius non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut philosophus dicit in II de
3973 caelo. Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi
3974 perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae; quam qui
3975 solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem, sine medicinae
3976 auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quae potest consequi
3977 perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est
3978 perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est
3979 capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae
3980 naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A5-p9">
3981 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity,
3982 if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
3983 Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation
3984 which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its
3985 object. Consequently the argument does not prove.
3986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33716] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3987 dicendum quod, quando imperfectum et perfectum sunt eiusdem
3988 speciei, ab eadem virtute causari possunt. Non autem hoc est
3989 necesse, si sunt alterius speciei, non enim quidquid potest causare
3990 dispositionem materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre.
3991 Imperfecta autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis
3992 potestati, non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta
3993 quae est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex
3994 obiecto. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A6-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 6. Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p2">
3995 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe
3996 a twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which
3997 is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order
3998 of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
3999 order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures
4000 acting on the lower, as stated in the
4001 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FS_Q5_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[109], A[2]</a>: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy,
4002 through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.
4003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33717] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
4004 sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit fieri beatus per actionem
4005 alicuius superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli. Cum enim duplex
4006 ordo inveniatur in rebus, unus partium universi ad invicem, alius
4007 totius universi ad bonum quod est extra universum; primus ordo
4008 ordinatur ad secundum sicut ad finem, ut dicitur XII Metaphys.;
4009 sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius
4010 exercitus ad ducem. Sed ordo partium universi ad invicem attenditur
4011 secundum quod superiores creaturae agunt in inferiores, ut in primo
4012 dictum est, beatitudo autem consistit in ordine hominis ad bonum
4013 quod est extra universum, quod est Deus. Ergo per actionem
4014 superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli, in hominem, homo beatus
4015 efficitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p3">
4016 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially
4017 hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually
4018 happy by an angel who is actually happy.
4019 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33718] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4020 quod est in potentia tale, potest reduci in actum per id quod est
4021 actu tale, sicut quod est potentia calidum, fit actu calidum per id
4022 quod est actu calidum. Sed homo est in potentia beatus. Ergo potest
4023 fieri actu beatus per Angelum, qui est actu beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p4">
4024 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's
4025 intellect as shown in the
4026 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q5_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>. Therefore an angel can make a man happy.
4027 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33719] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4028 beatitudo consistit in operatione intellectus, ut supra dictum est.
4029 Sed Angelus potest illuminare intellectum hominis, ut in primo
4030 habitum est. Ergo Angelus potest facere hominem beatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5">
4031 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4032 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.12" target="asv">Ps. 83:12</a>): "The Lord will give grace and glory."
4033 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33720] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4034 est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>gratiam et gloriam dabit
4035 dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p6">
4036 <b>I answer that,</b> Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which
4037 surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above
4038 nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now
4039 it has been shown above
4040 <a href="#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q5_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a> that Happiness is a good surpassing
4041 created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man
4042 made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as
4043 of the virtue, in whose act it consists.
4044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="33721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33721] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4045 dicendum quod, cum omnis creatura naturae legibus sit subiecta,
4046 utpote habens limitatam virtutem et actionem; illud quod excedit
4047 naturam creatam, non potest fieri virtute alicuius creaturae. Et
4048 ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit
4049 immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci, et
4050 cetera huiusmodi. Ostensum est autem quod beatitudo est quoddam
4051 bonum excedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod per
4052 actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur, sed homo beatus fit solo
4053 Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta. Si vero loquamur
4054 de beatitudine imperfecta, sic eadem ratio est de ipsa et de
4055 virtute, in cuius actu consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p7">
4056 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the
4057 last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to
4058 the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus,
4059 too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the
4060 attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself
4061 through the First Agent, which is God.
4062 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33722] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4063 dicendum quod plerumque contingit in potentiis activis ordinatis,
4064 quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam,
4065 inferiores vero potentiae coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi
4066 finis disponendo, sicut ad artem gubernativam, quae praeest
4067 navifactivae, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit. Sic
4068 igitur et in ordine universi, homo quidem adiuvatur ab Angelis ad
4069 consequendum ultimum finem, secundum aliqua praecedentia, quibus
4070 disponitur ad eius consecutionem, sed ipsum ultimum finem
4071 consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p8">
4072 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance
4073 a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle
4074 whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the "intention" of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white;
4075 nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something
4076 else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is
4077 in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently
4078 no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.
4079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33723] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4080 dicendum quod, quando aliqua forma actu existit in aliquo secundum
4081 esse perfectum et naturale, potest esse principium actionis in
4082 alterum; sicut calidum per calorem calefacit. Sed si forma existit
4083 in aliquo imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest
4084 esse principium communicationis sui ad alterum, sicut intentio
4085 coloris quae est in pupilla, non potest facere album; neque etiam
4086 omnia quae sunt illuminata aut calefacta, possunt alia calefacere
4087 et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio at calefactio essent usque ad
4088 infinitum. Lumen autem gloriae, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo
4089 quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale, in qualibet autem
4090 creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel
4091 participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam
4092 beatitudinem alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A6-p9">
4093 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as
4094 to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the
4095 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q5_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[106], A[1]</a>: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.
4096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33724] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4097 dicendum quod Angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis, vel
4098 etiam inferioris Angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum
4099 operum non autem quantum ad visionem divinae essentiae, ut in primo
4100 dictum est. Ad eam enim videndam, omnes immediate illuminantur a
4101 Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A7-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 7. Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p2">
4102 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite
4103 power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But
4104 man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above
4105 <a href="#FS_Q5_A6" id="FS_Q5_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not
4106 require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.
4107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33725] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
4108 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requirantur aliqua opera hominis
4109 ad hoc ut beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. Deus enim, cum sit agens
4110 infinitae virtutis, non praeexigit in agendo materiam, aut
4111 dispositionem materiae, sed statim potest totum producere. Sed
4112 opera hominis, cum non requirantur ad beatitudinem eius sicut causa
4113 efficiens, ut dictum est, non possunt requiri ad eam nisi sicut
4114 dispositiones. Ergo Deus, qui dispositiones non praeexigit in
4115 agendo, beatitudinem sine praecedentibus operibus confert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p3">
4116 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established
4117 nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect
4118 forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works.
4119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33726] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4120 sicut Deus est auctor beatitudinis immediate, ita et naturam
4121 immediate instituit. Sed in prima institutione naturae, produxit
4122 creaturas nulla dispositione praecedente vel actione creaturae; sed
4123 statim fecit unumquodque perfectum in sua specie. Ergo videtur quod
4124 beatitudinem conferat homini sine aliquibus operationibus
4125 praecedentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4">
4126 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
4127 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.6" target="asv">Rom. 4:6</a>) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining
4128 Happiness.
4129 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33727] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4130 apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus
4131 confert iustitiam sine operibus. Non ergo requiruntur aliqua opera
4132 hominis ad beatitudinem consequendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5">
4133 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4134 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.17" target="asv">Jn. 13:17</a>): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.
4135 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33728] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4136 est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, <i>si haec scitis, beati eritis si
4137 feceritis ea</i>. Ergo per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p6">
4138 <b>I answer that,</b> Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right
4139 order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter,
4140 in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make
4141 a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as
4142 sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should
4143 not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one
4144 has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs
4145 to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not
4146 to be
4147 moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
4148 becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in
4149 the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained
4150 in the
4151 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A5" id="FS_Q5_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[62], A[5]</a>; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits.
4152 Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.
4153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 co."><a name="33729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33729] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4154 dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, requiritur
4155 ad beatitudinem, cum nihil aliud sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis
4156 ad ultimum finem; quae ita exigitur ad consecutionem ultimi finis,
4157 sicut debita dispositio materiae ad consecutionem formae. Sed ex
4158 hoc non ostenditur quod aliqua operatio hominis debeat praecedere
4159 eius beatitudinem, posset enim Deus simul facere voluntatem recte
4160 tendentem in finem, et finem consequentem; sicut quandoque simul
4161 materiam disponit, et inducit formam. Sed ordo divinae sapientiae
4162 exigit ne hoc fiat, ut enim dicitur in II de caelo, <i>eorum quae
4163 nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu,
4164 aliquid uno motu, aliquid pluribus</i>. Habere autem perfectum
4165 bonum sine motu, convenit ei quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere
4166 autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei
4167 proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam
4168 operationem praecedentem. Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam
4169 creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur
4170 absque motu operationis, per quam tendit in ipsam. Sed Angelus, qui
4171 est superior ordine naturae quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex
4172 ordine divinae sapientiae, uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in
4173 primo expositum est. Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis
4174 motibus operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam, secundum
4175 philosophum, beatitudo est praemium virtuosarum operationum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p7">
4176 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows
4177 Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.
4178 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33730] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4179 dicendum quod operatio hominis non praeexigitur ad consecutionem
4180 beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinae virtutis
4181 beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8">
4182 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the
4183 creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated
4184 to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who,"
4185 according to
4186 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q5_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.10" target="asv"> Heb. 2:10, </a> "had brought many children into glory";
4187 therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But
4188 this is peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits
4189 of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ.
4190 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33731] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4191 dicendum quod primas creaturas statim Deus perfectas produxit,
4192 absque aliqua dispositione vel operatione creaturae praecedente,
4193 quia sic instituit prima individua specierum, ut per ea natura
4194 propagaretur ad posteros. Et similiter, quia per Christum, qui est
4195 Deus et homo, beatitudo erat ad alios derivanda, secundum illud
4196 apostoli ad Heb. II, <i>qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat</i>;
4197 statim a principio suae conceptionis, absque aliqua operatione
4198 meritoria praecedente, anima eius fuit beata. Sed hoc est singulare
4199 in ipso, nam pueris baptizatis subvenit meritum Christi ad
4200 beatitudinem consequendam, licet desint eis merita propria, eo quod
4201 per Baptismum sunt Christi membra effecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A7-p9">
4202 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account
4203 of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends
4204 towards Happiness.
4205 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33732] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4206 dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei, quae habetur
4207 per gratiam iustificantem, quae quidem non datur propter opera
4208 praecedentia. Non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo,
4209 sed magis est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q5_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q5_A8-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 8. Whether every man desires happiness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p2">
4210 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
4211 of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine
4212 says (De Trin. xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some
4213 in other things." Therefore not all desire Happiness.
4214 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33733] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
4215 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes appetant beatitudinem.
4216 Nullus enim potest appetere quod ignorat, cum bonum apprehensum sit
4217 obiectum appetitus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed multi nesciunt
4218 quid sit beatitudo, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIII de Trin.,
4219 patet ex hoc, quod <i>quidam posuerunt beatitudinem in voluptate
4220 corporis, quidam in virtute animi, quidam in aliis rebus</i>. Non
4221 ergo omnes beatitudinem appetunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p3">
4222 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above (
4223 <a href="#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q5_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not
4224 desire Happiness.
4225 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33734] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4226 essentia beatitudinis est visio essentiae divinae, ut dictum est.
4227 Sed aliqui opinantur hoc esse impossibile, quod Deus per essentiam
4228 ab homine videatur, unde hoc non appetunt. Ergo non omnes homines
4229 appetunt beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p4">
4230 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all
4231 do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire
4232 Happiness.
4233 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33735] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4234 Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin. quod <i>beatus est qui habet
4235 omnia quae vult, et nihil male vult</i>. Sed non omnes hoc volunt,
4236 quidam enim male aliqua volunt, et tamen volunt illa se velle. Non
4237 ergo omnes volunt beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p5">
4238 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' he
4239 would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
4240 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33736] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
4241 est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., <i>si minus dixisset,
4242 omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis, dixisset aliquid
4243 quod nullus in sua non cognosceret voluntate</i>. Quilibet ergo
4244 vult esse beatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p6">
4245 <b>I answer that,</b> Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every
4246 man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above (
4247 <a href="#FS_Q5_A3" id="FS_Q5_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently
4248 to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be
4249 satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which
4250 it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness;
4251 because they know not in what thing the general notion of
4252 happiness is found.
4253 And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 co."><a name="33737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33737] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
4254 dicendum quod beatitudo dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo,
4255 secundum communem rationem beatitudinis. Et sic necesse est quod
4256 omnis homo beatitudinem velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis
4257 est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit
4258 obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter
4259 eius voluntati satisfacit. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud
4260 est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur. Quod quilibet vult. Alio
4261 modo possumus loqui de beatitudine secundum specialem rationem,
4262 quantum ad id in quo beatitudo consistit. Et sic non omnes
4263 cognoscunt beatitudinem, quia nesciunt cui rei communis ratio
4264 beatitudinis conveniat. Et per consequens, quantum ad hoc, non
4265 omnes eam volunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p7a">Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.
4266 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33738] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet
4267 responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p7">
4268 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction,
4269 there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired
4270 in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general
4271 notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
4272 thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself,
4273 or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.
4274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="33739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33739] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4275 dicendum quod, cum voluntas sequatur apprehensionem intellectus seu
4276 rationis, sicut contingit quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, quod
4277 tamen est diversum secundum rationis considerationem; ita contingit
4278 quod aliquid est idem secundum rem, et tamen uno modo appetitur,
4279 alio modo non appetitur. Beatitudo ergo potest considerari sub
4280 ratione finalis boni et perfecti, quae est communis ratio
4281 beatitudinis, et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas in
4282 illud tendit, ut dictum est. Potest etiam considerari secundum
4283 alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius operationis,
4284 vel ex parte potentiae operativae, vel ex parte obiecti, et sic non
4285 ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q5_A8-p8">
4286 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition of Happiness given by some---"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled"
4287 is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of
4288 all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing
4289 satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if
4290 we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to
4291 Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such
4292 things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that
4293 are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to
4294 include perfect Happiness---that he "desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit,
4295 that "happy is he who has all he desires."
4296 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 5 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="33740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33740] Iª-IIae q. 5 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4297 dicendum quod ista definitio beatitudinis quam quidam posuerunt,
4298 beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, vel, cui omnia optata
4299 succedunt, quodam modo intellecta, est bona et sufficiens; alio
4300 vero modo, est imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter de
4301 omnibus quae vult homo naturali appetitu, sic verum est quod qui
4302 habet omnia quae vult, est beatus, nihil enim satiat naturalem
4303 hominis appetitum, nisi bonum perfectum, quod est beatitudo. Si
4304 vero intelligatur de his quae homo vult secundum apprehensionem
4305 rationis, sic habere quaedam quae homo vult, non pertinet ad
4306 beatitudinem, sed magis ad miseriam inquantum huiusmodi habita
4307 impediunt hominem ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult, sicut
4308 etiam ratio accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione
4309 veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus addidit ad
4310 perfectionem beatitudinis, quod nihil mali velit. Quamvis primum
4311 posset sufficere, si recte intelligeretur, scilicet quod beatus est
4312 qui habet omnia quae vult.</p></div></div></div></div>
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4316 </div>
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