Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
diff summa/english/FP_x.html @ 64:11682db9b870
from auto-split
| author | ht |
|---|---|
| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
| parents | |
| children | ca573ccfc3e7 |
line wrap: on
line diff
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_x.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,6015 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.x" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.x-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q103" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.x.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q103-p0.1">OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q103-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p2"> Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, + and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there + are eight points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p3"> (1) Whether the world is governed by someone?</p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p4"> (2) What is the end of this government?</p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p5"> (3) Whether the world is governed by one?</p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p6"> (4) Of the effects of this government?</p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p7"> (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?</p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p8"> (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p9"> (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?</p> + <p id="FP_Q103-p10"> (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?</p> + <div id="FP_Q103_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q103_A1-p0.1">Whether the world is governed by anyone?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work + for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have + no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but + has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle + of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their + actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this + universe by mandate eternal." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p6"> I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. + But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that + in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed + nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is + a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that + put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration + of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html">Q[44], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65], A[2]</a>), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is + not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate + perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, + so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; + and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for + an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end + unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end + shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, + shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement + we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, + would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later ( + <a id="FP_Q103_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html">Q[104], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, + directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression + from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their + nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their + nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, + so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q103_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q103_A2-p0.1">Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the + government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the + thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of + things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation. + But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic + can be the end of the government of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the + world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of + all things is something extrinsic to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their + beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what + has been expounded above ( + <a id="FP_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear + that good has the nature + of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things + is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a + particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which + is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something + done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the + buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe + being the good to which it is directed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the + end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder + is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, + but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that + Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is + the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation + thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate + end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in + Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q103_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q103_A3-p0.1">Whether the world is governed by one?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government + of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously + different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the + ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the + case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.4.9" target="asv">Eccles. 4:9</a>). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs + dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">Q[13], A[8]</a>). Therefore the world is governed by one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which + is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the + best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things + governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, + as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which + they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as + they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is + unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, + except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several + things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of + the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, + 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity + of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe ( + <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A2.html">Q[48], A[2]</a>), and not by a diversity of governors. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so + far as they are included in the one order of the universe. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is + possible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q103_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q103_A4-p0.1">Whether the effect of government is one or many?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that + which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example + of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved + <a id="FP_Q103_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore also the effect of this government is but one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the + many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects + of government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs + to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. + Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things + tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; + and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. + Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature + is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in + two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, + with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to + be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things + to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without + number. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two + things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p8"> From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.</p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q103_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q103_A5-p0.1">Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.11" target="asv">Eccles. 9:11</a>): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches + to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not + ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine + government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject + to the Divine government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it + is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. + Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, + even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their + nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; + and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal + being, as proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. + This can also + be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under + the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown + <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have + said above ( + <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A4.html">Q[44], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65], A[2]</a>), so it is impossible for + anything to escape from the Divine government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p7"> Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even + human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.9.9" target="asv">Ezech. 9:9</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such + things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element + of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government + of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would + tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which + constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher + cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects + may be found in these things according to some order of time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable + thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is + an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. + Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed + according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these + are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, + that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational + creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God + hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which + rational creatures are governed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the + Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own + act, it requires to be governed by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q103_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q103_A6-p0.1">Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the + opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly + things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to + watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain + spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But + God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; + thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the + same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater + subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled + by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution + of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some + things by means of others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p7"> The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest + degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design + of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his + attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we + must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p8"> But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better + in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself + and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some + of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, + but gives also the faculty of teaching others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of + government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would + not be accomplished by one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his + dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q103_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q103_A7-p0.1">Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. + iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would + follow that no evil exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs + outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. + Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, + and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine + government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Esth.13.9" target="asv">Esther 13:9</a>): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal + cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding + cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of + the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which + again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the + first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside + the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order + of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards + some other + cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q103_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped + from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order + of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not + as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside + the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q103_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q103_A8-p0.1">Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.8" target="asv">Is. 3:8</a>): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against + God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things + rebel against the order of the Divine government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign + good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8" target="asv">Wis. 8</a>) of Divine wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause + of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p7"> Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly + from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and + effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, + as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is + nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but + an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, + as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things sweetly." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for + even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their + nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p9"> Reply OBJ 2 is clear from the above.</p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; + but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q103_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.x.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q104" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q104-p0.1">THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q104-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104-p2"> We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:</p> + <p id="FP_Q104-p3"> (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q104-p4"> (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q104-p5"> (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?</p> + <p id="FP_Q104-p6"> (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?</p> + <div id="FP_Q104_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q104_A1-p0.1">Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in + being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature + cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which + is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be + in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, + because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of + the angels ( + <a id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A2.html">Q[50], AA[2]</a>,5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality + to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies ( + <a id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A2.html">Q[66], A[2]</a>). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality + to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since + it is not in potentiality to any other form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect + to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for + some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He + has ceased to create it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and + violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through + some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are + spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to + not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, + produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is + not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does + it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature + in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore + creatures are not kept in being by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>): "Upholding all things by the word of His power." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a + thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything + by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. + In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a + nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said + to preserve another 'per se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot + exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, + so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the + Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p8"> This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an + agent may be the cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being." This may be seen both in artificial + and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct cause of its "being." + For it is clear that the "being" of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and + arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying + the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able + to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house depends on the nature of these + materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For + if + an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of "being" which results from that form; + but it will be the cause of the effect, in its "becoming" only. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p9"> Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would + then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this + form for as much as it is in matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives "this form." And this + is to be the cause of "becoming," as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is + such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, + then the "becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the agent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p10"> Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists + in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus + the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause + of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of + "becoming" but also the cause of "being." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p11"> Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of + the effect: so neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of + the effect not only in "becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's + action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to + act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if + it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly + and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On + the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the + principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p12"> Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by + its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, + since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. + Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His + creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: + "As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns + at once to darkness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Being" naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from + the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures + and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make + it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an + effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but + only of "becoming." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not + need to be preserved thus, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either + motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p17"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A1-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q104_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q104_A2-p0.1">Whether God preserves every creature immediately?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as + above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less + therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause + preserving them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes + do not seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause only by moving, as above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A3.html">Q[45], A[3]</a>). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore + He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FP_Q104_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a + corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per se," by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of + the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal + things there are many causes which + hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; + and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when + we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally + on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the + principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all + the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p7"> For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: + thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation + of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation + and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which + are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend + on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only + produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving + another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue + of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in + the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is + lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of + the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q104_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q104_A3-p0.1">Whether God can annihilate anything?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything + tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate + anything. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because + God is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be + the case were He to annihilate anything. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action + is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated + another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate + anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things + of His own free-will, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.134.6" target="asv"> Ps. 134:6</a>: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He + hath done." Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence + otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, + God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; + and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as + such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has + this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to + non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on + creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, + so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q104_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q104_A4-p0.1">Whether anything is annihilated?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing + but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced + to nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves + (Phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; + and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are + reduced to nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, + and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained ( + <a id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things + which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To + each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p7"> Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no + potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, + since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation + of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in + existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that + they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving + all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence + is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, + however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent + from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot + resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue + to exist for ever. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for + it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely + reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of + the subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q104_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q105" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q105-p0.1">OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q105-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p2"> We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures + by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p4"> (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?</p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p5"> (2) Whether He can immediately move a body?</p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p6"> (3) Whether He can move the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p7"> (4) Whether He can move the will?</p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p8"> (5) Whether God works in every worker?</p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p9"> (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p10"> (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?</p> + <p id="FP_Q105-p11"> (8) Of the diversity of miracles.</p> + <div id="FP_Q105_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q105_A1-p0.1">Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, + Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets + like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by + some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means + of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any + particular form, except by means of a particular agent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as + we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html">Q[104], A[2]</a>). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, + only by means of particular causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active + power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it + can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing + else but the act of matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, + and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in + its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they + are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that + over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the + composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating + a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But + no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence + angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows + the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that + form on matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes + to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q105_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q105_A2-p0.1">Whether God can move a body immediately?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher + says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between + God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object + of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal + power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a + body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist + at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God's + power is infinite, as we have explained ( + <a id="FP_Q105_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore God + cannot move a body immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.9" target="asv"> Gn. 1:9 </a>"Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone can move a body immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. + Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any + bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated + <a id="FP_Q105_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light + result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else + tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to + that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and + moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever + in + respect of any movement whatever. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of + sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, + nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural + power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the + words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended + by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of + bulk," by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover + can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk," would move without time, which is impossible; + therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is + not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite + power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an + infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the + velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does + not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is + not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and + therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q105_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q105_A3-p0.1">Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its + own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is + moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; + and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the + intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as + the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle + of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible + to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God moves the human intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said + to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement + of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual + power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; + while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. + So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses + on him the likeness of the thing understood. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p7"> Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result + of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause + of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First + Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in + Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived + from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they + may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, + or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and + species in existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from + God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but + it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of + which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient + to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">Q[12], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Hence He moves the created + intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained ( + <a id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q105_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q105_A4-p0.1">Whether God can move the created will?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be + forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for + to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, + but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward + or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q105_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved + by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently + unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the + potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal + good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone + is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner + the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the + will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate + end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects + to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior + inclination of the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the + proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then + it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural + inclination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be + caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed + for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have + stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q105_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q105_A5-p0.1">Whether God works in every agent?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God + works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong + to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same + time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, + if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. + But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv">Is. 26:12</a>): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God + alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, + and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: + and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, + that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be + bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, + to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less + perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form + which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. + We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p7"> In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, + but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles + of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; + the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own + form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, + for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p8"> Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for + the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates + in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again + it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the + first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is + the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying + their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the + axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action + not + only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy + and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation + of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is + within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things + God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works + intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.10.11" target="asv"> Job 10:11</a>: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents + is superfluous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a + primary and a secondary agent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the + end of every action, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q105_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q105_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) + says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order + seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of + justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that + He is changeable; which cannot be said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the + multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. + Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human + affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is + contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that + of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p7"> If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, + if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things + depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary + causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural + necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something + outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, + or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts + against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against + Himself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which + did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to + him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent + on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is + clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in + a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies + depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not + against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from + Whom + is all mode, number, and order in nature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing + against such order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do + otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q105_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q105_A7-p0.1">Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of + the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being + accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God + does outside the natural order is a miracle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond + our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of + nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare + occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be + healed by the shadow of Peter ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.15" target="asv">Acts 5:15</a>). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we + all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things + are outside the course of natur are miraculous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes + things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge + without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed + to observe, we call it a miracle." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when + a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause + of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all + to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so + called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things + which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because + they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do + not belong to that order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses + the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside + the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of + the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in + which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes + from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown + to be wonderful. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q105_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q105_A8-p0.1">Whether one miracle is greater than another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In miraculous + deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore + one miracle is not greater than another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason + exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.12" target="asv">Jn. 14:12</a>): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power + of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.15" target="asv"> Is. 40:15</a>: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called + a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater + the miracle. Now the power of + nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, + or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold + the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it + is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the + dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which + it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air + is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; + and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different + ways + in which the power of nature is surpassed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p6"> From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.</p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p7"></p> + <p id="FP_Q105_A8-p8"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q104_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q106" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q106-p0.1">HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q106-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106-p2"> We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely + spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106-p3"> Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel + acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106-p4"> The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both + of the good and of the bad angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106-p5"> Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q106-p6"> (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?</p> + <p id="FP_Q106-p7"> (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q106-p8"> (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</p> + <p id="FP_Q106-p9"> (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?</p> + <div id="FP_Q106_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q106_A1-p0.1">Whether one angel enlightens another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. + But one man will not then enlighten another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.34" target="asv"> Jer. 31:34</a>: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten + another now. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of + nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes + from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as + Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the + angels of the first hierarchy." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation + of truth, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv"> Eph. 5:13</a>: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation + of the known truth; according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.8" target="asv">Eph. 3:8</a>): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all + men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one + angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): + "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p7"> Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said ( + <a id="FP_Q106_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A3.html">Q[105], A[3]</a>), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known + truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened + by the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is + hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual + things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the + truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by + a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is + natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth + which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. + Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he + possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident + power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards + by analogy." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. + It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know + the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which + are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He + comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior + angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the + latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural + light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image + of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, + except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, + dispositions to this ultimate form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q106_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q106_A2-p0.1">Whether one angel moves another angel's will?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above + <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to + the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an + end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's + will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are + so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another + angel's will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior + angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the + will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both + the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out + the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>), other goods in a + measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good + He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee + all good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.18" target="asv">Ex. 33:18,19</a>). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines + the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's + goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p7"> But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination + of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: + just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. + Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the + intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing + the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect + and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above + <a id="FP_Q106_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience + in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius + says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things + unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal + of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored + object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because + it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does + not apply to the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q106_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q106_A3-p0.1">Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and + represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.26" target="asv">Gal. 4:26</a>). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:31</a>): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted." + Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. + But, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual + substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened + by God can enlighten + superiors. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained + <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore + he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier. + iv; Eccl. Hier. v). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained + ( + <a id="FP_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">Q[105], A[6]</a>), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore + there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior + cause, as in human affairs the command of + the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of + corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual + substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are + the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that + the + inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy + the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more + sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas + in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in + sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, + and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual + nature. Hence the argument does not hold. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made + the order in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q106_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q106_A4-p0.1">Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says + (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual + knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the + superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the + former. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, + whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, + as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King + of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior + angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be + unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears + open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there + are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the + inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above + <a id="FP_Q106_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature + of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So + the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections + to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace + share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards + of the manifold grace of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10</a>). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same + to those below them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p7"> Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior + ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the + pupil who learns from him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation + but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards + when the Mystery was accomplished. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the + world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to + the inferior. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q106_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q105_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q107" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q107-p0.1">THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q107-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107-p2"> We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q107-p3"> (1) Whether one angel speaks to another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q107-p4"> (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?</p> + <p id="FP_Q107-p5"> (3) Whether an angel speaks to God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q107-p6"> (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?</p> + <p id="FP_Q107-p7"> (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?</p> + <div id="FP_Q107_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q107_A1-p0.1">Whether one angel speaks to another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection + "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. + But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to + another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior + speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and + this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another + to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties + of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p7"> To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q107_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">Q[82], A[4]</a>), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible + object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7); + secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear + that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition + of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second + to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either + to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual + consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior + word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel + himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another + only means to make known the mental concept to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, + or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept + is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens + that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but + some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof + as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the + tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another + at + once. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit + an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also + its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, + whereby he manifests his mental concept. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one + ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, + and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as + sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the + sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q107_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q107_A2-p0.1">Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby + the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and + to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and + invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic + speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of + Glory?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an + angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said + <a id="FP_Q107_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such + a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be + reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby + we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; + the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for + example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of + what + depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when + one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light, + nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an + enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; + but + only to know the truth in reality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p7"> Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, + which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will + as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed + to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and + the inferior speak to the superior. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p8"> From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the + perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the + angels, as was explained above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q107_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q107_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel speaks to God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make + known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q107_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways + appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks + to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.12" target="asv">Zech. 1:12</a>): "The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem." Therefore an + angel speaks to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q107_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. + In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in + human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns + the truth, or of whatever + depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing + is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech + the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to + be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels + speak + to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose + of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting + Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q107_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q107_A4-p0.1">Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works + where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's + speech is limited by the bounds of that place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one + to another" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.24" target="asv">Lk. 16:24</a>). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q107_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual operation + takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at + all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time + nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists + in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel + seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is + to perceive his speech. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of + what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less + one cries out." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A4-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q107_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q107_A5-p0.1">Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do + not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q107_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known + by one, it is for the same reason known by all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, + as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore + the speech of one angel to another extends to all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q107_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his + will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of + one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; + whereas others do not, not through the + obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p7"> From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; + and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created + will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q107_A5-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q106_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q108" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q108-p0.1">OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q108-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p2"> We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q108-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p3"> Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p4"> (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?</p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p5"> (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?</p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p6"> (3) Whether in one order there are many angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p7"> (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?</p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p8"> (5) Of the names and properties of each order.</p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p9"> (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.</p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p10"> (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</p> + <p id="FP_Q108-p11"> (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</p> + <div id="FP_Q108_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q108_A1-p0.1">Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident + that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the + Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, + it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one + order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. + Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and + the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also + of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can + be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are + two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality + on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude + can be subject in "one" way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince + belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws + and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; + for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says + (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner + we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), in treating of the + angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal + knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be + considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs + to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius + says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already + multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things + as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat + of each of the orders + <a id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the + multitude of subjects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p7"> Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, + and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is + no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, + enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to + the Divine Persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the + Philosopher asserts in those passages. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical distinction + among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence + the same argument does not apply to both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q108_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q108_A2-p0.1">Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined + is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there + is not one hierarchy only, but many. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But + among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore + there are not different orders of angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening," + and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting," + as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction + of orders among the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) that "God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders + of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained + <a id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. + Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy + requires diversity of orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p7"> This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different + orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and + another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p8"> But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has + a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as + the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus + honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their + actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so + in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy + is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are + so called. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than + by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate + it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone + can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect + grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among + the angels, according to their different offices and actions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the + kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that + are born of women" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher + way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the + heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q108_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q108_A3-p0.1">Whether there are many angels in one order?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q108_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs + to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs + to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by + their offices, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, several angels in one order + would be superfluous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or + four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than + with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. + Therefore there are not many angels of one order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas + he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, + one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one + order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; + whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and + in each of the other orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p7"> Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic + offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions + of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much + more so than any star, though this be hidden from us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely + speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those + who are first, middle, and last. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as + regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary + of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin + in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite + limit. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q108_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q108_A4-p0.1">Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a + sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. + Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of + hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which + comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic + orders are not from nature, but from grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the + gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore + neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some + gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the + angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels + may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge + and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, + the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural + powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end + they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the + gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the + capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q108_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html">Q[62], A[6]</a>). Hence + among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p7"> From the above the replies to the objections are evident.</p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A4-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q108_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q108_A5-p0.1">Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly + virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly + named. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.3" target="asv">Ps. 99:3</a>). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore + these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the + "Principalities." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But + charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. + Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the + orders of angels are not properly styled. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p8"> On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.2" target="asv"> Is. 6:2</a>; the name "Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv"> Col. 1:16</a>; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.21" target="asv"> Eph. 1:21</a>; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of + Scripture. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of + each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, + something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is + said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its + nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, + as we have stated ( + <a id="FP_Q108_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not + fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating + its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates + imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we + wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter + is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; + nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of + a man, + and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p10"> So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are + all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior + perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely + the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of + excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p11"> So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections + they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior + ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; + by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities + preside over the good spirits themselves." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the + superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. + The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation + only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest + order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels," + forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p13"> "Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in + that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain + excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the + "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine + operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly + the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word + gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the + Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free + from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and + from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy + which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies + "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation + of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the + same principle applies to the rest. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to + prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are + subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the + Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv">Rom. 13:2</a>). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception + of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. + Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside + [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first + in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies + "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according + to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.26" target="asv">Ps. 67:26</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared + to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, + and hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the + "Angels," and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory + (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing + greater things: and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine + commands. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. + Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of + heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they + are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which + is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to + the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised + powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly + we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an + inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p18"> In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," + which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the + Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this + knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; + whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two + excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the other two; and so the + order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the + "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not + conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may + consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones" + are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed + strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made + firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive + God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open + on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p20"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A5-p21"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q108_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q108_A6-p0.1">Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the + names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be + supreme. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is + nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher + than the "Seraphim." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately + above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the + "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the + "Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as + regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above + the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" + between the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers" + and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the + heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and + "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same + orders from the highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created + by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p8"> Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above + <a id="FP_Q108_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in + their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the + whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the + universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which + is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering + the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are + taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy + those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition---the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers"; + and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," + and "Archangels." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p9"> As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of + the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition + to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, + Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the + dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; + and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition + in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, + in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first + hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence + of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones"; + as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p10"> As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be + done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs + to the "Virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which + belongs to the "Powers." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p11"> The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there + are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." + There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others hold a middle place; and these + are the "Archangels," as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p12"> This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the + lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, + which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, + denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones," + who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called + "because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate + enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers" + is akin to the order of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to + them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples + and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; + "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of + the kingdom of the Persians resisted me" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p13"> The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order + what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things + in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order; + the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good + spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then + the "Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.3" target="asv">Rom. 13:3,4</a>). After these come the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the + "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within + the purview of reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel's subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. + Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their + name from their nearness and relation to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more + excellent way, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q108_A6-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. + Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler + way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, + God above all, is + better than to know them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according + to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also + agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in + the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the + "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; + since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p18"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A6-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q108_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q108_A7-p0.1">Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24</a>), that Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the + Father," and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment + one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore + the angelic orders would remain for no purpose. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says of the angels ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence + it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit + of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.5.20" target="asv">Judges 5:20</a>): "Stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in + their orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction + of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q108_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless + they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever + remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain + degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are + directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. + Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to + their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words + of the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful + to the enjoyment of God Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. + In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually + arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding + middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as + regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms + he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since + the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the + light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the + knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, + still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who + are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q108_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q108_A8-p0.1">Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest + heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest + hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the + like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls + of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the + souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>). I answer that, As above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. + Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction + will always remain. In view of this + distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting + as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.20.36" target="asv">Lk. 20:36</a>). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends + on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men + can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are + taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, + but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole + society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies + of + men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained + + <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">(A[4];</a> + <a id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A6.html">Q[62], A[6]</a>). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred + to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human + affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature + with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the + things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a + certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, + by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons + are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q108_A8-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q107_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q109" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q109-p0.1">THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q109-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109-p2"> We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q109-p3"> (1) Whether there are orders among the demons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q109-p4"> (2) Whether among them there is precedence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q109-p5"> (3) Whether one enlightens another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q109-p6"> (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?</p> + <div id="FP_Q109_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q109_A1-p0.1">Whether there are orders among the demons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine + says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. + Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a + holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said + to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. + But we never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not + to be placed in any other order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A4.html">Q[108], AA[4]</a>,7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace + has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p7"> If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic + orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in + the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are + still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good ( + <a id="FP_Q109_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html">Q[49], A[3]</a>); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; + but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations" + imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q109_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q109_A2-p0.1">Whether among the demons there is precedence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But + the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is + not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are always contentions" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not + according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according + to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the + inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> On + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24 </a>the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. + Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and + movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said + <a id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence + their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence---that the action of the + subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should + be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to + end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness + whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those + whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, + who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather + to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in + evil is to be more unhappy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q109_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q109_A3-p0.1">Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon + can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten + the inferior. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior + demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>). Therefore neither can they enlighten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html">Q[107], A[2]</a>), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. + Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's + perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the + Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of + speech. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or + in the demons, because, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html">Q[58], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">Q[79], A[2]</a>), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior + demons does not prove that they can enlighten + others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q109_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q109_A4-p0.1">Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected + with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels + do not rule over the bad. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. + Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot + be admitted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q109_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the + natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just + spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer + to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection + and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection + the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the + bad, and these are ruled by them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice + requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's + assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called + an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an + enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels + or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the + power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise + among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q109_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q108_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q110" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q110-p0.1">HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q110-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110-p2"> We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q110-p3"> (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q110-p4"> (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q110-p5"> (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?</p> + <p id="FP_Q110-p6"> (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?</p> + <div id="FP_Q110_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q110_A1-p0.1">Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, + needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal + things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government + of angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore + they need not be governed by the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled + by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders + of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above ( + <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">Q[108], A[2]</a>). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, + 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the + universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained + above ( + <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a> ; + <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">Q[108], A[1]</a>), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power + of + any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized + by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the + inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. + This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal + substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs + to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved + by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly + bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps + human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any + operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. + But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the + movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate + presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were + types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances + preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial + substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more + universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, + the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to + preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these + sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial + substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p10"> The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine + says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide + Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen says on the text, + "When the ass saw the angel" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.23" target="asv">Num. 22:23</a>), that "the world has need of angels who + preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (Hom. + xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than + over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: + the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow + that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded ( + <a id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A2.html">Q[108], A[2]</a>), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office + it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to + belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q110_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q110_A2-p0.1">Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. + But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards + heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception + of an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior + to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore + much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above + <a id="FP_Q110_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in + effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the + instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to + the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to + the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is + from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, + is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial + forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion + to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal + agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on + this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. + But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly + speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something + is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but + the way to existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural + things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole + "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter + is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's + concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject + to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does + not hold. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, + the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter + in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior + cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would + not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating + the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since + to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the + power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q110_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q110_A3-p0.1">Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their + forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q110_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause + other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle + of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this + without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence + it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is + below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves + (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in + potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has + a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted + that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and + chiefly by a local motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the + sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements + result from the power of spiritual substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal + agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the + body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to + any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q110_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q110_A4-p0.1">Whether angels can work miracles?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues + by whom signs and miracles are usually done." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, + bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he + says elsewhere in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore + the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] + that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in + our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, + as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. + Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore + an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written of God ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.4" target="asv">Ps. 135:4</a>): "Who alone doth great wonders." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if + something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone + upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order + of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or + any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence + God alone can work miracles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are + said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the + dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. + But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created + nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own + natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in + reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private + contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in + a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the + other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far + as + they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public + justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside + the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q110_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q111" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q111-p0.1">THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q111-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111-p2"> We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; + (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q111-p4"> (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q111-p5"> (2) Whether he can change man's will?</p> + <p id="FP_Q111-p6"> (3) Whether he can change man's imagination?</p> + <p id="FP_Q111-p7"> (4) Whether he can change man's senses?</p> + <div id="FP_Q111_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q111_A1-p0.1">Whether an angel can enlighten man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes + enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened + by an angel; but immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed + them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God---that is, natural reason and the creature. + Therefore God enlightens man immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. + Therefore he is not enlightened by them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But + such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q107_A2.html">Q[107], A[2]</a>). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A2.html">Q[109], A[2]</a>); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p7"> The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect + is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior + intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. + This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity + of the inferior angel, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p8"> The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand + by turning to the phantasms, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius + says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of + the sacred veils." On the + other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two + ways man is enlightened by an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will + tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded + by the will; hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, + faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is + accomplished by man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels + have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be + believed; but also as regards what is to be done. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the + human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. + Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus + whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made + known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows + what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like + manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q111_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q111_A2-p0.1">Whether the angels can change the will of man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers + a flame of fire" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.7" target="asv">Heb. 1:7</a>), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be, however, + unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however, + says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and + put into men" (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could + only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination + which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also + is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To change the will belongs to God alone, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the + inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination + to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the + will is from God alone, Who causes the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p7"> Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the + intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move + the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, + as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A2.html">Q[106], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p8"> In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the + sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being + able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or + to resist, the passion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject + to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of + the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because + such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher + principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something + following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q111_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q111_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel can change man's imagination?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused + by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it + is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But + an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to + the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." + But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge + of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this + there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, + by changing the imagination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.20" target="asv"> Mat. 1:20</a>;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. + For it was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], A[3]</a>), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of + bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused + in us by the local movement of + animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions + in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend + with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle"; + so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects + themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those + who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes + also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power + of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the + senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed + in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from + the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above + explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect + which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the + way he knows. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these + images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear + in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things + appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to + the people in parables, which He did not explain to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q111_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q111_A4-p0.1">Whether an angel can change the human senses?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation + does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other + natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the + door" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19.11" target="asv">Gn. 19:11</a>). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses, + in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom---namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin + "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily + imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:18</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for + we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged + with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, + can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object + from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q111_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this + interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, + and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since + he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode + of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q111_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q112" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q112-p0.1">THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q112-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112-p2"> We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q112-p3"> (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?</p> + <p id="FP_Q112-p4"> (2) Whether all are sent?</p> + <p id="FP_Q112-p5"> (3) Whether those who are sent, assist?</p> + <p id="FP_Q112-p6"> (4) From what orders they are sent.</p> + <div id="FP_Q112_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q112_A1-p0.1">Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual + actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are + intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, + it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive + wisdom" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:25</a>). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole + of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is + unfitting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.27" target="asv">Lk. 22:27</a>): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are + naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.20" target="asv">Ex. 23:20</a>): "Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> From what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">Q[108], A[6]</a>), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated ( + <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">Q[43], A[1]</a>), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin + to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent + as + proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before + by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, + His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things ( + <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html">Q[8], A[1]</a>). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such + a way as not to reach + another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal + creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this + takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p8"> Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose + authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister + is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels' + actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an + operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting + something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and + commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently + have sometimes a determinate place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body + should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the + empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king + lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his + dignity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through + the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the + contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in + no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule + and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels + do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them, + absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior + to every creature. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "Esteeming others better than themselves." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q112_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q112_A2-p0.1">Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>): "All are ministering spirits, sent to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?']. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A6.html">Q[108], A[6]</a>). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.6" target="asv">Is. 6:6,7</a>). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more + are even the highest angels sent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute + the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry; + which contradicts the words, "Thousands of thousands ministered to + Him" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil + no exterior service." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A3.html">Q[106], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior + things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards + corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for + the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished + immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these + bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. + Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels + without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, + but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p8"> It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers + of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to + any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; + but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. + It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the + ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying + by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope + is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been + said ( + <a id="FP_Q112_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q43_A1.html">Q[43], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent + immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the + inferior ministries. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q112_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q112_A3-p0.1">Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent, + and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before + the Lord" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.12.15" target="asv">Tob. 12:15</a>). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.6" target="asv"> Job 1:6</a>: "When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them." Therefore much more do the angels, + who are sent to minister, assist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, + but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is + highest of all. Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv"> Dan. 7:10</a>: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Therefore the angels who are + sent also assist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.25.3" target="asv"> Job 25:3</a>: "Is there any numbering of His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men." + Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and "administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of + whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed + by those who are in attendance---for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these + are said to administer, not to assist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those + who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are sent on the external ministry of our + salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine + mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the + inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special + prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p9"> From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.</p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii), "though + he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative + of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than + is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's + secrets than another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q112_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q112_A4-p0.1">Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as + Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the + angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore + the dominations are not sent to minister. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated + <a id="FP_Q112_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal + creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, + as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify + some kind of administration. But + the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the + other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; + the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory + says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to + external ministry; not to the four superior orders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be + done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others + are to do. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those + who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands"; + thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number + of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him." This explanation + rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are + in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number + of orders, as six administer and three assist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p8"> Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; + so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures + surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, + as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, + the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because + ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants + as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants + are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but + rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together + of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q112_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q113" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q113-p0.1">OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q113-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p2"> We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first + head eight points of inquiry arise: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p3"> (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p4"> (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?</p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p5"> (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p6"> (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?</p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p7"> (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?</p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p8"> (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?</p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p9"> (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?</p> + <p id="FP_Q113-p10"> (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?</p> + <div id="FP_Q113_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q113_A1-p0.1">Whether men are guarded by the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, + or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows + how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.120.4" target="asv"> Ps. 120:4</a>: "He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this + man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 20:39</a>). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in + some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly + false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.11" target="asv">Ps. 90:11</a>): "He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by + the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior + which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various + opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover + manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so + it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection + towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature + belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the + universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in + many ways. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the + habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this + the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him + grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, + Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q113_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">Q[111], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation + of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish + is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside + the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise + that miracles occur outside the order of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q113_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q113_A2-p0.1">Whether each man is guarded by an angel?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard + many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). + But as all the angels are unequal ( + <a id="FP_Q113_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps + men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than + another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says + (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.10" target="asv">Mat. 8:10</a>), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the + execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible + creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species, + but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which + cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what + remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to + the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things + corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different "genera" + of + things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable + that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose + that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian + is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one + man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to + the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or + weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation + of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q113_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html">Q[112], A[3]</a>, ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things, + only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the + inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one + immediately above him. Thus it + is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, + and others to the lesser things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.11" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:11,12</a>: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and + some of them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q113_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q113_A3-p0.1">Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that + the text ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv">Mat. 18:10</a>), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels + guard men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external + ministry ( + <a id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html">Q[112], A[4]</a>). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the + Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders + are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius + (Coel. Hier. v, ix). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated + <a id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard + him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce + the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one + man. The other kind of guardianship is + universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship + of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes. + Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits + by + the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each + order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen + by God for the higher degree of glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater + or less, as above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors' + power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q113_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q113_A4-p0.1">Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.7" target="asv">Phil. 2:7</a>) that "He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship + of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. + Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state + of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, + encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, + never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they + have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in + + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.31" target="asv">Ps. 31</a>). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Jerome quoted above + <a id="FP_Q113_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is + threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.159.4" target="asv"> Ps. 159:4</a>: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have + to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, + however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign + with him, in hell a demon to punish him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards + His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was + right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>) that "angels came and ministered to Him." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we + have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q113_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">Q[95], AA[1]</a>,3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason + he needed a guardian angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither + are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And + although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless + conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both + themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like + manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q113_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q113_A5-p0.1">Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who + shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard + a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction + as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon + as they are born. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel + is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore + angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian + is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves + (vide A, 4), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; + such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man + as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits + we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q113_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if + we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic + ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, + nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many + other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still + part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree + of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes + separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above + quoted, says. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q113_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q113_A6-p0.1">Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.51.9" target="asv">Jer. 51:9</a>) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her." And ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.5" target="asv">Is. 5:5</a>) it is written: "I will take away the hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]---"and it shall be wasted." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21.2" target="asv"> Ps. 21:2</a>: "O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes + they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are ever assailing us, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good + angels ever guard us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As appears above + <a id="FP_Q113_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor + anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is + it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of + His providence, but only in so far as He + allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes + a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some + trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House + of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being + subject to tribulation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p7"> From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.</p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: + for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be + with man in an instant. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A6-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q113_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q113_A7-p0.1">Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.33.7" target="asv">Is. 33:7</a>): "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills + of those whom they guard. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the + loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, + as we are told, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv"> Lk. 15:7.</a> Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.12" target="asv"> Numbers 18:12</a>: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men + have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which + have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv">Apoc. 21:4</a>): "Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have + no cause for grief. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will + of the angels and the other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens + in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply + speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is + called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; + although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo + into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. + Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking + the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine + justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words + of Rabsaces, as related + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.37.2" target="asv"> Is. 37:2 </a>seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers + who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression + is metaphorical, and + signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God + and the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p9"> The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.</p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering + of the Divine Providence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q113_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q113_A8-p0.1">Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? </h4> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be strife or discord among the angels. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.25.2" target="asv">Job 25:2</a>): "Who maketh peace in His high places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. + Therefore there is no strife among the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the + opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel + is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>): "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of the Persians was the angel + deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is + strife among them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the + kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his + prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having + led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of + the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p7"> But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship + of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard + to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. + But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so + that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels + cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they + consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their + wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things + about which they seek knowledge are in opposition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p8"> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q113_A8-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q112_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q114" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q114-p0.1">OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </h3> + <p id="FP_Q114-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114-p2"> We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q114-p3"> (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q114-p4"> (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</p> + <p id="FP_Q114-p5"> (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?</p> + <p id="FP_Q114-p6"> (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?</p> + <p id="FP_Q114-p7"> (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?</p> + <div id="FP_Q114_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q114_A1-p0.1">Whether men are assailed by the demons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by + God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed + to assail man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men + are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of + all justice, that men should be assailed by demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed + that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of + this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself + is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance + of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's + salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly + use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof + are to be referred to God as their first author. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail + us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to + man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 22:20.</a> For punishment is referred to God as its first author. + Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they + punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally + through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:16</a>), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the + demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of + the elect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q114_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q114_A2-p0.1">Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.1" target="asv"> Gn. 22:1, </a> "God tempted Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt + man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, + as appears from what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q114_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">Q[111], A[2]</a>), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.3.5" target="asv">1 Thess. 3:5</a>): "Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is, the devil, whose office it + is to tempt." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about + it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be + acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is + as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is + sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p7"> From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed + merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, + presumes to make an experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, + however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper + office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He + may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.13.3" target="asv">Dt. 13:3</a>): "The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p8"> The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort + of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages + and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p9"> Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.</p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher + of spirits" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore + this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q114_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html">Q[111], A[3]</a>), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can + nevertheless be inclined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q114_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q114_A3-p0.1">Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude + of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all + malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>): "You are of your father the devil." But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore every + sin is due to the devil's instigation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the + suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due + to the instigation of the devil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from + the movement of our free-will." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a + disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might + say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of + all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there + resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p7"> But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil + is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will + and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire + for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those + desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will + to curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the + devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our + first parents," as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p8"> Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.</p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, + in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to + man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not + due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q114_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q114_A4-p0.1">Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show + itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other + times do the demons perform lying wonders. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's + art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade + one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv">Mk. 16:20</a>): "The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says + <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q83.html">(Q[83];</a> [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of the magic art miracles are + wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in + the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power + of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. + And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power + and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him + to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p7"> It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they + are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. + And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house + and with it his children---these were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, + 19). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive + men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, + they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute + matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce + these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal + things which + can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the + operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, + which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, + cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body + of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by + the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p10"> Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his + corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q114_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A3.html">Q[111], AA[3]</a>,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as + he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same + way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. + Dei xviii, 18): "Man's imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, + appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be understood as though the + imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another + man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different + right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the + latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q114_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q114_A5-p0.1">Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ + overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore + it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is + not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other + sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to + be so for a certain definite time: wherefore ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv">Lk. 4:13</a>) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One + is on the part + of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], + "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt + for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. + As to this, Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv"> Lk. 4:13</a>: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from + frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.44" target="asv"> Mat. 12:44</a>: "I will return into my house from whence I came out." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p6"> From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.</p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p7"></p> + <p id="FP_Q114_A5-p8"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q113_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q115" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q115-p0.1">OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q115-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115-p2"> We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal + actions there are six points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115-p3"> (1) Whether a body can be active?</p> + <p id="FP_Q115-p4"> (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?</p> + <p id="FP_Q115-p5"> (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?</p> + <p id="FP_Q115-p6"> (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?</p> + <p id="FP_Q115-p7"> (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q115-p8"> (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?</p> + <div id="FP_Q115_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q115_A1-p0.1">Whether a body can be active?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but + do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and + are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance + below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. + Therefore corporeal substance is not active. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because + it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more + a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being + most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial + form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and + an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, + neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," + as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power + on that of which it lays hold." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. + For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments + mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, + are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, + according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion + seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, + and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that + these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter + is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned + by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual + and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p9"> But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion + as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the + participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be + in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of + its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: + but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the + form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form + of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an + action is effected by the contact of two bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p10"> But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while + he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first + contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him + to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the + substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial + principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of + the creation ( + <a id="FP_Q115_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html">Q[45], A[8]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p11"> The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, + while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle + (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would + be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p12"> We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.</p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature + inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. + Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p14"> From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a + mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is + purely passive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God + is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch + as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not + to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, + it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, + the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, + as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch + as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although + itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate + in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. + But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature + of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that + an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p18"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q115_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q115_A2-p0.1">Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual + order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in + which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain + seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable + to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, + matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production + of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal + virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds + lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal + nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural + things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation + of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are + generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, + consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is + manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things + are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and + passive + virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p8"> These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad + lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements + of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things + which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that + animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are + compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal + matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes + ideales]. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement + for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female + contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, + just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so + is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," + but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate + principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought + outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God + commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities + which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of + seminal virtues. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q115_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q115_A3-p0.1">Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De + Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they + are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and + there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need + to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through + the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore + the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: + a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly + bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more + subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible + bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is + moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. + Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the + heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save + locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of + the heavenly bodies, as to their cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption + here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. + If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles + of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle + above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves + sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions + in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary + to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p10"> This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive + their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, + would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior + bodies: which is clearly false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p11"> Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of + its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. + Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: + thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason + of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all + things are like God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. + Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed + sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because + the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the + various dispositions of matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q115_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q115_A4-p0.1">Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual + substances, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], A[3]</a>), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it + seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems + that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect + and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human + actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because + the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore + if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding + that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice + and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there + are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action + of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate + actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, + that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, + as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the + intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive + powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, + disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although + the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains + the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue + of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, + than on the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p7"> To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does + not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and + of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal + organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; + but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated + above ( + <a id="FP_Q115_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">Q[111], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: + so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine + intellect and will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly + bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the + truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting + his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say + that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q115_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q115_A5-p0.1">Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass + men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.24" target="asv"> Mat. 4:24 </a>and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through + the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, + namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine + (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and + held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. + This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain + powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is + manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would + in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors + of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p7"> For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius + says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which + it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto + <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q51_A1.html">Q[51], A[1]</a>): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action + of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame + God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because + as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q115_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html">Q[114], A[4]</a>, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended + result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. + ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property + of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according + to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto + disposed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of + believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations + corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, + rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered + to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q115_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q115_A6-p0.1">Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the + effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, + with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter + to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher + power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal + cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: + since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle + is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. + Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed + in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of + heavenly bodies take place of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This question is partly solved by what was said above + <a id="FP_Q115_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations + in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to + prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other + things to which human action extends. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p7"> But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced + by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning + of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows + of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. + vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p8"> For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes + are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to + fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently + the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p9"> Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, + has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise + (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly + a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to + its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these + two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be + reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take + fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the + surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight + on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of + heavenly bodies result of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which + can fail in their effects in the minority of cases. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local + distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly + body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature + or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly + body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless + the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q115_A6-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q114_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q116" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q116-p0.1">ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q116-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116-p2"> We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q116-p3"> (1) Is there such a thing as fate?</p> + <p id="FP_Q116-p4"> (2) Where is it?</p> + <p id="FP_Q116-p5"> (3) Is it unchangeable?</p> + <p id="FP_Q116-p6"> (4) Are all things subject to fate?</p> + <div id="FP_Q116_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q116_A1-p0.1">Whether there be such a thing as fate?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the + hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived + from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who + decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will + be neither luck nor chance in the world. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to + changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like + as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants + are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared + to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p6"> So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These + denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what + we have said above about Providence ( + <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p7"> On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural + things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is + nothing else than "a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, + 1,8,9]. But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A4.html">Q[115], A[4]</a>) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of + fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what + takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ( + <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html">Q[115], A[6]</a>) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every + action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect + of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grace + finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects + in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what + happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p8"> We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining + cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: + otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect + can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is + hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here + by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine + intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q116_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A4.html">Q[105], A[4]</a>). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p9"> So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were + "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those + who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If + anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, + but hold his tongue." For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared + to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q116_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q116_A2-p0.1">Whether fate is in created things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is + called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal + cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according + to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but + in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A6.html">Q[103], A[6]</a>), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two + ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this + ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, + thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is + served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements + of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain + of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above + <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q104_A2.html">Q[104], + A[2] + </a>; + <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.6" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113.html">Q[113];</a> + <a id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.7" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114.html">Q[114])</a>. It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature + of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But + essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies + order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; + and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. + In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q116_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q116_A3-p0.1">Whether fate is unchangeable?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten + is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity + of Providence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent + to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate + seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen + of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, + which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, + therefore, have held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen + of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the + effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q116_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html">Q[115], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p7"> Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians + said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved + above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p8"> We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, + it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional + is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the + chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable + Providence must also itself be unchangeable." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p9"> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q116_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q116_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are subject to fate?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and + the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are + born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be + excluded from the domain of fate. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the + Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject + to fate. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are + changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q116_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html">Q[9], A[2]</a>). Therefore fate is in all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FP_Q116_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject + also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to + fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. + iv): viz. that "those things which are + nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing + is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in + the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever + is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, + therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q116_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q117" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q117-p0.1">OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q117-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117-p2"> We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual + nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from + man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117-p3"> (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?</p> + <p id="FP_Q117-p4"> (2) Whether man can teach an angel?</p> + <p id="FP_Q117-p5"> (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?</p> + <p id="FP_Q117-p6"> (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?</p> + <p id="FP_Q117-p7"></p> + <div id="FP_Q117_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q117_A1-p0.1">Whether one man can teach another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.8" target="asv">Mat. 22:8</a>): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to + be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is + proper to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge + in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows + that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either + of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something + by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. + For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom + these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from + the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to + speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in + another by teaching him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.7" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:7</a>): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have + one passive intellect in common, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause + another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which + he + has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. + This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: + for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, + and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above + ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p8"> Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, + through the participation of separate forms, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it + knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider + what he + knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose + (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved + above ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">Q[79], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html">Q[84], A[3]</a>) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima + iii, 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p9"> We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing + him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of + effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused + to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes + from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical + art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things + must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection + of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not + as + principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, + by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing + the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended + end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p10"> Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; + and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle + of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are + naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal + principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own + research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, + leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what + the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p11"> Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing + to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he + may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous + knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or + something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, + by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above + ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">Q[111], A[1]</a>) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes + to the disciple the order of principles to + conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. + Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator + causes his hearer to know. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the + principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these + are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.3" target="asv">Ps. 102:3</a>); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>), + inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), through which light all things are shown to us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore + knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle + by which one is directed in working. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but + he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs + of which are proposed to him from without. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail + and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his + own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q117_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q117_A2-p0.1">Whether man can teach the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.10" target="asv">Eph. 3:10</a>): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the + Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior + angels, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116_A1.html">Q[116], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html">Q[112], A[3]</a>). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.1" target="asv"> Heb. 1:1,2</a>: "Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore + some men have been able to teach the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are + taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior + angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; + but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same + way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from + Our Lord's words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>): "There hath not risen among them + that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." + Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels + the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least + of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery + which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities + and powers in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church." As + though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities + and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection + this Church composed of men will be gathered together." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p7"> It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when + it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and + the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were + hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from + the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, + the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which + mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in + His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such + great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might + say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q117_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q117_A3-p0.1">Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work + miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his + reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal + matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on these words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.1" target="asv">Gal. 3:1</a>): "Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single + look bewitch others, especially children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. + Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is + changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on + sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or + by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels + also we have stated ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal + agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, + except by means of bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same + place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance + rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This + he says is the cause of the "evil eye." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p9"> But it has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, + that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits + takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact + with them to a certain distance: in the + same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; + [*De Insomniis ii]). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p10"> Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, + the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is + also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may + have some compact with them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated + above ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html">Q[81], A[3]</a>), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs + be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change + in exterior bodies, except by means of a + change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q117_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q117_A4-p0.1">Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance + as to local motion, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q117_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A5.html">Q[110], A[5]</a>). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained + power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not + have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the + body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey + the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the + limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, + by the power of God, it can exceed those limits. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally + unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance + is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only + one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower + heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it + is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the + dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some + demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q117_A4-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q118" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q118-p0.1">OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q118-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q118-p2"> We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.</p> + <p id="FP_Q118-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q118-p4"> (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</p> + <p id="FP_Q118-p5"> (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?</p> + <p id="FP_Q118-p6"> (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?</p> + <div id="FP_Q118_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q118_A1-p0.1">Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, + not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing + is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since + it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist + not by generation but by creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the + vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive + soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But + neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere + than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle + of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the + sensitive soul is not produced through the semen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the + animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul + of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: + or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above + ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html">Q[76], A[4]</a>) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does + not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore + the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced + from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20</a>: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated + are produced by the seminal power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html">Q[65], A[4]</a>). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having + being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made + except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p8"> But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above + ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html">Q[75], A[3]</a>): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to + existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist + forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p9"> Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that + both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce + the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p10"> Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance + to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their + like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, + act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of + nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant + derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from + the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, + so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some + seminal power derived therefrom. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">Q[25], A[3]</a>) on this point, nor need we repeat it here. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the + generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to + so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement + of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or + the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; + but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is + attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, + by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A3.html">Q[115], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been + said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's + power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. + Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very + beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it + begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore + is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as + though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would + be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after + the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of + the + thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, + by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved + and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal + but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q118_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q118_A2-p0.1">Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.46.26" target="asv">Gn. 46:26</a>): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from + the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html">Q[76], A[3]</a>), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated + from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man + are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual + soul is produced from the + semen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the + form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced + by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational + soul is from the begetter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in + the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created + by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now + it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no + part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p9"> Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the + body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. + Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De + Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p10"> Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through + generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing + else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with + the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from + the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, + and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive + soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p13"> Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; + and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one + would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html">Q[76], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p14"> Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal + power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, + but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says + that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is + susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity + constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. + Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from + the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an + animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the + beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further + perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. + Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be + essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those + who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: + and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p15"> There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has + been disproved above ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p16"> We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both + in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening + form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations + and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is + apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created + by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being + corrupted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to + one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior + agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, + but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been + said above ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A5.html">Q[105], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders + the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; + in this God does not concur. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p20"></p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A2-p21"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q118_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q118_A3-p0.1">Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv">Gn. 2:2</a>): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore + all souls were created at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created + with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently + at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv"> Gn. 2:2, </a> where it is said that "God ended" all "His work." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore + it began to exist before the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is + of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of + men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on + which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would + follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above + ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A4.html">Q[75], A[4]</a>). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, + as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a> ): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7; + <a id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a>). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: + whereas this cannot be said of an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p7"> Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, + it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. + Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without + a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p8"> But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united + to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed + it---this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did + not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not + fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the + world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above + time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: + since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the + begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of + some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion + of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, + we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into + them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.17" target="asv">Jn. 5:17</a>): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed + in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, + in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number + of species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was + not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.16" target="asv">16</a>): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q118_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q117_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q119" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q119-p0.1">OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q119-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q119-p2"> We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q119-p3"> (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?</p> + <p id="FP_Q119-p4"> (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?</p> + <div id="FP_Q119_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q119_A1-p0.1">Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not + changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter"; + and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food + is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore + the food is not changed into true human nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according + to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true + human nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due + only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for + what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow + that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically + the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, + identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture + of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality + of human nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore + that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered + in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common + matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate + matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus + a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul + and this body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p9"> Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist + save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain + individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have + been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human + nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p10"> But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in + this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed + into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent + the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed + by fire. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p11"> But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, + or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. + Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human + body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be + changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is + only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one + individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect + of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the + substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; + for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore + some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently + no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other + things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of + matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect + than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things + were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of + the + human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does + not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants + do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which + multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does + anything + increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of + generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p12"> Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature + in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain + determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter + until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true + human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through + the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase + required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary + existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does + not + belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of + living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not + the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, + would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly, + because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q119_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html">Q[118], A[1]</a>). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power + a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true + form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for + growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of + natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore + just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p13"> Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its + assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food + nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of food + is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and + be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from + the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what + is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the + mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their + species in matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something + belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, + or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water + is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, + cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying + that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p16"> It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh + considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that + which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. + But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and + renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is + substituted in its place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot + be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly + the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue + of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming + virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. + Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; + and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, + the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, + so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be + generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the + entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. + But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until + the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes + into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed + by natural heat. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p20"></p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A1-p21"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q119_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q119_A2-p0.1">Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene + says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which + is begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of + the begetter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something + is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom + the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced + from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance + of the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This question depends in some way on what has been stated above + <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A1.html">Q[118], A[1]</a>). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its + own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated + to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from + potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. + But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the + generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives + a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that + part. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p8"> Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. + For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of + the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something + else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, + then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) + the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of + the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal + from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut + in + two: which is inadmissible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p9"> It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather + is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as + stated above + <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q119_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">Q[108], A[1]</a> ). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into + the substance of the members. + Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what + is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, + is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated + seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form + of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates + its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should + have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the + father. In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in + relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from + which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal + matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and + likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal + virtue (in the production) of this man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p13"> But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because + the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the + active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation + of the Holy Ghost. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], + WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen. + </p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q103.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file