Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 16 Jun 2013 14:47:31 +0000 |
| parents | ca573ccfc3e7 |
| children | 8578f2a13dcd |
| files | summa/bilingual/FP_x.html |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_x.html Sun Jun 16 14:47:31 2013 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,8837 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.x" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FP.x-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q103">Q. 103. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q104">Q. 104. THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q105">Q. 105. OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q106">Q. 106. HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q107">Q. 107. THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q108">Q. 108. OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q109">Q. 109. THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q110">Q. 110. HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q111">Q. 111. THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q112">Q. 112. THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q113">Q. 113. OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q114">Q. 114. OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FP_Q115">Q. 115. OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q116">Q. 116. ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q117">Q. 117. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q118">Q. 118. OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q119">Q. 119. OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FP_Q103" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q103-p0.1">Q. 103. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q103-p2"> Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, + and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there + are eight points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q103-p3"><a href="#FP_Q103_A1"> (1) Whether the world is governed by someone?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p4"><a href="#FP_Q103_A2"> (2) What is the end of this government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p5"><a href="#FP_Q103_A3"> (3) Whether the world is governed by one?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p6"><a href="#FP_Q103_A4"> (4) Of the effects of this government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p7"><a href="#FP_Q103_A5"> (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p8"><a href="#FP_Q103_A6"> (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p9"><a href="#FP_Q103_A7"> (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p10"><a href="#FP_Q103_A8"> (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 pr."><a name="32692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32692] +Iª q. 103 pr.</span></a> Postquam praemissum est de creatione +rerum et distinctione earum, restat nunc tertio considerandum de +rerum gubernatione. Et primo, in communi; secundo, in speciali de +effectibus gubernationis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, +utrum mundus ab aliquo gubernetur. Secundo, quis sit finis +gubernationis ipsius. Tertio, utrum gubernetur ab uno. Quarto, de +effectibus gubernationis. Quinto, utrum omnia divinae gubernationi +subsint. Sexto, utrum omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. Septimo, +utrum divina gubernatio cassetur in aliquo. Octavo, utrum aliquid +divinae providentiae contranitatur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q103_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A1-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 1. Whether the world is governed by anyone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work + for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have + no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32693] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab aliquo. Illorum +enim est gubernari, quae moventur vel operantur propter finem. Sed +res naturales, quae sunt magna pars mundi, non moventur aut +operantur propter finem, quia non cognoscunt finem. Ergo mundus non +gubernatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but + has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32694] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum est proprie gubernari, quae ad aliquid moventur. Sed mundus +non videtur ad aliquid moveri, sed in se stabilitatem habet. Ergo +non gubernatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle + of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their + actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32695] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod in se habet necessitatem qua determinatur ad unum, non indiget +exteriori gubernante. Sed principaliores mundi partes quadam +necessitate determinantur ad unum in suis actibus et motibus. Ergo +mundus gubernatione non indiget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this + universe by mandate eternal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32696] Iª q. 103 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia +providentia</i>. Et Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., <i>o qui +perpetua mundum ratione gubernas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6"> I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. + But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that + in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed + nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is + a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that + put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration + of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A4" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A2" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[65], A[2]</a>), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is + not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate + perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, + so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 co."><a name="32697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32697] Iª q. 103 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam antiqui philosophi gubernationem mundo subtraxerunt, +dicentes omnia fortuito agi. Sed haec positio ostenditur esse +impossibilis ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex eo quod apparet in ipsis +rebus. Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus provenire quod melius est, +aut semper aut in pluribus, quod non contingeret, nisi per aliquam +providentiam res naturales dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est +gubernare. Unde ipse ordo certus rerum manifeste demonstrat +gubernationem mundi, sicut si quis intraret domum bene ordinatam, +ex ipsa domus ordinatione ordinatoris rationem perpenderet; ut, ab +Aristotele dictum, Tullius introducit in libro de natura deorum. +Secundo autem apparet idem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, per +quam res in esse productae sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Cum enim +optimi sit optima producere, non convenit summae Dei bonitati quod +res productas ad perfectum non perducat. Ultima autem perfectio +uniuscuiusque est in consecutione finis. Unde ad divinam bonitatem +pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem +perducat. Quod est gubernare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; + and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for + an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end + unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end + shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, + shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32698] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aliquid movetur vel operatur propter finem +dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut agens seipsum in finem, ut homo et +aliae creaturae rationales, et talium est cognoscere rationem +finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem. Aliquid autem dicitur moveri +vel operari propter finem, quasi ab alio actum vel directum in +finem, sicut sagitta movetur ad signum directa a sagittante, qui +cognoscit finem, non autem sagitta. Unde sicut motus sagittae ad +determinatum finem demonstrat aperte quod sagitta dirigitur ab +aliquo cognoscente; ita certus cursus naturalium rerum cognitione +carentium, manifeste declarat mundum ratione aliqua gubernari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement + we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, + would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A1" id="FP_Q103_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[104], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32699] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad +minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu +etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res +indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in +nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris +servaretur, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, + directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression + from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their + nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their + nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, + so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32700] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae +determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad +finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum +tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc +differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; +quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum +naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae +in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas +naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae +gubernationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A2-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 2. Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the + government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the + thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of + things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32701] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod finis gubernationis mundi non sit aliquid +extra mundum existens. Illud enim est finis gubernationis rei, ad +quod res gubernata perducitur. Sed illud ad quod res aliqua +perducitur, est aliquod bonum in ipsa re, sicut infirmus perducitur +ad sanitatem, quae est aliquod bonum in ipso. Ergo finis +gubernationis rerum non est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, sed aliquod +bonum in ipsis rebus existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation. + But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic + can be the end of the government of things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32702] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, I Ethic., quod <i>finium quidam sunt +operationes, quidam opera</i>, idest operata. Sed nihil extrinsecum +a toto universo potest esse operatum, operatio autem est in ipsis +operantibus. Ergo nihil extrinsecum potest esse finis gubernationis +rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the + world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32703] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum multitudinis videtur esse ordo et pax, quae est tranquillitas +ordinis. Ut Augustinus dicit XIX de Civ. Dei. Sed mundus in quadam +rerum multitudine consistit. Ergo finis gubernationis mundi est +pacificus ordo, qui est in ipsis rebus. Non ergo finis +gubernationis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of + all things is something extrinsic to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32704] Iª q. 103 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>universa propter se operatus est +dominus</i>. Ipse autem est extra totum ordinem universi. Ergo +finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their + beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what + has been expounded above ( + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear + that good has the nature + of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things + is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a + particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which + is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 co."><a name="32705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32705] Iª q. 103 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut, +principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur +principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet +Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet; necesse est quod etiam finis rerum +sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet. Manifestum +est enim quod bonum habet rationem finis. Unde finis particularis +alicuius rei est quoddam bonum particulare, finis autem universalis +rerum omnium est quoddam bonum universale. Bonum autem universale +est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa +essentia bonitatis, bonum autem particulare est quod est +participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate +creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde +illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit +extrinsecum a toto universo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something + done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the + buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe + being the good to which it is directed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32706] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod bonum aliquod consequimur multipliciter, uno modo, +sicut formam in nobis existentem, ut sanitatem aut scientiam; alio +modo, ut aliquid per nos operatum, sicut aedificator consequitur +finem faciendo domum; alio modo, sicut aliquod bonum habitum vel +possessum, ut ille qui emit, consequitur finem possidendo agrum. +Unde nihil prohibet illud ad quod perducitur universum, esse +quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the + end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder + is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, + but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that + Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is + the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation + thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32707] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de finibus artium, quarum +quaedam habent pro finibus operationes ipsas, sicut citharistae +finis est citharizare; quaedam vero habent pro fine quoddam +operatum, sicut aedificatoris finis non est aedificare, sed domus. +Contingit autem aliquid extrinsecum esse finem non solum sicut +operatum, sed etiam sicut possessum seu habitum, vel etiam sicut +repraesentatum, sicut si dicamus quod Hercules est finis imaginis, +quae fit ad eum repraesentandum. Sic igitur potest dici quod bonum +extrinsecum a toto universo est finis gubernationis rerum sicut +habitum et repraesentatum, quia ad hoc unaquaeque res tendit, ut +participet ipsum, et assimiletur ei, quantum potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate + end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in + Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32708] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso +existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi, hoc autem bonum non est +ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum +finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in +XII Metaphys.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A3-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 3. Whether the world is governed by one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government + of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously + different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32709] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab uno. De causa +enim per effectus iudicamus. Sed in gubernatione rerum apparet quod +res non uniformiter moventur et operantur, quaedam enim +contingenter, quaedam vero ex necessitate, et secundum alias +diversitates. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the + ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the + case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32710] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea +quae gubernantur ab uno, a se invicem non dissentiunt nisi propter +imperitiam aut impotentiam gubernantis, quae a Deo sunt procul. Sed +res creatae a se invicem dissentiunt, et contra se invicem pugnant; +ut in contrariis apparet. Non ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.4.9" target="asv">Eccles. 4:9</a>). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32711] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +natura semper invenitur quod melius est. Sed melius est simul esse +duos quam unum, ut dicitur Eccle. IV. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab +uno, sed a pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs + dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A8" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[8]</a>). Therefore the world is governed by one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32712] Iª q. 103 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod unum Deum et unum dominum confitemur; secundum illud apostoli +I ad Cor. VIII, <i>nobis est unus Deus, pater, et dominus unus</i>. +Quorum utrumque ad gubernationem pertinet, nam ad dominum pertinet +gubernatio subditorum; et Dei nomen ex providentia sumitur, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which + is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the + best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things + governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, + as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which + they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as + they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is + unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, + except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several + things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of + the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, + 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 co."><a name="32713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32713] Iª q. 103 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere quod mundus ab uno gubernetur. Cum enim +finis gubernationis mundi sit quod est essentialiter bonum, quod +est optimum, necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima. Optima +autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum. Cuius ratio est, quia +gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui +est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis; ut +Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod. Sicut omnia +desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non +possunt. Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde +videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod +dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et +ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est +unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum. Manifestum +est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi +ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest +convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde +multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur +ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante. +Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., <i>entia nolunt +disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo +princeps</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity + of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe ( + <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A1" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A2" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[48], A[2]</a>), and not by a diversity of governors. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32714] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod motus est actus mobilis a movente. Difformitas ergo +motuum est ex diversitate mobilium, quam requirit perfectio +universi, ut supra dictum est; non ex diversitate gubernantium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so + far as they are included in the one order of the universe. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32715] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod contraria, etsi dissentiant quantum ad fines +proximos, conveniunt tamen quantum ad finem ultimum, prout +concluduntur sub uno ordine universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is + possible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32716] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in particularibus bonis duo sunt meliora quam unum, +sed ei quod est essentialiter bonum, non potest fieri aliqua +additio bonitatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A4-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 4. Whether the effect of government is one or many?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that + which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example + of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32717] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod effectus gubernationis mundi sit unus +tantum, et non plures. Effectus enim gubernationis esse videtur id +quod per gubernationem in rebus gubernatis causatur. Hoc autem est +unum, scilicet bonum ordinis; ut in exercitu patet. Ergo +gubernationis mundi est unus effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A3" id="FP_Q103_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore also the effect of this government is but one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32718] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ab +uno natum est unum tantum procedere. Sed mundus gubernatur ab uno, +ut ostensum est. Ergo et gubernationis effectus est unus +tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the + many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects + of government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32719] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +effectus gubernationis non est unus tantum propter unitatem +gubernantis, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum multitudinem +gubernatorum. Haec autem sunt nobis innumerabilia. Ergo +gubernationis effectus non possunt comprehendi sub aliquo certo +numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs + to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32720] Iª q. 103 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius dicit, quod <i>deitas providentia et bonitate +perfecta omnia continet, et seipsa implet</i>. Gubernatio autem ad +providentiam pertinet. Ergo gubernationis divinae sunt aliqui +determinati effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. + Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things + tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; + and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. + Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature + is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in + two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, + with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to + be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things + to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without + number. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 co."><a name="32721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32721] Iª q. 103 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod effectus cuiuslibet actionis ex fine eius pensari potest, nam +per operationem efficitur ut pertingatur ad finem. Finis autem +gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem +et assimilationem omnia tendunt. Effectus igitur gubernationis +potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius finis, et sic +est unus effectus gubernationis, scilicet assimilari summo bono. +Alio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis secundum ea +quibus ad Dei assimilationem creatura perducitur. Et sic in +generali sunt duo effectus gubernationis. Creatura enim assimilatur +Deo quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad id quod Deus bonus est, +inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc quod Deus est aliis +causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem. +Unde duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in +bono, et motio earum ad bonum. Tertio modo potest considerari +effectus gubernationis in particulari, et sic sunt nobis +innumerabiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two + things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32722] Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ordo universi includit in se et conservationem rerum +diversarum a Deo institutarum, et motionem earum, quia secundum +haec duo invenitur ordo in rebus, secundum scilicet quod una est +melior alia, et secundum quod una ab alia movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p8"> From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32723] Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad alia duo patet +responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A5-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 5. Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.11" target="asv">Eccles. 9:11</a>): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches + to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not + ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine + government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32724] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia divinae gubernationi subdantur. +Dicitur enim Eccle. IX, <i>vidi sub sole nec velocium esse cursum, +nec fortium bellum, nec sapientium panem, nec doctorum divitias, +nec artificum gratiam, sed tempus casumque in omnibus</i>. Quae +autem gubernationi alicuius subsunt, non sunt casualia. Ergo ea +quae sunt sub sole, non subduntur divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject + to the Divine government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32725] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, dicit quod <i>non est Deo cura de +bobus</i>. Sed unicuique est cura eorum quae gubernantur ab ipso. +Non ergo omnia subduntur divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it + is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. + Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32726] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod seipsum gubernare potest, non videtur alterius +gubernatione indigere. Sed creatura rationalis seipsam gubernare +potest, cum habeat dominium sui actus, et per se agat; et non solum +agatur ab alio, quod videtur esse eorum quae gubernantur. Ergo non +omnia subsunt divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, + even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their + nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32727] Iª q. 103 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, V de Civ. Dei, quod <i>Deus non solum caelum +et terram, nec solum hominem et Angelum, sed nec exigui et +contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec avis pennulam, nec herbae +flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium convenientia +dereliquit</i>. Omnia ergo eius gubernationi subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; + and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal + being, as proved above ( + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. + This can also + be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under + the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A2" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have + said above ( + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A4" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[44], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A2" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[65], A[2]</a>), so it is impossible for + anything to escape from the Divine government. + </p><p id="FP_Q103_A5-p7"> Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even + human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.9.9" target="asv">Ezech. 9:9</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 co."><a name="32728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32728] Iª q. 103 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum, +et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem +dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet. Deus autem est causa non quidem +particularis unius generis rerum, sed universalis totius entis, ut +supra ostensum est. Unde sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo +creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur. +Patet etiam hoc idem ex ratione finis. Intantum enim alicuius +gubernatio se extendit, inquantum se extendere potest finis +gubernationis. Finis autem divinae gubernationis est ipsa sua +bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Unde cum nihil esse possit quod non +ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, ut ex supra dictis +patet; impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi +divinae. Stulta igitur fuit opinio dicentium quod haec inferiora +corruptibilia, vel etiam singularia, aut etiam res humanae non +gubernantur a Deo. Ex quorum persona dicitur Ezech. IX, +<i>dereliquit dominus terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such + things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element + of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government + of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would + tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which + constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher + cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects + may be found in these things according to some order of time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32729] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sub sole dicuntur esse ea quae secundum motum solis +generantur et corrumpuntur. In quibus omnibus casus invenitur; non +ita quod omnia quae in eis fiunt, sint casualia; sed quia in +quolibet eorum aliquid casuale inveniri potest. Et hoc ipsum quod +aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea +alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi +corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent, +maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid +praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus. Unde ad ostendendum +quod casualia secundum ordinem alicuius superioris causae +proveniunt, non dicit simpliciter quod vidit casum esse in omnibus, +sed dicit tempus et casum; quia scilicet secundum aliquem ordinem +temporis, casuales defectus inveniuntur in his rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable + thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is + an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. + Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed + according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these + are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, + that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational + creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God + hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which + rational creatures are governed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32730] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a +gubernante. Omnis autem motus est actus mobilis a movente, ut +dicitur in III Physic. Omnis autem actus proportionatur ei cuius +est actus. Et sic oportet quod diversa mobilia diversimode +moveantur, etiam secundum motionem unius motoris. Sic igitur +secundum unam artem Dei gubernantis, res diversimode gubernantur, +secundum earum diversitatem. Quaedam enim secundum suam naturam +sunt per se agentia, tanquam habentia dominium sui actus, et ista +gubernantur a Deo non solum per hoc quod moventur ab ipso Deo in +eis interius operante, sed etiam per hoc quod ab eo inducuntur ad +bonum et retrahuntur a malo per praecepta et prohibitiones, praemia +et poenas. Hoc autem modo non gubernantur a Deo creaturae +irrationales, quae tantum aguntur, et non agunt. Cum ergo apostolus +dicit quod Deo non est cura de bobus, non totaliter subtrahit boves +a cura gubernationis divinae; sed solum quantum ad modum qui +proprie competit rationali creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the + Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own + act, it requires to be governed by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32731] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum +et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab +intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua +creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, +indiget gubernari a Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A6-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 6. Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the + opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly + things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to + watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain + spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32732] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. +Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit +providentiam in tria, primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus +caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam +esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet +respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam +vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa +terram humanarum actionum. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate a Deo +gubernentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But + God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32733] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +melius est aliquid fieri per unum quam per multa, si sit possibile, +ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Sed Deus potest per seipsum absque +mediis causis omnia gubernare. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate +gubernet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; + thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the + same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32734] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil in Deo est deficiens et imperfectum. Sed ad defectum +gubernatoris pertinere videtur quod mediantibus aliquibus gubernet, +sicut rex terrenus, quia non sufficit ad omnia agenda, nec ubique +est praesens in suo regno, propter hoc oportet quod habeat suae +gubernationis ministros. Ergo Deus immediate omnia gubernat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater + subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled + by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32735] Iª q. 103 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., <i>quemadmodum corpora +crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine +reguntur; ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem, et +spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum +vitae rationalem pium et iustum, et ille per ipsum Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution + of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some + things by means of others. + </p><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p7"> The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest + degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design + of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his + attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we + must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least. + </p><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p8"> But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better + in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself + and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some + of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, + but gives also the faculty of teaching others. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 co."><a name="32736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32736] Iª q. 103 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in gubernatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ratio +gubernationis, quae est ipsa providentia; et executio. Quantum +igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia +gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus +gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum Deus +sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo +secundum sui optimum. Optimum autem in omni genere vel ratione vel +cognitione practica, qualis est ratio gubernationis, in hoc +consistit, quod particularia cognoscantur, in quibus est actus, +sicut optimus medicus est, non qui considerat sola universalia, sed +qui potest etiam considerare minima particularium; et idem patet in +ceteris. Unde oportet dicere quod Deus omnium etiam minimorum +particularium rationem gubernationis habeat. Sed cum per +gubernationem res quae gubernantur sint ad perfectionem +perducendae; tanto erit melior gubernatio, quanto maior perfectio a +gubernante rebus gubernatis communicatur. Maior autem perfectio est +quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, +quam si esset solummodo in se bonum. Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, +ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat, sicut si aliquis +magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam +aliorum doctores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of + government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32737] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad +rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare. +Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est +ratio gubernationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would + not be accomplished by one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32738] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio +causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per +multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his + dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32739] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non solum pertinet ad imperfectionem regis terreni +quod executores habeat suae gubernationis, sed etiam ad regis +dignitatem, quia ex ordine ministrorum potestas regia praeclarior +redditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A7-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 7. Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. + iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would + follow that no evil exists. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32740] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid praeter ordinem divinae +gubernationis contingere possit. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de +Consol., quod <i>Deus per bonum cuncta disponit</i>. Si ergo nihil +in rebus contingit praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, +sequeretur quod nihil esset malum in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs + outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32741] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil est casuale quod evenit secundum praeordinationem alicuius +gubernantis. Si igitur nihil accidit in rebus praeter ordinem +gubernationis divinae, sequitur quod nihil in rebus sit fortuitum +et casuale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. + Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, + and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine + government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32742] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ordo +divinae gubernationis est certus et immutabilis, quia est secundum +rationem aeternam. Si igitur nihil possit contingere in rebus +praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequitur quod omnia ex +necessitate eveniant, et nihil sit in rebus contingens, quod est +inconveniens. Potest igitur in rebus aliquid contingere praeter +ordinem gubernationis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Esth.13.9" target="asv">Esther 13:9</a>): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32743] Iª q. 103 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Esther XIII, <i>domine Deus, rex omnipotens, in +ditione tua cuncta sunt posita, et non est qui possit resistere +tuae voluntati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal + cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding + cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of + the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which + again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the + first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside + the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order + of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards + some other + cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 co."><a name="32744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32744] Iª q. 103 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus +evenire potest; non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius +ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit +nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse +est reducere in primam causam universalem, sicut indigestio +contingit praeter ordinem virtutis nutritivae, ex aliquo +impedimento, puta ex grossitie cibi, quam necesse est reducere in +aliquam aliam causam, et sic usque ad causam primam universalem. +Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis +tantum, sed universaliter totius entis; impossibile est quod +aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sed ex hoc +ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae +providentiae qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam, +necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur secundum aliam +causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above ( + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A3" id="FP_Q103_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped + from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32745] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, +quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo +res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius +particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine +gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order + of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32746] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem +ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad +divinam providentiam pertinet, nihil fit casu in mundo, ut +Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not + as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside + the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32747] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui effectus contingentes, per +comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere +possunt, non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum +ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid +contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa +subiecta gubernationi divinae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A8-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 8. Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.8" target="asv">Is. 3:8</a>): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32748] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid possit reniti contra ordinem +gubernationis divinae. Dicitur enim Isaiae III, <i>lingua eorum et +adinventiones eorum contra dominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against + God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32749] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus rex iuste punit eos qui eius ordinationi non repugnant. Si +igitur nihil contraniteretur divinae ordinationi, nullus iuste +puniretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things + rebel against the order of the Divine government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32750] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quaelibet res est subiecta ordini divinae gubernationis. Sed una +res ab alia impugnatur. Ergo aliqua sunt quae contranituntur +divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign + good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8" target="asv">Wis. 8</a>) of Divine wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32751] Iª q. 103 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., <i>non est aliquid quod +summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum +bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit</i>; ut +dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause + of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government. + </p><p id="FP_Q103_A8-p7"> Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly + from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and + effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, + as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is + nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but + an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, + as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things sweetly." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 co."><a name="32752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32752] Iª q. 103 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ordo divinae providentiae dupliciter potest considerari, uno +modo in generali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur a causa +gubernativa totius; alio modo in speciali, secundum scilicet quod +progreditur ex aliqua causa particulari, quae est executiva divinae +gubernationis. Primo igitur modo, nihil contranititur ordini +divinae gubernationis. Quod ex duobus patet. Primo quidem, ex hoc +quod ordo divinae gubernationis totaliter in bonum tendit, et +unaquaeque res in sua operatione et conatu non tendit nisi ad +bonum, nullus enim respiciens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius +dicit. Alio modo apparet idem ex hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, +omnis inclinatio alicuius rei vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil +est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente, sicut inclinatio +sagittae ad signum determinatum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam +impressio a sagittante. Unde omnia quae agunt vel naturaliter vel +voluntarie, quasi propria sponte perveniunt in id ad quod divinitus +ordinantur. Et ideo dicitur Deus omnia disponere suaviter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for + even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their + nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32753] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui vel cogitare vel loqui vel agere +contra Deum, non quia totaliter renitantur ordini divinae +gubernationis, quia etiam peccantes intendunt aliquod bonum, sed +quia contranituntur cuidam determinato bono, quod est eis +conveniens secundum suam naturam aut statum. Et ideo puniuntur +iuste a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> is clear from the above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32754] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet +solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; + but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32755] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur +quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa +particulari, non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali +totius.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q104" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q104-p0.1">Q. 104. THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q104-p2"> We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:</p><p id="FP_Q104-p3"><a href="#FP_Q104_A1"> (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p4"><a href="#FP_Q104_A2"> (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p5"><a href="#FP_Q104_A3"> (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p6"><a href="#FP_Q104_A4"> (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 pr."><a name="32756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32756] +Iª q. 104 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus divinae gubernationis in speciali. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creaturae indigeant ut +conserventur in esse a Deo. Secundo, utrum conserventur a Deo +immediate. Tertio, utrum Deus possit aliquid redigere in nihilum. +Quarto, utrum aliquid in nihilum redigatur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q104_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A1-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 1. Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in + being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature + cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which + is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be + in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, + because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of + the angels ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A2" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[50], AA[2]</a>,5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality + to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies ( + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A2" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[66], A[2]</a>). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality + to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since + it is not in potentiality to any other form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32757] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod creaturae non indigeant ut a Deo +conserventur in esse. Quod enim non potest non esse, non indiget ut +conservetur in esse, sicut quod non potest abscedere, non indiget +ut conservetur ne abscedat. Sed quaedam creaturae sunt quae +secundum sui naturam non possunt non esse. Ergo non omnes creaturae +indigent ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Probatio mediae. Quod per +se inest alicui, necesse est ei inesse, et oppositum eius +impossibile est ei inesse, sicut necessarium est binarium esse +parem, et impossibile est eum esse imparem. Esse autem per se +consequitur ad formam, quia unumquodque secundum hoc est ens actu, +quod habet formam. Quaedam autem creaturae sunt, quae sunt formae +quaedam subsistentes, sicut de Angelis dictum est; et sic per se +inest eis esse. Et eadem ratio est de illis quorum materia non est +in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut supra dictum est de +corporibus caelestibus. Huiusmodi ergo creaturae secundum suam +naturam ex necessitate sunt, et non possunt non esse, potentia enim +ad non esse non potest fundari neque in forma, quam per se sequitur +esse; neque in materia existente sub forma quam non potest +amittere, cum non sit in potentia ad aliam formam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect + to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for + some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He + has ceased to create it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32758] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +est potentior quolibet creato agente. Sed aliquod creatum agens +potest communicare suo effectui ut conservetur in esse, etiam eius +operatione cessante, sicut cessante actione aedificatoris, remanet +domus; et cessante actione ignis, remanet aqua calefacta per +aliquod tempus. Ergo multo magis Deus potest suae creaturae +conferre quod conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and + violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through + some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are + spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to + not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32759] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum violentum potest contingere absque aliqua causa agente. Sed +tendere ad non esse est innaturale et violentum cuilibet creaturae, +quia quaelibet creatura naturaliter appetit esse. Ergo nulla +creatura potest tendere in non esse, nisi aliquo agente ad +corruptionem. Sed quaedam sunt ad quorum corruptionem nihil agere +potest; sicut spirituales substantiae, et corpora caelestia. Ergo +huiusmodi creaturae non possunt tendere in non esse, etiam Dei +operatione cessante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, + produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is + not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does + it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature + in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore + creatures are not kept in being by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32760] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si +Deus conservat res in esse, hoc erit per aliquam actionem. Per +quamlibet autem actionem agentis, si sit efficax, aliquid fit in +effectu. Oportet igitur quod per actionem Dei conservantis aliquid +fiat in creatura. Sed hoc non videtur. Non enim per huiusmodi +actionem fit ipsum esse creaturae, quia quod iam est, non fit. +Neque iterum aliquid aliud superadditum, quia vel non continue Deus +conservaret creaturam in esse, vel continue aliquid adderetur +creaturae, quod est inconveniens. Non igitur creaturae conservantur +in esse a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>): "Upholding all things by the word of His power." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32761] Iª q. 104 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Heb. I, <i>portans omnia verbo virtutis suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a + thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything + by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. + In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a + nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said + to preserve another 'per se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot + exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, + so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the + Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi). + </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p8"> This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an + agent may be the cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being." This may be seen both in artificial + and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct cause of its "being." + For it is clear that the "being" of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and + arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying + the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able + to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house depends on the nature of these + materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For + if + an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of "being" which results from that form; + but it will be the cause of the effect, in its "becoming" only. + </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p9"> Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would + then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this + form for as much as it is in matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives "this form." And this + is to be the cause of "becoming," as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is + such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, + then the "becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the agent. + </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p10"> Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists + in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus + the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause + of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of + "becoming" but also the cause of "being." + </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p11"> Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of + the effect: so neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of + the effect not only in "becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's + action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to + act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if + it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly + and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On + the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the + principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun. + </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p12"> Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by + its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, + since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. + Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His + creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: + "As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns + at once to darkness." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 co."><a name="32762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32762] Iª q. 104 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod necesse est dicere, et secundum fidem et secundum rationem, +quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod aliquid conservatur ab altero dupliciter. +Uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, sicut ille dicitur rem +conservare, qui removet corrumpens; puta si aliquis puerum +custodiat ne cadat in ignem, dicitur eum conservare. Et sic etiam +Deus dicitur aliqua conservare, sed non omnia, quia quaedam sunt +quae non habent corrumpentia, quae necesse sit removere ad rei +conservationem. Alio modo dicitur aliquid rem aliquam conservare +per se et directe, inquantum scilicet illud quod conservatur, +dependet a conservante, ut sine eo esse non possit. Et hoc modo +omnes creaturae indigent divina conservatione. Dependet enim esse +cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere +possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae +virtutis conservarentur in esse, sicut Gregorius dicit. Et hoc sic +perspici potest. Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa, secundum +quod est causa eius. Sed considerandum est quod aliquod agens est +causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum +esse eius. Quod quidem contingit et in artificialibus, et in rebus +naturalibus. Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad eius +fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse eius. Manifestum est enim +quod esse domus consequitur formam eius, forma autem domus est +compositio et ordo, quae quidem forma consequitur naturalem +virtutem quarundam rerum. Sicut enim coquus coquit cibum adhibendo +aliquam virtutem naturalem activam, scilicet ignis; ita aedificator +facit domum adhibendo caementum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt +susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis et ordinis. Unde +esse domus dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri domus +dependet ex actione aedificatoris. Et simili ratione est +considerandum in rebus naturalibus. Quia si aliquod agens non est +causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod +consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri +tantum. Manifestum est autem quod, si aliqua duo sunt eiusdem +speciei, unum non potest esse per se causa formae alterius, +inquantum est talis forma, quia sic esset causa formae propriae, +cum sit eadem ratio utriusque. Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi +formae secundum quod est in materia, idest quod haec materia +acquirat hanc formam. Et hoc est esse causa secundum fieri; sicut +cum homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Et ideo quandocumque +naturalis effectus est natus impressionem agentis recipere secundum +eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus +dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius. Sed aliquando effectus +non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem +rationem secundum quam est in agente, sicut patet in omnibus +agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia +corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium +secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum +rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac +materia, et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Sicut +igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod +est causa effectus secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest +remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus non +solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio +quare aqua calefacta retinet calorem, cessante actione ignis; non +autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, cessante actione +solis. Quia scilicet materia aquae susceptiva est caloris ignis +secundum eandem rationem qua est in igne, unde si perfecte +perducatur ad formam ignis, retinebit calorem semper; si autem +imperfecte participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum quandam +inchoationem, calor non semper remanebit, sed ad tempus, propter +debilem participationem principii caloris. Aer autem nullo modo +natus est recipere lumen secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est +in sole, ut scilicet recipiat formam solis, quae est principium +luminis, et ideo, quia non habet radicem in aere, statim cessat +lumen, cessante actione solis. Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad +Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens +per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a +sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens +per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem +creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius +esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., +<i>virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret +aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura +concideret</i>. Et in VIII eiusdem libri dicit quod, <i>sicut aer +praesente lumine fit lucidus, sic homo, Deo sibi praesente, +illuminatur, absente autem, continuo tenebratur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Being" naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from + the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures + and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32763] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito +tamen influxu Dei, sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito +influxu solis. Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis +et corporibus caelestibus, magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere +suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make + it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an + effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but + only of "becoming." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32764] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut +conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei +communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget +creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa +essendi. Unde non est simile de agente quod non est causa essendi, +sed fieri tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not + need to be preserved thus, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32765] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de conservatione quae est per +remotionem corrumpentis; qua non indigent omnes creaturae, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either + motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32766] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam +actionem; sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse, quae quidem +actio est sine motu et tempore. Sicut etiam conservatio luminis in +aere est per continuatum influxum a sole.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A2-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 2. Whether God preserves every creature immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as + above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32767] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus immediate omnem creaturam conservet. +Eadem enim actione Deus est conservator rerum, qua et creator, ut +dictum est. Sed Deus immediate est creator omnium. Ergo immediate +est etiam conservator.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less + therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause + preserving them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32768] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unaquaeque res magis est proxima sibi, quam rei alteri. Sed non +potest communicari alicui creaturae quod conservet seipsam. Ergo +multo minus potest ei communicari quod conservet aliam. Ergo Deus +omnia conservat absque aliqua media causa conservante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes + do not seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause only by moving, as above stated ( + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q45_A3" id="FP_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[3]</a>). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32769] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus conservatur in esse ab eo quod est causa eius non solum +secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Sed omnes causae creatae, +ut videtur, non sunt causae suorum effectuum nisi secundum fieri, +non sunt enim causae nisi movendo, ut supra habitum est. Ergo non +sunt causae conservantes suos effectus in esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore + He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32770] Iª q. 104 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse. Sed Deus dat +esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis. Ergo etiam res in +esse conservat mediantibus aliquibus causis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A1" id="FP_Q104_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a + corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per se," by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of + the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal + things there are many causes which + hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; + and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when + we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally + on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the + principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all + the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause. + </p><p id="FP_Q104_A2-p7"> For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: + thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation + of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation + and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which + are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 co."><a name="32771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32771] Iª q. 104 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut dictum est, dupliciter aliquid rem aliquam in esse +conservat, uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, per hoc quod +removet vel impedit actionem corrumpentis; alio modo, directe et +per se, quia ab eo dependet esse alterius, sicut a causa dependet +esse effectus. Utroque autem modo aliqua res creata invenitur esse +alterius conservativa. Manifestum est enim quod etiam in rebus +corporalibus multa sunt quae impediunt actiones corrumpentium, et +per hoc dicuntur rerum conservativa; sicut sal impedit carnes a +putrefactione, et simile est in multis aliis. Invenitur etiam quod +ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. +Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus +dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima; secundario +vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima +causa est effectus conservativa; secundario vero omnes mediae +causae, et tanto magis quanto causa fuerit altior et primae causae +proximior. Unde superioribus causis, etiam in corporalibus rebus, +attribuitur conservatio et permanentia rerum, sicut philosophus +dicit, in XII Metaphys., quod primus motus, scilicet diurnus, est +causa continuitatis generationis; secundus autem motus, qui est per +zodiacum, est causa diversitatis quae est secundum generationem et +corruptionem. Et similiter astrologi, attribuunt Saturno, qui est +supremus planetarum; res fixas et permanentes. Sic igitur dicendum +est quod Deus conservat res quasdam in esse, mediantibus aliquibus +causis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend + on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32772] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum +creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis +dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse; +praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only + produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving + another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32773] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum propria causa sit conservativa effectus ab ea +dependentis; sicut nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit causa +sui ipsius, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit causa alterius; ita +etiam nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit sui ipsius +conservativus, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit conservativus +alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue + of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in + the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is + lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of + the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32774] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad +hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum +alicuius mutationis, quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo +subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu, +absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel +dispositionem conservat. Sicut in aere, prout illuminatur de novo, +intelligitur quaedam mutatio; sed conservatio luminis est absque +aeris immutatione, ex sola praesentia illuminantis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A3-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 3. Whether God can annihilate anything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything + tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate + anything. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32775] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid in nihilum +redigere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., +quod <i>Deus non est causa tendendi in non esse</i>. Hoc autem +contingeret, si aliquam creaturam redigeret in nihilum. Ergo Deus +non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because + God is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be + the case were He to annihilate anything. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32776] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +est causa rerum ut sint, per suam bonitatem, quia, ut Augustinus +dicit in libro de Doct. Christ., <i>inquantum Deus bonus est, +sumus</i>. Sed Deus non potest non esse bonus. Ergo non potest +facere ut res non sint. Quod faceret, si eas in nihilum +redigeret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action + is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated + another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32777] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +Deus in nihilum aliqua redigeret, oporteret quod hoc fieret per +aliquam actionem. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia omnis actio +terminatur ad aliquod ens; unde etiam actio corrumpentis terminatur +ad aliquid generatum, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius. +Ergo Deus non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32778] Iª q. 104 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Ierem. X, <i>corripe me, domine, verumtamen in +iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas +me</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate + anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things + of His own free-will, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.134.6" target="asv"> Ps. 134:6</a>: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He + hath done." Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence + otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, + God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; + and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 co."><a name="32779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32779] Iª q. 104 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam posuerunt quod Deus res in esse produxit agendo de +necessitate naturae. Quod si esset verum, Deus non posset rem +aliquam in nihilum redigere; sicut non potest a sua natura mutari. +Sed, sicut supra est habitum, haec positio est falsa, et a fide +Catholica penitus aliena, quae confitetur Deum res libera voluntate +produxisse in esse, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>omnia quaecumque +voluit dominus, fecit</i>. Hoc igitur quod Deus creaturae esse +communicat, ex Dei voluntate dependet. Nec aliter res in esse +conservat, nisi inquantum eis continue influit esse. Ut dictum est. +Sicut ergo antequam res essent, potuit eis non communicare esse, et +sic eas non facere; ita postquam iam factae sunt, potest eis non +influere esse, et sic esse desisterent. Quod est eas in nihilum +redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as + such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has + this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to + non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32780] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest +esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est +causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in +non esse; sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de +nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum +redigantur, subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on + creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, + so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32781] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate +naturae, quia divina bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis; sed per +liberam voluntatem. Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis +suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae +bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32782] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non +esset per aliquam actionem; sed per hoc quod ab agendo +cessaret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A4-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 4. Whether anything is annihilated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing + but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced + to nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32783] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid in nihilum redigatur. Finis enim +respondet principio. Sed a principio nihil erat nisi Deus. Ergo ad +hunc finem res perducentur, ut nihil sit nisi Deus. Et ita +creaturae in nihilum redigentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves + (Phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; + and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32784] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis creatura habet potentiam finitam. Sed nulla potentia finita +se extendit ad infinitum, unde in VIII Physic. probatur quod +potentia finita non potest movere tempore infinito. Ergo nulla +creatura potest durare in infinitum. Et ita quandoque in nihilum +redigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are + reduced to nothing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32785] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +forma et accidentia non habent materiam partem sui. Sed quandoque +desinunt esse. Ergo in nihilum rediguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32786] Iª q. 104 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Eccle. III. <i>Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit +Deus, perseverant in aeternum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, + and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things + which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To + each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles. + </p><p id="FP_Q104_A4-p7"> Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no + potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, + since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation + of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in + existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 co."><a name="32787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32787] Iª q. 104 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod eorum quae a Deo fiunt circa creaturam, quaedam proveniunt +secundum naturalem cursum rerum; quaedam vero miraculose operatur +praeter ordinem naturalem creaturis inditum, ut infra dicetur. Quae +autem facturus est Deus secundum ordinem naturalem rebus inditum, +considerari possunt ex ipsis rerum naturis, quae vero miraculose +fiunt, ordinantur ad gratiae manifestationem, secundum illud +apostoli I ad Cor. XII, <i>unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad +utilitatem</i>; et postmodum, inter cetera, subdit de miraculorum +operatione. Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla +earum in nihilum redigatur, quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in +eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic +saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est, +utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere +etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem, +cum magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res +in esse conservat. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino +in nihilum redigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that + they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving + all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32788] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non +fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum +redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia +in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum +illud apostoli Heb. I, <i>portans omnia verbo virtutis +suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence + is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, + however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent + from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot + resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue + to exist for ever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32789] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum; +sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi. +Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae +virtutis. Determinatur tamen quibusdam rebus virtus ad manendum +tempore determinato, inquantum impediri possunt ne percipiant +influxum essendi qui est ab eo, ex aliquo contrario agente, cui +finita virtus non potest resistere tempore infinito, sed solum +tempore determinato. Et ideo ea quae non habent contrarium, quamvis +habeant finitam virtutem, perseverant in aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for + it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely + reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of + the subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32790] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non +subsistant, sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid entis, sic enim ens +dicitur, quia eo aliquid est. Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non omnino +in nihilum rediguntur; non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed +remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q105" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q105-p0.1">Q. 105. OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q105-p2"> We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures + by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another. + </p><p id="FP_Q105-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q105-p4"><a href="#FP_Q105_A1"> (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p5"><a href="#FP_Q105_A2"> (2) Whether He can immediately move a body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p6"><a href="#FP_Q105_A3"> (3) Whether He can move the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p7"><a href="#FP_Q105_A4"> (4) Whether He can move the will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p8"><a href="#FP_Q105_A5"> (5) Whether God works in every worker?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p9"><a href="#FP_Q105_A6"> (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p10"><a href="#FP_Q105_A7"> (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p11"><a href="#FP_Q105_A8"> (8) Of the diversity of miracles.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 pr."><a name="32791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32791] +Iª q. 105 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de secundo +effectu gubernationis divinae qui est mutatio creaturarum. Et +primo, de mutatione creaturarum a Deo; secundo, de mutatione unius +creaturae ab alia. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deus +immediate possit movere materiam ad formam. Secundo, utrum +immediate possit movere aliquod corpus. Tertio, utrum possit movere +intellectum. Quarto, utrum possit movere voluntatem. Quinto, utrum +Deus operetur in omni operante. Sexto, utrum possit aliquid facere +praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Septimo, utrum omnia quae sic Deus +facit, sint miracula. Octavo, de diversitate miraculorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q105_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A1-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 1. Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, + Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets + like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32792] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere materiam +ad formam. Sicut enim probat philosophus in VII Metaphys., formam +in hac materia nihil facere potest nisi forma quae est in materia, +quia simile facit sibi simile. Sed Deus non est forma in materia. +Ergo non potest causare formam in materia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by + some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means + of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any + particular form, except by means of a particular agent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32793] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +aliquod agens se habeat ad multa, nullum eorum producet, nisi +determinetur ad ipsum per aliquid aliud, ut enim in III de anima +dicitur, universalis opinio non movet nisi mediante aliqua +particulari apprehensione. Sed virtus divina est universalis causa +omnium. Ergo non potest producere aliquam particularem formam, nisi +mediante aliquo particulari agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as + we have seen above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[104], A[2]</a>). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, + only by means of particular causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32794] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut esse commune dependet a prima causa universali, ita esse +determinatum dependet a determinatis causis particularibus, ut +supra habitum est. Sed determinatum esse alicuius rei est per +propriam eius formam. Ergo propriae rerum formae non producuntur a +Deo, nisi mediantibus causis particularibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32795] Iª q. 105 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo +terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active + power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it + can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing + else but the act of matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 co."><a name="32796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32796] Iª q. 105 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam. Quia ens in +potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam +sub sua potestate continet. Cum igitur materia contineatur sub +potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per +divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma +nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, + and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in + its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they + are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that + over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the + composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating + a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But + no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence + angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32797] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod effectus aliquis invenitur assimilari causae agenti +dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum eandem speciem; ut homo generatur ab +homine, et ignis ab igne. Alio modo, secundum virtualem +continentiam, prout scilicet forma effectus virtualiter continetur +in causa, et sic animalia ex putrefactione generata, et plantae et +corpora mineralia assimilantur soli et stellis, quorum virtute +generantur. Sic igitur effectus causae agenti similatur secundum +totum illud ad quod se extendit virtus agentis. Virtus autem Dei se +extendit ad formam et materiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde +compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem +continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem +speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad +formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem +aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non +continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo +Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem +imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows + the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that + form on matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32798] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus ageret, ex necessitate +naturae. Sed quia agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit +rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales; inde +est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae +imprimere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes + to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32799] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad +determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas +ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos +effectus producere per seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A2-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 2. Whether God can move a body immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher + says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between + God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32800] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere aliquod +corpus. Cum enim movens et motum oporteat esse simul, ut probatur +in VII Physic., oportet esse contactum quendam moventis et moti. +Sed non potest esse contactus Dei, et corporis alicuius, dicit enim +Dionysius, in I cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Dei non est aliquis +tactus</i>. Ergo Deus non potest immediate movere aliquod +corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object + of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal + power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32801] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +est movens non motum. Tale autem est appetibile apprehensum. Movet +igitur Deus sicut desideratum et apprehensum. Sed non apprehenditur +nisi ab intellectu, qui non est corpus, nec virtus corporis. Ergo +Deus non potest movere aliquod corpus immediate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a + body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist + at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God's + power is infinite, as we have explained ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q25_A2" id="FP_Q105_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore God + cannot move a body immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32802] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod potentia infinita movet in +instanti. Sed impossibile est aliquod corpus in instanti moveri, +quia, cum omnis motus sit inter opposita, sequeretur quod duo +opposita simul inessent eidem; quod est impossibile. Ergo corpus +non potest immediate moveri a potentia infinita. Potentia autem Dei +est infinita, ut supra habitum est. Ergo Deus non potest immediate +movere aliquod corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.9" target="asv"> Gn. 1:9 </a>"Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone can move a body immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32803] Iª q. 105 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +opera sex dierum Deus fecit immediate; in quibus continetur motus +corporum, ut patet per hoc quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>congregentur +aquae in locum unum</i>. Ergo Deus immediate potest movere +corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. + Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any + bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A1" id="FP_Q105_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light + result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else + tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to + that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and + moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever + in + respect of any movement whatever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 co."><a name="32804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32804] Iª q. 105 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod erroneum est dicere Deum non posse facere per seipsum omnes +determinatos effectus qui fiunt per quamcumque causam creatam. Unde +cum corpora moveantur immediate a causis creatis, nulli debet +venire in dubium quin Deus possit movere immediate quodcumque +corpus. Et hoc quidem consequens est ad ea quae supra dicta sunt. +Nam omnis motus corporis cuiuscumque vel consequitur ad aliquam +formam, sicut motus localis gravium et levium consequitur formam +quae datur a generante, ratione cuius generans dicitur movens, vel +est via ad formam aliquam, sicut calefactio est via ad formam +ignis. Eiusdem autem est imprimere formam, et disponere ad formam, +et dare motum consequentem formam, ignis enim non solum generat +alium ignem, sed etiam calefacit, et sursum movet. Cum igitur Deus +possit immediate formam materiae imprimere, consequens est ut +possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of + sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, + nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural + power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the + words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32805] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo +corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans +tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum +sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem +contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia +nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et +sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet +tangatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended + by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32806] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non +oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo +quod movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia +operatur propter suam bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of + bulk," by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover + can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk," would move without time, which is impossible; + therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is + not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite + power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an + infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the + velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does + not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is + not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and + therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32807] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Physic. intendit probare quod +virtus primi motoris non sit virtus in magnitudine, tali ratione, +virtus primi motoris est infinita (quod probat per hoc quod potest +movere tempore infinito); virtus autem infinita, si esset in aliqua +magnitudine, moveret in non tempore, quod est impossibile; ergo +oportet quod infinita virtus primi motoris sit non in magnitudine. +Ex quo patet quod corpus moveri in non tempore, non consequitur +nisi virtutem infinitam in magnitudine. Cuius ratio est, quia omnis +virtus quae est in magnitudine, movet secundum se totam, cum moveat +per necessitatem naturae. Potentia autem infinita +improportionabiliter excedit quamlibet potentiam finitam. Quanto +autem maior est potentia moventis, tanto est maior velocitas motus. +Cum igitur potentia finita moveat tempore determinato, sequitur +quod potentia infinita non moveat in aliquo tempore, quia +cuiuscumque temporis ad aliud tempus est aliqua proportio. Sed +virtus quae non est in magnitudine, est virtus alicuius +intelligentis, qui operatur in effectibus secundum quod eis +convenit. Et ideo, cum corpori non possit esse conveniens moveri in +non tempore, non sequitur quod moveat in non tempore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A3-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 3. Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its + own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is + moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; + and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32808] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non moveat immediate intellectum +creatum. Actio enim intellectus est ab eo in quo est, non enim +transit in exteriorem materiam, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Actio +autem eius quod movetur ab alio, non est ab eo in quo est, sed a +movente. Non ergo intellectus movetur ab alio. Et ita videtur quod +Deus non possit movere intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the + intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as + the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle + of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32809] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id +quod habet in se principium sufficiens sui motus, non movetur ab +alio. Sed motus intellectus est ipsum intelligere eius, sicut +dicitur quod intelligere vel sentire est motus quidam, secundum +philosophum, in III de anima. Sufficiens autem principium +intelligendi est lumen intelligibile inditum intellectui. Ergo non +movetur ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible + to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32810] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus ab intelligibili. +Sed Deus non est intelligibilis nobis, sed nostrum intellectum +excedit. Ergo Deus non potest movere nostrum intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God moves the human intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32811] Iª q. 105 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +docens movet intellectum addiscentis. Sed Deus docet hominem +scientiam, sicut dicitur in Psalmo. Ergo Deus movet intellectum +hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said + to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement + of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual + power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; + while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. + So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses + on him the likeness of the thing understood. + </p><p id="FP_Q105_A3-p7"> Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result + of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause + of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First + Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in + Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived + from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they + may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, + or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and + species in existence. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 co."><a name="32812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32812] Iª q. 105 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam +quae est principium motus; ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod +causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae +dicitur motus intellectus. Operationis autem intellectus est duplex +principium in intelligente, unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus +intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in +potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet +similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid +movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad +intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae. +Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est +primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur +immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde +cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur, +sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi. Similiter cum +ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in +prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum +modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo +existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu +intelligant; sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant. Sic +igitur Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad +intelligendum, vel naturalem vel superadditam; et inquantum +imprimit ei species intelligibiles; et utrumque tenet et conservat +in esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from + God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32813] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in +quo est, sicut a causa secunda, sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab +ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but + it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32814] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei +intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium +tamen, et a primo principio dependens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of + which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient + to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A3" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Hence He moves the created + intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.3" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32815] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum +quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi +potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato, +non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra +habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei +intelligibilis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A4-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 4. Whether God can move the created will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be + forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32816] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit movere voluntatem creatam. +Omne enim quod movetur ab extrinseco, cogitur. Sed voluntas non +potest cogi. Ergo non movetur ab aliquo extrinseco. Et ita non +potest moveri a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for + to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32817] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus +non potest facere quod contradictoria sint simul vera. Hoc autem +sequeretur, si voluntatem moveret, nam voluntarie moveri est ex se +moveri, et non ab alio. Ergo Deus non potest voluntatem movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, + but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward + or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32818] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +motus magis attribuitur moventi quam mobili, unde homicidium non +attribuitur lapidi, sed proiicienti. Si igitur Deus moveat +voluntatem, sequitur quod opera voluntaria non imputentur homini ad +meritum vel demeritum. Hoc autem est falsum. Non igitur Deus movet +voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32819] Iª q. 105 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur ad Philipp. II, <i>Deus est qui operatur in nobis +velle et perficere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A3" id="FP_Q105_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved + by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently + unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the + potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal + good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone + is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner + the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the + will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate + end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects + to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior + inclination of the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 co."><a name="32820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32820] Iª q. 105 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut intellectus, ut dictum est, movetur ab obiecto, et ab +eo qui dedit virtutem intelligendi; ita voluntas movetur ab +obiecto, quod est bonum, et ab eo qui creat virtutem volendi. +Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono; +non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo. Non enim +sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus +activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet virtutem passivam +mobilis. Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in +universali, est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et +intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum +creatum est quoddam particulare bonum, solus autem Deus est bonum +universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam +movet ut obiectum. Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo +causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in +obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in +bonum universale est primi moventis cui proportionatur ultimus +finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius +qui praeest multitudini. Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere +voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the + proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then + it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural + inclination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32821] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illud quod movetur ab altero dicitur cogi, si +moveatur contra inclinationem propriam, sed si moveatur ab alio +quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi; sicut +grave, cum movetur deorsum a generante, non cogitur. Sic igitur +Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius +propriam inclinationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be + caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32822] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio +intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio +principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod +movetur ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed + for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have + stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32823] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se +nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum +vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non +excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est; ideo per consequens +non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A5-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 5. Whether God works in every agent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God + works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32824] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non operetur in omni operante. Nulla +enim insufficientia est Deo attribuenda. Si igitur Deus operatur in +omni operante, sufficienter in quolibet operatur. Superfluum igitur +esset quod agens creatum aliquid operaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong + to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same + time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32825] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, una +operatio non est simul a duobus operantibus, sicut nec unus numero +motus potest esse duorum mobilium. Si igitur operatio creaturae est +a Deo in creatura operante, non potest esse simul a creatura. Et +ita nulla creatura aliquid operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, + if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. + But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32826] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +faciens dicitur esse causa operationis facti, inquantum dat ei +formam qua operatur. Si igitur Deus est causa operationis rerum +factarum ab ipso, hoc erit inquantum dat eis virtutem operandi. Sed +hoc est a principio, quando rem facit. Ergo videtur quod ulterius +non operetur in creatura operante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv">Is. 26:12</a>): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32827] Iª q. 105 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Isaiae XXVI, <i>omnia opera nostra operatus es in +nobis, domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God + alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, + and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: + and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, + that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be + bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, + to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less + perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form + which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. + We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation. + </p><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p7"> In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, + but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles + of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; + the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own + form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, + for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp. + </p><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p8"> Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for + the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates + in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again + it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the + first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is + the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying + their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the + axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action + not + only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy + and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation + of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is + within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things + God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works + intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.10.11" target="asv"> Job 10:11</a>: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 co."><a name="32828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32828] Iª q. 105 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt, +quod nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus, sed solus +Deus immediate omnia operaretur; puta quod ignis non calefaceret, +sed Deus in igne, et similiter de omnibus aliis. Hoc autem est +impossibile. Primo quidem, quia sic subtraheretur ordo causae et +causati a rebus creatis. Quod pertinet ad impotentiam creantis, ex +virtute enim agentis est, quod suo effectui det virtutem agendi. +Secundo, quia virtutes operativae quae in rebus inveniuntur, +frustra essent rebus attributae, si per eas nihil operarentur. +Quinimmo omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo esse frustra, si +propria operatione destituerentur, cum omnis res sit propter suam +operationem. Semper enim imperfectum est propter perfectius, sicut +igitur materia est propter formam, ita forma, quae est actus +primus, est propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et +sic operatio est finis rei creatae. Sic igitur intelligendum est +Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant +operationem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint +causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium +actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum. +Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed +ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui +movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod +ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam +suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus. Artifex enim movetur ad +agendum a fine, qui est ipsum operatum, puta arca vel lectus; et +applicat ad actionem securim quae incidit per suum acumen. Sic +igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur. Primo +quidem, secundum rationem finis. Cum enim omnis operatio sit +propter aliquod bonum verum vel apparens; nihil autem est vel +apparet bonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquam similitudinem +summi boni, quod est Deus; sequitur quod ipse Deus sit cuiuslibet +operationis causa ut finis. Similiter etiam considerandum est quod, +si sint multa agentia ordinata, semper secundum agens agit in +virtute primi, nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum. Et +secundum hoc, omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei; et ita ipse est +causa actionum omnium agentium. Tertio, considerandum est quod Deus +movet non solum res ad operandum, quasi applicando formas et +virtutes rerum ad operationem, sicut etiam artifex applicat securim +ad scindendum, qui tamen interdum formam securi non tribuit; sed +etiam dat formam creaturis agentibus, et eas tenet in esse. Unde +non solum est causa actionum inquantum dat formam quae est +principium actionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa motus +gravium et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et virtutes +rerum; prout sol dicitur esse causa manifestationis colorum, +inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo manifestantur colores. Et +quia forma rei est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur ut +prior et universalior; et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse +universalis in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum +rebus; sequitur quod Deus in omnibus intime operetur. Et propter +hoc in sacra Scriptura operationes naturae Deo attribuuntur quasi +operanti in natura; secundum illud Iob X, <i>pelle et carnibus +vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents + is superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32829] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi +agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum +agentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a + primary and a secondary agent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32830] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod una actio non procedit a duobus agentibus unius +ordinis, sed nihil prohibet quin una et eadem actio procedat a +primo et secundo agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the + end of every action, as above explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32831] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat +eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium +actionum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A6-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 6. Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) + says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order + seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32832] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere aliquid praeter +ordinem rebus inditum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXVI contra Faustum, +<i>Deus, conditor et creator omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam +facit</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse contra naturam, quod est praeter +ordinem naturaliter rebus inditum. Ergo Deus non potest facere +aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of + justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32833] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut ordo iustitiae est a Deo, ita et ordo naturae. Sed Deus non +potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem iustitiae, faceret enim tunc +aliquid iniustum. Ergo non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem +naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that + He is changeable; which cannot be said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32834] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ordinem naturae Deus instituit. Si igitur praeter ordinem naturae +Deus aliquid faciat, videtur quod ipse sit mutabilis. Quod est +inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32835] Iª q. 105 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod <i>Deus aliquando +aliquid facit contra solitum cursum naturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the + multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. + Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human + affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is + contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that + of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered. + </p><p id="FP_Q105_A6-p7"> If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, + if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things + depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary + causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural + necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something + outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, + or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts + against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against + Himself." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 co."><a name="32836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32836] Iª q. 105 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod a qualibet causa derivatur aliquis ordo in suos effectus, cum +quaelibet causa habeat rationem principii. Et ideo secundum +multiplicationem causarum, multiplicantur et ordines, quorum unus +continetur sub altero, sicut et causa continetur sub causa. Unde +causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e +converso. Cuius exemplum apparet in rebus humanis, nam ex +patrefamilias dependet ordo domus, qui continetur sub ordine +civitatis, qui procedit a civitatis rectore, cum et hic contineatur +sub ordine regis, a quo totum regnum ordinatur. Si ergo ordo rerum +consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem +Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam +praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem. Si vero consideretur +rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus +potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum +causarum ipse non est subiectus, sed talis ordo ei subiicitur, +quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per +arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum +instituere. Unde et potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere, +cum voluerit; puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis, +vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se +extendunt. Unde et Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod +<i>Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam +legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which + did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to + him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent + on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is + clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in + a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies + depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not + against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from + Whom + is all mode, number, and order in nature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32837] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, cum aliquid contingit in rebus naturalibus praeter +naturam inditam, hoc potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, per +actionem agentis qui inclinationem naturalem non dedit, sicut cum +homo movet corpus grave sursum, quod non habet ab eo ut moveatur +deorsum, et hoc est contra naturam. Alio modo, per actionem illius +agentis a quo dependet actio naturalis. Et hoc non est contra +naturam, ut patet in fluxu et refluxu maris, qui non est contra +naturam, quamvis sit praeter motum naturalem aquae, quae movetur +deorsum; est enim ex impressione caelestis corporis, a quo dependet +naturalis inclinatio inferiorum corporum. Cum igitur naturae ordo +sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non +est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, +quod <i>id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est +omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing + against such order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32838] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ordo iustitiae est secundum relationem ad causam +primam, quae est regula omnis iustitiae. Et ideo praeter hunc +ordinem, Deus nihil facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do + otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32839] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi +reservaret quid ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde +cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A7-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 7. Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of + the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being + accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God + does outside the natural order is a miracle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32840] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quae Deus facit praeter ordinem +naturalem rerum, sint miracula. Creatio enim mundi, et etiam +animarum, et iustificatio impii fiunt a Deo praeter ordinem +naturalem, non enim fiunt per actionem alicuius causae naturalis. +Et tamen haec miracula non dicuntur. Ergo non omnia quae facit Deus +praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond + our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of + nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare + occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be + healed by the shadow of Peter ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.15" target="asv">Acts 5:15</a>). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we + all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things + are outside the course of natur are miraculous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32841] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +miraculum dicitur aliquid arduum et insolitum supra facultatem +naturae et spem admirantis proveniens. Sed quaedam fiunt praeter +naturae ordinem, quae tamen non sunt ardua, sunt enim in minimis +rebus, sicut in restauratione gemmarum, vel sanatione aegrorum. Nec +etiam sunt insolita, cum frequenter eveniant, sicut cum infirmi in +plateis ponebantur ut ad umbram Petri sanarentur. Nec etiam sunt +supra facultatem naturae, ut cum aliqui sanantur a febribus. Nec +etiam supra spem, sicut resurrectionem mortuorum omnes speramus, +quae tamen fiet praeter ordinem naturae. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt +praeter naturae ordinem, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes + things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge + without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32842] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +miraculi nomen ab admiratione sumitur. Sed admiratio est de rebus +sensui manifestis. Sed quandoque aliqua accidunt praeter ordinem +naturalem in rebus sensui non manifestis, sicut cum apostoli facti +sunt scientes, neque invenientes neque discentes. Ergo non omnia +quae fiunt praeter ordinem naturae, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed + to observe, we call it a miracle." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32843] Iª q. 105 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod <i>cum Deus +aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, +magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when + a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause + of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all + to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so + called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things + which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 co."><a name="32844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32844] Iª q. 105 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod nomen miraculi ab admiratione sumitur. Admiratio autem +consurgit, cum effectus sunt manifesti et causa occulta; sicut +aliquis admiratur cum videt eclipsim solis et ignorat causam, ut +dicitur in principio Metaphys. Potest autem causa effectus alicuius +apparentis alicui esse nota, quae tamen est aliis incognita. Unde +aliquid est mirum uni, quod non est mirum aliis; sicut eclipsim +solis miratur rusticus, non autem astrologus. Miraculum autem +dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam +simpliciter et omnibus occultam. Haec autem est Deus. Unde illa +quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because + they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do + not belong to that order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32845] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo +fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non +sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter +ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses + the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside + the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of + the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in + which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes + from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32846] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod arduum dicitur miraculum, non propter dignitatem rei +in qua fit; sed quia excedit facultatem naturae. Similiter etiam +insolitum dicitur, non quia frequenter non eveniat sed quia est +praeter naturalem consuetudinem. Supra facultatem autem naturae +dicitur aliquid, non solum propter substantiam facti sed etiam +propter modum et ordinem faciendi. Supra spem etiam naturae +miraculum esse dicitur; non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide, +per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown + to be wonderful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32847] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia apostolorum, quamvis secundum se non fuerit +manifesta, manifestabatur tamen in effectibus, ex quibus mirabilis +apparebat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A8-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 8. Whether one miracle is greater than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In miraculous + deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore + one miracle is not greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32848] Iª q. 105 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod unum miraculum non sit maius alio. Dicit +enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Volusianum, <i>in rebus mirabiliter +factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis</i>. Sed eadem +potentia, scilicet Dei, fiunt omnia miracula. Ergo unum non est +maius alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason + exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32849] Iª q. 105 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +potentia Dei est infinita. Sed infinitum improportionabiliter +excedit omne finitum. Ergo non magis est mirandum quod faciat hunc +effectum, quam illum. Ergo unum miraculum non est maius altero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.12" target="asv">Jn. 14:12</a>): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32850] Iª q. 105 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XIV, de operibus miraculosis loquens, +<i>opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, et maiora horum +faciet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power + of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.15" target="asv"> Is. 40:15</a>: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called + a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater + the miracle. Now the power of + nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, + or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold + the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it + is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the + dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which + it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air + is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; + and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different + ways + in which the power of nature is surpassed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 co."><a name="32851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32851] Iª q. 105 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae, +quia quodcumque factum, divinae potentiae comparatum, est minimum; +secundum illud Isaiae XL, <i>ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae, et +quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt</i>. Sed dicitur aliquid +miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit. Et +ideo secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc +maius miraculum dicitur. Excedit autem aliquid facultatem naturae +tripliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam facti, sicut quod duo +corpora sint simul, vel quod sol retrocedat, aut quod corpus +humanum glorificetur; quod nullo modo natura facere potest. Et ista +tenent summum gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit +facultatem naturae, non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id +in quo fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum, et illuminatio caecorum, +et similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, et +potest praestare visum, sed non caeco. Et haec tenent secundum +locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid facultatem naturae, +quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi, sicut cum aliquis subito per +virtutem divinam a febre curatur absque curatione et consueto +processu naturae in talibus, et cum statim aer divina virtute in +pluvias densatur absque naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad +preces Samuelis et Eliae. Et huiusmodi tenent infimum locum in +miraculis. Quaelibet tamen horum habent diversos gradus, secundum +quod diversimode excedunt facultatem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p6"> From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 ad arg."><a name="32852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32852] Iª q. 105 a. 8 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet solutio ad obiecta, quae procedunt ex parte divinae +potentiae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q106" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q106-p0.1">Q. 106. HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q106-p2"> We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely + spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. + </p><p id="FP_Q106-p3"> Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel + acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man. + </p><p id="FP_Q106-p4"> The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both + of the good and of the bad angels. + </p><p id="FP_Q106-p5"> Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q106-p6"><a href="#FP_Q106_A1"> (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p7"><a href="#FP_Q106_A2"> (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p8"><a href="#FP_Q106_A3"> (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p9"><a href="#FP_Q106_A4"> (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 pr."><a name="32853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32853] +Iª q. 106 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo una +creatura moveat aliam. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut +primo consideremus quomodo Angeli moveant, qui sunt creaturae pure +spirituales; secundo, quomodo corpora moveant; tertio, quomodo +homines, qui sunt ex spirituali et corporali natura compositi. +Circa primum tria consideranda occurrunt, primo, quomodo Angelus +agat in Angelum; secundo, quomodo in creaturam corporalem; tertio, +quomodo in homines. Circa primum, considerare oportet de +illuminatione, et locutione Angelorum, et ordinatione eorum ad +invicem, tam bonorum, quam malorum. Circa illuminationem quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum unus Angelus moveat intellectum alterius +illuminando. Secundo, utrum unus moveat voluntatem alterius. +Tertio, utrum inferior Angelus possit illuminare superiorem. +Quarto, utrum superior Angelus illuminet inferiorem de omnibus quae +cognoscit.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q106_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A1-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 1. Whether one angel enlightens another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. + But one man will not then enlighten another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.34" target="asv"> Jer. 31:34</a>: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten + another now. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32854] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus non illuminet alium. Angeli +enim eandem beatitudinem possident nunc, quam nos in futuro +expectamus. Sed tunc unus homo non illuminabit alium; secundum +illud Ierem. XXXI, <i>non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, et vir +fratrem suum</i>. Ergo etiam neque nunc unus Angelus illuminat +alium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of + nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes + from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32855] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +triplex est lumen in Angelis, naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Sed +Angelus illuminatur lumine naturae, a creante; lumine gratiae, a +iustificante; lumine gloriae, a beatificante; quod totum Dei est. +Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat alium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as + Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32856] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lumen est forma quaedam mentis. Sed mens rationalis a solo Deo +formatur, nulla interposita creatura, ut Augustinus dicit in libro +octoginta trium quaest. Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat mentem +alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the + angels of the first hierarchy." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32857] Iª q. 106 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli +secundae hierarchiae purgantur et illuminantur et perficiuntur per +Angelos primae hierarchiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation + of truth, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv"> Eph. 5:13</a>: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation + of the known truth; according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.8" target="asv">Eph. 3:8</a>): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all + men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one + angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): + "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds." + </p><p id="FP_Q106_A1-p7"> Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A3" id="FP_Q106_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[3]</a>), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known + truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened + by the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is + hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual + things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the + truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by + a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is + natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth + which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. + Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he + possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident + power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards + by analogy." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 co."><a name="32858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32858] Iª q. 106 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod unus Angelus illuminat alium. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod lumen, secundum quod ad intellectum +pertinet, nihil est aliud quam quaedam manifestatio veritatis; +secundum illud ad Ephes. V, <i>omne quod manifestatur, lumen +est</i>. Unde illuminare nihil aliud est quam manifestationem +cognitae veritatis alteri tradere; secundum quem modum apostolus +dicit, ad Ephes. III, <i>mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est +gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti +absconditi a saeculis in Deo</i>. Sic igitur unus Angelus dicitur +illuminare alium, inquantum ei manifestat veritatem quam ipse +cognoscit. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod +<i>theologi plane monstrant caelestium substantiarum ornatus a +supremis mentibus doceri deificas scientias</i>. Cum autem ad +intelligendum duo concurrant, ut supra diximus, scilicet virtus +intellectiva, et similitudo rei intellectae; secundum haec duo unus +Angelus alteri veritatem notam notificare potest. Primo quidem, +fortificando virtutem intellectivam eius. Sicut enim virtus +imperfectioris corporis confortatur ex situali propinquitate +perfectioris corporis, ut minus calidum crescit in calore ex +praesentia magis calidi; ita virtus intellectiva inferioris Angeli +confortatur ex conversione superioris Angeli ad ipsum. Hoc enim +facit in spiritualibus ordo conversionis, quod facit in +corporalibus ordo localis propinquitatis. Secundo autem unus +Angelus alteri manifestat veritatem, ex parte similitudinis +intellectae. Superior enim Angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in +universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris Angeli +intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis +particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo Angelus veritatem +quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori +capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit. Sicut etiam +apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter +distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod +Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>unaquaeque substantia +intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam, +provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum +ductricem analogiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. + It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know + the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which + are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He + comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior + angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the + latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32859] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnes Angeli, tam superiores quam inferiores, +immediate vident Dei essentiam; et quantum ad hoc, unus non docet +alium. De hac enim doctrina propheta loquitur, unde dicit <i>non +docebit vir fratrem suum, dicens, cognosce dominum. Omnes enim +cognoscent me, a minimo eorum usque ad maximum</i>. Sed rationes +divinorum operum, quae in Deo cognoscuntur sicut in causa, omnes +quidem Deus in seipso cognoscit, quia seipsum comprehendit, aliorum +vero Deum videntium tanto unusquisque in Deo plures rationes +cognoscit, quanto eum perfectius videt. Unde superior Angelus plura +in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et +de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de +Div. Nom., quod <i>Angeli existentium illuminantur +rationibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural + light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32860] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unus Angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen +naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale +ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad +statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image + of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, + except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, + dispositions to this ultimate form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32861] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod rationalis mens formatur immediate a Deo, vel sicut +imago ab exemplari, quia non est facta ad alterius imaginem quam +Dei, vel sicut subiectum ab ultima forma completiva, quia semper +mens creata reputatur informis, nisi ipsi primae veritati +inhaereat. Aliae vero illuminationes, quae sunt ab homine vel +Angelo, sunt quasi dispositiones ad ultimam formam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A2-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 2. Whether one angel moves another angel's will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to + the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an + end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's + will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32862] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus possit movere voluntatem +alterius. Quia secundum Dionysium, sicut unus Angelus illuminat +alium, ita purgat et perficit; ut patet ex auctoritate supra +inducta. Sed purgatio et perfectio videntur pertinere ad +voluntatem, nam purgatio videtur esse a sordibus culpae, quae +pertinet ad voluntatem; perfectio autem videtur esse per +consecutionem finis, qui est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo unus Angelus +potest movere voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are + so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another + angel's will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32863] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier., <i>nomina Angelorum +designant eorum proprietates</i>. Seraphim autem incendentes +dicuntur, aut calefacientes, quod est per amorem, qui ad voluntatem +pertinet. Unus ergo Angelus movet voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior + angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32864] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod appetitus superior movet +appetitum inferiorem. Sed sicut intellectus Angeli superioris +superior est, ita etiam appetitus. Ergo videtur quod superior +Angelus possit immutare voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the + will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32865] Iª q. 106 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, eius +est immutare voluntatem, cuius est iustificare, cum iustitia sit +rectitudo voluntatis. Sed solus Deus est qui iustificat. Ergo unus +Angelus non potest mutare voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A4" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[4]</a>), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both + the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out + the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A4" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[105], A[4]</a>), other goods in a + measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good + He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee + all good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.18" target="asv">Ex. 33:18,19</a>). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines + the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's + goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion. + </p><p id="FP_Q106_A2-p7"> But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination + of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: + just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. + Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the + intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 co."><a name="32866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32866] Iª q. 106 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas immutatur dupliciter, uno +modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo ex parte ipsius potentiae. Ex +parte quidem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est +voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum; et ille qui +demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed +sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliqualiter inclinant +voluntatem; sed nihil sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum +universale, quod est Deus. Et hoc bonum solus ipse ostendit, ut per +essentiam videatur a beatis, qui dicenti Moysi, <i>ostende mihi +gloriam tuam</i>, respondit, <i>ego ostendam tibi omne bonum</i>, +ut habetur Exod. XXXIII. Angelus ergo non sufficienter movet +voluntatem, neque ut obiectum, neque ut ostendens obiectum. Sed +inclinat eam, ut amabile quoddam, et ut manifestans aliqua bona +creata ordinata in Dei bonitatem. Et per hoc inclinare potest ad +amorem creaturae vel Dei, per modum suadentis. Ex parte vero ipsius +potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo. Operatio +enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc +autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem +volendi creaturae contulit, sicut et naturalem inclinationem solum +illud agens potest mutare, quod potest dare virtutem quam +consequitur inclinatio naturalis. Solus autem Deus est qui +potentiam volendi tribuit creaturae, quia ipse solus est auctor +intellectualis naturae. Unde unus Angelus voluntatem alterius +movere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing + the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect + and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience + in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius + says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things + unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal + of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored + object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32867] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod secundum modum illuminationis, est accipienda et +purgatio et perfectio. Et quia Deus illuminat immutando intellectum +et voluntatem, purgat a defectibus intellectus et voluntatis, et +perficit in finem intellectus et voluntatis. Angeli autem +illuminatio refertur ad intellectum, ut dictum est. Et ideo etiam +purgatio Angeli intelligitur a defectu intellectus, qui est +nescientia; perfectio autem est consummatio in finem intellectus, +qui est veritas cognita. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. +Eccl. Hier., quod <i>in caelesti hierarchia purgatio est in +subiectis essentiis tanquam ignotorum illuminatio in perfectiorem +eas scientiam ducens</i>. Sicut si dicamus visum corporalem +purgari, inquantum removentur tenebrae; illuminari vero, inquantum +perfunditur lumine; perfici vero, secundum quod perducitur ad +cognitionem colorati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32868] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unus Angelus potest inducere alium ad amorem Dei per +modum persuadentis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because + it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does + not apply to the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32869] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de appetitu inferiori sensitivo, +qui potest moveri a superiori intellectivo, quia pertinet ad eandem +naturam animae, et quia inferior appetitus est virtus in organo +corporali. Quod in Angelis locum non habet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A3-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 3. Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and + represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.26" target="asv">Gal. 4:26</a>). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:31</a>): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted." + Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32870] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus inferior superiorem illuminare +possit. Ecclesiastica enim hierarchia derivata est a caelesti, et +eam repraesentat, unde et superna Ierusalem dicitur mater nostra, +Gal. IV. Sed in Ecclesia etiam superiores illuminantur ab +inferioribus et docentur; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XIV, +<i>potestis omnes per singulos prophetare, ut omnes discant, et +omnes exhortentur</i>. Ergo et in caelesti hierarchia superiores ab +inferioribus possunt illuminari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. + But, as was said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q106_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual + substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened + by God can enlighten + superiors. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32871] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut ordo corporalium substantiarum dependet ex Dei voluntate, ita +et ordo substantiarum spiritualium. Sed sicut dictum est, Deus +quandoque praeter ordinem substantiarum corporalium operatur. Ergo +quandoque etiam operatur praeter ordinem spiritualium +substantiarum, illuminando inferiores non per medios superiores. +Sic ergo inferiores illuminati a Deo, possunt superiores +illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore + he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32872] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unus +Angelus alium illuminat, ad quem se convertit, ut supra dictum est. +Sed cum ista conversio sit voluntaria, potest supremus Angelus ad +infimum se convertere, mediis praetermissis. Ergo potest eum +immediate illuminare, et ita potest illuminare superiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier. + iv; Eccl. Hier. v). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32873] Iª q. 106 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius dicit <i>hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter +firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum per superiora</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained + ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore + there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior + cause, as in human affairs the command of + the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of + corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual + substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are + the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that + the + inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 co."><a name="32874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32874] Iª q. 106 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod inferiores Angeli nunquam illuminant superiores, sed semper ab +eis illuminantur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est, +ordo continetur sub ordine, sicut causa continetur sub causa. Unde +sicut ordinatur causa ad causam, ita ordo ad ordinem. Et ideo non +est inconveniens, si aliquando aliquid fiat praeter ordinem +inferioris causae, ad ordinandum in superiorem causam, sicut in +rebus humanis praetermittitur mandatum praesidis, ut obediatur +principi. Et ita contingit ut praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, +aliquid Deus miraculose operetur, ad ordinandum homines in eius +cognitionem. Sed praetermissio ordinis qui debetur spiritualibus +substantiis, in nullo pertinet ad ordinationem hominum in Deum, cum +operationes Angelorum non sint nobis manifestae, sicut operationes +visibilium corporum. Et ideo ordo qui convenit spiritualibus +substantiis, nunquam a Deo praetermittitur, quin semper inferiora +moveantur per superiora, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy + the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more + sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas + in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in + sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, + and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32875] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ecclesiastica hierarchia imitatur caelestem +aliqualiter, sed non perfecte consequitur eius similitudinem. In +caelesti enim hierarchia tota ratio ordinis est ex propinquitate ad +Deum. Et ideo illi qui sunt Deo propinquiores, sunt et gradu +sublimiores, et scientia clariores, et propter hoc superiores +nunquam ab inferioribus illuminantur. Sed in ecclesiastica +hierarchia, interdum qui sunt Deo per sanctitatem propinquiores, +sunt gradu infimi, et scientia non eminentes, et quidam in uno +etiam secundum scientiam eminent, et in alio deficiunt. Et propter +hoc superiores ab inferioribus doceri possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual + nature. Hence the argument does not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32876] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est similis ratio de hoc quod Deus agat praeter +ordinem naturae corporalis, et naturae spiritualis, ut dictum est. +Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made + the order in the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32877] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Angelus voluntate convertitur ad alium Angelum +illuminandum; sed voluntas Angeli semper regulatur lege divina, +quae ordinem in Angelis instituit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A4-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 4. Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says + (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual + knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the + superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the + former. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32878] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus superior non illuminet inferiorem +de omnibus quae ipse novit. Dicit enim Dionysius, XII cap. Cael. +Hier., quod Angeli superiores habent scientiam magis universalem, +inferiores vero magis particularem et subiectam. Sed plura +continentur sub scientia universali quam sub particulari. Ergo non +omnia quae sciunt superiores Angeli, cognoscunt inferiores per +superiorum illuminationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, + whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, + as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King + of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior + angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32879] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Magister dicit, in XI distinctione II Sent., quod superiores Angeli +cognoverunt a saeculis mysterium incarnationis, inferioribus vero +ignotum fuit usquequo completum est. Quod videtur per hoc quod, +quibusdam Angelis quaerentibus, quis est iste rex gloriae? Quasi +ignorantibus, alii respondent, quasi scientes, dominus virtutum +ipse est rex gloriae, ut Dionysius exponit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc +autem non esset, si superiores Angeli illuminarent inferiores de +omnibus quae ipsi cognoscunt. Non ergo eos illuminant de omnibus +sibi notis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be + unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears + open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32880] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +omnia superiores Angeli inferioribus annuntiant quae cognoscunt, +nihil inferioribus ignotum remanet, quod superiores cognoscant. Non +ergo de cetero superiores poterunt illuminare inferiores. Quod +videtur inconveniens. Non ergo superiores de omnibus inferiores +illuminant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there + are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the + inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32881] Iª q. 106 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Gregorius dicit, quod <i>in illa caelesti patria, licet +quaedam data sint excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur +singulariter</i>. Et Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., quod +<i>unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi a superiori +datam, inferiori communicat</i>; ut patet ex auctoritate supra +inducta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature + of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So + the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections + to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace + share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards + of the manifold grace of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10</a>). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same + to those below them. + </p><p id="FP_Q106_A4-p7"> Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior + ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the + pupil who learns from him. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 co."><a name="32882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32882] Iª q. 106 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod omnes creaturae ex divina bonitate participant ut bonum quod +habent, in alia diffundant, nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis +communicet. Et inde est etiam quod agentia corporalia similitudinem +suam aliis tradunt, quantum possibile est. Quanto igitur aliqua +agentia magis in participatione divinae bonitatis constituuntur, +tanto magis perfectiones suas nituntur in alios transfundere, +quantum possibile est. Unde beatus Petrus monet eos qui divinam +bonitatem per gratiam participant, dicens, I Petr. IV, +<i>unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam +administrantes, sicut boni dispensatores multiformis gratiae +Dei</i>. Multo igitur magis sancti Angeli, qui sunt in plenissima +participatione divinae bonitatis, quidquid a Deo percipiunt, +subiectis impartiuntur. Non tamen recipitur ab inferioribus ita +excellenter sicut est in superioribus. Et ideo superiores semper +remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes. +Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister, quam +discipulus qui ab eo addiscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32883] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod superiorum Angelorum scientia dicitur esse +universalior, quantum ad eminentiorem modum intelligendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation + but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards + when the Mystery was accomplished. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32884] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum Magistri non sic est intelligendum, quod +inferiores Angeli penitus ignoraverint mysterium incarnationis; sed +quia non ita plene cognoverunt sicut superiores, et in eius +cognitione postmodum profecerunt, dum illud mysterium +impleretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the + world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to + the inferior. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32885] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, usque ad diem iudicii, semper nova aliqua supremis +Angelis revelantur divinitus de his quae pertinent ad dispositionem +mundi, et praecipue ad salutem electorum. Unde semper remanet unde +superiores Angeli inferiores illuminent.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q107" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q107-p0.1">Q. 107. THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q107-p2"> We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q107-p3"><a href="#FP_Q107_A1"> (1) Whether one angel speaks to another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p4"><a href="#FP_Q107_A2"> (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p5"><a href="#FP_Q107_A3"> (3) Whether an angel speaks to God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p6"><a href="#FP_Q107_A4"> (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p7"><a href="#FP_Q107_A5"> (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 pr."><a name="32886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32886] +Iª q. 107 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +locutionibus Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum unus Angelus loquatur alii. Secundo, utrum inferior +superiori. Tertio, utrum Angelus Deo. Quarto, utrum in locutione +Angeli aliquid distantia localis operetur. Quinto, utrum locutionem +unius Angeli ad alterum omnes cognoscant.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q107_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A1-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 1. Whether one angel speaks to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection + "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. + But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to + another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32887] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus alteri non loquatur. Dicit +enim Gregorius, XVIII Moral., quod <i>in statu resurrectionis +uniuscuiusque mentem ab alterius oculis membrorum corpulentia non +abscondit</i>. Multo igitur minus mens unius Angeli absconditur ab +altero. Sed locutio est ad manifestandum alteri quod latet in +mente. Non igitur oportet quod unus Angelus alteri loquatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior + speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and + this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32888] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +duplex est locutio, interior, per quam aliquis sibi ipsi loquitur; +et exterior, per quam aliquis loquitur alteri. Exterior autem +locutio fit per aliquod sensibile signum, puta voce vel nutu vel +aliquo corporis membro, puta lingua vel digito, quae Angelis +competere non possunt. Ergo unus Angelus alteri non loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another + to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32889] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +loquens excitat audientem ut attendat suae locutioni. Sed non +videtur per quid unus Angelus excitet alium ad attendendum, hoc +enim fit apud nos aliquo sensibili signo. Ergo unus Angelus non +loquitur alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32890] Iª q. 107 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, <i>si linguis hominum loquar et +Angelorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q107_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties + of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech." + </p><p id="FP_Q107_A1-p7"> To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above ( + <a href="#FP_Q82_A4" id="FP_Q107_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible + object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7); + secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear + that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition + of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second + to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either + to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual + consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior + word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel + himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another + only means to make known the mental concept to another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 co."><a name="32891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32891] Iª q. 107 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in Angelis est aliqua locutio, sed, sicut dicit Gregorius II +Moral., <i>dignum est ut mens nostra, qualitatem corporeae +locutionis excedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis +intimae suspendatur</i>. Ad intelligendum igitur qualiter unus +Angelus alii loquatur, considerandum est quod, sicut supra diximus +cum de actibus et potentiis animae ageretur, voluntas movet +intellectum ad suam operationem. Intelligibile autem est in +intellectu tripliciter, primo quidem, habitualiter, vel secundum +memoriam, ut Augustinus dicit; secundo autem, ut in actu +consideratum vel conceptum; tertio, ut ad aliud relatum. Manifestum +est autem quod de primo gradu in secundum transfertur intelligibile +per imperium voluntatis, unde in definitione habitus dicitur, quo +quis utitur cum voluerit. Similiter autem et de secundo gradu +transfertur in tertium per voluntatem, nam per voluntatem conceptus +mentis ordinatur ad alterum, puta vel ad agendum aliquid, vel ad +manifestandum alteri. Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu +considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi, nam +ipse conceptus mentis interius verbum vocatur. Ex hoc vero quod +conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri, per +voluntatem ipsius Angeli, conceptus mentis unius Angeli innotescit +alteri, et sic loquitur unus Angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud +loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, + or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept + is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens + that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but + some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof + as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the + tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another + at + once. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32892] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in nobis interior mentis conceptus quasi duplici +obstaculo clauditur. Primo quidem, ipsa voluntate, quae conceptum +intellectus potest retinere interius, vel ad extra ordinare. Et +quantum ad hoc, mentem unius nullus alius potest videre nisi solus +Deus; secundum illud I Cor. II, <i>quae sunt hominis, nemo novit +nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est</i>. Secundo autem clauditur +mens hominis ab alio homine per grossitiem corporis. Unde cum etiam +voluntas ordinat conceptum mentis ad manifestandum alteri, non +statim cognoscitur ab alio, sed oportet aliquod signum sensibile +adhibere. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, II Moral., <i>alienis +oculis intra secretum mentis, quasi post parietem corporis stamus, +sed cum manifestare nosmetipsos cupimus, quasi per linguae ianuam +egredimur, ut quales sumus intrinsecus, ostendamus</i>. Hoc autem +obstaculum non habet Angelus. Et ideo quam cito vult manifestare +suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit + an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also + its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, + whereby he manifests his mental concept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32893] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod locutio exterior quae fit per vocem, est nobis +necessaria propter obstaculum corporis. Unde non convenit Angelo, +sed sola locutio interior; ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur +sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad +alterius manifestationem. Et sic lingua Angelorum metaphorice +dicitur ipsa virtus Angeli, qua conceptum suum manifestat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one + ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, + and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as + sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the + sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32894] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quantum ad Angelos bonos, qui semper se invicem +vident in verbo, non esset necessarium ponere aliquid excitativum, +quia sicut unus semper videt alium, ita semper videt quidquid in eo +est ad se ordinatum. Sed quia etiam in statu naturae conditae sibi +invicem loqui poterant, et mali Angeli etiam nunc sibi invicem +loquuntur; dicendum est quod, sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita +intellectus movetur ab intelligibili. Sicut ergo per signum +sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem +potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A2-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 2. Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby + the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32895] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod inferior Angelus superiori non loquatur. +Quia super illud I Cor. XIII, <i>si linguis hominum loquar et +Angelorum</i>, dicit Glossa quod locutiones Angelorum sunt +illuminationes, quibus superiores illuminant inferiores. Sed +inferiores nunquam illuminant superiores, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +nec inferiores superioribus loquuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as was said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q107_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and + to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32896] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod illuminare nihil est aliud quam illud quod +est alicui manifestum, alteri manifestare. Sed hoc idem est loqui. +Ergo idem est loqui, et illuminare, et sic idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and + invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic + speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32897] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod <i>Deus ad Angelos loquitur, eo +ipso quod eorum cordibus occulta sua invisibilia ostendit</i>. Sed +hoc ipsum est illuminare. Ergo omnis Dei locutio est illuminatio. +Pari ergo ratione, omnis Angeli locutio est illuminatio. Nullo ergo +modo Angelus inferior superiori loqui potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of + Glory?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32898] Iª q. 107 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod, sicut Dionysius exponit VII Cael. Hier., inferiores Angeli +superioribus dixerunt, quis est iste rex gloriae?</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q107_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an + angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such + a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be + reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby + we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; + the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for + example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of + what + depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when + one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light, + nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an + enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; + but + only to know the truth in reality. + </p><p id="FP_Q107_A2-p7"> Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, + which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will + as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed + to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and + the inferior speak to the superior. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 co."><a name="32899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32899] Iª q. 107 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Angeli inferiores superioribus loqui possunt. Ad cuius +evidentiam, considerandum est quod omnis illuminatio est locutio in +Angelis, sed non omnis locutio est illuminatio. Quia sicut dictum +est, Angelum loqui Angelo nihil aliud est quam conceptum suum +ordinare ad hoc ut ei innotescat, per propriam voluntatem. Ea vero +quae mente concipiuntur, ad duplex principium referri possunt, +scilicet ad ipsum Deum, qui est prima veritas; et ad voluntatem +intelligentis, per quam aliquid actu consideramus. Quia vero +veritas est lumen intellectus, et regula omnis veritatis est ipse +Deus; manifestatio eius quod mente concipitur, secundum quod +dependet a prima veritate, et locutio est et illuminatio; puta si +unus homo dicat alii, caelum est a Deo creatum, vel, homo est +animal. Sed manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate +intelligentis, non potest dici illuminatio, sed locutio tantum; +puta si aliquis alteri dicat, volo hoc addiscere, volo hoc vel +illud facere. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas creata non est lux, +nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem, unde communicare ea +quae sunt a voluntate creata, inquantum huiusmodi, non est +illuminare. Non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quid +tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere, sed solum quid rei +veritas habeat. Manifestum est autem quod Angeli dicuntur +superiores vel inferiores per comparationem ad hoc principium quod +est Deus. Et ideo illuminatio, quae dependet a principio quod est +Deus, solum per superiores Angelos ad inferiores deducitur. Sed in +ordine ad principium quod est voluntas, ipse volens est primus et +supremus. Et ideo manifestatio eorum quae ad voluntatem pertinent, +per ipsum volentem deducitur ad alios quoscumque. Et quantum ad +hoc, et superiores inferioribus, et inferiores superioribus +loquuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objections 1 + & 2:</b> From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32900] Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet +solutio ad primum, et ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the + perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the + angels, as was explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32901] Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis Dei locutio ad Angelos est illuminatio, quia +cum voluntas Dei sit regula veritatis, etiam scire quid Deus velit, +pertinet ad perfectionem et illuminationem mentis creatae. Sed non +est eadem ratio de voluntate Angeli, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A3-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 3. Whether an angel speaks to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make + known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32902] Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus Deo non loquatur. Locutio enim est +ad manifestandum aliquid alteri. Sed Angelus nihil potest +manifestare Deo, qui omnia novit. Ergo Angelus non loquitur +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways + appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks + to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32903] Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +loqui est ordinare conceptum intellectus ad alterum, ut dictum est. +Sed Angelus semper conceptum suae mentis ordinat in Deum. Si ergo +aliquando Deo loquitur, semper Deo loquitur, quod potest videri +alicui inconveniens, cum aliquando Angelus Angelo loquatur. Videtur +ergo quod Angelus nunquam loquatur Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.12" target="asv">Zech. 1:12</a>): "The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem." Therefore an + angel speaks to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32904] Iª q. 107 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Zachar. I, <i>respondit Angelus domini, et dixit, +domine exercituum, usquequo non misereberis Ierusalem?</i> Loquitur +ergo Angelus Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. + In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in + human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns + the truth, or of whatever + depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing + is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech + the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to + be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels + speak + to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 co."><a name="32905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32905] Iª q. 107 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut dictum est, locutio Angeli est per hoc, quod conceptus +mentis ordinatur ad alterum. Sed aliquid ordinatur ad alterum +dupliciter. Uno modo, ad hoc quod communicet alteri; sicut in rebus +naturalibus agens ordinatur ad patiens et in locutione humana +doctor ordinatur ad discipulum. Et quantum ad hoc, nullo modo +Angelus loquitur Deo, neque de his quae ad rerum veritatem +pertinent, neque de his quae dependent a voluntate creata, quia +Deus est omnis veritatis et omnis voluntatis principium et +conditor. Alio modo ordinatur aliquid ad alterum, ut ab eo aliquid +accipiat; sicut in rebus naturalibus passivum ad agens, et in +locutione humana discipulus ad magistrum. Et hoc modo Angelus +loquitur Deo, vel consultando divinam voluntatem de agendis; vel +eius excellentiam, quam nunquam comprehendit, admirando; sicut +Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod <i>Angeli loquuntur Deo, cum per +hoc quod super semetipsos respiciunt, in motum admirationis +surgunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose + of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32906] Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed +quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid +manifestetur; sicut cum discipulus quaerit aliquid a magistro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting + Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32907] Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod locutione qua Angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et +admirantes, semper Angeli Deo loquuntur. Sed locutione qua eius +sapientiam consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando +aliquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desiderant +illuminari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A4-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 4. Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works + where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's + speech is limited by the bounds of that place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32908] Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod localis distantia operetur aliquid in +locutione angelica. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, <i>Angelus ubi +est, ibi operatur</i>. Locutio autem est quaedam operatio Angeli. +Cum ergo Angelus sit in determinato loco, videtur quod usque ad +determinatam loci distantiam Angelus loqui possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one + to another" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32909] Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +clamor loquentis fit propter distantiam audientis. Sed Isaiae VI +dicitur de Seraphim, quod clamabat alter ad alterum. Ergo videtur +quod in locutione Angelorum aliquid operetur localis distantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.24" target="asv">Lk. 16:24</a>). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32910] Iª q. 107 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod, sicut dicitur Luc. XVI, dives in Inferno positus loquebatur +Abrahae, non impediente locali distantia. Multo igitur minus +localis distantia potest impedire locutionem unius Angeli ad +alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual operation + takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at + all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time + nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 co."><a name="32911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32911] Iª q. 107 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod locutio Angeli in intellectuali operatione consistit, ut ex +dictis patet. Intellectualis autem operatio Angeli omnino abstracta +est a loco et tempore, nam etiam nostra intellectualis operatio est +per abstractionem ab hic et nunc, nisi per accidens ex parte +phantasmatum, quae in Angelis nulla sunt. In eo autem quod est +omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur neque temporis +diversitas, neque loci distantia. Unde in locutione Angeli nullum +impedimentum facit distantia loci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists + in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel + seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is + to perceive his speech. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32912] Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod locutio Angeli, sicut dictum est, est locutio +interior, quae tamen ab alio percipitur, et ideo est in Angelo +loquente, et per consequens ubi est Angelus loquens. Sed sicut +distantia localis non impedit quin unus Angelus alium videre +possit; ita etiam non impedit quin percipiat quod in eo ad se +ordinatur, quod est eius locutionem percipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of + what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less + one cries out." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32913] Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod clamor ille non est vocis corporeae, qui fit propter +distantiam loci; sed significat magnitudinem rei quae dicebatur, +vel magnitudinem affectus, secundum quod dicit Gregorius, II +Moral., <i>tanto quisque minus clamat, quanto minus +desiderat</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A5-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 5. Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do + not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A4" id="FP_Q107_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32914] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum omnes +cognoscant. Quod enim unius hominis locutionem non omnes audiant, +facit inaequalis loci distantia. Sed in locutione Angeli nihil +operatur localis distantia, ut dictum est. Ergo uno Angelo loquente +ad alterum, omnes percipiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known + by one, it is for the same reason known by all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32915] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes Angeli communicant in virtute intelligendi. Si ergo conceptus +mentis unius ordinatus ad alterum cognoscitur ab uno, pari ratione +cognoscitur ab aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, + as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore + the speech of one angel to another extends to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32916] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illuminatio est quaedam species locutionis. Sed illuminatio unius +Angeli ab altero, pervenit ad omnes Angelos, quia, ut Dionysius +dicit XV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>unaquaeque caelestis essentia +intelligentiam sibi traditam aliis communicat</i>. Ergo et locutio +unius Angeli ad alterum, ad omnes perducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32917] Iª q. 107 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod unus homo potest alteri soli loqui. Multo igitur magis hoc in +Angelis esse potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his + will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of + one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; + whereas others do not, not through the + obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 co."><a name="32918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32918] Iª q. 107 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, conceptus mentis unius Angeli percipi +potest ab altero, per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus, sua +voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum. Potest autem ex aliqua causa +ordinari aliquid ad unum, et non ad alterum. Et ideo potest +conceptus unius ab aliquo uno cognosci, et non ab aliis. Et sic +locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum potest percipere unus absque +aliis, non quidem impediente distantia locali, sed hoc faciente +voluntaria ordinatione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p7"> From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32919] Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad primum et secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; + and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created + will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32920] Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illuminatio est de his quae emanant a prima regula +veritatis, quae est principium commune omnium Angelorum, et ideo +illuminationes sunt omnibus communes. Sed locutio potest esse de +his quae ordinantur ad principium voluntatis creatae, quod est +proprium unicuique Angelo, et ideo non oportet quod huiusmodi +locutiones sint omnibus communes.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q108" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q108-p0.1">Q. 108. OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q108-p2"> We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q108-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely. + </p><p id="FP_Q108-p3"> Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q108-p4"><a href="#FP_Q108_A1"> (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p5"><a href="#FP_Q108_A2"> (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p6"><a href="#FP_Q108_A3"> (3) Whether in one order there are many angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p7"><a href="#FP_Q108_A4"> (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p8"><a href="#FP_Q108_A5"> (5) Of the names and properties of each order.</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p9"><a href="#FP_Q108_A6"> (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p10"><a href="#FP_Q108_A7"> (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p11"><a href="#FP_Q108_A8"> (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 pr."><a name="32921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32921] +Iª q. 108 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +ordinatione Angelorum secundum hierarchias et ordines, dictum est +enim quod superiores inferiores illuminant, et non e converso. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum omnes Angeli sint unius +hierarchiae. Secundo, utrum in una hierarchia sit unus tantum ordo. +Tertio, utrum in uno ordine sint plures Angeli. Quarto, utrum +distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum sit a natura. Quinto, de +nominibus et proprietatibus singulorum ordinum. Sexto, de +comparatione ordinum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum ordines durent post +diem iudicii. Octavo, utrum homines assumantur ad ordines +Angelorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q108_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A1-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 1. Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident + that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the + Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, + it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32922] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae. Cum +enim Angeli sint supremi inter creaturas, oportet dicere quod sint +optime dispositi. Sed optima dispositio est multitudinis secundum +quod continetur sub uno principatu; ut patet per philosophum, XII +Metaphys., et in III Politic. Cum ergo hierarchia nihil sit aliud +quam sacer principatus, videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius +hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one + order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32923] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, in III cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>hierarchia est +ordo, scientia et actio</i>. Sed omnes Angeli conveniunt in uno +ordine ad Deum, quem cognoscunt, et a quo in suis actionibus +regulantur. Ergo omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. + Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32924] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sacer principatus, qui dicitur hierarchia, invenitur in hominibus +et Angelis. Sed omnes homines sunt unius hierarchiae. Ergo etiam +omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32925] Iª q. 108 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius, VI cap. Cael. Hier., distinguit tres hierarchias +Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and + the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also + of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can + be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are + two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality + on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude + can be subject in "one" way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince + belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws + and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; + for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says + (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner + we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A3" id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), in treating of the + angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal + knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be + considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs + to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius + says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already + multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things + as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat + of each of the orders + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the + multitude of subjects. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A1-p7"> Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, + and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is + no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, + enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to + the Divine Persons. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 co."><a name="32926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32926] Iª q. 108 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod hierarchia est sacer principatus, ut dictum est. In nomine +autem principatus duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipse princeps, et +multitudo ordinata sub principe. Quia igitur unus est Deus princeps +non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam hominum, et totius creaturae; +ideo non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam totius rationalis +creaturae, quae sacrorum particeps esse potest, una est hierarchia, +secundum quod Augustinus dicit, in XII de Civ. Dei <i>duas esse +civitates, hoc est societates, unam in bonis Angelis et hominibus, +alteram in malis</i>. Sed si consideretur principatus ex parte +multitudinis ordinatae sub principe, sic unus principatus dicitur +secundum quod multitudo uno et eodem modo potest gubernationem +principis recipere. Quae vero non possunt secundum eundem modum +gubernari a principe, ad diversos principatus pertinent, sicut sub +uno rege sunt diversae civitates, quae diversis reguntur legibus et +ministris. Manifestum est autem quod homines alio modo divinas +illuminationes percipiunt quam Angeli, nam Angeli percipiunt eas in +intelligibili puritate, homines vero percipiunt eas sub sensibilium +similitudinibus, ut Dionysius dicit I cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo +oportuit distingui humanam hierarchiam ab angelica. Et per eundem +modum in Angelis tres hierarchiae distinguuntur. Dictum est enim +supra, dum de cognitione Angelorum ageretur, quod superiores Angeli +habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores. +Huiusmodi autem universalis acceptio cognitionis secundum tres +gradus in Angelis distingui potest. Possunt enim rationes rerum de +quibus Angeli illuminantur, considerari tripliciter. Primo quidem, +secundum quod procedunt a primo principio universali, quod est +Deus, et iste modus convenit primae hierarchiae, quae immediate ad +Deum extenditur, et quasi in vestibulis Dei collocatur, ut +Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Secundo vero, prout huiusmodi +rationes dependent ab universalibus causis creatis, quae iam aliquo +modo multiplicantur, et hic modus convenit secundae hierarchiae. +Tertio autem modo, secundum quod huiusmodi rationes applicantur +singulis rebus, et prout dependent a propriis causis, et hic modus +convenit infimae hierarchiae. Quod plenius patebit, cum de singulis +ordinibus agetur. Sic igitur distinguuntur hierarchiae ex parte +multitudinis subiectae. Unde manifestum est eos errare, et contra +intentionem Dionysii loqui, qui ponunt in divinis personis +hierarchiam quam vocant supercaelestem. In divinis enim personis +est quidam ordo naturae, sed non hierarchiae. Nam, ut Dionysius +dicit III cap. Cael. Hier., <i>ordo hierarchiae est alios quidem +purgari et illuminari et perfici, alios autem purgare et illuminare +et perficere</i>. Quod absit ut in divinis personis ponamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the + Philosopher asserts in those passages. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32927] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de principatu ex parte principis, +quia optimum est quod multitudo regatur ab uno principe, ut +philosophus in praedictis locis intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical distinction + among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32928] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quantum ad cognitionem ipsius Dei, quem omnes uno +modo, scilicet per essentiam, vident, non distinguuntur in Angelis +hierarchiae, sed quantum ad rationes rerum creatarum, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence + the same argument does not apply to both. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32929] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnes homines sunt unius speciei, et unus modus +intelligendi est eis connaturalis, non sic autem est in Angelis. +Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A2-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 2. Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined + is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there + is not one hierarchy only, but many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32930] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in una hierarchia non sint plures ordines. +Multiplicata enim definitione, multiplicatur et definitum. Sed +hierarchia, ut Dionysius dicit, est ordo. Si ergo sunt multi +ordines, non erit una hierarchia, sed multae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But + among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore + there are not different orders of angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32931] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +diversi ordines sunt diversi gradus. Sed gradus in spiritualibus +constituuntur secundum diversa dona spiritualia. Sed in Angelis +omnia dona spiritualia sunt communia, quia nihil ibi singulariter +possidetur. Ergo non sunt diversi ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening," + and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting," + as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction + of orders among the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32932] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in +ecclesiastica hierarchia distinguuntur ordines secundum purgare, +illuminare et perficere, nam ordo diaconorum est purgativus, +sacerdotum illuminativus, episcoporum perfectivus, ut Dionysius +dicit V cap. Eccles. Hier. Sed quilibet Angelus purgat, illuminat +et perficit. Non ergo est distinctio ordinum in Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) that "God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders + of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32933] Iª q. 108 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit ad Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit Christum +hominem supra <i>omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et +dominationem</i>; qui sunt diversi ordines Angelorum, et quidam +eorum ad unam hierarchiam pertinent, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. + Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy + requires diversity of orders. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p7"> This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different + orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and + another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p8"> But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has + a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as + the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus + honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their + actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so + in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 co."><a name="32934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32934] Iª q. 108 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut dictum est, una hierarchia est unus principatus, idest +una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis gubernatione. Non +autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine +diversi ordines non essent. Ipsa ergo ratio hierarchiae requirit +ordinum diversitatem. Quae quidem diversitas ordinum secundum +diversa officia et actus consideratur. Sicut patet quod in una +civitate sunt diversi ordines secundum diversos actus, nam alius +est ordo iudicantium, alius pugnantium, alius laborantium in agris, +et sic de aliis. Sed quamvis multi sint unius civitatis ordines, +omnes tamen ad tres possunt reduci, secundum quod quaelibet +multitudo perfecta habet principium, medium et finem. Unde et in +civitatibus triplex ordo hominum invenitur, quidam enim sunt +supremi, ut optimates; quidam autem sunt infimi, ut vilis populus; +quidam autem sunt medii, ut populus honorabilis. Sic igitur et in +qualibet hierarchia angelica ordines distinguuntur secundum +diversos actus et officia; et omnis ista diversitas ad tria +reducitur, scilicet ad summum, medium et infimum. Et propter hoc in +qualibet hierarchia Dionysius ponit tres ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy + is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are + so called. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32935] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ordo dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, ipsa ordinatio +comprehendens sub se diversos gradus, et hoc modo hierarchia +dicitur ordo. Alio modo dicitur ordo gradus unus, et sic dicuntur +plures ordines unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than + by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate + it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone + can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect + grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among + the angels, according to their different offices and actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32936] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in societate Angelorum omnia possidentur communiter; +sed tamen quaedam excellentius habentur a quibusdam quam ab aliis. +Unumquodque autem perfectius habetur ab eo qui potest illud +communicare, quam ab eo qui non potest, sicut perfectius est +calidum quod potest calefacere, quam quod non potest; et perfectius +scit qui potest docere, quam qui non potest. Et quanto perfectius +donum aliquis communicare potest, tanto in perfectiori gradu est, +sicut in perfectiori gradu magisterii est qui potest docere +altiorem scientiam. Et secundum hanc similitudinem consideranda est +diversitas graduum vel ordinum in Angelis, secundum diversa officia +et actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the + kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that + are born of women" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher + way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the + heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32937] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod inferior Angelus est superior supremo homine nostrae +hierarchiae; secundum illud Matth. XI, <i>qui minor est in regno +caelorum, maior est illo</i>, scilicet Ioanne Baptista, quo nullus +maior inter natos mulierum surrexit. Unde minor Angelus caelestis +hierarchiae potest non solum purgare sed illuminare et perficere, +et altiori modo quam ordines nostrae hierarchiae. Et sic secundum +distinctionem harum actionum non distinguuntur caelestes ordines; +sed secundum alias differentias actionum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A3-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 3. Whether there are many angels in one order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q108_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32938] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in uno ordine non sint plures Angeli. +Dictum est enim supra omnes Angelos inaequales esse ad invicem. Sed +unius ordinis esse dicuntur quae sunt aequalia. Ergo plures Angeli +non sunt unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs + to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs + to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by + their offices, as stated above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, several angels in one order + would be superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32939] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod +potest sufficienter fieri per unum, superfluum est quod fiat per +multa. Sed illud quod pertinet ad unum officium angelicum, +sufficienter potest fieri per unum Angelum; multo magis quam per +unum solem sufficienter fit quod pertinet ad officium solis, quanto +perfectior est Angelus caelesti corpore. Si ergo ordines +distinguuntur secundum officia, ut dictum est, superfluum est quod +sint plures Angeli unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or + four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than + with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. + Therefore there are not many angels of one order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32940] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod omnes Angeli sunt inaequales. Si ergo plures +Angeli sint unius ordinis, puta tres vel quatuor, infimus +superioris ordinis magis conveniet cum supremo inferioris quam cum +supremo sui ordinis. Et sic non videtur quod magis sit unius +ordinis cum hoc, quam cum illo. Non igitur sunt plures Angeli unius +ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32941] Iª q. 108 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Isaiae VI dicitur, quod Seraphim clamabant alter ad alterum. +Sunt ergo plures Angeli in uno ordine Seraphim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas + he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, + one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one + order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; + whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and + in each of the other orders. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A3-p7"> Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic + offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions + of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much + more so than any star, though this be hidden from us. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 co."><a name="32942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32942] Iª q. 108 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ille qui perfecte cognoscit res aliquas, potest usque ad +minima et actus et virtutes et naturas earum distinguere. Qui autem +cognoscit eas imperfecte, non potest distinguere nisi in +universali, quae quidem distinctio fit per pauciora. Sicut qui +imperfecte cognoscit res naturales, distinguit earum ordines in +universali, ponens in uno ordine caelestia corpora, in alio corpora +inferiora inanimata, in alio plantas, in alio animalia, qui autem +perfectius cognosceret res naturales, posset distinguere et in +ipsis corporibus caelestibus diversos ordines, et in singulis +aliorum. Nos autem imperfecte Angelos cognoscimus, et eorum +officia, ut Dionysius dicit VI cap. Cael. Hier. Unde non possumus +distinguere officia et ordines Angelorum, nisi in communi; secundum +quem modum, multi Angeli sub uno ordine continentur. Si autem +perfecte cognosceremus officia Angelorum, et eorum distinctiones, +perfecte sciremus quod quilibet Angelus habet suum proprium +officium et suum proprium ordinem in rebus, multo magis quam +quaelibet stella, etsi nos lateat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely + speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those + who are first, middle, and last. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32943] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnes Angeli unius ordinis sunt aliquo modo aequales, +quantum ad communem similitudinem secundum quam constituuntur in +uno ordine, sed simpliciter non sunt aequales. Unde Dionysius +dicit, X cap. Cael. Hier., quod in uno et eodem ordine Angelorum, +est accipere primos, medios et ultimos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32944] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa specialis distinctio ordinum et officiorum +secundum quam quilibet Angelus habet proprium officium et ordinem, +est nobis ignota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as + regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary + of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin + in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite + limit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32945] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in superficie quae partim est alba et partim +nigra, duae partes quae sunt in confinio albi et nigri, magis +conveniunt secundum situm quam aliquae duae partes albae, minus +tamen secundum qualitatem; ita duo Angeli qui sunt in terminis +duorum ordinum, magis secum conveniunt secundum propinquitatem +naturae, quam unus eorum cum aliquibus aliis sui ordinis; minus +autem secundum idoneitatem ad similia officia, quae quidem +idoneitas usque ad aliquem certum terminum protenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A4-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 4. Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a + sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. + Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of + hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32946] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum non +sit a natura in Angelis. Hierarchia enim dicitur sacer principatus, +et in definitione eius Dionysius ponit quod <i>deiforme, quantum +possibile est, similat</i>. Sed sanctitas et deiformitas est in +Angelis per gratiam, non per naturam. Ergo distinctio hierarchiarum +et ordinum in Angelis est per gratiam, non per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which + comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic + orders are not from nature, but from grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32947] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Seraphim dicuntur ardentes, vel incendentes, ut Dionysius dicit VII +cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem videtur ad caritatem pertinere, quae non +est a natura, sed a gratia, <i>diffunditur enim in cordibus nostris +per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>, ut dicitur ad Rom. +V. <i>Quod non solum ad sanctos homines pertinet, sed etiam de +sanctis Angelis dici potest</i>, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Civ. +Dei. Ergo ordines in Angelis non sunt a natura, sed a gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the + gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore + neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32948] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +hierarchia ecclesiastica exemplatur a caelesti. Sed ordines in +hominibus non sunt per naturam, sed per donum gratiae, non enim est +a natura quod unus est episcopus, et alius est sacerdos, et alius +diaconus. Ergo neque in Angelis sunt ordines a natura, sed a gratia +tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some + gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the + angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32949] Iª q. 108 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Magister dicit, IX dist. II Sent., quod <i>ordo Angelorum +dicitur multitudo caelestium spirituum, qui inter se aliquo munere +gratiae similantur, sicut et naturalium datorum participatione +conveniunt</i>. Distinctio ergo ordinum in Angelis est non solum +secundum dona gratuita, sed etiam secundum dona naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels + may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge + and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, + the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural + powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end + they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the + gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the + capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A6" id="FP_Q108_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[6]</a>). Hence + among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 co."><a name="32950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32950] Iª q. 108 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ordo gubernationis, qui est ordo multitudinis sub principatu +existentis, attenditur per respectum ad finem. Finis autem +Angelorum potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum facultatem +suae naturae, ut scilicet cognoscant et ament Deum naturali +cognitione et amore. Et secundum respectum ad hunc finem, +distinguuntur ordines Angelorum secundum naturalia dona. Alio modo +potest accipi finis angelicae multitudinis supra naturalem +facultatem eorum, qui consistit in visione divinae essentiae, et in +immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non +possunt nisi per gratiam. Unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem, +ordines distinguuntur in Angelis completive quidem secundum dona +gratuita, dispositive autem secundum dona naturalia, quia Angelis +data sunt dona gratuita secundum capacitatem naturalium, quod non +est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde in hominibus +distinguuntur ordines secundum dona gratuita tantum, et non +secundum naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p7"> From the above the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="32951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32951] Iª q. 108 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A5-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 5. Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly + virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly + named. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32952] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ordines Angelorum non convenienter +nominentur. Omnes enim caelestes spiritus dicuntur et Angeli et +virtutes caelestes. Sed nomina communia inconvenienter aliquibus +appropriantur. Ergo inconvenienter nominatur unus ordo Angelorum, +et alius virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.3" target="asv">Ps. 99:3</a>). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32953] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, esse +dominum est proprium Dei; secundum illud Psal. XCIX <i>scitote +quoniam dominus ipse est Deus</i>. Ergo inconvenienter unus ordo +caelestium spirituum dominationes vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore + these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32954] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nomen dominationis ad gubernationem pertinere videtur. Similiter +autem et nomen principatuum, et potestatum. Inconvenienter ergo +tribus ordinibus haec tria nomina imponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the + "Principalities." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32955] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli. Non ergo hoc nomen +debet imponi alii ordini quam ordini principatuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But + charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="32956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32956] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore qui ad caritatem pertinet, nomen +autem Cherubim imponitur a scientia. Caritas autem et scientia sunt +dona communia omnibus Angelis. Non ergo debent esse nomina +specialium ordinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. + Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the + orders of angels are not properly styled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="32957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32957] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +throni dicuntur sedes. Sed ex hoc ipso Deus in creatura rationali +sedere dicitur, quod ipsum cognoscit et amat. Non ergo debet esse +alius ordo thronorum ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Sic igitur +videtur quod inconvenienter ordines Angelorum nominentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.2" target="asv"> Is. 6:2</a>; the name "Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv"> Col. 1:16</a>; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.21" target="asv"> Eph. 1:21</a>; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of + Scripture. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32958] Iª q. 108 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae sic eos nominat. Nomen enim +Seraphim ponitur Isaiae VI; nomen Cherubim Ezech. I; nomen +thronorum, Coloss. I; dominationes autem et virtutes et potestates +et principatus ponuntur Ephes. I; nomen autem Archangeli ponitur in +canonica Iudae, nomina autem Angelorum in pluribus Scripturae +locis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of + each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, + something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is + said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its + nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, + as we have stated ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q108_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[2]</a>) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not + fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating + its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates + imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we + wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter + is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; + nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of + a man, + and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p10"> So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are + all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior + perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely + the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of + excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p11"> So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections + they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior + ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; + by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities + preside over the good spirits themselves." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 co."><a name="32959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32959] Iª q. 108 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in nominatione angelicorum ordinum, considerare oportet quod +<i>propria nomina singulorum ordinum proprietates eorum +designant</i>, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ad videndum +autem quae sit proprietas cuiuslibet ordinis, considerare oportet +quod in rebus ordinatis tripliciter aliquid esse contingit, +scilicet per proprietatem, per excessum, et per participationem. +Per proprietatem autem dicitur esse aliquid in re aliqua, quod +adaequatur et proportionatur naturae ipsius. Per excessum autem, +quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, est minus quam res cui +attribuitur, sed tamen convenit illi rei per quendam excessum; +sicut dictum est de omnibus nominibus quae attribuuntur Deo. Per +participationem autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, non +plenarie invenitur in eo, sed deficienter; sicut sancti homines +participative dicuntur dii. Si ergo aliquid nominari debeat nomine +designante proprietatem ipsius, non debet nominari ab eo quod +imperfecte participat, neque ab eo quod excedenter habet; sed ab eo +quod est sibi quasi coaequatum. Sicut si quis velit proprie +nominare hominem, dicet eum substantiam rationalem, non autem +substantiam intellectualem, quod est proprium nomen Angeli, quia +simplex intelligentia convenit Angelo per proprietatem, homini vero +per participationem; neque substantiam sensibilem, quod est nomen +bruti proprium, quia sensus est minus quam id quod est proprium +homini, et convenit homini excedenter prae aliis animalibus. Sic +igitur considerandum est in ordinibus Angelorum, quod omnes +spirituales perfectiones sunt omnibus Angelis communes et quod +omnes abundantius existunt in superioribus quam in inferioribus. +Sed cum in ipsis etiam perfectionibus sit quidam gradus, superior +perfectio attribuitur superiori ordini per proprietatem, inferiori +vero per participationem, e converso autem inferior attribuitur +inferiori per proprietatem, superiori autem per excessum. Et ita +superior ordo a superiori perfectione nominatur. Sic igitur +Dionysius exponit ordinum nomina secundum convenientiam ad +spirituales perfectiones eorum. Gregorius vero, in expositione +horum nominum, magis attendere videtur exteriora ministeria. Dicit +enim, quod <i>Angeli dicuntur qui minima nuntiant; Archangeli, qui +summa; virtutes per quas miracula fiunt; potestates quibus adversae +potestates repelluntur; principatus, qui ipsis bonis spiritibus +praesunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the + superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. + The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation + only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest + order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels," + forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p13"> "Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in + that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain + excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the + "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine + operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly + the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32960] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Angelus nuntius dicitur. Omnes ergo caelestes +spiritus, inquantum sunt manifestatores divinorum, Angeli vocantur. +Sed superiores Angeli habent quandam excellentiam in hac +manifestatione, a qua superiores ordines nominantur. Infimus autem +Angelorum ordo nullam excellentiam supra communem manifestationem +addit, et ideo a simplici manifestatione nominatur. Et sic nomen +commune remanet infimo ordini quasi proprium, ut dicit Dionysius V +cap. Cael. Hier. Vel potest dici quod infimus ordo specialiter +dicitur ordo Angelorum, quia immediate nobis annuntiant. Virtus +autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod +est media inter essentiam et operationem, et sic omnes caelestes +spiritus nominantur caelestes virtutes, sicut et caelestes +essentiae. Alio modo, secundum quod importat quendam excessum +fortitudinis, et sic est proprium nomen ordinis. Unde Dionysius +dicit, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen virtutum significat +quandam virilem et inconcussam fortitudinem, primo quidem ad omnes +operationes divinas eis convenientes; secundo, ad suscipiendum +divina. Et ita significat quod sine aliquo timore aggrediuntur +divina quae ad eos pertinent, quod videtur ad fortitudinem animi +pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word + gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the + Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free + from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and + from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy + which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies + "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation + of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the + same principle applies to the rest. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32961] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius XII cap. de Div. Nom., +<i>dominatio laudatur in Deo singulariter per quendam excessum, sed +per participationem, divina eloquia vocant dominos principaliores +ornatus, per quos inferiores ex donis eius accipiunt</i>. Unde et +Dionysius dicit in VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen dominationum +primo quidem significat quandam libertatem, quae est a servili +conditione et pedestri subiectione, sicut plebs subiicitur, et a +tyrannica oppressione, quam interdum etiam maiores patiuntur. +Secundo significat quandam rigidam et inflexibilem gubernationem, +quae ad nullum servilem actum inclinatur, neque ad aliquem actum +subiectorum vel oppressorum a tyrannis. Tertio significat appetitum +et participationem veri dominii, quod est in Deo. Et similiter +nomen cuiuslibet ordinis significat participationem eius quod est +in Deo; sicut nomen virtutum significat participationem divinae +virtutis; et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to + prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are + subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the + Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv">Rom. 13:2</a>). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception + of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. + Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside + [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first + in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies + "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according + to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.26" target="asv">Ps. 67:26</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32962] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nomen dominationis, et potestatis, et principatus, +diversimode ad gubernationem pertinet. Nam domini est solummodo +praecipere de agendis. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod <i>quaedam +Angelorum agmina, pro eo quod eis cetera ad obediendum subiecta +sunt, dominationes vocantur</i>. Nomen vero potestatis ordinationem +quandam designat; secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. XIII, <i>qui +potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit</i>. Et ideo Dionysius +dicit quod nomen potestatis significat quandam ordinationem et +circa susceptionem divinorum, et circa actiones divinas quas +superiores in inferiores agunt, eas sursum ducendo. Ad ordinem ergo +potestatum pertinet ordinare quae a subditis sint agenda. +Principari vero, ut Gregorius dicit, est inter reliquos priorem +existere, quasi primi sint in executione eorum quae imperantur. Et +ideo Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen principatuum +significat ductivum cum ordine sacro. Illi enim qui alios ducunt, +primi inter eos existentes, principes proprie vocantur secundum +illud Psalmi LXVII, <i>praevenerunt principes coniuncti +psallentibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared + to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, + and hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the + "Angels," and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory + (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing + greater things: and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine + commands. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32963] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod Archangeli, secundum Dionysium, medii sunt inter +principatus et Angelos. Medium autem comparatum uni extremo, +videtur alterum, inquantum participat naturam utriusque, sicut +tepidum respectu calidi est frigidum, respectu vero frigidi est +calidum. Sic et Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli, quia +respectu Angelorum sunt principes, respectu vero principatuum sunt +Angeli. Secundum Gregorium autem, dicuntur Archangeli ex eo quod +principantur soli ordini Angelorum, quasi magna nuntiantes. +Principatus autem dicuntur ex eo quod principantur omnibus +caelestibus virtutibus divinas iussiones explentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. + Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of + heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they + are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which + is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to + the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised + powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly + we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an + inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p18"> In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," + which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the + Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this + knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="32964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32964] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod nomen Seraphim non imponitur tantum a caritate, sed a +caritatis excessu, quem importat nomen ardoris vel incendii. Unde +Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier., exponit nomen Seraphim secundum +proprietates ignis, in quo est excessus caliditatis. In igne autem +tria possumus considerare. Primo quidem, motum, qui est sursum, et +qui est continuus. Per quod significatur quod indeclinabiliter +moventur in Deum. Secundo vero, virtutem activam eius, quae est +calidum. Quod quidem non simpliciter invenitur in igne, sed cum +quadam acuitate, quia maxime est penetrativus in agendo, et +pertingit usque ad minima; et iterum cum quodam superexcedenti +fervore. Et per hoc significatur actio huiusmodi Angelorum, quam in +subditos potenter exercent, eos in similem fervorem excitantes, et +totaliter eos per incendium purgantes. Tertio consideratur in igne +claritas eius. Et hoc significat quod huiusmodi Angeli in seipsis +habent inextinguibilem lucem, et quod alios perfecte illuminant. +Similiter etiam nomen Cherubim imponitur a quodam excessu +scientiae, unde interpretatur plenitudo scientiae. Quod Dionysius +exponit quantum ad quatuor, primo quidem, quantum ad perfectam Dei +visionem; secundo, quantum ad plenam susceptionem divini luminis; +tertio, quantum ad hoc, quod in ipso Deo contemplantur +pulchritudinem ordinis rerum a Deo derivatam; quarto, quantum ad +hoc, quod ipsi pleni existentes huiusmodi cognitione, eam copiose +in alios effundunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; + whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two + excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the other two; and so the + order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the + "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not + conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may + consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones" + are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed + strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made + firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive + God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open + on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="32965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32965] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod ordo thronorum habet excellentiam prae inferioribus +ordinibus in hoc, quod immediate in Deo rationes divinorum operum +cognoscere possunt. Sed Cherubim habent excellentiam scientiae; +Seraphim vero excellentiam ardoris. Et licet in his duabus +excellentiis includatur tertia, non tamen in illa quae est +thronorum, includuntur aliae duae. Et ideo ordo thronorum +distinguitur ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Hoc enim est commune +in omnibus, quod excellentia inferioris continetur in excellentia +superioris, et non e converso. Exponit autem Dionysius nomen +thronorum, per convenientiam ad materiales sedes. In quibus est +quatuor considerare. Primo quidem, situm, quia sedes supra terram +elevantur. Et sic ipsi Angeli qui throni dicuntur, elevantur usque +ad hoc, quod in Deo immediate rationes rerum cognoscant. Secundo in +materialibus sedibus consideratur firmitas, quia in ipsis aliquis +firmiter sedet. Hic autem est e converso, nam ipsi Angeli firmantur +per Deum. Tertio, quia sedes suscipit sedentem, et in ea deferri +potest. Sic et isti Angeli suscipiunt Deum in seipsis, et eum +quodammodo ad inferiores ferunt. Quarto, ex figura, quia sedes ex +una parte est aperta ad suscipiendum sedentem. Ita et isti Angeli +sunt per promptitudinem aperti ad suscipiendum Deum, et famulandum +ipsi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A6-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 6. Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the + names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be + supreme. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32966] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter gradus ordinum assignentur. +Ordo enim praelatorum videtur esse supremus. Sed dominationes, +principatus et potestates ex ipsis nominibus praelationem quandam +habent. Ergo isti ordines debent esse inter omnes supremi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is + nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32967] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto aliquis ordo est Deo propinquior, tanto est superior. Sed +ordo thronorum videtur esse Deo propinquissimus, nihil enim +coniungitur propinquius sedenti, quam sua sedes. Ergo ordo +thronorum est altissimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher + than the "Seraphim." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32968] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia est prior quam amor; et intellectus videtur esse altior +quam voluntas. Ergo et ordo Cherubim videtur esse altior quam ordo +Seraphim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately + above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="32969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32969] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius ponit principatus supra potestates. Non ergo collocantur +immediate supra Archangelos, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the + "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the + "Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32970] Iª q. 108 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius ponit, in prima quidem hierarchia. Seraphim ut +primos, Cherubim ut medios, thronos ut ultimos; in media vero, +dominationes ut primos, virtutes ut medios, potestates ut ultimos; +in ultima, principatus ut primos, Archangelos ut medios, Angelos ut +ultimos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as + regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above + the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" + between the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers" + and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the + heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and + "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same + orders from the highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created + by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p8"> Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A1" id="FP_Q108_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in + their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the + whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the + universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which + is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering + the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are + taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy + those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition---the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers"; + and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," + and "Archangels." + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p9"> As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of + the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition + to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, + Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the + dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; + and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition + in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, + in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first + hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence + of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones"; + as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels." + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p10"> As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be + done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs + to the "Virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which + belongs to the "Powers." + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p11"> The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there + are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." + There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others hold a middle place; and these + are the "Archangels," as above explained. + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p12"> This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the + lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, + which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, + denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones," + who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called + "because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate + enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers" + is akin to the order of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to + them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples + and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; + "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of + the kingdom of the Persians resisted me" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p13"> The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order + what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things + in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order; + the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good + spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then + the "Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.3" target="asv">Rom. 13:3,4</a>). After these come the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the + "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within + the purview of reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 co."><a name="32971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32971] Iª q. 108 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod gradus angelicorum ordinum assignant et Gregorius et +Dionysius, quantum ad alia quidem convenienter, sed quantum ad +principatus et virtutes differenter. Nam Dionysius collocat +virtutes sub dominationibus et supra potestates, principatus autem +sub potestatibus et supra Archangelos, Gregorius autem ponit +principatus in medio dominationum et potestatum, virtutes vero in +medio potestatum et Archangelorum. Et utraque assignatio +fulcimentum habere potest ex auctoritate apostoli. Qui, medios +ordines ascendendo enumerans, dicit, Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit +illum, scilicet Christum, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra +omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, ubi +virtutem ponit inter potestatem et dominationem, secundum +assignationem Dionysii. Sed ad Coloss. I, enumerans eosdem ordines +descendendo, dicit, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive +principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata +sunt, ubi principatus ponit medios inter dominationes et +potestates, secundum assignationem Gregorii. Primo igitur videamus +rationem assignationis Dionysii. In qua considerandum est quod, +sicut supra dictum est, prima hierarchia accipit rationes rerum in +ipso Deo; secunda vero in causis universalibus; tertia vero +secundum determinationem ad speciales effectus. Et quia Deus est +finis non solum angelicorum ministeriorum, sed etiam totius +creaturae, ad primam hierarchiam pertinet consideratio finis; ad +mediam vero dispositio universalis de agendis; ad ultimam autem +applicatio dispositionis ad effectum, quae est operis executio; +haec enim tria manifestum est in qualibet operatione inveniri. Et +ideo Dionysius, ex nominibus ordinum proprietates illorum +considerans, illos ordines in prima hierarchia posuit, quorum +nomina imponuntur per respectum ad Deum, scilicet Seraphim et +Cherubim et thronos. Illos vero ordines posuit in media hierarchia, +quorum nomina designant communem quandam gubernationem sive +dispositionem, scilicet dominationes, virtutes et potestates. Illos +vero ordines posuit in tertia hierarchia, quorum nomina designant +operis executionem, scilicet principatus, Angelos et Archangelos. +In respectu autem ad finem, tria considerari possunt, nam primo, +aliquis considerat finem; secundo vero, perfectam finis cognitionem +accipit; tertio vero, intentionem suam in ipso defigit; quorum +secundum ex additione se habet ad primum, et tertium ad utrumque. +Et quia Deus est finis creaturarum sicut dux est finis exercitus, +ut dicitur in XII Metaphys., potest aliquid simile huius ordinis +considerari in rebus humanis, nam quidam sunt qui hoc habent +dignitatis, ut per seipsos familiariter accedere possunt ad regem +vel ducem; quidam vero super hoc habent, ut etiam secreta eius +cognoscant; alii vero insuper circa ipsum semper inhaerent, quasi +ei coniuncti. Et secundum hanc similitudinem accipere possumus +dispositionem ordinum primae hierarchiae. Nam throni elevantur ad +hoc, quod Deum familiariter in seipsis recipiant, secundum quod +rationes rerum in ipso immediate cognoscere possunt, quod est +proprium totius primae hierarchiae. Cherubim vero supereminenter +divina secreta cognoscunt. Seraphim vero excellunt in hoc quod est +omnium supremum, scilicet Deo ipsi uniri. Ut sic ab eo quod est +commune toti hierarchiae, denominetur ordo thronorum; sicut ab eo +quod est commune omnibus caelestibus spiritibus, denominatur ordo +Angelorum. Ad gubernationis autem rationem tria pertinent. Quorum +primum est definitio eorum quae agenda sunt, quod est proprium +dominationum. Secundum autem est praebere facultatem ad implendum, +quod pertinet ad virtutes. Tertium autem est ordinare qualiter ea +quae praecepta vel definita sunt, impleri possint, ut aliqui +exequantur, et hoc pertinet ad potestates. Executio autem +angelicorum ministeriorum consistit in annuntiando divina. In +executione autem cuiuslibet actus, sunt quidam quasi incipientes +actionem et alios ducentes, sicut in cantu praecentores, et in +bello illi qui alios ducunt et dirigunt, et hoc pertinet ad +principatus. Alii vero sunt qui simpliciter exequuntur, et hoc +pertinet ad Angelos. Alii vero medio modo se habent, quod ad +Archangelos pertinet, ut supra dictum est. Invenitur autem congrua +haec ordinum assignatio. Nam semper summum inferioris ordinis +affinitatem habet cum ultimo superioris; sicut infima animalia +parum distant a plantis. Primus autem ordo est divinarum +personarum, qui terminatur ad spiritum sanctum, qui est amor +procedens, cum quo affinitatem habet supremus ordo primae +hierarchiae, ab incendio amoris denominatus. Infimus autem ordo +primae hierarchiae est thronorum, qui ex suo nomine habent quandam +affinitatem cum dominationibus, nam throni dicuntur, secundum +Gregorium, per quos Deus sua iudicia exercet; accipiunt enim +divinas illuminationes per convenientiam ad immediate illuminandum +secundam hierarchiam, ad quam pertinet dispositio divinorum +ministeriorum. Ordo vero potestatum affinitatem habet cum ordine +principatuum, nam cum potestatum sit ordinationem subiectis +imponere, haec ordinatio statim in nomine principatuum designatur, +qui sunt primi in executione divinorum ministeriorum, utpote +praesidentes gubernationi gentium et regnorum, quod est primum et +praecipuum in divinis ministeriis; nam bonum gentis est divinius +quam bonum unius hominis. Unde dicitur Dan. X, <i>princeps regni +Persarum restitit mihi</i>. Dispositio etiam ordinum quam Gregorius +ponit, congruitatem habet. Nam cum dominationes sint definientes et +praecipientes ea quae ad divina ministeria pertinent, ordines eis +subiecti disponuntur secundum dispositionem eorum in quos divina +ministeria exercentur ut autem Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., +<i>corpora quodam ordine reguntur, inferiora per superiora, et +omnia per spiritualem creaturam; et spiritus malus per spiritum +bonum</i>. Primus ergo ordo post dominationes dicitur principatuum, +qui etiam bonis spiritibus principantur. Deinde potestates, per +quas arcentur mali spiritus, sicut per potestates terrenas arcentur +malefactores, ut habetur Rom. XIII. Post quas sunt virtutes, quae +habent potestatem super corporalem naturam in operatione +miraculorum. Post quas sunt Archangeli et Angeli, qui nuntiant +hominibus vel magna, quae sunt supra rationem; vel parva, ad quae +ratio se extendere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel's subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. + Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their + name from their nearness and relation to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32972] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in Angelis potius est quod subiiciuntur Deo, quam +quod inferioribus praesident, et hoc derivatur ex illo. Et ideo +ordines nominati a praelatione non sunt supremi, sed magis ordines +nominati a conversione ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more + excellent way, as above explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32973] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa propinquitas ad Deum quae designatur nomine +thronorum, convenit etiam Cherubim et Seraphim, et excellentius, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As above explained ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27_A3" id="FP_Q108_A6-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. + Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler + way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, + God above all, is + better than to know them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32974] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio est secundum quod +cognita sunt in cognoscente; amor autem secundum quod amans unitur +rei amatae. Superiora autem nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis quam in +inferioribus, inferiora vero nobiliori modo in superioribus quam in +seipsis. Et ideo inferiorum quidem cognitio praeeminet dilectioni, +superiorum autem dilectio, et praecipue Dei, praeeminet +cognitioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according + to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also + agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in + the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the + "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; + since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="32975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32975] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, si quis diligenter consideret dispositiones ordinum +secundum Dionysium et Gregorium, parum vel nihil differunt, si ad +rem referantur. Exponit enim Gregorius principatuum nomen ex hoc, +quod bonis spiritibus praesunt, et hoc convenit virtutibus, +secundum quod in nomine virtutum intelligitur quaedam fortitudo +dans efficaciam inferioribus spiritibus ad exequenda divina +ministeria. Rursus virtutes, secundum Gregorium, videntur esse idem +quod principatus secundum Dionysium. Nam hoc est primum in divinis +ministeriis, miracula facere, per hoc enim paratur via +Annuntiationi Archangelorum et Angelorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A7-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 7. Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24</a>), that Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the + Father," and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32976] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non remanebunt post diem iudicii. +Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, quod Christus evacuabit omnem +principatum et potestatem, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, quod +erit in ultima consummatione. Pari ergo ratione, in illo statu +omnes alii ordines evacuabuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment + one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore + the angelic orders would remain for no purpose. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32977] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad +officium angelicorum ordinum pertinet purgare, illuminare et +perficere. Sed post diem iudicii unus Angelus non purgabit aut +illuminabit aut perficiet alium, quia non proficient amplius in +scientia. Ergo frustra ordines angelici remanerent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says of the angels ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence + it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit + of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32978] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. I, de Angelis, quod <i>omnes sunt +administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui +haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, ex quo patet quod officia +Angelorum ordinantur ad hoc, quod homines ad salutem adducantur. +Sed omnes electi usque ad diem iudicii salutem consequuntur. Non +ergo post diem iudicii remanebunt officia et ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.5.20" target="asv">Judges 5:20</a>): "Stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in + their orders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32979] Iª q. 108 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Iudic. V, stellae manentes in ordine et cursu suo, +quod exponitur de Angelis. Ergo Angeli semper in suis ordinibus +remanebunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction + of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless + they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever + remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain + degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are + directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. + Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 co."><a name="32980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32980] Iª q. 108 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in ordinibus angelicis duo possunt considerari, scilicet +distinctio graduum, et executio officiorum. Distinctio autem +graduum est in Angelis secundum differentiam gratiae et naturae, ut +supra dictum est. Et utraque differentia semper in Angelis +remanebit. Non enim posset naturarum differentia ab eis auferri, +nisi eis corruptis, differentia etiam gloriae erit in eis semper, +secundum differentiam meriti praecedentis. Executio autem +officiorum angelicorum aliquo modo remanebit post diem iudicii, et +aliquo modo cessabit. Cessabit quidem, secundum quod eorum officia +ordinantur ad perducendum aliquos ad finem, remanebit autem, +secundum quod convenit in ultima finis consecutione. Sicut etiam +alia sunt officia militarium ordinum in pugna, et in triumpho.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to + their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words + of the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful + to the enjoyment of God Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32981] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod principatus et potestates evacuabuntur in illa finali +consummatione quantum ad hoc, quod alios ad finem perducant, quia +consecuto iam fine, non est necessarium tendere in finem. Et haec +ratio intelligitur ex verbis apostoli, dicentis, cum tradiderit +regnum Deo et patri, idest, cum perduxerit fideles ad fruendum ipso +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. + In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually + arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding + middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as + regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms + he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since + the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the + light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the + knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, + still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32982] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actiones Angelorum super alios Angelos considerandae +sunt secundum similitudinem actionum intelligibilium quae sunt in +nobis. Inveniuntur autem in nobis multae intelligibiles actiones +quae sunt ordinatae secundum ordinem causae et causati; sicut cum +per multa media gradatim in unam conclusionem devenimus. Manifestum +est autem quod cognitio conclusionis dependet ex omnibus mediis +praecedentibus, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, +sed etiam quantum ad scientiae conservationem. Cuius signum est +quod, si quis oblivisceretur aliquod praecedentium mediorum, +opinionem quidem vel fidem de conclusione posset habere, sed non +scientiam, ordine causarum ignorato. Sic igitur, cum inferiores +Angeli rationes divinorum operum cognoscant per lumen superiorum +Angelorum, dependet eorum cognitio ex lumine superiorum, non solum +quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad +cognitionis conservationem. Licet ergo post iudicium non proficiant +inferiores Angeli in cognitione aliquarum rerum, non tamen propter +hoc excluditur quin a superioribus illuminentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who + are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32983] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi post diem iudicii homines non sint ulterius ad +salutem adducendi per ministerium Angelorum; tamen illi qui iam +salutem erunt consecuti, aliquam illustrationem habebunt per +Angelorum officia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A8-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 8. Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest + heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest + hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32984] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homines non assumantur ad ordines +Angelorum. Hierarchia enim humana continetur sub infima +hierarchiarum caelestium, sicut infima sub media, et media sub +prima. Sed Angeli infimae hierarchiae nunquam transferentur in +mediam aut in primam. Ergo neque homines transferentur ad ordines +Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the + like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32985] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ordinibus Angelorum aliqua officia competunt, utpote custodire, +miracula facere, Daemones arcere, et huiusmodi, quae non videntur +convenire animabus sanctorum. Ergo non transferentur ad ordines +Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls + of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the + souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32986] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut boni Angeli inducunt ad bonum, ita Daemones inducunt ad +malum. Sed erroneum est dicere quod animae hominum malorum +convertantur in Daemones, hoc enim Chrysostomus reprobat, super +Matth. Ergo non videtur quod animae sanctorum transferantur ad +ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32987] Iª q. 108 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXII, de sanctis, quod <i>erunt sicut +Angeli Dei in caelo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5a"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.2" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. + Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction + will always remain. In view of this + distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting + as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.20.36" target="asv">Lk. 20:36</a>). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends + on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men + can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are + taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, + but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole + society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies + of + men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 co."><a name="32988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32988] Iª q. 108 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, ordines Angelorum distinguuntur et +secundum conditionem naturae, et secundum dona gratiae. Si ergo +considerentur Angelorum ordines solum quantum ad gradum naturae, +sic homines nullo modo assumi possunt ad ordines Angelorum, quia +semper remanebit naturarum distinctio. Quam quidam considerantes, +posuerunt quod nullo modo homines transferri possunt ad +aequalitatem Angelorum. Quod est erroneum, repugnat enim +promissioni Christi, dicentis, Lucae XX, quod filii resurrectionis +erunt aequales Angelis in caelis. Illud enim quod est ex parte +naturae, se habet ut materiale in ratione ordinis, completivum vero +est quod est ex dono gratiae, quae dependet ex liberalitate Dei, +non ex ordine naturae. Et ideo per donum gratiae homines mereri +possunt tantam gloriam, ut Angelis aequentur secundum singulos +Angelorum gradus. Quod est homines ad ordines Angelorum assumi. +Quidam tamen dicunt quod ad ordines Angelorum non assumuntur omnes +qui salvantur, sed soli virgines vel perfecti; alii vero suum +ordinem constituent, quasi condivisum toti societati Angelorum. Sed +hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit XII de Civ. Dei, quod non +erunt duae societates hominum et Angelorum, sed una, quia omnium +beatitudo est adhaerere uni Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained + + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4];</a> + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A6" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[62], A[6]</a>). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred + to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32989] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod gratia Angelis datur secundum proportionem +naturalium; non autem sic est de hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Et +ideo sicut inferiores Angeli non possunt transferri ad naturalem +gradum superiorum, ita nec ad gratuitum. Homines vero possunt ad +gratuitum conscendere, sed non ad naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human + affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature + with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the + things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a + certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, + by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32990] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Angeli, secundum naturae ordinem, medii sunt inter +nos et Deum. Et ideo, secundum legem communem, per eos +administrantur non solum res humanae, sed etiam omnia corporalia. +Homines autem sancti, etiam post hanc vitam, sunt eiusdem naturae +nobiscum. Unde secundum legem communem, non administrant humana, +nec rebus vivorum intersunt, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de cura +pro mortuis agenda. Ex quadam tamen speciali dispensatione interdum +aliquibus sanctis conceditur, vel vivis vel mortuis, huiusmodi +officia exercere, vel miracula faciendo, vel Daemones arcendo, vel +aliquid huiusmodi; sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons + are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32991] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homines ad poenam Daemonum transferri, non est +erroneum, sed quidam erronee posuerunt Daemones nihil aliud esse +quam animas defunctorum. Et hoc Chrysostomus reprobat.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q109" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q109-p0.1">Q. 109. THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q109-p2"> We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q109-p3"><a href="#FP_Q109_A1"> (1) Whether there are orders among the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p4"><a href="#FP_Q109_A2"> (2) Whether among them there is precedence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p5"><a href="#FP_Q109_A3"> (3) Whether one enlightens another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p6"><a href="#FP_Q109_A4"> (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 pr."><a name="32992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32992] +Iª q. 109 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +ordinatione malorum Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum ordines sint in Daemonibus. Secundo, utrum in eis sit +praelatio. Tertio, utrum unus illuminet alium. Quarto, utrum +subiiciantur praelationi bonorum Angelorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q109_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A1-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 1. Whether there are orders among the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine + says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. + Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32993] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non sint in Daemonibus. Ordo enim +pertinet ad rationem boni, sicut et modus et species, ut Augustinus +dicit in libro de natura boni; et e contrario inordinatio pertinet +ad rationem mali. Sed in bonis Angelis nihil est inordinatum. Ergo +in malis Angelis non sunt aliqui ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a + holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32994] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ordines angelici sub aliqua hierarchia continentur. Sed Daemones +non sunt sub aliqua hierarchia, quae est sacer principatus, cum ab +omni sanctitate sint vacui. Ergo in Daemonibus non sunt +ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said + to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. + But we never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not + to be placed in any other order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32995] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Daemones de singulis ordinibus Angelorum ceciderunt, ut communiter +dicitur. Si ergo aliqui Daemones dicuntur esse alicuius ordinis, +quia de illo ordine ceciderunt; videtur quod deberent eis attribui +nomina singulorum ordinum. Nunquam autem invenitur quod dicantur +Seraphim, vel throni, vel dominationes. Ergo, pari ratione, non +sunt in aliquibus ordinibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32996] Iª q. 109 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. ult., quod <i>est nobis colluctatio +adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores +tenebrarum harum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q109_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q109_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[108], AA[4]</a>,7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace + has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory. + </p><p id="FP_Q109_A1-p7"> If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic + orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in + the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A3" id="FP_Q109_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are + still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 co."><a name="32997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32997] Iª q. 109 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut iam dictum est, ordo angelicus consideratur et secundum +gradum naturae, et secundum gradum gratiae. Gratia vero habet +duplicem statum, scilicet imperfectum, qui est status merendi; et +perfectum, qui est status gloriae consummatae. Si ergo +considerentur ordines angelici quantum ad perfectionem gloriae, sic +Daemones neque sunt in ordinibus angelicis, neque unquam fuerunt. +Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est gratiae imperfectae, +sic Daemones fuerunt quidem aliquando in ordinibus Angelorum, sed +ab eis ceciderunt; secundum illud quod supra posuimus, omnes +Angelos in gratia creatos fuisse. Si autem considerentur quantum ad +id quod est naturae, sic adhuc sunt in ordinibus, quia data +naturalia non amiserunt, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good ( + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q49_A3" id="FP_Q109_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32998] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod bonum potest inveniri sine malo; sed malum non potest +inveniri sine bono, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo Daemones, +inquantum habent naturam bonam, ordinati sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; + but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32999] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ordinatio Daemonum, si consideretur ex parte Dei +ordinantis, est sacra, utitur enim Daemonibus propter seipsum. Sed +ex parte voluntatis Daemonum, non est sacra, quia abutuntur sua +natura ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations" + imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33000] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore caritatis, nomen +autem thronorum ab inhabitatione divina, nomen autem dominationum +importat libertatem quandam, quae omnia opponuntur peccato. Et ideo +peccantibus Angelis huiusmodi nomina non attribuuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A2-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 2. Whether among the demons there is precedence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But + the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33001] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus non sit praelatio. Omnis +enim praelatio est secundum aliquem ordinem iustitiae. Sed Daemones +totaliter a iustitia ceciderunt. Ergo in eis non est praelatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is + not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are always contentions" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33002] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ubi +non est obedientia et subiectio, non est praelatio. Haec autem sine +concordia esse non possunt; quae in Daemonibus nulla est, secundum +illud Prov. XIII, <i>inter superbos semper sunt iurgia</i>. Ergo in +Daemonibus non est praelatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not + according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according + to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the + inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33003] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +in eis est aliqua praelatio, aut hoc pertinet ad eorum naturam, aut +ad eorum culpam vel poenam. Sed non ad eorum naturam, quia +subiectio et servitus non est ex natura, sed est ex peccato +subsecuta. Nec pertinet ad culpam vel poenam, quia sic superiores +Daemones, qui magis peccaverunt, inferioribus subderentur. Non ergo +est praelatio in Daemonibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> On + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24 </a>the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33004] Iª q. 109 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Glossa, I ad Cor. XV, <i>quandiu durat mundus, Angeli +Angelis, homines hominibus, et Daemones Daemonibus +praesunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. + Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and + movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A1" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence + their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence---that the action of the + subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should + be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to + end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 co."><a name="33005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33005] Iª q. 109 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum actio sequatur naturam rei, quorumcumque naturae sunt +ordinatae, oportet quod etiam actiones sub invicem ordinentur. +Sicut patet in rebus corporalibus, quia enim inferiora corpora +naturali ordine sunt infra corpora caelestia actiones et motus +eorum subduntur actionibus et motibus caelestium corporum. +Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod Daemonum quidam naturali +ordine sub aliis constituuntur. Unde et actiones eorum sub +actionibus superiorum sunt. Et hoc est quod rationem praelationis +facit, ut scilicet actio subditi subdatur actioni praelati. Sic +igitur ipsa naturalis dispositio Daemonum requirit quod sit in eis +praelatio. Convenit etiam hoc divinae sapientiae, quae nihil in +universo inordinatum relinquit, <i>quae attingit a fine usque ad +finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter</i>, ut dicitur Sap. +VIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33006] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod praelatio Daemonum non fundatur super eorum iustitia, +sed super iustitia Dei cuncta ordinantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness + whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those + whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33007] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod concordia Daemonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non +est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant; sed ex communi nequitia, qua +homines odiunt, et Dei iustitiae repugnant. Est enim proprium +hominum impiorum, ut eis se adiungant et subiiciant, ad propriam +nequitiam exequendam, quos potiores viribus vident.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, + who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather + to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in + evil is to be more unhappy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33008] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam, unde in +eis est naturalis praelatio. Quod in hominibus non contingit, qui +natura sunt pares. Quod autem superioribus inferiores subdantur, +non est ad bonum superiorum, sed magis ad malum eorum; quia cum +mala facere maxime ad miseriam pertineat, praeesse in malis est +esse magis miserum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A3-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 3. Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon + can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten + the inferior. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33009] Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus sit illuminatio. Illuminatio +enim consistit in manifestatione veritatis. Sed unus Daemon potest +alteri veritatem manifestare, quia superiores magis acumine +naturalis scientiae vigent. Ergo superiores Daemones possunt +inferiores illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior + demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33010] Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +corpus quod superabundat in lumine, potest illuminare corpus quod +in lumine deficit; sicut sol lunam. Sed superiores Daemones magis +abundant in participatione luminis naturalis. Ergo videtur quod +superiores Daemones possunt inferiores illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>). Therefore neither can they enlighten. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33011] Iª q. 109 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +illuminatio cum purgatione est et perfectione, ut supra dictum est. +Sed purgare non convenit Daemonibus; secundum illud Eccli. XXXIV, +<i>ab immundo quid mundabitur?</i> Ergo etiam neque illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[107], A[2]</a>), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. + Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's + perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the + Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of + speech. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 co."><a name="33012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33012] Iª q. 109 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod in Daemonibus non potest esse illuminatio proprie. Dictum est +enim supra quod illuminatio proprie est manifestatio veritatis, +secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum, qui illuminat omnem +intellectum. Alia autem manifestatio veritatis potest esse locutio; +sicut cum unus Angelus alteri suum conceptum manifestat. +Perversitas autem Daemonum hoc habet, quod unus alium non intendit +ordinare ad Deum, sed magis ab ordine divino abducere. Et ideo unus +Daemon alium non illuminat; sed unus alii suum conceptum per modum +locutionis intimare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33013] Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod non quaelibet veritatis manifestatio habet rationem +illuminationis, sed solum quae dicta est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or + in the demons, because, as above explained ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[58], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior + demons does not prove that they can enlighten + others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33014] Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod secundum ea quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent, +non est necessaria manifestatio veritatis neque in Angelis neque in +Daemonibus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, statim a principio suae +conditionis omnia cognoverunt quae ad naturalem cognitionem +pertinent. Et ideo maior plenitudo naturalis luminis quae est in +superioribus Daemonibus, non potest esse ratio illuminationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A4-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 4. Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected + with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels + do not rule over the bad. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33015] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod boni Angeli non habeant praelationem super +malos. Praelatio enim Angelorum praecipue attenditur secundum +illuminationes. Sed mali Angeli, cum sint tenebrae, non +illuminantur a bonis. Ergo boni Angeli non habent praelationem +super malos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. + Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot + be admitted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33016] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad +negligentiam praesidentis pertinere videntur ea quae per subditos +male fiunt. Sed Daemones multa mala faciunt. Si igitur subsunt +praelationi bonorum Angelorum, videtur in Angelis bonis esse aliqua +negligentia. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FP_Q109_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the + natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33017] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praelatio Angelorum sequitur naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. +Sed si Daemones de singulis ordinibus ceciderunt, ut communiter +dicitur, multi Daemones multis bonis Angelis sunt superiores ordine +naturae. Non ergo boni Angeli praelationem habent super omnes +malos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just + spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33018] Iª q. 109 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>spiritus vitae +desertor atque peccator regitur per spiritum vitae rationalem, pium +et iustum</i>. Et Gregorius dicit quod <i>potestates dicuntur +Angeli quorum ditioni virtutes adversae subiectae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer + to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection + and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection + the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the + bad, and these are ruled by them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 co."><a name="33019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33019] Iª q. 109 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod totus ordo praelationis primo et originaliter est in Deo, et +participatur a creaturis secundum quod Deo magis appropinquant, +illae enim creaturae super alias influentiam habent, quae sunt +perfectiores et Deo propinquiores. Maxima autem perfectio, et per +quam maxime Deo appropinquatur, est creaturarum fruentium Deo, +sicut sunt sancti Angeli, qua perfectione Daemones privantur. Et +ideo boni Angeli super malos praelationem habent, et per eos +reguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice + requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's + assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called + an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an + enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33020] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod per sanctos Angelos multa de divinis mysteriis +Daemonibus revelantur, cum divina iustitia exigit ut per Daemones +aliqua fiant vel ad punitionem malorum, vel ad exercitationem +bonorum, sicut in rebus humanis assessores iudicis revelant +tortoribus eius sententiam. Huiusmodi autem revelationes, si ad +Angelos revelantes comparentur, illuminationes sunt, quia ordinant +eas ad Deum. Ex parte vero Daemonum, non sunt illuminationes, quia +eas in Deum non ordinant, sed ad expletionem propriae +iniquitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels + or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33021] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sancti Angeli sunt ministri divinae sapientiae. Unde +sicut divina sapientia permittit aliqua mala fieri per malos +Angelos vel homines, propter bona quae ex eis elicit; ita et boni +Angeli non totaliter cohibent malos a nocendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the + power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise + among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33022] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Angelus qui est inferior ordine naturae, praeest +Daemonibus, quamvis superioribus ordine naturae; quia virtus +divinae iustitiae, cui inhaerent boni Angeli, potior est quam +virtus naturalis Angelorum. Unde et apud homines, spiritualis +iudicat omnia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Et philosophus dicit, in +libro Ethic., quod <i>virtuosus est regula et mensura omnium +humanorum actuum</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q110" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q110-p0.1">Q. 110. HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q110-p2"> We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q110-p3"><a href="#FP_Q110_A1"> (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p4"><a href="#FP_Q110_A2"> (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p5"><a href="#FP_Q110_A3"> (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p6"><a href="#FP_Q110_A4"> (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 pr."><a name="33023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33023] +Iª q. 110 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +praesidentia Angelorum super creaturam corporalem. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creatura corporalis administretur +per Angelos. Secundo, utrum creatura corporalis obediat Angelis ad +nutum. Tertio, utrum Angeli sua virtute possint immediate movere +corpora localiter. Quarto, utrum Angeli boni vel mali possint +facere miracula.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q110_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A1-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 1. Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, + needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal + things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government + of angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33024] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non administretur per +Angelos. Res enim quae habent determinatum modum operandi, non +indigent gubernari ab aliquo praesidente, ideo enim indigemus +gubernari, ne aliter operemur quam oporteat. Sed res corporales +habent determinatas actiones ex naturis sibi divinitus datis. Non +ergo indigent gubernatione Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore + they need not be governed by the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33025] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +inferiora in entibus gubernantur per superiora. Sed in corporibus +quaedam dicuntur inferiora, quaedam superiora. Inferiora igitur +gubernantur per superiora. Non ergo est necessarium quod +gubernentur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled + by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders + of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q110_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[2]</a>). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33026] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +diversi ordines Angelorum distinguuntur secundum diversa officia. +Sed si creaturae corporales administrantur per Angelos, tot erunt +officia Angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Ergo etiam tot erunt +ordines Angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Quod est contra supra +dicta. Non ergo corporalis creatura administratur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, + 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33027] Iª q. 110 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>omnia corpora reguntur +per spiritum vitae rationalem</i>. Et Gregorius dicit, in IV Dial., +quod <i>in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per creaturam invisibilem +disponi potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the + universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained + above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A3" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a> ; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A1" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[108], A[1]</a>), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power + of + any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized + by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the + inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. + This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal + substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 co."><a name="33028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33028] Iª q. 110 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod tam in rebus humanis quam in rebus naturalibus, hoc communiter +invenitur, quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a +potestate universali; sicut potestas ballivi gubernatur per +potestatem regis. Et in Angelis etiam est dictum quod superiores +Angeli, qui praesunt inferioribus, habent scientiam magis +universalem. Manifestum est autem quod virtus cuiuslibet corporis +est magis particularis quam virtus spiritualis substantiae, nam +omnis forma corporalis est forma individuata per materiam, et +determinata ad hic et nunc; formae autem immateriales sunt +absolutae et intelligibiles. Et ideo sicut inferiores Angeli, qui +habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores; ita omnia +corporalia reguntur per Angelos et hoc non solum a sanctis +doctoribus ponitur, sed etiam ab omnibus philosophis qui +incorporeas substantias posuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs + to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33029] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod res corporales habent determinatas actiones, sed has +actiones non exercent nisi secundum quod moventur, quia proprium +corporis est quod non agat nisi motum. Et ideo oportet quod +creatura corporalis a spirituali moveatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved + by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly + bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps + human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any + operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. + But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the + movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate + presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33030] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio ista procedit secundum opinionem Aristotelis, +qui posuit quod corpora caelestia moventur a substantiis +spiritualibus; quarum numerum conatus fuit assignare secundum +numerum motuum qui apparent in corporibus caelestibus. Sed non +posuit quod essent aliquae substantiae spirituales quae haberent +immediatam praesidentiam supra inferiora corpora, nisi forte animas +humanas. Et hoc ideo, quia non consideravit aliquas operationes in +inferioribus corporibus exerceri nisi naturales, ad quas +sufficiebat motus corporum caelestium. Sed quia nos ponimus multa +in corporibus inferioribus fieri praeter naturales actiones +corporum, ad quae non sufficiunt virtutes caelestium corporum; ideo +secundum nos, necesse est ponere quod Angeli habeant immediatam +praesidentiam non solum supra caelestia corpora, sed etiam supra +corpora inferiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q110_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were + types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances + preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial + substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more + universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, + the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to + preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these + sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial + substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence." + </p><p id="FP_Q110_A1-p10"> The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine + says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide + Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen says on the text, + "When the ass saw the angel" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.23" target="asv">Num. 22:23</a>), that "the world has need of angels who + preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (Hom. + xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than + over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: + the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow + that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[108], A[2]</a>), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office + it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to + belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33031] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod de substantiis immaterialibus diversimode philosophi +sunt locuti. Plato enim posuit substantias immateriales esse +rationes et species sensibilium corporum, et quasdam aliis +universaliores, et ideo posuit substantias immateriales habere +praesidentiam immediatam circa omnia sensibilia corpora, et +diversas circa diversa. Aristoteles autem posuit quod substantiae +immateriales non sunt species corporum sensibilium, sed aliquid +altius et universalius, et ideo non attribuit eis immediatam +praesidentiam supra singula corpora, sed solum supra universalia +agentia, quae sunt corpora caelestia. Avicenna vero mediam viam +secutus est. Posuit enim cum Platone, aliquam substantiam +spiritualem praesidentem immediate sphaerae activorum et +passivorum; eo quod, sicut Plato ponebat quod formae horum +sensibilium derivantur a substantiis immaterialibus, ita etiam +Avicenna hoc posuit. Sed in hoc a Platone differt, quod posuit unam +tantum substantiam immaterialem praesidentem omnibus corporibus +inferioribus, quam vocavit intelligentiam agentem. Doctores autem +sancti posuerunt, sicut et Platonici, diversis rebus corporeis +diversas substantias spirituales esse praepositas. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>unaquaeque res +visibilis in hoc mundo habet angelicam potestatem sibi +praepositam</i>. Et Damascenus dicit, <i>Diabolus erat ex iis +angelicis virtutibus quae praeerant terrestri ordini</i>. Et +Origenes dicit, super illud Num. XXII, <i>cum vidisset asina +Angelum, quod opus est mundo Angelis, qui praesunt super bestias, +et praesunt animalium nativitati, et virgultorum et plantationum et +ceterarum rerum incrementis</i>. Sed hoc non est ponendum propter +hoc, quod secundum suam naturam unus Angelus magis se habeat ad +praesidendum animalibus quam plantis, quia quilibet Angelus, etiam +minimus, habet altiorem virtutem et universaliorem quam aliquod +genus corporalium. Sed est ex ordine divinae sapientiae, quae +diversis rebus diversos rectores praeposuit. Nec tamen propter hoc +sequitur quod sint plures ordines Angelorum quam novem, quia, sicut +supra dictum est, ordines distinguuntur secundum generalia officia. +Unde sicut, secundum Gregorium, ad ordinem potestatum pertinent +omnes Angeli qui habent proprie praesidentiam super Daemones; ita +ad ordinem virtutum pertinere videntur omnes Angeli qui habent +praesidentiam super res pure corporeas; horum enim ministerio +interdum etiam miracula fiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A2-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 2. Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. + But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards + heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception + of an angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33032] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod materia corporalis obediat Angelis ad +nutum. Maior est enim virtus Angeli quam virtus animae. Sed +conceptioni animae obedit materia corporalis, immutatur enim corpus +hominis ex conceptione animae, ad calorem et frigus, et quandoque +usque ad sanitatem et aegritudinem. Ergo multo magis secundum +conceptionem Angeli, materia corporalis transmutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior + to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore + much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33033] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest virtus superior. Sed virtus +Angeli est superior quam virtus corporalis. Corpus autem sua +virtute potest transmutare materiam corporalem ad formam aliquam; +sicut cum ignis generat ignem. Ergo multo fortius virtute sua +Angeli possunt materiam corporalem transmutare ad aliquam +formam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q110_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in + effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the + instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to + the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to + the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is + from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, + is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33034] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, tota +natura corporalis administratur per Angelos, ut dictum est, et sic +videtur quod corpora se habet ad Angelos sicut instrumenta; nam +ratio instrumenti est quod sit movens motum. Sed in effectibus +aliquid invenitur ex virtute principalium agentium, quod non potest +esse per virtutem instrumenti; et hoc est id quod est principalius +in effectu. Sicut digestio nutrimenti est per virtutem caloris +naturalis, qui est instrumentum animae nutritivae; sed quod +generetur caro viva, est ex virtute animae. Similiter quod secetur +lignum, pertinet ad serram; sed quod perveniatur ad formam lecti, +est ex ratione artis. Ergo forma substantialis, quae est +principalius in effectibus corporalibus, est ex virtute Angelorum. +Materia ergo obedit, ad sui informationem, Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33035] Iª q. 110 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., <i>non est putandum istis +transgressoribus Angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum +materiam, sed soli Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q110_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial + forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion + to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal + agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on + this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. + But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly + speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something + is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but + the way to existence. + </p><p id="FP_Q110_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural + things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole + "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter + is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 co."><a name="33036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33036] Iª q. 110 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Platonici posuerunt formas quae sunt in materia, causari ex +immaterialibus formis, quia formas materiales ponebant esse +participationes quasdam immaterialium formarum. Et hos, quantum ad +aliquid, secutus est Avicenna, qui posuit omnes formas quae sunt in +materia, procedere a conceptione intelligentiae, et quod agentia +corporalia sunt solum disponentia ad formas. Qui in hoc videntur +fuisse decepti, quia existimaverunt formam quasi aliquid per se +factum, ut sic ab aliquo formali principio procederet. Sed sicut +philosophus probat in VII Metaphys., hoc quod proprie fit, est +compositum, hoc enim proprie est quasi subsistens. Forma autem non +dicitur ens quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est, et sic per +consequens nec forma proprie fit; eius enim est fieri, cuius est +esse, cum fieri nihil aliud sit quam via in esse. Manifestum est +autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens agit sibi +simile. Et ideo id quod facit res naturales, habet similitudinem +cum composito, vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem; +vel quia totum compositum, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad +formam, est in virtute ipsius; quod est proprium Dei. Sic igitur +omnis informatio materiae vel est a Deo immediate, vel ab aliquo +agente corporali; non autem immediate ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's + concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject + to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does + not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33037] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod anima nostra unitur corpori ut forma; et sic non est +mirum, si formaliter transmutatur ex conceptione ipsius; praesertim +cum motus sensitivi appetitus, qui fit cum quadam transmutatione +corporali, subdatur imperio rationis. Angelus autem non sic se +habet ad corpora naturalia. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, + the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter + in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior + cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33038] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod id quod potest virtus inferior, potest superior non +eodem, sed excellentiori modo, sicut intellectus cognoscit +sensibilia excellentiori modo quam sensus. Et sic Angelus +excellentiori modo transmutat materiam corporalem quam agentia +corporalia, scilicet movendo ipsa agentia corporalia, tanquam causa +superior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would + not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating + the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since + to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the + power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33039] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nihil prohibet ex virtute Angelorum aliquos effectus +sequi in rebus naturalibus, ad quae agentia corporalia non +sufficerent. Sed hoc non est obedire materiam Angelis ad nutum; +sicut nec coquis obedit materia ad nutum, quia aliquem modum +decoctionis operantur per ignem secundum aliquam artis +moderationem, quam ignis per se non faceret, cum reducere materiam +in actum formae substantialis, non excedat virtutem corporalis +agentis, quia simile natum est sibi simile facere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A3-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 3. Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their + forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q110_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33040] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod corpora non obediant Angelis ad motum +localem. Motus enim localis corporum naturalium sequitur formas +eorum. Sed Angeli non causant formas corporum naturalium, ut dictum +est. Ergo neque possunt causare in eis motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause + other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33041] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +VIII Physic. probatur quod motus localis est primus motuum. Sed +Angeli non possunt causare alios motus, transmutando materiam +formaliter. Ergo neque etiam possunt causare motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle + of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33042] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +membra corporalia obediunt conceptioni animae ad motum localem, +inquantum habent in seipsis aliquod principium vitae. In corporibus +autem naturalibus non est aliquod principium vitae. Ergo non +obediunt Angelis ad motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this + without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33043] Iª q. 110 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Angeli adhibent semina +corporalia ad aliquos effectus producendos. Sed hoc non possunt +facere nisi localiter movendo. Ergo corpora obediunt eis ad motum +localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence + it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is + below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves + (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in + potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has + a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted + that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and + chiefly by a local motion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 co."><a name="33044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33044] Iª q. 110 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. de Div. Nom., <i>divina +sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum</i>, ex +quo patet quod natura inferior in sui supremo attingitur a natura +superiori. Natura autem corporalis est infra naturam spiritualem. +Inter omnes autem motus corporeos perfectior est motus localis, ut +probatur in VIII Physic., cuius ratio est, quia mobile secundum +locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsecum, inquantum +huiusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet ad locum. Et +ideo natura corporalis nata est moveri immediate a natura +spirituali secundum locum. Unde et philosophi posuerunt suprema +corpora moveri localiter a spiritualibus substantiis. Unde videmus +quod anima movet corpus primo et principaliter locali motu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the + sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements + result from the power of spiritual substances. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33045] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in corporibus sunt alii motus locales praeter eos qui +consequuntur formas, sicut fluxus et refluxus maris non consequitur +formam substantialem aquae, sed virtutem lunae. Et multo magis +aliqui motus locales consequi possunt virtutem spiritualium +substantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal + agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33046] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Angeli, causando motum localem tanquam priorem, per +eum causare possunt alios motus, adhibendo scilicet agentia +corporalia ad huiusmodi effectus producendos; sicut faber adhibet +ignem ad emollitionem ferri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the + body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to + any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33047] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Angeli habent virtutem minus contractam quam animae. +Unde virtus motiva animae contrahitur ad corpus unitum, quod per +eam vivificatur, quo mediante alia potest movere. Sed virtus Angeli +non est contracta ad aliquod corpus. Unde potest corpora non +coniuncta localiter movere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A4-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 4. Whether angels can work miracles?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues + by whom signs and miracles are usually done." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33048] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possunt facere miracula. Dicit enim +Gregorius, <i>virtutes vocantur illi spiritus, per quos signa et +miracula frequentius fiunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, + bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he + says elsewhere in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore + the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33049] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaestionum, <i>quod +magi faciunt miracula per privatos contractus, boni Christiani per +publicam iustitiam, mali Christiani per signa publicae +iustitiae</i>. Sed magi faciunt miracula per hoc quod exaudiuntur a +Daemonibus, ut ipse alibi in eodem libro dicit. Ergo Daemones +miracula possunt facere. Ergo multo magis Angeli boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] + that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in + our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, + as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. + Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33050] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus in eodem libro dicit quod <i>omnia quae visibiliter +fiunt, etiam per inferiores potestates aeris huius non absurde +fieri posse creduntur</i>. Sed quando effectus aliquis naturalium +causarum producitur absque ordine naturalis causae, hoc dicimus +esse miraculum; puta cum aliquis sanatur a febre, non per +operationem naturae. Ergo Angeli et Daemones possunt facere +miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore + an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="33051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33051] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus superior non subditur ordini inferioris causae. Sed natura +corporalis est inferior Angelo. Ergo Angelus potest operari praeter +ordinem corporalium agentium. Quod est miracula facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written of God ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.4" target="asv">Ps. 135:4</a>): "Who alone doth great wonders." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33052] Iª q. 110 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod de Deo dicitur in Psalmo, <i>qui facit mirabilia magna +solus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if + something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone + upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order + of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or + any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence + God alone can work miracles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 co."><a name="33053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33053] Iª q. 110 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem +naturae. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat +praeter ordinem naturae alicuius particularis, quia sic, cum +aliquis proiicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit +praeter ordinem naturae lapidis. Ex hoc ergo aliquid dicitur esse +miraculum, quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Hoc +autem non potest facere nisi Deus, quia quidquid facit Angelus, vel +quaecumque alia creatura, propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem +naturae creatae; et sic non est miraculum. Unde relinquitur quod +solus Deus miracula facere possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are + said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the + dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33054] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Angeli aliqui dicuntur miracula facere, vel quia ad +eorum desiderium Deus miracula facit, sicut et sancti homines +dicuntur miracula facere. Vel quia aliquod ministerium exhibent in +miraculis quae fiunt; sicut colligendo pulveres in resurrectione +communi, vel huiusmodi aliquid agendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. + But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created + nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own + natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in + reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private + contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in + a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the + other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far + as + they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public + justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33055] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod miracula simpliciter loquendo, dicuntur, ut dictum +est, cum aliqua fiunt praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Sed +quia non omnis virtus naturae creatae est nota nobis, ideo cum +aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae creatae nobis notae, per +virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos. Sic igitur +cum Daemones aliquid faciunt sua virtute naturali, miracula +dicuntur non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Et hoc modo magi per +Daemones miracula faciunt. Et dicuntur fieri per privatos +contractus, quia quaelibet virtus creaturae in universo se habet ut +virtus alicuius privatae personae in civitate; unde cum magus +aliquid facit per pactum initum cum Daemone, hoc fit quasi per +quendam privatum contractum. Sed iustitia divina est in toto +universo sicut lex publica in civitate. Et ideo boni Christiani, +inquantum per iustitiam divinam miracula faciunt, dicuntur facere +miracula per publicam iustitiam. Mali autem Christiani per signa +publicae iustitiae, sicut invocando nomen Christi, vel exhibendo +aliqua sacramenta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33056] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod spirituales potestates possunt facere ea quae +visibiliter fiunt in hoc mundo, adhibendo corporalia semina per +motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside + the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="33057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33057] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, licet Angeli possint aliquid facere praeter ordinem +naturae corporalis, non tamen possunt aliquid facere praeter +ordinem totius creaturae, quod exigitur ad rationem miraculi, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q111" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q111-p0.1">Q. 111. THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q111-p2"> We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; + (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men. + </p><p id="FP_Q111-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q111-p4"><a href="#FP_Q111_A1"> (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p5"><a href="#FP_Q111_A2"> (2) Whether he can change man's will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p6"><a href="#FP_Q111_A3"> (3) Whether he can change man's imagination?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p7"><a href="#FP_Q111_A4"> (4) Whether he can change man's senses?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 pr."><a name="33058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33058] +Iª q. 111 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de actione +Angelorum in homines. Et primo, quantum possint eos immutare sua +virtute naturali; secundo, quomodo mittantur a Deo ad ministerium +hominum; tertio, quomodo custodiant homines. Circa primum +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Angelus possit illuminare +intellectum hominis. Secundo, utrum possit immutare affectum eius. +Tertio, utrum possit immutare imaginationem eius. Quarto, utrum +possit immutare sensum eius.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q111_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A1-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 1. Whether an angel can enlighten man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes + enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened + by an angel; but immediately by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33059] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit illuminare hominem. +Homo enim illuminatur per fidem, unde Dionysius, in Eccles. Hier., +illuminationem attribuit Baptismo, qui est fidei sacramentum. Sed +fides immediate est a Deo; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, <i>gratia +estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est</i>. +Ergo homo non illuminatur ab Angelo, sed immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed + them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God---that is, natural reason and the creature. + Therefore God enlightens man immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33060] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +super illud Rom. I, <i>Deus illis manifestavit</i>, dicit Glossa +quod <i>non solum ratio naturalis ad hoc profuit ut divina +hominibus manifestarentur, sed etiam Deus illis revelavit per opus +suum</i>, scilicet per creaturam. Sed utrumque est a Deo immediate, +scilicet ratio naturalis, et creatura. Ergo Deus immediate +illuminat hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. + Therefore he is not enlightened by them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33061] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque illuminatur, cognoscit suam illuminationem. Sed homines +non percipiunt se ab Angelis illuminari. Ergo non illuminantur ab +eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But + such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A2" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[107], A[2]</a>). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33062] Iª q. 111 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius probat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod revelationes +divinorum perveniunt ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Huiusmodi +autem revelationes sunt illuminationes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +homines illuminantur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FP_Q111_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[109], A[2]</a>); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them. + </p><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p7"> The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above + ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect + is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior + intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. + This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity + of the inferior angel, as explained above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p8"> The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand + by turning to the phantasms, as above explained ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q111_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius + says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of + the sacred veils." On the + other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two + ways man is enlightened by an angel. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 co."><a name="33063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33063] Iª q. 111 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum divinae providentiae ordo habeat ut actionibus superiorum +inferiora subdantur, ut supra dictum est; sicut inferiores Angeli +illuminantur per superiores, ita homines qui sunt Angelis +inferiores, per eos illuminantur. Sed modus utriusque +illuminationis quodammodo est similis, et quodammodo diversus. +Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio, quae est manifestatio +divinae veritatis, secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum quod +intellectus inferior confortatur per actionem intellectus +superioris; et secundum quod proponuntur intellectui inferiori +species intelligibiles quae sunt in superiori, ut capi possint ab +inferiori. Et hoc quidem in Angelis fit, secundum quod superior +Angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum +capacitatem inferioris Angeli, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus +humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere, +quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad +phantasmata, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem +proponunt Angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium; +secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod +<i>impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi +varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum</i>. Ex alia vero parte, +intellectus humanus, tanquam inferior, fortificatur per actionem +intellectus angelici. Et secundum haec duo attenditur illuminatio +qua homo illuminatur ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will + tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded + by the will; hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, + faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is + accomplished by man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels + have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be + believed; but also as regards what is to be done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33064] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ad fidem duo concurrunt. Primo quidem habitus +intellectus, quo disponitur ad obediendum voluntati tendenti in +divinam veritatem, intellectus enim assentit veritati fidei, non +quasi convictus ratione, sed quasi imperatus a voluntate; nullus +enim credit nisi volens, ut Augustinus dicit. Et quantum ad hoc, +fides est a solo Deo. Secundo requiritur ad fidem, quod credibilia +proponantur credenti. Et hoc quidem fit per hominem, secundum quod +fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X; sed per Angelos +principaliter, per quos hominibus revelantur divina. Unde Angeli +operantur aliquid ad illuminationem fidei. Et tamen homines +illuminantur ab Angelis non solum de credendis, sed etiam de +agendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the + human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. + Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33065] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per +Angelum confortari, ut dictum est. Et similiter ex speciebus a +creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas, +quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per Angelum +adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem +deveniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus + whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made + known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows + what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like + manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33066] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod operatio intellectualis, et illuminatio, dupliciter +possunt considerari. Uno modo, ex parte rei intellectae, et sic +quicumque intelligit vel illuminatur, cognoscit se intelligere vel +illuminari; quia cognoscit rem sibi esse manifestam. Alio modo, ex +parte principii, et sic non quicumque intelligit aliquam veritatem, +cognoscit quid sit intellectus, qui est principium intellectualis +operationis. Et similiter non quicumque illuminatur ab Angelo, +cognoscit se ab Angelo illuminari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A2-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 2. Whether the angels can change the will of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers + a flame of fire" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.7" target="asv">Heb. 1:7</a>), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be, however, + unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33067] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possint immutare voluntatem +hominis. Quia super illud Heb. I, <i>qui facit Angelos suos +spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis</i>, dicit Glossa quod +<i>ignis sunt, dum spiritu fervent, et vitia nostra urunt</i>. Sed +hoc non esset, nisi voluntatem immutarent. Ergo Angeli possunt +immutare voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however, + says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and + put into men" (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could + only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33068] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Beda +dicit quod <i>Diabolus non est immissor malarum cogitationum, sed +incensor</i>. Damascenus autem ulterius dicit quod etiam est +immissor, dicit enim in II libro, quod <i>omnis malitia et immundae +passiones ex Daemonibus excogitatae sunt, et immittere homini sunt +concessi</i>. Et pari ratione, Angeli boni immittunt et incendunt +bonas cogitationes. Sed hoc non possent facere, nisi immutarent +voluntatem. Ergo immutant voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination + which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also + is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33069] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Angelus, sicut est dictum, illuminat intellectum hominis +mediantibus phantasmatibus. Sed sicut phantasia, quae deservit +intellectui, potest immutari ab Angelo; ita et appetitus sensitivus +qui deservit voluntati, quia et ipse etiam est vis utens organo +corporali. Ergo sicut illuminat intellectum, ita potest immutare +voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To change the will belongs to God alone, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33070] Iª q. 111 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod immutare voluntatem est proprium Dei; secundum illud Prov. +XXI, <i>cor regis in manu domini; quocumque voluerit, vertet +illud</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the + inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination + to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the + will is from God alone, Who causes the will. + </p><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p7"> Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the + intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move + the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, + as above explained ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A2" id="FP_Q111_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[2]</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p8"> In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the + sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being + able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or + to resist, the passion. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 co."><a name="33071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33071] Iª q. 111 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod voluntas potest immutari dupliciter. Uno modo, ab interiori. +Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio +voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem, +qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis. Sicut +enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita +inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem. +Alio modo movetur voluntas ab exteriori. Et hoc in Angelo est +quidem uno modo tantum, scilicet a bono apprehenso per intellectum. +Unde secundum quod aliquis est causa quod aliquid apprehendatur ut +bonum ad appetendum, secundum hoc movet voluntatem. Et sic etiam +solus Deus efficaciter potest movere voluntatem; Angelus autem et +homo per modum suadentis, ut supra dictum est. Sed praeter hunc +modum, etiam aliter movetur in hominibus voluntas ab exteriori, +scilicet ex passione existente circa appetitum sensitivum; sicut ex +concupiscentia vel ira inclinatur voluntas ad aliquid volendum. Et +sic etiam Angeli, inquantum possunt concitare huiusmodi passiones, +possunt voluntatem movere. Non tamen ex necessitate, quia voluntas +semper remanet libera ad consentiendum vel resistendum +passioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33072] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ministri Dei, vel homines vel Angeli, dicuntur urere +vitia, et inflammare ad virtutes, per modum persuasionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject + to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of + the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because + such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher + principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33073] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius +eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati. +Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad +cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel +passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat +immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit. Sed bonae cogitationes +attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet Angelorum +ministerio procurentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something + following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33074] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intellectus humanus, secundum praesentem statum, non +potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; sed voluntas +humana potest aliquid velle ex iudicio rationis, non sequendo +passionem appetitus sensitivi. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A3-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 3. Whether an angel can change man's imagination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused + by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it + is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33075] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare imaginationem +hominis. Phantasia enim, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est motus +factus a sensu secundum actum. Sed si fieret per immutationem +Angeli, non fieret a sensu secundum actum. Ergo est contra rationem +phantasiae, quae est actus imaginativae virtutis, ut sit per +immutationem Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But + an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q111_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33076] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +formae quae sunt in imaginatione, cum sint spirituales, sunt +nobiliores formis quae sunt in materia sensibili. Sed Angelus non +potest imprimere formas in materia sensibili, ut dictum est. Ergo +non potest imprimere formas in imaginatione. Et ita non potest eam +immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to + the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." + But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge + of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33077] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>commixtione +alterius spiritus fieri potest ut ea quae ipse scit, per huiusmodi +imagines ei cui miscetur ostendat, sive intelligenti, sive ut ab +alio intellecta pandantur</i>. Sed non videtur quod Angelus possit +misceri imaginationi humanae; neque quod imaginatio possit capere +intelligibilia, quae Angelus cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod Angelus +non possit mutare imaginationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this + there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, + by changing the imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="33078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33078] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in +visione imaginaria homo adhaeret similitudinibus rerum quasi ipsis +rebus. Sed in hoc est quaedam deceptio. Cum ergo Angelus bonus non +possit esse causa deceptionis, videtur quod non possit causare +imaginariam visionem, imaginationem immutando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.20" target="asv"> Mat. 1:20</a>;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33079] Iª q. 111 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod ea quae apparent in somnis, videntur imaginaria visione. Sed +Angeli revelant aliqua in somnis; ut patet Matth. I et II, de +Angelo qui Ioseph in somnis apparuit. Ergo Angelus potest +imaginationem movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. + For it was said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FP_Q111_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[3]</a>), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of + bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused + in us by the local movement of + animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions + in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend + with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle"; + so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects + themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those + who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes + also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power + of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 co."><a name="33080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33080] Iª q. 111 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Angelus, tam bonus quam malus, virtute naturae suae potest +movere imaginationem hominis. Quod quidem sic considerari potest. +Dictum est enim supra quod natura corporalis obedit Angelo ad motum +localem. Illa ergo quae ex motu locali aliquorum corporum possunt +causari, subsunt virtuti naturali Angelorum. Manifestum est autem +quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali +mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum. Unde Aristoteles, in +Lib. de Somn. et Vig., assignans causam apparitionis somniorum, +dicit quod, cum animal dormit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad +principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus, idest impressiones +relictae ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in spiritibus sensualibus +conservantur, et movent principium sensitivum, ita quod fit quaedam +apparitio, ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis +exterioribus mutaretur. Et tanta potest esse commotio spirituum et +humorum, quod huiusmodi apparitiones etiam vigilantibus fiant; +sicut patet in phreneticis, et in aliis huiusmodi. Sicut igitur hoc +fit per naturalem commotionem humorum; et quandoque etiam per +voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod prius senserat, +ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute Angeli boni vel mali, quandoque +quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque autem absque +tali alienatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the + senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed + in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33081] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod primum principium phantasiae est a sensu secundum +actum, non enim possumus imaginari quae nullo modo sensimus, vel +secundum totum vel secundum partem; sicut caecus natus non potest +imaginari colorem. Sed aliquando imaginatio informatur, ut actus +phantastici motus consurgat, ab impressionibus interius +conservatis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from + the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above + explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33082] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Angelus transmutat imaginationem, non quidem +imprimendo aliquam formam imaginariam nullo modo per sensum prius +acceptam (non enim posset facere quod caecus imaginaretur colores), +sed hoc facit per motum localem spirituum et humorum, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect + which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the + way he knows. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33083] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod commixtio illa spiritus angelici ad imaginationem +humanam, non est per essentiam, sed per effectum quem praedicto +modo in imaginatione facit; cui demonstrat quae ipse novit, non +tamen eo modo quo ipse novit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these + images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear + in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things + appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to + the people in parables, which He did not explain to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33084] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod Angelus causans aliquam imaginariam visionem, +quandoque quidem simul intellectum illuminat, ut cognoscat quid per +huiusmodi similitudines significetur, et tunc nulla est deceptio. +Quandoque vero per operationem Angeli solummodo similitudines rerum +apparent in imaginatione, nec tamen tunc causatur deceptio ab +Angelo, sed ex defectu intellectus eius cui talia apparent. Sicut +nec Christus fuit causa deceptionis in hoc quod multa turbis in +parabolis proposuit, quae non exposuit eis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A4-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 4. Whether an angel can change the human senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation + does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33085] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare sensum +humanum. Operatio enim sensitiva est operatio vitae. Huiusmodi +autem operatio non est a principio extrinseco. Non ergo operatio +sensitiva potest causari ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other + natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33086] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus sensitiva est nobilior quam nutritiva. Sed Angelus, ut +videtur, non potest mutare virtutem nutritivam; sicut nec alias +formas naturales. Ergo neque virtutem sensitivam immutare +potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FP_Q111_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33087] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sensus naturaliter movetur a sensibili. Sed Angelus non potest +immutare naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo Angelus non +potest immutare sensum, sed semper sensus a sensibili +immutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the + door" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19.11" target="asv">Gn. 19:11</a>). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses, + in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom---namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin + "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily + imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:18</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33088] Iª q. 111 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Angeli qui subverterunt Sodomam, <i>percusserunt Sodomitas +caecitate (vel aorasia), ut ostium domus invenire non possent</i>, +ut dicitur Gen. XIX. Et simile legitur IV Reg. VI, de Syris quos +Elisaeus duxit in Samariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for + we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged + with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, + can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object + from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q51_A2" id="FP_Q111_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 co."><a name="33089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33089] Iª q. 111 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod sensus immutatur dupliciter. Uno modo, ab exteriori; sicut cum +mutatur a sensibili. Alio modo, ab interiori, videmus enim quod, +perturbatis spiritibus et humoribus immutatur sensus; lingua enim +infirmi, quia plena est cholerico humore, omnia sentit ut amara; et +simile contingit in aliis sensibus. Utroque autem modo Angelus +potest immutare sensum hominis sua naturali virtute. Potest enim +Angelus opponere exterius sensui sensibile aliquod, vel a natura +formatum, vel aliquod de novo formando; sicut facit dum corpus +assumit, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam potest interius +commovere spiritus et humores, ut supra dictum est, ex quibus +sensus diversimode immutentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this + interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33090] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod principium sensitivae operationis non potest esse +absque principio interiori, quod est potentia sensitiva, sed illud +interius principium potest multipliciter ab exteriori principio +commoveri, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, + and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33091] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam per commotionem interiorem spirituum et +humorum, potest Angelus aliquid operari ad immutandum actum +potentiae nutritivae. Et similiter potentiae appetitivae, et +sensitivae, et cuiuscumque potentiae corporali organo utentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since + he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode + of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33092] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praeter ordinem totius creaturae Angelus facere non +potest, sed praeter ordinem alicuius particularis naturae facere +potest, cum tali ordini non subdatur. Et sic quodam singulari modo +potest sensum immutare, praeter modum communem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q112" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q112-p0.1">Q. 112. THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q112-p2"> We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q112-p3"><a href="#FP_Q112_A1"> (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p4"><a href="#FP_Q112_A2"> (2) Whether all are sent?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p5"><a href="#FP_Q112_A3"> (3) Whether those who are sent, assist?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p6"><a href="#FP_Q112_A4"> (4) From what orders they are sent.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 pr."><a name="33093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33093] +Iª q. 112 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de missione +Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliqui +Angeli mittantur in ministerium. Secundo, utrum omnes mittantur. +Tertio, utrum illi qui mittuntur, assistant. Quarto, de quibus +ordinibus mittantur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q112_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A1-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 1. Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual + actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are + intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33094] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli in ministerium non mittantur. Omnis +enim missio est ad aliquem determinatum locum. Sed actiones +intellectuales non determinant aliquem locum, quia intellectus +abstrahit ab hic et nunc. Cum igitur actiones angelicae sint +intellectuales, videtur quod Angeli ad suas actiones agendas non +mittantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, + it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33095] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +caelum Empyreum est locus pertinens ad dignitatem Angelorum. Si +igitur ad nos mittantur in ministerium, videtur quod eorum +dignitati aliquid depereat. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive + wisdom" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:25</a>). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole + of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is + unfitting. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33096] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +exterior occupatio impedit sapientiae contemplationem, unde dicitur +Eccli. XXXVIII, <i>qui minoratur actu, percipiet sapientiam</i>. Si +igitur Angeli aliqui mittuntur ad exteriora ministeria, videtur +quod retardentur a contemplatione. Sed tota eorum beatitudo in +contemplatione Dei consistit. Si ergo mitterentur, eorum beatitudo +minueretur. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.27" target="asv">Lk. 22:27</a>): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are + naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33097] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +ministrare est inferioris, unde dicitur Lucae XXII, <i>quis maior +est, qui recumbit, an ille qui ministrat? Nonne qui recumbit?</i> +Sed Angeli sunt maiores nobis ordine naturae. Ergo non mittuntur in +ministerium nostrum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.20" target="asv">Ex. 23:20</a>): "Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33098] Iª q. 112 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, <i>ecce ego mittam Angelum meum, qui +praecedat te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q112_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> From what has been said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[6]</a>), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q43_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[43], A[1]</a>), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin + to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent + as + proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before + by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, + His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q8_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[8], A[1]</a>). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such + a way as not to reach + another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was above stated ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.4" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal + creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this + takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God. + </p><p id="FP_Q112_A1-p8"> Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose + authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister + is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels' + actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 co."><a name="33099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33099] Iª q. 112 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ex supra dictis manifestum esse potest quod aliqui Angeli in +ministerium mittuntur a Deo. Ut enim supra dictum est, cum de +missione divinarum personarum ageretur, ille mitti dicitur, qui +aliquo modo ab alio procedit, ut incipiat esse ubi prius non erat, +vel ubi prius erat, per alium modum. Filius enim aut spiritus +sanctus mitti dicitur, ut a patre procedens per originem; et +incipit esse novo modo, idest per gratiam vel per naturam +assumptam, ubi prius erat per deitatis praesentiam. Dei enim +proprium est ubique esse, quia cum sit universale agens, eius +virtus attingit omnia entia; unde est in omnibus rebus, ut supra +dictum est. Virtus autem Angeli, cum sit particulare agens, non +attingit totum universum; sed sic attingit unum, quod non attingit +aliud. Et ideo ita est hic, quod non alibi. Manifestum est autem +per supra dicta, quod creatura corporalis per Angelos +administratur. Cum igitur aliquid est fiendum per aliquem Angelum +circa aliquam creaturam corpoream, de novo applicatur Angelus illi +corpori sua virtute; et sic Angelus de novo incipit ibi esse. Et +hoc totum procedit ex imperio divino. Unde sequitur, secundum +praemissa, quod Angelus a Deo mittatur. Sed actio quam Angelus +missus exercet, procedit a Deo sicut a primo principio, cuius nutu +et auctoritate Angeli operantur; et in Deum reducitur sicut in +ultimum finem. Et hoc facit rationem ministri, nam minister est +sicut instrumentum intelligens; instrumentum autem ab alio movetur, +et eius actio ad aliud ordinatur. Unde actiones Angelorum +ministeria vocantur; et propter hoc dicuntur in ministerium +mitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an + operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting + something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and + commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently + have sometimes a determinate place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33100] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod aliqua operatio dupliciter dicitur intellectualis. +Uno modo, quasi in ipso intellectu consistens, ut contemplatio. Et +talis operatio non determinat sibi locum, immo, ut Augustinus dicit +IV de Trin., <i>etiam nos, secundum quod aliquid aeternum mente +sapimus, non in hoc mundo sumus</i>. Alio modo dicitur aliqua actio +intellectualis, quia est ab aliquo intellectu regulata et imperata. +Et sic manifestum est quod operationes intellectuales interdum +determinant sibi loca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body + should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the + empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king + lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his + dignity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33101] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod caelum Empyreum pertinet ad dignitatem Angeli +secundum congruentiam quandam, quia congruum est ut supremum +corporum naturae quae est supra omnia corpora, attribuatur. Non +tamen Angelus aliquid dignitatis accipit a caelo Empyreo. Et ideo +quando actu non est in caelo Empyreo, nihil eius dignitati +subtrahitur, sicut nec regi, quando non actu sedet in regali solio, +quod congruit eius dignitati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through + the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the + contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in + no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule + and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels + do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33102] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in nobis exterior occupatio puritatem contemplationis +impedit, quia actioni insistimus secundum sensitivas vires, quarum +actiones cum intenduntur, retardantur actiones intellectivae +virtutis. Sed Angelus per solam intellectualem operationem regulat +suas actiones exteriores. Unde actiones exteriores in nullo +impediunt eius contemplationem, quia duarum actionum quarum una est +regula et ratio alterius, una non impedit, sed iuvat aliam. Unde +Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod <i>Angeli non sic foris exeunt, +ut internae contemplationis gaudiis priventur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them, + absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior + to every creature. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "Esteeming others better than themselves." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33103] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod Angeli in suis actionibus exterioribus ministrant +principaliter Deo, et secundario nobis. Non quia nos sumus +superiores eis, simpliciter loquendo, sed quilibet homo vel +Angelus, inquantum adhaerendo Deo fit unus spiritus cum Deo, est +superior omni creatura. Unde apostolus, ad Philipp. II, dicit, +<i>superiores sibi invicem arbitrantes</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q112_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A2-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 2. Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>): "All are ministering spirits, sent to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?']. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33104] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli in ministerium mittantur. +Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. I, <i>omnes sunt administratorii +spiritus, in ministerium missi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[6]</a>). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.6" target="asv">Is. 6:6,7</a>). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33105] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +inter ordines supremus est ordo Seraphim, ut ex supra dictis patet. +Sed Seraphim est missus ad purgandum labia prophetae, ut habetur +Isaiae VI. Ergo multo magis inferiores Angeli mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more + are even the highest angels sent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33106] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +divinae personae in infinitum excedunt omnes ordines Angelorum. Sed +divinae personae mittuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis +quicumque supremi Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute + the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry; + which contradicts the words, "Thousands of thousands ministered to + Him" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33107] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si +superiores Angeli non mittuntur ad exterius ministerium, hoc non +est nisi quia superiores Angeli exequuntur divina ministeria per +inferiores. Sed cum omnes Angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum +est, quilibet Angelus habet inferiorem Angelum, praeter ultimum. +Ergo unus Angelus solus ministraret in ministerium missus. Quod est +contra id quod dicitur Daniel VII, <i>millia millium ministrabant +ei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil + no exterior service." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33108] Iª q. 112 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Gregorius dicit, referens sententiam Dionysii, <i>superiora +agmina usum exterioris ministerii nequaquam habent</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what has been said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior + things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards + corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for + the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished + immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these + bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. + Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels + without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, + but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 co."><a name="33109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33109] Iª q. 112 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, hoc habet ordo divinae +providentiae, non solum in Angelis, sed etiam in toto universo, +quod inferiora per superiora administrantur, sed ab hoc ordine in +rebus corporalibus aliquando ex divina dispensatione receditur, +propter altiorem ordinem, secundum scilicet quod expedit ad gratiae +manifestationem. Quod enim caecus natus fuit illuminatus, quod +Lazarus fuit suscitatus, immediate a Deo factum est, absque aliqua +actione caelestium corporum. Sed et Angeli boni et mali possunt +aliquid in istis corporibus operari praeter actionem caelestium +corporum, condensando nubes in pluvias, et aliqua huiusmodi +faciendo. Neque alicui debet esse dubium quin Deus immediate +hominibus aliqua revelare posset, non mediantibus Angelis; et +superiores Angeli, non mediantibus inferioribus. Et secundum hanc +considerationem, quidam dixerunt quod, secundum communem legem, +superiores non mittuntur, sed inferiores tantum; sed ex aliqua +dispensatione divina, interdum etiam superiores mittuntur. Sed hoc +non videtur rationabile. Quia ordo angelicus attenditur secundum +dona gratiarum. Ordo autem gratiae non habet alium superiorem +ordinem, propter quem praetermitti debeat, sicut praetermittitur +ordo naturae propter ordinem gratiae. Considerandum est etiam quod +ordo naturae in operationibus miraculorum praetermittitur, propter +fidei confirmationem. Ad quam nihil valeret, si praetermitteretur +ordo angelicus, quia hoc a nobis percipi non posset. Nihil etiam +est ita magnum in ministeriis divinis, quod per inferiores ordines +exerceri non possit. Unde Gregorius dicit quod <i>qui summa +annuntiant, Archangeli vocantur. Hinc est quod ad virginem Mariam +Gabriel Archangelus mittitur</i>. Quod tamen fuit summum inter +omnia divina ministeria, ut ibidem subditur. Et ideo simpliciter +dicendum est, cum Dionysio, quod superiores Angeli nunquam ad +exterius ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p8"> It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers + of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to + any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33110] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut in missionibus divinarum personarum aliqua est +visibilis, quae attenditur secundum creaturam corpoream; aliqua +invisibilis, quae fit secundum spiritualem effectum, ita in +missionibus Angelorum aliqua dicitur exterior, quae scilicet est ad +aliquod ministerium circa corporalia exhibendum, et secundum hanc +missionem non omnes mittuntur; alia est interior, secundum +intellectuales effectus, prout scilicet unus Angelus illuminat +alium, et sic omnes Angeli mittuntur. Vel aliter dicendum quod +apostolus inducit illud ad probandum quod Christus sit maior +Angelis per quos data est lex; ut sic ostendat excellentiam novae +legis ad veterem. Unde non oportet quod intelligatur nisi de +Angelis ministerii, per quos data est lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; + but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. + It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the + ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying + by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope + is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33111] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum, secundum Dionysium, quod ille Angelus qui missus est ad +purgandum labia prophetae, fuit de inferioribus Angelis; sed dictus +est Seraphim, idest incendens, aequivoce, propter hoc quod venerat +ad incendendum labia prophetae. Vel dicendum quod superiores Angeli +communicant propria dona, a quibus denominantur, mediantibus +inferioribus Angelis. Sic igitur unus de Seraphim dictus est +purgasse incendio labia prophetae, non quia hoc ipse immediate +fecerit, sed quia inferior Angelus virtute eius hoc fecit. Sicut +Papa dicitur absolvere aliquem, etiam si per alium officium +absolutionis impendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been + said ( + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q43_A1" id="FP_Q112_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[43], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33112] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod divinae personae non mittuntur in ministerium, sed +aequivoce mitti dicuntur; ut ex praedictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent + immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the + inferior ministries. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33113] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod in divinis ministeriis est multiplex gradus. Unde +nihil prohibet etiam inaequales Angelos immediate ad ministeria +mitti; ita tamen quod superiores mittantur ad altiora ministeria, +inferiores vero ad inferiora.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q112_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A4-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 4. Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as + Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33123] Iª q. 112 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli secundae hierarchiae omnes +mittantur. Angeli enim omnes vel assistunt vel ministrant; secundum +quod habetur Dan. VII. Sed Angeli secundae hierarchiae non +assistunt, illuminantur enim per Angelos primae hierarchiae, sicut +dicit Dionysius VIII cap. Cael. Hier. Omnes ergo Angeli secundae +hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the + angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33124] Iª q. 112 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., quod <i>plures sunt qui ministrant, +quam qui assistunt</i>. Sed hoc non esset, si Angeli secundae +hierarchiae in ministerium non mitterentur. Ergo omnes Angeli +secundae hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore + the dominations are not sent to minister. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33125] Iª q. 112 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius dicit, quod <i>dominationes sunt maiores omni +subiectione</i>. Sed mitti in ministerium, ad subiectionem +pertinet. Ergo dominationes in ministerium non mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A1" id="FP_Q112_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal + creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, + as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify + some kind of administration. But + the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the + other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; + the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory + says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to + external ministry; not to the four superior orders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 co."><a name="33126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33126] Iª q. 112 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, mitti ad exterius ministerium proprie +convenit Angelo, secundum quod ex divino imperio operatur circa +aliquam creaturam corporalem; quod quidem pertinet ad executionem +divini ministerii. Proprietates autem Angelorum ex eorum nominibus +manifestantur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo +Angeli illorum ordinum ad exterius ministerium mittuntur, ex quorum +nominibus aliqua executio datur intelligi. In nomine autem +dominationum non importatur aliqua executio, sed sola dispositio et +imperium de exequendis. Sed in nominibus inferiorum ordinum +intelligitur aliqua executio, nam Angeli et Archangeli denominantur +a denuntiando; virtutes et potestates dicuntur per respectum ad +aliquem actum; principis etiam est, ut Gregorius dicit, inter alios +operantes priorem existere. Unde ad hos quinque ordines pertinet in +exterius ministerium mitti, non autem ad quatuor superiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be + done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others + are to do. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33127] Iª q. 112 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dominationes computantur quidem inter Angelos +ministrantes, non sicut exequentes ministerium, sed sicut +disponentes et mandantes quid per alios fieri debeat. Sicut +architectores in artificiis nihil manu operantur, sed solum +disponunt et praecipiunt quid alii debeant operari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q112_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those + who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands"; + thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number + of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him." This explanation + rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are + in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number + of orders, as six administer and three assist. + </p><p id="FP_Q112_A4-p8"> Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; + so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures + surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, + as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, + the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because + ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants + as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants + are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but + rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together + of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33128] Iª q. 112 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod de numero assistentium et ministrantium duplex ratio +haberi potest. Gregorius enim dicit plures esse ministrantes quam +assistentes. Intelligit enim quod dicitur, millia millium +ministrabant ei, non esse dictum multiplicative, sed partitive; ac +si diceretur, millia de numero millium. Et sic ministrantium +numerus ponitur indefinitus, ad significandum excessum; +assistentium vero finitus, cum subditur, et decies millies centena +millia assistebant ei. Et hoc procedit secundum rationem +Platonicorum, qui dicebant quod quanto aliqua sunt uni primo +principio propinquiora, tanto sunt minoris multitudinis, sicut +quanto numerus est propinquior unitati, tanto est multitudine +minor. Et haec opinio salvatur quantum ad numerum ordinum, dum sex +ministrant, et tres assistunt. Sed Dionysius ponit, XIV cap. Cael. +Hier., quod multitudo Angelorum transcendit omnem materialem +multitudinem; ut scilicet, sicut corpora superiora transcendunt +corpora inferiora magnitudine quasi in immensum, ita superiores +naturae incorporeae transcendunt multitudine omnes naturas +corporeas; quia quod est melius, est magis a Deo intentum et +multiplicatum. Et secundum hoc, cum assistentes sint superiores +ministrantibus, plures erunt assistentes quam ministrantes. Unde +secundum hoc, millia millium legitur multiplicativae, ac si +diceretur, millies millia. Et quia decies centum sunt mille, si +diceretur, decies centena millia, daretur intelligi quod tot essent +assistentes, quot ministrantes, sed quia dicitur, decies millies +centena millia, multo plures dicuntur esse assistentes quam +ministrantes. Nec tamen hoc pro tanto dicitur, quia tantus solum +sit Angelorum numerus, sed multo maior, quia omnem materialem +multitudinem excedit. Quod significatur per multiplicationem +maximorum numerorum supra seipsos, scilicet denarii, centenarii et +millenarii; ut Dionysius ibidem dicit.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q113" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q113-p0.1">Q. 113. OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q113-p2"> We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first + head eight points of inquiry arise: + </p><p id="FP_Q113-p3"><a href="#FP_Q113_A1"> (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p4"><a href="#FP_Q113_A2"> (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p5"><a href="#FP_Q113_A3"> (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p6"><a href="#FP_Q113_A4"> (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p7"><a href="#FP_Q113_A5"> (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p8"><a href="#FP_Q113_A6"> (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p9"><a href="#FP_Q113_A7"> (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p10"><a href="#FP_Q113_A8"> (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 pr."><a name="33129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33129] +Iª q. 113 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de custodia +bonorum Angelorum, et de impugnatione malorum. Et circa primum +quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum homines ab Angelis custodiantur. +Secundo, utrum singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam +deputentur. Tertio, utrum custodia pertineat solum ad ultimum +ordinem Angelorum. Quarto, utrum omni homini conveniat habere +Angelum custodem. Quinto, quando incipiat custodia Angeli circa +hominem. Sexto, utrum Angelus semper custodiat hominem. Septimo, +utrum doleat de perditione custoditi. Octavo, utrum inter Angelos +sit pugna ratione custodiae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q113_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A1-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 1. Whether men are guarded by the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, + or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows + how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33130] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homines non custodiantur ab Angelis. +Custodes enim deputantur aliquibus vel quia nesciunt, vel quia non +possunt custodire seipsos; sicut pueris et infirmis. Sed homo +potest custodire seipsum per liberum arbitrium; et scit, per +naturalem cognitionem legis naturalis. Ergo homo non custoditur ab +Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.120.4" target="asv"> Ps. 120:4</a>: "He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33131] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ubi +adest fortior custodia, infirmior superfluere videtur. Sed homines +custodiuntur a Deo; secundum illud Psalmi CXX, <i>non dormitabit +neque dormiet qui custodit Israel</i>. Ergo non est necessarium +quod homo custodiatur ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this + man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 20:39</a>). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in + some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly + false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33132] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +perditio custoditi redundat in negligentiam custodis, unde dicitur +cuidam, III Reg. XX, <i>custodi virum istum, qui si lapsus fuerit, +erit anima tua pro anima eius</i>. Sed multi homines quotidie +pereunt, in peccatum cadentes, quibus Angeli subvenire possent vel +visibiliter apparendo, vel miracula faciendo, vel aliquo simili +modo. Essent ergo negligentes Angeli, si eorum custodiae homines +essent commissi, quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur Angeli sunt +hominum custodes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.11" target="asv">Ps. 90:11</a>): "He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33133] Iª q. 113 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in Psalmo, <i>Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut +custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by + the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior + which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various + opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover + manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so + it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 co."><a name="33134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33134] Iª q. 113 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, secundum rationem divinae providentiae, hoc in rebus omnibus +invenitur, quod mobilia et variabilia per immobilia et invariabilia +moventur et regulantur; sicut omnia corporalia per substantias +spirituales immobiles, et corpora inferiora per corpora superiora, +quae sunt invariabilia secundum substantiam. Sed et nos ipsi +regulamur circa conclusiones in quibus possumus diversimode +opinari, per principia quae invariabiliter tenemus. Manifestum est +autem quod in rebus agendis cognitio et affectus hominis +multipliciter variari et deficere possunt a bono. Et ideo +necessarium fuit quod hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputarentur, +per quos regularentur et moverentur ad bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection + towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature + belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the + universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in + many ways. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33135] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum +vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni, +propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis +cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest, +aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in +applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera, +contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, +<i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae +nostrae</i>. Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the + habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this + the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him + grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, + Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FP_Q113_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[111], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33136] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod +affectus inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum +virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias +ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit +prudentiae. Quantum ergo ad primum, Deus immediate custodit +hominem, infundendo ei gratiam et virtutes. Quantum autem ad +secundum, Deus custodit hominem sicut universalis instructor, cuius +instructio ad hominem provenit mediantibus Angelis, ut supra +habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation + of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish + is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside + the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise + that miracles occur outside the order of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33137] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni discedunt +propter passionem peccati; ita etiam discedunt ab instigatione +bonorum Angelorum, quae fit invisibiliter per hoc quod homines +illuminant ad bene agendum. Unde quod homines pereunt, non est +imputandum negligentiae Angelorum, sed malitiae hominum. Quod autem +aliquando, praeter legem communem, hominibus visibiliter apparent, +ex speciali Dei gratia est, sicut etiam quod praeter ordinem +naturae miracula fiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A2-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 2. Whether each man is guarded by an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard + many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33138] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non singuli homines a singulis Angelis +custodiantur. Angelus enim est virtuosior quam homo. Sed unus homo +sufficit ad custodiam multorum hominum. Ergo multo magis unus +Angelus multos homines potest custodire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). + But as all the angels are unequal ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q113_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps + men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33139] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +inferiora reducuntur in Deum a superioribus per media, ut Dionysius +dicit. Sed cum omnes Angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum est, +solus unus Angelus est inter quem et homines non est aliquis +medius. Ergo unus Angelus solus est qui immediate custodit +homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than + another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says + (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33140] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +maiores Angeli maioribus officiis deputantur. Sed non est maius +officium custodire unum hominem quam alium, cum omnes homines +natura sint pares. Cum ergo omnium Angelorum sit unus maior alio, +secundum Dionysium, videtur quod diversi homines non custodiantur a +diversis Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.10" target="asv">Mat. 8:10</a>), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33141] Iª q. 113 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Hieronymus, exponens illud Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in +caelis</i>, dicit, <i>magna est dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque +habeat, ab ortu nativitatis, in custodiam sui Angelum +delegatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the + execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible + creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species, + but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which + cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what + remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to + the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things + corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different "genera" + of + things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable + that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose + that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 co."><a name="33142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33142] Iª q. 113 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur. +Cuius ratio est, quia Angelorum custodia est quaedam executio +divinae providentiae circa homines. Providentia autem Dei aliter se +habet ad homines, et ad alias corruptibiles creaturas, quia aliter +se habent ad incorruptibilitatem. Homines enim non solum sunt +incorruptibiles quantum ad communem speciem, sed etiam quantum ad +proprias formas singulorum, quae sunt animae rationales, quod de +aliis rebus corruptibilibus dici non potest. Manifestum est autem +quod providentia Dei principaliter est circa illa quae perpetuo +manent, circa ea vero quae transeunt, providentia Dei est inquantum +ordinat ipsa ad res perpetuas. Sic igitur providentia Dei +comparatur ad singulos homines, sicut comparatur ad singula genera +vel species corruptibilium rerum. Sed secundum Gregorium, diversi +ordines deputantur diversis rerum generibus; puta potestates ad +arcendos Daemones, virtutes ad miracula facienda in rebus +corporeis. Et probabile est quod diversis speciebus rerum diversi +Angeli eiusdem ordinis praeficiantur. Unde etiam rationabile est ut +diversis hominibus diversi Angeli ad custodiam deputentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian + is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one + man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to + the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or + weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation + of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33143] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod alicui homini adhibetur custos dupliciter. Uno modo, +inquantum est homo singularis, et sic uni homini debetur unus +custos, et interdum plures deputantur ad custodiam unius. Alio +modo, inquantum est pars alicuius collegii, et sic toti collegio +unus homo ad custodiam praeponitur, ad quem pertinet providere ea +quae pertinent ad unum hominem in ordine ad totum collegium; sicut +sunt ea quae exterius aguntur, de quibus alii aedificantur vel +scandalizantur. Angelorum autem custodia deputatur hominibus etiam +quantum ad invisibilia et occulta, quae pertinent ad singulorum +salutem secundum seipsos. Unde singulis hominibus singuli Angeli +deputantur ad custodiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above stated ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A3" id="FP_Q113_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[112], A[3]</a>, ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things, + only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the + inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one + immediately above him. Thus it + is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33144] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Angeli primae hierarchiae omnes +quantum ad aliqua illuminantur immediate a Deo, sed quaedam sunt de +quibus illuminantur superiores tantum immediate a Deo, quae +inferioribus revelant. Et idem etiam in inferioribus ordinibus +considerandum est, nam aliquis infimus Angelus illuminatur quantum +ad quaedam ab aliquo supremo, et quantum ad aliqua ab eo qui +immediate sibi praefertur. Et sic etiam possibile est quod aliquis +Angelus immediate illuminet hominem, qui tamen habet aliquos +Angelos sub se, quos illuminat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, + and others to the lesser things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.11" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:11,12</a>: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and + some of them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33145] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quamvis homines natura sint pares, tamen +inaequalitas in eis invenitur, secundum quod ex divina providentia +quidam ordinantur ad maius, et quidam ad minus; secundum illud quod +dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, <i>in multitudine disciplinae domini +separavit eos, ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, ex ipsis maledixit +et humiliavit</i>. Et sic maius officium est custodire unum hominem +quam alium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A3-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 3. Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that + the text ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv">Mat. 18:10</a>), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels + guard men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33146] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod custodire homines non pertineat solum ad +infimum ordinem Angelorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod hoc quod +dicitur Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in caelo etc., intelligitur +non de quibuscumque Angelis, sed de supereminentibus</i>. Ergo +supereminentes Angeli custodiunt homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external + ministry ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A4" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[112], A[4]</a>). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33147] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus, ad Heb. I, dicit quod <i>Angeli sunt in ministerium +missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, et sic +videtur quod missio Angelorum ad custodiam hominum ordinetur. Sed +quinque ordines in exterius ministerium mittuntur, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo omnes Angeli quinque ordinum custodiae hominum +deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the + Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders + are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33148] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad +custodiam hominum maxime videtur esse necessarium arcere Daemones, +quod pertinet ad potestates, secundum Gregorium; et miracula +facere, quod pertinet ad virtutes. Ergo illi etiam ordines +deputantur ad custodiam, et non solum infimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius + (Coel. Hier. v, ix). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33149] Iª q. 113 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod in Psalmo custodia hominum attribuitur Angelis; quorum ordo +est infimus, secundum Dionysium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard + him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce + the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one + man. The other kind of guardianship is + universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship + of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes. + Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits + by + the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 co."><a name="33150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33150] Iª q. 113 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, homini custodia dupliciter adhibetur. +Uno modo custodia particularis, secundum quod singulis hominibus +singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Et talis custodia pertinet +ad infimum ordinem Angelorum, quorum, secundum Gregorium, est +minima nuntiare; hoc autem videtur esse minimum in officiis +Angelorum, procurare ea quae ad unius hominis tantum salutem +pertinent. Alia vero est custodia universalis. Et haec +multiplicatur secundum diversos ordines, nam quanto agens fuerit +universalius, tanto est superius. Sic igitur custodia humanae +multitudinis pertinet ad ordinem principatuum, vel forte ad +Archangelos, qui dicuntur principes Angeli, unde et Michael, quem +Archangelum dicimus, unus de principibus dicitur Dan. X. Ulterius +autem super omnes naturas corporeas habent custodiam virtutes. Et +ulterius etiam super Daemones habent custodiam potestates. Et +ulterius etiam super bonos spiritus habent custodiam principatus, +secundum Gregorium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each + order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen + by God for the higher degree of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33151] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum Chrysostomi potest intelligi, ut loquatur de +supremis in ordine infimo Angelorum, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, in +quolibet ordine sunt primi, medii et ultimi. Est autem probabile +quod maiores Angeli deputentur ad custodiam eorum qui sunt ad +maiorem gradum gloriae a Deo electi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater + or less, as above explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33152] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non omnes Angeli qui mittuntur, habent particularem +custodiam super singulos homines; sed quidam ordines habent +universalem custodiam, magis vel minus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors' + power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33153] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam inferiores Angeli exercent officia superiorum, +inquantum aliquid de dono eorum participant, et se habent ad +superiores sicut executores virtutis eorum. Et per hunc modum etiam +Angeli infimi ordinis possunt et arcere Daemones, et miracula +facere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A4-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 4. Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.7" target="asv">Phil. 2:7</a>) that "He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship + of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. + Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33154] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod non omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam +deputentur. Dicitur enim de Christo, Philipp. II, quod est <i>in +similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo</i>. Si +igitur omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, etiam +Christus Angelum custodem habuisset. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens, +cum Christus sit maior omnibus Angelis. Non ergo omnibus hominibus +Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state + of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33155] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnium hominum primus fuit Adam. Sed sibi non competebat habere +Angelum custodem, ad minus in statu innocentiae, quia tunc nullis +periculis angustiabatur. Ergo Angeli non praeficiuntur ad custodiam +omnibus hominibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, + encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, + never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they + have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in + + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.31" target="asv">Ps. 31</a>). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33156] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, ut per eos manuducantur +ad vitam aeternam, et incitentur ad bene operandum, et muniantur +contra insultus Daemonum. Sed homines praesciti ad damnationem, +nunquam perveniunt ad vitam aeternam. Infideles etiam, etsi +interdum bona opera faciant, non tamen bene faciunt, quia non recta +intentione faciunt, fides enim intentionem dirigit, ut Augustinus +dicit. Antichristi etiam adventus erit secundum operationem +Satanae, ut dicitur II ad Thessal. II. Non ergo omnibus hominibus +Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Jerome quoted above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33157] Iª q. 113 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +auctoritas Hieronymi supra inducta, qui dicit quod <i>unaquaeque +anima ad sui custodiam habet Angelum deputatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is + threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.159.4" target="asv"> Ps. 159:4</a>: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have + to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, + however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign + with him, in hell a demon to punish him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 co."><a name="33158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33158] Iª q. 113 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod homo in statu vitae istius constitutus, est quasi in quadam +via, qua debet tendere ad patriam. In qua quidem via multa pericula +homini imminent, tum ab interiori, tum ab exteriori; secundum illud +Psalmi CXLI, <i>in via hac qua ambulabam, absconderunt laqueum +mihi</i>. Et ideo sicut hominibus per viam non tutam ambulantibus +dantur custodes, ita et cuilibet homini, quandiu viator est, custos +Angelus deputatur. Quando autem iam ad terminum viae pervenerit, +iam non habebit Angelum custodem; sed habebit in regno Angelum +conregnantem, in Inferno Daemonem punientem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards + His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was + right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>) that "angels came and ministered to Him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33159] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod homo, immediate regulabatur a +verbo Dei, unde non indigebat custodia Angelorum. Et iterum +secundum animam erat comprehensor; sed ratione passibilitatis +corporis, erat viator. Et secundum hoc, non debebatur ei Angelus +custos, tanquam superior; sed Angelus minister, tanquam inferior. +Unde dicitur Matth. IV, quod <i>accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant +ei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we + have said above ( + <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q113_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[95], AA[1]</a>,3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason + he needed a guardian angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33160] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae non patiebatur aliquod +periculum ab interiori, quia interius erant omnia ordinata, ut +supra dictum est, sed imminebat ei periculum ab exteriori, propter +insidias Daemonum; ut rei probavit eventus. Et ideo indigebat +custodia Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither + are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And + although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless + conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both + themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like + manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33161] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut praesciti et infideles, et etiam Antichristus, +non privantur interiori auxilio naturalis rationis; ita etiam non +privantur exteriori auxilio toti naturae humanae divinitus +concesso, scilicet custodia Angelorum. Per quam etsi non iuventur +quantum ad hoc quod vitam aeternam bonis operibus mereantur, +iuvantur tamen quantum ad hoc, quod ab aliquibus malis retrahuntur, +quibus et sibi ipsis et aliis nocere possunt. Nam et ipsi Daemones +arcentur per bonos Angelos, ne noceant quantum volunt. Et similiter +Antichristus non tantum nocebit, quantum vellet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A5-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 5. Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who + shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard + a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33162] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non deputetur homini ad custodiam +a sua nativitate. Angeli enim mittuntur <i>in ministerium, propter +eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, ut apostolus, ad Heb. +dicit. Sed homines incipiunt haereditatem capere salutis, quando +baptizantur. Ergo Angelus deputatur homini ad custodiam a tempore +Baptismi, et non a tempore nativitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction + as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon + as they are born. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33163] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +homines ab Angelis custodiuntur, inquantum ab eis illuminantur per +modum doctrinae. Sed pueri mox nati non sunt capaces doctrinae, +quia non habent usum rationis. Ergo pueris mox natis non deputantur +Angeli custodes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel + is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore + angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33164] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +pueri in materno utero existentes habent animam rationalem aliquo +tempore, sicut et post nativitatem ex utero. Sed cum sunt in +materno utero, non deputantur eis Angeli ad custodiam, ut videtur, +quia neque etiam ministri Ecclesiae eos sacramentis imbuunt. Non +ergo statim a nativitate hominibus Angeli ad custodiam +deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33165] Iª q. 113 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Hieronymus dicit, quod <i>unaquaeque anima, ab ortu +nativitatis, habet in custodiam sui Angelum deputatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian + is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves + (vide A, 4), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; + such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man + as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits + we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A1" id="FP_Q113_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 co."><a name="33166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33166] Iª q. 113 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut Origenes dicit super Matthaeum, super hoc est duplex +opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod Angelus ad custodiam homini +deputatur a tempore Baptismi, alii vero quod a tempore nativitatis. +Et hanc opinionem Hieronymus approbat; et rationabiliter. Beneficia +enim quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus, +incipiunt a tempore Baptismi; sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia +huiusmodi. Sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet +naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem +naturam accipit. Et tale beneficium est custodia Angelorum, ut ex +praemissis patet. Unde statim a nativitate habet homo Angelum ad +sui custodiam deputatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if + we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic + ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, + nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33167] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Angeli mittuntur in ministerium, efficaciter quidem +propter eos solos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, si consideretur +ultimus effectus custodiae, qui est perceptio haereditatis. +Nihilominus tamen et aliis ministerium Angelorum non subtrahitur, +quamvis in eis hanc efficaciam non habeat, quod perducantur ad +salutem. Efficax tamen est circa eos Angelorum ministerium, +inquantum a multis malis retrahuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many + other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33168] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod officium custodiae ordinatur quidem ad illuminationem +doctrinae, sicut ad ultimum et principalem effectum. Nihilominus +tamen multos alios effectus habet, qui pueris competunt, scilicet +arcere Daemones, et alia nocumenta tam corporalia quam spiritualia +prohibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still + part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree + of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes + separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above + quoted, says. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33169] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est +a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo +adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid +arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod Angelus qui est in +custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed +in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, Angelus ei ad custodiam +deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A6-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 6. Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.51.9" target="asv">Jer. 51:9</a>) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her." And ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.5" target="asv">Is. 5:5</a>) it is written: "I will take away the hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]---"and it shall be wasted." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33170] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus custos quandoque deserat hominem +cuius custodiae deputatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. li, ex persona +Angelorum, <i>curavimus Babylonem, et non est curata, derelinquamus +ergo eam</i>. Et Isaiae V, <i>auferam sepem eius, et erit in +conculcationem</i>; Glossa, <i>idest Angelorum custodiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21.2" target="asv"> Ps. 21:2</a>: "O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33171] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +principalius custodit Deus quam Angelus. Sed Deus aliquando hominem +derelinquit; secundum illud Psalmi XXI, <i>Deus, Deus meus, respice +in me, quare me dereliquisti?</i> Ergo multo magis Angelus custos +hominem derelinquit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes + they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33172] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicit Damascenus, <i>Angeli, cum sunt hic nobiscum, non sunt +in caelo</i>. Sed aliquando sunt in caelo. Ergo aliquando nos +derelinquunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are ever assailing us, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good + angels ever guard us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33173] Iª q. 113 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +Daemones nos semper impugnant; secundum illud I Petri V, +<i>adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit, +quaerens quem devoret</i>. Ergo multo magis boni Angeli semper nos +custodiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As appears above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor + anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is + it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of + His providence, but only in so far as He + allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes + a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some + trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House + of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being + subject to tribulation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 co."><a name="33174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33174] Iª q. 113 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod custodia Angelorum, ut ex supra dictis patet, est quaedam +executio divinae providentiae circa homines facta. Manifestum est +autem quod nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae +subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum +subditur universali providentiae entium. Sed intantum Deus, +secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere, +inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae vel +culpae. Similiter etiam dicendum est quod Angelus custos nunquam +totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit; +prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel +etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum +iudiciorum. Et secundum hoc Babylon et domus Israel ab Angelis +derelictae dicuntur, quia Angeli earum custodes non impediverunt +quin tribulationibus subderentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p7"> From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33175] Iª q. 113 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet +solutio ad primum et secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: + for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be + with man in an instant. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33176] Iª q. 113 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Angelus, etsi interdum derelinquat hominem loco, non +tamen derelinquit eum quantum ad effectum custodiae, quia etiam cum +est in caelo, cognoscit quid circa hominem agatur; nec indiget mora +temporis ad motum localem, sed statim potest adesse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A7-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 7. Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.33.7" target="asv">Is. 33:7</a>): "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills + of those whom they guard. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33177] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli doleant de malis eorum quos +custodiunt. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXXIII, <i>Angeli pacis amare +flebunt</i>. Sed fletus est signum doloris et tristitiae. Ergo +Angeli tristantur de malis hominum quos custodiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the + loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33178] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia est, ut Augustinus dicit, <i>de his quae nobis nolentibus +accidunt</i>. Sed perditio hominis custoditi est contra voluntatem +Angeli custodis. Ergo tristantur Angeli de perditione hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, + as we are told, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv"> Lk. 15:7.</a> Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33179] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut gaudio contrariatur tristitia, ita poenitentiae contrariatur +peccatum. Sed Angeli gaudent de peccatore poenitentiam agente, ut +habetur Lucae XV. Ergo tristantur de iusto in peccatum cadente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.12" target="asv"> Numbers 18:12</a>: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men + have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which + have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="33180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33180] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +super illud Num. XVIII; quidquid offerunt primitiarum etc., dicit +Glossa Origenis; <i>trahuntur Angeli in iudicium, utrum ex ipsorum +negligentia, an hominum ignavia lapsi sint</i>. Sed quilibet +rationabiliter dolet de malis propter quae in iudicium tractus est. +Ergo Angeli dolent de peccatis hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv">Apoc. 21:4</a>): "Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have + no cause for grief. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33181] Iª q. 113 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ubi +est tristitia et dolor, non est perfecta felicitas, unde dicitur +Apoc. XXI, <i>mors ultra non erit, neque luctus, neque clamor, +neque ullus dolor</i>. Sed Angeli sunt perfecte beati. Ergo de +nullo dolent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will + of the angels and the other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens + in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply + speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is + called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; + although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo + into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. + Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking + the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine + justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 co."><a name="33182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33182] Iª q. 113 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod Angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum. +Tristitia enim et dolor, secundum Augustinum, non est nisi de his +quae contrariantur voluntati. Nihil autem accidit in mundo quod sit +contrarium voluntati Angelorum et aliorum beatorum, quia voluntas +eorum totaliter inhaeret ordini divinae iustitiae; nihil autem fit +in mundo, nisi quod per divinam iustitiam fit aut permittitur. Et +ideo, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit in mundo contra voluntatem +beatorum. Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur +simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum +quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant, +quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut +nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et +universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc +vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem +dicitur. Sic igitur Angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter +et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo +divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur, +et peccare permittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words + of Rabsaces, as related + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.37.2" target="asv"> Is. 37:2 </a>seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers + who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression + is metaphorical, and + signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God + and the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33183] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod verbum illud Isaiae potest intelligi de Angelis, +idest nuntiis, Ezechiae, qui fleverunt propter verba Rabsacis; de +quibus habetur Isaiae XXXVII. Et hoc secundum litteralem sensum. +Secundum vero allegoricum, Angeli pacis sunt apostoli et alii +praedicatores, qui flent pro peccatis hominum. Si vero secundum +sensum anagogicum exponatur de Angelis beatis, tunc metaphorica +erit locutio, ad designandum quod Angeli volunt in universali +hominum salutem. Sic enim Deo et Angelis huiusmodi passiones +attribuuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p9"> The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33184] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum patet +solutio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering + of the Divine Providence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33185] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tam in poenitentia hominum, quam in peccato, manet +una ratio gaudii Angelis, scilicet impletio ordinis divinae +providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="33186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33186] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod Angeli ducuntur in iudicium pro peccatis hominum, non +quasi rei, sed quasi testes, ad convincendum homines de eorum +ignavia.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q114" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q114-p0.1">Q. 114. OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q114-p2"> We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q114-p3"><a href="#FP_Q114_A1"> (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p4"><a href="#FP_Q114_A2"> (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p5"><a href="#FP_Q114_A3"> (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p6"><a href="#FP_Q114_A4"> (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p7"><a href="#FP_Q114_A5"> (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 pr."><a name="33193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33193] +Iª q. 114 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +impugnatione Daemonum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum homines a Daemonibus impugnentur. Secundo, utrum tentare sit +proprium Diaboli. Tertio, utrum omnia peccata hominum ex +impugnatione sive tentatione Daemonum proveniant. Quarto, utrum +possint vera miracula facere ad seducendum. Quinto, utrum Daemones +qui ab hominibus superantur, ab impugnatione hominum arceantur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q114_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A1-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 1. Whether men are assailed by the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by + God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed + to assail man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33194] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homines non impugnentur a Daemonibus. +Angeli enim deputantur ad hominum custodiam, missi a Deo. Sed +Daemones non mittuntur a Deo, cum Daemonum intentio sit perdere +animas, Dei autem salvare. Ergo Daemones non deputantur ad hominum +impugnationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men + are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of + all justice, that men should be assailed by demons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33195] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, non +est aequa conditio pugnae, ut infirmus contra fortem, ignarus +contra astutum exponatur ad bellum. Sed homines sunt infirmi et +ignari; Daemones autem potentes et astuti. Non est ergo +permittendum a Deo, qui est omnis iustitiae auctor, ut homines a +Daemonibus impugnentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed + that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33196] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad +exercitium hominum sufficit impugnatio carnis et mundi. Sed Deus +permittit electos suos impugnari propter eorum exercitium. Ergo non +videtur necessarium quod a Daemonibus impugnentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of + this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33197] Iª q. 114 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. VI, quod <i>non est nobis +colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus principes et +potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, contra +spiritualia nequitiae in caelestibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself + is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance + of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's + salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly + use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof + are to be referred to God as their first author. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 co."><a name="33198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33198] Iª q. 114 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa impugnationem Daemonum duo est considerare, scilicet +ipsam impugnationem, et impugnationis ordinem. Impugnatio quidem +ipsa ex Daemonum malitia procedit, qui propter invidiam profectum +hominum impedire nituntur; et propter superbiam divinae potestatis +similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad +hominum impugnationem, sicut et Angeli Deo ministrant in +determinatis officiis ad hominum salutem. Sed ordo impugnationis +ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis uti, ad bona ea +ordinando. Sed ex parte Angelorum, tam ipsa custodia quam ordo +custodiae reducitur ad Deum, sicut ad primum auctorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail + us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to + man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 22:20.</a> For punishment is referred to God as its first author. + Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they + punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33199] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod mali Angeli impugnant homines dupliciter. Uno modo, +instigando ad peccatum. Et sic non mittuntur a Deo ad impugnandum, +sed aliquando permittuntur, secundum Dei iusta iudicia. Aliquando +autem impugnant homines puniendo. Et sic mittuntur a Deo; sicut +missus est spiritus mendax ad puniendum Achab regem Israel, ut +dicitur III Reg. ult. Poena enim refertur in Deum, sicut in primum +auctorem. Et tamen Daemones ad puniendum missi, alia intentione +puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia; +mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally + through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:16</a>), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33200] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ad hoc quod non sit inaequalis pugnae conditio, fit +ex parte hominis recompensatio, principaliter quidem per auxilium +divinae gratiae; secundario autem per custodiam Angelorum. Unde IV +Reg., Elisaeus dixit ad ministrum suum, <i>noli timere, plures enim +nobiscum sunt, quam cum illis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the + demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of + the elect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33201] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod infirmitati humanae sufficeret ad exercitium +impugnatio quae est a carne et mundo, sed malitiae Daemonum non +sufficit, quae utroque utitur ad hominum impugnationem. Sed tamen +ex divina ordinatione hoc provenit in gloriam electorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q114_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A4-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 4. Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show + itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other + times do the demons perform lying wonders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33218] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Daemones non possint homines seducere per +aliqua miracula vera. Operatio enim Daemonum maxime vigebit in +operibus Antichristi. Sed sicut apostolus dicit II ad Thessal. II, +<i>eius adventus est secundum operationem Satanae, in omni virtute +et signis et prodigiis mendacibus</i>. Ergo multo magis alio +tempore per Daemones non fiunt nisi signa mendacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's + art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33219] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vera +miracula per aliquam corporum immutationem fiunt. Sed Daemones non +possunt immutare corpus in aliam naturam, dicit enim Augustinus, +XVIII de Civ. Dei, <i>nec corpus quidem humanum ulla ratione +crediderim Daemonum arte vel potestate in membra bestialia posse +converti</i>. Ergo Daemones vera miracula facere non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade + one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv">Mk. 16:20</a>): "The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33220] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +argumentum efficaciam non habet, quod se habet ad opposita. Si ergo +miracula vera possunt fieri a Daemonibus ad falsitatem +persuadendam, non erunt efficacia ad veritatem fidei confirmandam. +Quod est inconveniens, cum dicatur Marci ult., <i>domino +cooperante, et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says + <a href="#FP_Q83" id="FP_Q114_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(Q[83];</a> [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of the magic art miracles are + wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33221] Iª q. 114 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, libro octoginta trium quaest., quod +<i>magicis artibus fiunt miracula plerumque similia illis miraculis +quae fiunt per servos Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FP_Q114_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in + the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power + of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. + And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power + and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him + to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle. + </p><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p7"> It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they + are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. + And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house + and with it his children---these were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, + 19). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 co."><a name="33222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33222] Iª q. 114 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, si miraculum proprie accipiatur, +Daemones miracula facere non possunt, nec aliqua creatura, sed +solus Deus, quia miraculum proprie dicitur quod fit praeter ordinem +totius naturae creatae, sub quo ordine continetur omnis virtus +creaturae. Dicitur tamen quandoque miraculum large, quod excedit +humanam facultatem et considerationem. Et sic Daemones possunt +facere miracula, quae scilicet homines mirantur, inquantum eorum +facultatem et cognitionem excedunt. Nam et unus homo, inquantum +facit aliquid quod est supra facultatem et cognitionem alterius, +ducit alium in admirationem sui operis, ut quodammodo miraculum +videatur operari. Sciendum est tamen quod, quamvis huiusmodi opera +Daemonum, quae nobis miracula videntur, ad veram rationem miraculi +non pertingant; sunt tamen quandoque verae res. Sicut magi +Pharaonis per virtutem Daemonum veros serpentes et ranas fecerunt. +<i>Et quando ignis de caelo cecidit et familiam Iob cum gregibus +pecorum uno impetu consumpsit, et turbo domum deiiciens filios eius +occidit, quae fuerunt opera Satanae, phantasmata non fuerunt</i>, +ut Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive + men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, + they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33223] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit ibidem, Antichristi opera +possunt dici esse signa mendacii, <i>vel quia mortales sensus per +phantasmata decepturus est, ut quod non facit, videatur facere, vel +quia, si sint vera prodigia, ad mendacium tamen pertrahent +credituros</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As we have said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q114_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute + matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce + these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal + things which + can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the + operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, + which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, + cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body + of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by + the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality. + </p><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p10"> Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his + corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A3" id="FP_Q114_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[111], AA[3]</a>,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as + he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same + way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. + Dei xviii, 18): "Man's imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, + appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be understood as though the + imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another + man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33224] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, materia corporalis non +obedit Angelis bonis seu malis ad nutum, ut Daemones sua virtute +possint transmutare materiam de forma in formam, sed possunt +adhibere quaedam semina quae in elementis mundi inveniuntur, ad +huiusmodi effectus complendos, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin. Et +ideo dicendum est quod omnes transmutationes corporalium rerum quae +possunt fieri per aliquas virtutes naturales, ad quas pertinent +praedicta semina, possunt fieri per operationem Daemonum, huiusmodi +seminibus adhibitis; sicut cum aliquae res transmutantur in +serpentes vel ranas, quae per putrefactionem generari possunt. +Illae vero transmutationes corporalium rerum quae non possunt +virtute naturae fieri, nullo modo operatione Daemonum, secundum rei +veritatem, perfici possunt; sicut quod corpus humanum mutetur in +corpus bestiale, aut quod corpus hominis mortuum reviviscat. Et si +aliquando aliquid tale operatione Daemonum fieri videatur, hoc non +est secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum apparentiam tantum. Quod +quidem potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, ab interiori; +secundum quod Daemon potest mutare phantasiam hominis, et etiam +sensus corporeos, ut aliquid videatur aliter quam sit, sicut supra +dictum est. Et hoc etiam interdum fieri dicitur virtute aliquarum +rerum corporalium. Alio modo, ab exteriori. Cum enim ipse possit +formare corpus ex aere cuiuscumque formae et figurae, ut illud +assumens in eo visibiliter appareat; potest eadem ratione +circumponere cuicumque rei corporeae quamcumque formam corpoream, +ut in eius specie videatur. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit XVIII +de Civ. Dei, quod <i>phantasticum hominis, quod etiam cogitando +sive somniando per rerum innumerabilium genera variatur, velut +corporatum in alicuius animalis effigie, sensibus apparet +alienis</i>. Quod non est sic intelligendum, quod ipsa vis +phantastica hominis, aut species eius, eadem numero incorporata +alterius sensibus ostendatur, sed quia Daemon qui in phantasia +unius hominis format aliquam speciem, ipse etiam potest similem +speciem alterius sensibus offerre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different + right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the + latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33225] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium +quaest., <i>cum talia faciunt magi qualia sancti, diverso fine et +diverso iure fiunt. Illi enim faciunt, quaerentes gloriam suam, +isti, quaerentes gloriam Dei. Et illi faciunt per quaedam privata +commercia; isti autem publica administratione, et iussu Dei, cui +cuncta creatura subiecta est</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q114_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A5-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 5. Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ + overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore + it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33226] Iª q. 114 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod Daemon qui superatur ab aliquo, non +propter hoc ab impugnatione arceatur. Christus enim efficacissime +suum tentatorem vicit. Sed tamen postea eum impugnavit, ad +occisionem eius Iudaeos incitando. Ergo non est verum quod Diabolus +victus ab impugnatione cesset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is + not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33227] Iª q. 114 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +infligere poenam ei qui in pugna succumbit, est incitare ad acrius +impugnandum. Hoc autem non pertinet ad Dei misericordiam. Ergo +Daemones superati non arcentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33228] Iª q. 114 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur Matth. IV, tunc reliquit eum Diabolus, scilicet +Christum superantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other + sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to + be so for a certain definite time: wherefore ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv">Lk. 4:13</a>) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One + is on the part + of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], + "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt + for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. + As to this, Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv"> Lk. 4:13</a>: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from + frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.44" target="asv"> Mat. 12:44</a>: "I will return into my house from whence I came out." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 co."><a name="33229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33229] Iª q. 114 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam dicunt quod Daemon superatus nullum hominum potest de +cetero tentare, nec de eodem nec de alio peccato. Quidam autem +dicunt quod potest alios tentare, sed non eundem. Et hoc +probabilius dicitur, si tamen intelligatur usque ad aliquod tempus, +unde et Lucae IV dicitur quod, <i>consummata omni tentatione, +Diabolus recessit a Christo usque ad tempus</i>. Et huius ratio est +duplex. Una est ex parte divinae clementiae, quia, ut Chrysostomus +dicit, super Matth., <i>non tandiu homines Diabolus tentat, quandiu +vult, sed quandiu Deus permittit; quia etsi permittat paulisper +tentare, tamen repellit, propter infirmam naturam</i>. Alia ratio +sumitur ex astutia Diaboli, unde Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, quod +<i>Diabolus instare formidat, quia frequentius refugit +triumphari</i>. Quod tamen aliquando Diabolus redeat ad eum quem +dimisit, patet per illud quod dicitur Matth. XII, <i>revertar in +domum meam, unde exivi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p6"> From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 ad arg."><a name="33230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33230] Iª q. 114 a. 5 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q115" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q115-p0.1">Q. 115. OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q115-p2"> We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal + actions there are six points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q115-p3"><a href="#FP_Q115_A1"> (1) Whether a body can be active?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p4"><a href="#FP_Q115_A2"> (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p5"><a href="#FP_Q115_A3"> (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p6"><a href="#FP_Q115_A4"> (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p7"><a href="#FP_Q115_A5"> (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p8"><a href="#FP_Q115_A6"> (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 pr."><a name="33231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33231] +Iª q. 115 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +actione corporalis creaturae; et fato, quod aliquibus corporibus +attribuitur. Circa actiones corporales quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum +aliquod corpus sit activum. Secundo, utrum in corporibus sint +aliquae seminales rationes. Tertio, utrum corpora caelestia sint +causa eorum quae hic per inferiora corpora fiunt. Quarto, utrum +sint causa humanorum actuum. Quinto, utrum eorum actionibus +Daemones subdantur. Sexto, utrum caelestia corpora imponant +necessitatem his quae eorum actionibus subduntur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q115_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A2-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual + order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in + which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33244] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod in materia corporali non sint aliquae +rationes seminales. Ratio enim importat aliquid secundum esse +spirituale. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquid spiritualiter, +sed materialiter tantum, secundum scilicet modum eius in quo est. +Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain + seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable + to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33245] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Daemones quaedam opera faciunt +adhibendo occultis motibus quaedam semina, quae in elementis +cognoscunt. Sed ea quae per motum localem adhibentur, sunt corpora, +non rationes. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod sunt in corporali +materia seminales rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, + matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33246] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +semen est principium activum. Sed in materia corporali non est +aliquod principium activum, cum materiae non competat agere, ut +dictum est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales +rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production + of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal + virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33247] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in +materia corporali dicuntur esse quaedam causales rationes, quae +videntur sufficere ad rerum productionem. Sed seminales rationes +sunt aliae a causalibus, quia praeter seminales rationes fiunt +miracula, non autem praeter causales. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur +quod seminales rationes sunt in materia corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds + lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33248] Iª q. 115 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., <i>omnium rerum quae +corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in +istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal + nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural + things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation + of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are + generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, + consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is + manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things + are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and + passive + virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement. + </p><p id="FP_Q115_A2-p8"> These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad + lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements + of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things + which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that + animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are + compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 co."><a name="33249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33249] Iª q. 115 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in +II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora +viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus +ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus +dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum +generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia +generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et +foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen +naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur. +Manifestum est autem quod principium activum et passivum +generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia +generantur. Et ideo convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas +et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, +seminales rationes vocat. Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et +passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo +quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt +principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes +ideales. Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a +principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis. Tertio +vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum +successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc +animali, tanquam in particularibus causis. Quarto modo, sunt in +seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum +comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales +causae universales ad primos effectus productos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal + matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes + ideales]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33250] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum +naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in +materia corporali; possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad +suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement + for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33251] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae vel passivae sunt in +aliquibus partibus corporalibus; quae dum adhibentur per motum +localem ad aliquos effectus complendos, dicuntur semina adhiberi +per Daemones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female + contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33252] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod semen maris est principium activum in generatione +animalis. Sed potest etiam dici semen id quod est ex parte feminae, +quod est principium passivum. Et sic sub semine comprehendi possunt +vires activae et passivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, + just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so + is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," + but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate + principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought + outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God + commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities + which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of + seminal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33253] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus +seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes +seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam +causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod <i>sicut matres gravidae +sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium</i>. +Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie +loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et +praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam +neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri +possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas +naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi +virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt +praeter rationes seminales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A3-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 3. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De + Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they + are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33254] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia non sint causa eorum +quae hic in inferioribus corporibus fiunt. Dicit enim Damascenus, +nos autem dicimus quoniam ipsa, scilicet corpora caelestia, <i>non +sunt causa alicuius eorum quae fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum quae +corrumpuntur, signa autem sunt magis imbrium et aeris +transmutationis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and + there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need + to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33255] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad +faciendum aliquid, sufficit agens et materia. Sed in istis +inferioribus invenitur materia patiens, inveniuntur etiam contraria +agentia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Ergo non est +necessarium, ad causandum ea quae hic inferius fiunt, causalitatem +caelestibus corporibus attribuere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through + the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore + the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33256] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +agens agit sibi simile. Sed videmus quod omnia quae fiunt hic +inferius, fiunt per hoc quod calefiunt et frigidantur, et +humectantur et desiccantur, et aliis huiusmodi qualitatibus +alterantur, quae non inveniuntur in corporibus caelestibus. Ergo +corpora caelestia non sunt causa eorum quae hic fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: + a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly + bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="33257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33257] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, <i>nihil est magis corporeum +quam corporis sexus</i>. Sed corporis sexus non causatur ex +corporibus caelestibus, cuius signum esse videtur, quod duorum +geminorum sub una constellatione natorum, unus est masculus et +alter est femina. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa rerum +corporalium quae hic fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more + subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible + bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33258] Iª q. 115 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>corpora crassiora et +inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur</i>. +Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>lumen solis ad +generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet, +et nutrit et auget et perficit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is + moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. + Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the + heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save + locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of + the heavenly bodies, as to their cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 co."><a name="33259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33259] Iª q. 115 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum omnis multitudo ab unitate procedat; quod autem immobile +est, uno modo se habet, quod vero movetur, multiformiter, +considerandum est, in tota natura, quod omnis motus ab immobili +procedit. Et ideo quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis +causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia. Corpora autem caelestia sunt +inter alia corpora magis immobilia, non enim moventur nisi motu +locali. Et ideo motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et +multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in +causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption + here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33260] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dictum Damasceni intelligendum est, quod corpora +caelestia non sunt prima causa generationis et corruptionis eorum +quae hic fiunt; sicut dicebant illi qui ponebant corpora caelestia +esse deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. + If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles + of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle + above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves + sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions + in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary + to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions. + </p><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p10"> This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive + their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, + would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior + bodies: which is clearly false. + </p><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p11"> Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of + its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. + Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: + thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33261] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod principia activa in istis inferioribus corporibus non +inveniuntur nisi qualitates activae elementorum, quae sunt calidum +et frigidum et huiusmodi. Et si sic esset quod formae substantiales +inferiorum corporum non diversificarentur nisi secundum huiusmodi +accidentia, quorum principia rarum et densum antiqui naturales +posuerunt; non oporteret super haec inferiora corpora aliquod +principium activum ponere, sed ipsa sufficerent ad agendum. Sed +recte considerantibus apparet quod huiusmodi accidentia se habent +sicut materiales dispositiones ad formas substantiales naturalium +corporum. Materia autem non sufficit ad agendum. Et ideo oportet +super has materiales dispositiones ponere aliquod principium +activum. Unde Platonici posuerunt species separatas, secundum +quarum participationem inferiora corpora substantiales formas +consequuntur. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia species separatae +semper eodem modo se haberent, cum ponantur immobiles, et sic +sequeretur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa generationem et +corruptionem inferiorum corporum; quod patet esse falsum. Unde +secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod +principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam +causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum +corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in +istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum +caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod +<i>homo generat hominem, et sol</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason + of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all + things are like God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33262] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod corpora caelestia inferioribus corporibus non sunt +similia similitudine speciei; sed inquantum sua universali virtute +continent in se quidquid in inferioribus corporibus generatur; +secundum quem modum dicimus etiam omnia esse Deo similia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. + Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed + sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because + the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the + various dispositions of matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33263] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur +in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae +dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus +humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim +formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur +ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per +astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis, +secundum diversam materiae dispositionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A4-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 4. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual + substances, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FP_Q115_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[3]</a>), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it + seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33264] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum +actuum. Corpora enim caelestia, cum moveantur a spiritualibus +substantiis, sicut supra dictum est, agunt in virtute earum quasi +instrumenta. Sed illae substantiae spirituales sunt superiores +animabus nostris. Ergo videtur quod possint imprimere in animas +nostras, et sic causare actus humanos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems + that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33265] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne +multiforme reducitur in aliquod uniforme principium. Sed actus +humani sunt varii et multiformes. Ergo videtur quod reducantur in +uniformes motus caelestium corporum, sicut in sua principia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect + and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human + actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33266] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +astrologi frequenter vera annuntiant de eventibus bellorum, et +aliis humanis actibus, quorum principia sunt intellectus et +voluntas. Quod facere non possent secundum caelestia corpora, nisi +essent humanorum actuum causa. Sunt ergo corpora caelestia +humanorum actuum causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33267] Iª q. 115 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>corpora caelestia humanorum actuum +nequaquam sunt causa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A3" id="FP_Q115_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because + the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore + if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding + that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice + and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there + are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action + of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate + actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, + that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, + as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the + intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive + powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, + disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although + the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains + the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue + of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, + than on the intellect. + </p><p id="FP_Q115_A4-p7"> To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does + not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and + of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal + organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 co."><a name="33268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33268] Iª q. 115 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod corpora caelestia in corpora quidem imprimunt directe et per +se, sicut iam dictum est. In vires autem animae quae sunt actus +organorum corporeorum, directe quidem, sed per accidens, quia +necesse est huiusmodi actus harum potentiarum impediri secundum +impedimenta organorum, sicut oculus turbatus non bene videt. Unde +si intellectus et voluntas essent vires corporeis organis +alligatae, sicut posuerunt aliqui, dicentes quod intellectus non +differt a sensu; ex necessitate sequeretur quod corpora caelestia +essent causa electionum et actuum humanorum. Et ex hoc sequeretur +quod homo naturali instinctu ageretur ad suas actiones, sicut +cetera animalia, in quibus non sunt nisi vires animae corporeis +organis alligatae, nam illud quod fit in istis inferioribus ex +impressione corporum caelestium, naturaliter agitur. Et ita +sequeretur quod homo non esset liberi arbitrii, sed haberet +actiones determinatas, sicut et ceterae res naturales. Quae +manifeste sunt falsa, et conversationi humanae contraria. Sciendum +est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum +caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt; +inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab +inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur. +Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas. Nam +intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus +apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel +memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus. Sed voluntas +non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, +licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, +habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate +voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare. Et ideo +impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt +inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima +causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum. Ponere igitur +caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium +illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam +eorum dicebant quod <i>talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in +diem inducit pater virorum deorumque</i>. Quia ergo constat +intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum, +impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum +actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; + but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated + above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FP_Q115_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[111], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33269] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora +movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus +corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando. +Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: + so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine + intellect and will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33270] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut multiformitas corporalium motuum reducitur +sicut in causam in uniformitatem motuum caelestium; ita +multiformitas actuum qui sunt ab intellectu et voluntate, reducitur +in principium uniforme quod est intellectus et voluntas divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly + bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the + truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting + his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say + that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33271] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod plures hominum sequuntur passiones, quae sunt motus +sensitivi appetitus, ad quas cooperari possunt corpora caelestia, +pauci autem sunt sapientes, qui huiusmodi passionibus resistant. Et +ideo astrologi ut in pluribus vera possunt praedicere, et maxime in +communi. Non autem in speciali, quia nihil prohibet aliquem hominem +per liberum arbitrium passionibus resistere. Unde et ipsi astrologi +dicunt quod sapiens homo dominatur astris, inquantum scilicet +dominatur suis passionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A5-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 5. Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass + men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.24" target="asv"> Mat. 4:24 </a>and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33272] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia possint imprimere in +ipsos Daemones. Daemones enim secundum certa augmenta lunae aliquos +homines vexant, qui et propter hoc lunatici dicuntur; ut patet +Matth. IV et XVII. Sed hoc non esset, nisi corporibus caelestibus +subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium +corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through + the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33273] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +necromantici observant certas constellationes ad invocandos +Daemones. Non autem per corpora caelestia invocarentur, si non eis +subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium +corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, + namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine + (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33274] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +corpora caelestia virtuosiora sunt quam corpora inferiora. Sed +quibusdam inferioribus corporibus Daemones arcentur, scilicet +herbis et lapidibus et animantibus, et quibusdam <i>sonis certis ac +vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis</i>, ut a Porphyrio +dictum Augustinus introducit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo multo magis +Daemones subduntur actioni caelestium corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33275] Iª q. 115 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Daemones sunt superiores ordine naturae quam corpora +caelestia. Agens autem est superius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit +XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni +corporum caelestium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and + held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. + This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain + powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is + manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would + in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors + of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things. + </p><p id="FP_Q115_A5-p7"> For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius + says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which + it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A4" id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q51_A1" id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[51], A[1]</a>): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action + of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 co."><a name="33276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33276] Iª q. 115 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa Daemones fuit triplex opinio. Prima Peripateticorum, qui +posuerunt Daemones non esse; sed ea quae attribuuntur Daemonibus, +secundum artem necromanticam, fiunt virtute caelestium corporum. Et +hoc est quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, introducit dictum a +Porphyrio, quod <i>fabricantur in terra ab hominibus potestates +idoneae siderum variis effectibus exequendis</i>. Sed haec positio +est manifeste falsa. Experimento enim scitur multa per Daemones +fieri, ad quae nullo modo virtus caelestium corporum sufficeret; +puta quod arreptitii loquuntur lingua ignota, quod recitant versus +et auctoritates quas nunquam sciverunt, quod necromantici faciunt +statuas loqui et moveri, et similia. Ex quibus Platonici moti +fuerunt ut ponerent Daemones esse animalia corpore aerea, animo +passiva; ut ab Apuleio dictum Augustinus introducit VIII de Civ. +Dei. Et haec est secunda opinio, secundum quam dici posset quod +Daemones hoc modo subduntur corporibus caelestibus, sicut et de +hominibus dictum est. Sed haec opinio ex superioribus patet esse +falsa, dicimus enim Daemones esse substantias intellectuales +corporibus non unitas. Unde patet quod non subduntur actioni +caelestium corporum, nec per se nec per accidens, nec directe nec +indirecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame + God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because + as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q114_A4" id="FP_Q115_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[114], A[4]</a>, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended + result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. + ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property + of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according + to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto + disposed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33277] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod hoc quod Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae +homines vexant, contingit propter duo. Primo quidem, ad hoc quod +infament creaturam Dei, scilicet lunam, ut Hieronymus et +Chrysostomus dicunt. Secundo quia, cum non possint operari nisi +mediantibus naturalibus virtutibus, ut supra dictum est; in suis +operibus considerant corporum aptitudines ad effectus intentos. +Manifestum est autem quod <i>cerebrum humidissimum est omnium +partium corporis</i>, ut Aristoteles dicit, et ideo maxime +subiicitur operationi lunae, quae ex sua proprietate habet movere +humorem. In cerebro autem perficiuntur vires animales, et ideo +Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae perturbant hominis +phantasiam, quando considerant cerebrum ad hoc esse dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of + believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations + corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33278] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Daemones advocati in certis constellationibus, +propter duo veniunt. Primo quidem, ut homines in hunc errorem +inducant, quod credant aliquod numen esse in stellis. Secundo, quia +considerant secundum aliquas certas constellationes materiam +corporalem magis esse dispositam ad effectus pro quibus +advocantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, + rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered + to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33279] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXI de Civ. Dei, <i>Daemones +alliciuntur per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum, +animalium, carminum, rituum, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus +signis</i>; inquantum scilicet haec eis exhibentur in signum divini +honoris, cuius ipsi sunt cupidi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A6-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 6. Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the + effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, + with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33280] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia imponant necessitatem +iis quae eorum actioni subduntur. Causa enim sufficienti posita, +necesse est effectum poni. Sed corpora caelestia sunt sufficiens +causa suorum effectuum. Cum igitur corpora caelestia, cum suis +motibus et dispositionibus, ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia; +videtur quod effectus eorum ex necessitate consequantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter + to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher + power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33281] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus agentis ex necessitate sequitur in materia, quando virtus +agentis tanta fuerit quod possit sibi subiicere totaliter materiam. +Sed tota materia inferiorum corporum subiicitur virtuti caelestium +corporum, tanquam excellentiori. Ergo ex necessitate effectus +caelestium corporum recipitur in materia corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal + cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: + since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle + is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. + Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33282] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +effectus caelestis corporis non ex necessitate proveniat, hoc est +propter aliquam causam impedientem. Sed quamlibet causam corpoream +quae impedire posset effectum caelestis corporis, necesse est +reduci in aliquod caeleste principium, cum caelestia corpora sint +causa omnium quae hic fiunt. Ergo, cum et illud caeleste principium +sit necessarium, sequitur quod necesse sit impediri effectum +alterius corporis caelestis. Et sic omnia quae hic contingunt, ex +necessitate eveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed + in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of + heavenly bodies take place of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33283] Iª q. 115 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., <i>quod neque +eorum quae in corporibus sunt signorum caelestium, velut aquarum et +ventorum, inconveniens est multa non evenire</i>. Sic ergo non +omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This question is partly solved by what was said above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A4" id="FP_Q115_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations + in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to + prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other + things to which human action extends. + </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p7"> But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced + by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning + of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows + of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. + vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition. + </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p8"> For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes + are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to + fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently + the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity. + </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p9"> Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, + has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise + (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly + a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to + its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these + two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be + reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take + fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the + surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight + on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of + heavenly bodies result of necessity. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 co."><a name="33284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33284] Iª q. 115 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod ista quaestio partim quidem absoluta est, secundum praemissa; +partim autem difficultatem habet. Ostensum enim est quod, quamvis +ex impressione corporum caelestium fiant aliquae inclinationes in +natura corporali, voluntas tamen non ex necessitate sequitur has +inclinationes. Et ideo nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem +impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine, +sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit. Sed +nullum tale principium invenitur in rebus naturalibus, quod habeat +libertatem sequendi vel non sequendi impressiones caelestes. Unde +videtur quod in talibus, ad minus, omnia ex necessitate proveniant, +secundum antiquam quorundam rationem, qui, supponentes omne quod +est causam habere, et quod, posita causa, ex necessitate ponitur +effectus, concludebant, quod omnia ex necessitate contingant. Quam +quidem opinionem repellit Aristoteles in VI Metaphys., secundum duo +quae ipsi supponunt. Primo enim, non est verum quod, posita +quacumque causa, necesse sit effectum poni. Sunt enim quaedam +causae quae ordinantur ad suos effectus non ex necessitate, sed ut +in pluribus, quae quandoque deficiunt in minori parte. Sed quia +huiusmodi causae non deficiunt in minori parte, nisi propter +aliquam causam impedientem, videtur adhuc praedictum inconveniens +non vitari, quia et ipsum impedimentum talis causae ex necessitate +contingit. Et ideo, secundo, oportet dicere quod omne quod est per +se, habet causam, quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam, +quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam +habet, similiter et musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam, +quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem quod +causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum +ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis +concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter +hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam +causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod +aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aeris generetur +et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem, et +similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia +combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed +quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet +causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens. Et sic patet +quod non omnes effectus caelestium corporum sunt ex +necessitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which + can fail in their effects in the minority of cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33285] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum +mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere +possunt in minori parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local + distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly + body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature + or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly + body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33286] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus corporis caelestis non est infinita. Unde +requirit determinatam dispositionem in materia ad inducendum suum +effectum, et quantum ad distantiam loci, et quantum ad alias +conditiones. Et ideo sicut distantia loci impedit effectum +caelestis corporis (non enim sol eundem caloris effectum habet in +Dacia, quem habet in Aethiopia); ita et grossities materiae, vel +frigiditas aut caliditas, aut alia huiusmodi dispositio, impedire +potest effectum corporis caelestis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless + the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33287] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, +reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam; tamen +concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in +causam caelestem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q116" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q116-p0.1">Q. 116. ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q116-p2"> We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q116-p3"><a href="#FP_Q116_A1"> (1) Is there such a thing as fate?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p4"><a href="#FP_Q116_A2"> (2) Where is it?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p5"><a href="#FP_Q116_A3"> (3) Is it unchangeable?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p6"><a href="#FP_Q116_A4"> (4) Are all things subject to fate?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 pr."><a name="33288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33288] +Iª q. 116 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de fato. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, an fatum sit. Secundo, in quo +sit. Tertio, utrum sit immobile. Quarto, utrum omnia subsint +fato.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q116_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q116_A2-p0.1">Q. 116. A. 2. Whether fate is in created things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is + called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33295] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit in rebus creatis. Dicit enim +Augustinus, V de Civ. Dei, quod <i>ipsa Dei voluntas vel potestas +fati nomine appellatur</i>. Sed voluntas et potestas Dei non est in +creaturis, sed in Deo. Ergo fatum non est in rebus creatis, sed in +Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal + cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33296] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +fatum comparatur ad ea quae ex fato aguntur, ut causa; ut ipse +modus loquendi ostendit. Sed causa universalis per se eorum quae +hic per accidens aguntur, est solus Deus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +fatum est in Deo, et non in rebus creatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according + to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but + in God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33297] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si +fatum est in creaturis, aut est substantia, aut accidens, et +quodcumque horum detur, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum +creaturarum multitudinem. Cum ergo fatum videatur esse unum tantum, +videtur quod fatum non sit in creaturis, sed in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33298] Iª q. 116 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod <i>fatum est dispositio +rebus mobilibus inhaerens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been stated above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A6" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[103], A[6]</a>), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two + ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this + ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, + thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is + served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements + of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain + of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A2" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[104], + A[2] + </a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.6" shape="rect">Q[113];</a> + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q114" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.7" shape="rect">Q[114])</a>. It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 co."><a name="33299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33299] Iª q. 116 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, divina providentia per causas +medias suos effectus exequitur. Potest ergo ipsa ordinatio +effectuum dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est in +ipso Deo, et sic ipsa ordinatio effectuum vocatur providentia. +Secundum vero quod praedicta ordinatio consideratur in mediis +causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet +rationem fati. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, IV de Consol., +<i>sive famulantibus quibusdam providentiae divinae spiritibus +fatum exercetur; seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, sive +caelestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu Daemonum +varia solertia, seu aliquibus eorum, seu omnibus, fatalis series +texitur</i>, de quibus omnibus per singula in praecedentibus dictum +est. Sic ergo est manifestum quod fatum est in ipsis causis +creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus +producendos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature + of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But + essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33300] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus +seriem causarum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum +quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas +dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu +series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33301] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et +ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies + order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; + and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. + In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33302] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere +qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non +est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per +comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum +fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad +ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit, +<i>te tua fata trahunt</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q116_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q116_A4-p0.1">Q. 116. A. 4. Whether all things are subject to fate?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and + the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are + born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be + excluded from the domain of fate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33309] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod omnia fato subdantur. Dicit enim Boetius, +in IV de Consol., <i>series fati caelum et sidera movet, elementa +in se invicem temperat, et alterna format transmutatione; eadem +nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes foetuum seminumque +renovat progressus; haec actus fortunasque hominum indissolubili +causarum connexione constringit</i>. Nihil ergo excipi videtur, +quod sub fati serie non contineatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the + Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject + to fate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33310] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod fatum aliquid est, +secundum quod ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei refertur. Sed +voluntas Dei est causa omnium quae fiunt, ut Augustinus dicit in +III de Trin. Ergo omnia subduntur fato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are + changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q9_A2" id="FP_Q116_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[2]</a>). Therefore fate is in all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33311] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +fatum, secundum Boetium, est <i>dispositio rebus mobilibus +inhaerens</i>. Sed omnes creaturae sunt mutabiles, et solus Deus +vere immutabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in omnibus creaturis +est fatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33312] Iª q. 116 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod <i>quaedam quae sub +providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A2" id="FP_Q116_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject + also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to + fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. + iv): viz. that "those things which are + nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing + is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 co."><a name="33313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33313] Iª q. 116 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum +causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis +secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato. Si qua vero sunt quae +immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non +subduntur fato; sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium +substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, +quod <i>ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, +fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod +quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati +maioribus implicatur</i>; quia magis subiicitur necessitati +secundarum causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in + the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33314] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod omnia illa quae ibi tanguntur, fiunt a Deo +mediantibus causis secundis; et ideo sub fati serie continentur. +Sed non est eadem ratio de omnibus aliis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever + is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33315] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fatum refertur ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei, sicut +ad primum principium. Unde non oportet quod quidquid subiicitur +voluntati divinae vel potestati, subiiciatur fato, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, + therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33316] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quamvis omnes creaturae sint aliquo modo mutabiles, +tamen aliquae earum non procedunt a causis creatis mutabilibus. Et +ideo non subiiciuntur fato, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q117" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q117-p0.1">Q. 117. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q117-p2"> We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual + nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from + man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FP_Q117-p3"><a href="#FP_Q117_A1"> (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p4"><a href="#FP_Q117_A2"> (2) Whether man can teach an angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p5"><a href="#FP_Q117_A3"> (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p6"><a href="#FP_Q117_A4"> (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 pr."><a name="33317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33317] +Iª q. 117 pr.</span></a> Postea considerandum est de his quae +pertinent ad actionem hominis, qui est compositus ex spirituali et +corporali creatura. Et primo considerandum est de actione hominis; +secundo, de propagatione hominis ex homine. Circa primum quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum unus homo possit docere alium, causando in +ipso scientiam. Secundo, utrum homo possit docere Angelum. Tertio, +utrum homo per virtutem suae animae possit immutare materiam +corporalem. Quarto, utrum anima hominis separata possit movere +corpora motu locali.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q117_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A1-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 1. Whether one man can teach another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.8" target="asv">Mat. 22:8</a>): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to + be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is + proper to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33318] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit alium docere. Dicit enim +dominus, Matth. XXIII, <i>nolite vocari Rabbi</i>; ubi dicit Glossa +Hieronymi, <i>ne divinum honorem hominibus tribuatis</i>. Esse ergo +magistrum pertinet proprie ad divinum honorem. Sed docere est +proprium magistri. Homo ergo non potest docere, sed hoc est +proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge + in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows + that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33319] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si +homo alium docet, hoc non est nisi inquantum agit per scientiam +suam ad causandum scientiam in alio. Sed qualitas per quam aliquis +agit ad faciendum sibi simile, est qualitas activa. Ergo sequitur +quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sicut et calor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either + of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33320] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad +scientiam requiritur lumen intelligibile, et species rei +intellectae. Sed neutrum istorum potest causare unus homo in alio. +Ergo unus homo non potest docendo causare scientiam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something + by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. + For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom + these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from + the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to + speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in + another by teaching him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33321] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +doctor nihil agit ad discipulum nisi quod proponit ei quaedam +signa, vel vocibus aliquid significando, vel nutibus. Sed +proponendo signa non potest aliquis alium docere, causando in eo +scientiam. Quia aut proponit signa rerum notarum; aut rerum +ignotarum. Si rerum notarum, ille ergo cui signa proponuntur, iam +habet scientiam, et eam non acquirit a magistro. Si autem rerum +ignotarum, per huiusmodi signa nihil addiscit, sicut si aliquis +proponeret alicui Latino verba Graeca, quorum significationem +ignoraret, per hoc eum docere non posset. Nullo ergo modo unus homo +potest, alium docendo, scientiam in eo causare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.7" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:7</a>): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33322] Iª q. 117 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. II, <i>in quo positus sum ego +praedicator et apostolus, doctor gentium in fide et +veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have + one passive intellect in common, as stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause + another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which + he + has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. + This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: + for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, + and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p8"> Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, + through the participation of separate forms, as stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A3" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it + knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider + what he + knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose + (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved + above ( + <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q84_A3" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[3]</a>) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima + iii, 4). + </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p9"> We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing + him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of + effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused + to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes + from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical + art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things + must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection + of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not + as + principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, + by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing + the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended + end. + </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p10"> Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; + and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle + of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are + naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal + principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own + research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, + leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what + the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge." + </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p11"> Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing + to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he + may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous + knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or + something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, + by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above + ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[111], A[1]</a>) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes + to the disciple the order of principles to + conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. + Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator + causes his hearer to know. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 co."><a name="33323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33323] Iª q. 117 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod circa hoc diversae fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in +Comment. III de anima, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse +omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod +eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc, +ponit quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat aliam scientiam in +altero ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam +quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata +in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad +intelligibilem apprehensionem. Quae quidem opinio quantum ad hoc +vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si +consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei +veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum +ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum, +et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum +diversa phantasmata; falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est. +Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod scientia inest a +principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum +separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis +impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet. +Et secundum hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de +novo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam +habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci. Sicut etiam +ponebant quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem +formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem +specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est quod +intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in potentia pura ad +intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles dicit in III de anima. Et +ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in +addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in +VIII Physic. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod effectuum +qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio +tantum; sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte. +Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio, +quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo +quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae; +quandoque autem ab interiori principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per +virtutem naturae. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda. +Primo quidem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut +enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et expellendo +materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars. Secundo attendendum est, +quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut +principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est +principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei +instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum, +sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas, +quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum. Scientia autem acquiritur +in homine et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui per +inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori, +ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam +principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod +cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia +principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi +universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum +memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit; per inventionem +propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad +ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus +novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod +dicitur in I Poster., quod <i>omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex +praeexistenti fit cognitione</i>. Ducit autem magister discipulum +ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem, +proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus +eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam, puta cum proponit ei aliquas +propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis +discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia +exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus +intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis +ignotae. Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non +quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra +dictum est de Angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus +sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit +discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per +seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis +posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod +demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Et per hunc modum ille +qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the + principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these + are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.3" target="asv">Ps. 102:3</a>); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>), + inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), through which light all things are shown to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33324] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, homo docens solummodo exterius +ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans, sed sicut natura +interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen +intellectus est principalis causa scientiae. Utrumque autem horum +est a Deo. Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, qui sanat omnes +infirmitates tuas; ita de eo dicitur, qui docet hominem scientiam, +inquantum lumen vultus eius super nos signatur, per quod nobis +omnia ostenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore + knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle + by which one is directed in working. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33325] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum +agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod +scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis +dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis +dirigitur in operando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but + he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs + of which are proposed to him from without. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33326] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, +nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam +doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet +intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit +exterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail + and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his + own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33327] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum +notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in +particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per +seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel +esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia +completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A2-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 2. Whether man can teach the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.10" target="asv">Eph. 3:10</a>): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the + Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33328] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homines possint docere Angelos. Dicit enim +apostolus, ad Ephes. III, <i>ut innotescat principibus et +potestatibus in caelestibus per Ecclesiam multiformis sapientia +Dei</i>. Sed Ecclesia est congregatio hominum fidelium. Ergo +Angelis per homines aliqua innotescunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior + angels, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[116], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A3" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[112], A[3]</a>). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.1" target="asv"> Heb. 1:1,2</a>: "Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore + some men have been able to teach the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33329] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Angeli superiores, qui immediate de divinis a Deo illuminantur, +inferiores Angelos instruere possunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed +aliqui homines immediate de divinis per Dei verbum sunt instructi; +sicut maxime patet de apostolis, secundum illud ad Heb. I, +<i>novissime, diebus istis, locutus est nobis in filio</i>. Ergo +aliqui homines aliquos Angelos docere potuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are + taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior + angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33330] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inferiores Angeli a superioribus instruuntur. Sed quidam homines +superiores sunt aliquibus Angelis, cum ad supremos ordines +Angelorum aliqui homines assumantur, ut Gregorius dicit in quadam +homilia. Ergo aliqui inferiores Angeli per aliquos homines de +divinis instrui possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; + but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same + way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from + Our Lord's words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>): "There hath not risen among them + that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." + Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels + the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33331] Iª q. 117 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnes divinae +illuminationes perferuntur ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Non ergo +Angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least + of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery + which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities + and powers in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church." As + though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities + and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection + this Church composed of men will be gathered together." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 co."><a name="33332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33332] Iª q. 117 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra habitum est, inferiores Angeli loqui quidem +possunt superioribus Angelis, manifestando eis suas cogitationes; +sed de rebus divinis superiores ab inferioribus nunquam +illuminantur. Manifestum est autem quod eo modo quo inferiores +Angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam +infimis Angelorum. Quod patet per id quod dominus dicit, Matth. XI, +<i>inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista; sed qui +minor est in regno caelorum, maior est illo</i>. Sic igitur de +rebus divinis ab hominibus Angeli nunquam illuminantur. +Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines Angelis per modum +locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius +Dei est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p7"> It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when + it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and + the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were + hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from + the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, + the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which + mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33333] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Augustinus, V super Gen. ad Litt., sic exponit illam +apostoli auctoritatem. Praemiserat enim apostolus, <i>mihi, omnium +sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit +dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Ita dico +absconditi, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in +caelestibus, per Ecclesiam scilicet, multiformis sapientia Dei</i>. +Quasi dicat, ita hoc sacramentum erat absconditum hominibus, ut +tamen Ecclesiae caelesti, quae continetur in principibus et +potestatibus, hoc sacramentum notum esset <i>a saeculis, non ante +saecula, quia ibi primitus Ecclesia fuit, quo post resurrectionem +et ista Ecclesia hominum congreganda est</i>. Potest tamen et +aliter dici, quod <i>illud quod absconditum est, non tantum in Deo +innotescit Angelis, verum etiam hic eis apparet, cum efficitur +atque propalatur</i>, ut Augustinus ibidem subdit. Et sic dum per +apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, Angelis +aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis +occulta. Et per hunc modum potest intelligi quod Hieronymus dicit, +quod, apostolis praedicantibus, Angeli aliqua mysteria cognoverunt, +quia scilicet per praedicationem apostolorum huiusmodi mysteria +explebantur in rebus ipsis, sicut praedicante Paulo convertebantur +gentes; de quo apostolus ibi loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in + His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33334] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non +secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur. +Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such + great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might + say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33335] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores +aliquibus Angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet +habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem +beatitudinis gradum quam quidam Angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus +semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam +parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A3-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 3. Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work + miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his + reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal + matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33336] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod homo per virtutem animae possit corporalem +materiam immutare. Dicit enim Gregorius, II Dialog., quod <i>sancti +miracula aliquando ex prece faciunt, aliquando ex potestate, sicut +Petrus, qui Tabitham mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram +mentientes morti increpando tradidit</i>. Sed in operatione +miraculorum fit aliqua immutatio materiae corporalis. Ergo homines +virtute suae animae possunt materiam corporalem immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on these words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.1" target="asv">Gal. 3:1</a>): "Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single + look bewitch others, especially children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. + Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33337] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +super illud ad Gal. III, <i>quis vos fascinavit veritati non +obedire?</i> Dicit Glossa quod <i>quidam habent</i> oculos urentes, +qui solo aspectu inficiunt alios, et maxime pueros. Sed hoc non +esset, nisi virtus animae posset materiam corporalem immutare. Ergo +homo per virtutem suae animae potest materiam corporalem +immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is + changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on + sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33338] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +corpus humanum est nobilius quam alia inferiora corpora. Sed per +apprehensionem animae humanae immutatur corpus humanum ad calorem +et frigus, ut patet in irascentibus et timentibus; et quandoque +etiam haec immutatio pervenit usque ad aegritudinem et mortem. Ergo +multo magis anima hominis potest sua virtute materiam corporalem +immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33339] Iª q. 117 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod <i>materia corporalis +soli Deo obedit ad nutum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or + by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels + also we have stated ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal + agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, + except by means of bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 co."><a name="33340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33340] Iª q. 117 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad +formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma; +vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma +praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque. Unde et de +Angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non +possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad +effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute +naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus +aliquibus corporibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same + place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33341] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae, +non naturae. Quod patet per illud quod Gregorius ibidem dicit, +<i>qui filii Dei ex potestate sunt, ut dicit Ioannes, quid mirum si +signa facere ex potestate valeant?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance + rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This + he says is the cause of the "evil eye." + </p><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p9"> But it has been shown above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, + that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits + takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact + with them to a certain distance: in the + same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; + [*De Insomniis ii]). + </p><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p10"> Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, + the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is + also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may + have some compact with them. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33342] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fascinationis causam assignavit Avicenna ex hoc, quod +materia corporalis nata est obedire spirituali substantiae magis +quam contrariis agentibus in natura. Et ideo quando anima fuerit +fortis in sua imaginatione, corporalis materia immutatur secundum +eam. Et hanc dicit esse causam oculi fascinantis. Sed supra +ostensum est quod materia corporalis non obedit substantiae +spirituali ad nutum, nisi soli creatori. Et ideo melius dicendum +est, quod ex forti imaginatione animae immutantur spiritus corporis +coniuncti. Quae quidem immutatio spirituum maxime fit in oculis, ad +quos subtiliores spiritus perveniunt. Oculi autem inficiunt aerem +continuum usque ad determinatum spatium, per quem modum specula, si +fuerint nova et pura, contrahunt quandam impuritatem ex aspectu +mulieris menstruatae, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de Somn. et +Vig. Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad +malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum +modum praedictum aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime +pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum +impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel +etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas +Daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q117_A3-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs + be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change + in exterior bodies, except by means of a + change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33343] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima corpori humano unitur ut forma, et appetitus +sensitivus, qui obedit aliqualiter rationi, ut supra dictum est, +est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et ideo oportet quod ad +apprehensionem animae humanae, commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum +aliqua operatione corporali. Ad exteriora vero corpora immutanda +apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione +proprii corporis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A4-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 4. Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance + as to local motion, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A5" id="FP_Q117_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[5]</a>). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33344] Iª q. 117 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis separata possit corpora +saltem localiter movere. Substantiae enim spirituali naturaliter +obedit corpus ad motum localem, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima +separata est substantia spiritualis. Ergo suo imperio potest +exteriora corpora movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained + power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not + have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33345] Iª q. 117 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in +itinerario Clementis dicitur, narrante Niceta ad Petrum, quod Simon +magus per magicas artes pueri a se interfecti animam retinebat, per +quam magicas operationes efficiebat. Sed hoc esse non potuisset +sine aliqua corporum transmutatione, ad minus locali. Ergo anima +separata habet virtutem localiter movendi corpora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33346] Iª q. 117 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod philosophus dicit, in libro de anima quod anima non potest +movere quodcumque corpus, sed solummodo proprium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the + body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey + the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the + limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, + by the power of God, it can exceed those limits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 co."><a name="33347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33347] Iª q. 117 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod +corpus. Manifestum est enim quod, cum anima est corpori unita, non +movet corpus nisi vivificatum, unde si aliquod membrum corporis +mortificetur, non obedit animae ad motum localem. Manifestum est +autem quod ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur. Unde nullum +corpus obedit ei ad motum localem, quantum est ex virtute suae +naturae, supra quam potest aliquid ei conferri virtute divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally + unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance + is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only + one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower + heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it + is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33348] Iª q. 117 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes +non determinantur ad aliqua corpora, sicut sunt Angeli, qui sunt +naturaliter a corporibus absoluti, et ideo diversa corpora eis +possunt obedire ad motum. Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae +virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus, +non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus, +sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset +movere caelum superius. Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam +determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud +corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the + dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some + demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33349] Iª q. 117 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et +Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter Daemones simulant se esse +animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc +credebant. Et ideo credibile est quod Simon magus illudebatur ab +aliquo Daemone, qui simulabat se esse animam pueri quem ipse +occiderat.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q118" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q118-p0.1">Q. 118. OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q118-p2"> We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.</p><p id="FP_Q118-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q118-p4"><a href="#FP_Q118_A1"> (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</a></p><p id="FP_Q118-p5"><a href="#FP_Q118_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?</a></p><p id="FP_Q118-p6"><a href="#FP_Q118_A3"> (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 pr."><a name="33350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33350] +Iª q. 118 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +traductione hominis ex homine. Et primo, quantum ad animam; +secundo, quantum ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, +utrum anima sensitiva traducatur cum semine. Secundo, utrum anima +intellectiva. Tertio, utrum omnes animae fuerint simul creatae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q118_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A1-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 1. Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, + not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing + is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since + it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist + not by generation but by creation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33351] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima sensitiva non traducatur cum semine, +sed sit per creationem a Deo. Omnis enim substantia perfecta quae +non est composita ex materia et forma, si esse incipiat, hoc non +est per generationem, sed per creationem, quia nihil generatur nisi +ex materia. Sed anima sensitiva est substantia perfecta, alioquin +non posset movere corpus, et cum sit forma corporis, non est ex +materia et forma composita. Ergo non incipit esse per generationem, +sed per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the + vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive + soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33352] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +principium generationis in rebus viventibus est per potentiam +generativam; quae, cum numeretur inter vires animae vegetabilis, +est infra animam sensitivam. Nihil autem agit ultra suam speciem. +Ergo anima sensitiva non potest causari per vim generativam +animalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But + neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere + than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle + of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the + sensitive soul is not produced through the semen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33353] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +generans generat sibi simile, et sic oportet quod forma generati +sit actu in causa generationis. Sed anima sensitiva non est actu in +semine, nec ipsa nec aliqua pars eius, quia nulla pars animae +sensitivae est nisi in aliqua parte corporis; in semine autem non +est aliqua corporis particula, quia nulla particula corporis est +quae non fiat ex semine, et per virtutem seminis. Ergo anima +sensitiva non causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the + animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul + of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: + or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above + ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q118_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[4]</a>) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does + not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore + the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33354] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si +in semine est aliquod principium activum animae sensitivae, aut +illud principium manet, generato iam animali; aut non manet. Sed +manere non potest. Quia vel esset idem cum anima sensitiva animalis +generati, et hoc est impossibile, quia sic esset idem generans et +generatum, faciens et factum. Vel esset aliquid aliud, et hoc etiam +est impossibile, quia supra ostensum est quod in uno animali non +est nisi unum principium formale, quod est una anima. Si autem non +manet, hoc etiam videtur impossibile, quia sic aliquod agens ageret +ad corruptionem sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima +sensitiva potest generari ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced + from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20</a>: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated + are produced by the seminal power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33355] Iª q. 118 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ita +se habet virtus quae est in semine, ad animalia quae ex semine +generantur, sicut se habet virtus quae est in elementis mundi, ad +animalia quae ex elementis mundi producuntur, sicut quae ex +putrefactione generantur. Sed in huiusmodi animalibus animae +producuntur ex virtute quae est in elementis; secundum illud Gen. +I, <i>producant aquae reptile animae viventis</i>. Ergo et +animalium quae generantur ex semine, animae producuntur ex virtute +quae est in semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God ( + <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A4" id="FP_Q118_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[4]</a>). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having + being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made + except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation. + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p8"> But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above + ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[3]</a>): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to + existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist + forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them. + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p9"> Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that + both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce + the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed. + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p10"> Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance + to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their + like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, + act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of + nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant + derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from + the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, + so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some + seminal power derived therefrom. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 co."><a name="33356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33356] Iª q. 118 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari. +Quae quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res +subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per +se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberetur ei fieri. Et +cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem, +sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem. +Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se +habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet, non enim +corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma +subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum +corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur +inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt. Unde et ipsis +compositis debetur fieri. Et quia generans est simile generato, +necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae +huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus +agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum, per +aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis. Quanto autem aliquod +agens est potentius, tanto potest suam actionem diffundere ad magis +distans, sicut quanto aliquod corpus est magis calidum, tanto ad +remotius calefactionem producit. Corpora igitur non viventia, quae +sunt inferiora naturae ordine, generant quidem sibi simile, non per +aliquod medium, sed per seipsa; sicut ignis per seipsum generat +ignem. Sed corpora viventia, tanquam potentiora, agunt ad +generandum sibi simile et sine medio, et per medium. Sine medio +quidem, in opere nutritionis, in quo caro generat carnem, cum medio +vero, in actu generationis, quia ex anima generantis derivatur +quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et +a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum. +Et sicut non refert dicere quod aliquid moveatur ab instrumento, +vel a principali agente; ita non refert dicere quod anima generati +causetur ab anima generantis, vel a virtute derivata ab ipsa, quae +est in semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough ( + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q25_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[3]</a>) on this point, nor need we repeat it here. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33357] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se +subsistens. Et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic +iterare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the + generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to + so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33358] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute +propria, sed in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia. Et ideo +virtus generativa plantae generat plantam; virtus vero generativa +animalis generat animal. Quanto enim anima fuerit perfectior, tanto +virtus eius generativa ordinatur ad perfectiorem effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement + of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or + the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; + but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is + attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, + by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[115], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been + said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's + power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33359] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa vis activa quae est in semine, ex anima +generantis derivata, est quasi quaedam motio ipsius animae +generantis, nec est anima, aut pars animae, nisi in virtute; sicut +in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quaedam ad talem +formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod +organum in actu; sed fundatur in ipso spiritu incluso in semine, +quod est spumosum, ut attestatur eius albedo. In quo etiam spiritu +est quidam calor ex virtute caelestium corporum, quorum etiam +virtute agentia inferiora agunt ad speciem, ut supra dictum est. Et +quia in huiusmodi spiritu concurrit virtus animae cum virtute +caelesti, dicitur quod homo generat hominem, et sol. Calidum autem +elementare se habet instrumentaliter ad virtutem animae, sicut +etiam ad virtutem nutritivam, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. + Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very + beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it + begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore + is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as + though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would + be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after + the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of + the + thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, + by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved + and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal + but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33360] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod in animalibus perfectis, quae generantur ex coitu, +virtus activa est in semine maris, secundum philosophum in libro de +Generat. Animal.; materia autem foetus est illud quod ministratur a +femina. In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima +vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum +primum, sicut anima sensitiva est in dormientibus. Cum autem +incipit attrahere alimentum, tunc iam actu operatur. Huiusmodi +igitur materia transmutatur a virtute quae est in semine maris, +quousque perducatur in actum animae sensitivae, non ita quod +ipsamet vis quae erat in semine, fiat anima sensitiva; quia sic +idem esset generans et generatum; et hoc magis esset simile +nutritioni et augmento, quam generationi, ut philosophus dicit. +Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi quod erat in semine, +producta est anima sensitiva in generato quantum ad aliquam partem +eius principalem, tunc iam illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit +operari ad complementum proprii corporis, per modum nutritionis et +augmenti. Virtus autem activa quae erat in semine, esse desinit, +dissoluto semine, et evanescente spiritu qui inerat. Nec hoc est +inconveniens, quia vis ista non est principale agens, sed +instrumentale; motio autem instrumenti cessat, effectu iam producto +in esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q118_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A2-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 2. Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.46.26" target="asv">Gn. 46:26</a>): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from + the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33361] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva causetur ex semine. +Dicitur enim Gen. XLVI, <i>cunctae animae quae egressae sunt de +femore Iacob, sexaginta sex</i>. Sed nihil egreditur de femore +hominis, nisi inquantum causatur ex semine. Ergo anima intellectiva +causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as shown above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q118_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[3]</a>), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated + from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man + are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual + soul is produced from the + semen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33362] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut supra ostensum est, in homine est una et eadem anima secundum +substantiam, intellectiva, sensitiva et nutritiva. Sed anima +sensitiva in homine generatur ex semine, sicut in aliis animalibus, +unde et philosophus dicit in libro de Generat. Animal., quod non +simul fit animal et homo, sed prius fit animal habens animam +sensitivam. Ergo et anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the + form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced + by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33363] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum +et idem agens, est cuius actio terminatur ad formam, et materiam, +alioquin ex forma et materia non fieret unum simpliciter. Sed anima +intellectiva est forma corporis humani, quod formatur per virtutem +seminis. Ergo et anima intellectiva per virtutem seminis +causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational + soul is from the begetter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33364] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, homo +generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Sed species humana +constituitur per animam rationalem. Ergo anima rationalis est a +generante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in + the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created + by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="33365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33365] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +inconveniens est dicere quod Deus cooperetur peccantibus. Sed si +animae rationales crearentur a Deo, Deus interdum cooperaretur +adulteris, de quorum illicito coitu proles interdum generatur. Non +ergo animae rationales creantur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33366] Iª q. 118 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod <i>animae rationales +non seminantur per coitum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now + it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no + part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle. + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p9"> Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the + body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. + Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De + Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without." + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p10"> Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q118_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through + generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing + else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with + the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 co."><a name="33367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33367] Iª q. 118 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod impossibile est virtutem activam quae est in materia, +extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum. +Manifestum est autem quod principium intellectivum in homine est +principium transcendens materiam, habet enim operationem in qua non +communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quae est in +semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii. Similiter etiam quia +virtus quae est in semine agit in virtute animae generantis, +secundum quod anima generantis est actus corporis, utens ipso +corpore in sua operatione. In operatione autem intellectus non +communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout +intellectivum est, non potest ad semen pervenire. Et ideo +philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., dicit, <i>relinquitur +intellectus solus de foris advenire</i>. Similiter etiam anima +intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore, est subsistens, +ut supra habitum est, et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri. Et cum sit +immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed +solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a +generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non +subsistentem; et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo +haereticum est dicere quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum +semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33368] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod in auctoritate illa ponitur per synecdochen pars pro +toto, idest anima pro toto homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from + the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, + and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive + soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul. + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p13"> Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; + and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one + would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q118_A2-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[3]</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p14"> Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal + power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, + but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says + that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is + susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity + constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. + Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from + the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an + animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the + beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further + perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. + Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be + essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those + who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: + and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted. + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p15"> There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has + been disproved above ( + <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q118_A2-p15.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p16"> We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both + in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening + form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations + and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is + apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created + by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being + corrupted. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33369] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliqui dixerunt quod operationes vitae quae apparent +in embryone, non sunt ab anima eius, sed ab anima matris; vel a +virtute formativa quae est in semine. Quorum utrumque falsum est, +opera enim vitae non possunt esse a principio extrinseco, sicut +sentire, nutriri et augeri. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima +praeexistit in embryone a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum +autem sensitiva, et tandem intellectiva. Dicunt ergo quidam quod +supra animam vegetabilem quae primo inerat, supervenit alia anima, +quae est sensitiva; et supra illam iterum alia, quae est +intellectiva. Et sic sunt in homine tres animae, quarum una est in +potentia ad aliam. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo alii dicunt +quod illa eadem anima quae primo fuit vegetativa tantum, postmodum, +per actionem virtutis quae est in semine, perducitur ad hoc quod +fiat etiam sensitiva; et tandem perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem +fiat intellectiva, non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per +virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet Dei deforis illustrantis. Et +propter hoc dicit philosophus quod intellectus venit ab extrinseco. +Sed hoc stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma +substantialis recipit magis et minus; sed superadditio maioris +perfectionis facit aliam speciem, sicut additio unitatis facit +aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem +forma numero sit diversarum specierum. Secundo, quia sequeretur +quod generatio animalis esset motus continuus, paulatim procedens +de imperfecto ad perfectum; sicut accidit in alteratione. Tertio, +quia sequeretur quod generatio hominis aut animalis non sit +generatio simpliciter, quia subiectum eius esset ens actu. Si enim +a principio in materia prolis est anima vegetabilis, et postmodum +usque ad perfectum paulatim perducitur; erit semper additio +perfectionis sequentis sine corruptione perfectionis praecedentis. +Quod est contra rationem generationis simpliciter. Quarto, quia aut +id quod causatur ex actione Dei, est aliquid subsistens, et ita +oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma praeexistente, quae +non erat subsistens; et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas +in corpore. Aut non est aliquid subsistens, sed quaedam perfectio +animae praeexistentis, et sic ex necessitate sequitur quod anima +intellectiva corrumpatur, corrupto corpore; quod est impossibile. +Est autem et alius modus dicendi, secundum eos qui ponunt unum +intellectum in omnibus. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo dicendum +est quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius, +necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, +quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen +quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc amplius. +Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad +ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis +animalibus. Et hoc ad sensum apparet in animalibus ex putrefactione +generatis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod anima intellectiva creatur +a Deo in fine generationis humanae, quae simul est et sensitiva et +nutritiva, corruptis formis praeexistentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to + one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior + agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, + but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been + said above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A5" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[5]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders + the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33370] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa locum habet in diversis agentibus non +ordinatis ad invicem. Sed si sint multa agentia ordinata, nihil +prohibet virtutem superioris agentis pertingere ad ultimam formam; +virtutes autem inferiorum agentium pertingere solum ad aliquam +materiae dispositionem; sicut virtus seminis disponit materiam, +virtus autem animae dat formam, in generatione animalis. Manifestum +est autem ex praemissis quod tota natura corporalis agit ut +instrumentum spiritualis virtutis; et praecipue Dei. Et ideo nihil +prohibet quin formatio corporis sit ab aliqua virtute corporali, +anima autem intellectiva sit a solo Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33371] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod homo generat sibi simile, inquantum per virtutem +seminis eius disponitur materia ad susceptionem talis formae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; + in this God does not concur. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="33372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33372] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod in actione adulterorum, illud quod est naturae, bonum +est, et huic cooperatur Deus. Quod vero est inordinatae voluptatis, +malum est, et huic Deus non cooperatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q118_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A3-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 3. Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv">Gn. 2:2</a>): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore + all souls were created at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33373] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod animae humanae fuerint creatae simul a +principio mundi. Dicitur enim Gen. II, <i>requievit Deus ab omni +opere quod patrarat</i>. Hoc autem non esset, si quotidie novas +animas crearet. Ergo omnes animae sunt simul creatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created + with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently + at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv"> Gn. 2:2, </a> where it is said that "God ended" all "His work." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33374] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad +perfectionem universi maxime pertinent substantiae spirituales. Si +igitur animae simul crearentur cum corporibus, quotidie +innumerabiles spirituales substantiae perfectioni universi +adderentur, et sic universum a principio fuisset imperfectum. Quod +est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>Deum omne opus suum +complesse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore + it began to exist before the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33375] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +finis rei respondet eius principio. Sed anima intellectiva remanet, +destructo corpore. Ergo incoepit esse ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33376] Iª q. 118 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod <i>simul anima +creatur cum corpore</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is + of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of + men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on + which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would + follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above + ( + <a href="#FP_Q75_A4" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, + as shown above ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[85], A[1]</a> ): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above ( + <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7; + <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[85], A[1]</a>). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: + whereas this cannot be said of an angel. + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p7"> Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, + it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. + Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without + a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body. + </p><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p8"> But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united + to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed + it---this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did + not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not + fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the + world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above + time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: + since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the + begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of + some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion + of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, + we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into + them. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 co."><a name="33377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33377] Iª q. 118 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod quidam posuerunt quod animae intellectivae accidat uniri +corpori, ponentes eam esse eiusdem conditionis cum substantiis +spiritualibus quae corpori non uniuntur. Et ideo posuerunt animas +hominum simul a principio cum Angelis creatas. Sed haec opinio +falsa est. Primo quidem, quantum ad radicem. Si enim accidentaliter +conveniret animae corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista +unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset +homo, quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod etiam anima +humana non sit eiusdem naturae cum Angelis, ipse diversus modus +intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est, homo enim intelligit +a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra +ostensum est. Et ideo indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad +operationem sensitivae partis. Quod de Angelo dici non potest. +Secundo apparet falsitas in ipsa positione. Si enim animae naturale +est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et +sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit +autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab +his quae sunt praeter naturam, non enim fecit hominem sine manu aut +sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis. Multo igitur minus +fecit animam sine corpore. Si vero aliquis dicat quod non est +naturale animae corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sint +corporibus unitae. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex +eius voluntate; aut ex alia causa. Si ex eius voluntate, videtur +hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec voluntas +irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore, et vellet ei uniri, +si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniretur, quia +natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo, quia nulla ratio esset +quare animae a principio mundi creatae, post tot tempora voluntas +accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. Est enim substantia spiritualis +supra tempus, utpote revolutiones caeli excedens. Tertio quia +videretur a casu esse quod haec anima huic corpori uniretur, cum ad +hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animae +advenientis, et hominis generantis. Si autem praeter voluntatem +ipsius corpori unitur, et praeter eius naturam; oportet quod hoc +sit ex causa violentiam inferente, et sic erit ei poenale et +triste. Quod est secundum errorem Origenis, qui posuit animas +incorporari propter poenam peccati. Unde cum haec omnia sint +inconvenientia, simpliciter confitendum est quod animae non sunt +creatae ante corpora, sed simul creantur cum corporibus +infunduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.17" target="asv">Jn. 5:17</a>): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed + in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, + in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33378] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod Deus dicitur cessasse die septimo, non quidem ab omni +opere, cum dicatur Ioan. V, <i>pater meus usque modo operatur</i>; +sed a novis rerum generibus et speciebus condendis, quae in +operibus primis non aliquo modo praeextiterint. Sic enim animae +quae nunc creantur, praeextiterunt secundum similitudinem speciei +in primis operibus, in quibus anima Adae creata fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number + of species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33379] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod perfectioni universi, quantum ad numerum +individuorum, quotidie potest addi aliquid, non autem quantum ad +numerum specierum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was + not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.16" target="asv">16</a>): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33380] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc quod anima remanet sine corpore, contingit per +corporis corruptionem, quae consecuta est ex peccato. Unde non fuit +conveniens quod ab hoc inciperent Dei opera, quia, sicut scriptum +est Sap. I, <i>Deus mortem non fecit, sed impii manibus et verbis +accersierunt eam</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FP_Q119" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FP_Q119-p0.1">Q. 119. OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FP_Q119-p2"> We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q119-p3"><a href="#FP_Q119_A1"> (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?</a></p><p id="FP_Q119-p4"><a href="#FP_Q119_A2"> (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 pr."><a name="33381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33381] +Iª q. 119 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +propagatione hominis quantum ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +duo. Primo, utrum aliquid de alimento convertatur in veritatem +humanae naturae. Secundo, utrum semen, quod est humanae +generationis principium, sit de superfluo alimenti.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FP_Q119_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q119_A1-p0.1">Q. 119. A. 1. Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not + changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33382] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem +humanae naturae. Dicitur enim Matth. XV, <i>omne quod in os intrat, +in ventrem vadit, et per secessum emittitur</i>. Sed quod +emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo nihil de +alimento in veritatem humanae naturae transit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter"; + and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food + is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore + the food is not changed into true human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33383] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus, in I de Generat., distinguit carnem secundum speciem, +et secundum materiam; et dicit quod caro secundum materiam advenit +et recedit. Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit. +Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam, +non autem caro secundum speciem. Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem +humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius. Ergo alimentum non +transit in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according + to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true + human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33384] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad +veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod +si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem +restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo +nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due + only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33385] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si +alimentum transiret in veritatem humanae naturae, quidquid in +homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit +nisi per deperditionem alicuius. Posset igitur homo per sumptionem +alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for + what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow + that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically + the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, + identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="33386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33386] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si +alimentum in veritatem humanae naturae transiret, nihil esset in +homine quod non posset recedere et reparari, quia id quod in homine +generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo +diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in +principio suae generationis, finaliter remaneret in ipso. Et sic +non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam, cum ad hoc quod +aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem +est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanae +naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture + of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality + of human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33387] Iª q. 119 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>alimenta carnis +corrupta, idest amittentia formam suam, in membrorum fabricam +migrant</i>. Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanae +naturae. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore + that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered + in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common + matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate + matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus + a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul + and this body. + </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p9"> Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist + save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain + individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have + been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human + nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature. + </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p10"> But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in + this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed + into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent + the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed + by fire. + </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p11"> But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, + or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. + Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human + body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be + changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is + only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one + individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect + of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the + substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; + for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore + some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently + no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other + things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of + matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect + than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things + were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of + the + human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does + not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants + do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which + multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does + anything + increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of + generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible. + </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p12"> Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature + in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain + determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter + until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true + human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through + the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase + required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary + existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does + not + belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of + living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not + the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, + would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly, + because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above ( + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A1" id="FP_Q119_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[118], A[1]</a>). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power + a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true + form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for + growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of + natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore + just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food. + </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p13"> Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its + assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food + nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 co."><a name="33388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33388] Iª q. 119 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum +quod, secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., <i>hoc modo se habet +unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse</i>. Illud ergo +pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione +naturae ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, +in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est +in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi +consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad +veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet +materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam +individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est +anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et +Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus. Sunt autem quaedam, quorum +formae non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma +solis non potest salvari nisi in materia quae actu sub ea +continetur. Et secundum hunc modum, aliqui posuerunt quod forma +humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quae +scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine. Ita +quod quidquid aliud praeter illud quod ex primo parente in posteros +derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae +naturae, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanae naturae. Sed illa +materia quae in primo homine formae humanae fuit subiecta, in +seipsa multiplicatur, et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a +corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hos, alimentum non +convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, sed dicunt quod alimentum +accipitur ut quoddam fomentum naturae, idest ut resistat actioni +caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel +stannum adiungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. Sed haec +positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia +eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia +materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere, et ideo omnia +generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem +quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quae ei +subiicitur, alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde +relinquitur quod et alii materiae advenire possit, aliquo alio in +veritatem humanae naturae transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus +quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum +individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et +huiusmodi. Sic igitur non esset nisi unum individuum humanae +speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiae +attendatur nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in +rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit maiores dimensiones; vel etiam +secundum substantiam materiae. Sola autem eadem substantia materiae +manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata, quia idem ad +seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem +multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua +alia substantia materiae adveniat, vel per creationem, vel per +conversionem alterius in ipsam. Unde relinquitur quod non potest +aliqua materia multiplicari, nisi vel per rarefactionem, sicut cum +ex aqua fit aer; vel per conversionem alterius rei, sicut +multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem +materiae. Sed manifestum est multiplicationem materiae in humanis +corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem, quia sic corpora hominum +perfectae aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum. Nec +iterum per creationem novae materiae, quia secundum Gregorium, +<i>omnia sunt simul creata secundum substantiam materiae, licet non +secundum speciem formae</i>. Unde relinquitur quod multiplicatio +corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc, quod alimentum convertitur in +veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia cum homo non differat ab +animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod +etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicarentur per +conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quandam +multiplicationem. Quae non potest esse naturalis, cum materia +secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem; +nec iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere, nisi per +rarefactionem, vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum +opus generativae et nutritivae, quae dicuntur vires naturales, +esset miraculosum. Quod est omnino inconveniens. Unde alii dixerunt +quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia +materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si +accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa +manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in +generatione huius individui, ita quod illam materiam nunquam +deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam +dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae. Sed +quia huiusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam, +requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in +substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et +hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanae +naturae, quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad +quantitatem eius. Iam vero si quid aliud advenit ex alimento, non +pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc +etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec opinio iudicat de +materia corporum viventium, ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in +quibus etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen +est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum +individuum; quae quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus +nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus +viventibus, si alimentum in veritatem naturae ipsorum non +converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quae est in semine, est +quaedam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum +est. Unde non potest esse maioris virtutis in agendo, quam ipsa +anima a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit +aliqua materia formam naturae humanae, multo magis anima in +nutrimentum coniunctum poterit veram formam naturae humanae +imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento +indigetur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento +necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod +deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset +restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in +locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate +humanae naturae, ita et id quod ex alimento generatur. Et ideo, +secundum alios, dicendum est quod alimentum vere convertitur in +veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et +ossis et huiusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II +de anima, quod <i>alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia +caro</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of food + is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and + be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33389] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dominus non dicit quod totum quod in os intrat, per +secessum emittatur, sed omne, quia de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum +per secessum emittitur. Vel potest dici quod quidquid ex alimento +generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros +quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from + the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what + is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the + mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their + species in matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something + belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, + or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water + is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, + cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying + that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains. + </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p16"> It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh + considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that + which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. + But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and + renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is + substituted in its place. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33390] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliqui per carnem secundum speciem intellexerunt id +quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante, et +hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat. Carnem vero +secundum materiam dicunt esse quae generatur ex alimento, et hanc +dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit. +Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi quod, +sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, puta in ligno et +lapide, <i>ita et in carne hoc est secundum speciem, et illud +secundum materiam</i>. Manifestum est autem quod praedicta +distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quae non generantur +ex semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum, cum id quod ex alimento +generatur, adiungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut +aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem philosophus; non +potest alia esse natura eius quod advenit, et eius cui advenit, cum +iam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem. Unde nulla ratio est quod +unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Et ideo +aliter dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est +secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam +considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest +secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper +manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si +consideretur caro secundum materiam, sic non manet, sed paulatim +consumitur et restauratur, sicut patet in igne fornacis, cuius +forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum eius +substituitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot + be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly + the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue + of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33391] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id +in quo fundatur virtus speciei. Quod si subtrahatur, restitui non +potest, sicut si amputetur manus aut pes, vel aliquid huiusmodi. +Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum +perfecte naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc; sicut est sanguis, +et alia huiusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus +speciei in radice, quae non tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming + virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. + Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; + and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, + the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, + so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33392] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam +actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et +ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut +possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem +deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest +convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et +tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. +Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. +Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per +admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut +philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be + generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the + entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. + But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until + the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes + into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed + by natural heat. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="33393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33393] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I de Generat. quando +aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de +novo generari, quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem +praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota materia simul +amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit +alius ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, aliud +substituatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur, +semper remanet idem ignis numero, quia semper quod additur, transit +in praeexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus +viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem +naturalem consumitur.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>