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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.x" class="div2">
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2 <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A4.html"></a>
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3 <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a>
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4 <h2 id="FP.x-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)</h2>
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5 <div id="FP_Q103" class="div3">
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6 <a href="summa.FP.x.html"></a>
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7 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a>
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8 <h3 id="FP_Q103-p0.1">OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
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9 <p id="FP_Q103-p1"></p>
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10 <p id="FP_Q103-p2"> Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof,
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11 and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there
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12 are eight points of inquiry:
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13 </p>
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14 <p id="FP_Q103-p3"> (1) Whether the world is governed by someone?</p>
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15 <p id="FP_Q103-p4"> (2) What is the end of this government?</p>
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16 <p id="FP_Q103-p5"> (3) Whether the world is governed by one?</p>
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17 <p id="FP_Q103-p6"> (4) Of the effects of this government?</p>
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18 <p id="FP_Q103-p7"> (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?</p>
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19 <p id="FP_Q103-p8"> (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</p>
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20 <p id="FP_Q103-p9"> (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?</p>
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21 <p id="FP_Q103-p10"> (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?</p>
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22 <div id="FP_Q103_A1" class="div4">
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23 <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a>
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24 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a>
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25 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A1-p0.1">Whether the world is governed by anyone?</h4>
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26 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p1"></p>
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27 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p2">
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28 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work
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29 for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have
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30 no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.
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31 </p>
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32 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p3">
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33 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but
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34 has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
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35 </p>
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36 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p4">
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37 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle
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38 of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their
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39 actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
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40 </p>
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41 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p5">
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42 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
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43 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this
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44 universe by mandate eternal."
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45 </p>
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46 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p6"> I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance.
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47 But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that
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48 in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed
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49 nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is
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50 a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that
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51 put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration
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52 of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (
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53 <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html">Q[44], A[4]</a>;
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54 <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65], A[2]</a>), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is
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55 not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate
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56 perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence,
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57 so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.
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58 </p>
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59 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p7">
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60 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures;
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61 and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for
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62 an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end
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63 unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end
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64 shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge,
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65 shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
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66 </p>
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67 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p8">
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68 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement
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69 we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing,
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70 would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (
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71 <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html">Q[104], A[1]</a>).
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72 </p>
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73 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p9">
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74 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God,
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75 directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression
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76 from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their
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77 nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their
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78 nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer,
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79 so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
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80 </p>
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81 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p10"></p>
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82 <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p11"></p>
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83 <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a>
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84 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a>
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85 </div>
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86 <div id="FP_Q103_A2" class="div4">
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87 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a>
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88 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a>
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89 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A2-p0.1">Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?</h4>
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90 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p1"></p>
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91 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p2">
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92 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the
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93 government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the
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94 thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of
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95 things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.
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96 </p>
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97 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p3">
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98 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation.
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99 But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic
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100 can be the end of the government of things.
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101 </p>
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102 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p4">
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103 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine
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104 says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the
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105 world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.
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106 </p>
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107 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p5">
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108 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
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109 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of
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110 all things is something extrinsic to them.
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111 </p>
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112 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p6">
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113 <b>I answer that,</b> As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their
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114 beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what
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115 has been expounded above (
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116 <a id="FP_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear
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117 that good has the nature
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118 of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things
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119 is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a
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120 particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which
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121 is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.
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122 </p>
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123 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p7">
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124 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something
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125 done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the
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126 buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe
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127 being the good to which it is directed.
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128 </p>
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129 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p8">
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130 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the
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131 end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder
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132 is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made,
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133 but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that
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134 Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is
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135 the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation
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136 thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.
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137 </p>
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138 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p9">
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139 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate
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140 end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in
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141 Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.
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142 </p>
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143 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p10"></p>
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144 <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p11"></p>
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145 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a>
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146 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a>
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147 </div>
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148 <div id="FP_Q103_A3" class="div4">
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149 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a>
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150 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a>
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151 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A3-p0.1">Whether the world is governed by one?</h4>
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152 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p1"></p>
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153 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p2">
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154 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government
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155 of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously
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156 different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
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157 </p>
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158 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p3">
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159 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the
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160 ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the
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161 case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
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162 </p>
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163 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p4">
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164 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" (
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165 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.4.9" target="asv">Eccles. 4:9</a>). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.
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166 </p>
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167 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p5">
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168 <b>On the contrary,</b> We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (
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169 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs
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170 dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (
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171 <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">Q[13], A[8]</a>). Therefore the world is governed by one.
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172 </p>
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173 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p6">
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174 <b>I answer that,</b> We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which
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175 is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the
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176 best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things
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177 governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness,
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178 as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which
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179 they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as
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180 they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is
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181 unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord,
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182 except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several
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183 things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of
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184 the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi,
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185 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
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186 </p>
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187 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p7">
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188 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity
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189 of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (
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190 <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2;
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191 <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html">Q[48], A[2]</a>), and not by a diversity of governors.
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192 </p>
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193 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p8">
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194 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so
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195 far as they are included in the one order of the universe.
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196 </p>
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197 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p9">
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198 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is
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199 possible.
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200 </p>
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201 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p10"></p>
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202 <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p11"></p>
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203 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a>
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204 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a>
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205 </div>
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206 <div id="FP_Q103_A4" class="div4">
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207 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a>
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208 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a>
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209 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A4-p0.1">Whether the effect of government is one or many?</h4>
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210 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p1"></p>
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211 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p2">
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212 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that
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213 which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example
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214 of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.
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215 </p>
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216 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p3">
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217 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved
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218 <a id="FP_Q103_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.
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219 </p>
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220 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p4">
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221 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the
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222 many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects
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223 of government.
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224 </p>
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225 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p5">
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226 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs
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227 to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.
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228 </p>
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229 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p6">
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230 <b>I answer that,</b> The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected.
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231 Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things
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232 tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself;
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233 and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good.
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234 Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature
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235 is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in
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236 two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly,
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237 with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to
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238 be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things
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239 to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without
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240 number.
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241 </p>
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242 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p7">
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243 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two
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244 things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.
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245 </p>
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246 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p8"> From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.</p>
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247 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p9"></p>
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248 <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p10"></p>
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249 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a>
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250 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a>
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251 </div>
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252 <div id="FP_Q103_A5" class="div4">
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253 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a>
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254 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a>
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255 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A5-p0.1">Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?</h4>
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256 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p1"></p>
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257 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p2">
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258 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (
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259 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.11" target="asv">Eccles. 9:11</a>): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches
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260 to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not
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261 ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine
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262 government.
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263 </p>
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264 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p3">
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265 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
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266 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject
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267 to the Divine government.
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268 </p>
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269 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p4">
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270 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it
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271 is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed.
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272 Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.
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273 </p>
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274 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p5">
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275 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal,
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276 even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their
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277 nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government.
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278 </p>
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279 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p6">
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280 <b>I answer that,</b> For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection;
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281 and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal
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282 being, as proved above (
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283 <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government.
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284 This can also
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285 be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under
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286 the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown
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287 <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have
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288 said above (
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289 <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html">Q[44], A[4]</a>;
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290 <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65], A[2]</a>), so it is impossible for
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291 anything to escape from the Divine government.
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292 </p>
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293 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p7"> Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even
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294 human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth"
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295 (
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296 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.9.9" target="asv">Ezech. 9:9</a>).
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297 </p>
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298 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p8">
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299 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such
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300 things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element
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301 of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government
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302 of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would
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303 tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which
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304 constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher
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305 cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects
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306 may be found in these things according to some order of time.
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307 </p>
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308 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p9">
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309 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable
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310 thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is
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311 an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover.
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312 Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed
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313 according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these
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314 are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this,
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315 that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational
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316 creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God
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317 hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which
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318 rational creatures are governed.
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319 </p>
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320 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p10">
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321 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the
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322 Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own
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323 act, it requires to be governed by God.
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324 </p>
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325 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p11"></p>
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326 <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p12"></p>
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327 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a>
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328 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a>
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329 </div>
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330 <div id="FP_Q103_A6" class="div4">
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331 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a>
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332 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a>
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333 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A6-p0.1">Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</h4>
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334 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p1"></p>
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335 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p2">
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336 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the
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337 opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly
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338 things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to
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339 watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain
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340 spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.
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341 </p>
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342 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p3">
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343 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But
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344 God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.
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345 </p>
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346 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p4">
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347 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others;
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348 thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the
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349 same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.
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350 </p>
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351 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p5">
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352 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater
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353 subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled
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354 by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."
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355 </p>
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356 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p6">
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357 <b>I answer that,</b> In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution
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358 of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some
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359 things by means of others.
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360 </p>
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361 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p7"> The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest
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362 degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design
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363 of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his
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364 attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we
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365 must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.
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366 </p>
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367 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p8"> But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better
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368 in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself
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369 and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some
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370 of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils,
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371 but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
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372 </p>
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373 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p9">
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374 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of
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375 government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.
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376 </p>
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377 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p10">
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378 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would
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379 not be accomplished by one.
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380 </p>
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381 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p11">
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382 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his
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383 dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.
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384 </p>
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385 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p12"></p>
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386 <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p13"></p>
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387 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a>
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388 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a>
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389 </div>
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390 <div id="FP_Q103_A7" class="div4">
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391 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a>
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392 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a>
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393 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A7-p0.1">Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?</h4>
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394 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p1"></p>
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395 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p2">
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396 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol.
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397 iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would
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398 follow that no evil exists.
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399 </p>
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400 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p3">
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401 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs
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402 outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.
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403 </p>
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404 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p4">
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405 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.
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406 Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity,
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407 and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine
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408 government.
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409 </p>
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410 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p5">
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411 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
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412 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Esth.13.9" target="asv">Esther 13:9</a>): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will."
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413 </p>
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414 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p6">
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415 <b>I answer that,</b> It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal
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416 cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding
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417 cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of
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418 the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which
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419 again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the
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420 first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside
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421 the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order
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422 of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards
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423 some other
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424 cause.
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425 </p>
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426 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p7">
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427 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (
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428 <a id="FP_Q103_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped
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429 from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
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430 </p>
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431 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p8">
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432 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order
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433 of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
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434 </p>
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435 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p9">
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436 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not
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437 as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside
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438 the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
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439 </p>
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440 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p10"></p>
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441 <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p11"></p>
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442 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a>
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443 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a>
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444 </div>
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445 <div id="FP_Q103_A8" class="div4">
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446 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a>
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447 <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a>
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448 <h4 id="FP_Q103_A8-p0.1">Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?</h4>
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449 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p1"></p>
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450 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p2">
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451 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (
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452 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.8" target="asv">Is. 3:8</a>): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."
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453 </p>
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454 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p3">
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455 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against
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456 God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.
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457 </p>
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458 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p4">
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459 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things
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460 rebel against the order of the Divine government.
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461 </p>
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462 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p5">
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463 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign
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464 good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (
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465 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8" target="asv">Wis. 8</a>) of Divine wisdom.
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466 </p>
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467 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p6">
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468 <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause
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469 of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.
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470 </p>
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471 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p7"> Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly
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472 from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and
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473 effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that,
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474 as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is
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475 nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but
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476 an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end,
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477 as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things sweetly."
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478 </p>
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479 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p8">
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480 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for
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481 even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their
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482 nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.
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483 </p>
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89
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484 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> is clear from the above.</p>
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64
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485 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p10">
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486 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause;
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487 but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
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488 </p>
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489 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p11"></p>
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490 <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p12"></p>
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491 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a>
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492 <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a>
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493 </div>
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494 <a href="summa.FP.x.html"></a>
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495 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a>
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496 </div>
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497 <div id="FP_Q104" class="div3">
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498 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a>
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499 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a>
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500 <h3 id="FP_Q104-p0.1">THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
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501 <p id="FP_Q104-p1"></p>
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502 <p id="FP_Q104-p2"> We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:</p>
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503 <p id="FP_Q104-p3"> (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?</p>
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504 <p id="FP_Q104-p4"> (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?</p>
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505 <p id="FP_Q104-p5"> (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?</p>
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506 <p id="FP_Q104-p6"> (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?</p>
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507 <div id="FP_Q104_A1" class="div4">
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508 <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a>
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509 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a>
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510 <h4 id="FP_Q104_A1-p0.1">Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?</h4>
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511 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p1"></p>
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512 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p2">
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513 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in
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514 being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature
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515 cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which
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516 is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be
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517 in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself,
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518 because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of
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519 the angels (
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520 <a id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], AA[2]</a>,5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality
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521 to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (
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522 <a id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A2.html">Q[66], A[2]</a>). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality
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523 to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since
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524 it is not in potentiality to any other form.
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525 </p>
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526 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p3">
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527 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect
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528 to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for
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529 some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He
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530 has ceased to create it.
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531 </p>
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532 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p4">
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533 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and
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534 violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through
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535 some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are
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536 spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to
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537 not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.
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538 </p>
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539 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p5">
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540 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious,
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541 produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is
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542 not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does
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543 it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature
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544 in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore
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545 creatures are not kept in being by God.
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546 </p>
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547 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p6">
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548 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
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549 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>): "Upholding all things by the word of His power."
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550 </p>
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551 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p7">
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552 <b>I answer that,</b> Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a
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553 thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything
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554 by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire.
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555 In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a
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556 nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said
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557 to preserve another 'per se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot
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558 exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God,
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559 so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the
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560 Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).
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561 </p>
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562 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p8"> This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an
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563 agent may be the cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being." This may be seen both in artificial
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564 and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct cause of its "being."
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565 For it is clear that the "being" of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and
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566 arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying
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567 the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able
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568 to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house depends on the nature of these
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569 materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For
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570 if
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571 an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of "being" which results from that form;
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572 but it will be the cause of the effect, in its "becoming" only.
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573 </p>
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574 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p9"> Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would
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575 then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this
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576 form for as much as it is in matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives "this form." And this
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577 is to be the cause of "becoming," as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is
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578 such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause,
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579 then the "becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the agent.
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580 </p>
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581 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p10"> Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists
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582 in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus
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583 the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause
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584 of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of
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585 "becoming" but also the cause of "being."
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586 </p>
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587 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p11"> Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of
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588 the effect: so neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of
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589 the effect not only in "becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's
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590 action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to
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591 act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if
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592 it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly
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593 and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On
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594 the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the
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595 principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.
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596 </p>
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597 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p12"> Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by
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598 its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence,
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599 since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence.
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600 Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His
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601 creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says:
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602 "As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns
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603 at once to darkness."
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604 </p>
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605 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p13">
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606 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Being" naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from
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607 the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures
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608 and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
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609 </p>
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610 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p14">
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611 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make
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612 it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an
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613 effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but
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614 only of "becoming."
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615 </p>
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616 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p15">
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617 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not
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618 need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
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619 </p>
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620 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p16">
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621 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either
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622 motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.
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623 </p>
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624 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p17"></p>
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625 <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p18"></p>
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626 <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a>
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627 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a>
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628 </div>
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629 <div id="FP_Q104_A2" class="div4">
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630 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a>
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631 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a>
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632 <h4 id="FP_Q104_A2-p0.1">Whether God preserves every creature immediately?</h4>
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633 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p1"></p>
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634 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p2">
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635 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as
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636 above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.
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637 </p>
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638 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p3">
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639 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less
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640 therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause
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641 preserving them.
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642 </p>
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643 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p4">
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644 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes
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645 do not seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause only by moving, as above stated (
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646 <a id="FP_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html">Q[45], A[3]</a>). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.
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647 </p>
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648 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p5">
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649 <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore
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650 He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
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651 </p>
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652 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p6">
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653 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
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654 <a id="FP_Q104_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a
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655 corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per se," by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of
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656 the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal
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657 things there are many causes which
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658 hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction;
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659 and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when
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660 we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally
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661 on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the
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662 principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all
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663 the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.
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664 </p>
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665 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p7"> For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes:
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666 thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation
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667 of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation
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668 and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which
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669 are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.
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670 </p>
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671 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p8">
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672 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend
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673 on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation.
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674 </p>
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675 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p9">
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676 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only
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677 produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
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678 another.
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679 </p>
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680 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p10">
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681 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue
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682 of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in
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683 the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is
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684 lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of
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685 the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.
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686 </p>
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687 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p11"></p>
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688 <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p12"></p>
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689 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a>
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690 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a>
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691 </div>
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692 <div id="FP_Q104_A3" class="div4">
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693 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a>
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694 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a>
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695 <h4 id="FP_Q104_A3-p0.1">Whether God can annihilate anything?</h4>
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696 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p1"></p>
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697 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p2">
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698 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything
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699 tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate
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700 anything.
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701 </p>
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702 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p3">
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703 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because
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704 God is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be
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705 the case were He to annihilate anything.
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706 </p>
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707 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p4">
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708 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action
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709 is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated
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710 another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.
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711 </p>
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712 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p5">
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713 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
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714 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
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715 </p>
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716 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p6">
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717 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate
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718 anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above (
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719 <a id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things
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720 of His own free-will, according to
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721 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.134.6" target="asv"> Ps. 134:6</a>: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He
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722 hath done." Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence
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723 otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed,
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724 God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence;
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725 and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.
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726 </p>
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727 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p7">
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728 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as
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729 such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has
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730 this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to
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731 non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.
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732 </p>
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733 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p8">
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734 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on
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735 creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence,
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736 so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.
|
|
|
737 </p>
|
|
|
738 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p9">
|
|
|
739 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
|
|
|
740 </p>
|
|
|
741 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
742 <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
743 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
744 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
745 </div>
|
|
|
746 <div id="FP_Q104_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
747 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a>
|
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|
748 <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a>
|
|
|
749 <h4 id="FP_Q104_A4-p0.1">Whether anything is annihilated?</h4>
|
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|
750 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
751 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p2">
|
|
|
752 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing
|
|
|
753 but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced
|
|
|
754 to nothing.
|
|
|
755 </p>
|
|
|
756 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p3">
|
|
|
757 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves
|
|
|
758 (Phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration;
|
|
|
759 and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.
|
|
|
760 </p>
|
|
|
761 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p4">
|
|
|
762 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are
|
|
|
763 reduced to nothing.
|
|
|
764 </p>
|
|
|
765 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p5">
|
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|
766 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
767 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
|
|
|
768 </p>
|
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|
769 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p6">
|
|
|
770 <b>I answer that,</b> Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously,
|
|
|
771 and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (
|
|
|
772 <a id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things
|
|
|
773 which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To
|
|
|
774 each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (
|
|
|
775 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.
|
|
|
776 </p>
|
|
|
777 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p7"> Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no
|
|
|
778 potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible,
|
|
|
779 since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation
|
|
|
780 of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in
|
|
|
781 existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.
|
|
|
782 </p>
|
|
|
783 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p8">
|
|
|
784 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that
|
|
|
785 they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving
|
|
|
786 all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (
|
|
|
787 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>).
|
|
|
788 </p>
|
|
|
789 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p9">
|
|
|
790 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence
|
|
|
791 is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things,
|
|
|
792 however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent
|
|
|
793 from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot
|
|
|
794 resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue
|
|
|
795 to exist for ever.
|
|
|
796 </p>
|
|
|
797 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p10">
|
|
|
798 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for
|
|
|
799 it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely
|
|
|
800 reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of
|
|
|
801 the subject.
|
|
|
802 </p>
|
|
|
803 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
804 <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
805 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
806 <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a>
|
|
|
807 </div>
|
|
|
808 <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
809 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
810 </div>
|
|
|
811 <div id="FP_Q105" class="div3">
|
|
|
812 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
813 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
814 <h3 id="FP_Q105-p0.1">OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
815 <p id="FP_Q105-p1"></p>
|
|
|
816 <p id="FP_Q105-p2"> We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures
|
|
|
817 by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another.
|
|
|
818 </p>
|
|
|
819 <p id="FP_Q105-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
820 <p id="FP_Q105-p4"> (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?</p>
|
|
|
821 <p id="FP_Q105-p5"> (2) Whether He can immediately move a body?</p>
|
|
|
822 <p id="FP_Q105-p6"> (3) Whether He can move the intellect?</p>
|
|
|
823 <p id="FP_Q105-p7"> (4) Whether He can move the will?</p>
|
|
|
824 <p id="FP_Q105-p8"> (5) Whether God works in every worker?</p>
|
|
|
825 <p id="FP_Q105-p9"> (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?</p>
|
|
|
826 <p id="FP_Q105-p10"> (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?</p>
|
|
|
827 <p id="FP_Q105-p11"> (8) Of the diversity of miracles.</p>
|
|
|
828 <div id="FP_Q105_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
829 <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a>
|
|
|
830 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
831 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A1-p0.1">Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?</h4>
|
|
|
832 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
833 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p2">
|
|
|
834 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii,
|
|
|
835 Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets
|
|
|
836 like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.
|
|
|
837 </p>
|
|
|
838 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p3">
|
|
|
839 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by
|
|
|
840 some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means
|
|
|
841 of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any
|
|
|
842 particular form, except by means of a particular agent.
|
|
|
843 </p>
|
|
|
844 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p4">
|
|
|
845 <b>Objection 3:</b> As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as
|
|
|
846 we have seen above (
|
|
|
847 <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html">Q[104], A[2]</a>). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God,
|
|
|
848 only by means of particular causes.
|
|
|
849 </p>
|
|
|
850 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p5">
|
|
|
851 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
852 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."
|
|
|
853 </p>
|
|
|
854 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p6">
|
|
|
855 <b>I answer that,</b> God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active
|
|
|
856 power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it
|
|
|
857 can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing
|
|
|
858 else but the act of matter.
|
|
|
859 </p>
|
|
|
860 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p7">
|
|
|
861 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man,
|
|
|
862 and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in
|
|
|
863 its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they
|
|
|
864 are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that
|
|
|
865 over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (
|
|
|
866 <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
867 <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the
|
|
|
868 composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating
|
|
|
869 a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But
|
|
|
870 no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence
|
|
|
871 angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
|
|
|
872 </p>
|
|
|
873 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p8">
|
|
|
874 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows
|
|
|
875 the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that
|
|
|
876 form on matter.
|
|
|
877 </p>
|
|
|
878 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p9">
|
|
|
879 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes
|
|
|
880 to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.
|
|
|
881 </p>
|
|
|
882 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
883 <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
884 <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a>
|
|
|
885 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
886 </div>
|
|
|
887 <div id="FP_Q105_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
888 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
889 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
890 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A2-p0.1">Whether God can move a body immediately?</h4>
|
|
|
891 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
892 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p2">
|
|
|
893 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher
|
|
|
894 says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between
|
|
|
895 God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
|
|
|
896 </p>
|
|
|
897 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p3">
|
|
|
898 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object
|
|
|
899 of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal
|
|
|
900 power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
|
|
|
901 </p>
|
|
|
902 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p4">
|
|
|
903 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a
|
|
|
904 body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist
|
|
|
905 at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God's
|
|
|
906 power is infinite, as we have explained (
|
|
|
907 <a id="FP_Q105_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore God
|
|
|
908 cannot move a body immediately.
|
|
|
909 </p>
|
|
|
910 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p5">
|
|
|
911 <b>On the contrary,</b> God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from
|
|
|
912 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.9" target="asv"> Gn. 1:9 </a>"Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone can move a body immediately.
|
|
|
913 </p>
|
|
|
914 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p6">
|
|
|
915 <b>I answer that,</b> It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause.
|
|
|
916 Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any
|
|
|
917 bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated
|
|
|
918 <a id="FP_Q105_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light
|
|
|
919 result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else
|
|
|
920 tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to
|
|
|
921 that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and
|
|
|
922 moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever
|
|
|
923 in
|
|
|
924 respect of any movement whatever.
|
|
|
925 </p>
|
|
|
926 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p7">
|
|
|
927 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of
|
|
|
928 sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches,
|
|
|
929 nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural
|
|
|
930 power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the
|
|
|
931 words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched.
|
|
|
932 </p>
|
|
|
933 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p8">
|
|
|
934 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended
|
|
|
935 by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
|
|
|
936 </p>
|
|
|
937 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p9">
|
|
|
938 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of
|
|
|
939 bulk," by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover
|
|
|
940 can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk," would move without time, which is impossible;
|
|
|
941 therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is
|
|
|
942 not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite
|
|
|
943 power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an
|
|
|
944 infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the
|
|
|
945 velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does
|
|
|
946 not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is
|
|
|
947 not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and
|
|
|
948 therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.
|
|
|
949 </p>
|
|
|
950 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
951 <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
952 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
953 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
954 </div>
|
|
|
955 <div id="FP_Q105_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
956 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
957 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
958 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A3-p0.1">Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?</h4>
|
|
|
959 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
960 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p2">
|
|
|
961 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its
|
|
|
962 own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is
|
|
|
963 moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another;
|
|
|
964 and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect.
|
|
|
965 </p>
|
|
|
966 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p3">
|
|
|
967 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the
|
|
|
968 intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as
|
|
|
969 the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle
|
|
|
970 of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another.
|
|
|
971 </p>
|
|
|
972 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p4">
|
|
|
973 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible
|
|
|
974 to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.
|
|
|
975 </p>
|
|
|
976 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p5">
|
|
|
977 <b>On the contrary,</b> The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (
|
|
|
978 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God moves the human intellect.
|
|
|
979 </p>
|
|
|
980 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p6">
|
|
|
981 <b>I answer that,</b> As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said
|
|
|
982 to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement
|
|
|
983 of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual
|
|
|
984 power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality;
|
|
|
985 while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands.
|
|
|
986 So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses
|
|
|
987 on him the likeness of the thing understood.
|
|
|
988 </p>
|
|
|
989 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p7"> Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result
|
|
|
990 of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause
|
|
|
991 of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First
|
|
|
992 Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in
|
|
|
993 Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived
|
|
|
994 from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they
|
|
|
995 may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural,
|
|
|
996 or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and
|
|
|
997 species in existence.
|
|
|
998 </p>
|
|
|
999 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1000 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from
|
|
|
1001 God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.
|
|
|
1002 </p>
|
|
|
1003 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1004 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but
|
|
|
1005 it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
|
|
|
1006 </p>
|
|
|
1007 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p10">
|
|
|
1008 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of
|
|
|
1009 which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient
|
|
|
1010 to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (
|
|
|
1011 <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">Q[12], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
1012 <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Hence He moves the created
|
|
|
1013 intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (
|
|
|
1014 <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>).
|
|
|
1015 </p>
|
|
|
1016 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1017 <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1018 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1019 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1020 </div>
|
|
|
1021 <div id="FP_Q105_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1022 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1023 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1024 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A4-p0.1">Whether God can move the created will?</h4>
|
|
|
1025 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1026 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1027 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
|
|
|
1028 forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God.
|
|
|
1029 </p>
|
|
|
1030 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1031 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for
|
|
|
1032 to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will.
|
|
|
1033 </p>
|
|
|
1034 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1035 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone,
|
|
|
1036 but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward
|
|
|
1037 or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.
|
|
|
1038 </p>
|
|
|
1039 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1040 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1041 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
|
|
|
1042 </p>
|
|
|
1043 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1044 <b>I answer that,</b> As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above
|
|
|
1045 <a id="FP_Q105_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved
|
|
|
1046 by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently
|
|
|
1047 unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the
|
|
|
1048 potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal
|
|
|
1049 good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone
|
|
|
1050 is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner
|
|
|
1051 the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the
|
|
|
1052 will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate
|
|
|
1053 end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects
|
|
|
1054 to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior
|
|
|
1055 inclination of the will.
|
|
|
1056 </p>
|
|
|
1057 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p7">
|
|
|
1058 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
|
|
|
1059 proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then
|
|
|
1060 it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural
|
|
|
1061 inclination.
|
|
|
1062 </p>
|
|
|
1063 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1064 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be
|
|
|
1065 caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.
|
|
|
1066 </p>
|
|
|
1067 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p9">
|
|
|
1068 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed
|
|
|
1069 for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have
|
|
|
1070 stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
|
|
|
1071 </p>
|
|
|
1072 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1073 <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1074 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1075 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1076 </div>
|
|
|
1077 <div id="FP_Q105_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
1078 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1079 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1080 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A5-p0.1">Whether God works in every agent?</h4>
|
|
|
1081 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1082 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p2">
|
|
|
1083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God
|
|
|
1084 works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.
|
|
|
1085 </p>
|
|
|
1086 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p3">
|
|
|
1087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong
|
|
|
1088 to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same
|
|
|
1089 time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.
|
|
|
1090 </p>
|
|
|
1091 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p4">
|
|
|
1092 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore,
|
|
|
1093 if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating.
|
|
|
1094 But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.
|
|
|
1095 </p>
|
|
|
1096 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p5">
|
|
|
1097 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1098 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv">Is. 26:12</a>): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."
|
|
|
1099 </p>
|
|
|
1100 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p6">
|
|
|
1101 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God
|
|
|
1102 alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire,
|
|
|
1103 and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things:
|
|
|
1104 and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause,
|
|
|
1105 that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be
|
|
|
1106 bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way,
|
|
|
1107 to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less
|
|
|
1108 perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form
|
|
|
1109 which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature.
|
|
|
1110 We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.
|
|
|
1111 </p>
|
|
|
1112 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p7"> In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action,
|
|
|
1113 but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles
|
|
|
1114 of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent;
|
|
|
1115 the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own
|
|
|
1116 form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought,
|
|
|
1117 for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.
|
|
|
1118 </p>
|
|
|
1119 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p8"> Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for
|
|
|
1120 the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates
|
|
|
1121 in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again
|
|
|
1122 it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the
|
|
|
1123 first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is
|
|
|
1124 the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying
|
|
|
1125 their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the
|
|
|
1126 axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action
|
|
|
1127 not
|
|
|
1128 only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy
|
|
|
1129 and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation
|
|
|
1130 of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is
|
|
|
1131 within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things
|
|
|
1132 God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works
|
|
|
1133 intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according
|
|
|
1134 to
|
|
|
1135 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.10.11" target="asv"> Job 10:11</a>: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews."
|
|
|
1136 </p>
|
|
|
1137 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p9">
|
|
|
1138 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents
|
|
|
1139 is superfluous.
|
|
|
1140 </p>
|
|
|
1141 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p10">
|
|
|
1142 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a
|
|
|
1143 primary and a secondary agent.
|
|
|
1144 </p>
|
|
|
1145 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p11">
|
|
|
1146 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the
|
|
|
1147 end of every action, as above explained.
|
|
|
1148 </p>
|
|
|
1149 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1150 <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1151 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1152 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1153 </div>
|
|
|
1154 <div id="FP_Q105_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
1155 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1156 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1157 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?</h4>
|
|
|
1158 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1159 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p2">
|
|
|
1160 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
|
|
|
1161 says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order
|
|
|
1162 seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.
|
|
|
1163 </p>
|
|
|
1164 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p3">
|
|
|
1165 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of
|
|
|
1166 justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.
|
|
|
1167 </p>
|
|
|
1168 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p4">
|
|
|
1169 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that
|
|
|
1170 He is changeable; which cannot be said.
|
|
|
1171 </p>
|
|
|
1172 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p5">
|
|
|
1173 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."
|
|
|
1174 </p>
|
|
|
1175 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p6">
|
|
|
1176 <b>I answer that,</b> From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
|
|
|
1177 multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause.
|
|
|
1178 Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human
|
|
|
1179 affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
|
|
|
1180 contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that
|
|
|
1181 of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.
|
|
|
1182 </p>
|
|
|
1183 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p7"> If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for,
|
|
|
1184 if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things
|
|
|
1185 depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary
|
|
|
1186 causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural
|
|
|
1187 necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something
|
|
|
1188 outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them,
|
|
|
1189 or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts
|
|
|
1190 against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against
|
|
|
1191 Himself."
|
|
|
1192 </p>
|
|
|
1193 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p8">
|
|
|
1194 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which
|
|
|
1195 did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to
|
|
|
1196 him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent
|
|
|
1197 on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is
|
|
|
1198 clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in
|
|
|
1199 a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies
|
|
|
1200 depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not
|
|
|
1201 against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from
|
|
|
1202 Whom
|
|
|
1203 is all mode, number, and order in nature."
|
|
|
1204 </p>
|
|
|
1205 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p9">
|
|
|
1206 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing
|
|
|
1207 against such order.
|
|
|
1208 </p>
|
|
|
1209 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p10">
|
|
|
1210 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do
|
|
|
1211 otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.
|
|
|
1212 </p>
|
|
|
1213 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1214 <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1215 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1216 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1217 </div>
|
|
|
1218 <div id="FP_Q105_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
1219 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1220 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1221 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A7-p0.1">Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?</h4>
|
|
|
1222 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1223 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p2">
|
|
|
1224 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of
|
|
|
1225 the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being
|
|
|
1226 accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God
|
|
|
1227 does outside the natural order is a miracle.
|
|
|
1228 </p>
|
|
|
1229 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p3">
|
|
|
1230 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond
|
|
|
1231 our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of
|
|
|
1232 nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare
|
|
|
1233 occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be
|
|
|
1234 healed by the shadow of Peter (
|
|
|
1235 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.15" target="asv">Acts 5:15</a>). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we
|
|
|
1236 all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things
|
|
|
1237 are outside the course of natur are miraculous.
|
|
|
1238 </p>
|
|
|
1239 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p4">
|
|
|
1240 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes
|
|
|
1241 things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge
|
|
|
1242 without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous.
|
|
|
1243 </p>
|
|
|
1244 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p5">
|
|
|
1245 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed
|
|
|
1246 to observe, we call it a miracle."
|
|
|
1247 </p>
|
|
|
1248 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p6">
|
|
|
1249 <b>I answer that,</b> The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when
|
|
|
1250 a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause
|
|
|
1251 of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all
|
|
|
1252 to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so
|
|
|
1253 called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things
|
|
|
1254 which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.
|
|
|
1255 </p>
|
|
|
1256 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p7">
|
|
|
1257 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because
|
|
|
1258 they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do
|
|
|
1259 not belong to that order.
|
|
|
1260 </p>
|
|
|
1261 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p8">
|
|
|
1262 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses
|
|
|
1263 the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside
|
|
|
1264 the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of
|
|
|
1265 the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in
|
|
|
1266 which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes
|
|
|
1267 from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
|
|
|
1268 </p>
|
|
|
1269 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p9">
|
|
|
1270 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown
|
|
|
1271 to be wonderful.
|
|
|
1272 </p>
|
|
|
1273 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1274 <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1275 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
1276 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1277 </div>
|
|
|
1278 <div id="FP_Q105_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
1279 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1280 <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a>
|
|
|
1281 <h4 id="FP_Q105_A8-p0.1">Whether one miracle is greater than another?</h4>
|
|
|
1282 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1283 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p2">
|
|
|
1284 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In miraculous
|
|
|
1285 deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore
|
|
|
1286 one miracle is not greater than another.
|
|
|
1287 </p>
|
|
|
1288 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p3">
|
|
|
1289 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason
|
|
|
1290 exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.
|
|
|
1291 </p>
|
|
|
1292 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p4">
|
|
|
1293 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (
|
|
|
1294 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.12" target="asv">Jn. 14:12</a>): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do."
|
|
|
1295 </p>
|
|
|
1296 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p5">
|
|
|
1297 <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power
|
|
|
1298 of God, according to
|
|
|
1299 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.15" target="asv"> Is. 40:15</a>: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called
|
|
|
1300 a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater
|
|
|
1301 the miracle. Now the power of
|
|
|
1302 nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place,
|
|
|
1303 or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold
|
|
|
1304 the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it
|
|
|
1305 is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the
|
|
|
1306 dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which
|
|
|
1307 it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air
|
|
|
1308 is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias;
|
|
|
1309 and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different
|
|
|
1310 ways
|
|
|
1311 in which the power of nature is surpassed.
|
|
|
1312 </p>
|
|
|
1313 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p6"> From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.</p>
|
|
|
1314 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p7"></p>
|
|
|
1315 <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p8"></p>
|
|
|
1316 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
1317 <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a>
|
|
|
1318 </div>
|
|
|
1319 <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1320 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1321 </div>
|
|
|
1322 <div id="FP_Q106" class="div3">
|
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|
1323 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1324 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1325 <h3 id="FP_Q106-p0.1">HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1326 <p id="FP_Q106-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1327 <p id="FP_Q106-p2"> We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely
|
|
|
1328 spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.
|
|
|
1329 </p>
|
|
|
1330 <p id="FP_Q106-p3"> Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel
|
|
|
1331 acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.
|
|
|
1332 </p>
|
|
|
1333 <p id="FP_Q106-p4"> The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both
|
|
|
1334 of the good and of the bad angels.
|
|
|
1335 </p>
|
|
|
1336 <p id="FP_Q106-p5"> Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1337 <p id="FP_Q106-p6"> (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?</p>
|
|
|
1338 <p id="FP_Q106-p7"> (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?</p>
|
|
|
1339 <p id="FP_Q106-p8"> (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</p>
|
|
|
1340 <p id="FP_Q106-p9"> (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?</p>
|
|
|
1341 <div id="FP_Q106_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1342 <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a>
|
|
|
1343 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1344 <h4 id="FP_Q106_A1-p0.1">Whether one angel enlightens another?</h4>
|
|
|
1345 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1346 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1347 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.
|
|
|
1348 But one man will not then enlighten another, according to
|
|
|
1349 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.34" target="asv"> Jer. 31:34</a>: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten
|
|
|
1350 another now.
|
|
|
1351 </p>
|
|
|
1352 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1353 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of
|
|
|
1354 nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes
|
|
|
1355 from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.
|
|
|
1356 </p>
|
|
|
1357 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1358 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as
|
|
|
1359 Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.
|
|
|
1360 </p>
|
|
|
1361 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1362 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the
|
|
|
1363 angels of the first hierarchy."
|
|
|
1364 </p>
|
|
|
1365 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1366 <b>I answer that,</b> One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation
|
|
|
1367 of truth, according to
|
|
|
1368 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv"> Eph. 5:13</a>: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation
|
|
|
1369 of the known truth; according to the Apostle (
|
|
|
1370 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.8" target="asv">Eph. 3:8</a>): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
|
|
|
1371 men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one
|
|
|
1372 angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii):
|
|
|
1373 "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds."
|
|
|
1374 </p>
|
|
|
1375 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p7"> Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (
|
|
|
1376 <a id="FP_Q106_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html">Q[105], A[3]</a>), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known
|
|
|
1377 truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened
|
|
|
1378 by the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is
|
|
|
1379 hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual
|
|
|
1380 things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the
|
|
|
1381 truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by
|
|
|
1382 a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is
|
|
|
1383 natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth
|
|
|
1384 which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge.
|
|
|
1385 Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he
|
|
|
1386 possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident
|
|
|
1387 power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards
|
|
|
1388 by analogy."
|
|
|
1389 </p>
|
|
|
1390 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1391 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another.
|
|
|
1392 It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know
|
|
|
1393 the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which
|
|
|
1394 are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He
|
|
|
1395 comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior
|
|
|
1396 angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the
|
|
|
1397 latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things."
|
|
|
1398 </p>
|
|
|
1399 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1400 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural
|
|
|
1401 light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.
|
|
|
1402 </p>
|
|
|
1403 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1404 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image
|
|
|
1405 of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed,
|
|
|
1406 except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were,
|
|
|
1407 dispositions to this ultimate form.
|
|
|
1408 </p>
|
|
|
1409 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1410 <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1411 <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a>
|
|
|
1412 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1413 </div>
|
|
|
1414 <div id="FP_Q106_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1415 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1416 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1417 <h4 id="FP_Q106_A2-p0.1">Whether one angel moves another angel's will?</h4>
|
|
|
1418 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1419 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1420 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above
|
|
|
1421 <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to
|
|
|
1422 the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an
|
|
|
1423 end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's
|
|
|
1424 will.
|
|
|
1425 </p>
|
|
|
1426 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1427 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are
|
|
|
1428 so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another
|
|
|
1429 angel's will.
|
|
|
1430 </p>
|
|
|
1431 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1432 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior
|
|
|
1433 angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel.
|
|
|
1434 </p>
|
|
|
1435 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1436 <b>On the contrary,</b> To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the
|
|
|
1437 will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will.
|
|
|
1438 </p>
|
|
|
1439 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1440 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
|
|
|
1441 <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both
|
|
|
1442 the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out
|
|
|
1443 the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (
|
|
|
1444 <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>), other goods in a
|
|
|
1445 measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good
|
|
|
1446 He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee
|
|
|
1447 all good" (
|
|
|
1448 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.18" target="asv">Ex. 33:18,19</a>). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines
|
|
|
1449 the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's
|
|
|
1450 goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.
|
|
|
1451 </p>
|
|
|
1452 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p7"> But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination
|
|
|
1453 of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will:
|
|
|
1454 just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination.
|
|
|
1455 Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the
|
|
|
1456 intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will.
|
|
|
1457 </p>
|
|
|
1458 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p8">
|
|
|
1459 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing
|
|
|
1460 the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect
|
|
|
1461 and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above
|
|
|
1462 <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience
|
|
|
1463 in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius
|
|
|
1464 says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things
|
|
|
1465 unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal
|
|
|
1466 of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored
|
|
|
1467 object.
|
|
|
1468 </p>
|
|
|
1469 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1470 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above.
|
|
|
1471 </p>
|
|
|
1472 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p10">
|
|
|
1473 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because
|
|
|
1474 it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does
|
|
|
1475 not apply to the angels.
|
|
|
1476 </p>
|
|
|
1477 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1478 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1479 <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
1480 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1481 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1482 </div>
|
|
|
1483 <div id="FP_Q106_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
1484 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1485 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1486 <h4 id="FP_Q106_A3-p0.1">Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</h4>
|
|
|
1487 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1488 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1489 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and
|
|
|
1490 represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" (
|
|
|
1491 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.26" target="asv">Gal. 4:26</a>). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (
|
|
|
1492 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:31</a>): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted."
|
|
|
1493 Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.
|
|
|
1494 </p>
|
|
|
1495 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1496 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances.
|
|
|
1497 But, as was said above (
|
|
|
1498 <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual
|
|
|
1499 substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened
|
|
|
1500 by God can enlighten
|
|
|
1501 superiors.
|
|
|
1502 </p>
|
|
|
1503 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1504 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained
|
|
|
1505 <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore
|
|
|
1506 he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors.
|
|
|
1507 </p>
|
|
|
1508 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1509 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier.
|
|
|
1510 iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
|
|
|
1511 </p>
|
|
|
1512 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1513 <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained
|
|
|
1514 (
|
|
|
1515 <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore
|
|
|
1516 there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior
|
|
|
1517 cause, as in human affairs the command of
|
|
|
1518 the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of
|
|
|
1519 corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual
|
|
|
1520 substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are
|
|
|
1521 the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that
|
|
|
1522 the
|
|
|
1523 inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.
|
|
|
1524 </p>
|
|
|
1525 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1526 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy
|
|
|
1527 the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more
|
|
|
1528 sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas
|
|
|
1529 in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in
|
|
|
1530 sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science,
|
|
|
1531 and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.
|
|
|
1532 </p>
|
|
|
1533 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p8">
|
|
|
1534 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual
|
|
|
1535 nature. Hence the argument does not hold.
|
|
|
1536 </p>
|
|
|
1537 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p9">
|
|
|
1538 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made
|
|
|
1539 the order in the angels.
|
|
|
1540 </p>
|
|
|
1541 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1542 <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1543 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1544 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1545 </div>
|
|
|
1546 <div id="FP_Q106_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1547 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1548 <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a>
|
|
|
1549 <h4 id="FP_Q106_A4-p0.1">Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?</h4>
|
|
|
1550 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1551 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1552 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says
|
|
|
1553 (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual
|
|
|
1554 knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the
|
|
|
1555 superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the
|
|
|
1556 former.
|
|
|
1557 </p>
|
|
|
1558 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1559 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,
|
|
|
1560 whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring,
|
|
|
1561 as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King
|
|
|
1562 of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior
|
|
|
1563 angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so.
|
|
|
1564 </p>
|
|
|
1565 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1566 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be
|
|
|
1567 unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears
|
|
|
1568 open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things.
|
|
|
1569 </p>
|
|
|
1570 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1571 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there
|
|
|
1572 are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the
|
|
|
1573 inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above
|
|
|
1574 <a id="FP_Q106_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
|
|
|
1575 </p>
|
|
|
1576 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1577 <b>I answer that,</b> Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature
|
|
|
1578 of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So
|
|
|
1579 the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections
|
|
|
1580 to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace
|
|
|
1581 share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards
|
|
|
1582 of the manifold grace of God" (
|
|
|
1583 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10</a>). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same
|
|
|
1584 to those below them.
|
|
|
1585 </p>
|
|
|
1586 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p7"> Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior
|
|
|
1587 ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the
|
|
|
1588 pupil who learns from him.
|
|
|
1589 </p>
|
|
|
1590 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p8">
|
|
|
1591 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.
|
|
|
1592 </p>
|
|
|
1593 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p9">
|
|
|
1594 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation
|
|
|
1595 but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards
|
|
|
1596 when the Mystery was accomplished.
|
|
|
1597 </p>
|
|
|
1598 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p10">
|
|
|
1599 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the
|
|
|
1600 world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to
|
|
|
1601 the inferior.
|
|
|
1602 </p>
|
|
|
1603 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1604 <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1605 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1606 <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a>
|
|
|
1607 </div>
|
|
|
1608 <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
1609 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1610 </div>
|
|
|
1611 <div id="FP_Q107" class="div3">
|
|
|
1612 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1613 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1614 <h3 id="FP_Q107-p0.1">THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1615 <p id="FP_Q107-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1616 <p id="FP_Q107-p2"> We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1617 <p id="FP_Q107-p3"> (1) Whether one angel speaks to another?</p>
|
|
|
1618 <p id="FP_Q107-p4"> (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?</p>
|
|
|
1619 <p id="FP_Q107-p5"> (3) Whether an angel speaks to God?</p>
|
|
|
1620 <p id="FP_Q107-p6"> (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?</p>
|
|
|
1621 <p id="FP_Q107-p7"> (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?</p>
|
|
|
1622 <div id="FP_Q107_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1623 <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a>
|
|
|
1624 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1625 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A1-p0.1">Whether one angel speaks to another?</h4>
|
|
|
1626 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1627 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1628 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection
|
|
|
1629 "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another.
|
|
|
1630 But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to
|
|
|
1631 another.
|
|
|
1632 </p>
|
|
|
1633 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1634 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior
|
|
|
1635 speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and
|
|
|
1636 this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
|
|
|
1637 </p>
|
|
|
1638 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1639 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another
|
|
|
1640 to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
|
|
|
1641 </p>
|
|
|
1642 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1643 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
1644 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels."
|
|
|
1645 </p>
|
|
|
1646 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1647 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties
|
|
|
1648 of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech."
|
|
|
1649 </p>
|
|
|
1650 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p7"> To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (
|
|
|
1651 <a id="FP_Q107_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">Q[82], A[4]</a>), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible
|
|
|
1652 object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7);
|
|
|
1653 secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear
|
|
|
1654 that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition
|
|
|
1655 of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second
|
|
|
1656 to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either
|
|
|
1657 to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual
|
|
|
1658 consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior
|
|
|
1659 word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel
|
|
|
1660 himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another
|
|
|
1661 only means to make known the mental concept to another.
|
|
|
1662 </p>
|
|
|
1663 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1664 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within,
|
|
|
1665 or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to
|
|
|
1666 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept
|
|
|
1667 is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens
|
|
|
1668 that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but
|
|
|
1669 some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof
|
|
|
1670 as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the
|
|
|
1671 tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another
|
|
|
1672 at
|
|
|
1673 once.
|
|
|
1674 </p>
|
|
|
1675 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1676 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit
|
|
|
1677 an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also
|
|
|
1678 its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power,
|
|
|
1679 whereby he manifests his mental concept.
|
|
|
1680 </p>
|
|
|
1681 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1682 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one
|
|
|
1683 ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other,
|
|
|
1684 and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as
|
|
|
1685 sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the
|
|
|
1686 sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.
|
|
|
1687 </p>
|
|
|
1688 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1689 <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1690 <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a>
|
|
|
1691 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1692 </div>
|
|
|
1693 <div id="FP_Q107_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1694 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1695 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1696 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A2-p0.1">Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?</h4>
|
|
|
1697 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1698 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1699 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (
|
|
|
1700 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby
|
|
|
1701 the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (
|
|
|
1702 <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.
|
|
|
1703 </p>
|
|
|
1704 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1705 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as was said above (
|
|
|
1706 <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and
|
|
|
1707 to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows.
|
|
|
1708 </p>
|
|
|
1709 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1710 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and
|
|
|
1711 invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic
|
|
|
1712 speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.
|
|
|
1713 </p>
|
|
|
1714 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1715 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of
|
|
|
1716 Glory?"
|
|
|
1717 </p>
|
|
|
1718 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p6">
|
|
|
1719 <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an
|
|
|
1720 angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said
|
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|
1721 <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such
|
|
|
1722 a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be
|
|
|
1723 reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby
|
|
|
1724 we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth;
|
|
|
1725 the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for
|
|
|
1726 example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of
|
|
|
1727 what
|
|
|
1728 depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when
|
|
|
1729 one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light,
|
|
|
1730 nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an
|
|
|
1731 enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect;
|
|
|
1732 but
|
|
|
1733 only to know the truth in reality.
|
|
|
1734 </p>
|
|
|
1735 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p7"> Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment,
|
|
|
1736 which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will
|
|
|
1737 as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed
|
|
|
1738 to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and
|
|
|
1739 the inferior speak to the superior.
|
|
|
1740 </p>
|
|
89
|
1741 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objections 1
|
|
|
1742 & 2:</b> From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p>
|
|
64
|
1743 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p9">
|
|
|
1744 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the
|
|
|
1745 perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the
|
|
|
1746 angels, as was explained above.
|
|
|
1747 </p>
|
|
|
1748 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1749 <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p11"></p>
|
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|
1750 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1751 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1752 </div>
|
|
|
1753 <div id="FP_Q107_A3" class="div4">
|
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|
1754 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a>
|
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|
1755 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1756 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel speaks to God?</h4>
|
|
|
1757 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1758 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p2">
|
|
|
1759 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make
|
|
|
1760 known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.
|
|
|
1761 </p>
|
|
|
1762 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p3">
|
|
|
1763 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above
|
|
|
1764 <a id="FP_Q107_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways
|
|
|
1765 appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks
|
|
|
1766 to God.
|
|
|
1767 </p>
|
|
|
1768 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p4">
|
|
|
1769 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
1770 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.12" target="asv">Zech. 1:12</a>): "The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem." Therefore an
|
|
|
1771 angel speaks to God.
|
|
|
1772 </p>
|
|
|
1773 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p5">
|
|
|
1774 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
|
|
|
1775 <a id="FP_Q107_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner.
|
|
|
1776 In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in
|
|
|
1777 human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns
|
|
|
1778 the truth, or of whatever
|
|
|
1779 depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing
|
|
|
1780 is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech
|
|
|
1781 the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to
|
|
|
1782 be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
|
|
|
1783 speak
|
|
|
1784 to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration."
|
|
|
1785 </p>
|
|
|
1786 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p6">
|
|
|
1787 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose
|
|
|
1788 of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.
|
|
|
1789 </p>
|
|
|
1790 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p7">
|
|
|
1791 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting
|
|
|
1792 Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
|
|
|
1793 </p>
|
|
|
1794 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p8"></p>
|
|
|
1795 <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p9"></p>
|
|
|
1796 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1797 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1798 </div>
|
|
|
1799 <div id="FP_Q107_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
1800 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1801 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1802 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A4-p0.1">Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?</h4>
|
|
|
1803 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1804 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p2">
|
|
|
1805 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works
|
|
|
1806 where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's
|
|
|
1807 speech is limited by the bounds of that place.
|
|
|
1808 </p>
|
|
|
1809 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p3">
|
|
|
1810 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one
|
|
|
1811 to another" (
|
|
|
1812 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.
|
|
|
1813 </p>
|
|
|
1814 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p4">
|
|
|
1815 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (
|
|
|
1816 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.24" target="asv">Lk. 16:24</a>). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.
|
|
|
1817 </p>
|
|
|
1818 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p5">
|
|
|
1819 <b>I answer that,</b> The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (
|
|
|
1820 <a id="FP_Q107_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual operation
|
|
|
1821 takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at
|
|
|
1822 all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time
|
|
|
1823 nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.
|
|
|
1824 </p>
|
|
|
1825 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p6">
|
|
|
1826 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists
|
|
|
1827 in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel
|
|
|
1828 seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is
|
|
|
1829 to perceive his speech.
|
|
|
1830 </p>
|
|
|
1831 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p7">
|
|
|
1832 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of
|
|
|
1833 what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less
|
|
|
1834 one cries out."
|
|
|
1835 </p>
|
|
|
1836 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p8"></p>
|
|
|
1837 <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
1838 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1839 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1840 </div>
|
|
|
1841 <div id="FP_Q107_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
1842 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1843 <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a>
|
|
|
1844 <h4 id="FP_Q107_A5-p0.1">Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?</h4>
|
|
|
1845 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1846 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p2">
|
|
|
1847 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do
|
|
|
1848 not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained
|
|
|
1849 <a id="FP_Q107_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another.
|
|
|
1850 </p>
|
|
|
1851 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p3">
|
|
|
1852 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known
|
|
|
1853 by one, it is for the same reason known by all.
|
|
|
1854 </p>
|
|
|
1855 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p4">
|
|
|
1856 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because,
|
|
|
1857 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore
|
|
|
1858 the speech of one angel to another extends to all.
|
|
|
1859 </p>
|
|
|
1860 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p5">
|
|
|
1861 <b>On the contrary,</b> One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.
|
|
|
1862 </p>
|
|
|
1863 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p6">
|
|
|
1864 <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained (
|
|
|
1865 <a id="FP_Q107_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his
|
|
|
1866 will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of
|
|
|
1867 one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another;
|
|
|
1868 whereas others do not, not through the
|
|
|
1869 obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.
|
|
|
1870 </p>
|
|
|
1871 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p7"> From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p>
|
|
|
1872 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p8">
|
|
|
1873 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels;
|
|
|
1874 and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created
|
|
|
1875 will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.
|
|
|
1876 </p>
|
|
|
1877 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p9"></p>
|
|
|
1878 <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p10"></p>
|
|
|
1879 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1880 <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a>
|
|
|
1881 </div>
|
|
|
1882 <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
1883 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1884 </div>
|
|
|
1885 <div id="FP_Q108" class="div3">
|
|
|
1886 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
1887 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1888 <h3 id="FP_Q108-p0.1">OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
1889 <p id="FP_Q108-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1890 <p id="FP_Q108-p2"> We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (
|
|
|
1891 <a id="FP_Q108-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.
|
|
|
1892 </p>
|
|
|
1893 <p id="FP_Q108-p3"> Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
1894 <p id="FP_Q108-p4"> (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?</p>
|
|
|
1895 <p id="FP_Q108-p5"> (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?</p>
|
|
|
1896 <p id="FP_Q108-p6"> (3) Whether in one order there are many angels?</p>
|
|
|
1897 <p id="FP_Q108-p7"> (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?</p>
|
|
|
1898 <p id="FP_Q108-p8"> (5) Of the names and properties of each order.</p>
|
|
|
1899 <p id="FP_Q108-p9"> (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.</p>
|
|
|
1900 <p id="FP_Q108-p10"> (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</p>
|
|
|
1901 <p id="FP_Q108-p11"> (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</p>
|
|
|
1902 <div id="FP_Q108_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
1903 <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a>
|
|
|
1904 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1905 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A1-p0.1">Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?</h4>
|
|
|
1906 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1907 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p2">
|
|
|
1908 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident
|
|
|
1909 that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the
|
|
|
1910 Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality,
|
|
|
1911 it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
|
|
|
1912 </p>
|
|
|
1913 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p3">
|
|
|
1914 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one
|
|
|
1915 order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
|
|
|
1916 </p>
|
|
|
1917 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p4">
|
|
|
1918 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy.
|
|
|
1919 Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.
|
|
|
1920 </p>
|
|
|
1921 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p5">
|
|
|
1922 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.
|
|
|
1923 </p>
|
|
|
1924 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p6">
|
|
|
1925 <b>I answer that,</b> Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and
|
|
|
1926 the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also
|
|
|
1927 of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can
|
|
|
1928 be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are
|
|
|
1929 two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality
|
|
|
1930 on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude
|
|
|
1931 can be subject in "one" way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince
|
|
|
1932 belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws
|
|
|
1933 and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels;
|
|
|
1934 for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says
|
|
|
1935 (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner
|
|
|
1936 we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (
|
|
|
1937 <a id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), in treating of the
|
|
|
1938 angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal
|
|
|
1939 knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be
|
|
|
1940 considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs
|
|
|
1941 to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius
|
|
|
1942 says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already
|
|
|
1943 multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things
|
|
|
1944 as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat
|
|
|
1945 of each of the orders
|
|
|
1946 <a id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the
|
|
|
1947 multitude of subjects.
|
|
|
1948 </p>
|
|
|
1949 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p7"> Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons,
|
|
|
1950 and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is
|
|
|
1951 no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed,
|
|
|
1952 enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to
|
|
|
1953 the Divine Persons.
|
|
|
1954 </p>
|
|
|
1955 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p8">
|
|
|
1956 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the
|
|
|
1957 Philosopher asserts in those passages.
|
|
|
1958 </p>
|
|
|
1959 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p9">
|
|
|
1960 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical distinction
|
|
|
1961 among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained.
|
|
|
1962 </p>
|
|
|
1963 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p10">
|
|
|
1964 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence
|
|
|
1965 the same argument does not apply to both.
|
|
|
1966 </p>
|
|
|
1967 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
1968 <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
1969 <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a>
|
|
|
1970 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
1971 </div>
|
|
|
1972 <div id="FP_Q108_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
1973 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
1974 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
1975 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A2-p0.1">Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?</h4>
|
|
|
1976 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
1977 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p2">
|
|
|
1978 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined
|
|
|
1979 is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there
|
|
|
1980 is not one hierarchy only, but many.
|
|
|
1981 </p>
|
|
|
1982 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p3">
|
|
|
1983 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But
|
|
|
1984 among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore
|
|
|
1985 there are not different orders of angels.
|
|
|
1986 </p>
|
|
|
1987 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p4">
|
|
|
1988 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening,"
|
|
|
1989 and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting,"
|
|
|
1990 as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction
|
|
|
1991 of orders among the angels.
|
|
|
1992 </p>
|
|
|
1993 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p5">
|
|
|
1994 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
1995 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) that "God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders
|
|
|
1996 of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained
|
|
|
1997 <a id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">(A[6])</a>.
|
|
|
1998 </p>
|
|
|
1999 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2000 <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince.
|
|
|
2001 Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy
|
|
|
2002 requires diversity of orders.
|
|
|
2003 </p>
|
|
|
2004 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p7"> This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different
|
|
|
2005 orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and
|
|
|
2006 another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth.
|
|
|
2007 </p>
|
|
|
2008 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p8"> But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has
|
|
|
2009 a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as
|
|
|
2010 the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus
|
|
|
2011 honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their
|
|
|
2012 actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so
|
|
|
2013 in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
|
|
|
2014 </p>
|
|
|
2015 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2016 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy
|
|
|
2017 is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are
|
|
|
2018 so called.
|
|
|
2019 </p>
|
|
|
2020 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2021 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than
|
|
|
2022 by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate
|
|
|
2023 it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone
|
|
|
2024 can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect
|
|
|
2025 grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among
|
|
|
2026 the angels, according to their different offices and actions.
|
|
|
2027 </p>
|
|
|
2028 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p11">
|
|
|
2029 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the
|
|
|
2030 kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that
|
|
|
2031 are born of women" (
|
|
|
2032 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher
|
|
|
2033 way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the
|
|
|
2034 heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.
|
|
|
2035 </p>
|
|
|
2036 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2037 <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
2038 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2039 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2040 </div>
|
|
|
2041 <div id="FP_Q108_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2042 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2043 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2044 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A3-p0.1">Whether there are many angels in one order?</h4>
|
|
|
2045 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2046 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2047 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above (
|
|
|
2048 <a id="FP_Q108_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order.
|
|
|
2049 </p>
|
|
|
2050 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2051 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs
|
|
|
2052 to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs
|
|
|
2053 to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by
|
|
|
2054 their offices, as stated above
|
|
|
2055 <a id="FP_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, several angels in one order
|
|
|
2056 would be superfluous.
|
|
|
2057 </p>
|
|
|
2058 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2059 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or
|
|
|
2060 four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than
|
|
|
2061 with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former.
|
|
|
2062 Therefore there are not many angels of one order.
|
|
|
2063 </p>
|
|
|
2064 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2065 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" (
|
|
|
2066 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim.
|
|
|
2067 </p>
|
|
|
2068 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2069 <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas
|
|
|
2070 he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus,
|
|
|
2071 one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one
|
|
|
2072 order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another;
|
|
|
2073 whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and
|
|
|
2074 in each of the other orders.
|
|
|
2075 </p>
|
|
|
2076 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p7"> Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic
|
|
|
2077 offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions
|
|
|
2078 of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much
|
|
|
2079 more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.
|
|
|
2080 </p>
|
|
|
2081 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2082 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely
|
|
|
2083 speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those
|
|
|
2084 who are first, middle, and last.
|
|
|
2085 </p>
|
|
|
2086 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2087 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.
|
|
|
2088 </p>
|
|
|
2089 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p10">
|
|
|
2090 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as
|
|
|
2091 regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary
|
|
|
2092 of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin
|
|
|
2093 in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite
|
|
|
2094 limit.
|
|
|
2095 </p>
|
|
|
2096 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2097 <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2098 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2099 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2100 </div>
|
|
|
2101 <div id="FP_Q108_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
2102 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2103 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2104 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A4-p0.1">Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?</h4>
|
|
|
2105 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2106 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2107 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a
|
|
|
2108 sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel.
|
|
|
2109 Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of
|
|
|
2110 hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.
|
|
|
2111 </p>
|
|
|
2112 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2113 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which
|
|
|
2114 comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (
|
|
|
2115 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic
|
|
|
2116 orders are not from nature, but from grace.
|
|
|
2117 </p>
|
|
|
2118 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2119 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the
|
|
|
2120 gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore
|
|
|
2121 neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.
|
|
|
2122 </p>
|
|
|
2123 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2124 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some
|
|
|
2125 gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the
|
|
|
2126 angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.
|
|
|
2127 </p>
|
|
|
2128 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2129 <b>I answer that,</b> The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels
|
|
|
2130 may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge
|
|
|
2131 and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly,
|
|
|
2132 the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural
|
|
|
2133 powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end
|
|
|
2134 they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the
|
|
|
2135 gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the
|
|
|
2136 capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (
|
|
|
2137 <a id="FP_Q108_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html">Q[62], A[6]</a>). Hence
|
|
|
2138 among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.
|
|
|
2139 </p>
|
|
|
2140 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p7"> From the above the replies to the objections are evident.</p>
|
|
|
2141 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p8"></p>
|
|
|
2142 <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
2143 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2144 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2145 </div>
|
|
|
2146 <div id="FP_Q108_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
2147 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2148 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2149 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A5-p0.1">Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?</h4>
|
|
|
2150 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2151 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p2">
|
|
|
2152 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly
|
|
|
2153 virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly
|
|
|
2154 named.
|
|
|
2155 </p>
|
|
|
2156 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p3">
|
|
|
2157 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (
|
|
|
2158 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.3" target="asv">Ps. 99:3</a>). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."
|
|
|
2159 </p>
|
|
|
2160 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p4">
|
|
|
2161 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore
|
|
|
2162 these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.
|
|
|
2163 </p>
|
|
|
2164 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p5">
|
|
|
2165 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the
|
|
|
2166 "Principalities."
|
|
|
2167 </p>
|
|
|
2168 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p6">
|
|
|
2169 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But
|
|
|
2170 charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders.
|
|
|
2171 </p>
|
|
|
2172 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p7">
|
|
|
2173 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.
|
|
|
2174 Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the
|
|
|
2175 orders of angels are not properly styled.
|
|
|
2176 </p>
|
|
89
|
2177 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in
|
|
64
|
2178 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.2" target="asv"> Is. 6:2</a>; the name "Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in
|
|
|
2179 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv"> Col. 1:16</a>; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in
|
|
|
2180 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.21" target="asv"> Eph. 1:21</a>; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of
|
|
|
2181 Scripture.
|
|
|
2182 </p>
|
|
|
2183 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p9">
|
|
|
2184 <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of
|
|
|
2185 each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things,
|
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|
2186 something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is
|
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|
2187 said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its
|
|
|
2188 nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner,
|
|
|
2189 as we have stated (
|
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|
2190 <a id="FP_Q108_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not
|
|
|
2191 fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating
|
|
|
2192 its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates
|
|
|
2193 imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we
|
|
|
2194 wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter
|
|
|
2195 is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation;
|
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|
2196 nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of
|
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|
2197 a man,
|
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|
2198 and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.
|
|
|
2199 </p>
|
|
|
2200 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p10"> So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are
|
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|
2201 all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior
|
|
|
2202 perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely
|
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|
2203 the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of
|
|
|
2204 excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.
|
|
|
2205 </p>
|
|
|
2206 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p11"> So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections
|
|
|
2207 they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior
|
|
|
2208 ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest;
|
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|
2209 by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities
|
|
|
2210 preside over the good spirits themselves."
|
|
|
2211 </p>
|
|
|
2212 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p12">
|
|
|
2213 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the
|
|
|
2214 superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated.
|
|
|
2215 The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation
|
|
|
2216 only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest
|
|
|
2217 order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels,"
|
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|
2218 forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.
|
|
|
2219 </p>
|
|
|
2220 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p13"> "Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in
|
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|
2221 that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain
|
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|
2222 excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the
|
|
|
2223 "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine
|
|
|
2224 operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly
|
|
|
2225 the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.
|
|
|
2226 </p>
|
|
|
2227 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p14">
|
|
|
2228 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word
|
|
|
2229 gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the
|
|
|
2230 Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free
|
|
|
2231 from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and
|
|
|
2232 from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy
|
|
|
2233 which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies
|
|
|
2234 "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation
|
|
|
2235 of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the
|
|
|
2236 same principle applies to the rest.
|
|
|
2237 </p>
|
|
|
2238 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p15">
|
|
|
2239 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to
|
|
|
2240 prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are
|
|
|
2241 subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the
|
|
|
2242 Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God"
|
|
|
2243 (
|
|
|
2244 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv">Rom. 13:2</a>). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception
|
|
|
2245 of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above.
|
|
|
2246 Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside
|
|
|
2247 [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first
|
|
|
2248 in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies
|
|
|
2249 "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according
|
|
|
2250 to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers" (
|
|
|
2251 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.26" target="asv">Ps. 67:26</a>).
|
|
|
2252 </p>
|
|
|
2253 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p16">
|
|
|
2254 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared
|
|
|
2255 to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot,
|
|
|
2256 and hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the
|
|
|
2257 "Angels," and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory
|
|
|
2258 (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing
|
|
|
2259 greater things: and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine
|
|
|
2260 commands.
|
|
|
2261 </p>
|
|
|
2262 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p17">
|
|
|
2263 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire.
|
|
|
2264 Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of
|
|
|
2265 heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they
|
|
|
2266 are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which
|
|
|
2267 is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to
|
|
|
2268 the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised
|
|
|
2269 powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly
|
|
|
2270 we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an
|
|
|
2271 inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.
|
|
|
2272 </p>
|
|
|
2273 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p18"> In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge,"
|
|
|
2274 which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the
|
|
|
2275 Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this
|
|
|
2276 knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others.
|
|
|
2277 </p>
|
|
|
2278 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p19">
|
|
|
2279 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works;
|
|
|
2280 whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two
|
|
|
2281 excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the other two; and so the
|
|
|
2282 order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the
|
|
|
2283 "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not
|
|
|
2284 conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may
|
|
|
2285 consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones"
|
|
|
2286 are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed
|
|
|
2287 strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made
|
|
|
2288 firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive
|
|
|
2289 God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open
|
|
|
2290 on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.
|
|
|
2291 </p>
|
|
|
2292 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p20"></p>
|
|
|
2293 <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p21"></p>
|
|
|
2294 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2295 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2296 </div>
|
|
|
2297 <div id="FP_Q108_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
2298 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2299 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2300 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A6-p0.1">Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?</h4>
|
|
|
2301 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2302 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p2">
|
|
|
2303 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the
|
|
|
2304 names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be
|
|
|
2305 supreme.
|
|
|
2306 </p>
|
|
|
2307 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p3">
|
|
|
2308 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is
|
|
|
2309 nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest.
|
|
|
2310 </p>
|
|
|
2311 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p4">
|
|
|
2312 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher
|
|
|
2313 than the "Seraphim."
|
|
|
2314 </p>
|
|
|
2315 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p5">
|
|
|
2316 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately
|
|
|
2317 above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).
|
|
|
2318 </p>
|
|
|
2319 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p6">
|
|
|
2320 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the
|
|
|
2321 "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the
|
|
|
2322 "Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."
|
|
|
2323 </p>
|
|
|
2324 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p7">
|
|
|
2325 <b>I answer that,</b> The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as
|
|
|
2326 regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above
|
|
|
2327 the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities"
|
|
|
2328 between the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers"
|
|
|
2329 and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who (
|
|
|
2330 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the
|
|
|
2331 heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and
|
|
|
2332 "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same
|
|
|
2333 orders from the highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created
|
|
|
2334 by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory.
|
|
|
2335 </p>
|
|
|
2336 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p8"> Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above
|
|
|
2337 <a id="FP_Q108_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in
|
|
|
2338 their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the
|
|
|
2339 whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the
|
|
|
2340 universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which
|
|
|
2341 is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering
|
|
|
2342 the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are
|
|
|
2343 taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy
|
|
|
2344 those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition---the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers";
|
|
|
2345 and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels,"
|
|
|
2346 and "Archangels."
|
|
|
2347 </p>
|
|
|
2348 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p9"> As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of
|
|
|
2349 the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition
|
|
|
2350 to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii,
|
|
|
2351 Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the
|
|
|
2352 dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets;
|
|
|
2353 and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition
|
|
|
2354 in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves,
|
|
|
2355 in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first
|
|
|
2356 hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence
|
|
|
2357 of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones";
|
|
|
2358 as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels."
|
|
|
2359 </p>
|
|
|
2360 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p10"> As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be
|
|
|
2361 done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs
|
|
|
2362 to the "Virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which
|
|
|
2363 belongs to the "Powers."
|
|
|
2364 </p>
|
|
|
2365 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p11"> The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there
|
|
|
2366 are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "Principalities."
|
|
|
2367 There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others hold a middle place; and these
|
|
|
2368 are the "Archangels," as above explained.
|
|
|
2369 </p>
|
|
|
2370 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p12"> This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the
|
|
|
2371 lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons,
|
|
|
2372 which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity,
|
|
|
2373 denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones,"
|
|
|
2374 who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called
|
|
|
2375 "because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate
|
|
|
2376 enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers"
|
|
|
2377 is akin to the order of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to
|
|
|
2378 them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples
|
|
|
2379 and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof;
|
|
|
2380 "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of
|
|
|
2381 the kingdom of the Persians resisted me" (
|
|
|
2382 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>).
|
|
|
2383 </p>
|
|
|
2384 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p13"> The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order
|
|
|
2385 what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things
|
|
|
2386 in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order;
|
|
|
2387 the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good
|
|
|
2388 spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then
|
|
|
2389 the "Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (
|
|
|
2390 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.3" target="asv">Rom. 13:3,4</a>). After these come the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the
|
|
|
2391 "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within
|
|
|
2392 the purview of reason.
|
|
|
2393 </p>
|
|
|
2394 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p14">
|
|
|
2395 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel's subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former.
|
|
|
2396 Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their
|
|
|
2397 name from their nearness and relation to God.
|
|
|
2398 </p>
|
|
|
2399 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p15">
|
|
|
2400 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more
|
|
|
2401 excellent way, as above explained.
|
|
|
2402 </p>
|
|
|
2403 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p16">
|
|
|
2404 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As above explained (
|
|
|
2405 <a id="FP_Q108_A6-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved.
|
|
|
2406 Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler
|
|
|
2407 way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things,
|
|
|
2408 God above all, is
|
|
|
2409 better than to know them.
|
|
|
2410 </p>
|
|
|
2411 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p17">
|
|
|
2412 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according
|
|
|
2413 to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also
|
|
|
2414 agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in
|
|
|
2415 the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the
|
|
|
2416 "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations;
|
|
|
2417 since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels."
|
|
|
2418 </p>
|
|
|
2419 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p18"></p>
|
|
|
2420 <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p19"></p>
|
|
|
2421 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2422 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2423 </div>
|
|
|
2424 <div id="FP_Q108_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
2425 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2426 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2427 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A7-p0.1">Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</h4>
|
|
|
2428 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2429 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p2">
|
|
|
2430 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (
|
|
|
2431 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24</a>), that Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the
|
|
|
2432 Father," and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state.
|
|
|
2433 </p>
|
|
|
2434 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p3">
|
|
|
2435 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment
|
|
|
2436 one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore
|
|
|
2437 the angelic orders would remain for no purpose.
|
|
|
2438 </p>
|
|
|
2439 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p4">
|
|
|
2440 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says of the angels (
|
|
|
2441 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence
|
|
|
2442 it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit
|
|
|
2443 of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.
|
|
|
2444 </p>
|
|
|
2445 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p5">
|
|
|
2446 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
2447 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.5.20" target="asv">Judges 5:20</a>): "Stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in
|
|
|
2448 their orders.
|
|
|
2449 </p>
|
|
|
2450 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p6">
|
|
|
2451 <b>I answer that,</b> In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction
|
|
|
2452 of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained
|
|
|
2453 <a id="FP_Q108_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless
|
|
|
2454 they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever
|
|
|
2455 remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain
|
|
|
2456 degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are
|
|
|
2457 directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end.
|
|
|
2458 Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.
|
|
|
2459 </p>
|
|
|
2460 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p7">
|
|
|
2461 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to
|
|
|
2462 their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words
|
|
|
2463 of the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful
|
|
|
2464 to the enjoyment of God Himself.
|
|
|
2465 </p>
|
|
|
2466 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p8">
|
|
|
2467 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions.
|
|
|
2468 In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually
|
|
|
2469 arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding
|
|
|
2470 middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as
|
|
|
2471 regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms
|
|
|
2472 he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since
|
|
|
2473 the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the
|
|
|
2474 light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the
|
|
|
2475 knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things,
|
|
|
2476 still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.
|
|
|
2477 </p>
|
|
|
2478 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p9">
|
|
|
2479 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who
|
|
|
2480 are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
|
|
|
2481 </p>
|
|
|
2482 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2483 <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2484 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
2485 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2486 </div>
|
|
|
2487 <div id="FP_Q108_A8" class="div4">
|
|
|
2488 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2489 <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a>
|
|
|
2490 <h4 id="FP_Q108_A8-p0.1">Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</h4>
|
|
|
2491 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2492 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p2">
|
|
|
2493 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
|
|
|
2494 heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest
|
|
|
2495 hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders.
|
|
|
2496 </p>
|
|
|
2497 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p3">
|
|
|
2498 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the
|
|
|
2499 like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.
|
|
|
2500 </p>
|
|
|
2501 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p4">
|
|
|
2502 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls
|
|
|
2503 of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the
|
|
|
2504 souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.
|
|
|
2505 </p>
|
|
|
2506 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p5">
|
|
|
2507 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of God" (
|
|
89
|
2508 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.1"
|
|
|
2509 href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30"
|
|
|
2510 target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>).</p>
|
|
|
2511 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p5a"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained (
|
|
64
|
2512 <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
|
|
|
2513 Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction
|
|
|
2514 will always remain. In view of this
|
|
|
2515 distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting
|
|
|
2516 as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (
|
|
|
2517 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.20.36" target="asv">Lk. 20:36</a>). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends
|
|
|
2518 on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men
|
|
|
2519 can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are
|
|
|
2520 taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders,
|
|
|
2521 but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole
|
|
|
2522 society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies
|
|
|
2523 of
|
|
|
2524 men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone."
|
|
|
2525 </p>
|
|
|
2526 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p6">
|
|
|
2527 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained
|
|
|
2528
|
|
|
2529 <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">(A[4];</a>
|
|
|
2530 <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html">Q[62], A[6]</a>). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred
|
|
|
2531 to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.
|
|
|
2532 </p>
|
|
|
2533 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p7">
|
|
|
2534 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human
|
|
|
2535 affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature
|
|
|
2536 with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the
|
|
|
2537 things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a
|
|
|
2538 certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles,
|
|
|
2539 by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi).
|
|
|
2540 </p>
|
|
|
2541 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p8">
|
|
|
2542 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons
|
|
|
2543 are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.
|
|
|
2544 </p>
|
|
|
2545 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p9"></p>
|
|
|
2546 <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2547 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
2548 <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a>
|
|
|
2549 </div>
|
|
|
2550 <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
2551 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2552 </div>
|
|
|
2553 <div id="FP_Q109" class="div3">
|
|
|
2554 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2555 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2556 <h3 id="FP_Q109-p0.1">THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2557 <p id="FP_Q109-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2558 <p id="FP_Q109-p2"> We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
2559 <p id="FP_Q109-p3"> (1) Whether there are orders among the demons?</p>
|
|
|
2560 <p id="FP_Q109-p4"> (2) Whether among them there is precedence?</p>
|
|
|
2561 <p id="FP_Q109-p5"> (3) Whether one enlightens another?</p>
|
|
|
2562 <p id="FP_Q109-p6"> (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?</p>
|
|
|
2563 <div id="FP_Q109_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2564 <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a>
|
|
|
2565 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2566 <h4 id="FP_Q109_A1-p0.1">Whether there are orders among the demons?</h4>
|
|
|
2567 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2568 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2569 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine
|
|
|
2570 says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels.
|
|
|
2571 Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders.
|
|
|
2572 </p>
|
|
|
2573 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2574 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a
|
|
|
2575 holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.
|
|
|
2576 </p>
|
|
|
2577 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2578 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said
|
|
|
2579 to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders.
|
|
|
2580 But we never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not
|
|
|
2581 to be placed in any other order.
|
|
|
2582 </p>
|
|
|
2583 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2584 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
2585 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness."
|
|
|
2586 </p>
|
|
|
2587 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2588 <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above (
|
|
|
2589 <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">Q[108], AA[4]</a>,7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace
|
|
|
2590 has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.
|
|
|
2591 </p>
|
|
|
2592 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p7"> If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic
|
|
|
2593 orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in
|
|
|
2594 the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (
|
|
|
2595 <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are
|
|
|
2596 still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
|
|
|
2597 </p>
|
|
|
2598 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2599 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (
|
|
|
2600 <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html">Q[49], A[3]</a>); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.
|
|
|
2601 </p>
|
|
|
2602 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2603 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself;
|
|
|
2604 but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.
|
|
|
2605 </p>
|
|
|
2606 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p10">
|
|
|
2607 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations"
|
|
|
2608 imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.
|
|
|
2609 </p>
|
|
|
2610 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2611 <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2612 <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a>
|
|
|
2613 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2614 </div>
|
|
|
2615 <div id="FP_Q109_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
2616 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2617 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2618 <h4 id="FP_Q109_A2-p0.1">Whether among the demons there is precedence?</h4>
|
|
|
2619 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2620 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2621 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But
|
|
|
2622 the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them.
|
|
|
2623 </p>
|
|
|
2624 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2625 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is
|
|
|
2626 not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are always contentions" (
|
|
|
2627 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
|
|
|
2628 </p>
|
|
|
2629 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2630 <b>Objection 3:</b> If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
|
|
|
2631 according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according
|
|
|
2632 to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the
|
|
|
2633 inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
|
|
|
2634 </p>
|
|
|
2635 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2636 <b>On the contrary,</b> On
|
|
|
2637 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24 </a>the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons."
|
|
|
2638 </p>
|
|
|
2639 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2640 <b>I answer that,</b> Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other.
|
|
|
2641 Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
|
|
|
2642 movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said
|
|
|
2643 <a id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence
|
|
|
2644 their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence---that the action of the
|
|
|
2645 subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should
|
|
|
2646 be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to
|
|
|
2647 end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (
|
|
|
2648 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>).
|
|
|
2649 </p>
|
|
|
2650 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p7">
|
|
|
2651 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
|
|
|
2652 </p>
|
|
|
2653 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2654 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness
|
|
|
2655 whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those
|
|
|
2656 whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
|
|
|
2657 </p>
|
|
|
2658 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2659 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men,
|
|
|
2660 who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather
|
|
|
2661 to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in
|
|
|
2662 evil is to be more unhappy.
|
|
|
2663 </p>
|
|
|
2664 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2665 <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2666 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2667 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2668 </div>
|
|
|
2669 <div id="FP_Q109_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2670 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2671 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2672 <h4 id="FP_Q109_A3-p0.1">Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?</h4>
|
|
|
2673 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2674 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2675 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon
|
|
|
2676 can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten
|
|
|
2677 the inferior.
|
|
|
2678 </p>
|
|
|
2679 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2680 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
|
|
|
2681 demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
|
|
|
2682 </p>
|
|
|
2683 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2684 <b>On the contrary,</b> Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (
|
|
|
2685 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" (
|
|
|
2686 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
|
|
|
2687 </p>
|
|
|
2688 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2689 <b>I answer that,</b> There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained (
|
|
|
2690 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html">Q[107], A[2]</a>), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect.
|
|
|
2691 Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's
|
|
|
2692 perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the
|
|
|
2693 Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of
|
|
|
2694 speech.
|
|
|
2695 </p>
|
|
|
2696 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2697 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
|
|
|
2698 </p>
|
|
|
2699 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p7">
|
|
|
2700 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or
|
|
|
2701 in the demons, because, as above explained (
|
|
|
2702 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
2703 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html">Q[58], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
2704 <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">Q[79], A[2]</a>), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior
|
|
|
2705 demons does not prove that they can enlighten
|
|
|
2706 others.
|
|
|
2707 </p>
|
|
|
2708 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p8"></p>
|
|
|
2709 <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p9"></p>
|
|
|
2710 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2711 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2712 </div>
|
|
|
2713 <div id="FP_Q109_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
2714 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2715 <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a>
|
|
|
2716 <h4 id="FP_Q109_A4-p0.1">Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?</h4>
|
|
|
2717 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2718 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2719 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected
|
|
|
2720 with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels
|
|
|
2721 do not rule over the bad.
|
|
|
2722 </p>
|
|
|
2723 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2724 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
|
|
|
2725 Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot
|
|
|
2726 be admitted.
|
|
|
2727 </p>
|
|
|
2728 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2729 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained
|
|
|
2730 <a id="FP_Q109_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the
|
|
|
2731 natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels.
|
|
|
2732 </p>
|
|
|
2733 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p5">
|
|
|
2734 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just
|
|
|
2735 spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers."
|
|
|
2736 </p>
|
|
|
2737 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p6">
|
|
|
2738 <b>I answer that,</b> The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer
|
|
|
2739 to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection
|
|
|
2740 and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection
|
|
|
2741 the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the
|
|
|
2742 bad, and these are ruled by them.
|
|
|
2743 </p>
|
|
|
2744 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p7">
|
|
|
2745 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
|
|
|
2746 requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's
|
|
|
2747 assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called
|
|
|
2748 an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an
|
|
|
2749 enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness.
|
|
|
2750 </p>
|
|
|
2751 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p8">
|
|
|
2752 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels
|
|
|
2753 or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
|
|
|
2754 </p>
|
|
|
2755 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p9">
|
|
|
2756 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the
|
|
|
2757 power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise
|
|
|
2758 among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (
|
|
|
2759 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts."
|
|
|
2760 </p>
|
|
|
2761 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2762 <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2763 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2764 <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a>
|
|
|
2765 </div>
|
|
|
2766 <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
2767 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2768 </div>
|
|
|
2769 <div id="FP_Q110" class="div3">
|
|
|
2770 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2771 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2772 <h3 id="FP_Q110-p0.1">HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
2773 <p id="FP_Q110-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2774 <p id="FP_Q110-p2"> We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
2775 <p id="FP_Q110-p3"> (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</p>
|
|
|
2776 <p id="FP_Q110-p4"> (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?</p>
|
|
|
2777 <p id="FP_Q110-p5"> (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?</p>
|
|
|
2778 <p id="FP_Q110-p6"> (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?</p>
|
|
|
2779 <div id="FP_Q110_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
2780 <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a>
|
|
|
2781 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2782 <h4 id="FP_Q110_A1-p0.1">Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</h4>
|
|
|
2783 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2784 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p2">
|
|
|
2785 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action,
|
|
|
2786 needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal
|
|
|
2787 things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government
|
|
|
2788 of angels.
|
|
|
2789 </p>
|
|
|
2790 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p3">
|
|
|
2791 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore
|
|
|
2792 they need not be governed by the angels.
|
|
|
2793 </p>
|
|
|
2794 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p4">
|
|
|
2795 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled
|
|
|
2796 by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders
|
|
|
2797 of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (
|
|
|
2798 <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">Q[108], A[2]</a>). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.
|
|
|
2799 </p>
|
|
|
2800 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p5">
|
|
|
2801 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv,
|
|
|
2802 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature."
|
|
|
2803 </p>
|
|
|
2804 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p6">
|
|
|
2805 <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the
|
|
|
2806 universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained
|
|
|
2807 above (
|
|
|
2808 <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a> ;
|
|
|
2809 <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">Q[108], A[1]</a>), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power
|
|
|
2810 of
|
|
|
2811 any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized
|
|
|
2812 by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the
|
|
|
2813 inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels.
|
|
|
2814 This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal
|
|
|
2815 substances.
|
|
|
2816 </p>
|
|
|
2817 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p7">
|
|
|
2818 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs
|
|
|
2819 to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.
|
|
|
2820 </p>
|
|
|
2821 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p8">
|
|
|
2822 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved
|
|
|
2823 by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
|
|
|
2824 bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps
|
|
|
2825 human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any
|
|
|
2826 operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed.
|
|
|
2827 But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the
|
|
|
2828 movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate
|
|
|
2829 presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
|
|
|
2830 </p>
|
|
|
2831 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p9">
|
|
|
2832 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were
|
|
|
2833 types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
|
|
|
2834 preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial
|
|
|
2835 substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
|
|
|
2836 universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents,
|
|
|
2837 the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to
|
|
|
2838 preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these
|
|
|
2839 sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial
|
|
|
2840 substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."
|
|
|
2841 </p>
|
|
|
2842 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p10"> The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine
|
|
|
2843 says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide
|
|
|
2844 Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen says on the text,
|
|
|
2845 "When the ass saw the angel" (
|
|
|
2846 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.23" target="asv">Num. 22:23</a>), that "the world has need of angels who
|
|
|
2847 preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (Hom.
|
|
|
2848 xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than
|
|
|
2849 over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things:
|
|
|
2850 the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow
|
|
|
2851 that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (
|
|
|
2852 <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">Q[108], A[2]</a>), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office
|
|
|
2853 it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to
|
|
|
2854 belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
|
|
|
2855 </p>
|
|
|
2856 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2857 <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2858 <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a>
|
|
|
2859 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2860 </div>
|
|
|
2861 <div id="FP_Q110_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
2862 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2863 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2864 <h4 id="FP_Q110_A2-p0.1">Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?</h4>
|
|
|
2865 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2866 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p2">
|
|
|
2867 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul.
|
|
|
2868 But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards
|
|
|
2869 heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception
|
|
|
2870 of an angel.
|
|
|
2871 </p>
|
|
|
2872 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p3">
|
|
|
2873 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior
|
|
|
2874 to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore
|
|
|
2875 much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
|
|
|
2876 </p>
|
|
|
2877 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p4">
|
|
|
2878 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above
|
|
|
2879 <a id="FP_Q110_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in
|
|
|
2880 effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the
|
|
|
2881 instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to
|
|
|
2882 the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to
|
|
|
2883 the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is
|
|
|
2884 from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects,
|
|
|
2885 is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.
|
|
|
2886 </p>
|
|
|
2887 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p5">
|
|
|
2888 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."
|
|
|
2889 </p>
|
|
|
2890 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p6">
|
|
|
2891 <b>I answer that,</b> The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial
|
|
|
2892 forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion
|
|
|
2893 to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal
|
|
|
2894 agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on
|
|
|
2895 this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle.
|
|
|
2896 But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly
|
|
|
2897 speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something
|
|
|
2898 is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but
|
|
|
2899 the way to existence.
|
|
|
2900 </p>
|
|
|
2901 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural
|
|
|
2902 things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole
|
|
|
2903 "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter
|
|
|
2904 is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
|
|
|
2905 </p>
|
|
|
2906 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p8">
|
|
|
2907 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's
|
|
|
2908 concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject
|
|
|
2909 to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does
|
|
|
2910 not hold.
|
|
|
2911 </p>
|
|
|
2912 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p9">
|
|
|
2913 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example,
|
|
|
2914 the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter
|
|
|
2915 in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior
|
|
|
2916 cause.
|
|
|
2917 </p>
|
|
|
2918 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p10">
|
|
|
2919 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would
|
|
|
2920 not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
|
|
|
2921 the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since
|
|
|
2922 to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the
|
|
|
2923 power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
|
|
|
2924 </p>
|
|
|
2925 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2926 <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
2927 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
2928 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2929 </div>
|
|
|
2930 <div id="FP_Q110_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
2931 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2932 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2933 <h4 id="FP_Q110_A3-p0.1">Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?</h4>
|
|
|
2934 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2935 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p2">
|
|
|
2936 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their
|
|
|
2937 forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above
|
|
|
2938 <a id="FP_Q110_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.
|
|
|
2939 </p>
|
|
|
2940 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p3">
|
|
|
2941 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause
|
|
|
2942 other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion.
|
|
|
2943 </p>
|
|
|
2944 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p4">
|
|
|
2945 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle
|
|
|
2946 of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.
|
|
|
2947 </p>
|
|
|
2948 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p5">
|
|
|
2949 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this
|
|
|
2950 without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.
|
|
|
2951 </p>
|
|
|
2952 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p6">
|
|
|
2953 <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence
|
|
|
2954 it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is
|
|
|
2955 below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves
|
|
|
2956 (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in
|
|
|
2957 potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has
|
|
|
2958 a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted
|
|
|
2959 that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and
|
|
|
2960 chiefly by a local motion.
|
|
|
2961 </p>
|
|
|
2962 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p7">
|
|
|
2963 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the
|
|
|
2964 sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements
|
|
|
2965 result from the power of spiritual substances.
|
|
|
2966 </p>
|
|
|
2967 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p8">
|
|
|
2968 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal
|
|
|
2969 agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.
|
|
|
2970 </p>
|
|
|
2971 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p9">
|
|
|
2972 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
|
|
|
2973 body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to
|
|
|
2974 any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
|
|
|
2975 </p>
|
|
|
2976 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
2977 <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
2978 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
2979 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
2980 </div>
|
|
|
2981 <div id="FP_Q110_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
2982 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
2983 <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a>
|
|
|
2984 <h4 id="FP_Q110_A4-p0.1">Whether angels can work miracles?</h4>
|
|
|
2985 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
2986 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p2">
|
|
|
2987 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues
|
|
|
2988 by whom signs and miracles are usually done."
|
|
|
2989 </p>
|
|
|
2990 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p3">
|
|
|
2991 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice,
|
|
|
2992 bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he
|
|
|
2993 says elsewhere in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore
|
|
|
2994 the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
|
|
|
2995 </p>
|
|
|
2996 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p4">
|
|
|
2997 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
|
|
|
2998 that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in
|
|
|
2999 our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle,
|
|
|
3000 as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature.
|
|
|
3001 Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.
|
|
|
3002 </p>
|
|
|
3003 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3004 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore
|
|
|
3005 an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles.
|
|
|
3006 </p>
|
|
|
3007 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3008 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written of God (
|
|
|
3009 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.4" target="asv">Ps. 135:4</a>): "Who alone doth great wonders."
|
|
|
3010 </p>
|
|
|
3011 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p7">
|
|
|
3012 <b>I answer that,</b> A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if
|
|
|
3013 something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone
|
|
|
3014 upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order
|
|
|
3015 of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or
|
|
|
3016 any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence
|
|
|
3017 God alone can work miracles.
|
|
|
3018 </p>
|
|
|
3019 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p8">
|
|
|
3020 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are
|
|
|
3021 said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the
|
|
|
3022 dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
|
|
|
3023 </p>
|
|
|
3024 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p9">
|
|
|
3025 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature.
|
|
|
3026 But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created
|
|
|
3027 nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own
|
|
|
3028 natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in
|
|
|
3029 reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private
|
|
|
3030 contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in
|
|
|
3031 a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the
|
|
|
3032 other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far
|
|
|
3033 as
|
|
|
3034 they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public
|
|
|
3035 justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.
|
|
|
3036 </p>
|
|
|
3037 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p10">
|
|
|
3038 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.
|
|
|
3039 </p>
|
|
|
3040 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p11">
|
|
|
3041 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside
|
|
|
3042 the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.
|
|
|
3043 </p>
|
|
|
3044 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3045 <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3046 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3047 <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a>
|
|
|
3048 </div>
|
|
|
3049 <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3050 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3051 </div>
|
|
|
3052 <div id="FP_Q111" class="div3">
|
|
|
3053 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3054 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3055 <h3 id="FP_Q111-p0.1">THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3056 <p id="FP_Q111-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3057 <p id="FP_Q111-p2"> We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power;
|
|
|
3058 (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.
|
|
|
3059 </p>
|
|
|
3060 <p id="FP_Q111-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
3061 <p id="FP_Q111-p4"> (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?</p>
|
|
|
3062 <p id="FP_Q111-p5"> (2) Whether he can change man's will?</p>
|
|
|
3063 <p id="FP_Q111-p6"> (3) Whether he can change man's imagination?</p>
|
|
|
3064 <p id="FP_Q111-p7"> (4) Whether he can change man's senses?</p>
|
|
|
3065 <div id="FP_Q111_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
3066 <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a>
|
|
|
3067 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3068 <h4 id="FP_Q111_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel can enlighten man?</h4>
|
|
|
3069 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3070 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3071 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes
|
|
|
3072 enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to
|
|
|
3073 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened
|
|
|
3074 by an angel; but immediately by God.
|
|
|
3075 </p>
|
|
|
3076 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3077 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (
|
|
|
3078 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed
|
|
|
3079 them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God---that is, natural reason and the creature.
|
|
|
3080 Therefore God enlightens man immediately.
|
|
|
3081 </p>
|
|
|
3082 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3083 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
|
|
|
3084 Therefore he is not enlightened by them.
|
|
|
3085 </p>
|
|
|
3086 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3087 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But
|
|
|
3088 such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (
|
|
|
3089 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>;
|
|
|
3090 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html">Q[107], A[2]</a>). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.
|
|
|
3091 </p>
|
|
|
3092 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3093 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (
|
|
|
3094 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html">Q[109], A[2]</a>); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.
|
|
|
3095 </p>
|
|
|
3096 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p7"> The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above
|
|
|
3097 (
|
|
|
3098 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect
|
|
|
3099 is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior
|
|
|
3100 intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby.
|
|
|
3101 This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity
|
|
|
3102 of the inferior angel, as explained above (
|
|
|
3103 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>).
|
|
|
3104 </p>
|
|
|
3105 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p8"> The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand
|
|
|
3106 by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (
|
|
|
3107 <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius
|
|
|
3108 says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of
|
|
|
3109 the sacred veils." On the
|
|
|
3110 other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two
|
|
|
3111 ways man is enlightened by an angel.
|
|
|
3112 </p>
|
|
|
3113 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p9">
|
|
|
3114 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will
|
|
|
3115 tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded
|
|
|
3116 by the will; hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly,
|
|
|
3117 faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is
|
|
|
3118 accomplished by man, according to
|
|
|
3119 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels
|
|
|
3120 have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be
|
|
|
3121 believed; but also as regards what is to be done.
|
|
|
3122 </p>
|
|
|
3123 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p10">
|
|
|
3124 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the
|
|
|
3125 human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures.
|
|
|
3126 Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.
|
|
|
3127 </p>
|
|
|
3128 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p11">
|
|
|
3129 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus
|
|
|
3130 whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made
|
|
|
3131 known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows
|
|
|
3132 what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like
|
|
|
3133 manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.
|
|
|
3134 </p>
|
|
|
3135 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3136 <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3137 <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a>
|
|
|
3138 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3139 </div>
|
|
|
3140 <div id="FP_Q111_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
3141 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3142 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3143 <h4 id="FP_Q111_A2-p0.1">Whether the angels can change the will of man?</h4>
|
|
|
3144 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3145 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p2">
|
|
|
3146 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers
|
|
|
3147 a flame of fire" (
|
|
|
3148 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.7" target="asv">Heb. 1:7</a>), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be, however,
|
|
|
3149 unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will.
|
|
|
3150 </p>
|
|
|
3151 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p3">
|
|
|
3152 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however,
|
|
|
3153 says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and
|
|
|
3154 put into men" (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could
|
|
|
3155 only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them.
|
|
|
3156 </p>
|
|
|
3157 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p4">
|
|
|
3158 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination
|
|
|
3159 which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also
|
|
|
3160 is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will.
|
|
|
3161 </p>
|
|
|
3162 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p5">
|
|
|
3163 <b>On the contrary,</b> To change the will belongs to God alone, according to
|
|
|
3164 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
|
|
|
3165 </p>
|
|
|
3166 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p6">
|
|
|
3167 <b>I answer that,</b> The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the
|
|
|
3168 inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination
|
|
|
3169 to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the
|
|
|
3170 will is from God alone, Who causes the will.
|
|
|
3171 </p>
|
|
|
3172 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p7"> Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the
|
|
|
3173 intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move
|
|
|
3174 the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion,
|
|
|
3175 as above explained (
|
|
|
3176 <a id="FP_Q111_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html">Q[106], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
3177 </p>
|
|
|
3178 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p8"> In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the
|
|
|
3179 sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being
|
|
|
3180 able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or
|
|
|
3181 to resist, the passion.
|
|
|
3182 </p>
|
|
|
3183 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p9">
|
|
|
3184 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.
|
|
|
3185 </p>
|
|
|
3186 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p10">
|
|
|
3187 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject
|
|
|
3188 to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of
|
|
|
3189 the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because
|
|
|
3190 such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
|
|
|
3191 principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.
|
|
|
3192 </p>
|
|
|
3193 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p11">
|
|
|
3194 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something
|
|
|
3195 following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
|
|
|
3196 </p>
|
|
|
3197 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3198 <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3199 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3200 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3201 </div>
|
|
|
3202 <div id="FP_Q111_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
3203 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3204 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3205 <h4 id="FP_Q111_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel can change man's imagination?</h4>
|
|
|
3206 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3207 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p2">
|
|
|
3208 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused
|
|
|
3209 by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it
|
|
|
3210 is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.
|
|
|
3211 </p>
|
|
|
3212 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p3">
|
|
|
3213 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But
|
|
|
3214 an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (
|
|
|
3215 <a id="FP_Q111_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.
|
|
|
3216 </p>
|
|
|
3217 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p4">
|
|
|
3218 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to
|
|
|
3219 the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other."
|
|
|
3220 But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge
|
|
|
3221 of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.
|
|
|
3222 </p>
|
|
|
3223 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p5">
|
|
|
3224 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
|
|
|
3225 there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision,
|
|
|
3226 by changing the imagination.
|
|
|
3227 </p>
|
|
|
3228 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p6">
|
|
|
3229 <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears
|
|
|
3230 from
|
|
|
3231 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.20" target="asv"> Mat. 1:20</a>;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.
|
|
|
3232 </p>
|
|
|
3233 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p7">
|
|
|
3234 <b>I answer that,</b> Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows.
|
|
|
3235 For it was said above (
|
|
|
3236 <a id="FP_Q111_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], A[3]</a>), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of
|
|
|
3237 bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused
|
|
|
3238 in us by the local movement of
|
|
|
3239 animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions
|
|
|
3240 in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend
|
|
|
3241 with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle";
|
|
|
3242 so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects
|
|
|
3243 themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those
|
|
|
3244 who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes
|
|
|
3245 also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power
|
|
|
3246 of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.
|
|
|
3247 </p>
|
|
|
3248 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p8">
|
|
|
3249 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the
|
|
|
3250 senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed
|
|
|
3251 in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.
|
|
|
3252 </p>
|
|
|
3253 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p9">
|
|
|
3254 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from
|
|
|
3255 the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above
|
|
|
3256 explained.
|
|
|
3257 </p>
|
|
|
3258 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p10">
|
|
|
3259 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect
|
|
|
3260 which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the
|
|
|
3261 way he knows.
|
|
|
3262 </p>
|
|
|
3263 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p11">
|
|
|
3264 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these
|
|
|
3265 images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear
|
|
|
3266 in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things
|
|
|
3267 appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to
|
|
|
3268 the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.
|
|
|
3269 </p>
|
|
|
3270 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3271 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3272 <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
3273 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3274 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3275 </div>
|
|
|
3276 <div id="FP_Q111_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
3277 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3278 <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a>
|
|
|
3279 <h4 id="FP_Q111_A4-p0.1">Whether an angel can change the human senses?</h4>
|
|
|
3280 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3281 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p2">
|
|
|
3282 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation
|
|
|
3283 does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.
|
|
|
3284 </p>
|
|
|
3285 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p3">
|
|
|
3286 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other
|
|
|
3287 natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.
|
|
|
3288 </p>
|
|
|
3289 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p4">
|
|
|
3290 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (
|
|
|
3291 <a id="FP_Q111_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object.
|
|
|
3292 </p>
|
|
|
3293 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3294 <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the
|
|
|
3295 door" (
|
|
|
3296 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19.11" target="asv">Gn. 19:11</a>). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses,
|
|
|
3297 in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom---namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin
|
|
|
3298 "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily
|
|
|
3299 imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (
|
|
|
3300 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:18</a>).
|
|
|
3301 </p>
|
|
|
3302 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3303 <b>I answer that,</b> The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for
|
|
|
3304 we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged
|
|
|
3305 with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power,
|
|
|
3306 can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object
|
|
|
3307 from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (
|
|
|
3308 <a id="FP_Q111_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways.
|
|
|
3309 </p>
|
|
|
3310 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p7">
|
|
|
3311 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this
|
|
|
3312 interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained.
|
|
|
3313 </p>
|
|
|
3314 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p8">
|
|
|
3315 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power,
|
|
|
3316 and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ.
|
|
|
3317 </p>
|
|
|
3318 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p9">
|
|
|
3319 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since
|
|
|
3320 he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode
|
|
|
3321 of nature.
|
|
|
3322 </p>
|
|
|
3323 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3324 <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3325 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3326 <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a>
|
|
|
3327 </div>
|
|
|
3328 <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3329 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3330 </div>
|
|
|
3331 <div id="FP_Q112" class="div3">
|
|
|
3332 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3333 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3334 <h3 id="FP_Q112-p0.1">THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3335 <p id="FP_Q112-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3336 <p id="FP_Q112-p2"> We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
3337 <p id="FP_Q112-p3"> (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?</p>
|
|
|
3338 <p id="FP_Q112-p4"> (2) Whether all are sent?</p>
|
|
|
3339 <p id="FP_Q112-p5"> (3) Whether those who are sent, assist?</p>
|
|
|
3340 <p id="FP_Q112-p6"> (4) From what orders they are sent.</p>
|
|
|
3341 <div id="FP_Q112_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
3342 <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a>
|
|
|
3343 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3344 <h4 id="FP_Q112_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?</h4>
|
|
|
3345 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3346 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3347 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual
|
|
|
3348 actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are
|
|
|
3349 intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions.
|
|
|
3350 </p>
|
|
|
3351 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3352 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry,
|
|
|
3353 it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.
|
|
|
3354 </p>
|
|
|
3355 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3356 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive
|
|
|
3357 wisdom" (
|
|
|
3358 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:25</a>). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole
|
|
|
3359 of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is
|
|
|
3360 unfitting.
|
|
|
3361 </p>
|
|
|
3362 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3363 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written (
|
|
|
3364 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.27" target="asv">Lk. 22:27</a>): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are
|
|
|
3365 naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us.
|
|
|
3366 </p>
|
|
|
3367 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3368 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3369 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.20" target="asv">Ex. 23:20</a>): "Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee."
|
|
|
3370 </p>
|
|
|
3371 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p7">
|
|
|
3372 <b>I answer that,</b> From what has been said above (
|
|
|
3373 <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">Q[108], A[6]</a>), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated (
|
|
|
3374 <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">Q[43], A[1]</a>), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin
|
|
|
3375 to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent
|
|
|
3376 as
|
|
|
3377 proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before
|
|
|
3378 by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent,
|
|
|
3379 His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (
|
|
|
3380 <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html">Q[8], A[1]</a>). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such
|
|
|
3381 a way as not to reach
|
|
|
3382 another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was above stated (
|
|
|
3383 <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal
|
|
|
3384 creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this
|
|
|
3385 takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.
|
|
|
3386 </p>
|
|
|
3387 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p8"> Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose
|
|
|
3388 authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister
|
|
|
3389 is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels'
|
|
|
3390 actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.
|
|
|
3391 </p>
|
|
|
3392 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p9">
|
|
|
3393 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an
|
|
|
3394 operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting
|
|
|
3395 something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and
|
|
|
3396 commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently
|
|
|
3397 have sometimes a determinate place.
|
|
|
3398 </p>
|
|
|
3399 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p10">
|
|
|
3400 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body
|
|
|
3401 should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the
|
|
|
3402 empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king
|
|
|
3403 lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his
|
|
|
3404 dignity.
|
|
|
3405 </p>
|
|
|
3406 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p11">
|
|
|
3407 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through
|
|
|
3408 the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the
|
|
|
3409 contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in
|
|
|
3410 no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule
|
|
|
3411 and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
|
|
|
3412 do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation."
|
|
|
3413 </p>
|
|
|
3414 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p12">
|
|
|
3415 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them,
|
|
|
3416 absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior
|
|
|
3417 to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (
|
|
|
3418 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "Esteeming others better than themselves."
|
|
|
3419 </p>
|
|
|
3420 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3421 <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p14"></p>
|
|
|
3422 <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a>
|
|
|
3423 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3424 </div>
|
|
|
3425 <div id="FP_Q112_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
3426 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3427 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3428 <h4 id="FP_Q112_A2-p0.1">Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?</h4>
|
|
|
3429 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3430 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p2">
|
|
|
3431 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says (
|
|
|
3432 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>): "All are ministering spirits, sent to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].
|
|
|
3433 </p>
|
|
|
3434 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p3">
|
|
|
3435 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above (
|
|
|
3436 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">Q[108], A[6]</a>). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (
|
|
|
3437 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.6" target="asv">Is. 6:6,7</a>). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent.
|
|
|
3438 </p>
|
|
|
3439 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p4">
|
|
|
3440 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more
|
|
|
3441 are even the highest angels sent.
|
|
|
3442 </p>
|
|
|
3443 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p5">
|
|
|
3444 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute
|
|
|
3445 the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above (
|
|
|
3446 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry;
|
|
|
3447 which contradicts the words, "Thousands of thousands ministered to
|
|
|
3448 Him" (
|
|
|
3449 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>).
|
|
|
3450 </p>
|
|
|
3451 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p6">
|
|
|
3452 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil
|
|
|
3453 no exterior service."
|
|
|
3454 </p>
|
|
|
3455 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p7">
|
|
|
3456 <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what has been said above (
|
|
|
3457 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>;
|
|
|
3458 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior
|
|
|
3459 things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards
|
|
|
3460 corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for
|
|
|
3461 the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished
|
|
|
3462 immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these
|
|
|
3463 bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects.
|
|
|
3464 Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels
|
|
|
3465 without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent,
|
|
|
3466 but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.
|
|
|
3467 </p>
|
|
|
3468 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p8"> It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers
|
|
|
3469 of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to
|
|
|
3470 any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law.
|
|
|
3471 </p>
|
|
|
3472 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p9">
|
|
|
3473 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order;
|
|
|
3474 but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet.
|
|
|
3475 It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the
|
|
|
3476 ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying
|
|
|
3477 by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope
|
|
|
3478 is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.
|
|
|
3479 </p>
|
|
|
3480 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p10">
|
|
|
3481 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been
|
|
|
3482 said (
|
|
|
3483 <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">Q[43], A[1]</a>).
|
|
|
3484 </p>
|
|
|
3485 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p11">
|
|
|
3486 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent
|
|
|
3487 immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the
|
|
|
3488 inferior ministries.
|
|
|
3489 </p>
|
|
|
3490 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3491 <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3492 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3493 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3494 </div>
|
|
|
3495 <div id="FP_Q112_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
3496 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3497 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3498 <h4 id="FP_Q112_A3-p0.1">Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?</h4>
|
|
|
3499 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3500 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p2">
|
|
|
3501 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent,
|
|
|
3502 and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited."
|
|
|
3503 </p>
|
|
|
3504 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p3">
|
|
|
3505 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before
|
|
|
3506 the Lord" (
|
|
|
3507 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.12.15" target="asv">Tob. 12:15</a>). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.
|
|
|
3508 </p>
|
|
|
3509 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p4">
|
|
|
3510 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to
|
|
|
3511 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.6" target="asv"> Job 1:6</a>: "When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them." Therefore much more do the angels,
|
|
|
3512 who are sent to minister, assist.
|
|
|
3513 </p>
|
|
|
3514 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p5">
|
|
|
3515 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately,
|
|
|
3516 but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is
|
|
|
3517 highest of all. Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of
|
|
|
3518 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv"> Dan. 7:10</a>: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Therefore the angels who are
|
|
|
3519 sent also assist.
|
|
|
3520 </p>
|
|
|
3521 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p6">
|
|
|
3522 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says, on
|
|
|
3523 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.25.3" target="asv"> Job 25:3</a>: "Is there any numbering of His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men."
|
|
|
3524 Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist.
|
|
|
3525 </p>
|
|
|
3526 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p7">
|
|
|
3527 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and "administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of
|
|
|
3528 whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed
|
|
|
3529 by those who are in attendance---for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these
|
|
|
3530 are said to administer, not to assist.
|
|
|
3531 </p>
|
|
|
3532 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those
|
|
|
3533 who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are sent on the external ministry of our
|
|
|
3534 salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine
|
|
|
3535 mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the
|
|
|
3536 inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special
|
|
|
3537 prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God.
|
|
|
3538 </p>
|
|
|
3539 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p9"> From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.</p>
|
|
|
3540 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p10">
|
|
|
3541 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii), "though
|
|
|
3542 he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels."
|
|
|
3543 </p>
|
|
|
3544 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p11">
|
|
|
3545 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative
|
|
|
3546 of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than
|
|
|
3547 is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's
|
|
|
3548 secrets than another.
|
|
|
3549 </p>
|
|
|
3550 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
3551 <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
3552 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3553 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3554 </div>
|
|
|
3555 <div id="FP_Q112_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
3556 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3557 <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a>
|
|
|
3558 <h4 id="FP_Q112_A4-p0.1">Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?</h4>
|
|
|
3559 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3560 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p2">
|
|
|
3561 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according
|
|
|
3562 to
|
|
|
3563 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as
|
|
|
3564 Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.
|
|
|
3565 </p>
|
|
|
3566 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p3">
|
|
|
3567 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the
|
|
|
3568 angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.
|
|
|
3569 </p>
|
|
|
3570 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p4">
|
|
|
3571 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore
|
|
|
3572 the dominations are not sent to minister.
|
|
|
3573 </p>
|
|
|
3574 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3575 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated
|
|
|
3576 <a id="FP_Q112_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal
|
|
|
3577 creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names,
|
|
|
3578 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify
|
|
|
3579 some kind of administration. But
|
|
|
3580 the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the
|
|
|
3581 other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing";
|
|
|
3582 the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory
|
|
|
3583 says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to
|
|
|
3584 external ministry; not to the four superior orders.
|
|
|
3585 </p>
|
|
|
3586 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3587 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be
|
|
|
3588 done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others
|
|
|
3589 are to do.
|
|
|
3590 </p>
|
|
|
3591 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p7">
|
|
|
3592 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those
|
|
|
3593 who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (
|
|
|
3594 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands";
|
|
|
3595 thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number
|
|
|
3596 of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him." This explanation
|
|
|
3597 rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are
|
|
|
3598 in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number
|
|
|
3599 of orders, as six administer and three assist.
|
|
|
3600 </p>
|
|
|
3601 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p8"> Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things;
|
|
|
3602 so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures
|
|
|
3603 surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence,
|
|
|
3604 as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way,
|
|
|
3605 the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because
|
|
|
3606 ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants
|
|
|
3607 as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants
|
|
|
3608 are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but
|
|
|
3609 rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together
|
|
|
3610 of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
|
|
|
3611 </p>
|
|
|
3612 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
3613 <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p10"></p>
|
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|
3614 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a>
|
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|
3615 <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a>
|
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|
3616 </div>
|
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|
3617 <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a>
|
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3618 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
3619 </div>
|
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|
3620 <div id="FP_Q113" class="div3">
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3621 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a>
|
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3622 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
3623 <h3 id="FP_Q113-p0.1">OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
3624 <p id="FP_Q113-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3625 <p id="FP_Q113-p2"> We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first
|
|
|
3626 head eight points of inquiry arise:
|
|
|
3627 </p>
|
|
|
3628 <p id="FP_Q113-p3"> (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?</p>
|
|
|
3629 <p id="FP_Q113-p4"> (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?</p>
|
|
|
3630 <p id="FP_Q113-p5"> (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</p>
|
|
|
3631 <p id="FP_Q113-p6"> (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?</p>
|
|
|
3632 <p id="FP_Q113-p7"> (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?</p>
|
|
|
3633 <p id="FP_Q113-p8"> (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?</p>
|
|
|
3634 <p id="FP_Q113-p9"> (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?</p>
|
|
|
3635 <p id="FP_Q113-p10"> (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?</p>
|
|
|
3636 <div id="FP_Q113_A1" class="div4">
|
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|
3637 <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a>
|
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|
3638 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a>
|
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|
3639 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A1-p0.1">Whether men are guarded by the angels?</h4>
|
|
|
3640 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3641 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p2">
|
|
|
3642 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how,
|
|
|
3643 or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows
|
|
|
3644 how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.
|
|
|
3645 </p>
|
|
|
3646 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p3">
|
|
|
3647 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to
|
|
|
3648 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.120.4" target="asv"> Ps. 120:4</a>: "He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel.
|
|
|
3649 </p>
|
|
|
3650 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p4">
|
|
|
3651 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this
|
|
|
3652 man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (
|
|
|
3653 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 20:39</a>). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in
|
|
|
3654 some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly
|
|
|
3655 false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.
|
|
|
3656 </p>
|
|
|
3657 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p5">
|
|
|
3658 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
3659 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.11" target="asv">Ps. 90:11</a>): "He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."
|
|
|
3660 </p>
|
|
|
3661 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p6">
|
|
|
3662 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by
|
|
|
3663 the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior
|
|
|
3664 which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various
|
|
|
3665 opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover
|
|
|
3666 manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so
|
|
|
3667 it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.
|
|
|
3668 </p>
|
|
|
3669 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p7">
|
|
|
3670 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection
|
|
|
3671 towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature
|
|
|
3672 belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the
|
|
|
3673 universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in
|
|
|
3674 many ways. Hence it is written (
|
|
|
3675 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.
|
|
|
3676 </p>
|
|
|
3677 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p8">
|
|
|
3678 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the
|
|
|
3679 habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this
|
|
|
3680 the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him
|
|
|
3681 grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor,
|
|
|
3682 Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (
|
|
|
3683 <a id="FP_Q113_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">Q[111], A[1]</a>).
|
|
|
3684 </p>
|
|
|
3685 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p9">
|
|
|
3686 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation
|
|
|
3687 of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish
|
|
|
3688 is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside
|
|
|
3689 the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise
|
|
|
3690 that miracles occur outside the order of nature.
|
|
|
3691 </p>
|
|
|
3692 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3693 <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3694 <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a>
|
|
|
3695 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3696 </div>
|
|
|
3697 <div id="FP_Q113_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
3698 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3699 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3700 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A2-p0.1">Whether each man is guarded by an angel?</h4>
|
|
|
3701 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3702 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p2">
|
|
|
3703 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard
|
|
|
3704 many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.
|
|
|
3705 </p>
|
|
|
3706 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p3">
|
|
|
3707 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii).
|
|
|
3708 But as all the angels are unequal (
|
|
|
3709 <a id="FP_Q113_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps
|
|
|
3710 men.
|
|
|
3711 </p>
|
|
|
3712 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p4">
|
|
|
3713 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than
|
|
|
3714 another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says
|
|
|
3715 (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels.
|
|
|
3716 </p>
|
|
|
3717 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p5">
|
|
|
3718 <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (
|
|
|
3719 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.10" target="asv">Mat. 8:10</a>), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."
|
|
|
3720 </p>
|
|
|
3721 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p6">
|
|
|
3722 <b>I answer that,</b> Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the
|
|
|
3723 execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible
|
|
|
3724 creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species,
|
|
|
3725 but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which
|
|
|
3726 cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what
|
|
|
3727 remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to
|
|
|
3728 the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things
|
|
|
3729 corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different "genera"
|
|
|
3730 of
|
|
|
3731 things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable
|
|
|
3732 that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose
|
|
|
3733 that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.
|
|
|
3734 </p>
|
|
|
3735 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p7">
|
|
|
3736 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian
|
|
|
3737 is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one
|
|
|
3738 man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to
|
|
|
3739 the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or
|
|
|
3740 weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation
|
|
|
3741 of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men.
|
|
|
3742 </p>
|
|
|
3743 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p8">
|
|
|
3744 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above stated (
|
|
|
3745 <a id="FP_Q113_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html">Q[112], A[3]</a>, ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things,
|
|
|
3746 only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the
|
|
|
3747 inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one
|
|
|
3748 immediately above him. Thus it
|
|
|
3749 is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens.
|
|
|
3750 </p>
|
|
|
3751 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p9">
|
|
|
3752 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater,
|
|
|
3753 and others to the lesser things, according to
|
|
|
3754 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.11" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:11,12</a>: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and
|
|
|
3755 some of them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.
|
|
|
3756 </p>
|
|
|
3757 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3758 <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3759 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
3760 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3761 </div>
|
|
|
3762 <div id="FP_Q113_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
3763 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3764 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3765 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A3-p0.1">Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</h4>
|
|
|
3766 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3767 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p2">
|
|
|
3768 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that
|
|
|
3769 the text (
|
|
|
3770 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv">Mat. 18:10</a>), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels
|
|
|
3771 guard men.
|
|
|
3772 </p>
|
|
|
3773 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p3">
|
|
|
3774 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (
|
|
|
3775 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external
|
|
|
3776 ministry (
|
|
|
3777 <a id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html">Q[112], A[4]</a>). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.
|
|
|
3778 </p>
|
|
|
3779 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p4">
|
|
|
3780 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the
|
|
|
3781 Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders
|
|
|
3782 are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.
|
|
|
3783 </p>
|
|
|
3784 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p5">
|
|
|
3785 <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius
|
|
|
3786 (Coel. Hier. v, ix).
|
|
|
3787 </p>
|
|
|
3788 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p6">
|
|
|
3789 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated
|
|
|
3790 <a id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard
|
|
|
3791 him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce
|
|
|
3792 the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one
|
|
|
3793 man. The other kind of guardianship is
|
|
|
3794 universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship
|
|
|
3795 of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes.
|
|
|
3796 Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (
|
|
|
3797 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits
|
|
|
3798 by
|
|
|
3799 the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).
|
|
|
3800 </p>
|
|
|
3801 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p7">
|
|
|
3802 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each
|
|
|
3803 order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen
|
|
|
3804 by God for the higher degree of glory.
|
|
|
3805 </p>
|
|
|
3806 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p8">
|
|
|
3807 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater
|
|
|
3808 or less, as above explained.
|
|
|
3809 </p>
|
|
|
3810 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p9">
|
|
|
3811 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors'
|
|
|
3812 power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles.
|
|
|
3813 </p>
|
|
|
3814 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3815 <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3816 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
3817 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3818 </div>
|
|
|
3819 <div id="FP_Q113_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
3820 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3821 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3822 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A4-p0.1">Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?</h4>
|
|
|
3823 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3824 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p2">
|
|
|
3825 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (
|
|
|
3826 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.7" target="asv">Phil. 2:7</a>) that "He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship
|
|
|
3827 of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels.
|
|
|
3828 Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
|
|
|
3829 </p>
|
|
|
3830 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p3">
|
|
|
3831 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state
|
|
|
3832 of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
|
|
|
3833 </p>
|
|
|
3834 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p4">
|
|
|
3835 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life,
|
|
|
3836 encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation,
|
|
|
3837 never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they
|
|
|
3838 have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in
|
|
|
3839
|
|
|
3840 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.31" target="asv">Ps. 31</a>). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is written (
|
|
|
3841 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.
|
|
|
3842 </p>
|
|
|
3843 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p5">
|
|
|
3844 <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Jerome quoted above
|
|
|
3845 <a id="FP_Q113_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."
|
|
|
3846 </p>
|
|
|
3847 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p6">
|
|
|
3848 <b>I answer that,</b> Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is
|
|
|
3849 threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to
|
|
|
3850 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.159.4" target="asv"> Ps. 159:4</a>: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have
|
|
|
3851 to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When,
|
|
|
3852 however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign
|
|
|
3853 with him, in hell a demon to punish him.
|
|
|
3854 </p>
|
|
|
3855 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p7">
|
|
|
3856 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards
|
|
|
3857 His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was
|
|
|
3858 right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is
|
|
|
3859 written (
|
|
|
3860 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>) that "angels came and ministered to Him."
|
|
|
3861 </p>
|
|
|
3862 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p8">
|
|
|
3863 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we
|
|
|
3864 have said above (
|
|
|
3865 <a id="FP_Q113_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">Q[95], AA[1]</a>,3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason
|
|
|
3866 he needed a guardian angel.
|
|
|
3867 </p>
|
|
|
3868 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p9">
|
|
|
3869 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither
|
|
|
3870 are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And
|
|
|
3871 although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless
|
|
|
3872 conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both
|
|
|
3873 themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like
|
|
|
3874 manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.
|
|
|
3875 </p>
|
|
|
3876 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3877 <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3878 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
3879 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3880 </div>
|
|
|
3881 <div id="FP_Q113_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
3882 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3883 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3884 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A5-p0.1">Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?</h4>
|
|
|
3885 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3886 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p2">
|
|
|
3887 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who
|
|
|
3888 shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says (
|
|
|
3889 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard
|
|
|
3890 a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.
|
|
|
3891 </p>
|
|
|
3892 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p3">
|
|
|
3893 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction
|
|
|
3894 as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon
|
|
|
3895 as they are born.
|
|
|
3896 </p>
|
|
|
3897 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p4">
|
|
|
3898 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel
|
|
|
3899 is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore
|
|
|
3900 angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.
|
|
|
3901 </p>
|
|
|
3902 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p5">
|
|
|
3903 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth."
|
|
|
3904 </p>
|
|
|
3905 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p6">
|
|
|
3906 <b>I answer that,</b> as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian
|
|
|
3907 is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves
|
|
|
3908 (vide A, 4), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism;
|
|
|
3909 such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man
|
|
|
3910 as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits
|
|
|
3911 we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (
|
|
|
3912 <a id="FP_Q113_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him.
|
|
|
3913 </p>
|
|
|
3914 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p7">
|
|
|
3915 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if
|
|
|
3916 we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic
|
|
|
3917 ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious,
|
|
|
3918 nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.
|
|
|
3919 </p>
|
|
|
3920 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p8">
|
|
|
3921 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many
|
|
|
3922 other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.
|
|
|
3923 </p>
|
|
|
3924 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p9">
|
|
|
3925 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still
|
|
|
3926 part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree
|
|
|
3927 of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes
|
|
|
3928 separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above
|
|
|
3929 quoted, says.
|
|
|
3930 </p>
|
|
|
3931 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3932 <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
3933 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
3934 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3935 </div>
|
|
|
3936 <div id="FP_Q113_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
3937 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3938 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
3939 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A6-p0.1">Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?</h4>
|
|
|
3940 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3941 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p2">
|
|
|
3942 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (
|
|
|
3943 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.51.9" target="asv">Jer. 51:9</a>) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her." And (
|
|
|
3944 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.5" target="asv">Is. 5:5</a>) it is written: "I will take away the hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]---"and it shall be wasted."
|
|
|
3945 </p>
|
|
|
3946 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p3">
|
|
|
3947 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to
|
|
|
3948 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21.2" target="asv"> Ps. 21:2</a>: "O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man.
|
|
|
3949 </p>
|
|
|
3950 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p4">
|
|
|
3951 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes
|
|
|
3952 they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.
|
|
|
3953 </p>
|
|
|
3954 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p5">
|
|
|
3955 <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are ever assailing us, according to
|
|
|
3956 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good
|
|
|
3957 angels ever guard us.
|
|
|
3958 </p>
|
|
|
3959 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p6">
|
|
|
3960 <b>I answer that,</b> As appears above
|
|
|
3961 <a id="FP_Q113_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor
|
|
|
3962 anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is
|
|
|
3963 it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of
|
|
|
3964 His providence, but only in so far as He
|
|
|
3965 allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes
|
|
|
3966 a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some
|
|
|
3967 trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House
|
|
|
3968 of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being
|
|
|
3969 subject to tribulation.
|
|
|
3970 </p>
|
|
|
3971 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p7"> From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.</p>
|
|
|
3972 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p8">
|
|
|
3973 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship:
|
|
|
3974 for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be
|
|
|
3975 with man in an instant.
|
|
|
3976 </p>
|
|
|
3977 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p9"></p>
|
|
|
3978 <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p10"></p>
|
|
|
3979 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
3980 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
3981 </div>
|
|
|
3982 <div id="FP_Q113_A7" class="div4">
|
|
|
3983 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
3984 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
3985 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A7-p0.1">Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?</h4>
|
|
|
3986 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p1"></p>
|
|
|
3987 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p2">
|
|
|
3988 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (
|
|
|
3989 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.33.7" target="asv">Is. 33:7</a>): "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills
|
|
|
3990 of those whom they guard.
|
|
|
3991 </p>
|
|
|
3992 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p3">
|
|
|
3993 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the
|
|
|
3994 loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.
|
|
|
3995 </p>
|
|
|
3996 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p4">
|
|
|
3997 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance,
|
|
|
3998 as we are told,
|
|
|
3999 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv"> Lk. 15:7.</a> Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.
|
|
|
4000 </p>
|
|
|
4001 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p5">
|
|
|
4002 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, on
|
|
|
4003 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.12" target="asv"> Numbers 18:12</a>: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men
|
|
|
4004 have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which
|
|
|
4005 have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins.
|
|
|
4006 </p>
|
|
|
4007 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p6">
|
|
|
4008 <b>On the contrary,</b> Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (
|
|
|
4009 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv">Apoc. 21:4</a>): "Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have
|
|
|
4010 no cause for grief.
|
|
|
4011 </p>
|
|
|
4012 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p7">
|
|
|
4013 <b>I answer that,</b> Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De
|
|
|
4014 Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will
|
|
|
4015 of the angels and the other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens
|
|
|
4016 in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply
|
|
|
4017 speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is
|
|
|
4018 called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances;
|
|
|
4019 although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo
|
|
|
4020 into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it.
|
|
|
4021 Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking
|
|
|
4022 the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine
|
|
|
4023 justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.
|
|
|
4024 </p>
|
|
|
4025 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p8">
|
|
|
4026 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words
|
|
|
4027 of Rabsaces, as related
|
|
|
4028 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.37.2" target="asv"> Is. 37:2 </a>seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers
|
|
|
4029 who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression
|
|
|
4030 is metaphorical, and
|
|
|
4031 signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God
|
|
|
4032 and the angels.
|
|
|
4033 </p>
|
|
|
4034 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p9"> The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.</p>
|
|
|
4035 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p10">
|
|
|
4036 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering
|
|
|
4037 of the Divine Providence.
|
|
|
4038 </p>
|
|
|
4039 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p11">
|
|
|
4040 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.
|
|
|
4041 </p>
|
|
|
4042 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4043 <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4044 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4045 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4046 </div>
|
|
|
4047 <div id="FP_Q113_A8" class="div4">
|
|
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4048 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a>
|
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|
4049 <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a>
|
|
|
4050 <h4 id="FP_Q113_A8-p0.1">Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? </h4>
|
|
|
4051 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4052 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p2">
|
|
|
4053 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be strife or discord among the angels. For it is written (
|
|
|
4054 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.25.2" target="asv">Job 25:2</a>): "Who maketh peace in His high places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife.
|
|
|
4055 </p>
|
|
|
4056 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p3">
|
|
|
4057 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels.
|
|
|
4058 Therefore there is no strife among the angels.
|
|
|
4059 </p>
|
|
|
4060 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p4">
|
|
|
4061 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the
|
|
|
4062 opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel
|
|
|
4063 is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels.
|
|
|
4064 </p>
|
|
|
4065 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p5">
|
|
|
4066 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
4067 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>): "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of the Persians was the angel
|
|
|
4068 deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is
|
|
|
4069 strife among them.
|
|
|
4070 </p>
|
|
|
4071 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p6">
|
|
|
4072 <b>I answer that,</b> The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the
|
|
|
4073 kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his
|
|
|
4074 prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having
|
|
|
4075 led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of
|
|
|
4076 the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.
|
|
|
4077 </p>
|
|
|
4078 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p7"> But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship
|
|
|
4079 of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard
|
|
|
4080 to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree.
|
|
|
4081 But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so
|
|
|
4082 that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels
|
|
|
4083 cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they
|
|
|
4084 consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their
|
|
|
4085 wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things
|
|
|
4086 about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.
|
|
|
4087 </p>
|
|
|
4088 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p8"> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p>
|
|
|
4089 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p9"></p>
|
|
|
4090 <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4091 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a>
|
|
|
4092 <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a>
|
|
|
4093 </div>
|
|
|
4094 <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4095 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4096 </div>
|
|
|
4097 <div id="FP_Q114" class="div3">
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|
4098 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a>
|
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4099 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4100 <h3 id="FP_Q114-p0.1">OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </h3>
|
|
|
4101 <p id="FP_Q114-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4102 <p id="FP_Q114-p2"> We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
4103 <p id="FP_Q114-p3"> (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?</p>
|
|
|
4104 <p id="FP_Q114-p4"> (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</p>
|
|
|
4105 <p id="FP_Q114-p5"> (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?</p>
|
|
|
4106 <p id="FP_Q114-p6"> (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?</p>
|
|
|
4107 <p id="FP_Q114-p7"> (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?</p>
|
|
|
4108 <div id="FP_Q114_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
4109 <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a>
|
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|
4110 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4111 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A1-p0.1">Whether men are assailed by the demons?</h4>
|
|
|
4112 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4113 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p2">
|
|
|
4114 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by
|
|
|
4115 God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed
|
|
|
4116 to assail man.
|
|
|
4117 </p>
|
|
|
4118 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p3">
|
|
|
4119 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men
|
|
|
4120 are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of
|
|
|
4121 all justice, that men should be assailed by demons.
|
|
|
4122 </p>
|
|
|
4123 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p4">
|
|
|
4124 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed
|
|
|
4125 that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.
|
|
|
4126 </p>
|
|
|
4127 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p5">
|
|
|
4128 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
4129 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of
|
|
|
4130 this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places."
|
|
|
4131 </p>
|
|
|
4132 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p6">
|
|
|
4133 <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself
|
|
|
4134 is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance
|
|
|
4135 of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's
|
|
|
4136 salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly
|
|
|
4137 use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof
|
|
|
4138 are to be referred to God as their first author.
|
|
|
4139 </p>
|
|
|
4140 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p7">
|
|
|
4141 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail
|
|
|
4142 us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to
|
|
|
4143 man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in
|
|
|
4144 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 22:20.</a> For punishment is referred to God as its first author.
|
|
|
4145 Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they
|
|
|
4146 punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.
|
|
|
4147 </p>
|
|
|
4148 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p8">
|
|
|
4149 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally
|
|
|
4150 through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (
|
|
|
4151 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:16</a>), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."
|
|
|
4152 </p>
|
|
|
4153 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p9">
|
|
|
4154 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the
|
|
|
4155 demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of
|
|
|
4156 the elect.
|
|
|
4157 </p>
|
|
|
4158 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p10"></p>
|
|
|
4159 <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4160 <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a>
|
|
|
4161 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4162 </div>
|
|
|
4163 <div id="FP_Q114_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
4164 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4165 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4166 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A2-p0.1">Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</h4>
|
|
|
4167 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4168 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p2">
|
|
|
4169 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to
|
|
|
4170 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.1" target="asv"> Gn. 22:1, </a> "God tempted Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt
|
|
|
4171 man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt.
|
|
|
4172 </p>
|
|
|
4173 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p3">
|
|
|
4174 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.
|
|
|
4175 </p>
|
|
|
4176 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p4">
|
|
|
4177 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will,
|
|
|
4178 as appears from what has been said above (
|
|
|
4179 <a id="FP_Q114_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">Q[111], A[2]</a>), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt.
|
|
|
4180 </p>
|
|
|
4181 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p5">
|
|
|
4182 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
4183 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.3.5" target="asv">1 Thess. 3:5</a>): "Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is, the devil, whose office it
|
|
|
4184 is to tempt."
|
|
|
4185 </p>
|
|
|
4186 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p6">
|
|
|
4187 <b>I answer that,</b> To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about
|
|
|
4188 it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be
|
|
|
4189 acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is
|
|
|
4190 as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is
|
|
|
4191 sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.
|
|
|
4192 </p>
|
|
|
4193 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p7"> From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed
|
|
|
4194 merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were,
|
|
|
4195 presumes to make an experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil,
|
|
|
4196 however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper
|
|
|
4197 office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He
|
|
|
4198 may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (
|
|
|
4199 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.13.3" target="asv">Dt. 13:3</a>): "The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him."
|
|
|
4200 </p>
|
|
|
4201 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p8"> The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort
|
|
|
4202 of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages
|
|
|
4203 and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.
|
|
|
4204 </p>
|
|
94
|
4205 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.</p>
|
|
64
|
4206 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p10">
|
|
|
4207 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher
|
|
|
4208 of spirits" (
|
|
|
4209 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore
|
|
|
4210 this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone.
|
|
|
4211 </p>
|
|
|
4212 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p11">
|
|
|
4213 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (
|
|
|
4214 <a id="FP_Q114_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html">Q[111], A[3]</a>), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can
|
|
|
4215 nevertheless be inclined.
|
|
|
4216 </p>
|
|
|
4217 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4218 <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4219 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4220 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4221 </div>
|
|
|
4222 <div id="FP_Q114_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
4223 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4224 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4225 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A3-p0.1">Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?</h4>
|
|
|
4226 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4227 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p2">
|
|
|
4228 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude
|
|
|
4229 of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all
|
|
|
4230 malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil."
|
|
|
4231 </p>
|
|
|
4232 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p3">
|
|
|
4233 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (
|
|
|
4234 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>): "You are of your father the devil." But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore every
|
|
|
4235 sin is due to the devil's instigation.
|
|
|
4236 </p>
|
|
|
4237 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p4">
|
|
|
4238 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the
|
|
|
4239 suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due
|
|
|
4240 to the instigation of the devil.
|
|
|
4241 </p>
|
|
|
4242 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p5">
|
|
|
4243 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from
|
|
|
4244 the movement of our free-will."
|
|
|
4245 </p>
|
|
|
4246 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p6">
|
|
|
4247 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a
|
|
|
4248 disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might
|
|
|
4249 say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of
|
|
|
4250 all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there
|
|
|
4251 resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.
|
|
|
4252 </p>
|
|
|
4253 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p7"> But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil
|
|
|
4254 is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will
|
|
|
4255 and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire
|
|
|
4256 for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those
|
|
|
4257 desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will
|
|
|
4258 to curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the
|
|
|
4259 devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our
|
|
|
4260 first parents," as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii).
|
|
|
4261 </p>
|
|
94
|
4262 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.</p>
|
|
64
|
4263 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p9">
|
|
|
4264 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby,
|
|
|
4265 in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.
|
|
|
4266 </p>
|
|
|
4267 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p10">
|
|
|
4268 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to
|
|
|
4269 man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not
|
|
|
4270 due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.
|
|
|
4271 </p>
|
|
|
4272 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4273 <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4274 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4275 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4276 </div>
|
|
|
4277 <div id="FP_Q114_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
4278 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4279 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4280 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A4-p0.1">Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?</h4>
|
|
|
4281 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4282 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p2">
|
|
|
4283 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show
|
|
|
4284 itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (
|
|
|
4285 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other
|
|
|
4286 times do the demons perform lying wonders.
|
|
|
4287 </p>
|
|
|
4288 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p3">
|
|
|
4289 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine
|
|
|
4290 says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's
|
|
|
4291 art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.
|
|
|
4292 </p>
|
|
|
4293 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p4">
|
|
|
4294 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade
|
|
|
4295 one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (
|
|
|
4296 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv">Mk. 16:20</a>): "The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."
|
|
|
4297 </p>
|
|
|
4298 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p5">
|
|
|
4299 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says
|
|
|
4300 <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q83.html">(Q[83];</a> [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of the magic art miracles are
|
|
|
4301 wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God."
|
|
|
4302 </p>
|
|
|
4303 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p6">
|
|
|
4304 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said above (
|
|
|
4305 <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in
|
|
|
4306 the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power
|
|
|
4307 of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience.
|
|
|
4308 And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power
|
|
|
4309 and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him
|
|
|
4310 to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.
|
|
|
4311 </p>
|
|
|
4312 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p7"> It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they
|
|
|
4313 are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs.
|
|
|
4314 And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house
|
|
|
4315 and with it his children---these were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx,
|
|
|
4316 19).
|
|
|
4317 </p>
|
|
|
4318 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p8">
|
|
|
4319 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive
|
|
|
4320 men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies,
|
|
|
4321 they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him."
|
|
|
4322 </p>
|
|
|
4323 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p9">
|
|
|
4324 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As we have said above (
|
|
|
4325 <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute
|
|
|
4326 matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce
|
|
|
4327 these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal
|
|
|
4328 things which
|
|
|
4329 can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the
|
|
|
4330 operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs,
|
|
|
4331 which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature,
|
|
|
4332 cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body
|
|
|
4333 of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by
|
|
|
4334 the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality.
|
|
|
4335 </p>
|
|
|
4336 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p10"> Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his
|
|
|
4337 corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (
|
|
|
4338 <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html">Q[111], AA[3]</a>,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as
|
|
|
4339 he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same
|
|
|
4340 way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ.
|
|
|
4341 Dei xviii, 18): "Man's imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things,
|
|
|
4342 appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be understood as though the
|
|
|
4343 imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another
|
|
|
4344 man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses.
|
|
|
4345 </p>
|
|
|
4346 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p11">
|
|
|
4347 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different
|
|
|
4348 right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the
|
|
|
4349 latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject."
|
|
|
4350 </p>
|
|
|
4351 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4352 <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4353 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4354 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4355 </div>
|
|
|
4356 <div id="FP_Q114_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
4357 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4358 <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a>
|
|
|
4359 <h4 id="FP_Q114_A5-p0.1">Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?</h4>
|
|
|
4360 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4361 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p2">
|
|
|
4362 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
|
|
|
4363 overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore
|
|
|
4364 it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
|
|
|
4365 </p>
|
|
|
4366 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p3">
|
|
|
4367 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is
|
|
|
4368 not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults.
|
|
|
4369 </p>
|
|
|
4370 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p4">
|
|
|
4371 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
|
|
|
4372 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.
|
|
|
4373 </p>
|
|
|
4374 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p5">
|
|
|
4375 <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other
|
|
|
4376 sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to
|
|
|
4377 be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (
|
|
|
4378 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv">Lk. 4:13</a>) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One
|
|
|
4379 is on the part
|
|
|
4380 of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works],
|
|
|
4381 "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt
|
|
|
4382 for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil.
|
|
|
4383 As to this, Ambrose says on
|
|
|
4384 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv"> Lk. 4:13</a>: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from
|
|
|
4385 frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from
|
|
|
4386 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.44" target="asv"> Mat. 12:44</a>: "I will return into my house from whence I came out."
|
|
|
4387 </p>
|
|
|
4388 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p6"> From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.</p>
|
|
|
4389 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p7"></p>
|
|
|
4390 <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p8"></p>
|
|
|
4391 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4392 <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a>
|
|
|
4393 </div>
|
|
|
4394 <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a>
|
|
|
4395 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4396 </div>
|
|
|
4397 <div id="FP_Q115" class="div3">
|
|
|
4398 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4399 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4400 <h3 id="FP_Q115-p0.1">OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
4401 <p id="FP_Q115-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4402 <p id="FP_Q115-p2"> We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal
|
|
|
4403 actions there are six points of inquiry:
|
|
|
4404 </p>
|
|
|
4405 <p id="FP_Q115-p3"> (1) Whether a body can be active?</p>
|
|
|
4406 <p id="FP_Q115-p4"> (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?</p>
|
|
|
4407 <p id="FP_Q115-p5"> (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?</p>
|
|
|
4408 <p id="FP_Q115-p6"> (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?</p>
|
|
|
4409 <p id="FP_Q115-p7"> (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?</p>
|
|
|
4410 <p id="FP_Q115-p8"> (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?</p>
|
|
|
4411 <div id="FP_Q115_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
4412 <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a>
|
|
|
4413 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4414 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A1-p0.1">Whether a body can be active?</h4>
|
|
|
4415 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4416 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p2">
|
|
|
4417 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but
|
|
|
4418 do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and
|
|
|
4419 are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances."
|
|
|
4420 </p>
|
|
|
4421 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p3">
|
|
|
4422 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance
|
|
|
4423 below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.
|
|
|
4424 Therefore corporeal substance is not active.
|
|
|
4425 </p>
|
|
|
4426 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p4">
|
|
|
4427 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because
|
|
|
4428 it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more
|
|
|
4429 a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active.
|
|
|
4430 </p>
|
|
|
4431 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p5">
|
|
|
4432 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being
|
|
|
4433 most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active.
|
|
|
4434 </p>
|
|
|
4435 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p6">
|
|
|
4436 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial
|
|
|
4437 form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and
|
|
|
4438 an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise,
|
|
|
4439 neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject,"
|
|
|
4440 as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active.
|
|
|
4441 </p>
|
|
|
4442 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p7">
|
|
|
4443 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power
|
|
|
4444 on that of which it lays hold."
|
|
|
4445 </p>
|
|
|
4446 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p8">
|
|
|
4447 <b>I answer that,</b> It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors.
|
|
|
4448 For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments
|
|
|
4449 mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies,
|
|
|
4450 are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that,
|
|
|
4451 according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion
|
|
|
4452 seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby,
|
|
|
4453 and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that
|
|
|
4454 these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter
|
|
|
4455 is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned
|
|
|
4456 by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual
|
|
|
4457 and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.
|
|
|
4458 </p>
|
|
|
4459 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p9"> But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion
|
|
|
4460 as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the
|
|
|
4461 participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be
|
|
|
4462 in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of
|
|
|
4463 its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal:
|
|
|
4464 but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the
|
|
|
4465 form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form
|
|
|
4466 of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an
|
|
|
4467 action is effected by the contact of two bodies.
|
|
|
4468 </p>
|
|
|
4469 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p10"> But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while
|
|
|
4470 he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first
|
|
|
4471 contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him
|
|
|
4472 to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the
|
|
|
4473 substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial
|
|
|
4474 principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of
|
|
|
4475 the creation (
|
|
|
4476 <a id="FP_Q115_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html">Q[45], A[8]</a>).
|
|
|
4477 </p>
|
|
|
4478 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p11"> The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent,
|
|
|
4479 while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle
|
|
|
4480 (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would
|
|
|
4481 be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue.
|
|
|
4482 </p>
|
|
|
4483 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p12"> We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.</p>
|
|
|
4484 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p13">
|
|
|
4485 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature
|
|
|
4486 inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
|
|
|
4487 Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act.
|
|
|
4488 </p>
|
|
94
|
4489 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a
|
|
64
|
4490 mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is
|
|
|
4491 purely passive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God
|
|
|
4492 is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
|
|
|
4493 </p>
|
|
|
4494 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p15">
|
|
|
4495 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch
|
|
|
4496 as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not
|
|
|
4497 to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly,
|
|
|
4498 it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing,
|
|
|
4499 the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement,
|
|
|
4500 as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.
|
|
|
4501 </p>
|
|
|
4502 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p16">
|
|
|
4503 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch
|
|
|
4504 as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.
|
|
|
4505 </p>
|
|
|
4506 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p17">
|
|
|
4507 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although
|
|
|
4508 itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate
|
|
|
4509 in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh.
|
|
|
4510 But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature
|
|
|
4511 of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that
|
|
|
4512 an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.
|
|
|
4513 </p>
|
|
|
4514 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p18"></p>
|
|
|
4515 <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p19"></p>
|
|
|
4516 <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a>
|
|
|
4517 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4518 </div>
|
|
|
4519 <div id="FP_Q115_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
4520 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4521 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4522 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A2-p0.1">Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?</h4>
|
|
|
4523 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4524 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p2">
|
|
|
4525 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual
|
|
|
4526 order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in
|
|
|
4527 which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
|
|
|
4528 </p>
|
|
|
4529 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p3">
|
|
|
4530 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
|
|
|
4531 seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable
|
|
|
4532 to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
|
|
|
4533 </p>
|
|
|
4534 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p4">
|
|
|
4535 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above,
|
|
|
4536 matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
|
|
|
4537 </p>
|
|
|
4538 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p5">
|
|
|
4539 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production
|
|
|
4540 of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
|
|
|
4541 virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
|
|
|
4542 </p>
|
|
|
4543 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p6">
|
|
|
4544 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds
|
|
|
4545 lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
|
|
|
4546 </p>
|
|
|
4547 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p7">
|
|
|
4548 <b>I answer that,</b> It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal
|
|
|
4549 nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
|
|
|
4550 things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation
|
|
|
4551 of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are
|
|
|
4552 generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united,
|
|
|
4553 consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is
|
|
|
4554 manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things
|
|
|
4555 are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and
|
|
|
4556 passive
|
|
|
4557 virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.
|
|
|
4558 </p>
|
|
|
4559 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p8"> These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
|
|
|
4560 lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements
|
|
|
4561 of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things
|
|
|
4562 which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that
|
|
|
4563 animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are
|
|
|
4564 compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.
|
|
|
4565 </p>
|
|
|
4566 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p9">
|
|
|
4567 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal
|
|
|
4568 matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes
|
|
|
4569 ideales].
|
|
|
4570 </p>
|
|
|
4571 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p10">
|
|
|
4572 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement
|
|
|
4573 for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.
|
|
|
4574 </p>
|
|
|
4575 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p11">
|
|
|
4576 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female
|
|
|
4577 contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles.
|
|
|
4578 </p>
|
|
|
4579 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p12">
|
|
|
4580 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues,
|
|
|
4581 just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so
|
|
|
4582 is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues,"
|
|
|
4583 but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate
|
|
|
4584 principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought
|
|
|
4585 outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God
|
|
|
4586 commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities
|
|
|
4587 which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of
|
|
|
4588 seminal virtues.
|
|
|
4589 </p>
|
|
|
4590 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4591 <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4592 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4593 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4594 </div>
|
|
|
4595 <div id="FP_Q115_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
4596 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4597 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4598 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A3-p0.1">Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?</h4>
|
|
|
4599 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4600 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p2">
|
|
|
4601 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De
|
|
|
4602 Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they
|
|
|
4603 are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes."
|
|
|
4604 </p>
|
|
|
4605 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p3">
|
|
|
4606 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and
|
|
|
4607 there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need
|
|
|
4608 to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.
|
|
|
4609 </p>
|
|
|
4610 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p4">
|
|
|
4611 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through
|
|
|
4612 the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore
|
|
|
4613 the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
|
|
|
4614 </p>
|
|
|
4615 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p5">
|
|
|
4616 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies:
|
|
|
4617 a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly
|
|
|
4618 bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
|
|
|
4619 </p>
|
|
|
4620 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p6">
|
|
|
4621 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more
|
|
|
4622 subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible
|
|
|
4623 bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."
|
|
|
4624 </p>
|
|
|
4625 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p7">
|
|
|
4626 <b>I answer that,</b> Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
|
|
|
4627 moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable.
|
|
|
4628 Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the
|
|
|
4629 heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save
|
|
|
4630 locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of
|
|
|
4631 the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.
|
|
|
4632 </p>
|
|
|
4633 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p8">
|
|
|
4634 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption
|
|
|
4635 here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods.
|
|
|
4636 </p>
|
|
|
4637 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p9">
|
|
|
4638 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like.
|
|
|
4639 If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles
|
|
|
4640 of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle
|
|
|
4641 above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves
|
|
|
4642 sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions
|
|
|
4643 in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary
|
|
|
4644 to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions.
|
|
|
4645 </p>
|
|
|
4646 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p10"> This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive
|
|
|
4647 their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable,
|
|
|
4648 would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
|
|
|
4649 bodies: which is clearly false.
|
|
|
4650 </p>
|
|
|
4651 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p11"> Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of
|
|
|
4652 its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies.
|
|
|
4653 Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body:
|
|
|
4654 thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."
|
|
|
4655 </p>
|
|
|
4656 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p12">
|
|
|
4657 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason
|
|
|
4658 of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all
|
|
|
4659 things are like God.
|
|
|
4660 </p>
|
|
|
4661 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p13">
|
|
|
4662 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter.
|
|
|
4663 Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed
|
|
|
4664 sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because
|
|
|
4665 the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the
|
|
|
4666 various dispositions of matter.
|
|
|
4667 </p>
|
|
|
4668 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4669 <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p15"></p>
|
|
|
4670 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4671 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4672 </div>
|
|
|
4673 <div id="FP_Q115_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
4674 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4675 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4676 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A4-p0.1">Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?</h4>
|
|
|
4677 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4678 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p2">
|
|
|
4679 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
|
|
|
4680 substances, as stated above (
|
|
|
4681 <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], A[3]</a>), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it
|
|
|
4682 seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
|
|
|
4683 </p>
|
|
|
4684 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p3">
|
|
|
4685 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems
|
|
|
4686 that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles.
|
|
|
4687 </p>
|
|
|
4688 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p4">
|
|
|
4689 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect
|
|
|
4690 and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human
|
|
|
4691 actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
|
|
|
4692 </p>
|
|
|
4693 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p5">
|
|
|
4694 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."
|
|
|
4695 </p>
|
|
|
4696 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p6">
|
|
|
4697 <b>I answer that,</b> The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above
|
|
|
4698 <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because
|
|
|
4699 the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore
|
|
|
4700 if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding
|
|
|
4701 that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice
|
|
|
4702 and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there
|
|
|
4703 are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action
|
|
|
4704 of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate
|
|
|
4705 actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however,
|
|
|
4706 that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely,
|
|
|
4707 as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the
|
|
|
4708 intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive
|
|
|
4709 powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity,
|
|
|
4710 disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although
|
|
|
4711 the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains
|
|
|
4712 the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
|
|
|
4713 of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions,
|
|
|
4714 than on the intellect.
|
|
|
4715 </p>
|
|
|
4716 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p7"> To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does
|
|
|
4717 not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and
|
|
|
4718 of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal
|
|
|
4719 organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.
|
|
|
4720 </p>
|
|
|
4721 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p8">
|
|
|
4722 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies;
|
|
|
4723 but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated
|
|
|
4724 above (
|
|
|
4725 <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">Q[111], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
4726 </p>
|
|
|
4727 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p9">
|
|
|
4728 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause:
|
|
|
4729 so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine
|
|
|
4730 intellect and will.
|
|
|
4731 </p>
|
|
|
4732 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p10">
|
|
|
4733 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly
|
|
|
4734 bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the
|
|
|
4735 truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting
|
|
|
4736 his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say
|
|
|
4737 that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
|
|
|
4738 </p>
|
|
|
4739 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4740 <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4741 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4742 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4743 </div>
|
|
|
4744 <div id="FP_Q115_A5" class="div4">
|
|
|
4745 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4746 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4747 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A5-p0.1">Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?</h4>
|
|
|
4748 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4749 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p2">
|
|
|
4750 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
|
|
|
4751 men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from
|
|
|
4752 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.24" target="asv"> Mat. 4:24 </a>and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
|
|
|
4753 </p>
|
|
|
4754 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p3">
|
|
|
4755 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through
|
|
|
4756 the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them.
|
|
|
4757 </p>
|
|
|
4758 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p4">
|
|
|
4759 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies,
|
|
|
4760 namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine
|
|
|
4761 (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
|
|
|
4762 </p>
|
|
|
4763 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p5">
|
|
|
4764 <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine
|
|
|
4765 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
|
|
|
4766 </p>
|
|
|
4767 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p6">
|
|
|
4768 <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and
|
|
|
4769 held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies.
|
|
|
4770 This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain
|
|
|
4771 powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is
|
|
|
4772 manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would
|
|
|
4773 in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors
|
|
|
4774 of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.
|
|
|
4775 </p>
|
|
|
4776 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p7"> For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius
|
|
|
4777 says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which
|
|
|
4778 it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto
|
|
|
4779 <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (
|
|
|
4780 <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">Q[51], A[1]</a>): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action
|
|
|
4781 of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
|
|
|
4782 </p>
|
|
|
4783 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p8">
|
|
|
4784 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame
|
|
|
4785 God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because
|
|
|
4786 as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (
|
|
|
4787 <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html">Q[114], A[4]</a>, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended
|
|
|
4788 result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal.
|
|
|
4789 ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property
|
|
|
4790 of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according
|
|
|
4791 to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto
|
|
|
4792 disposed.
|
|
|
4793 </p>
|
|
|
4794 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p9">
|
|
|
4795 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of
|
|
|
4796 believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations
|
|
|
4797 corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.
|
|
|
4798 </p>
|
|
|
4799 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p10">
|
|
|
4800 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs,
|
|
|
4801 rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered
|
|
|
4802 to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
|
|
|
4803 </p>
|
|
|
4804 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4805 <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4806 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
4807 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4808 </div>
|
|
|
4809 <div id="FP_Q115_A6" class="div4">
|
|
|
4810 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4811 <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a>
|
|
|
4812 <h4 id="FP_Q115_A6-p0.1">Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?</h4>
|
|
|
4813 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4814 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p2">
|
|
|
4815 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
|
|
|
4816 effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies,
|
|
|
4817 with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity.
|
|
|
4818 </p>
|
|
|
4819 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p3">
|
|
|
4820 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter
|
|
|
4821 to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher
|
|
|
4822 power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter.
|
|
|
4823 </p>
|
|
|
4824 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p4">
|
|
|
4825 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal
|
|
|
4826 cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle:
|
|
|
4827 since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle
|
|
|
4828 is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
|
|
|
4829 Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.
|
|
|
4830 </p>
|
|
|
4831 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p5">
|
|
|
4832 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed
|
|
|
4833 in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of
|
|
|
4834 heavenly bodies take place of necessity.
|
|
|
4835 </p>
|
|
|
4836 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p6">
|
|
|
4837 <b>I answer that,</b> This question is partly solved by what was said above
|
|
|
4838 <a id="FP_Q115_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations
|
|
|
4839 in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
|
|
|
4840 prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other
|
|
|
4841 things to which human action extends.
|
|
|
4842 </p>
|
|
|
4843 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p7"> But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced
|
|
|
4844 by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning
|
|
|
4845 of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows
|
|
|
4846 of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph.
|
|
|
4847 vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
|
|
|
4848 </p>
|
|
|
4849 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p8"> For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes
|
|
|
4850 are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to
|
|
|
4851 fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently
|
|
|
4852 the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
|
|
|
4853 </p>
|
|
|
4854 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p9"> Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally,
|
|
|
4855 has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise
|
|
|
4856 (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly
|
|
|
4857 a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to
|
|
|
4858 its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these
|
|
|
4859 two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be
|
|
|
4860 reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take
|
|
|
4861 fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the
|
|
|
4862 surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight
|
|
|
4863 on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of
|
|
|
4864 heavenly bodies result of necessity.
|
|
|
4865 </p>
|
|
|
4866 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p10">
|
|
|
4867 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which
|
|
|
4868 can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
|
|
|
4869 </p>
|
|
|
4870 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p11">
|
|
|
4871 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local
|
|
|
4872 distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly
|
|
|
4873 body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature
|
|
|
4874 or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly
|
|
|
4875 body.
|
|
|
4876 </p>
|
|
|
4877 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p12">
|
|
|
4878 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless
|
|
|
4879 the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
|
|
|
4880 </p>
|
|
|
4881 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4882 <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p14"></p>
|
|
|
4883 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4884 <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a>
|
|
|
4885 </div>
|
|
|
4886 <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a>
|
|
|
4887 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4888 </div>
|
|
|
4889 <div id="FP_Q116" class="div3">
|
|
|
4890 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
4891 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4892 <h3 id="FP_Q116-p0.1">ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
4893 <p id="FP_Q116-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4894 <p id="FP_Q116-p2"> We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
4895 <p id="FP_Q116-p3"> (1) Is there such a thing as fate?</p>
|
|
|
4896 <p id="FP_Q116-p4"> (2) Where is it?</p>
|
|
|
4897 <p id="FP_Q116-p5"> (3) Is it unchangeable?</p>
|
|
|
4898 <p id="FP_Q116-p6"> (4) Are all things subject to fate?</p>
|
|
|
4899 <div id="FP_Q116_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
4900 <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a>
|
|
|
4901 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4902 <h4 id="FP_Q116_A1-p0.1">Whether there be such a thing as fate?</h4>
|
|
|
4903 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4904 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p2">
|
|
|
4905 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the
|
|
|
4906 hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."
|
|
|
4907 </p>
|
|
|
4908 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p3">
|
|
|
4909 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
|
|
|
4910 from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who
|
|
|
4911 decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will
|
|
|
4912 be neither luck nor chance in the world.
|
|
|
4913 </p>
|
|
|
4914 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p4">
|
|
|
4915 <b>On the contrary,</b> What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
|
|
|
4916 changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order."
|
|
|
4917 </p>
|
|
|
4918 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p5">
|
|
|
4919 <b>I answer that,</b> In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like
|
|
|
4920 as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants
|
|
|
4921 are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared
|
|
|
4922 to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.
|
|
|
4923 </p>
|
|
|
4924 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p6"> So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These
|
|
|
4925 denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what
|
|
|
4926 we have said above about Providence (
|
|
|
4927 <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
4928 </p>
|
|
|
4929 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p7"> On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural
|
|
|
4930 things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is
|
|
|
4931 nothing else than "a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v,
|
|
|
4932 1,8,9]. But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (
|
|
|
4933 <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">Q[115], A[4]</a>) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of
|
|
|
4934 fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what
|
|
|
4935 takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said (
|
|
|
4936 <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html">Q[115], A[6]</a>) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every
|
|
|
4937 action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect
|
|
|
4938 of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grace
|
|
|
4939 finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects
|
|
|
4940 in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what
|
|
|
4941 happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance.
|
|
|
4942 </p>
|
|
|
4943 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p8"> We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
|
|
|
4944 cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect:
|
|
|
4945 otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect
|
|
|
4946 can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is
|
|
|
4947 hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here
|
|
|
4948 by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine
|
|
|
4949 intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (
|
|
|
4950 <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.
|
|
|
4951 </p>
|
|
|
4952 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p9"> So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were
|
|
|
4953 "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those
|
|
|
4954 who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If
|
|
|
4955 anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion,
|
|
94
|
4956 but hold his tongue."</p><!-- markup added by HST-->
|
|
|
4957 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p9a"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
|
|
64
|
4958 </p>
|
|
|
4959 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p10">
|
|
|
4960 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared
|
|
|
4961 to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
|
|
|
4962 </p>
|
|
|
4963 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p11"></p>
|
|
|
4964 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p12"></p>
|
|
|
4965 <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p13"></p>
|
|
|
4966 <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a>
|
|
|
4967 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
4968 </div>
|
|
|
4969 <div id="FP_Q116_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
4970 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
4971 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
4972 <h4 id="FP_Q116_A2-p0.1">Whether fate is in created things?</h4>
|
|
|
4973 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
4974 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p2">
|
|
|
4975 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
|
|
|
4976 called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
|
|
|
4977 </p>
|
|
|
4978 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p3">
|
|
|
4979 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
|
|
|
4980 cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above
|
|
|
4981 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.
|
|
|
4982 </p>
|
|
|
4983 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p4">
|
|
|
4984 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according
|
|
|
4985 to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but
|
|
|
4986 in God.
|
|
|
4987 </p>
|
|
|
4988 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p5">
|
|
|
4989 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things."
|
|
|
4990 </p>
|
|
|
4991 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p6">
|
|
|
4992 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been stated above (
|
|
|
4993 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>;
|
|
|
4994 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html">Q[103], A[6]</a>), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two
|
|
|
4995 ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this
|
|
|
4996 ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects,
|
|
|
4997 thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is
|
|
|
4998 served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements
|
|
|
4999 of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain
|
|
|
5000 of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above
|
|
|
5001 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
|
|
|
5002 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html">Q[104],
|
|
|
5003 A[2]
|
|
|
5004 </a>;
|
|
|
5005 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>;
|
|
|
5006 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.6" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113.html">Q[113];</a>
|
|
|
5007 <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.7" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114.html">Q[114])</a>. It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.
|
|
|
5008 </p>
|
|
|
5009 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p7">
|
|
|
5010 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature
|
|
|
5011 of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But
|
|
|
5012 essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
|
|
|
5013 </p>
|
|
|
5014 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p8">
|
|
|
5015 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
|
|
|
5016 </p>
|
|
|
5017 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p9">
|
|
|
5018 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies
|
|
|
5019 order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one;
|
|
|
5020 and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple.
|
|
|
5021 In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."
|
|
|
5022 </p>
|
|
|
5023 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5024 <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5025 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5026 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5027 </div>
|
|
|
5028 <div id="FP_Q116_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
5029 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5030 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5031 <h4 id="FP_Q116_A3-p0.1">Whether fate is unchangeable?</h4>
|
|
|
5032 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5033 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p2">
|
|
|
5034 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten
|
|
|
5035 is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity
|
|
|
5036 of Providence."
|
|
|
5037 </p>
|
|
|
5038 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p3">
|
|
|
5039 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent
|
|
|
5040 to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable.
|
|
|
5041 </p>
|
|
|
5042 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p4">
|
|
|
5043 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate
|
|
|
5044 seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen
|
|
|
5045 of necessity.
|
|
|
5046 </p>
|
|
|
5047 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p5">
|
|
|
5048 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition.
|
|
|
5049 </p>
|
|
|
5050 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p6">
|
|
|
5051 <b>I answer that,</b> The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes,
|
|
|
5052 which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some,
|
|
|
5053 therefore, have held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen
|
|
|
5054 of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the
|
|
|
5055 effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above (
|
|
|
5056 <a id="FP_Q116_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html">Q[115], A[6]</a>).
|
|
|
5057 </p>
|
|
|
5058 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p7"> Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians
|
|
|
5059 said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved
|
|
|
5060 above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.
|
|
|
5061 </p>
|
|
|
5062 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p8"> We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence,
|
|
|
5063 it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional
|
|
|
5064 is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the
|
|
|
5065 chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable
|
|
|
5066 Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
|
|
|
5067 </p>
|
|
94
|
5068 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p>
|
|
64
|
5069 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5070 <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5071 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5072 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5073 </div>
|
|
|
5074 <div id="FP_Q116_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
5075 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5076 <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a>
|
|
|
5077 <h4 id="FP_Q116_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are subject to fate?</h4>
|
|
|
5078 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5079 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p2">
|
|
|
5080 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and
|
|
|
5081 the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are
|
|
|
5082 born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be
|
|
|
5083 excluded from the domain of fate.
|
|
|
5084 </p>
|
|
|
5085 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p3">
|
|
|
5086 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
|
|
|
5087 Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject
|
|
|
5088 to fate.
|
|
|
5089 </p>
|
|
|
5090 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p4">
|
|
|
5091 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
|
|
|
5092 changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (
|
|
|
5093 <a id="FP_Q116_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html">Q[9], A[2]</a>). Therefore fate is in all things.
|
|
|
5094 </p>
|
|
|
5095 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p5">
|
|
|
5096 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
|
|
|
5097 </p>
|
|
|
5098 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p6">
|
|
|
5099 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
|
|
|
5100 <a id="FP_Q116_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject
|
|
|
5101 also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to
|
|
|
5102 fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol.
|
|
|
5103 iv): viz. that "those things which are
|
|
|
5104 nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing
|
|
|
5105 is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
|
|
|
5106 </p>
|
|
|
5107 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p7">
|
|
|
5108 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
|
|
|
5109 the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
|
|
|
5110 </p>
|
|
|
5111 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p8">
|
|
|
5112 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever
|
|
|
5113 is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
|
|
|
5114 </p>
|
|
|
5115 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p9">
|
|
|
5116 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these,
|
|
|
5117 therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
|
|
|
5118 </p>
|
|
|
5119 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5120 <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5121 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5122 <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a>
|
|
|
5123 </div>
|
|
|
5124 <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a>
|
|
|
5125 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5126 </div>
|
|
|
5127 <div id="FP_Q117" class="div3">
|
|
|
5128 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5129 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5130 <h3 id="FP_Q117-p0.1">OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
5131 <p id="FP_Q117-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5132 <p id="FP_Q117-p2"> We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual
|
|
|
5133 nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from
|
|
|
5134 man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry:
|
|
|
5135 </p>
|
|
|
5136 <p id="FP_Q117-p3"> (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?</p>
|
|
|
5137 <p id="FP_Q117-p4"> (2) Whether man can teach an angel?</p>
|
|
|
5138 <p id="FP_Q117-p5"> (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?</p>
|
|
|
5139 <p id="FP_Q117-p6"> (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?</p>
|
|
|
5140 <p id="FP_Q117-p7"></p>
|
|
|
5141 <div id="FP_Q117_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
5142 <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a>
|
|
|
5143 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5144 <h4 id="FP_Q117_A1-p0.1">Whether one man can teach another?</h4>
|
|
|
5145 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5146 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p2">
|
|
|
5147 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (
|
|
|
5148 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.8" target="asv">Mat. 22:8</a>): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to
|
|
|
5149 be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is
|
|
|
5150 proper to God.
|
|
|
5151 </p>
|
|
|
5152 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p3">
|
|
|
5153 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge
|
|
|
5154 in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows
|
|
|
5155 that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.
|
|
|
5156 </p>
|
|
|
5157 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p4">
|
|
|
5158 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either
|
|
|
5159 of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.
|
|
|
5160 </p>
|
|
|
5161 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p5">
|
|
|
5162 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something
|
|
|
5163 by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him.
|
|
|
5164 For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom
|
|
|
5165 these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from
|
|
|
5166 the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to
|
|
|
5167 speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in
|
|
|
5168 another by teaching him.
|
|
|
5169 </p>
|
|
|
5170 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p6">
|
|
|
5171 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
|
|
|
5172 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.7" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:7</a>): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth."
|
|
|
5173 </p>
|
|
|
5174 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p7">
|
|
|
5175 <b>I answer that,</b> On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have
|
|
|
5176 one passive intellect in common, as stated above (
|
|
|
5177 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause
|
|
|
5178 another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which
|
|
|
5179 he
|
|
|
5180 has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension.
|
|
|
5181 This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known:
|
|
|
5182 for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect,
|
|
|
5183 and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above
|
|
|
5184 (
|
|
|
5185 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
5186 </p>
|
|
|
5187 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p8"> Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning,
|
|
|
5188 through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (
|
|
|
5189 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it
|
|
|
5190 knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider
|
|
|
5191 what he
|
|
|
5192 knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose
|
|
|
5193 (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved
|
|
|
5194 above (
|
|
|
5195 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">Q[79], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
5196 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">Q[84], A[3]</a>) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima
|
|
|
5197 iii, 4).
|
|
|
5198 </p>
|
|
|
5199 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p9"> We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing
|
|
|
5200 him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of
|
|
|
5201 effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused
|
|
|
5202 to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes
|
|
|
5203 from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical
|
|
|
5204 art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things
|
|
|
5205 must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection
|
|
|
5206 of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not
|
|
|
5207 as
|
|
|
5208 principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle,
|
|
|
5209 by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing
|
|
|
5210 the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
|
|
|
5211 end.
|
|
|
5212 </p>
|
|
|
5213 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p10"> Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research;
|
|
|
5214 and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle
|
|
|
5215 of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are
|
|
|
5216 naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal
|
|
|
5217 principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own
|
|
|
5218 research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches,
|
|
|
5219 leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what
|
|
|
5220 the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge."
|
|
|
5221 </p>
|
|
|
5222 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p11"> Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing
|
|
|
5223 to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he
|
|
|
5224 may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous
|
|
|
5225 knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or
|
|
|
5226 something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly,
|
|
|
5227 by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above
|
|
|
5228 (
|
|
|
5229 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>;
|
|
|
5230 <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">Q[111], A[1]</a>) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes
|
|
|
5231 to the disciple the order of principles to
|
|
|
5232 conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles.
|
|
|
5233 Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator
|
|
|
5234 causes his hearer to know.
|
|
|
5235 </p>
|
|
|
5236 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p12">
|
|
|
5237 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
|
|
|
5238 principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these
|
|
|
5239 are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (
|
|
|
5240 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.3" target="asv">Ps. 102:3</a>); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (
|
|
|
5241 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>),
|
|
|
5242 inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (
|
|
|
5243 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), through which light all things are shown to us.
|
|
|
5244 </p>
|
|
|
5245 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p13">
|
|
|
5246 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore
|
|
|
5247 knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle
|
|
|
5248 by which one is directed in working.
|
|
|
5249 </p>
|
|
|
5250 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p14">
|
|
|
5251 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but
|
|
|
5252 he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs
|
|
|
5253 of which are proposed to him from without.
|
|
|
5254 </p>
|
|
|
5255 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p15">
|
|
|
5256 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail
|
|
|
5257 and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his
|
|
|
5258 own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.
|
|
|
5259 </p>
|
|
|
5260 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p16"></p>
|
|
|
5261 <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p17"></p>
|
|
|
5262 <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a>
|
|
|
5263 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5264 </div>
|
|
|
5265 <div id="FP_Q117_A2" class="div4">
|
|
|
5266 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5267 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5268 <h4 id="FP_Q117_A2-p0.1">Whether man can teach the angels?</h4>
|
|
|
5269 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5270 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p2">
|
|
|
5271 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (
|
|
|
5272 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.10" target="asv">Eph. 3:10</a>): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the
|
|
|
5273 Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.
|
|
|
5274 </p>
|
|
|
5275 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p3">
|
|
|
5276 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior
|
|
|
5277 angels, as stated above (
|
|
|
5278 <a id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">Q[116], A[1]</a>;
|
|
|
5279 <a id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html">Q[112], A[3]</a>). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles
|
|
|
5280 from
|
|
|
5281 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.1" target="asv"> Heb. 1:1,2</a>: "Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore
|
|
|
5282 some men have been able to teach the angels.
|
|
|
5283 </p>
|
|
|
5284 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p4">
|
|
|
5285 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are
|
|
|
5286 taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior
|
|
|
5287 angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.
|
|
|
5288 </p>
|
|
|
5289 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p5">
|
|
|
5290 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them;
|
|
|
5291 but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same
|
|
|
5292 way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from
|
|
|
5293 Our Lord's words (
|
|
|
5294 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>): "There hath not risen among them
|
|
|
5295 that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he."
|
|
|
5296 Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels
|
|
|
5297 the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.
|
|
|
5298 </p>
|
|
|
5299 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p6">
|
|
|
5300 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least
|
|
|
5301 of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery
|
|
|
5302 which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities
|
|
|
5303 and powers in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church." As
|
|
|
5304 though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities
|
|
|
5305 and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection
|
|
|
5306 this Church composed of men will be gathered together."
|
|
|
5307 </p>
|
|
|
5308 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p7"> It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when
|
|
|
5309 it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and
|
|
|
5310 the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were
|
|
|
5311 hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from
|
|
|
5312 the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles,
|
|
|
5313 the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which
|
|
|
5314 mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.
|
|
|
5315 </p>
|
|
|
5316 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p8">
|
|
|
5317 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in
|
|
|
5318 His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
|
|
|
5319 </p>
|
|
|
5320 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p9">
|
|
|
5321 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such
|
|
|
5322 great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might
|
|
|
5323 say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
|
|
|
5324 </p>
|
|
|
5325 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p10"></p>
|
|
|
5326 <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p11"></p>
|
|
|
5327 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5328 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5329 </div>
|
|
|
5330 <div id="FP_Q117_A3" class="div4">
|
|
|
5331 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5332 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5333 <h4 id="FP_Q117_A3-p0.1">Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?</h4>
|
|
|
5334 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5335 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p2">
|
|
|
5336 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work
|
|
|
5337 miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his
|
|
|
5338 reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal
|
|
|
5339 matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.
|
|
|
5340 </p>
|
|
|
5341 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p3">
|
|
|
5342 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on these words (
|
|
|
5343 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.1" target="asv">Gal. 3:1</a>): "Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single
|
|
|
5344 look bewitch others, especially children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter.
|
|
|
5345 Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.
|
|
|
5346 </p>
|
|
|
5347 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p4">
|
|
|
5348 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is
|
|
|
5349 changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on
|
|
|
5350 sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.
|
|
|
5351 </p>
|
|
|
5352 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p5">
|
|
|
5353 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will."
|
|
|
5354 </p>
|
|
|
5355 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p6">
|
|
|
5356 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
|
|
|
5357 <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or
|
|
|
5358 by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels
|
|
|
5359 also we have stated (
|
|
|
5360 <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal
|
|
|
5361 agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter,
|
|
|
5362 except by means of bodies.
|
|
|
5363 </p>
|
|
|
5364 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p7">
|
|
|
5365 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same
|
|
|
5366 place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"
|
|
|
5367 </p>
|
|
|
5368 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p8">
|
|
|
5369 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance
|
|
|
5370 rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This
|
|
|
5371 he says is the cause of the "evil eye."
|
|
|
5372 </p>
|
|
|
5373 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p9"> But it has been shown above (
|
|
|
5374 <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say,
|
|
|
5375 that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits
|
|
|
5376 takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact
|
|
|
5377 with them to a certain distance: in the
|
|
|
5378 same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.;
|
|
|
5379 [*De Insomniis ii]).
|
|
|
5380 </p>
|
|
|
5381 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p10"> Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation,
|
|
|
5382 the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is
|
|
|
5383 also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may
|
|
|
5384 have some compact with them.
|
|
|
5385 </p>
|
|
|
5386 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p11">
|
|
|
5387 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated
|
|
|
5388 above (
|
|
|
5389 <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html">Q[81], A[3]</a>), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs
|
|
|
5390 be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change
|
|
|
5391 in exterior bodies, except by means of a
|
|
|
5392 change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
|
|
|
5393 </p>
|
|
|
5394 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5395 <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5396 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5397 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5398 </div>
|
|
|
5399 <div id="FP_Q117_A4" class="div4">
|
|
|
5400 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5401 <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a>
|
|
|
5402 <h4 id="FP_Q117_A4-p0.1">Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?</h4>
|
|
|
5403 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5404 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p2">
|
|
|
5405 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance
|
|
|
5406 as to local motion, as stated above (
|
|
|
5407 <a id="FP_Q117_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A5.html">Q[110], A[5]</a>). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.
|
|
|
5408 </p>
|
|
|
5409 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p3">
|
|
|
5410 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
|
|
|
5411 power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not
|
|
|
5412 have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.
|
|
|
5413 </p>
|
|
|
5414 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p4">
|
|
|
5415 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
|
|
|
5416 </p>
|
|
|
5417 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p5">
|
|
|
5418 <b>I answer that,</b> The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
|
|
|
5419 body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey
|
|
|
5420 the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the
|
|
|
5421 limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though,
|
|
|
5422 by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.
|
|
|
5423 </p>
|
|
|
5424 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p6">
|
|
|
5425 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally
|
|
|
5426 unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance
|
|
|
5427 is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only
|
|
|
5428 one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower
|
|
|
5429 heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it
|
|
|
5430 is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
|
|
|
5431 </p>
|
|
|
5432 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p7">
|
|
|
5433 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the
|
|
|
5434 dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some
|
|
|
5435 demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
|
|
|
5436 </p>
|
|
|
5437 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p8"></p>
|
|
|
5438 <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p9"></p>
|
|
|
5439 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5440 <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a>
|
|
|
5441 </div>
|
|
|
5442 <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5443 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5444 </div>
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5445 <div id="FP_Q118" class="div3">
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5446 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a>
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5447 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a>
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5448 <h3 id="FP_Q118-p0.1">OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
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5449 <p id="FP_Q118-p1"></p>
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5450 <p id="FP_Q118-p2"> We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.</p>
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5451 <p id="FP_Q118-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
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5452 <p id="FP_Q118-p4"> (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</p>
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5453 <p id="FP_Q118-p5"> (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?</p>
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5454 <p id="FP_Q118-p6"> (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?</p>
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5455 <div id="FP_Q118_A1" class="div4">
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5456 <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a>
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5457 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a>
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5458 <h4 id="FP_Q118_A1-p0.1">Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</h4>
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5459 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p1"></p>
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5460 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p2">
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5461 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance,
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5462 not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing
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5463 is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since
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5464 it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist
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5465 not by generation but by creation.
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5466 </p>
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5467 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p3">
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5468 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
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5469 vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive
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5470 soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power.
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5471 </p>
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5472 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p4">
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5473 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
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5474 neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere
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5475 than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle
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5476 of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the
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5477 sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.
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5478 </p>
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5479 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p5">
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5480 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the
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5481 animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul
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5482 of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made:
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5483 or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above
|
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5484 (
|
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5485 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html">Q[76], A[4]</a>) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does
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5486 not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore
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5487 the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.
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5488 </p>
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5489 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p6">
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5490 <b>On the contrary,</b> The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced
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5491 from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power,
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5492 according to
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5493 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20</a>: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated
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5494 are produced by the seminal power.
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5495 </p>
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5496 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p7">
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5497 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (
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5498 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html">Q[65], A[4]</a>). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having
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5499 being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made
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5500 except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.
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5501 </p>
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5502 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p8"> But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above
|
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5503 (
|
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5504 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html">Q[75], A[3]</a>): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to
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5505 existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist
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5506 forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.
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5507 </p>
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5508 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p9"> Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that
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5509 both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce
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5510 the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
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5511 </p>
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5512 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p10"> Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance
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5513 to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their
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5514 like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful,
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5515 act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of
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5516 nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant
|
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5517 derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from
|
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5518 the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent,
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5519 so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some
|
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5520 seminal power derived therefrom.
|
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5521 </p>
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5522 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p11">
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|
5523 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (
|
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|
5524 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">Q[25], A[3]</a>) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.
|
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5525 </p>
|
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5526 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p12">
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5527 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the
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5528 generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to
|
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5529 so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
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5530 </p>
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5531 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p13">
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5532 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement
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5533 of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or
|
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5534 the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ;
|
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|
5535 but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
|
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5536 attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies,
|
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5537 by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (
|
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|
5538 <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html">Q[115], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been
|
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|
5539 said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's
|
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5540 power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
|
|
|
5541 </p>
|
|
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5542 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p14">
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5543 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
|
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|
5544 Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very
|
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5545 beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it
|
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5546 begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore
|
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5547 is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as
|
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5548 though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would
|
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5549 be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after
|
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5550 the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of
|
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5551 the
|
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5552 thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body,
|
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|
5553 by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved
|
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|
5554 and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal
|
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|
5555 but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.
|
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|
5556 </p>
|
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5557 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p15"></p>
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5558 <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p16"></p>
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5559 <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a>
|
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5560 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a>
|
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5561 </div>
|
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|
5562 <div id="FP_Q118_A2" class="div4">
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5563 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a>
|
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|
5564 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a>
|
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|
5565 <h4 id="FP_Q118_A2-p0.1">Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?</h4>
|
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|
5566 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p1"></p>
|
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|
5567 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p2">
|
|
|
5568 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (
|
|
|
5569 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.46.26" target="asv">Gn. 46:26</a>): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from
|
|
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5570 the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
|
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|
5571 </p>
|
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5572 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p3">
|
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|
5573 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as shown above (
|
|
|
5574 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html">Q[76], A[3]</a>), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated
|
|
|
5575 from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man
|
|
|
5576 are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual
|
|
|
5577 soul is produced from the
|
|
|
5578 semen.
|
|
|
5579 </p>
|
|
|
5580 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p4">
|
|
|
5581 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the
|
|
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5582 form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced
|
|
|
5583 by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.
|
|
|
5584 </p>
|
|
|
5585 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p5">
|
|
|
5586 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational
|
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5587 soul is from the begetter.
|
|
|
5588 </p>
|
|
|
5589 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p6">
|
|
|
5590 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in
|
|
|
5591 the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created
|
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5592 by God.
|
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|
5593 </p>
|
|
|
5594 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p7">
|
|
|
5595 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition."
|
|
|
5596 </p>
|
|
|
5597 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p8">
|
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|
5598 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now
|
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|
5599 it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no
|
|
|
5600 part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.
|
|
|
5601 </p>
|
|
|
5602 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p9"> Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the
|
|
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5603 body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect.
|
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|
5604 Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De
|
|
|
5605 Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without."
|
|
|
5606 </p>
|
|
|
5607 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p10"> Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (
|
|
|
5608 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through
|
|
|
5609 generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing
|
|
|
5610 else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with
|
|
|
5611 the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.
|
|
|
5612 </p>
|
|
|
5613 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p11">
|
|
|
5614 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
|
|
|
5615 </p>
|
|
|
5616 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p12">
|
|
|
5617 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from
|
|
|
5618 the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment,
|
|
|
5619 and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive
|
|
|
5620 soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.
|
|
|
5621 </p>
|
|
|
5622 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p13"> Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes;
|
|
|
5623 and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one
|
|
|
5624 would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (
|
|
|
5625 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html">Q[76], A[3]</a>).
|
|
|
5626 </p>
|
|
|
5627 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p14"> Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal
|
|
|
5628 power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power,
|
|
|
5629 but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says
|
|
|
5630 that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is
|
|
|
5631 susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity
|
|
|
5632 constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species.
|
|
|
5633 Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from
|
|
|
5634 the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an
|
|
|
5635 animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the
|
|
|
5636 beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further
|
|
|
5637 perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called.
|
|
|
5638 Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be
|
|
|
5639 essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
|
|
|
5640 who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul:
|
|
|
5641 and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.
|
|
|
5642 </p>
|
|
|
5643 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p15"> There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has
|
|
|
5644 been disproved above (
|
|
|
5645 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>).
|
|
|
5646 </p>
|
|
|
5647 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p16"> We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both
|
|
|
5648 in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening
|
|
|
5649 form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations
|
|
|
5650 and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is
|
|
|
5651 apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created
|
|
|
5652 by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being
|
|
|
5653 corrupted.
|
|
|
5654 </p>
|
|
|
5655 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p17">
|
|
|
5656 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to
|
|
|
5657 one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior
|
|
|
5658 agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter,
|
|
|
5659 but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been
|
|
|
5660 said above (
|
|
|
5661 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html">Q[105], A[5]</a>;
|
|
|
5662 <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders
|
|
|
5663 the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.
|
|
|
5664 </p>
|
|
|
5665 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p18">
|
|
|
5666 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.
|
|
|
5667 </p>
|
|
|
5668 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p19">
|
|
|
5669 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil;
|
|
|
5670 in this God does not concur.
|
|
|
5671 </p>
|
|
|
5672 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p20"></p>
|
|
|
5673 <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p21"></p>
|
|
|
5674 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5675 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5676 </div>
|
|
|
5677 <div id="FP_Q118_A3" class="div4">
|
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5678 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a>
|
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5679 <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a>
|
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5680 <h4 id="FP_Q118_A3-p0.1">Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?</h4>
|
|
|
5681 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5682 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p2">
|
|
|
5683 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (
|
|
|
5684 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv">Gn. 2:2</a>): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore
|
|
|
5685 all souls were created at the same time.
|
|
|
5686 </p>
|
|
|
5687 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p3">
|
|
|
5688 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created
|
|
|
5689 with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently
|
|
|
5690 at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to
|
|
|
5691 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv"> Gn. 2:2, </a> where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."
|
|
|
5692 </p>
|
|
|
5693 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p4">
|
|
|
5694 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore
|
|
|
5695 it began to exist before the body.
|
|
|
5696 </p>
|
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|
5697 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p5">
|
|
|
5698 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body."
|
|
|
5699 </p>
|
|
|
5700 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p6">
|
|
|
5701 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is
|
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|
5702 of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of
|
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|
5703 men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on
|
|
|
5704 which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would
|
|
|
5705 follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above
|
|
|
5706 (
|
|
|
5707 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A4.html">Q[75], A[4]</a>). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding,
|
|
|
5708 as shown above (
|
|
|
5709 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>;
|
|
|
5710 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a> ): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (
|
|
|
5711 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7;
|
|
|
5712 <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a>). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part:
|
|
|
5713 whereas this cannot be said of an angel.
|
|
|
5714 </p>
|
|
|
5715 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p7"> Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body,
|
|
|
5716 it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection.
|
|
|
5717 Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without
|
|
|
5718 a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.
|
|
|
5719 </p>
|
|
|
5720 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p8"> But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united
|
|
|
5721 to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed
|
|
|
5722 it---this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did
|
|
|
5723 not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not
|
|
|
5724 fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the
|
|
|
5725 world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above
|
|
|
5726 time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance:
|
|
|
5727 since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the
|
|
|
5728 begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of
|
|
|
5729 some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion
|
|
|
5730 of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable,
|
|
|
5731 we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into
|
|
|
5732 them.
|
|
|
5733 </p>
|
|
|
5734 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p9">
|
|
|
5735 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (
|
|
|
5736 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.17" target="asv">Jn. 5:17</a>): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed
|
|
|
5737 in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species,
|
|
|
5738 in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.
|
|
|
5739 </p>
|
|
|
5740 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p10">
|
|
|
5741 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number
|
|
|
5742 of species.
|
|
|
5743 </p>
|
|
|
5744 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p11">
|
|
|
5745 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was
|
|
|
5746 not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (
|
|
|
5747 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>,
|
|
|
5748 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.16" target="asv">16</a>): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
|
|
|
5749 </p>
|
|
|
5750 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p12"></p>
|
|
|
5751 <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p13"></p>
|
|
|
5752 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5753 <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a>
|
|
|
5754 </div>
|
|
|
5755 <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a>
|
|
|
5756 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5757 </div>
|
|
|
5758 <div id="FP_Q119" class="div3">
|
|
|
5759 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a>
|
|
|
5760 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a>
|
|
|
5761 <h3 id="FP_Q119-p0.1">OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
|
|
|
5762 <p id="FP_Q119-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5763 <p id="FP_Q119-p2"> We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:</p>
|
|
|
5764 <p id="FP_Q119-p3"> (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?</p>
|
|
|
5765 <p id="FP_Q119-p4"> (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?</p>
|
|
|
5766 <div id="FP_Q119_A1" class="div4">
|
|
|
5767 <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a>
|
|
|
5768 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html"></a>
|
|
|
5769 <h4 id="FP_Q119_A1-p0.1">Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?</h4>
|
|
|
5770 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p1"></p>
|
|
|
5771 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p2">
|
|
|
5772 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (
|
|
|
5773 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not
|
|
|
5774 changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
|
|
|
5775 </p>
|
|
|
5776 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p3">
|
|
|
5777 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter";
|
|
|
5778 and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food
|
|
|
5779 is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore
|
|
|
5780 the food is not changed into true human nature.
|
|
|
5781 </p>
|
|
|
5782 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p4">
|
|
|
5783 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according
|
|
|
5784 to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true
|
|
|
5785 human nature.
|
|
|
5786 </p>
|
|
|
5787 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p5">
|
|
|
5788 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due
|
|
|
5789 only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.
|
|
|
5790 </p>
|
|
|
5791 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p6">
|
|
|
5792 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for
|
|
|
5793 what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow
|
|
|
5794 that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically
|
|
|
5795 the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same,
|
|
|
5796 identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
|
|
|
5797 </p>
|
|
|
5798 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p7">
|
|
|
5799 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture
|
|
|
5800 of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality
|
|
|
5801 of human nature.
|
|
|
5802 </p>
|
|
|
5803 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p8">
|
|
|
5804 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore
|
|
|
5805 that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered
|
|
|
5806 in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common
|
|
|
5807 matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate
|
|
|
5808 matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus
|
|
|
5809 a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul
|
|
|
5810 and this body.
|
|
|
5811 </p>
|
|
|
5812 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p9"> Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist
|
|
|
5813 save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain
|
|
|
5814 individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have
|
|
|
5815 been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
|
|
|
5816 nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
|
|
|
5817 </p>
|
|
|
5818 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p10"> But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in
|
|
|
5819 this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed
|
|
|
5820 into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent
|
|
|
5821 the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed
|
|
|
5822 by fire.
|
|
|
5823 </p>
|
|
|
5824 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p11"> But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter,
|
|
|
5825 or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely.
|
|
|
5826 Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human
|
|
|
5827 body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be
|
|
|
5828 changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is
|
|
|
5829 only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one
|
|
|
5830 individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect
|
|
|
5831 of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the
|
|
|
5832 substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied;
|
|
|
5833 for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore
|
|
|
5834 some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently
|
|
|
5835 no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other
|
|
|
5836 things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of
|
|
|
5837 matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect
|
|
|
5838 than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things
|
|
|
5839 were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of
|
|
|
5840 the
|
|
|
5841 human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does
|
|
|
5842 not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants
|
|
|
5843 do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which
|
|
|
5844 multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does
|
|
|
5845 anything
|
|
|
5846 increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of
|
|
|
5847 generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.
|
|
|
5848 </p>
|
|
|
5849 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p12"> Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature
|
|
|
5850 in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain
|
|
|
5851 determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter
|
|
|
5852 until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true
|
|
|
5853 human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through
|
|
|
5854 the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase
|
|
|
5855 required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary
|
|
|
5856 existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does
|
|
|
5857 not
|
|
|
5858 belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of
|
|
|
5859 living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not
|
|
|
5860 the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore,
|
|
|
5861 would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly,
|
|
|
5862 because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (
|
|
|
5863 <a id="FP_Q119_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html">Q[118], A[1]</a>). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power
|
|
|
5864 a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true
|
|
|
5865 form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for
|
|
|
5866 growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of
|
|
|
5867 natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore
|
|
|
5868 just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.
|
|
|
5869 </p>
|
|
|
5870 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p13"> Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its
|
|
|
5871 assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food
|
|
|
5872 nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."
|
|
|
5873 </p>
|
|
|
5874 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p14">
|
|
|
5875 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of food
|
|
|
5876 is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and
|
|
|
5877 be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
|
|
|
5878 </p>
|
|
|
5879 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p15">
|
|
|
5880 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from
|
|
|
5881 the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what
|
|
|
5882 is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the
|
|
|
5883 mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their
|
|
|
5884 species in matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something
|
|
|
5885 belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally,
|
|
|
5886 or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water
|
|
|
5887 is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added,
|
|
|
5888 cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying
|
|
|
5889 that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
|
|
|
5890 </p>
|
|
|
5891 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p16"> It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh
|
|
|
5892 considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that
|
|
|
5893 which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition.
|
|
|
5894 But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and
|
|
|
5895 renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is
|
|
|
5896 substituted in its place.
|
|
|
5897 </p>
|
|
|
5898 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p17">
|
|
|
5899 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot
|
|
|
5900 be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly
|
|
|
5901 the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue
|
|
|
5902 of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
|
|
|
5903 </p>
|
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|
5904 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p18">
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5905 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming
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5906 virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth.
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5907 Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this;
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5908 and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether,
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5909 the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water,
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5910 so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
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5911 </p>
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5912 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p19">
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5913 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be
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5914 generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the
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5915 entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire.
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5916 But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until
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5917 the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes
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5918 into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed
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5919 by natural heat.
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5920 </p>
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5921 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p20"></p>
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5922 <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p21"></p>
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5923 <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a>
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5924 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html"></a>
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5925 </div>
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5926 <div id="FP_Q119_A2" class="div4">
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5927 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a>
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5928 <a href="summa.FS.html"></a>
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5929 <h4 id="FP_Q119_A2-p0.1">Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?</h4>
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5930 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p1"></p>
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5931 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p2">
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5932 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene
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5933 says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which
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5934 is begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of
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5935 the begetter.
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5936 </p>
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5937 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p3">
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5938 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something
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5939 is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom
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5940 the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men.
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5941 </p>
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5942 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p4">
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5943 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced
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5944 from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
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5945 </p>
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5946 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p5">
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5947 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance
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5948 of the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.
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5949 </p>
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5950 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p6">
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5951 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."
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5952 </p>
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5953 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p7">
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5954 <b>I answer that,</b> This question depends in some way on what has been stated above
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5955 <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
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5956 <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html">Q[118], A[1]</a>). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its
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5957 own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated
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5958 to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from
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5959 potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected.
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5960 But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the
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5961 generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives
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5962 a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that
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5963 part.
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5964 </p>
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5965 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p8"> Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members.
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5966 For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of
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5967 the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something
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5968 else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from,
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5969 then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of)
|
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5970 the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of
|
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5971 the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal
|
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5972 from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut
|
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5973 in
|
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5974 two: which is inadmissible.
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5975 </p>
|
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5976 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p9"> It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather
|
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5977 is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as
|
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5978 stated above
|
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5979 <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html">(A[1];</a>
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5980 <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">Q[108], A[1]</a> ). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into
|
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5981 the substance of the members.
|
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5982 Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what
|
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5983 is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher,
|
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|
5984 is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated
|
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5985 seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
|
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|
5986 </p>
|
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5987 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p10">
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5988 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form
|
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5989 of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.
|
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5990 </p>
|
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5991 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p11">
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5992 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates
|
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|
5993 its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should
|
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5994 have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the
|
|
94
|
5995 father.</p><p id="FP_Q119_A2-p11a"><!-- markup
|
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5996 added by HST--><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in
|
|
64
|
5997 relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
|
|
|
5998 </p>
|
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5999 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p12">
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|
6000 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from
|
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6001 which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal
|
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|
6002 matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and
|
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|
6003 likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal
|
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6004 virtue (in the production) of this man.
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6005 </p>
|
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|
6006 <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p13"> But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because
|
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6007 the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the
|
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|
6008 active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation
|
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|
6009 of the Holy Ghost. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.],
|
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6010 WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.
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6011 </p>
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6012 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a>
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6013 <a href="summa.FS.html"></a>
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6014 </div>
|
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6015 <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a>
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6016 <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a>
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6017 </div>
|
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6018 <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A4.html"></a>
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6019 <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a>
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6020 `
|
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89
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6021 </div>
|
