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            <h2 id="FP.vi-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF GOOD AND EVIL (QQ[48]-49)</h2>
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               <h3 id="FP_Q48-p0.1">THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the
                  distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures.
               </p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p3"> Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.</p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p4"> Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p5"> (1) Whether evil is a nature?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p6"> (2) Whether evil is found in things?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p7"> (3) Whether good is the subject of evil?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p8"> (4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p9"> (5) The division of evil into pain and fault.</p>
               <p id="FP_Q48-p10"> (6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?</p>
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q48_A1-p0.1">Whether evil is a nature?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic.
                     x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality;
                     for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries,
                     as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be
                     a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection
                     of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all
                     things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore
                     evil is a nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being nor a good."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the
                     nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being
                     and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that
                     evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of
                     evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For
                     since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore
                     they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward
                     examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says
                     (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as
                     being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white,
                     and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries;
                     because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object
                     of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences
                     in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself
                     constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end;
                     just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus,
                     therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good;
                     as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the
                     order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between
                     good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right
                     order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not
                     evil." And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not
                     from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that
                     sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of
                     good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the
                     sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.
                     But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed
                     to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as
                     Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of
                     itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according
                     as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good.
                     Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally,
                     that is, by reason of some good joined to it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A1-p15"></p>
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q48_A2-p0.1">Whether evil is found in things?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something,
                     that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from
                     non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which
                     is contrary to what has been said 
                     <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good
                     unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things
                     made by God there is no evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may
                     be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good
                     which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose
                     their existence as incorruptible
                     things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p7"> As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible
                     beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows
                     that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence
                     it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an
                     evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but
                     a privation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a
                     thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a
                     being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together
                     subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense
                     being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other
                     privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things
                     may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order
                     to the whole, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q48_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>). And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail
                     in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not
                     to destroy,
                     but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail;
                     secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many
                     good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted,
                     nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a
                     sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A2-p12"></p>
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q48_A3-p0.1">Whether evil is in good as in its subject?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv,
                     4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But "non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore,
                     neither does evil require good as its subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as
                     in its subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in
                     good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only in good."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q48_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative
                     and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist
                     is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a
                     man would be evil who had not the swiftness
                     of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance,
                     the privation of sight is called blindness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p8"> Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same---viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute
                     potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether
                     it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both
                     of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection
                     and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation
                     to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher
                     says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not "sight,"
                     but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid
                     down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference
                     to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter,
                     and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus;
                     whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as
                     is clear from the explanation given.
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q48_A4-p0.1">Whether evil corrupts the whole good?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries.
                     Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and
                     uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is
                     at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot wholly consume good."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed
                     by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind
                     of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness
                     the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is
                     diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p7"> The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but
                     rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as
                     contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared
                     for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its
                     perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied
                     in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p8"> Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither
                     is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements;
                     for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely
                     multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also
                     infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which
                     is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude
                     of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which
                     in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to
                     grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>: "Our sins have divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs
                     to its very nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where
                     it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation
                     to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous
                     is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third),
                     so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion,
                     we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of
                     the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance
                     either equally or more.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p12"> Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per
                     se," but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A4-p14"></p>
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                  <h4 id="FP_Q48_A5-p0.1">Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p2"> [*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification, being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain
                     of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense."---Ed.]
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures
                     there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore
                     evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which
                     are evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for "temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion
                     for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q48_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a>; not is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently
                     divided into pain and fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p6">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It would seem that this division is superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil
                     "because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Evil, as was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">(A[3])</a> is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and
                     second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold.
                     In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness
                     is an evil, as also it is an evil to
                     be wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it
                     does not exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil,
                     which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which
                     comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition
                     that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due
                     operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect
                     action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere negation, as was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q48_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight
                     is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise,
                     it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself, because existence
                     and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not,
                     properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the
                     action of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent
                     in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained
                     in evil, as including the idea of injury.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q48_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q48_A6-p0.1">Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good
                     than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above 
                     <a id="FP_Q48_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is better
                     than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation
                     of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body.
                     But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal
                     goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning,
                     so as to include privation of grace or glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p7"> There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain,
                     as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment." And
                     this because, since good absolutely considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act is operation,
                     or the use of something possessed, it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good
                     use of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well
                     what he has, man is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good
                     he has, as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disordered
                     act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than
                     pain has.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p8"> The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And
                     this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either something created, as sight, destroyed
                     by blindness, or something uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature forfeits its uncreated good.
                     But the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine
                     will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it
                     is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the
                     reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than
                     pain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection,
                     than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way,
                     both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault,
                     inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p12"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q48_A6-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.FP.vi.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="FP_Q49" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="FP_Q49-p0.1">THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="FP_Q49-p1"></p>
               <p id="FP_Q49-p2"> We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three points of inquire:</p>
               <p id="FP_Q49-p3"> (1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q49-p4"> (2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?</p>
               <p id="FP_Q49-p5"> (3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?</p>
               <div id="FP_Q49_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether good can be the cause of evil?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause
                     of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause,
                     if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no possible source of evil except good."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to
                     a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper
                     disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except
                     from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause
                     except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p8"> And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection
                     which belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the
                     cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise,
                     neither has
                     it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good,
                     but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p9"> In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused
                     by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus the defect in
                     the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason
                     only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not
                     in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent
                     or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form
                     intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation
                     of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it
                     impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and
                     water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form
                     of water, but at the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But if there
                     is a defect in the proper effect of the fire---as, for instance, that it fails to heat---this comes either by defect of the
                     action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not
                     receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which
                     of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause
                     of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good
                     will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless
                     the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes evil
                     to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">Q[19], A[9]</a>), this is by accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for instance, the
                     exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the
                     inward heat.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same
                     kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to
                     it. Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above.
                     But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually
                     deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault
                     follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q49_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.5" target="asv">Is. 45:5</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">7</a>): "I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil."
                     And
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv"> Amos 3:6, </a> "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above
                     
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2] , A[3]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4), it follows that also every evil is from God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same.
                     But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being."
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what was said 
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect,
                     but the highest perfection, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as
                     to its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p7"> But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards
                     both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said 
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that
                     corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order
                     of the universe. Now,
                     the order of the universe requires, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>, ad 2; 
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html">Q[48], A[2]</a>), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order
                     of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Amos.12.6" target="asv">1
                        2:6
                     </a>: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made death"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A2-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the
                     universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty,
                     but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and
                     perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused
                     by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature
                     of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
                     reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
                     the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="FP_Q49_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.FP.vii.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="FP_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?</h4>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes.
                     But contrariety is found in things, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q49_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:15</a>: "Good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary
                     principles, one of good, the other of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good,
                     as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation
                     to what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially,
                     but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is "per se." But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore,
                     we must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause,
                     but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient
                     cause, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>; 
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p10"> First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], AA[3]</a>,4). But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html">Q[5], A[3]</a>); and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p11"> Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness,
                     as shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A4.html">Q[48], A[4]</a>), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly
                     and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the
                     wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly
                     evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p12"> Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good,
                     as was shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent
                     to the direct cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p13"> Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence
                     also arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being,
                     and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something
                     by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for
                     instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however,
                     of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself,
                     and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>, ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p14"> Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to
                     reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes
                     even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common
                     cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the
                     power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was
                     shown above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular
                     cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was
                     said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above (
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A1.html">Q[48], AA[1]</a>, 2,3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a
                     perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil
                     by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the
                     same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme
                     good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any
                     essential evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above 
                     <a id="FP_Q49_A3-p19.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false.
                     For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole
                     universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as
                     in the greater number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that is, in regard to
                     reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="FP_Q49_A3-p20">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.
                  </p>
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