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1 The unlikelihood of being able to ask these questions.
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2 The fraction that is solid is tiny. The right size solid is to a
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3 ... of measure zero, and then left arising there is another tiny
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4 factor.
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5
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6 That doesn't pose a metaphysical problem for the project, because we
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7 are those things, isn't it amazing that that 1/10^40 chance came good.
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8
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9 What we are left with we see two ways of trying to understand, the
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10 romantic idealisation of science, that it will produce a causal,
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11 bumpint-and-shoving picture on the one hand, the conceptions of the
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12 religious sensibilities on the other. If you take the deliverables of
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13 science seriously, none of the foundations of that romantic 19th
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14 century view are tenable.
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15
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16 It is more unlikely than our mind can grasp. Measurement?
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17
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18 That there are limitations on what we can in fact understand _in
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19 principle_ is itself very hard to get our heads around.
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20
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21 [HST primary-school vs. post-grad physics (it's OK to teach Newton to
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22 kids even though it's false) and religion (it's not OK to teach
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23 Christianity to kids)]
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24
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25 At the beginning of the GA text it says that contemporary science
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26 actually runs rough-shod over the presumptions of primary-school
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27 science, but there was a question as to whether the non-effectiveness
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28 stuff just leads to a 'classical' embodiment view or goes further into
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29 the territory I _claim_ for it, getting much closer to religious
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30 sensibility territory. I'm going to just state that this stuff is
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31 domesticating the territory of r_s: this is all still pre-amble.
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32
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33 What can we say if we step back and consider the world and our place
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34 in it in the light of the new [e.g. non-effectiveness?] scientific
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35 understanding,
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36
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37 Try to articulate the ontological and epistemolical theses and frame
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38 them in such a way that they end up with "this may not be God, but
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39 it's close enough"...
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40
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41 Wondering whether we should just try to do that, just rewrite the
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42 paper, more clearly and more relaxedly, and just say that.
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43
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44 That does mean starting with a blank sheet of paper.
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45
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46 What stands between me and doing that, where are the lacunae?
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47
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48 Suppose I start with the unlikelihood, and try to build forward from
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49 there.
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50
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51 [pause - HST: how does that get to e.g. non-effectiveness/deiexis/embodiment?]
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52
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53 Maybe part 1 is just the sheer unlikelihood
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54
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55 Part 2 is what, though, can we say about the world
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56 And then, as best we understand it, 1st off differential equations have
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57 turned out to be the framework that can best carry the expressions of
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58 the regularities [that we encounter in the world], and in particular
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59 something like quantum-field-theoretic vortexes...
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60
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61 There's also the question that given that each of us is a patch of that
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62 [?] universe, what is it to know or understand anything, then the
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63 Object book is relevant, registration and that story, the reification
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64 of objects, registration in general.
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65
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66 And then there's this thing, which I think is the most urgent for me
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67 to say compellingly and compactly, which is that if for example I
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68 register something as an object, or I register [what did Strawson call
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69 it, the instantiation of fields, "it's raining", "it's sunny here
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70 now", the instantiation not of properties but of qualities]. But let
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71 me talk objects.
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72
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73 There's this point which is fundamental to everything, that if I
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74 register an object as an object, what I'm registering is not really
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75 just the object, what I'm registering is a patch of the ineffable,
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76 which I register _as_ an object, and I say "this is an apple", but
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77 that [ has not done justice to the patch -- my _view_ is not
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78 restricted to its appleness, but my attention, that to which I'm
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79 attentionally directed, is what I'm registering as an apple. I
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80 continue to look beyond, to look beyond, to be aware of the finitude
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81 of the registration.]
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82
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83 The apple, as it were, is not the-patch-registered-as-an-apple. The
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84 apple _is_ a full inenffable patch in all its glory---that which I have
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85 registered as an apple. That to which I'm directed---the object of my
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86 attention transcends its exemplification of all apple properties,
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87 there's more to it than its just being an apple. And not just more to
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88 it in the sense that there's more to all apples than their appleness
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89 or what follows from their being apples, but more about this
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90 particular apple than words can express. It's kind of as if one is
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91 standing on a cliff overlooking the ocean at night and there's motion,
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92 barely detectable motion, and I say "there's a ship moving slowly down
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93 the channel" and you look too and say "yeah, I see". Both of us are
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94 attentive to, attend to, that which we're supposing is a moving ship.
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95
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96
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97
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