--- a/summa/english/FP_ix.html	Fri Oct 14 20:49:45 2011 +0000
+++ b/summa/english/FP_ix.html	Fri Oct 14 20:50:30 2011 +0000
@@ -2115,16 +2115,15 @@
                      of
                      which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved
                      for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions.
-                  </p>
                   <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p9"> The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there
                      exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive,
                      but not the locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive
                      powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek
                      necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power---namely, men.
                      But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite
-                     (De Anima ii, 3).
-                  </p>
+                     (De Anima ii, 3).</p>
                   <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p10"> Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.</p>
+                  </p>
                   <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p11">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "natural appetite" is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural
                      appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the "animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this
@@ -3537,7 +3536,13 @@
                      desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge,
                      virtue, and suchlike.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p9"><!-- Added by HST, missing
+in original, copied from
+	http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques80.pdf --><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As is explained in De Anima 3, a general opinion (opinio universalis) does
+not effect movement except by the mediation of a particular case (mediante particulari).  Similarly, a
+higher appetite effects movement by the mediation of a lower appetite.  This is why the power to effect
+movement that follows upon the intellect is not distinct from the power to effect movement that follows
+upon the sensory power.</p>
                   <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p10"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A1.html"></a>
                   <a href="summa.FP_Q81.html"></a>
@@ -4099,10 +4104,9 @@
                      And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this
                      way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the
                      irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature,
-                     and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection
-                     is clear.
-                  </p>
-                  <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p10"></p>
+                     and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says.</p>
+                  <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whence the answer to the third objection
+                     is clear.</p>
                   <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p11"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html"></a>
                   <a href="summa.FP_Q83.html"></a>