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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.vi" class="div2">
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2 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
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3 <a href="summa.FP_Q48.html"></a>
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4 <h2 id="FP.vi-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF GOOD AND EVIL (QQ[48]-49)</h2>
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5 <div id="FP_Q48" class="div3">
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6 <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a>
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7 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
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8 <h3 id="FP_Q48-p0.1">THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
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9 <p id="FP_Q48-p1"></p>
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10 <p id="FP_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the
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11 distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures.
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12 </p>
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13 <p id="FP_Q48-p3"> Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.</p>
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14 <p id="FP_Q48-p4"> Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:</p>
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15 <p id="FP_Q48-p5"> (1) Whether evil is a nature?</p>
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16 <p id="FP_Q48-p6"> (2) Whether evil is found in things?</p>
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17 <p id="FP_Q48-p7"> (3) Whether good is the subject of evil?</p>
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18 <p id="FP_Q48-p8"> (4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?</p>
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19 <p id="FP_Q48-p9"> (5) The division of evil into pain and fault.</p>
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20 <p id="FP_Q48-p10"> (6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?</p>
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21 <div id="FP_Q48_A1" class="div4">
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22 <a href="summa.FP_Q48.html"></a>
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23 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
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24 <h4 id="FP_Q48_A1-p0.1">Whether evil is a nature?</h4>
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25 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p1"></p>
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26 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p2">
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27 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic.
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28 x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature.
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29 </p>
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30 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p3">
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31 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality;
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32 for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
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33 </p>
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34 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p4">
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35 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries,
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36 as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be
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37 a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
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38 </p>
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39 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p5">
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40 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
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41 </p>
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42 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p6">
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43 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection
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44 of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all
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45 things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore
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46 evil is a nature.
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47 </p>
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48 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p7">
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49 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being nor a good."
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50 </p>
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51 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p8">
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52 <b>I answer that,</b> One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the
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53 nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being
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54 and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that
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55 evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of
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56 evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For
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57 since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
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58 </p>
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59 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p9">
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60 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore
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61 they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward
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62 examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says
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63 (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as
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64 being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white,
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65 and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries;
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66 because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.
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67 </p>
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68 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p10">
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69 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object
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70 of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences
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71 in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself
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72 constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end;
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73 just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus,
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74 therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good;
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75 as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the
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76 order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed.
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77 </p>
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78 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p11">
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79 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between
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80 good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right
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81 order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not
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82 evil." And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not
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83 from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.
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84 </p>
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85 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p12">
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86 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that
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87 sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of
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88 good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the
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89 sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.
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90 But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed
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91 to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as
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92 Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of
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93 itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention."
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94 </p>
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95 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p13">
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96 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according
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97 as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good.
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98 Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally,
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99 that is, by reason of some good joined to it.
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100 </p>
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101 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p14"></p>
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102 <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p15"></p>
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103 <a href="summa.FP_Q48.html"></a>
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104 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
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105 </div>
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106 <div id="FP_Q48_A2" class="div4">
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107 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
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108 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html"></a>
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109 <h4 id="FP_Q48_A2-p0.1">Whether evil is found in things?</h4>
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110 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p1"></p>
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111 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p2">
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112 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something,
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113 that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from
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114 non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.
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115 </p>
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116 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p3">
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117 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which
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118 is contrary to what has been said
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119 <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
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120 </p>
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121 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p4">
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122 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good
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123 unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things
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124 made by God there is no evil.
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125 </p>
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126 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p5">
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127 <b>On the contrary,</b> On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
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128 </p>
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129 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p6">
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130 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
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131 <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may
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132 be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good
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133 which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose
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134 their existence as incorruptible
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135 things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.
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136 </p>
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137 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p7"> As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible
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138 beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows
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139 that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence
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140 it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an
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141 evil.
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142 </p>
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143 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p8">
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144 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but
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145 a privation.
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146 </p>
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147 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p9">
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148 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a
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149 thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a
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150 being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together
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151 subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense
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152 being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other
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153 privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things
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154 may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.
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155 </p>
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156 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p10">
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157 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order
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158 to the whole, as was said above (
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159 <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>). And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail
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160 in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not
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161 to destroy,
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162 but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail;
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163 secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many
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164 good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted,
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165 nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a
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166 sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.
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167 </p>
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168 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p11"></p>
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169 <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p12"></p>
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170 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
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171 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html"></a>
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172 </div>
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173 <div id="FP_Q48_A3" class="div4">
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174 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
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175 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a>
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176 <h4 id="FP_Q48_A3-p0.1">Whether evil is in good as in its subject?</h4>
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177 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p1"></p>
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178 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p2">
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179 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv,
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180 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.
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181 </p>
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182 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p3">
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183 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But "non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore,
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184 neither does evil require good as its subject.
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185 </p>
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186 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p4">
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187 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as
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188 in its subject.
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189 </p>
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190 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p5">
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191 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in
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192 good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (
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193 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"
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194 </p>
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195 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p6">
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196 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only in good."
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197 </p>
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198 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p7">
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199 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above
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200 <a id="FP_Q48_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative
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201 and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist
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202 is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a
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203 man would be evil who had not the swiftness
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204 of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance,
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205 the privation of sight is called blindness.
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206 </p>
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207 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p8"> Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same---viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute
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208 potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether
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209 it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both
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210 of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection
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211 and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation
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212 to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.
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213 </p>
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214 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p9">
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215 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.
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216 </p>
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217 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p10">
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218 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher
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219 says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.
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220 </p>
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221 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p11">
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222 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not "sight,"
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223 but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid
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224 down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference
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225 to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter,
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226 and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus;
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227 whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good.
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228 </p>
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229 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p12">
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230 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as
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231 is clear from the explanation given.
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232 </p>
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233 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p13"></p>
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234 <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p14"></p>
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235 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
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236 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a>
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237 </div>
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238 <div id="FP_Q48_A4" class="div4">
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239 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html"></a>
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240 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a>
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241 <h4 id="FP_Q48_A4-p0.1">Whether evil corrupts the whole good?</h4>
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242 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p1"></p>
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243 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p2">
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244 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries.
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245 Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
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246 </p>
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247 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p3">
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248 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and
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249 uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
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250 </p>
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251 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p4">
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252 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is
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253 at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
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254 </p>
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255 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p5">
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256 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot wholly consume good."
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257 </p>
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258 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p6">
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259 <b>I answer that,</b> Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed
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260 by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind
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261 of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness
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262 the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is
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263 diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality.
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264 </p>
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265 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p7"> The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but
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266 rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as
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267 contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared
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268 for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its
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269 perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied
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270 in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.
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271 </p>
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272 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p8"> Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither
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273 is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements;
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274 for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely
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275 multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also
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276 infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which
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277 is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude
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278 of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which
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279 in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to
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280 grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to
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281 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>: "Our sins have divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs
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282 to its very nature.
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283 </p>
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284 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p9">
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285 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
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286 </p>
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287 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p10">
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288 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where
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289 it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation
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290 to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
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291 </p>
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292 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p11">
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293 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous
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294 is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third),
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295 so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion,
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296 we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of
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297 the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance
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298 either equally or more.
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299 </p>
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300 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p12"> Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per
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301 se," but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.
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302 </p>
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303 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p13"></p>
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304 <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p14"></p>
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305 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html"></a>
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306 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a>
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307 </div>
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308 <div id="FP_Q48_A5" class="div4">
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309 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a>
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310 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a>
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311 <h4 id="FP_Q48_A5-p0.1">Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?</h4>
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312 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p1"></p>
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313 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p2"> [*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain
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314 of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense."---Ed.]
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315 </p>
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316 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p3">
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317 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures
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318 there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore
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319 evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
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320 </p>
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321 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p4">
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322 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which
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323 are evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
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324 </p>
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325 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p5">
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326 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for "temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion
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327 for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on
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328 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a>; not is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently
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329 divided into pain and fault.
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330 </p>
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331 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p6">
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332 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It would seem that this division is superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil
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333 "because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain.
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334 </p>
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335 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p7">
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336 <b>I answer that,</b> Evil, as was said above
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337 <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">(A[3])</a> is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and
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338 second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold.
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339 In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness
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340 is an evil, as also it is an evil to
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341 be wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it
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342 does not exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil,
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343 which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which
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344 comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition
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345 that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above (
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346 <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due
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347 operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect
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348 action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.
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349 </p>
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350 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p8">
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351 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere negation, as was said above
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352 <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight
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353 is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise,
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354 it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself, because existence
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355 and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature.
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356 </p>
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357 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p9">
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358 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.
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359 </p>
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360 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p10">
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361 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not,
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362 properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the
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363 action of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault.
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364 </p>
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365 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p11">
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366 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent
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367 in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained
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368 in evil, as including the idea of injury.
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369 </p>
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370 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p12"></p>
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371 <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p13"></p>
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372 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a>
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373 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a>
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374 </div>
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375 <div id="FP_Q48_A6" class="div4">
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376 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a>
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377 <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a>
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378 <h4 id="FP_Q48_A6-p0.1">Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?</h4>
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379 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p1"></p>
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380 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p2">
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381 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good
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382 than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.
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383 </p>
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384 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p3">
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385 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above
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386 <a id="FP_Q48_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is better
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387 than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault.
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388 </p>
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389 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p4">
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390 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation
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391 of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
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392 </p>
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393 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p5">
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394 <b>On the contrary,</b> A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body.
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395 But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain.
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396 </p>
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397 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p6">
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398 <b>I answer that,</b> Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal
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399 goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning,
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400 so as to include privation of grace or glory.
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401 </p>
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402 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p7"> There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain,
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403 as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment." And
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404 this because, since good absolutely considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act is operation,
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405 or the use of something possessed, it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good
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406 use of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well
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407 what he has, man is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good
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408 he has, as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disordered
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409 act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than
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410 pain has.
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411 </p>
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412 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p8"> The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And
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413 this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either something created, as sight, destroyed
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414 by blindness, or something uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature forfeits its uncreated good.
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415 But the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine
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416 will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it
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417 is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has.
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418 </p>
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419 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p9">
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420 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the
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421 reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than
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422 pain.
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423 </p>
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424 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p10">
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425 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection,
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426 than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.
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427 </p>
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428 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p11">
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429 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way,
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430 both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault,
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431 inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end.
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432 </p>
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433 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p12"></p>
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434 <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p13"></p>
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435 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a>
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436 <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a>
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437 </div>
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438 <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a>
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439 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
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440 </div>
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441 <div id="FP_Q49" class="div3">
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442 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a>
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443 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
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444 <h3 id="FP_Q49-p0.1">THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
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445 <p id="FP_Q49-p1"></p>
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446 <p id="FP_Q49-p2"> We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three points of inquire:</p>
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447 <p id="FP_Q49-p3"> (1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?</p>
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448 <p id="FP_Q49-p4"> (2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?</p>
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449 <p id="FP_Q49-p5"> (3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?</p>
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450 <div id="FP_Q49_A1" class="div4">
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451 <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a>
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452 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
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453 <h4 id="FP_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether good can be the cause of evil?</h4>
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454 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p1"></p>
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455 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p2">
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456 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said (
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457 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."
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458 </p>
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459 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p3">
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460 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause
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461 of evil.
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462 </p>
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463 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p4">
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464 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause,
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465 if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.
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466 </p>
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467 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p5">
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468 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.
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469 </p>
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470 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p6">
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471 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no possible source of evil except good."
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472 </p>
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473 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p7">
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474 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to
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475 a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper
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476 disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except
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477 from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause
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478 except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.
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479 </p>
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480 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p8"> And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection
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481 which belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the
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482 cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above (
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483 <a id="FP_Q49_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise,
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484 neither has
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485 it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good,
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486 but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.
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487 </p>
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488 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p9"> In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused
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489 by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus the defect in
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490 the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason
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491 only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not
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492 in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent
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493 or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form
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494 intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation
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495 of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it
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496 impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and
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497 water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form
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498 of water, but at the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But if there
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499 is a defect in the proper effect of the fire---as, for instance, that it fails to heat---this comes either by defect of the
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500 action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not
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501 receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which
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502 of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause
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503 of evil.
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504 </p>
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505 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p10">
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506 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good
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507 will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless
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508 the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.
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509 </p>
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510 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p11">
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511 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes evil
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512 to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained above (
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513 <a id="FP_Q49_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">Q[19], A[9]</a>), this is by accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for instance, the
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514 exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the
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515 inward heat.
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516 </p>
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517 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p12">
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518 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same
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519 kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to
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520 it. Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above.
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521 But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually
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522 deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault
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523 follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.
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524 </p>
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525 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p13">
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526 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above.
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527 </p>
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528 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p14"></p>
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529 <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p15"></p>
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530 <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a>
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531 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
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532 </div>
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533 <div id="FP_Q49_A2" class="div4">
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534 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
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535 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
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536 <h4 id="FP_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?</h4>
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537 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p1"></p>
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538 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p2">
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539 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (
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540 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.5" target="asv">Is. 45:5</a>,
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541 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">7</a>): "I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil."
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542 And
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543 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv"> Amos 3:6, </a> "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?"
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544 </p>
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545 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p3">
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546 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above
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547
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548 <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (
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549 <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2] , A[3]</a>;
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550 <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4), it follows that also every evil is from God.
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551 </p>
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552 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p4">
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553 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same.
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554 But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.
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555 </p>
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556 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p5">
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557 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being."
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558 </p>
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559 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p6">
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560 <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what was said
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561 <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect,
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562 but the highest perfection, as was shown above (
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563 <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as
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564 to its cause.
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565 </p>
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566 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p7"> But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards
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567 both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said
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568 <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that
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569 corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order
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570 of the universe. Now,
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571 the order of the universe requires, as was said above (
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572 <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 2;
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573 <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html">Q[48], A[2]</a>), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order
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574 of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to
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575 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Amos.12.6" target="asv">1
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576 2:6
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577 </a>: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made death"
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578 (
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579 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the
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580 universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty,
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581 but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.
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582 </p>
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583 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p8">
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584 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.
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585 </p>
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586 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p9">
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587 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and
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588 perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused
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589 by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature
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590 of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
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591 reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.
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592 </p>
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593 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p10">
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594 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
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595 the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
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596 </p>
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597 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p11"></p>
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598 <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p12"></p>
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599 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
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600 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
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601 </div>
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602 <div id="FP_Q49_A3" class="div4">
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603 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
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604 <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a>
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605 <h4 id="FP_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?</h4>
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606 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p1"></p>
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607 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p2">
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608 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes.
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609 But contrariety is found in things, according to
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610 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:15</a>: "Good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary
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611 principles, one of good, the other of evil.
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612 </p>
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613 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p3">
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614 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good,
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615 as was shown above (
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616 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>;
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617 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
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618 </p>
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619 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p4">
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620 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation
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621 to what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil.
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622 </p>
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623 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p5">
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624 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially,
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625 but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.
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626 </p>
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627 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p6">
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628 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is "per se." But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore,
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629 we must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause,
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630 but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few.
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631 </p>
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632 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p7">
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633 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient
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634 cause, as was said above (
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635 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil.
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636 </p>
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637 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p8">
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638 <b>On the contrary,</b> The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was shown above (
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639 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>;
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640 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
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641 </p>
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642 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p9">
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643 <b>I answer that,</b> It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.
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644 </p>
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645 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p10"> First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above (
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646 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], AA[3]</a>,4). But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good (
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647 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html">Q[5], A[3]</a>); and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject (
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648 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>).
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649 </p>
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650 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p11"> Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness,
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651 as shown above (
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652 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above (
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653 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html">Q[48], A[4]</a>), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly
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654 and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the
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655 wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly
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656 evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.
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657 </p>
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658 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p12"> Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good,
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659 as was shown above
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660 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent
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661 to the direct cause.
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662 </p>
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663 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p13"> Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence
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664 also arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being,
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665 and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something
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666 by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for
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667 instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however,
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668 of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself,
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669 and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above (
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670 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>, ad 1).
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671 </p>
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672 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p14"> Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to
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673 reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes
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674 even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common
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675 cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the
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676 power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was
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677 shown above (
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678 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>).
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679 </p>
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680 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p15">
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681 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular
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682 cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.
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683 </p>
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684 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p16">
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685 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was
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686 said above (
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687 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above (
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688 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">Q[48], AA[1]</a>, 2,3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.
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689 </p>
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690 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p17">
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691 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a
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692 perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil
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693 by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the
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694 same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme
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695 good.
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696 </p>
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697 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p18">
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698 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any
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699 essential evil.
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700 </p>
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701 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p19">
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702 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above
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703 <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p19.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false.
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704 For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole
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705 universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as
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706 in the greater number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that is, in regard to
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707 reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason.
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708 </p>
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709 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p20">
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710 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.
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711 </p>
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712 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p21"></p>
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713 <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p22"></p>
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714 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
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715 <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a>
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716 </div>
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717 <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a>
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718 <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
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719 </div>
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720 <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
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721 <a href="summa.FP_Q48.html"></a>
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722 `
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723 </div> |
