Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_vi.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,723 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.vi" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.vi-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF GOOD AND EVIL (QQ[48]-49)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q48" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q48-p0.1">THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q48-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the + distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p3"> Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.</p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p4"> Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:</p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p5"> (1) Whether evil is a nature?</p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p6"> (2) Whether evil is found in things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p7"> (3) Whether good is the subject of evil?</p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p8"> (4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?</p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p9"> (5) The division of evil into pain and fault.</p> + <p id="FP_Q48-p10"> (6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?</p> + <div id="FP_Q48_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q48_A1-p0.1">Whether evil is a nature?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. + x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality; + for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, + as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be + a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection + of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all + things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore + evil is a nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being nor a good." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the + nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being + and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that + evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of + evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For + since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore + they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward + examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says + (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as + being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white, + and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries; + because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object + of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences + in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself + constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; + just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, + therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; + as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the + order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between + good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right + order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not + evil." And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not + from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that + sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of + good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the + sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. + But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed + to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as + Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of + itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according + as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. + Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, + that is, by reason of some good joined to it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q48_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q48_A2-p0.1">Whether evil is found in things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something, + that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from + non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which + is contrary to what has been said + <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good + unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things + made by God there is no evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may + be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good + which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose + their existence as incorruptible + things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p7"> As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible + beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows + that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence + it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an + evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but + a privation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a + thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a + being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together + subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense + being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other + privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things + may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order + to the whole, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>). And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail + in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not + to destroy, + but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; + secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many + good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, + nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a + sufferer be praised if there were no injustice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q48_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q48_A3-p0.1">Whether evil is in good as in its subject?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, + 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But "non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, + neither does evil require good as its subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as + in its subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in + good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only in good." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above + <a id="FP_Q48_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative + and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist + is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a + man would be evil who had not the swiftness + of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, + the privation of sight is called blindness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p8"> Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same---viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute + potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether + it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both + of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection + and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation + to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher + says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not "sight," + but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid + down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference + to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, + and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus; + whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as + is clear from the explanation given. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q48_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q48_A4-p0.1">Whether evil corrupts the whole good?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. + Therefore evil corrupts the whole good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and + uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is + at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot wholly consume good." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed + by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind + of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness + the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is + diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p7"> The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but + rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as + contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared + for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its + perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied + in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p8"> Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither + is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements; + for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely + multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also + infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which + is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude + of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which + in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to + grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>: "Our sins have divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs + to its very nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where + it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation + to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous + is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), + so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, + we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of + the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance + either equally or more. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p12"> Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per + se," but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q48_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q48_A5-p0.1">Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p2"> [*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain + of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense."---Ed.] + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures + there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore + evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which + are evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for "temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion + for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a>; not is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently + divided into pain and fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It would seem that this division is superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil + "because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Evil, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">(A[3])</a> is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and + second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold. + In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness + is an evil, as also it is an evil to + be wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it + does not exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil, + which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which + comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition + that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due + operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect + action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere negation, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight + is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, + it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself, because existence + and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not, + properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the + action of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent + in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained + in evil, as including the idea of injury. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q48_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q48_A6-p0.1">Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good + than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q48_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is better + than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation + of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. + But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal + goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, + so as to include privation of grace or glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p7"> There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, + as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment." And + this because, since good absolutely considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act is operation, + or the use of something possessed, it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good + use of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well + what he has, man is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good + he has, as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disordered + act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than + pain has. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p8"> The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And + this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either something created, as sight, destroyed + by blindness, or something uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature forfeits its uncreated good. + But the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine + will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it + is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the + reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than + pain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection, + than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way, + both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, + inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q49" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q49-p0.1">THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q49-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q49-p2"> We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three points of inquire:</p> + <p id="FP_Q49-p3"> (1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?</p> + <p id="FP_Q49-p4"> (2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?</p> + <p id="FP_Q49-p5"> (3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?</p> + <div id="FP_Q49_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether good can be the cause of evil?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause + of evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, + if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no possible source of evil except good." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to + a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper + disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except + from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause + except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p8"> And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection + which belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the + cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, + neither has + it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good, + but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p9"> In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused + by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus the defect in + the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason + only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not + in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent + or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form + intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation + of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it + impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and + water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form + of water, but at the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But if there + is a defect in the proper effect of the fire---as, for instance, that it fails to heat---this comes either by defect of the + action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not + receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which + of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause + of evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good + will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless + the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes evil + to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">Q[19], A[9]</a>), this is by accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for instance, the + exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the + inward heat. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same + kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to + it. Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. + But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually + deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault + follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q49_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.5" target="asv">Is. 45:5</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">7</a>): "I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil." + And + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv"> Amos 3:6, </a> "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above + + <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2] , A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4), it follows that also every evil is from God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. + But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what was said + <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, + but the highest perfection, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as + to its cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p7"> But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards + both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said + <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that + corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order + of the universe. Now, + the order of the universe requires, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 2; + <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html">Q[48], A[2]</a>), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order + of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Amos.12.6" target="asv">1 + 2:6 + </a>: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made death" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the + universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, + but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and + perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused + by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature + of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is + reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of + the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q49_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. + But contrariety is found in things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:15</a>: "Good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary + principles, one of good, the other of evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, + as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation + to what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially, + but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is "per se." But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, + we must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause, + but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient + cause, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p10"> First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], AA[3]</a>,4). But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html">Q[5], A[3]</a>); and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p11"> Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, + as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html">Q[48], A[4]</a>), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly + and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the + wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly + evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p12"> Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, + as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent + to the direct cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p13"> Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence + also arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, + and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something + by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for + instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, + of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, + and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p14"> Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to + reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes + even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common + cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the + power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was + shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular + cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was + said above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">Q[48], AA[1]</a>, 2,3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a + perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil + by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the + same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme + good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any + essential evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p19.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false. + For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole + universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as + in the greater number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that is, in regard to + reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p21"></p> + <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p22"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q48.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file