--- a/summa/english/FP_x.html	Sat May 31 14:36:13 2014 +0000
+++ b/summa/english/FP_x.html	Sun Jun 01 11:19:28 2014 +0000
@@ -4202,7 +4202,7 @@
                      of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages
                      and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p9"> Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.</p>
+                  <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.</p>
                   <p id="FP_Q114_A2-p10">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher
                      of spirits" (
@@ -4259,7 +4259,7 @@
                      devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our
                      first parents," as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii).
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p8"> Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.</p>
+                  <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.</p>
                   <p id="FP_Q114_A3-p9">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby,
                      in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.
@@ -4486,7 +4486,7 @@
                      inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
                      Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act.
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p14"> From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a
+                  <p id="FP_Q115_A1-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a
                      mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is
                      purely passive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God
                      is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
@@ -4953,7 +4953,8 @@
                      "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those
                      who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If
                      anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion,
-                     but hold his tongue." For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
+                     but hold his tongue."</p><!-- markup added by HST-->
+      <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p9a"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
                   </p>
                   <p id="FP_Q116_A1-p10">
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared
@@ -5064,7 +5065,7 @@
                      chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable
                      Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
                   </p>
-                  <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p9"> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p>
+                  <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> From this the answers to the objections are clear.</p>
                   <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p10"></p>
                   <p id="FP_Q116_A3-p11"></p>
                   <a href="summa.FP_Q116_A2.html"></a>
@@ -5991,7 +5992,8 @@
                      <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates
                      its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should
                      have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the
-                     father. In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in
+                     father.</p><p id="FP_Q119_A2-p11a"><!-- markup
+added by HST--><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in
                      relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
                   </p>
                   <p id="FP_Q119_A2-p12">