--- a/summa/english/FP_ix.html	Fri Oct 14 20:50:30 2011 +0000
+++ b/summa/english/FP_ix.html	Sun Feb 26 16:39:39 2012 +0000
@@ -5634,9 +5634,12 @@
                      definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii,
                      10.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p8">
-                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to
-                     the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who
+                  <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher says
+	that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition
+	and division.</p>
+      <p><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same answer applies to
+                     the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning,</p><p>
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> and to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who
                      errs in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and
                      of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense
                      are to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion.
@@ -5686,7 +5689,9 @@
                      need in its operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative powers are of better disposition, are
                      better disposed to understand.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p7"> The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect
+                  <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b>
+	The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above;</p>
+<p><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> likewise the reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect
                      consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is.
                   </p>
                   <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p8">
@@ -5817,7 +5822,7 @@
                      <a id="FP_Q86_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A7.html">Q[85], A[7]</a>), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms
                      in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the
                      intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the
-                     proposition "Socrates is a man." Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.
+                     proposition "Socrates is a man."</p><p><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.
                   </p>
                   <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p8">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is