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Q5
author ht
date Fri, 09 May 2008 17:20:13 +0000
parents 1a67da87d11f
children c102f6bf9d04
files summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml
diffstat 1 files changed, 1078 insertions(+), 641 deletions(-) [+]
line wrap: on
line diff
--- a/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml	Fri May 09 17:19:53 2008 +0000
+++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml	Fri May 09 17:20:13 2008 +0000
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
 <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?>
-<!DOCTYPE div2
-  SYSTEM "../../dtd/ThML10.dtd">
+<!DOCTYPE div2 SYSTEM "../../dtd/ThML10.dtd" >
 <div2 id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])">
 		  <h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q2" next="FP_Q2_A1" prev="FP.ii" progress="0.25%" n="i" title="Question. 2 - The Existence of God (Three Articles)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q2-p0.1">Question 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2-p0.1">Question 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -46,15 +44,13 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be
 self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in
 us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says
 (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted
 in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28299"><span class=
-"ref">[28299] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28299"><span class="ref">[28299] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim
 nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter
 inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit
@@ -70,8 +66,7 @@
 mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it
 exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore
 the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28300"><span class=
-"ref">[28300] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illa
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28300"><span class="ref">[28300] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illa
 dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis,
 cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis
 principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars,
@@ -85,18 +80,14 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the
 existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence
 of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not
 exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if
 there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself:
-"I am the way, the truth, and the life" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>)
+"I am the way, the truth, and the life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>)
 Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28301"><span class=
-"ref">[28301] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28301"><span class="ref">[28301] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 veritatem esse est per se notum, quia qui negat veritatem esse,
 concedit veritatem esse, si enim veritas non est, verum est
 veritatem non esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod
@@ -110,12 +101,9 @@
 self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
 concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of
 the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
-his heart, There is no God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.52.1"
-parsed="vul|Ps|52|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p5.1"
-passage="Ps. 52:1">Ps. 52:1</scripRef>). Therefore, that God exists is
+his heart, There is no God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.52.1" parsed="vul|Ps|52|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p5.1" passage="Ps. 52:1">Ps. 52:1</scripRef>). Therefore, that God exists is
 not self-evident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28302"><span class=
-"ref">[28302] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, nullus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28302"><span class="ref">[28302] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, nullus
 potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est per se notum ut patet per
 philosophum, in IV Metaphys. et I Poster., circa prima
 demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius
@@ -130,8 +118,7 @@
   is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more
   known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by
 effects.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303"><span class=
-"ref">[28303] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303"><span class="ref">[28303] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo,
 secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos.
 Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum
@@ -158,8 +145,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who
   imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in
 riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28304"><span class=
-"ref">[28304] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28304"><span class="ref">[28304] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam
 confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus
 est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat
@@ -177,8 +163,7 @@
 there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be
 thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God
 does not exist.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28305"><span class=
-"ref">[28305] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28305"><span class="ref">[28305] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit
 significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam
 crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat
@@ -194,8 +179,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A1-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 3:</b> The existence of truth in general is self-evident
 but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28306"><span class=
-"ref">[28306] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28306"><span class="ref">[28306] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod veritatem esse in communi, est per se notum, sed primam
 veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos.</p>
 </div>
@@ -211,17 +195,13 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith
 that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because
 a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the
-unseen (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.11.1"
-parsed="vul|Heb|11|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p2.1"
-passage="Heb. 11:1">Heb. 11:1</scripRef>). Therefore it cannot be
+unseen (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.11.1" parsed="vul|Heb|11|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p2.1" passage="Heb. 11:1">Heb. 11:1</scripRef>). Therefore it cannot be
 demonstrated that God exists.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28307"><span class=
-"ref">[28307] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28307"><span class="ref">[28307] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabile. Deum enim
 esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt
 demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non
@@ -230,30 +210,26 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence
 is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's
 essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene
 says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God
 exists.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28308"><span class=
-"ref">[28308] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28308"><span class="ref">[28308] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium
 demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire
 quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non
 possumus demonstrare Deum esse.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the
 existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His
 effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is
 infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and
 infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be
 demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the
 existence of God cannot be demonstrated.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28309"><span class=
-"ref">[28309] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28309"><span class="ref">[28309] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
 demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus eius.
 Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati ei, cum ipse sit
 infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem ad infinitum non est
@@ -265,15 +241,11 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
-clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.20" parsed="vul|Rom|1|20|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p5.1"
-passage="Rom. 1:20">Rom. 1:20</scripRef>). But this would not be
+clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.20" parsed="vul|Rom|1|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p5.1" passage="Rom. 1:20">Rom. 1:20</scripRef>). But this would not be
 unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things
 that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether
 it exists.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28310"><span class=
-"ref">[28310] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28310"><span class="ref">[28310] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae
 facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Sed hoc non esset, nisi
 per ea quae facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse, primum enim
@@ -287,8 +259,7 @@
 cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
 not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
 which are known to us.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="28311"><span class=
-"ref">[28311] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="28311"><span class="ref">[28311] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur
 propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per
 effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae
@@ -304,8 +275,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
   known and demonstrated.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28312"><span class=
-"ref">[28312] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28312"><span class="ref">[28312] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem
 naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I non sunt
 articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides
@@ -320,8 +290,7 @@
   derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the
 existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the
 meaning of the word "God".</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28313"><span class=
-"ref">[28313] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28313"><span class="ref">[28313] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti
 effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc
 maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse
@@ -339,8 +308,7 @@
 the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
 demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
 cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28314"><span class=
-"ref">[28314] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28314"><span class="ref">[28314] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta
 cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest
 manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex
@@ -359,15 +327,13 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
 does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the
 other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He
 is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no
 evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does
 not exist.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28315"><span class=
-"ref">[28315] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28315"><span class="ref">[28315] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia si unum contrariorum
 fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur
 in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si
@@ -376,8 +342,7 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
 superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few
 principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we
 see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing
@@ -385,8 +350,7 @@
 principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to
 one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no
 need to suppose God's existence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28316"><span class=
-"ref">[28316] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28316"><span class="ref">[28316] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
 potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed
 videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per
 alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit, quia ea quae sunt
@@ -398,11 +362,8 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am."
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.14" parsed="vul|Exod|3|14|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p4.1"
-passage="Ex. 3:14">Ex. 3:14</scripRef>)</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28317"><span class=
-"ref">[28317] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.14" parsed="vul|Exod|3|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p4.1" passage="Ex. 3:14">Ex. 3:14</scripRef>)</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28317"><span class="ref">[28317] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei, <i>ego sum qui sum</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
@@ -424,8 +385,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p10"> The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
   arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.</p>
 </div>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="28318"><span class=
-"ref">[28318] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="28318"><span class="ref">[28318] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest. Prima autem et
 manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim,
 et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod
@@ -503,15 +463,13 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As
 Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He
 would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence
 and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is
 part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to
 exist, and out of it produce good.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28319"><span class=
-"ref">[28319] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28319"><span class="ref">[28319] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, <i>Deus, cum
 sit summe bonus, nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus
 suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de
@@ -522,8 +480,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown
   in the body of the Article.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28320"><span class=
-"ref">[28320] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28320"><span class="ref">[28320] I&ordf; q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex
 directione alicuius superioris agentis, necesse est ea quae a
 natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam.
@@ -541,8 +498,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q3" next="FP_Q3_A1" prev="FP_Q2_A3" progress="0.36%" n="ii" title="Question. 3 - OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q3-p0.1">Question 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3-p0.1">Question 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -589,18 +545,14 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy
 Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written:
 "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than
 Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the
-earth and broader than the sea" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.11.8-Job.11.9" parsed="vul|Job|11|8|11|9"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" passage="Job 11:8,9">Job
+earth and broader than the sea" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.11.8-Job.11.9" parsed="vul|Job|11|8|11|9" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" passage="Job 11:8,9">Job
 11:8,9</scripRef>). Therefore God is a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28322"><span class=
-"ref">[28322] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28322"><span class="ref">[28322] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus. Corpus enim est quod
 habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam
 dimensionem, dicitur enim Iob XI, <i>excelsior caelo est, et quid
@@ -609,20 +561,13 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything
 that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But
 God seems to have figure, for it is written: "Let us make man to our
-image and likeness" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26"
-parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3.1"
-passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>). Now a figure is called an
+image and likeness" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26" parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3.1" passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>). Now a figure is called an
 image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory
-and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.1.3" parsed="vul|Heb|1|3|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3.2"
-passage="Heb. 1:3">Heb. 1:3</scripRef>). Therefore God is a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28323"><span class=
-"ref">[28323] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.1.3" parsed="vul|Heb|1|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p3.2" passage="Heb. 1:3">Heb. 1:3</scripRef>). Therefore God is a body.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28323"><span class="ref">[28323] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 figuratum est corpus, cum figura sit qualitas circa quantitatem.
 Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus, cum scriptum sit Gen. I,
 <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>,
@@ -632,22 +577,14 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has
 corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to
-God. "Hast thou an arm like God?" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.40.4" parsed="vul|Job|40|4|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" passage="Job 40:4">Job
+God. "Hast thou an arm like God?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.40.4" parsed="vul|Job|40|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" passage="Job 40:4">Job
 40:4</scripRef>); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.33.16" parsed="vul|Ps|33|16|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.2"
-passage="Ps. 33:16">Ps. 33:16</scripRef>); and "The right hand of the
-Lord hath wrought strength" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.117.16"
-parsed="vul|Ps|117|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.3"
-passage="Ps. 117:16">Ps. 117:16</scripRef>). Therefore God is a
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.33.16" parsed="vul|Ps|33|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.2" passage="Ps. 33:16">Ps. 33:16</scripRef>); and "The right hand of the
+Lord hath wrought strength" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.117.16" parsed="vul|Ps|117|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p4.3" passage="Ps. 117:16">Ps. 117:16</scripRef>). Therefore God is a
 body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28324"><span class=
-"ref">[28324] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28324"><span class="ref">[28324] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 quod habet partes corporeas, est corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit
 Deo partes corporeas, dicitur enim Iob XL, <i>si habes brachium ut
 Deus</i>; et in Psalmo, <i>oculi domini super iustos; et, dextera
@@ -655,17 +592,11 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture
 belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said
-of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord sitting" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.6.1" parsed="vul|Isa|6|1|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" passage="Is. 6:1">Is. 6:1</scripRef>),
-and "He standeth up to judge" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.3.13"
-parsed="vul|Isa|3|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5.2"
-passage="Is. 3:13">Is. 3:13</scripRef>). Therefore God is a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28325"><span class=
-"ref">[28325] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, situs
+of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord sitting" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.6.1" parsed="vul|Isa|6|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" passage="Is. 6:1">Is. 6:1</scripRef>),
+and "He standeth up to judge" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.3.13" parsed="vul|Isa|3|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p5.2" passage="Is. 3:13">Is. 3:13</scripRef>). Therefore God is a body.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28325"><span class="ref">[28325] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, situs
 non convenit nisi corpori. Sed ea quae ad situm pertinent, in
 Scripturis dicuntur de Deo, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, <i>vidi dominum
 sedentem</i>; et Isaiae III, <i>stat ad iudicandum dominus</i>.
@@ -673,21 +604,14 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies
 or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But
 in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term "whereto,"
-according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.33.6" parsed="vul|Ps|33|6|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p6.1"
-passage="Ps. 33:6">Ps. 33:6</scripRef>), and as a term "wherefrom":
+according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.33.6" parsed="vul|Ps|33|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p6.1" passage="Ps. 33:6">Ps. 33:6</scripRef>), and as a term "wherefrom":
 "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.17.13" parsed="vul|Jer|17|13|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p6.2"
-passage="Jer. 17:13">Jer. 17:13</scripRef>). Therefore God is a
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.17.13" parsed="vul|Jer|17|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p6.2" passage="Jer. 17:13">Jer. 17:13</scripRef>). Therefore God is a
 body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28326"><span class=
-"ref">[28326] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28326"><span class="ref">[28326] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
 potest esse terminus localis a quo vel ad quem, nisi sit corpus vel
 aliquod corporeum. Sed Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus
 localis ut ad quem, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>accedite ad eum, et
@@ -697,12 +621,8 @@
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p7"><b>On
-the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:John.4.24" parsed="vul|John|4|24|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p7.1"
-passage="Jn. 4:24">Jn. 4:24</scripRef>): "God is a spirit."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327"><span class=
-"ref">[28327] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.4.24" parsed="vul|John|4|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" passage="Jn. 4:24">Jn. 4:24</scripRef>): "God is a spirit."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327"><span class="ref">[28327] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
@@ -712,8 +632,7 @@
   infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence
   that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the
 body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="28328"><span class=
-"ref">[28328] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="28328"><span class="ref">[28328] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 absolute Deum non esse corpus. Quod tripliciter ostendi potest.
 Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum, ut patet
 inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est
@@ -744,8 +663,7 @@
 of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power;
 by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie
 under His protection.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28329"><span class=
-"ref">[28329] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28329"><span class="ref">[28329] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis
 spiritualia et divina sub similitudinibus corporalium. Unde, cum
 trinam dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatis
@@ -763,8 +681,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26" parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p10.1" passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of
   God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28330"><span class=
-"ref">[28330] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28330"><span class="ref">[28330] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod homo dicitur esse ad imaginem Dei, non secundum
 corpus, sed secundum id quo homo excellit alia animalia, unde, Gen.
 I, postquam dictum est, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
@@ -775,15 +692,13 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal
 parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions,
 and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the
 eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of
 seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other
 parts.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28331"><span class=
-"ref">[28331] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28331"><span class="ref">[28331] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum
 actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est
 videre, unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad
@@ -792,14 +707,12 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever
 pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of
 parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His
 unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His
 power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28332"><span class=
-"ref">[28332] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28332"><span class="ref">[28332] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod etiam ea quae ad situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi
 secundum quandam similitudinem, sicut dicitur sedens, propter suam
 immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans, propter suam fortitudinem
@@ -807,14 +720,12 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw
 near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the
 affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we
 withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies
 merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28333"><span class=
-"ref">[28333] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28333"><span class="ref">[28333] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
 quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit,
 sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic
 accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant
@@ -832,18 +743,13 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of
 matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture
-attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.10.38" parsed="vul|Heb|10|38|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p2.1"
-passage="Heb. 10:38">Heb. 10:38</scripRef>), where God says: "But My
+attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.10.38" parsed="vul|Heb|10|38|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p2.1" passage="Heb. 10:38">Heb. 10:38</scripRef>), where God says: "But My
 just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not
 please My soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28334"><span class=
-"ref">[28334] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28334"><span class="ref">[28334] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae.
 Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma,
 quia anima est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo,
@@ -853,16 +759,12 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy
 and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed
 to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people"
-(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.105.40" parsed="vul|Ps|105|40|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p3.1"
-passage="Ps. 105:40">Ps. 105:40</scripRef>). Therefore God is composed
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.105.40" parsed="vul|Ps|105|40|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p3.1" passage="Ps. 105:40">Ps. 105:40</scripRef>). Therefore God is composed
 of matter and form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28335"><span class=
-"ref">[28335] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ira,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28335"><span class="ref">[28335] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ira,
 gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones coniuncti, ut dicitur I de
 anima. Sed huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura dicitur enim in
 Psalmo, <i>iratus est furore dominus in populum suum</i>. Ergo Deus
@@ -870,13 +772,11 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is
 the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual,
 for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of
 matter and form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28336"><span class=
-"ref">[28336] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28336"><span class="ref">[28336] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus videtur esse
 individuum, non enim de multis praedicatur. Ergo est compositus ex
 materia et forma.</p>
@@ -888,8 +788,7 @@
 for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not
 a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not
 composed of matter and form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337"><span class=
-"ref">[28337] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337"><span class="ref">[28337] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
 compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva
 est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut
 ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.</p>
@@ -900,8 +799,7 @@
   first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
   therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and
 form.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="28338"><span class=
-"ref">[28338] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="28338"><span class="ref">[28338] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod impossibile est in Deo esse materiam. Primo quidem, quia
 materia est id quod est in potentia. Ostensum est autem quod Deus
 est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde
@@ -927,8 +825,7 @@
 resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
 soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
 soul.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28339"><span class=
-"ref">[28339] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28339"><span class="ref">[28339] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod anima attribuitur Deo per similitudinem actus. Quod
 enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est, unde illud dicitur
 esse placitum animae Dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.</p>
@@ -940,8 +837,7 @@
 account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
 the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
 as His anger.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28340"><span class=
-"ref">[28340] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28340"><span class="ref">[28340] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum
 similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, ira
 eius punitio metaphorice vocatur.</p>
@@ -950,8 +846,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
   God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28341"><span class=
-"ref">[28341] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28341"><span class="ref">[28341] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia individuantur per
 materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum
 substans, forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud
@@ -972,14 +867,12 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in
 itself. But the substance or nature of God---i.e. the Godhead---is
 said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His
 essence or nature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28342"><span class=
-"ref">[28342] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28342"><span class="ref">[28342] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel
 natura. Nihil enim est in seipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quae
 est deitas, dicitur esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit
@@ -987,14 +880,12 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect
 is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in
 created things the "suppositum" is not identical with its nature; for
 a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same
 as His Godhead.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28343"><span class=
-"ref">[28343] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28343"><span class="ref">[28343] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 effectus assimilatur suae causae, quia omne agens agit sibi simile.
 Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura, non
 enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod
@@ -1005,13 +896,10 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is said of God that He is life itself, and not
 only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the
-life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6"
-parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p4.1"
-passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>). Now the relation between
+life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p4.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>). Now the relation between
 Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living
 thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28344"><span class=
-"ref">[28344] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Contra, de Deo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28344"><span class="ref">[28344] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Contra, de Deo
 dicitur quod est vita, et non solum quod est vivens, ut patet Ioan.
 XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et vita</i>. Sicut autem se habet vita
 ad viventem, ita deitas ad Deum. Ergo Deus est ipsa deitas.</p>
@@ -1025,8 +913,7 @@
 are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He
 must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus
 predicated of Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="28345"><span class=
-"ref">[28345] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="28345"><span class="ref">[28345] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura. Ad cuius
 intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus compositis ex materia et
 forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et
@@ -1056,8 +943,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
   that there is any composition in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28346"><span class=
-"ref">[28346] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28346"><span class="ref">[28346] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per
 modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo
 loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius
@@ -1075,8 +961,7 @@
 precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
 divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
 therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28347"><span class=
-"ref">[28347] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28347"><span class="ref">[28347] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod effectus Dei imitantur ipsum, non perfecte, sed
 secundum quod possunt. Et hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet,
 quod id quod est simplex et unum, non potest repraesentari nisi per
@@ -1097,8 +982,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.21" parsed="vul|Wis|14|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p2.1" passage="Wis. 14:21">Wis. 14:21</scripRef>). Therefore God's existence is not His
   essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28348"><span class=
-"ref">[28348] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28348"><span class="ref">[28348] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si
 enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui
 nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur,
@@ -1109,15 +993,12 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know
-"whether" God exists as said above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2">Q[2],
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know
+"whether" God exists as said above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2">Q[2],
 A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence
 is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
 nature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349"><span class=
-"ref">[28349] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349"><span class="ref">[28349] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo
 scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus
 scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius,
 sive quidditas vel natura.</p>
@@ -1128,8 +1009,7 @@
 the contrary,</b> Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
 accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
 God is His existence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28350"><span class=
-"ref">[28350] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28350"><span class="ref">[28350] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin., <i>esse non est accidens in
 Deo, sed subsistens veritas</i>. Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est
 suum esse.</p>
@@ -1142,8 +1022,7 @@
   <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not
   therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His
 own existence, and not merely His own essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351"><span class=
-"ref">[28351] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351"><span class="ref">[28351] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam
 suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem,
 quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius,
@@ -1180,8 +1059,7 @@
   lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the
 first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the
 second sense.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28352"><span class=
-"ref">[28352] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28352"><span class="ref">[28352] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi
 dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei
 additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine
@@ -1196,8 +1074,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A2">Q[2],
   A[2]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353"><span class=
-"ref">[28353] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353"><span class="ref">[28353] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum
 essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam
 anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo
@@ -1220,27 +1097,23 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of
 itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a
 genus of substance.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28354"><span class=
-"ref">[28354] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28354"><span class="ref">[28354] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit in genere aliquo. Substantia enim
 est ens per se subsistens. Hoc autem maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus
 est in genere substantiae.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can
 be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured
 by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all
 substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in
 the genus of substance.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28355"><span class=
-"ref">[28355] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28355"><span class="ref">[28355] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui generis; sicut longitudines
 per longitudinem, et numeri per numerum. Sed Deus est mensura
 omnium substantiarum, ut patet per Commentatorem, X Metaphys. Ergo
@@ -1252,8 +1125,7 @@
 the contrary,</b> In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
 nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is
 not in any genus.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28356"><span class=
-"ref">[28356] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, genus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28356"><span class="ref">[28356] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, genus
 est prius, secundum intellectum, eo quod in genere continetur. Sed
 nihil est prius Deo, nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum.
 Ergo Deus non est in aliquo genere.</p>
@@ -1270,8 +1142,7 @@
 quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the
 principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as
 its principle.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="28357"><span class=
-"ref">[28357] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="28357"><span class="ref">[28357] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter et
 proprie; sicut species, quae sub genere continentur. Alio modo, per
 reductionem, sicut principia et privationes, sicut punctus et
@@ -1323,8 +1194,7 @@
 property of existing in this way---namely, of existing of itself; this
 existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is
 not in the genus of substance.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28358"><span class=
-"ref">[28358] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28358"><span class="ref">[28358] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod substantiae nomen non significat hoc solum quod est
 per se esse, quia hoc quod est esse, non potest per se esse genus,
 ut ostensum est. Sed significat essentiam cui competit sic esse,
@@ -1339,8 +1209,7 @@
 measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of
 all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as
 it resembles Him.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28359"><span class=
-"ref">[28359] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28359"><span class="ref">[28359] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de mensura proportionata, hanc
 enim oportet esse homogeneam mensurato. Deus autem non est mensura
 proportionata alicui. Dicitur tamen mensura omnium, ex eo quod
@@ -1358,16 +1227,14 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
 are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as
 Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one,
 cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot
 be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other
 things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us,
 are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28360"><span class=
-"ref">[28360] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28360"><span class="ref">[28360] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua accidentia. Substantia
 enim nulli est accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic. Quod ergo in uno
 est accidens, non potest in alio esse substantia, sicut probatur
@@ -1377,14 +1244,12 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every
 genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of
 accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not
 in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is
 absurd.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28361"><span class=
-"ref">[28361] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28361"><span class="ref">[28361] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
 quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa autem sunt genera
 accidentium. Si igitur prima illorum generum non sunt in Deo, erunt
 multa prima extra Deum, quod est inconveniens.</p>
@@ -1395,8 +1260,7 @@
 the contrary,</b> Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
 subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
 Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28362"><span class=
-"ref">[28362] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28362"><span class="ref">[28362] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
 accidens in subiecto est. Deus autem non potest esse subiectum,
 quia <i>forma simplex non potest esse subiectum</i>, ut dicit
 Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens.</p>
@@ -1407,8 +1271,7 @@
   absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
   subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the
 first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="28363"><span class=
-"ref">[28363] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="28363"><span class="ref">[28363] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, secundum praemissa, manifeste apparet quod in Deo accidens
 esse non potest. Primo quidem, quia subiectum comparatur ad
 accidens, sicut potentia ad actum, subiectum enim secundum accidens
@@ -1432,8 +1295,7 @@
 to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of
 us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in
 God as there are in us.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28364"><span class=
-"ref">[28364] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28364"><span class="ref">[28364] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod virtus et sapientia non univoce dicuntur de Deo et de
 nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde non sequitur quod accidentia sint in
 Deo, sicut in nobis.</p>
@@ -1446,8 +1308,7 @@
 substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if
 contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all
 being, outside of every genus.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28365"><span class=
-"ref">[28365] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28365"><span class="ref">[28365] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod, cum substantia sit prior accidentibus, principia
 accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae sicut in priora.
 Quamvis Deus non sit primum contentum in genere substantiae, sed
@@ -1465,14 +1326,12 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
 not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus
 from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all
 good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether
 simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28366"><span class=
-"ref">[28366] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28366"><span class="ref">[28366] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino simplex. Ea enim quae
 sunt a Deo, imitantur ipsum, unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et
 a primo bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quae sunt a Deo, nihil
@@ -1480,14 +1339,12 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is
 best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is
 better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better
 than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose
 them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28367"><span class=
-"ref">[28367] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28367"><span class="ref">[28367] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
 quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed, apud nos, composita
 sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et
 elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino
@@ -1498,8 +1355,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p4"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
 absolutely simple."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28368"><span class=
-"ref">[28368] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28368"><span class="ref">[28368] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Deus vere et summe simplex
 est.</p>
 </div>
@@ -1515,8 +1371,7 @@
 argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not
 made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of
 things that are dim."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="28369"><span class=
-"ref">[28369] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="28369"><span class="ref">[28369] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse
 manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit
 compositio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est;
@@ -1555,11 +1410,8 @@
 to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
 things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
 be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
-its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (<a xml:link="simple"
-shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p6.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370"><span class=
-"ref">[28370] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370"><span class="ref">[28370] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata
 primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo
 modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid
@@ -1571,13 +1423,8 @@
 to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple
 things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
 one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
-goodness is found in one simple thing (<a xml:link="simple"
-shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p7.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a> and <a xml:link="simple"
-shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p7.2"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2">Q[6], A[2]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371"><span class=
-"ref">[28371] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+goodness is found in one simple thing (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a> and <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2">Q[6], A[2]</a>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371"><span class="ref">[28371] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia
 perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in
 multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici,
@@ -1595,15 +1442,13 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
 enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says
 (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things is that which is above
 being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the
 composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition
 of other things.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28372"><span class=
-"ref">[28372] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28372"><span class="ref">[28372] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat.
 Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>esse omnium est, quae
 super esse est deitas</i>. Sed esse omnium intrat compositionem
@@ -1611,13 +1456,11 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a
 form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the
 word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form." But a form is part
 of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28373"><span class=
-"ref">[28373] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28373"><span class="ref">[28373] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
 est forma, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de verbis domini, quod
 verbum Dei (quod est Deus) est forma quaedam non formata. Sed forma
 est pars compositi. Ergo Deus est pars alicuius compositi.</p>
@@ -1626,8 +1469,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ
   from each other.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28374"><span class=
-"ref">[28374] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28374"><span class="ref">[28374] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et
 materia prima sunt, et nullo modo differunt. Ergo penitus sunt
 idem. Sed materia prima intrat compositionem rerum. Ergo et Deus.
@@ -1641,8 +1483,7 @@
 the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
 touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling
 part with part."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1"><a name="28375"><span class=
-"ref">[28375] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1"><a name="28375"><span class="ref">[28375] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque tactus est
 eius (scilicet Dei), <i>neque alia quaedam ad partes commiscendi
 communio</i>.</p>
@@ -1652,8 +1493,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p6">
 Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
 them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2"><a name="28376"><span class=
-"ref">[28376] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2"><a name="28376"><span class="ref">[28376] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>causa prima regit omnes res,
 praeterquam commisceatur eis</i>.</p>
 </div>
@@ -1664,17 +1504,13 @@
   actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal
   parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and
 potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from
-the foregoing (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">Q[3],
+the foregoing (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">Q[3],
 A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated
 form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which is
 essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in
 ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it
-has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (<a
-xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p7.2"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377"><span class=
-"ref">[28377] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377"><span class="ref">[28377] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod
 Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de
 civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum
@@ -1709,8 +1545,7 @@
 to Objection 1:</b> The Godhead is called the being of all things, as
 their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their
 essence.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28378"><span class=
-"ref">[28378] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28378"><span class="ref">[28378] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod deitas dicitur esse omnium effective et exemplariter,
 non autem per essentiam.</p>
 </div>
@@ -1719,8 +1554,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8-p9"><b>Reply
 to Objection 2:</b> The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that
 is part of a compound.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28379"><span class=
-"ref">[28379] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28379"><span class="ref">[28379] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod verbum est forma exemplaris, non autem forma quae est
 pars compositi.</p>
 </div>
@@ -1730,8 +1564,7 @@
   different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking,
 primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being,
 diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28380"><span class=
-"ref">[28380] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28380"><span class="ref">[28380] I&ordf; q. 3 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis, hoc enim
 compositorum est. Homo enim et equus differunt rationali et
 irrationali differentiis, quae quidem differentiae non differunt
@@ -1750,8 +1583,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q4" next="FP_Q4_A1" prev="FP_Q3_A8" progress="0.58%" n="iii" title="Question. 4 - THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p0.1">Question 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p0.1">Question 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -1762,8 +1594,8 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p4"> (1) Whether God is perfect?</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p5"> (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4-p6"> (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?</p>
-
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 pr."><a name="28381"><span class="ref">[28381]
+</div>
+     <div xml:lang="la"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 pr."><a name="28381"><span class="ref">[28381]
 I&ordf; q. 4 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
 simplicitatis, de perfectione ipsius Dei dicendum est. Et quia
 unumquodque, secundum quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo
@@ -1778,41 +1610,34 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
 perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it
 is completely made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He
 is not perfect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28382"><span class=
-"ref">[28382] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28382"><span class="ref">[28382] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod esse perfectum non conveniat Deo.
 Perfectum enim dicitur quasi totaliter factum. Sed Deo non convenit
 esse factum. Ergo nec esse perfectum.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the
 first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be
 imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable
 life. Therefore God is imperfect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383"><span class=
-"ref">[28383] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383"><span class="ref">[28383] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
 est primum rerum principium. Sed principia rerum videntur esse
 imperfecta, semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo
 Deus est imperfectus.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown
-above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3],
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown
+above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3],
 A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most
 imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all
 modification. Therefore God is imperfect.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384"><span class=
-"ref">[28384] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384"><span class="ref">[28384] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse
 videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum, et recipiens
 omnium additiones. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.</p>
@@ -1821,11 +1646,8 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
-Father is perfect" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.5.48"
-parsed="vul|Matt|5|48|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p5.1"
-passage="Mat. 5:48">Mat. 5:48</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28385"><span class=
-"ref">[28385] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+Father is perfect" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.5.48" parsed="vul|Matt|5|48|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p5.1" passage="Mat. 5:48">Mat. 5:48</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28385"><span class="ref">[28385] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Matt. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester
 caelestis perfectus est</i>.</p>
 </div>
@@ -1839,8 +1661,7 @@
 thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we
 call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its
 perfection.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="28386"><span class=
-"ref">[28386] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="28386"><span class="ref">[28386] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, sicut philosophus narrat in XII Metaphys., quidam antiqui
 philosophi, scilicet Pythagorici et Speusippus, non attribuerunt
 optimum et perfectissimum primo principio. Cuius ratio est, quia
@@ -1867,8 +1688,7 @@
 are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is
 not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or
 not.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28387"><span class=
-"ref">[28387] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28387"><span class="ref">[28387] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, <i>balbutiendo ut possumus,
 excelsa Dei resonamus, quod enim factum non est, perfectum proprie
 dici non potest</i>. Sed quia in his quae fiunt, tunc dicitur esse
@@ -1886,8 +1706,7 @@
 which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
 that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
 act by some being already actual.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28388"><span class=
-"ref">[28388] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28388"><span class="ref">[28388] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod principium materiale, quod apud nos imperfectum
 invenitur, non potest esse simpliciter primum, sed praeceditur ab
 alio perfecto. Nam semen, licet sit principium animalis generati ex
@@ -1901,8 +1720,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is
   considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as
 that which exists.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28389"><span class=
-"ref">[28389] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28389"><span class="ref">[28389] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia
 ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde
 ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum.
@@ -1923,15 +1741,12 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
 perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown
-above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3],
+above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3],
 A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and
 diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390"><span class=
-"ref">[28390] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390"><span class="ref">[28390] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint perfectiones omnium rerum.
 Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt
 multae et diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones
@@ -1939,16 +1754,14 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites
 cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each
 other, for each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the
 differences by which "genera" are divided, and "species" constituted,
 are opposed to each other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist
 in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are
 not in God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28391"><span class=
-"ref">[28391] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28391"><span class="ref">[28391] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 opposita non possunt esse in eodem. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt
 oppositae, unaquaeque enim species perficitur per suam differentiam
 specificam; differentiae autem quibus dividitur genus et
@@ -1958,15 +1771,13 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living
 thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent
 thing than what merely lives. Therefore life is more perfect than
 existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is
 existence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and
 knowledge, and other similar perfections.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28392"><span class=
-"ref">[28392] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, vivens
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28392"><span class="ref">[28392] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, vivens
 est perfectius quam ens, et sapiens quam vivens, ergo et vivere est
 perfectius quam esse, et sapere quam vivere. Sed essentia Dei est
 ipsum esse. Ergo non habet in se perfectionem vitae et sapientiae,
@@ -1977,8 +1788,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p5"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
 existence prepossesses all things."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28393"><span class=
-"ref">[28393] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28393"><span class="ref">[28393] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., quod Deus in uno
 existentia omnia praehabet.</p>
 </div>
@@ -1993,8 +1803,7 @@
 single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
 without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is
 the very existence to subsisting things."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="28394"><span class=
-"ref">[28394] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="28394"><span class="ref">[28394] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. Unde et dicitur
 universaliter perfectus, quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae
 inveniatur in aliquo genere, ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys. Et
@@ -2034,8 +1843,7 @@
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply
   to the Second Objection.</p>
 <div xml:lang="la">
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28395"><span class=
-"ref">[28395] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28395"><span class="ref">[28395] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, <i>sicut sol</i>, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div.
 Nom., <i>sensibilium substantias et qualitates multas et
 differentes, ipse unus existens et uniformiter lucendo, in seipso
@@ -2043,8 +1851,7 @@
 est praeexistere omnia secundum naturalem unionem</i>. Et sic, quae
 sunt diversa et opposita in seipsis, in Deo praeexistunt ut unum,
 absque detrimento simplicitatis ipsius.</p>
-<p title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28396"><span class=
-"ref">[28396] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+<p title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28396"><span class="ref">[28396] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
 solutio ad secundum.</p>
 </div>
 </div>
@@ -2054,8 +1861,7 @@
   existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and
 wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
 Him who is subsisting being itself.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28397"><span class=
-"ref">[28397] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28397"><span class="ref">[28397] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod, sicut in eodem capite idem Dionysius dicit, licet ipsum esse
 sit perfectius quam vita, et ipsa vita quam ipsa sapientia, si
 considerentur secundum quod distinguuntur ratione, tamen vivens est
@@ -2078,17 +1884,12 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no
-creature can be like God. For it is written (<scripRef
-osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.85.8" parsed="vul|Ps|85|8|0|0"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p2.1"
-passage="Ps. 85:8">Ps. 85:8</scripRef>): "There is none among the gods
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no
+creature can be like God. For it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.85.8" parsed="vul|Ps|85|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p2.1" passage="Ps. 85:8">Ps. 85:8</scripRef>): "There is none among the gods
 like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are
 those which are called participation gods. Therefore still less can
 other creatures be said to be like God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28398"><span class=
-"ref">[28398] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28398"><span class="ref">[28398] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
 proceditur. Videtur quod nulla creatura possit esse similis Deo.
 Dicitur enim in Psalmo, <i>non est similis tui in diis, domine</i>.
 Sed inter omnes creaturas, excellentiores sunt quae dicuntur dii
@@ -2097,17 +1898,13 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness
 implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a
 different "genus." Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus
 we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in
-the same "genus" as God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (<a
-xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p3.1"
-href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is
+the same "genus" as God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is
 like God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399"><span class=
-"ref">[28399] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399"><span class="ref">[28399] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
 similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est autem comparatio eorum
 quae sunt diversorum generum; ergo nec similitudo, non enim dicimus
 quod dulcedo sit similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est eiusdem
@@ -2116,29 +1913,23 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of
 those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with
 God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence
 differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28400"><span class=
-"ref">[28400] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28400"><span class="ref">[28400] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
 similia dicuntur quae conveniunt in forma. Sed nihil convenit cum
 Deo in forma, nullius enim rei essentia est ipsum esse, nisi solius
 Dei. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse similis Deo.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like
 things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If
 therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature,
 which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened
-God?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.40.18"
-parsed="vul|Isa|40|18|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p5.1"
-passage="Is. 40:18">Is. 40:18</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28401"><span class=
-"ref">[28401] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
+God?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.40.18" parsed="vul|Isa|40|18|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p5.1" passage="Is. 40:18">Is. 40:18</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28401"><span class="ref">[28401] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
 similibus est mutua similitudo, nam simile est simili simile. Si
 igitur aliqua creatura est similis Deo, et Deus erit similis alicui
 creaturae. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Isaiae XL, <i>cui
@@ -2148,14 +1939,10 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6"><b>On
 the contrary,</b> It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
-likeness" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26"
-parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6.1"
-passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>), and: "When He shall appear we
-shall be like to Him" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.3.2"
-parsed="vul|1John|3|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" passage="1
+likeness" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.1.26" parsed="vul|Gen|1|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6.1" passage="Gn. 1:26">Gn. 1:26</scripRef>), and: "When He shall appear we
+shall be like to Him" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1John.3.2" parsed="vul|1John|3|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" passage="1
 Jn. 3:2">1 Jn. 3:2</scripRef>).</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402"><span class=
-"ref">[28402] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402"><span class="ref">[28402] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
 similitudinem nostram</i>; et I Ioann. III, <i>cum apparuerit,
 similes ei erimus</i>.</p>
@@ -2169,13 +1956,11 @@
   In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like
 God as the first and universal principle of all being.</p>
 <div xml:lang="la">
-<p title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402"><span class=
-"ref">[28402] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+<p title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402"><span class="ref">[28402] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
 similitudinem nostram</i>; et I Ioann. III, <i>cum apparuerit,
 similes ei erimus</i>.</p>
-<p title="I q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="28403"><span class=
-"ref">[28403] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+<p title="I q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="28403"><span class="ref">[28403] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
 quod, cum similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel
 communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos
 modos communicandi in forma. Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae
@@ -2211,8 +1996,7 @@
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because
   they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28404"><span class=
-"ref">[28404] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28404"><span class="ref">[28404] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., cum
 sacra Scriptura dicit aliquid non esse simile Deo, <i>non est
 contrarium assimilationi ad ipsum. Eadem enim sunt similia Deo, et
@@ -2229,22 +2013,19 @@
 to Objection 2:</b> God is not related to creatures as though
 belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus,"
 and as the principle of all "genera."</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28405"><span class=
-"ref">[28405] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28405"><span class="ref">[28405] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
 dicendum quod Deus non se habet ad creaturas sicut res diversorum
 generum, sed sicut id quod est extra omne genus, et principium
 omnium generum.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of
 creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form
 according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely
 according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas
 other things are beings by participation.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28406"><span class=
-"ref">[28406] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28406"><span class="ref">[28406] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
 quod non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter
 communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et
 speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens
@@ -2252,8 +2033,7 @@
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
-id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it
 may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must
 nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius
 says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of
@@ -2261,8 +2041,7 @@
 For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a
 creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God
 is like a creature.</p>
-<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28407"><span class=
-"ref">[28407] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28407"><span class="ref">[28407] I&ordf; q. 4 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
 quod, licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo,
 nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturae,
 quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., <i>in his quae unius
@@ -2277,84 +2056,173 @@
 
 			 </div4>
 		  </div3>
-<!-- merged down to here -->
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5" next="FP_Q5_A1" prev="FP_Q4_A3" progress="0.67%" n="iv" title="Question. 5 - OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p0.1">Question 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p0.1">Question 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
 			 <div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p2"> We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p4"> (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p5"> (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p6"> (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p7"> (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p8"> (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5-p9"> (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?</p>
 </div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 pr."><a name="28408"><span class="ref">[28408]
+I&ordf; q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bono, et primo de
+bono in communi; secundo de bonitate Dei. Circa primum quaeruntur
+sex. Primo, utrum bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem. Secundo,
+supposito quod differant ratione tantum, quid sit prius secundum
+rationem, utrum bonum vel ens. Tertio, supposito quod ens sit
+prius, utrum omne ens sit bonum. Quarto, ad quam causam ratio boni
+reducatur. Quinto, utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et
+ordine. Sexto, quomodo dividatur bonum in honestum, utile et
+delectabile.</p>
+</div>
 <div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" next="FP_Q5_A2" prev="FP_Q5" progress="0.67%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether goodness differs really from being?">
 <h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4>
 
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good."</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I
+perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing:
+that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really
+differ.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28409"><span class=
+"ref">[28409] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod bonum differat secundum rem ab ente. Dicit
+enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdom., <i>intueor in rebus aliud esse
+quod sunt bona, et aliud esse quod sunt</i>. Ergo bonum et ens
+differunt secundum rem.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can
+be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of
+being", according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore goodness
+differs really from being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28410"><span class=
+"ref">[28410] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur per informationem entis, ut
+habetur in commento libri de causis. Ergo bonum differt secundum
+rem ab ente.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can
+be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness
+differs really from being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28411"><span class=
+"ref">[28411] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+suscipit magis et minus. Esse autem non suscipit magis et minus.
+Ergo bonum differt secundum rem ab ente.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
+"inasmuch as we exist we are good."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28412"><span class=
+"ref">[28412] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de doctrina Christiana, quod
+<i>inquantum sumus, boni sumus</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect
-  so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>; <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.</p>
+  so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things
+actual, as is clear from the foregoing (<a xml:link="simple"
+shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>; <a xml:link="simple"
+shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p6.2"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that
+goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the
+aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413"><span class=
+"ref">[28413] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum
+rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit,
+quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit
+quod <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>. Manifestum est autem
+quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum, nam
+omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum
+unumquodque, inquantum est actu, unde manifestum est quod intantum
+est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens, esse enim est actualitas
+omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde manifestum est quod bonum
+et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed bonum dicit rationem
+appetibilis, quam non dicit ens.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial
   being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but
   that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.),
-  "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.</p>
+  "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one
+thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's
+goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its
+primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete
+actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal
+actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete
+actuality, it in some sort has being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28414"><span class=
+"ref">[28414] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia
+tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid
+ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid
+proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad
+potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum
+quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem
+est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse
+substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem
+superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album
+significat esse secundum quid, non enim esse album aufert esse in
+potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu.
+Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per
+consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo
+perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam
+perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem
+inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec
+bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum
+esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et
+bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens, secundum vero ultimum
+actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic
+ergo quod dicit Boetius, quod <i>in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona,
+et aliud quod sunt</i>, referendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse
+simpliciter, quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens
+simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen
+secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum, et secundum ultimum
+actum est quodammodo ens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p8"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
+signifies complete actuality.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28415"><span class=
+"ref">[28415] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bonum dicitur per informationem, prout accipitur
+bonum simpliciter, secundum ultimum actum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
+according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
+knowledge or virtue.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28416"><span class=
+"ref">[28416] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum ad tertium, quod bonum dicitur secundum magis et minus,
+secundum actum supervenientem; puta secundum scientiam vel
+virtutem.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -2368,48 +2236,174 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been born" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.26.24" parsed="vul|Matt|26|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p4.1" passage="Mat. 26:24">Mat. 26:24</scripRef>). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being."</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according
+to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius
+(Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of
+God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea
+goodness is prior to being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28417"><span class=
+"ref">[28417] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam
+ens. Ordo enim nominum est secundum ordinem rerum significatarum
+per nomina. Sed Dionysius, inter alia nomina Dei, prius ponit bonum
+quam ens, ut patet, in III cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo bonum secundum
+rationem est prius quam ens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which
+is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive
+than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness
+extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence
+extends to existing things alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior
+to being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28418"><span class=
+"ref">[28418] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud
+est prius secundum rationem, quod ad plura se extendit. Sed bonum
+ad plura se extendit quam ens, quia, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de
+Div. Nom., <i>bonum se extendit ad existentia et non existentia,
+ens vero ad existentia tantum</i>. Ergo bonum est prius secundum
+rationem quam ens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the
+more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more
+universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable;
+whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas:
+"It were better for him, if that man had not been born" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.26.24" parsed="vul|Matt|26|24|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p4.1"
+passage="Mat. 26:24">Mat. 26:24</scripRef>). Therefore in idea
+goodness is prior to being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28419"><span class=
+"ref">[28419] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+est universalius, est prius secundum rationem. Sed bonum videtur
+universalius esse quam ens, quia bonum habet rationem appetibilis;
+quibusdam autem appetibile est ipsum non esse; dicitur enim, Matth.
+XXVI, de Iuda, <i>bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset</i> et
+cetera. Ergo bonum est prius quam ens, secundum rationem.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is
+existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things
+besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and
+goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is
+prior in idea to being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28420"><span class=
+"ref">[28420] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
+solum esse est appetibile, sed et vita et sapientia, et multa
+huiusmodi, et sic videtur quod esse sit quoddam particulare
+appetibile, et bonum, universale. Bonum ergo simpliciter est prius
+secundum rationem quam ens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first
+of created things is being."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28421"><span class=
+"ref">[28421] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>prima rerum creatarum est
+esse</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
-  sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.</p>
+  sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is
+prior to goodness.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="28422"><span class=
+"ref">[28422] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod ens secundum rationem est prius quam bonum. Ratio enim
+significata per nomen, est id quod concipit intellectus de re, et
+significat illud per vocem, illud ergo est prius secundum rationem,
+quod prius cadit in conceptione intellectus. Primo autem in
+conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque
+cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys.
+Unde ens est proprium obiectum intellectus, et sic est primum
+intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile. Ita ergo secundum
+rationem prius est ens quam bonum.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus
   goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being.
-  Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).</p>
+  Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence"
+(Div. Nom. v).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28423"><span class=
+"ref">[28423] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Dionysius determinat de divinis nominibus secundum
+quod important circa Deum habitudinem causae, nominamus enim Deum,
+ut ipse dicit, ex creaturis, sicut causam ex effectibus. Bonum
+autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae
+finalis, cuius causalitas prima est, quia agens non agit nisi
+propter finem, et ab agente materia movetur ad formam, unde dicitur
+quod finis est causa causarum. Et sic, in causando, bonum est prius
+quam ens, sicut finis quam forma, et hac ratione, inter nomina
+significantia causalitatem divinam, prius ponitur bonum quam ens.
+Et iterum quia, secundum Platonicos, qui, materiam a privatione non
+distinguentes, dicebant materiam esse non ens, ad plura se extendit
+participatio boni quam participatio entis. Nam materia prima
+participat bonum, cum appetat ipsum (nihil autem appetit nisi
+simile sibi), non autem participat ens, cum ponatur non ens. Et
+ideo dicit Dionysius quod <i>bonum extenditur ad non
+existentia</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which
-  tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.</p>
+  tend even those things which are not actual, but merely
+potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only,
+either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to
+those things which are actual.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28424"><span class=
+"ref">[28424] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio
+ad secundum. Vel dicendum quod bonum extenditur ad existentia et
+non existentia, non secundum praedicationem, sed secundum
+causalitatem, ut per non existentia intelligamus, non ea
+simpliciter quae penitus non sunt, sed ea quae sunt in potentia et
+non in actu, quia bonum habet rationem finis, in quo non solum
+quiescunt quae sunt in actu, sed ad ipsum etiam ea moventur quae in
+actu non sunt sed in potentia tantum. Ens autem non importat
+habitudinem causae nisi formalis tantum, vel inhaerentis vel
+exemplaris, cuius causalitas non se extendit nisi ad ea quae sunt
+in actu.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
   relatively good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28425"><span class=
+"ref">[28425] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod non esse secundum se non est appetibile, sed per accidens,
+inquantum scilicet ablatio alicuius mali est appetibilis, quod
+malum quidem aufertur per non esse. Ablatio vero mali non est
+appetibilis, nisi inquantum per malum privatur quodam esse. Illud
+igitur quod per se est appetibile, est esse, non esse vero per
+accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur, quo
+homo non sustinet privari. Et sic etiam per accidens non esse
+dicitur bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life,
+wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are
+actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And
+thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is
+good except being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28426"><span class=
+"ref">[28426] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+quod vita et scientia, et alia huiusmodi, sic appetuntur ut sunt in
+actu, unde in omnibus appetitur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est
+appetibile nisi ens, et per consequens nihil est bonum nisi
+ens.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -2423,44 +2417,155 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.5.20" parsed="vul|Isa|5|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p3.1" passage="Is. 5:20">Is. 5:20</scripRef>). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.4.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|4|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" passage="1 Tim. 4:4">1 Tim. 4:4</scripRef>): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to desire.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not
+every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as
+is clear from A[1]. But whatever is added to being limits it; as
+substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits
+being. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28427"><span class=
+"ref">[28427] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod non omne ens sit bonum. Bonum enim addit
+supra ens, ut ex dictis patet. Ea vero quae addunt aliquid supra
+ens, contrahunt ipsum, sicut substantia, quantitas, qualitas, et
+alia huiusmodi. Ergo bonum contrahit ens. Non igitur omne ens est
+bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is
+good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.5.20" parsed="vul|Isa|5|20|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p3.1"
+passage="Is. 5:20">Is. 5:20</scripRef>). But some things are called
+evil. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28428"><span class=
+"ref">[28428] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nullum
+malum est bonum, Isaiae V, <i>vae qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum
+malum</i>. Sed aliquod ens dicitur malum. Ergo non omne ens est
+bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness
+implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability,
+but rather that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not
+contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is
+good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28429"><span class=
+"ref">[28429] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+habet rationem appetibilis. Sed materia prima non habet rationem
+appetibilis, sed appetentis tantum. Ergo materia prima non habet
+rationem boni. Non igitur omne ens est bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the
+Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not
+exist." But mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no
+science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28430"><span class=
+"ref">[28430] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in III Metaphys., quod in mathematicis non est
+bonum. Sed mathematica sunt quaedam entia, alioquin de eis non
+esset scientia. Ergo non omne ens est bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
+every creature of God is good (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.4.4"
+parsed="vul|1Tim|4|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" passage="1
+Tim. 4:4">1 Tim. 4:4</scripRef>): and God is the greatest
+good. Therefore every being is good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28431"><span class=
+"ref">[28431] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+ens quod non est Deus, est Dei creatura. Sed omnis creatura Dei est
+bona, ut dicitur I ad Tim., IV cap., Deus vero est maxime bonus.
+Ergo omne ens est bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p7"><b>I
+answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as
+being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act
+implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability
+and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being
+as such is good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="28432"><span class=
+"ref">[28432] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod omne ens, inquantum est ens, est bonum. Omne enim ens,
+inquantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum, quia omnis
+actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem
+appetibilis et boni, ut ex dictis patet. Unde sequitur omne ens,
+inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p8"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
+included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or
+nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being
+beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper
+to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not
+limit being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28433"><span class=
+"ref">[28433] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod substantia, quantitas et qualitas, et ea quae sub eis
+continentur, contrahunt ens applicando ens ad aliquam quidditatem
+seu naturam. Sic autem non addit aliquid bonum super ens, sed
+rationem tantum appetibilis et perfectionis, quod convenit ipsi
+esse in quacumque natura sit. Unde bonum non contrahit ens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
+being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
+evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
+because it lacks the power to see well.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28434"><span class=
+"ref">[28434] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum inquantum est ens, sed
+inquantum caret quodam esse, sicut homo dicitur malus inquantum
+caret esse virtutis, et oculus dicitur malus inquantum caret
+acumine visus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary
+matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially
+good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be
+said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it,
+nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness,
+viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to
+be desirable is not its property, but to desire.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28435"><span class=
+"ref">[28435] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod materia prima, sicut non est ens nisi in potentia, ita nec
+bonum nisi in potentia. Licet, secundum Platonicos, dici possit
+quod materia prima est non ens, propter privationem adiunctam. Sed
+tamen participat aliquid de bono, scilicet ipsum ordinem vel
+aptitudinem ad bonum. Et ideo non convenit sibi quod sit
+appetibile, sed quod appetat.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
   as was said in the preceding article.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28436"><span class=
+"ref">[28436] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+quod mathematica non subsistunt separata secundum esse, quia si
+subsisterent, esset in eis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsorum. Sunt
+autem mathematica separata secundum rationem tantum, prout
+abstrahuntur a motu et a materia, et sic abstrahuntur a ratione
+finis, qui habet rationem moventis. Non est autem inconveniens quod
+in aliquo ente secundum rationem non sit bonum vel ratio boni, cum
+ratio entis sit prior quam ratio boni, sicut supra dictum est.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -2474,38 +2579,133 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other
+causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as
+beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore
+goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28437"><span class=
+"ref">[28437] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod bonum non habeat rationem causae finalis,
+sed magis aliarum. Ut enim dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
+<i>bonum laudatur ut pulchrum</i>. Sed pulchrum importat rationem
+causae formalis. Ergo bonum habet rationem causae formalis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is
+self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is
+that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving
+implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the
+aspect of an efficient cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28438"><span class=
+"ref">[28438] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+est diffusivum sui esse, ut ex verbis Dionysii accipitur, quibus
+dicit quod <i>bonum est ex quo omnia subsistunt et sunt</i>. Sed
+esse diffusivum importat rationem causae efficientis. Ergo bonum
+habet rationem causae efficientis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine
+says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good."
+But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore
+goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28439"><span class=
+"ref">[28439] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
+Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., quod <i>quia Deus bonus est, nos
+sumus</i>. Sed ex Deo sumus sicut ex causa efficiente. Ergo bonum
+importat rationem causae efficientis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
+considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
+which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
+cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28440"><span class=
+"ref">[28440] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod <i>illud cuius causa
+est, est sicut finis et bonum aliorum</i>. Bonum ergo habet
+rationem causae finalis.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in
   causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of
   goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="28441"><span class=
+"ref">[28441] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem
+finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen
+ratio boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis, et rationem
+causae formalis. Videmus enim quod id quod est primum in causando,
+ultimum est in causato, ignis enim primo calefacit quam formam
+ignis inducat, cum tamen calor in igne consequatur formam
+substantialem. In causando autem, primum invenitur bonum et finis,
+qui movet efficientem; secundo, actio efficientis, movens ad
+formam; tertio advenit forma. Unde e converso esse oportet in
+causato, quod primum sit ipsa forma, per quam est ens; secundo
+consideratur in ea virtus effectiva, secundum quod est perfectum in
+esse (quia unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi
+simile facere, ut dicit philosophus in IV Meteor.); tertio
+consequitur ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
-  things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to the final cause.</p>
+  things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in
+due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as
+in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of
+reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
+assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
+to the nature of a formal cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28442"><span class=
+"ref">[28442] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia
+super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc,
+bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum
+proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et
+ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad
+rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim
+dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione
+consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis,
+sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis
+virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem,
+similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad
+rationem causae formalis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p8"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
+sense that an end is said to move.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28443"><span class=
+"ref">[28443] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse, eo modo quo finis
+dicitur movere.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A4-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he
+has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
+powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
+understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end
+as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is
+good" has reference to the final cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28444"><span class=
+"ref">[28444] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod quilibet habens voluntatem, dicitur bonus inquantum habet
+bonam voluntatem, quia per voluntatem utimur omnibus quae in nobis
+sunt. Unde non dicitur bonus homo, qui habet bonum intellectum, sed
+qui habet bonam voluntatem. Voluntas autem respicit finem ut
+obiectum proprium, et sic, quod dicitur, quia Deus est bonus,
+sumus, refertur ad causam finalem.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -2520,54 +2720,215 @@
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p2.1" passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it
-  its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p7"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.</p>
+  its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the
+essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28445"><span class=
+"ref">[28445] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod ratio boni non consistat in modo, specie
+et ordine. Bonum enim et ens ratione differunt, ut supra dictum
+est. Sed modus, species et ordo pertinere ad rationem entis
+videntur, quia, sicut dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in numero, pondere
+et mensura disposuisti</i>, ad quae tria reducuntur species, modus
+et ordo, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad litteram,
+<i>mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem
+praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et stabilitatem trahit</i>.
+Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode,
+species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of
+goodness consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must
+have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with
+species and order in endless succession.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28446"><span class=
+"ref">[28446] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ipse
+modus, species et ordo bona quaedam sunt. Si ergo ratio boni
+consistit in modo, specie et ordine, oportet etiam quod modus
+habeat modum, speciem et ordinem, et similiter species et ordo.
+Ergo procederetur in infinitum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the
+privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total
+absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not
+consist in mode, species and order.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28447"><span class=
+"ref">[28447] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, malum
+est privatio modi et speciei et ordinis. Sed malum non tollit
+totaliter bonum. Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et
+ordine.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein
+consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we
+can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore the essence of
+goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28448"><span class=
+"ref">[28448] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illud
+in quo consistit ratio boni, non potest dici malum. Sed dicitur
+malus modus, mala species, malus ordo. Ergo ratio boni non
+consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode,
+species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears
+from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has
+weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of
+the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and
+measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
+species and order.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="28449"><span class=
+"ref">[28449] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, modus,
+species et ordo ex pondere, numero et mensura causantur, ut ex
+auctoritate Augustini inducta patet. Non autem omnia bona habent
+pondus, numerum et mensuram, dicit enim Ambrosius, in Hexaemeron,
+quod <i>lucis natura est, ut non in numero, non in pondere, non in
+mensura creata sit</i>. Non ergo ratio boni consistit in modo,
+specie et ordine.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p7"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
+three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
+everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
+very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they
+do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be
+unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the
+essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28450"><span class=
+"ref">[28450] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>haec tria,
+modus, species et ordo, tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo
+factis, et ita, haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi
+parva, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est</i>. Quod non
+esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni
+consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p8"><b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together
   with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit
-  added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.</p>
+  added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a
+difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its
+species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or
+to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as
+it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with
+its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the essence of
+goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode,
+species and order.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="28451"><span class=
+"ref">[28451] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, sic enim
+est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. Perfectum autem dicitur, cui
+nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque
+sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam,
+et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod
+aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et
+ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam.
+Praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio
+principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam, et hoc
+significatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit.
+Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem, quia per formam
+unumquodque in specie constituitur. Et propter hoc dicitur quod
+numerus speciem praebet, quia definitiones significantes speciem
+sunt sicut numeri, secundum philosophum in VIII Metaphys.; sicut
+enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in
+definitionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta. Ad formam autem
+consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid
+huiusmodi, quia unumquodque, inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in
+id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad
+pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in
+perfectione, consistit etiam in modo, specie et ordine.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it
+is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28452"><span class=
+"ref">[28452] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ista tria non consequuntur ens, nisi inquantum est
+perfectum, et secundum hoc est bonum.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything
-  else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.</p>
+  else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an
+object that is white.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28453"><span class=
+"ref">[28453] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod modus, species et ordo eo modo dicuntur bona, sicut
+et entia, non quia ipsa sint quasi subsistentia, sed quia eis alia
+sunt et entia et bona. Unde non oportet quod ipsa habeant aliqua
+alia, quibus sint bona. Non enim sic dicuntur bona, quasi
+formaliter aliis sint bona; sed quia ipsis formaliter aliqua sunt
+bona; sicut albedo non dicitur ens quia ipsa aliquo sit, sed quia
+ipsa aliquid est secundum quid, scilicet album.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being
+is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its
+mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species and order as he
+is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything
+predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of some sort of being, as
+blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not
+destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon
+the being of sight.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28454"><span class=
+"ref">[28454] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod quodlibet esse est secundum formam aliquam, unde secundum
+quodlibet esse rei, consequuntur ipsam modus, species et ordo,
+sicut homo habet speciem, modum et ordinem, inquantum est homo; et
+similiter inquantum est albus, habet similiter modum, speciem et
+ordinem; et inquantum est virtuosus, et inquantum est sciens, et
+secundum omnia quae de ipso dicuntur. Malum autem privat quodam
+esse, sicut caecitas privat esse visus, unde non tollit omnem
+modum, speciem et ordinem; sed solum modum, speciem et ordinem quae
+consequuntur esse visus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine
+says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the
+same can be said of species and order). "But an evil mode, species and
+order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not
+belonging to that which they ought to belong. Therefore they are
+called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28455"><span class=
+"ref">[28455] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de natura boni, <i>omnis
+modus, inquantum modus, bonus est</i> (et sic potest dici de specie
+et ordine), <i>sed malus modus, vel mala species, vel malus ordo,
+aut ideo dicuntur quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia
+non his rebus accommodantur, quibus accommodanda sunt; ut ideo
+dicantur mala, quia sunt aliena et incongrua</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature
+of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not
+absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because the power
+of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active
+quality of the first body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="28456"><span class=
+"ref">[28456] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
+quod natura lucis dicitur esse sine numero et pondere et mensura,
+non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad corporalia, quia virtus
+lucis ad omnia corporalia se extendit, inquantum est qualitas
+activa primi corporis alterantis, scilicet caeli.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -2581,38 +2942,135 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9)</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the
+pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the
+pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not
+rightly divided by them.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28457"><span class=
+"ref">[28457] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter dividatur bonum per
+honestum, utile et delectabile. Bonum enim, sicut dicit philosophus
+in I Ethic., dividitur per decem praedicamenta. Honestum autem,
+utile et delectabile inveniri possunt in uno praedicamento. Ergo
+non convenienter per haec dividitur bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every
+division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be
+opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful;
+whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by
+opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and
+Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is
+incorrect.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28458"><span class=
+"ref">[28458] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
+divisio fit per opposita. Sed haec tria non videntur esse opposita,
+nam honesta sunt delectabilia, nullumque inhonestum est utile (quod
+tamen oportet, si divisio fieret per opposita, ut opponerentur
+honestum et utile), ut etiam dicit Tullius, in libro de officiis.
+Ergo praedicta divisio non est conveniens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one
+thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the
+useful is not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and
+virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the
+pleasant and the virtuous.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28459"><span class=
+"ref">[28459] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
+unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum est. Sed utile non est bonum
+nisi propter delectabile vel honestum. Ergo non debet utile dividi
+contra delectabile et honestum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
+Offic. i, 9)</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28460"><span class=
+"ref">[28460] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Ambrosius, in libro de officiis, utitur ista divisione
+boni.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
   absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which
-  something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according to its proper formality.</p>
+  something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that
+sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of
+the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite
+tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is
+desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of
+the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the
+pleasant.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="28461"><span class=
+"ref">[28461] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius
+et communius rationem boni consideremus, invenitur haec divisio
+proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est
+aliquid, inquantum est appetibile, et terminus motus appetitus.
+Cuius quidem motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione
+motus corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis
+naturalis, simpliciter quidem ad ultimum; secundum quid autem etiam
+ad medium, per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum, et dicitur
+aliquis terminus motus, inquantum aliquam partem motus terminat. Id
+autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi dupliciter,
+vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote locus vel forma; vel quies in
+re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile
+terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod
+tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut
+ultimum, terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in
+quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum, quia honestum
+dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum
+appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p7"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is
+divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it
+according to its proper formality.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28462"><span class=
+"ref">[28462] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod bonum, inquantum est idem subiecto cum ente,
+dividitur per decem praedicamenta, sed secundum propriam rationem,
+competit sibi ista divisio.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable
   in themselves.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28463"><span class=
+"ref">[28463] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod haec divisio non est per oppositas res, sed per
+oppositas rationes. Dicuntur tamen illa proprie delectabilia, quae
+nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem,
+cum aliquando sint et noxia et inhonesta. Utilia vero dicuntur,
+quae non habent in se unde desiderentur; sed desiderantur solum ut
+sunt ducentia in alterum, sicut sumptio medicinae amarae. Honesta
+vero dicuntur, quae in seipsis habent unde desiderentur.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A6-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as
+something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as
+something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority
+and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then
+of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28464"><span class=
+"ref">[28464] I&ordf; q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod bonum non dividitur in ista tria sicut univocum aequaliter de
+his praedicatum, sed sicut analogum, quod praedicatur secundum
+prius et posterius. Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et
+secundario de delectabili; tertio de utili.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -2620,10 +3078,9 @@
 
 			 </div4>
 		  </div3>
-
+<!-- merged down to here -->
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6" next="FP_Q6_A1" prev="FP_Q5_A6" progress="0.84%" n="v" title="Question. 6 - THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p0.1">Question 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p0.1">Question 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -2816,8 +3273,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7" next="FP_Q7_A1" prev="FP_Q6_A4" progress="0.92%" n="vi" title="Question. 7 - THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p0.1">Question 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p0.1">Question 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -3059,8 +3515,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8" next="FP_Q8_A1" prev="FP_Q7_A4" progress="1.04%" n="vii" title="Question. 8 - THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p0.1">Question 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p0.1">Question 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -3321,8 +3776,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q9" next="FP_Q9_A1" prev="FP_Q8_A4" progress="1.16%" n="viii" title="Question. 9 - THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p0.1">Question 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p0.1">Question 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -3445,8 +3899,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10" next="FP_Q10_A1" prev="FP_Q9_A2" progress="1.23%" n="ix" title="Question. 10 - THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p0.1">Question 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p0.1">Question 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -3819,8 +4272,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11" next="FP_Q11_A1" prev="FP_Q10_A6" progress="1.42%" n="x" title="Question. 11 - THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p0.1">Question 11. THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p0.1">Question 11. THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -4038,8 +4490,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12" next="FP_Q12_A1" prev="FP_Q11_A4" progress="1.53%" n="xi" title="Question. 12 - HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q12-p0.1">Question 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12-p0.1">Question 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -4737,8 +5188,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q13" next="FP_Q13_A1" prev="FP_Q12_A13" progress="1.92%" n="xii" title="Question. 13 - THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p0.1">Question 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p0.1">Question 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -5471,8 +5921,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q14" next="FP_Q14_A1" prev="FP_Q13_A12" progress="2.35%" n="xiii" title="Question. 14 - OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p0.1">Question 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p0.1">Question 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -6373,8 +6822,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q15" next="FP_Q15_A1" prev="FP_Q14_A16" progress="2.85%" n="xiv" title="Question. 15 - OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p0.1">Question 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p0.1">Question 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -6555,8 +7003,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -6966,8 +7413,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -7194,8 +7640,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -7431,8 +7876,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -8111,8 +8555,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q20" next="FP_Q20_A1" prev="FP_Q19_A12" progress="3.78%" n="xix" title="Question. 20 - GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -8358,8 +8801,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q21" next="FP_Q21_A1" prev="FP_Q20_A4" progress="3.92%" n="xx" title="Question. 21 - THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p0.1">Question 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p0.1">Question 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -8576,8 +9018,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q22" next="FP_Q22_A1" prev="FP_Q21_A4" progress="4.03%" n="xxi" title="Question. 22 - THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p0.1">Question 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p0.1">Question 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -8819,8 +9260,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q23" next="FP_Q23_A1" prev="FP_Q22_A4" progress="4.18%" n="xxii" title="Question. 23 - OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p0.1">Question 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p0.1">Question 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -9288,8 +9728,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q24" next="FP_Q24_A1" prev="FP_Q23_A8" progress="4.47%" n="xxiii" title="Question. 24 - THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p0.1">Question 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p0.1">Question 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -9450,8 +9889,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q25" next="FP_Q25_A1" prev="FP_Q24_A3" progress="4.54%" n="xxiv" title="Question. 25 - THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p0.1">Question 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p0.1">Question 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
@@ -9804,8 +10242,7 @@
 		  </div3>
 
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q26" next="FP_Q26_A1" prev="FP_Q25_A6" progress="4.76%" n="xxv" title="Question. 26 - OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) ">
-			 <h3 xml:lang="en"
-			   id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p0.1">Question 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
+			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p0.1">Question 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>