Mercurial > hg > BCS
comparison 2025-05-22.txt @ 82:9ca6db06a003
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| author | Henry S Thompson <ht@inf.ed.ac.uk> |
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| date | Thu, 22 May 2025 16:42:36 +0100 |
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| children | 50f27971bf6e |
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| 1 The unlikelihood of being able to ask these questions. | |
| 2 The fraction that is solid is tiny. The right size solid is to a | |
| 3 ... of measure zero, and then left arising there is another tiny | |
| 4 factor. | |
| 5 | |
| 6 That doesn't pose a metaphysical problem for the project, because we | |
| 7 are those things, isn't it amazing that that 1/10^40 chance came good. | |
| 8 | |
| 9 What we are left with we see two ways of trying to understand, the | |
| 10 romantic idealisation of science, that it will produce a causal, | |
| 11 bumpint-and-shoving picture on the one hand, the conceptions of the | |
| 12 religious sensibilities on the other. If you take the deliverables of | |
| 13 science seriously, none of the foundations of that romantic 19th | |
| 14 century view are tenable. | |
| 15 | |
| 16 It is more unlikely than our mind can grasp. Measurement? | |
| 17 | |
| 18 That there are limitations on what we can in fact understand _in | |
| 19 principle_ is itself very hard to get our heads around. | |
| 20 | |
| 21 [HST primary-school vs. post-grad physics (it's OK to teach Newton to | |
| 22 kids even though it's false) and religion (it's not OK to teach | |
| 23 Christianity to kids)] | |
| 24 | |
| 25 At the beginning of the GA text it says that contemporary science | |
| 26 actually runs rough-shod over the presumptions of primary-school | |
| 27 science, but there was a question as to whether the non-effectiveness | |
| 28 stuff just leads to a 'classical' embodiment view or goes further into | |
| 29 the territory I _claim_ for it, getting much closer to religious | |
| 30 sensibility territory. I'm going to just state that this stuff is | |
| 31 domesticating the territory of r_s: this is all still pre-amble. | |
| 32 | |
| 33 What can we say if we step back and consider the world and our place | |
| 34 in it in the light of the new [e.g. non-effectiveness?] scientific | |
| 35 understanding, | |
| 36 | |
| 37 Try to articulate the ontological and epistemolical theses and frame | |
| 38 them in such a way that they end up with "this may not be God, but | |
| 39 it's close enough"... | |
| 40 | |
| 41 Wondering whether we should just try to do that, just rewrite the | |
| 42 paper, more clearly and more relaxedly, and just say that. | |
| 43 | |
| 44 That does mean starting with a blank sheet of paper. | |
| 45 | |
| 46 What stands between me and doing that, where are the lacunae? | |
| 47 | |
| 48 Suppose I start with the unlikelihood, and try to build forward from | |
| 49 there. | |
| 50 | |
| 51 [pause - HST: how does that get to e.g. non-effectiveness/deiexis/embodiment?] | |
| 52 | |
| 53 Maybe part 1 is just the sheer unlikelihood | |
| 54 | |
| 55 Part 2 is what, though, can we say about the world | |
| 56 And then, as best we understand it, 1st off differential equations have | |
| 57 turned out to be the framework that can best carry the expressions of | |
| 58 the regularities [that we encounter in the world], and in particular | |
| 59 something like quantum-field-theoretic vortexes... | |
| 60 | |
| 61 There's also the question that given that each of us is a patch of that | |
| 62 [?] universe, what is it to know or understand anything, then the | |
| 63 Object book is relevant, registration and that story, the reification | |
| 64 of objects, registration in general. | |
| 65 | |
| 66 And then there's this thing, which I think is the most urgent for me | |
| 67 to say compellingly and compactly, which is that if for example I | |
| 68 register something as an object, or I register [what did Strawson call | |
| 69 it, the instantiation of fields, "it's raining", "it's sunny here | |
| 70 now", the instantiation not of properties but of qualities]. But let | |
| 71 me talk objects. | |
| 72 | |
| 73 There's this point which is fundamental to everything, that if I | |
| 74 register an object as an object, what I'm registering is not really | |
| 75 just the object, what I'm registering is a patch of the ineffable, | |
| 76 which I register _as_ an object, and I say "this is an apple", but | |
| 77 that [ has not done justice to the patch -- my _view_ is not | |
| 78 restricted to its appleness, but my attention, that to which I'm | |
| 79 attentionally directed, is what I'm registering as an apple. I | |
| 80 continue to look beyond, to look beyond, to be aware of the finitude | |
| 81 of the registration.] | |
| 82 | |
| 83 The apple, as it were, is not the-patch-registered-as-an-apple. The | |
| 84 apple _is_ a full inenffable patch in all its glory---that which I have | |
| 85 registered as an apple. That to which I'm directed---the object of my | |
| 86 attention transcends its exemplification of all apple properties, | |
| 87 there's more to it than its just being an apple. And not just more to | |
| 88 it in the sense that there's more to all apples than their appleness | |
| 89 or what follows from their being apples, but more about this | |
| 90 particular apple than words can express. It's kind of as if one is | |
| 91 standing on a cliff overlooking the ocean at night and there's motion, | |
| 92 barely detectable motion, and I say "there's a ship moving slowly down | |
| 93 the channel" and you look too and say "yeah, I see". Both of us are | |
| 94 attentive to, attend to, that which we're supposing is a moving ship. | |
| 95 | |
| 96 | |
| 97 |
