--- a/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml	Fri May 09 17:20:13 2008 +0000
+++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml	Mon Jun 02 21:28:54 2008 +0000
@@ -3078,61 +3078,119 @@
 
 			 </div4>
 		  </div3>
-<!-- merged down to here -->
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6" next="FP_Q6_A1" prev="FP_Q5_A6" progress="0.84%" n="v" title="Question. 6 - THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
 			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p0.1">Question 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
 			 <div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p2"> We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p3"> (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p4"> (2) Whether God is the supreme good?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p5"> (3) Whether He alone is essentially good?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p6"> (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</p>
-</div>
-
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6-p6"> (4) Whether all
+things are good by the divine goodness?</p>
+</div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 pr."><a name="28465"><span class="ref">[28465]
+I&ordf; q. 6 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bonitate Dei. Et
+circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum esse bonum conveniat
+Deo. Secundo, utrum Deus sit summum bonum. Tertio, utrum ipse solus
+sit bonus per suam essentiam. Quarto, utrum omnia sint bona
+bonitate divina.</p></div>
 <div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" next="FP_Q6_A2" prev="FP_Q6" progress="0.84%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is good?">
 <h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether God is good?</h4>
 
-
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Lam.3.25" parsed="vul|Lam|3|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p4.1" passage="Lam. 3:25">Lam. 3:25</scripRef>): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."</p>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
+good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species
+and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is
+immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does
+not belong to God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28466"><span class=
+"ref">[28466] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum non conveniat Deo. Ratio enim
+boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine. Haec autem non videntur
+Deo convenire, cum Deus immensus sit, et ad aliquid non ordinetur.
+Ergo esse bonum non convenit Deo.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is
+what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all
+things do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is
+known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28467"><span class=
+"ref">[28467] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+est quod omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia non
+omnia cognoscunt ipsum, nihil autem appetitur nisi notum. Ergo esse
+bonum non convenit Deo.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p4"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Lam.3.25" parsed="vul|Lam|3|25|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p4.1"
+passage="Lam. 3:25">Lam. 3:25</scripRef>): "The Lord is good to them
+that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28468"><span class=
+"ref">[28468] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Thren. III, <i>bonus est dominus sperantibus in eum,
+animae quaerenti illum</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of
-  all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p6"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.</p>
+  all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of
+desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)
+attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that,
+God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 co."><a name="28469"><span class=
+"ref">[28469] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim aliquid est,
+secundum quod est appetibile. Unumquodque autem appetit suam
+perfectionem. Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam
+similitudo agentis, cum omne agens agat sibi simile. Unde ipsum
+agens est appetibile, et habet rationem boni, hoc enim est quod de
+ipso appetitur, ut eius similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit
+prima causa effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod sibi competit
+ratio boni et appetibilis. Unde Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom.,
+attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens quod
+bonus dicitur Deus, <i>sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p6"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the
+essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence
+it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;
+wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28470"><span class=
+"ref">[28470] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod habere modum, speciem et ordinem, pertinet ad
+rationem boni causati. Sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causa, unde ad
+eum pertinet imponere aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista
+tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a
-  natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.</p>
+  natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by
+a higher intelligence.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471"><span class=
+"ref">[28471] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt
+ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam
+similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae
+Deum appetunt, quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum, quod est
+proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas
+participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur usque ad
+cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent
+absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori
+cognoscente.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -3146,37 +3204,150 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.18.19" parsed="vul|Luke|18|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p3.1" passage="Lk. 18:19">Lk. 18:19</scripRef>): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3], A[5]</a>; <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good;
+otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an
+addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme
+good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above
+(<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p2.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the
+supreme good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472"><span class=
+"ref">[28472] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim
+bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed
+omne quod se habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo
+summum bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut supra
+ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est summum bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is
+what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all
+desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore
+there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.18.19" parsed="vul|Luke|18|19|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p3.1"
+passage="Lk. 18:19">Lk. 18:19</scripRef>): "None is good but God
+alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as
+e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other
+heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28473"><span class=
+"ref">[28473] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
+bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>, ut dicit philosophus. Sed nihil
+aliud est quod omnia appetunt, nisi solus Deus, qui est finis
+omnium. Ergo nihil aliud est bonum nisi Deus. Quod etiam videtur
+per id quod dicitur Matth. XIX, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>.
+Sed summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum calidum in
+comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non potest dici summum
+bonum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme
+implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not
+comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a
+line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good
+things, as appears above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5">Q[3],
+A[5]</a>; <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4],
+A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in
+relation to others.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474"><span class=
+"ref">[28474] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum
+comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt
+comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor
+quam linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis
+bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non possit dici
+summum bonum respectu eorum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of
+the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified
+minds."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28475"><span class=
+"ref">[28475] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>Trinitas divinarum
+personarum est summum bonum, quod purgatissimis mentibus
+cernitur</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an
-  effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.</p>
+  effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the
+equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun
+more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in
+the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in
+Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme
+good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="28476"><span class=
+"ref">[28476] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo
+genere vel ordine rerum. Sic enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum
+est, inquantum omnes perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut
+a prima causa. Non autem effluunt ab eo sicut ab agente univoco, ut
+ex superioribus patet, sed sicut ab agente quod non convenit cum
+suis effectibus, neque in ratione speciei, nec in ratione generis.
+Similitudo autem effectus in causa quidem univoca invenitur
+uniformiter, in causa autem aequivoca invenitur excellentius, sicut
+calor excellentiori modo est in sole quam in igne. Sic ergo oportet
+quod cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima causa omnium non univoca,
+quod sit in eo excellentissimo modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum
+bonum.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in
   comparison with it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28477"><span class=
+"ref">[28477] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod summum bonum addit super bonum, non rem aliquam
+absolutam, sed relationem tantum. Relatio autem qua aliquid de Deo
+dicitur relative ad creaturas, non est realiter in Deo, sed in
+creatura; in Deo vero secundum rationem; sicut scibile relative
+dicitur ad scientiam, non quia ad ipsam referatur, sed quia
+scientia refertur ad ipsum. Et sic non oportet quod in summo bono
+sit aliqua compositio, sed solum quod alia deficiant ab ipso.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p8"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is
+not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
+but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
+said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
+essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28478"><span class=
+"ref">[28478] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>,
+non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus appetatur,
+sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet. Quod autem
+dicitur, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>, intelligitur de bono
+per essentiam, ut post dicetur.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way
+comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now
+we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not
+that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
+principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
+and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28479"><span class=
+"ref">[28479] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod ea quae non sunt in eodem genere, si quidem sint in diversis
+generibus contenta, nullo modo comparabilia sunt. De Deo autem
+negatur esse in eodem genere cum aliis bonis, non quod ipse sit in
+quodam alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium
+omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et huiusmodi
+comparationem importat summum bonum.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -3190,39 +3361,136 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; as we said above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
+essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is
+convertible with "being," so is "good"; as we said above (<a
+xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p2.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one
+essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore
+every being is good essentially.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480"><span class=
+"ref">[28480] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium
+Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra
+habitum est. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per
+philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam
+essentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is
+what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the
+being of each thing is its good. But everything is a being
+essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28481"><span class=
+"ref">[28481] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
+bonum est quod omnia appetunt, cum ipsum esse sit desideratum ab
+omnibus, ipsum esse cuiuslibet rei est eius bonum. Sed quaelibet
+res est ens per suam essentiam. Ergo quaelibet res est bona per
+suam essentiam.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
-  supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.</p>
+  supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good
+essentially.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28482"><span class=
+"ref">[28482] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
+res per suam bonitatem est bona. Si igitur aliqua res est quae non
+sit bona per suam essentiam, oportebit quod eius bonitas non sit
+sua essentia. Illa ergo bonitas, cum sit ens quoddam, oportet quod
+sit bona, et si quidem alia bonitate, iterum de illa bonitate
+quaeretur. Aut ergo erit procedere in infinitum, aut venire ad
+aliquam bonitatem quae non erit bona per aliam bonitatem. Eadem
+ergo ratione standum est in primo. Res igitur quaelibet est bona
+per suam essentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God
+are good by participation." Therefore they are not good
+essentially.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28483"><span class=
+"ref">[28483] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod alia omnia a Deo
+sunt bona per participationem. Non igitur per essentiam.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
   substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A6">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and
-  He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.</p>
+  He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the
+last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every
+kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is
+good essentially.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484"><span class=
+"ref">[28484] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim
+dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem
+alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse
+constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia
+superadduntur, ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia
+vero perfectio alicuius est per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit
+sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse, quod
+habet per suam formam substantialem, secunda vero eius perfectio
+consistit in caliditate, levitate et siccitate, et huiusmodi,
+tertia vero perfectio eius est secundum quod in loco suo quiescit.
+Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum suam
+essentiam, sed soli Deo, cuius solius essentia est suum esse; et
+cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur
+accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter, ut esse potentem,
+sapientem, et huiusmodi, sicut ex dictis patet. Ipse etiam ad nihil
+aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium
+rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam
+perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus
+per suam essentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p7"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but
+only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own
+essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually
+and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only
+actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not
+good essentially, as was shown above.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28485"><span class=
+"ref">[28485] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed
+indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam
+essentiam. Simplicium autem essentiae sunt indivisae et actu et
+potentia, compositorum vero essentiae sunt indivisae secundum actum
+tantum. Et ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam
+essentiam, non autem bona, ut ostensum est.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p8"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being,
+yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does
+not follow that a creature is good essentially.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28486"><span class=
+"ref">[28486] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum habet esse,
+tamen essentia rei creatae non est ipsum esse, et ideo non sequitur
+quod res creata sit bona per suam essentiam.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself
   has some other goodness whereby it is good.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28487"><span class=
+"ref">[28487] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid
+superadditum; vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio
+superaddita, vel ordo ad finem. Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita
+dicitur bona sicut et ens, hac autem ratione dicitur ens, quia ea
+est aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione
+dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum, non quia ipsa habeat
+aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -3236,34 +3504,94 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all
+things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De
+Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away this and that, and see
+good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any
+other good, but the good of every good." But everything is good by its
+own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is
+God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28488"><span class=
+"ref">[28488] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint bona bonitate divina. Dicit
+enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., <i>bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle
+hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, ita Deum
+videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni</i>. Sed
+unumquodque est bonum suo bono. Ergo unumquodque est bonum ipso
+bono quod est Deus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius
+says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are
+directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness;
+therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28489"><span class=
+"ref">[28489] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., omnia dicuntur bona inquantum
+ordinantur ad Deum, et hoc ratione bonitatis divinae. Ergo omnia
+sunt bona bonitate divina.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p4"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have
+being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but
+through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the
+divine goodness, but by their own goodness.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28490"><span class=
+"ref">[28490] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia
+per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona
+bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div>
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ix.FP_Q84.FP_Q84_A4">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now
   just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are
   called good by way of participation.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and
   a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3">Q[4], A[3]</a>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p8"> This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="28491"><span class=
+"ref">[28491] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod nihil prohibet in his quae relationem important, aliquid ab
+extrinseco denominari; sicut aliquid denominatur locatum a loco, et
+mensuratum a mensura. Circa vero ea quae absolute dicuntur, diversa
+fuit opinio. Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas; et
+quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species separatas
+participando; ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo secundum ideam
+hominis separatam. Et sicut ponebat ideam hominis et equi
+separatam, quam vocabat per se hominem et per se equum, ita ponebat
+ideam entis et ideam unius separatam, quam dicebat per se ens et
+per se unum, et eius participatione unumquodque dicitur ens vel
+unum. Hoc autem quod est per se bonum et per se unum, ponebat esse
+summum Deum, a quo omnia dicuntur bona per modum participationis.
+Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod
+ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut
+Aristoteles multipliciter probat; tamen hoc absolute verum est,
+quod est aliquod unum per essentiam suam bonum, quod dicimus Deum,
+ut ex superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat
+Aristoteles. A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono,
+unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum
+per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter, ut
+ex superioribus patet. Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate
+divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius
+bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine
+divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas
+denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae
+bonitates.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4-p8"> This is
+a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 6 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="28492"><span class=
+"ref">[28492] I&ordf; q. 6 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+responsio ad obiecta.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -3278,75 +3606,165 @@
 			 
 
 			 <div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p2"> After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p3"> Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p4"> (1) Whether God is infinite?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p5"> (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p6"> (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7-p7"> (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</p>
 </div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 pr."><a name="28493"><span class="ref">[28493]
+I&ordf; q. 7 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
+perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate, et de
+existentia eius in rebus, attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et
+in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus.
+Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit infinitus.
+Secundo, utrum aliquid praeter ipsum sit infinitum secundum
+essentiam. Tertio, utrum aliquid possit esse infinitum secundum
+magnitudinem. Quarto, utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum
+multitudinem.</p>
+</div>
 <div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" next="FP_Q7_A2" prev="FP_Q7" progress="0.92%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is infinite?">
 <h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether God is infinite?</h4>
 
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless."</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher
+says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But
+God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28494"><span class=
+"ref">[28494] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit infinitus. Omne enim
+infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae,
+ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est
+infinitus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to
+the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But
+there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above
+(<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p3.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A1">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not
+belong to Him to be infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495"><span class=
+"ref">[28495] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt
+quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut
+supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here
+in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to
+place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be
+another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and
+not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not
+infinite in substance.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28496"><span class=
+"ref">[28496] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum secundum locum, ergo quod
+ita est hoc quod non est aliud, est finitum secundum substantiam.
+Sed Deus est hoc, et non est aliud, non enim est lapis nec lignum.
+Ergo Deus non est infinitus secundum substantiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
+infinite and eternal, and boundless."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28497"><span class=
+"ref">[28497] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Damascenus, quod <i>Deus est infinitus et aeternus et
+incircumscriptibilis</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to
-  the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.</p>
+  the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of
+things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498"><span class=
+"ref">[28498] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio,
+ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res
+effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt
+circa naturam primi principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa
+infinitatem ipsius. Quia enim ponebant primum principium materiam,
+consequenter attribuerunt primo principio infinitatem materialem;
+dicentes aliquod corpus infinitum esse primum principium rerum.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7"> We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to
   this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown
-  above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p8"> From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+  above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1">Q[4],
+A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being
+received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown
+above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4">Q[3],
+A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">
+Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod
+non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et
+forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia,
+antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas, sed cum
+recipit unam, terminatur per illam. Forma vero finitur per
+materiam, inquantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad
+multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate
+huius rei. Materia autem perficitur per formam per quam finitur, et
+ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur materiae, habet rationem
+imperfecti; est enim quasi materia non habens formam. Forma autem
+non perficitur per materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo
+contrahitur, unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae
+non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Illud autem
+quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus
+patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed
+ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum
+est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p8"> From
+this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28499"><span class=
+"ref">[28499] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+responsio ad primum.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this article.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28500"><span class=
+"ref">[28500] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod terminus quantitatis est sicut forma ipsius, cuius
+signum est, quod figura, quae consistit in terminatione
+quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem. Unde infinitum
+quod competit quantitati, est infinitum quod se tenet ex parte
+materiae, et tale infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est.</p></div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact
+that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other,
+and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all
+other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there
+such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did
+not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other
+whiteness existing in a subject.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28501"><span class=
+"ref">[28501] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non receptum
+in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis,
+et alia removentur ab eo, sicut, si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc
+ipso quod non esset in alio, differret ab omni albedine existente
+in subiecto.</p>
+</div>
 
 			 </div4>
 
@@ -3356,37 +3774,144 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its effect.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power
+of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God
+is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce
+an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its
+effect.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28502"><span class=
+"ref">[28502] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse
+infinitum per essentiam. Virtus enim rei proportionatur essentiae
+eius. Si igitur essentia Dei est infinita, oportet quod eius virtus
+sit infinita. Ergo potest producere effectum infinitum, cum
+quantitas virtutis per effectum cognoscatur.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has
+infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has
+an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend
+itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created
+intellectual substance is infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28503"><span class=
+"ref">[28503] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed
+intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim
+universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo
+omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary
+matter is something other than God, as was shown above (<a
+xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p4.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A8">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is
+infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504"><span class=
+"ref">[28504] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia
+prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse
+infinitum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in
+Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first
+principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28505"><span class=
+"ref">[28505] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod infinitum non potest esse ex principio aliquo, ut dicitur in
+III Physic. Omne autem quod est praeter Deum, est ex Deo sicut ex
+primo principio. Ergo nihil quod est praeter Deum, potest esse
+infinitum.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
   its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated,
-  nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.</p>
+  nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus
+subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that
+its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it
+cannot be absolutely infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 co."><a name="28506"><span class=
+"ref">[28506] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod aliquid praeter Deum potest esse infinitum secundum quid, sed
+non simpliciter. Si enim loquamur de infinito secundum quod
+competit materiae, manifestum est quod omne existens in actu, habet
+aliquam formam, et sic materia eius est terminata per formam. Sed
+quia materia, secundum quod est sub una forma substantiali, remanet
+in potentia ad multas formas accidentales; quod est finitum
+simpliciter, potest esse infinitum secundum quid, utpote lignum est
+finitum secundum suam formam, sed tamen est infinitum secundum
+quid, inquantum est in potentia ad figuras infinitas. Si autem
+loquamur de infinito secundum quod convenit formae, sic manifestum
+est quod illa quorum formae sunt in materia, sunt simpliciter
+finita, et nullo modo infinita. Si autem sint aliquae formae
+creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam
+de Angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid,
+inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahuntur per
+aliquam materiam, sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse,
+et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum
+et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse
+infinitum simpliciter.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p7"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its
+essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created
+being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely
+infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot
+make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two
+contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make
+anything to be absolutely infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28507"><span class=
+"ref">[28507] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod hoc est contra rationem facti, quod essentia rei sit
+ipsum esse eius, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum, unde
+contra rationem facti est, quod sit simpliciter infinitum. Sicut
+ergo Deus, licet habeat potentiam infinitam, non tamen potest
+facere aliquid non factum (hoc enim esset contradictoria esse
+simul); ita non potest facere aliquid infinitum simpliciter.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p8"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends
+itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form
+not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the
+angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the
+act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28508"><span class=
+"ref">[28508] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod virtus intellectus extendit se
+quodammodo ad infinita, procedit ex hoc quod intellectus est forma
+non in materia; sed vel totaliter separata, sicut sunt substantiae
+Angelorum; vel ad minus potentia intellectiva, quae non est actus
+alicuius organi, in anima intellectiva corpori coniuncta.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature,
+since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is
+something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter
+even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively,
+because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28509"><span class=
+"ref">[28509] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod materia prima non existit in rerum natura per seipsam, cum non
+sit ens in actu, sed potentia tantum, unde magis est aliquid
+concreatum, quam creatum. Nihilominus tamen materia prima, etiam
+secundum potentiam, non est infinita simpliciter, sed secundum
+quid, quia eius potentia non se extendit nisi ad formas
+naturales.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -3400,58 +3925,227 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
+can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics
+there is no error, since "there is no lie in things abstract," as the
+Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in
+magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let
+this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to
+be infinite in magnitude.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28510"><span class=
+"ref">[28510] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod possit esse aliquid infinitum actu
+secundum magnitudinem. In scientiis enim mathematicis non invenitur
+falsum, <i>quia abstrahentium non est mendacium</i>, ut dicitur in
+II Physic. Sed scientiae mathematicae utuntur infinito secundum
+magnitudinem, dicit enim geometra in suis demonstrationibus, sit
+linea talis infinita. Ergo non est impossibile aliquid esse
+infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not
+against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite
+is not against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite and
+the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not
+impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28511"><span class=
+"ref">[28511] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
+quod non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile
+convenire sibi. Sed esse infinitum non est contra rationem
+magnitudinis, sed magis finitum et infinitum videntur esse
+passiones quantitatis. Ergo non est impossibile aliquam
+magnitudinem esse infinitam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is
+infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is
+infinitely divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii. But contraries are
+concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is
+opposed to division, and increase opposed to diminution, it appears
+that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible
+for magnitude to be infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28512"><span class=
+"ref">[28512] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+magnitudo divisibilis est in infinitum, sic enim definitur
+continuum, quod est in infinitum divisibile, ut patet in III
+Physic. Sed contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Cum ergo
+divisioni opponatur additio, et diminutioni augmentum, videtur quod
+magnitudo possit crescere in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse
+magnitudinem infinitam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and
+time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over
+which movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv. But it is not against
+the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every
+determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a
+beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of
+magnitude to be infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28513"><span class=
+"ref">[28513] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, motus
+et tempus habent quantitatem et continuitatem a magnitudine super
+quam transit motus, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed non est contra
+rationem temporis et motus quod sint infinita, cum unumquodque
+indivisibile signatum in tempore et motu circulari, sit principium
+et finis. Ergo nec contra rationem magnitudinis erit quod sit
+infinita.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
+surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite
+body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to
+surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28514"><span class=
+"ref">[28514] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+corpus superficiem habet. Sed omne corpus superficiem habens est
+finitum, quia superficies est terminus corporis finiti. Ergo omne
+corpus est finitum. Et similiter potest dici de superficie et
+linea. Nihil est ergo infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in
   magnitude.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p8"> We must
+therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be
+considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its quantity
+only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.</p>
+
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p9"> Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
   every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by
-  another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p10"> The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality.</p>
+  another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite
+circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the farther
+they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other;
+therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely
+distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place
+belonging to any other.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p10"> The
+same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical
+body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because
+nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of
+quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so
+would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.</p>
+</div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 co."><a name="28515"><span class=
+"ref">[28515] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod aliud est esse infinitum secundum suam essentiam, et secundum
+magnitudinem. Dato enim quod esset aliquod corpus infinitum
+secundum magnitudinem, utpote ignis vel aer, non tamen esset
+infinitum secundum essentiam, quia essentia sua esset terminata ad
+aliquam speciem per formam, et ad aliquod individuum per materiam.
+Et ideo, habito ex praemissis quod nulla creatura est infinita
+secundum essentiam, adhuc restat inquirere utrum aliquid creatum
+sit infinitum secundum magnitudinem. Sciendum est igitur quod
+corpus, quod est magnitudo completa, dupliciter sumitur, scilicet
+mathematice, secundum quod consideratur in eo sola quantitas; et
+naturaliter, secundum quod consideratur in eo materia et forma. Et
+de corpore quidem naturali, quod non possit esse infinitum in actu,
+manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale aliquam formam
+substantialem habet determinatam, cum igitur ad formam
+substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad
+determinatam formam consequantur determinata accidentia; inter quae
+est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam
+quantitatem et in maius et in minus. Unde impossibile est aliquod
+corpus naturale infinitum esse. Hoc etiam ex motu patet. Quia omne
+corpus naturale habet aliquem motum naturalem. Corpus autem
+infinitum non posset habere aliquem motum naturalem, nec rectum,
+quia nihil movetur naturaliter motu recto, nisi cum est extra suum
+locum, quod corpori infinito accidere non posset; occuparet enim
+omnia loca, et sic indifferenter quilibet locus esset locus eius.
+Et similiter etiam neque secundum motum circularem. Quia in motu
+circulari oportet quod una pars corporis transferatur ad locum in
+quo fuit alia pars; quod in corpore circulari, si ponatur
+infinitum, esse non posset, quia duae lineae protractae a centro,
+quanto longius protrahuntur a centro, tanto longius distant ab
+invicem; si ergo corpus esset infinitum, in infinitum lineae
+distarent ab invicem, et sic una nunquam posset pervenire ad locum
+alterius. De corpore etiam mathematico eadem ratio est. Quia si
+imaginemur corpus mathematicum existens actu, oportet quod
+imaginemur ipsum sub aliqua forma, quia nihil est actu nisi per
+suam formam. Unde, cum forma quanti, inquantum huiusmodi, sit
+figura, oportebit quod habeat aliquam figuram. Et sic erit finitum,
+est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A
+geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but
+takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he
+finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28516"><span class=
+"ref">[28516] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod geometer non indiget sumere aliquam lineam esse
+infinitam actu, sed indiget accipere aliquam lineam finitam actu, a
+qua possit subtrahi quantum necesse est, et hanc nominat lineam
+infinitam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although
+the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still
+it is against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it
+is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether
+circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not possible in any
+species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite
+magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28517"><span class=
+"ref">[28517] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, licet infinitum non sit contra rationem magnitudinis
+in communi, est tamen contra rationem cuiuslibet speciei eius,
+scilicet contra rationem magnitudinis bicubitae vel tricubitae,
+sive circularis vel triangularis, et similium. Non autem est
+possibile in genere esse quod in nulla specie est. Unde non est
+possibile esse aliquam magnitudinem infinitam, cum nulla species
+magnitudinis sit infinita.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The
+infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by
+division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have
+the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which
+has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the
+addition of magnitude, but only in division.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28518"><span class=
+"ref">[28518] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod infinitum quod convenit quantitati, ut dictum est, se tenet ex
+parte materiae. Per divisionem autem totius acceditur ad materiam,
+nam partes se habent in ratione materiae, per additionem autem
+acceditur ad totum, quod se habet in ratione formae. Et ideo non
+invenitur infinitum in additione magnitudinis, sed in divisione
+tantum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement
+and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have
+potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole;
+therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not
+agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the totality
+of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in
+potentiality.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28519"><span class=
+"ref">[28519] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+quod motus et tempus non sunt secundum totum in actu, sed
+successive, unde habent potentiam permixtam actui. Sed magnitudo
+est tota in actu. Et ideo infinitum quod convenit quantitati, et se
+tenet ex parte materiae, repugnat totalitati magnitudinis, non
+autem totalitati temporis vel motus, esse enim in potentia convenit
+materiae.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -3465,47 +4159,162 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p5.1" passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an
+actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for
+a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to
+infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually
+to exist.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28520"><span class=
+"ref">[28520] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit esse multitudinem infinitam
+secundum actum. Non enim est impossibile id quod est in potentia
+reduci ad actum. Sed numerus est in infinitum multiplicabilis. Ergo
+non est impossibile esse multitudinem infinitam in actu.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
+possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the
+species of figures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of
+actual figures is possible.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28521"><span class=
+"ref">[28521] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+cuiuslibet speciei possibile est esse aliquod individuum in actu.
+Sed species figurae sunt infinitae. Ergo possibile est esse
+infinitas figuras in actu.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not
+opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a
+multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not
+opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to
+coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an actual
+infinite number of things is possible.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28522"><span class=
+"ref">[28522] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea
+quae non opponuntur ad invicem, non impediunt se invicem. Sed,
+posita aliqua multitudine rerum, adhuc possunt fieri alia multa
+quae eis non opponuntur, ergo non est impossibile aliqua iterum
+simul esse cum eis, et sic in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse
+infinita in actu.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
+measure, and number, and weight" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p5.1"
+passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28523"><span class=
+"ref">[28523] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in pondere, numero et mensura
+disposuisti</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation
-  could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+  could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an
+infinite medium.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p7"> A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as
-  one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
+  one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for
+it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters
+little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if
+the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said
+that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.</p>
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p8"> This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator;
   for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach
   matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude.</p>
 </div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 co."><a name="28524"><span class=
+"ref">[28524] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Quidam enim, sicut Avicenna et
+Algazel, dixerunt quod impossibile est esse multitudinem actu
+infinitam per se, sed infinitam per accidens multitudinem esse, non
+est impossibile. Dicitur enim multitudo esse infinita per se,
+quando requiritur ad aliquid ut multitudo infinita sit. Et hoc est
+impossibile esse, quia sic oporteret quod aliquid dependeret ex
+infinitis; unde eius generatio nunquam compleretur, cum non sit
+infinita pertransire. Per accidens autem dicitur multitudo
+infinita, quando non requiritur ad aliquid infinitas multitudinis,
+sed accidit ita esse. Et hoc sic manifestari potest in operatione
+fabri, ad quam quaedam multitudo requiritur per se, scilicet quod
+sit ars in anima, et manus movens, et martellus. Et si haec in
+infinitum multiplicarentur, nunquam opus fabrile compleretur, quia
+dependeret ex infinitis causis. Sed multitudo martellorum quae
+accidit ex hoc quod unum frangitur et accipitur aliud, est
+multitudo per accidens, accidit enim quod multis martellis
+operetur; et nihil differt utrum uno vel duobus vel pluribus
+operetur, vel infinitis, si infinito tempore operaretur. Per hunc
+igitur modum, posuerunt quod possibile est esse actu multitudinem
+infinitam per accidens. Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia omnem
+multitudinem oportet esse in aliqua specie multitudinis. Species
+autem multitudinis sunt secundum species numerorum. Nulla autem
+species numeri est infinita, quia quilibet numerus est multitudo
+mensurata per unum. Unde impossibile est esse multitudinem
+infinitam actu, sive per se, sive per accidens. Item, multitudo in
+rerum natura existens est creata, et omne creatum sub aliqua certa
+intentione creantis comprehenditur, non enim in vanum agens aliquod
+operatur. Unde necesse est quod sub certo numero omnia creata
+comprehendantur. Impossibile est ergo esse multitudinem infinitam
+in actu, etiam per accidens. Sed esse multitudinem infinitam in
+potentia, possibile est. Quia augmentum multitudinis consequitur
+divisionem magnitudinis, quanto enim aliquid plus dividitur, tanto
+plura secundum numerum resultant. Unde, sicut infinitum invenitur
+in potentia in divisione continui, quia proceditur ad materiam, ut
+supra ostensum est; eadem ratione etiam infinitum invenitur in
+potentia in additione multitudinis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its
+mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and
+not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act
+successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
+succeeded by another multitude to infinity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28525"><span class=
+"ref">[28525] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod unumquodque quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum
+secundum modum sui esse, dies enim non reducitur in actum ut sit
+tota simul, sed successive. Et similiter infinitum multitudinis non
+reducitur in actum ut sit totum simul, sed successive, quia post
+quamlibet multitudinem, potest sumi alia multitudo in
+infinitum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of
+figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various
+species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and
+as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to
+act, so neither is the multitude of figures.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28526"><span class=
+"ref">[28526] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod species figurarum habent infinitatem ex infinitate
+numeri, sunt enim species figurarum, trilaterum, quadrilaterum, et
+sic inde. Unde, sicut multitudo infinita numerabilis non reducitur
+in actum quod sit tota simul, ita nec multitudo figurarum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although
+the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of
+others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any
+single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually
+infinite multitude to exist.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28527"><span class=
+"ref">[28527] I&ordf; q. 7 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod, licet, quibusdam positis, alia poni non sit eis oppositum;
+tamen infinita poni opponitur cuilibet speciei multitudinis. Unde
+non est possibile esse aliquam multitudinem actu infinitam.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -3513,7 +4322,7 @@
 
 			 </div4>
 		  </div3>
-
+<!-- merged down to here -->
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8" next="FP_Q8_A1" prev="FP_Q7_A4" progress="1.04%" n="vii" title="Question. 8 - THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)">
 			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p0.1">Question 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>