Mercurial > hg > Aquinas

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+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual AquinasQuestion 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</title><style>
+     h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both}
+    @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm}
+    </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13" next="FP_Q13_A1" prev="FP_Q12_A13" progress="1.92%" n="xii" title="Question. 13 - THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p0.1">Question 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9" next="FP_Q13_A10" prev="FP_Q13_A8" progress="2.21%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether this name “God” is communicable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Pet.1.4" parsed="vul|2Pet|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" passage="2 Pet. 1:4">2 Pet. 1:4</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to
+  others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28859" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28859] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile.
+Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur
+et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat
+divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II
+Pet. I, <i>magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc
+efficiamur divinae consortes naturae</i>. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est
+communicabile.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God"
+is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact
+that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are
+gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" is
+communicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28860" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28860] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sola
+nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est
+nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet
+plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>.
+Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other
+names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as
+"good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is
+communicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28861" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28861] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
+nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina
+quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt
+communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen
+Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
+wood and stones" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.21" parsed="vul|Wis|14|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" passage="Wis. 14:21">Wis. 14:21</scripRef>), in reference to the
+divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28862" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28862] Iª q. 13 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus
+imposuerunt</i>; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen
+Deus est nomen incommunicabile.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
+  strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the
+  reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing
+  cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be
+  communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound
+  things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7" shownumber="no"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who
+  by nature are not gods," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gal.4.8" parsed="vul|Gal|4|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" passage="Gal. 4:8">Gal. 4:8</scripRef>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p8" shownumber="no"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28863" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28863] Iª q. 13 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo,
+proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile
+est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile
+multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est
+communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis
+significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus
+illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per
+similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid
+leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones
+dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt
+communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito
+singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel
+secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana
+communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis
+non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum;
+potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis
+existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam
+cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno
+supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum
+naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest
+intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod
+est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen
+impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile
+et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere
+pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod
+individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum
+similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles,
+inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet
+fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod
+suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae
+subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis,
+non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per
+similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas
+simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum
+quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum
+habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis
+nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde,
+quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus
+quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum
+compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad
+significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen
+Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est;
+natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est,
+sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum
+rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc
+nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos
+soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, <i>his qui natura non sunt
+dii, serviebatis</i>; Glossa, <i>non sunt dii natura, sed opinione
+hominum</i>. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non
+secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per
+quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid
+divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, <i>ego dixi, dii
+estis</i>. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum
+Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod
+consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis
+incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud
+Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc
+individuum.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the
+participation of some similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28864" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28864] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum
+similitudinis participationem.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name,
+for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God
+Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do
+not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of
+being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to
+the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name
+"sun."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28865" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28865] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non
+proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse
+Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis.
+Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum
+essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum
+rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc
+nomine sol.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the
+perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify
+the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves
+absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But
+this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which
+we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28866" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28866] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita
+quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non
+tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad
+significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum
+rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus
+impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue,
+ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10" next="FP_Q13_A11" prev="FP_Q13_A9" progress="2.25%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by  participation, and according to opinion?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
+It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature,
+by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse
+signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and
+negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who
+says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is
+God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28867" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28867] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per
+naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim
+est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et
+negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed Catholicus
+dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est
+Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the
+enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not
+in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this
+supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this
+name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in
+opinion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28868" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28868] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem,
+ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum
+opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo
+univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine
+vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum
+veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now
+when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name
+God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the
+heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore
+this name "God" is applied univocally to both.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28869" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28869] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit
+unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super
+omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum
+esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p6" shownumber="no"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><div xml:lang="la">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28870" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28870] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra,
+illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re,
+ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de
+animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de
+Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.</p>
+<p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28871" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28871] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non
+cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non
+significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens
+unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed
+aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p>
+</div></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition
+  of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p8" shownumber="no"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
+  comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28872" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28872] Iª q. 13 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non
+accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc
+patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est
+omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen
+secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione
+eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens
+de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de
+accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in
+definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina;
+huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et
+medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus,
+secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum
+quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim
+aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus
+nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum
+idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari
+aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum
+est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum
+significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde
+manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it
+  is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.95.5" parsed="vul|Ps|95|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" passage="Ps. 95:5">Ps. 95:5</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p10" shownumber="no"> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><div xml:lang="la">
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28873" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28873] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis
+praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo,
+de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo.
+Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo
+intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet
+significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius
+intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud.
+Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit
+Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad
+significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum,
+non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic
+enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali
+significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, <i>omnes dii
+gentium Daemonia</i>.</p>
+<p title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28874" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28874] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt
+secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum
+diversam significationem.</p>
+</div></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
+Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured
+animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal
+names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being,
+which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated
+equivocally of different predicaments.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 4" shownumber="no"><a name="28875" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28875] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non
+dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit
+aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod
+analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de
+diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
+  names the meaning of which we know not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5" shownumber="no"><a name="28876" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus
+neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam
+rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra
+dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere
+potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua
+accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero
+aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec
+ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum
+significationem ignoramus.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11" next="FP_Q13_A12" prev="FP_Q13_A10" progress="2.29%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
+It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of
+God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE
+WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS
+is not the most proper name of God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28877" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28877] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime
+proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile,
+ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile.
+Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good
+excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially
+belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore
+this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO
+IS.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28878" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28878] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>boni nominatio est
+manifestativa omnium Dei processionum</i>. Sed hoc maxime Deo
+convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen
+bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for
+God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS
+imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not
+the most applicable to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28879" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28879] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus
+non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est
+nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est
+non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say
+to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered
+him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you"
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.13-Exod.3.14" parsed="vul|Exod|3|13|3|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" passage="Ex. 3:13,14">Ex. 3:13,14</scripRef>). Therefor this name HE
+WHO IS most properly belongs to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28880" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28880] Iª q. 13 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, <i>si dixerint mihi,
+quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?</i> Et respondit ei dominus,
+<i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui
+est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7" shownumber="no"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p8" shownumber="no"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
+  more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of
+  substance."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p9" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28881" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28881] Iª q. 13 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen
+Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat
+formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius
+essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est,
+manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat
+Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. Secundo, propter
+eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus
+communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra
+ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant
+ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam
+cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque
+modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo
+quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus
+determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie
+dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod
+<i>principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui
+est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut
+quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum</i>.
+Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae
+rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se
+habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum <i>pelagus
+substantiae infinitum</i>. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione.
+Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo
+dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit
+Augustinus in V de Trin.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
+  singular.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28882" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28882] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam
+hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et
+quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est.
+Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est
+magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum
+naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton,
+quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam
+incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
+Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so
+far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered
+absolutely comes before the idea of cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28883" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28883] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum
+est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute
+praeintelligitur causae.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
+Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should
+import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed
+from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the
+first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28884" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28884] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina
+importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab
+aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter
+quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12" next="FP_Q14" prev="FP_Q13_A11" progress="2.31%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
+It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For
+Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true;
+but affirmations are vague."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28885" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28885] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt
+formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod
+<i>negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem
+incompactae</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a
+subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q[3]
+): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an
+affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an
+affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28886" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28886] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod <i>forma simplex subiectum
+esse non potest</i>. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra
+ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo
+propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de
+Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise
+than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown
+above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every
+affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
+that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28887" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed
+Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est.
+Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum
+compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo
+formari non possit.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative
+propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He
+is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed
+about God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28888" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28888] Iª q. 13 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam
+affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus,
+et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt
+vere formari de Deo.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for
+  the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in
+  some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28889" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28889] Iª q. 13 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad
+cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione
+affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent
+idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et
+hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato
+accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali.
+Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et
+differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi.
+Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est
+homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura
+sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur
+homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito,
+sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem
+praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum
+intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem
+suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam
+formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod
+praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero
+diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas
+praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus
+per ipsam compositionem. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino
+unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas
+conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso
+est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis
+conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus
+respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae
+est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et
+subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per
+compositionem.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or,
+according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name
+can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28890" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28890] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse
+incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem,
+inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut
+supra dictum est.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as
+they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound
+things in which there is something taken as subject and something that
+is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and
+attributes something else to it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28891" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28891] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices
+subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed
+apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid
+quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit
+formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this
+  does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but
+  its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it
+understands simple things above itself, it understands them according
+to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to
+understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not
+false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28892" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28892] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter
+quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter
+potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel
+ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera
+est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse
+aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito,
+quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit
+eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis,
+sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in
+intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod
+intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit
+immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed
+habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum
+intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum
+modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea
+esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans
+compositionem de Deo.</p></div></div>
+</div></div>
+
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14" next="FP_Q14_A1" prev="FP_Q13_A12" progress="2.35%" n="xiii" title="Question. 14 - OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p0.1">Question 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" next="FP_Q14_A6" prev="FP_Q14_A4" progress="2.46%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God knows things other than Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
+things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of
+God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does
+not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things
+other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28924"><span class=
+"ref">[28924] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque
+enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in
+libro octoginta trium qu., quod <i>neque quidquam Deus extra
+seipsum intuetur</i>. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is
+the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God
+understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the
+perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is
+impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28925"><span class=
+"ref">[28925] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat
+alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod
+est impossibile.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding
+is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from
+its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the
+nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If
+therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God
+Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot
+be. Therefore He does not understand things other than
+Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28926"><span class=
+"ref">[28926] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum
+intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius
+actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius,
+quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est
+ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus
+intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid
+aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a
+se.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are
+naked and open to His eyes" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.13"
+parsed="vul|Heb|4|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5.1"
+passage="Heb. 4:13">Heb. 4:13</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28927"><span class=
+"ref">[28927] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Hebr. IV, <i>omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis
+eius</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
+  that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for
+  everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="28928"><span class=
+"ref">[28928] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim
+quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset
+perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte
+aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte
+cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non
+potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum
+virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa
+effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod
+Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si
+adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est
+eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut
+in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et
+quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod
+est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
+  mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p8" shownumber="no"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p>Ad
+sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod
+dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in
+altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur
+per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus
+videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod
+videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per
+speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem
+speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri.</p>
+<p>Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia
+seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in
+ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem
+aliorum ab ipso.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p9"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine
+in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to
+be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in
+the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in
+Himself, as above explained.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28929"><span class=
+"ref">[28929] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se
+intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se
+intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in
+seipso, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the
+  divine intellect other than the divine essence.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28930"><span class=
+"ref">[28930] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem
+secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam
+est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, <i>lapis enim non
+est in anima, sed species eius</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ea
+vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia
+Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod
+aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia
+Dei.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible
+  form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the
+principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own
+essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does
+not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is
+specified by anything else than the divine essence
+itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28931"><span class=
+"ref">[28931] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in
+alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia
+intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per
+obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium
+intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per
+formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per
+calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur
+intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec
+est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud
+quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde
+non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus,
+specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6" next="FP_Q14_A7" prev="FP_Q14_A5" progress="2.50%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper
+  knowledge.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932"><span class=
+"ref">[28932] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria
+cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum
+quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in
+prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo,
+sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in
+universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus
+cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam
+cognitionem.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge
+  of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28933"><span class=
+"ref">[28933] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quantum distat essentia creaturae ab essentia divina, tantum distat
+essentia divina ab essentia creaturae. Sed per essentiam creaturae
+non potest cognosci essentia divina, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec
+per essentiam divinam potest cognosci essentia creaturae. Et sic,
+cum Deus nihil cognoscat nisi per essentiam suam, sequitur quod non
+cognoscat creaturam secundum eius essentiam, ut cognoscat de ea
+quid est, quod est propriam cognitionem de re habere.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a
+thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all
+things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by
+its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and
+diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things,
+but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their
+proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of
+them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28934"><span class=
+"ref">[28934] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+propria cognitio non habetur de re, nisi per propriam eius
+rationem. Sed cum Deus cognoscat omnia per essentiam suam, non
+videtur quod unumquodque per propriam rationem cognoscat, idem enim
+non potest esse propria ratio multorum et diversorum. Non ergo
+habet propriam cognitionem Deus de rebus, sed communem, nam
+cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res
+solum in communi.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of
+things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct
+from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is
+written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the
+spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of
+thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature
+invisible in His sight" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.12-Heb.4.13" parsed="vul|Heb|4|12|4|13"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5.1"
+passage="Heb. 4:12,13">Heb. 4:12,13</scripRef>).</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28935"><span class=
+"ref">[28935] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+habere propriam cognitionem de rebus, est cognoscere res non solum
+in communi, sed secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. Sic autem
+Deus cognoscit res. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, quod <i>pertingit usque
+ad divisionem spiritus et animae, compagum quoque et medullarum; et
+discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis; et non est ulla
+creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7" shownumber="no"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
+  understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
+  instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
+  of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes
+  them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God
+  is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge;
+  and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p9" shownumber="no"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
+  unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="28936"><span class=
+"ref">[28936] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt, dicentes quod Deus alia a se non
+cognoscit nisi in communi, scilicet inquantum sunt entia. Sicut
+enim ignis, si cognosceret seipsum ut est principium caloris,
+cognosceret naturam caloris, et omnia alia inquantum sunt calida;
+ita Deus, inquantum cognoscit se ut principium essendi, cognoscit
+naturam entis, et omnia alia inquantum sunt entia. Sed hoc non
+potest esse. Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in
+speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus
+noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad
+cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam
+rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut
+patet in I Physic. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se,
+esset in universali tantum, et non in speciali, sequeretur quod
+eius intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per
+consequens nec eius esse, quod est contra ea quae superius ostensa
+sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria
+cognitione; non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis,
+sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad huius
+evidentiam, considerandum est quod quidam, volentes ostendere quod
+Deus per unum cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis, ut puta
+quod, si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas
+progredientes a centro; vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam,
+cognosceret omnes colores. Sed haec exempla, licet quantum ad
+aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem;
+tamen deficiunt quantum ad hoc, quod multitudo et diversitas non
+causantur ab illo uno principio universali, quantum ad id quod
+principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo
+communicant. Non enim diversitas colorum causatur ex luce solum,
+sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis, et similiter
+diversitas linearum ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod huiusmodi
+diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio
+secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non
+sic est. Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in
+quacumque creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum
+modum excellentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant,
+scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per
+quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et
+intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et
+intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma,
+per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio
+quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad
+id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae
+res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones
+contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non
+sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad
+lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos, ut si dicerem,
+homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad numeros
+imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum
+perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti, non solum in communi,
+sed etiam propria cognitione. Sicut qui cognoscit hominem,
+cognoscit animal propria cognitione, et qui cognoscit senarium,
+cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, cum essentia
+Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cuiuscumque
+rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria
+cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit,
+secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat.
+Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret
+quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio, nec etiam
+ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos
+essendi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria
+cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone
+  according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to
+  import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p11" shownumber="no"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28937"><span class=
+"ref">[28937] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est,
+potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium
+sic importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. Et sic falsum
+est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud
+esse quod habet in cognoscente, oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem
+secundum esse quod habet in oculo; sed per speciem lapidis quam
+habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra
+oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse
+quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum
+esse quod habet extra cognoscentem, sicut intellectus cognoscit
+lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu,
+inquantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse
+lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod hoc
+adverbium sic importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod
+sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in
+cognoscente, quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente,
+tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est
+quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod
+in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto
+perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p12"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is
+compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect
+act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the
+knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the
+converse.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28938"><span class=
+"ref">[28938] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut
+actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non
+sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e
+converso.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p13"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be
+taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the
+divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the
+proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which
+diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28939"><span class=
+"ref">[28939] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum
+adaequationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid excedens omnes
+creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscuiusque,
+secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a
+diversis creaturis.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" next="FP_Q14_A8"
+prev="FP_Q14_A6" progress="2.55%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether
+the knowledge of God is discursive?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is
+discursive?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of
+God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the
+Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many
+things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a
+time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as
+shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at
+once, but discourses from one to another.</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28940"><span class=
+"ref">[28940] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim
+Dei non est secundum scire in habitu, sed secundum intelligere in
+actu. Sed secundum philosophum, in II Topic., scire in habitu
+contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. Cum ergo
+Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur
+quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud
+discurrat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its
+cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known)
+through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is
+discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28941"><span class=
+"ref">[28941] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+cognoscere effectum per causam est scire discurrentis. Sed Deus
+cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo
+cognitio sua est discursiva.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature
+more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their
+created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things
+caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28942"><span class=
+"ref">[28942] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+perfectius Deus scit unamquamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed
+nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus, et sic de causis
+ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in
+Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
+Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their
+particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there;
+but He sees all things together at once."</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28943"><span class=
+"ref">[28943] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quod <i>Deus non
+particulatim vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternante
+conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc; sed omnia videt simul</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things,
+  which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever
+  proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in
+  Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not
+discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 co."><a name="28944"><span class=
+"ref">[28944] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus. Quod sic patet. In
+scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum
+successionem tantum, sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in
+actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est
+secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in
+cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non
+potest. Multa enim, quae successive intelligimus si unumquodque
+eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus si in aliquo
+uno ea intelligamus, puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si
+diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno,
+quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul, et non successive omnia
+videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non
+potest. Primo quidem, quia secundus discursus praesupponit primum,
+procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque
+considerant. Deinde, quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto
+ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur primum,
+adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo,
+sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur
+in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus.
+Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius
+cognitio non est discursiva.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding
+in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
+as shown above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28945"><span class=
+"ref">[28945] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen
+contingit multa intelligere in aliquo uno, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously,
+effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His
+knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28946"><span class=
+"ref">[28946] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Deus non cognoscit per causam quasi prius cognitam,
+effectus incognitos, sed eos cognoscit in causa. Unde eius cognitio
+est sine discursu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the
+causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a
+manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the
+knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His
+knowledge is not discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28947"><span class=
+"ref">[28947] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in
+ipsis causis, multo melius quam nos, non tamen ita quod cognitio
+effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut
+in nobis. Unde eius scientia non est discursiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" next="FP_Q14_A9" prev="FP_Q14_A7" progress="2.57%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God
+is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" passage=" Rom. 8:30, "> Rom. 8:30,
+</scripRef> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing
+will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is
+future, it is on that account known by God, before it
+exists."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28948"><span class=
+"ref">[28948] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
+enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., <i>non propterea aliquid
+erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur
+a Deo antequam fiat</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the
+effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the
+knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that
+creatures are eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28949"><span class=
+"ref">[28949] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si
+ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae
+sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior
+to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says
+(Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a
+cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of
+things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28950"><span class=
+"ref">[28950] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X
+Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse
+causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv),
+"Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and
+temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they
+are."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28951"><span class=
+"ref">[28951] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., <i>universas creaturas, et
+spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo
+sunt, quia novit</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that
+  remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a
+  determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the
+appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest
+that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of
+understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in
+so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the
+cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of
+approbation."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 co."><a name="28952"><span class=
+"ref">[28952] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet
+ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad
+artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo
+quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma
+intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium
+calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis,
+inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat
+principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad
+effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium
+actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur
+ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma
+intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia
+oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi
+determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys.
+Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum
+suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia
+sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde
+scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari
+scientia approbationis.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p8" shownumber="no"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28953"><span class=
+"ref">[28953] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae,
+cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut
+dictum est. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt
+futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non
+secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod
+Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus
+sciat.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p9"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is
+the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that
+things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence
+although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that
+creatures are eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28954"><span class=
+"ref">[28954] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt
+in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab
+aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen
+quod creaturae sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who
+  gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already
+built.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
+title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28955"><span class=
+"ref">[28955] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et
+scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus
+naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut
+scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura
+eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura
+ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui
+eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam
+facta capit.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" next="FP_Q14_A10" prev="FP_Q14_A8" progress="2.60%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not
+knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true
+things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the
+knowledge of God is not of things that are not.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28956"><span class=
+"ref">[28956] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium.
+Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens
+convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires
+likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that
+are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore
+what is not, cannot be known by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28957"><span class=
+"ref">[28957] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea
+quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum,
+qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a
+Deo.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is
+the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things
+that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God
+has no knowledge of things that are not.</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28958"><span class=
+"ref">[28958] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non
+entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet
+scientiam de non entibus.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who
+. . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.4.17" parsed="vul|Rom|4|17|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5.1"
+passage="Rom. 4:17">Rom. 4:17</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28959"><span class=
+"ref">[28959] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt,
+tanquam ea quae sunt</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by
+  the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p7" shownumber="no"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time,
+  as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 co."><a name="28960"><span class=
+"ref">[28960] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem
+prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse.
+Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu,
+sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia
+activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi,
+vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per
+creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse
+facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro
+tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum
+quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam
+enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et
+omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum
+intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae
+sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens
+intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in
+quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam
+vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec
+sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere
+scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo
+dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum
+extra videntem.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not
+actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true
+that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by
+God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28961"><span class=
+"ref">[28961] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem
+ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic
+sciuntur a Deo.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p9"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being
+everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as
+everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in
+potentiality are known by God, although they are not in
+act.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28962"><span class=
+"ref">[28962] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est,
+inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque
+intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae
+sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a
+Deo.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p10"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God,
+joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary
+that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this
+necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further,
+it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be
+possible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28963"><span class=
+"ref">[28963] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta.
+Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel
+futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et
+iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse
+possint.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10" next="FP_Q14_A11"
+prev="FP_Q14_A9" progress="2.62%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether
+God knows evil things?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil
+things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De
+Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does
+not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine
+says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in
+potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing
+(A[2] ), it seems that God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28964"><span class=
+"ref">[28964] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim
+philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus qui non est in
+potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni,
+ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in
+potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus
+non cognoscat mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either
+the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of
+God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God
+does not know evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28965"><span class=
+"ref">[28965] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed
+scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia
+Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known
+either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He
+knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing <a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence
+neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to
+the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966"><span class=
+"ref">[28966] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum
+oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam
+essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est
+similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae
+nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo
+Deus non cognoscit mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through
+another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not
+known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if
+evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known
+by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not
+imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4"><a name="28967"><span class=
+"ref">[28967] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur.
+Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret
+quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente.
+Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte
+cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei
+est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.15.11" parsed="vul|Prov|15|11|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6.1"
+passage="Prov. 15:11">Prov. 15:11</scripRef>), "Hell and destruction
+are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28968"><span class=
+"ref">[28968] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Proverb. XV, <i>Infernus et perditio coram
+Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness.
+  Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives
+the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through
+light."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 co."><a name="28969"><span class=
+"ref">[28969] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat
+omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus
+accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte
+cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est
+cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse
+mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit
+bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae.
+Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus per
+semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras
+quam a lumine</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by
+  privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate
+substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in
+Himself, but by the opposite good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28970"><span class=
+"ref">[28970] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod
+intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per
+privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra
+dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem
+divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae
+simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed
+in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non
+per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a
+substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per
+privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum
+oppositum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause
+of the good whereby evil is known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28971"><span class=
+"ref">[28971] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni,
+per quod cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p10"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not
+opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is
+opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and
+knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="28972"><span class=
+"ref">[28972] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae
+non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei;
+quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita
+cognoscit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect
+knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of
+itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the
+privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known
+except by good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28973"><span class=
+"ref">[28973] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae
+cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est
+per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio
+boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per
+bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11" next="FP_Q14_A12" prev="FP_Q14_A10" progress="2.64%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether God knows singular things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
+singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the
+human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its
+immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher
+says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with
+singular things." Therefore God does not know singular
+things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28974"><span class=
+"ref">[28974] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia.
+Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus
+humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem,
+non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima,
+<i>ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium</i>. Ergo Deus
+non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties
+alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from
+material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree
+abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular
+things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28975"><span class=
+"ref">[28975] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae
+recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed
+res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus
+non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about
+through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular
+things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for
+the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in
+potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure
+act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28976"><span class=
+"ref">[28976] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo
+singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo,
+quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in
+potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus.
+Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5.1"
+passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>), "All the ways of a man
+are open to His eyes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977"><span class=
+"ref">[28977] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis
+eius</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if
+  He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p7" shownumber="no"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined
+  together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p8" shownumber="no"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p9" shownumber="no"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10" shownumber="no"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q44.FP_Q44_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
+  He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978"><span class=
+"ref">[28978] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in
+creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut
+ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad
+perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia
+cognoscat. Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid
+cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra
+Empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III Metaphys., quod
+accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed
+perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et
+unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus
+universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia;
+Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed
+qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt
+quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil
+est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur
+universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus
+cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare
+omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex
+causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae,
+quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per
+materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod
+est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur,
+non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum
+praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate.
+Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando
+causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est.
+Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud
+praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio
+cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit.
+Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per
+suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei,
+inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei
+se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio
+universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur;
+necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae
+per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam
+suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum
+earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens
+cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali,
+sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si
+esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition
+  of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the
+individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also
+singular things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28979"><span class=
+"ref">[28979] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a
+principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri
+intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium.
+Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed
+species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia,
+non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium
+existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive
+sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus
+cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p12"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the
+species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions
+like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power
+extends to both immaterial and material things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28980"><span class=
+"ref">[28980] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse
+suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in
+imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et
+materialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p13"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as
+regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so
+far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the
+divine being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28981"><span class=
+"ref">[28981] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum
+suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet,
+similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12" next="FP_Q14_A13" prev="FP_Q14_A11" progress="2.68%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether God can know infinite things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
+  God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
+title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28982"><span class=
+"ref">[28982] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita.
+Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, quia
+infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid
+extra assumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Augustinus etiam dicit,
+XII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis
+comprehensione finitur</i>. Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo
+non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
+  God's knowledge, which is infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28983"><span class=
+"ref">[28983] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod
+ea quae in se sunt infinita, scientiae Dei finita sunt, contra,
+ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile; et finiti quod sit
+pertransibile, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed infinitum non potest
+transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Physic.
+Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam
+infinito. Et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiae Dei, quae est
+infinita.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is
+the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the
+infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be
+known by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28984"><span class=
+"ref">[28984] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+scientia Dei est mensura scitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti
+est, quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a
+Deo.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be
+comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds."</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985"><span class=
+"ref">[28985] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum
+numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei,
+cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so
+  that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible
+  species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal
+  principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 co."><a name="28986"><span class=
+"ref">[28986] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, cum Deus sciat non solum ea quae sunt actu, sed etiam ea quae
+sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae, ut ostensum est; haec autem
+constat esse infinita; necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita.
+Et licet scientia visionis, quae est tantum eorum quae sunt vel
+erunt vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non
+ponamus mundum ab aeterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in
+aeternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur, tamen,
+si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam
+scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes
+et affectiones cordium, quae in infinitum multiplicabuntur,
+creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo
+est, quia cognitio cuiuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum
+modum formae quae est principium cognitionis. Species enim
+sensibilis, quae est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius
+individui, unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest.
+Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei
+quantum ad naturam speciei, quae est participabilis a
+particularibus infinitis, unde intellectus noster per speciem
+intelligibilem hominis, cognoscit quodammodo homines infinitos. Sed
+tamen non inquantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod
+communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species
+intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum
+quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia
+speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus
+intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quae sunt vel esse
+possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum
+ad principia propria uniuscuiusque, ut ostensum est. Unde sequitur
+quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita, etiam secundum quod sunt
+ab invicem distincta.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
+  part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not
+successively, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" shape="rect"
+xml:link="simple">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him
+from knowing infinite things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987"><span class=
+"ref">[28987] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum
+philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo
+partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est
+cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci
+infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper
+remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit
+infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum
+cognoscat omnia simul, non successive, ut supra dictum est. Unde
+nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not
+  as if it were traversable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28988"><span class=
+"ref">[28988] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod transitio importat quandam successionem in partibus,
+et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest, neque a finito
+neque ab infinito. Sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit
+adaequatio, quia id comprehendi dicitur, cuius nihil est extra
+comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti, quod
+comprehendatur ab infinito. Et sic, quod in se est infinitum,
+potest dici finitum scientiae Dei, tanquam comprehensum, non tamen
+tanquam pertransibile.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous
+  quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet
+it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being,
+because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence
+they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of
+God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28989"><span class=
+"ref">[28989] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua
+quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et
+veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae
+naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam; sicut artificiatum
+inquantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita
+actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines; vel secundum
+quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui
+dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et
+finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas
+naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13" next="FP_Q14_A14" prev="FP_Q14_A12" progress="2.71%" n="xiii" title="Article. 13 - Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God
+is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause
+proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of
+things known, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect"
+xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is
+necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the
+knowledge of God is not of contingent things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990"><span class=
+"ref">[28990] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
+decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit
+futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus
+necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum
+est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse
+necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
+  antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it
+is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the
+consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows,
+is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent
+things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28991"><span class=
+"ref">[28991] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute,
+consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens
+ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem
+necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster.
+probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit
+hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum.
+Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum
+quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et
+consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo,
+est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God
+must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must
+necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more
+certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily
+be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by
+God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28992"><span class=
+"ref">[28992] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis
+necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia
+nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum
+contingens futurum est scitum a Deo.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.32.15" parsed="vul|Ps|32|15|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5.1"
+passage="Ps. 32:15">Ps. 32:15</scripRef>), "He Who hath made the
+hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works,"
+i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to
+free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28993"><span class=
+"ref">[28993] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda
+eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed
+opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta.
+Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7" shownumber="no"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
+  another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as
+  each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only
+  because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994"><span class=
+"ref">[28994] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae
+actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum
+autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus
+contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum
+est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno
+modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non
+consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet
+contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic
+infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus,
+sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari
+contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et
+ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se
+habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem
+alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem
+in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem
+cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum
+prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est
+actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non
+tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo
+esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur
+aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul
+existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae
+sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea
+ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam
+dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout
+sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia
+et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino
+conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura
+contingentia, suis causis comparata.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme
+cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the
+proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is
+contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the
+movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So
+likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their
+proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first
+cause, is necessary.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28995"><span class=
+"ref">[28995] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus
+potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut
+germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam
+contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit
+necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter
+causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit
+necessaria.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as
+  this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies
+  to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass
+  will grow."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p10" shownumber="no"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
+  anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28996"><span class=
+"ref">[28996] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc
+contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia,
+licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc
+non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad
+futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur
+quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia
+est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est
+contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est.
+Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens,
+contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut
+principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel
+necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel
+contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse
+hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum
+esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde
+dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec
+tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium
+absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod
+propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset
+enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota
+necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem,
+si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod
+quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae,
+consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed
+secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et
+esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid,
+illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale
+secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso.
+Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit,
+consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae,
+scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est,
+sicut et antecedens, <i>quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est
+esse</i>, ut dicitur in I Periherm.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
+  by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it
+  refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p12" shownumber="no"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
+  "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus
+  material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28997"><span class=
+"ref">[28997] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis
+successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae
+est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia
+inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius
+intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit
+per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab
+aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes
+transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet
+esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se
+sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae
+sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo
+subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute,
+secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec
+propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit
+distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de
+re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit,
+est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita
+et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est
+necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio
+habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album
+possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re
+est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc
+dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis
+autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta
+distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album,
+quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est
+inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non
+scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico
+scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed
+cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur,
+potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei
+inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur
+lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est
+intelligibile.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14" next="FP_Q14_A15" prev="FP_Q14_A13" progress="2.77%" n="xiv" title="Article. 14 - Whether God knows enunciable things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
+enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our
+intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect,
+there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable
+things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1"><a name="28998"><span class=
+"ref">[28998] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
+decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat
+enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui
+nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino
+nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge
+is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of
+enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does
+not know enunciable things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2"><a name="28999"><span class=
+"ref">[28999] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est
+similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non
+cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord
+knoweth the thoughts of men" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.93.11"
+parsed="vul|Ps|93|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4.1"
+passage="Ps. 93:11">Ps. 93:11</scripRef>). But enunciable things are
+contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable
+things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 s. c."><a name="29000"><span class=
+"ref">[29000] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes
+hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus
+hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p6" shownumber="no"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
+  intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine
+  intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 co."><a name="29001"><span class=
+"ref">[29001] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri;
+Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut
+supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia
+quae formari possunt. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et
+composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum
+enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel
+divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem
+intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos
+in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia
+quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro
+non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod
+species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat
+aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae
+ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam
+successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet
+nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis,
+enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet
+eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo
+essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis
+accidere possunt.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p7"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would
+avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable
+things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 1"><a name="29002"><span class=
+"ref">[29002] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret
+enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition
+signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence,
+which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are
+signified by enunciation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 2"><a name="29003"><span class=
+"ref">[29003] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei,
+et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo
+omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" next="FP_Q14_A16"
+prev="FP_Q14_A14" progress="2.79%" n="xv" title="Article. 15 - Whether
+the knowledge of God is variable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is
+variable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related
+to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is
+applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of
+creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the
+variation of creatures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1"><a name="29004"><span class=
+"ref">[29004] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
+decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit
+variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae
+important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et
+variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est
+variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He
+can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know
+more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase
+and diminution.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2"><a name="29005"><span class=
+"ref">[29005] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura
+facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic
+scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et
+diminutionem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now
+that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the
+future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus
+the knowledge of God is variable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3"><a name="29006"><span class=
+"ref">[29006] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum,
+quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit,
+scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there
+is no change nor shadow of alteration" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.1.17" parsed="vul|Jas|1|17|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" passage="James 1:17">James
+1:17</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007"><span class=
+"ref">[29007] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque
+vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I
+answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is
+clear from the foregoing <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4" shape="rect"
+xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether
+immutable, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.2"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9],
+A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether
+invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008"><span class=
+"ref">[29008] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet;
+sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum
+est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent
+  upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures
+themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are
+attributed to God variously, according to the variation of
+creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations
+consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and
+therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable
+manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 1"><a name="29009"><span class=
+"ref">[29009] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important
+relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia
+Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo,
+quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in
+intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in
+seipsis autem variabiliter. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus
+et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur
+actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod
+in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo
+dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor,
+et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui
+intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de
+Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His
+  knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because
+  such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and
+then afterwards knew.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 2"><a name="29010"><span class=
+"ref">[29010] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit.
+Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod
+possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam
+visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum
+aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse
+quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia
+sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si
+tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret,
+esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia
+quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in
+aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse
+secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum
+a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam
+sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea
+sciat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes
+  a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is
+  variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for
+  example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example,
+if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it;
+or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was
+sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of
+which can be in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 3"><a name="29011"><span class=
+"ref">[29011] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile,
+Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res
+significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum
+hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit
+Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse
+nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium
+orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia
+sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera,
+quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates
+sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et
+ideo concedendum est quod haec non est vera, quidquid Deus scivit,
+scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod
+scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinae
+scientiae est, quod sciat unam et eandem rem quandoque esse et
+quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinae scientiae est,
+quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque
+esse falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si
+enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et
+dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra
+variatur, vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta si, mutata re,
+eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas
+opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur
+eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16" next="FP_Q15" prev="FP_Q14_A15" progress="2.82%" n="xvi" title="Article. 16 - Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a
+speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause
+of things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect"
+xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the
+cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
+speculative.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012"><span class=
+"ref">[29012] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
+decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat
+scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra
+ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum
+scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge
+comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine
+knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
+speculative.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2"><a name="29013"><span class=
+"ref">[29013] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea.
+Scientia speculativa est per abstractionem a rebus, quod divinae
+scientiae non competit. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent
+must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent
+than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of
+Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of
+things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 s. c."><a name="29014"><span class=
+"ref">[29014] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
+quod est nobilius, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia speculativa
+est nobilior quam practica, ut patet per philosophum, in principio
+Metaphys. Ergo Deus habet de rebus scientiam speculativam.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing,
+  and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the
+  end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
+  and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p6" shownumber="no"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p7" shownumber="no"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the
+  physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 co."><a name="29015"><span class=
+"ref">[29015] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod aliqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica
+tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum
+aliquid practica. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliqua
+scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter. Primo, ex parte rerum
+scitarum, quae non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia
+hominis de rebus naturalibus vel divinis. Secundo, quantum ad modum
+sciendi, ut puta si aedificator consideret domum definiendo et
+dividendo et considerando universalia praedicata ipsius. Hoc
+siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare, et non
+secundum quod operabilia sunt, operabile enim est aliquid per
+applicationem formae ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in
+principia universalia formalia. Tertio, quantum ad finem, <i>nam
+intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo</i>, sicut dicitur
+in III de anima. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem
+operationis, finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio
+veritatis. Unde, si quis aedificator consideret qualiter posset
+fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis, sed ad
+cognoscendum tantum, erit, quantum ad finem, speculativa
+consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quae est
+speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae
+vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est
+secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero
+ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. Secundum
+hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus de seipso habet scientiam
+speculativam tantum, ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero
+aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam. Speculativam
+quidem, quantum ad modum, quidquid enim in rebus nos speculative
+cognoscimus definiendo et dividendo, hoc totum Deus multo
+perfectius novit. Sed de his quae potest quidem facere, sed
+secundum nullum tempus facit, non habet practicam scientiam,
+secundum quod practica scientia dicitur a fine. Sic autem habet
+practicam scientiam de his quae secundum aliquod tempus facit. Mala
+vero, licet ab eo non sint operabilia, tamen sub cognitione
+practica ipsius cadunt, sicut et bona, inquantum permittit vel
+impedit vel ordinat ea, sicut et aegritudines cadunt sub practica
+scientia medici, inquantum per artem suam curat eas.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is
+the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually
+the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period
+of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things
+which He can make, and which nevertheless are never
+made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 1"><a name="29016"><span class=
+"ref">[29016] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa, non quidem sui ipsius, sed
+aliorum, quorundam quidem actu, scilicet eorum quae secundum
+aliquod tempus fiunt; quorundam vero virtute, scilicet eorum quae
+potest facere, et tamen nunquam fiunt.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p10" shownumber="no"> In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He
+  knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 2"><a name="29017"><span class=
+"ref">[29017] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod scientiam esse acceptam a rebus scitis, non per se
+convenit scientiae speculativae, sed per accidens, inquantum est
+humana.</p><p title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 3"><a name="29018"><span class=
+"ref">[29018] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 3</span></a> Ad id vero quod
+in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod de operabilibus perfecta
+scientia non habetur, nisi sciantur inquantum operabilia sunt. Et
+ideo, cum scientia Dei sit omnibus modis perfecta, oportet quod
+sciat ea quae sunt a se operabilia, inquantum huiusmodi, et non
+solum secundum quod sunt speculabilia. Sed tamen non receditur a
+nobilitate speculativae scientiae, quia omnia alia a se videt in
+seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognoscit; et sic in speculativa
+sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam
+omnium aliorum.</p></div></div>
+</div></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15" next="FP_Q15_A1" prev="FP_Q14_A16" progress="2.85%" n="xiv" title="Question. 15 - OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p0.1">Question 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1" next="FP_Q15_A2" prev="FP_Q15" progress="2.86%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there are ideas?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in
+  him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
+  pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q46.FP_Q46_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the
+  world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2" next="FP_Q15_A3" prev="FP_Q15_A1" progress="2.88%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether ideas are many?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
+  except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the
+  accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot
+  be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily
+  be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it
+  would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to
+  which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house,
+  as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3" next="FP_Q16" prev="FP_Q15_A2" progress="2.92%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" href="#FP_Q15_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to
+  everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
+  whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
+  However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p2" shownumber="no"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" next="FP_Q16_A2" prev="FP_Q16" progress="2.95%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
+  unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
+  namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be
+  true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
+  intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera
+  Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone";
+  for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their
+  relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought
+  or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" next="FP_Q16_A3" prev="FP_Q16_A1" progress="2.99%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For
+  although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing:
+  for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the
+  thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p6" shownumber="no"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3" next="FP_Q16_A4" prev="FP_Q16_A2" progress="3.01%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
+  intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
+  apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4" next="FP_Q16_A5" prev="FP_Q16_A3" progress="3.03%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether good is logically prior to the true?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
+  from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
+  fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
+  fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" next="FP_Q16_A6" prev="FP_Q16_A4" progress="3.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His
+  own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
+  understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6" next="FP_Q16_A7" prev="FP_Q16_A5" progress="3.07%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
+  healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
+  intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" passage=" Ps. 11:2, "> Ps. 11:2, </scripRef> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
+  so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
+  science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7" next="FP_Q16_A8" prev="FP_Q16_A6" progress="3.10%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth is eternal?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
+  eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[3]</a>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
+  from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
+  and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
+  reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8" next="FP_Q17" prev="FP_Q16_A7" progress="3.13%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
+  Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
+  one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
+  before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
+  this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1" next="FP_Q17_A2" prev="FP_Q17" progress="3.16%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether falsity exists in things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when
+  compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper
+  operation of his art.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
+  vanity, and seek after lying?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.4.3" parsed="vul|Ps|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" passage="Ps. 4:3">Ps. 4:3</scripRef>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.3.21" parsed="vul|John|3|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" passage="Jn. 3:21">Jn. 3:21</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p8" shownumber="no"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
+  Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
+  naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this
+  way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p12" shownumber="no"> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" next="FP_Q17_A3" prev="FP_Q17_A1" progress="3.20%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether there is falsity in the senses?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
+  are.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
+  neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p8" shownumber="no"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
+  sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
+  the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" next="FP_Q17_A4" prev="FP_Q17_A2" progress="3.22%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether falsity is in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
+  with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
+  sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can
+  exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p6" shownumber="no"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
+  In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at
+  all.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4" next="FP_Q18" prev="FP_Q17_A3" progress="3.25%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether true and false are contraries?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are contraries?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.8.5" parsed="vul|Jer|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" passage="Jer. 8:5">Jer. 8:5</scripRef>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
+  except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
+  opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p2" shownumber="no"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) What is life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1" next="FP_Q18_A2" prev="FP_Q18" progress="3.28%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether to live belongs to all natural things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
+  begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is
+  called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
+  Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
+  such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
+  case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" next="FP_Q18_A3" prev="FP_Q18_A1" progress="3.31%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether life is an operation?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.18.3" parsed="vul|John|18|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" passage=" Jn. 18:3, "> Jn. 18:3, </scripRef> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
+  dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
+  denotes "to run" in the abstract.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
+  this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by
+  a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p10" shownumber="no"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" next="FP_Q18_A4" prev="FP_Q18_A2" progress="3.34%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether life is properly attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.83.3" parsed="vul|Ps|83|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" passage="Ps. 83:3">Ps. 83:3</scripRef>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and
+  sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their
+  inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p7" shownumber="no"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
+  only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of
+  their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible
+  beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p8" shownumber="no"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
+  degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in
+  movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself
+  is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4" next="FP_Q19" prev="FP_Q18_A3" progress="3.38%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are life in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Acts.17.28" parsed="vul|Acts|17|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" passage="Acts 17:28">Acts 17:28</scripRef>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.3-John.1.4" parsed="vul|John|1|3|1|4" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" passage="Jn. 1:3,4">Jn. 1:3,4</scripRef>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
+  another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
+  as having a divine existence in that mind.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
+  truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
+  mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
+  far as life implies a principle of operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19" progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2" parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
+  without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
+  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2" next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1 Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
+  its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
+  things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
+  Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
+  own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
+  necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
+  will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship
+  in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
+  supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
+  divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
+  necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
+  must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
+  the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
+  for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
+  all these things are one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
+  to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
+  If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
+  premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
+  cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
+  unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
+  cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
+  the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
+  For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as
+  does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
+  class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
+  but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
+  dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
+  themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
+  takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
+  we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
+  hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
+  He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
+  rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
+  and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
+  men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
+  necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
+  referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
+  belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
+  contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
+  beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
+  corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
+  even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
+  willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
+  beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
+  necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
+  punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
+  6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
+  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
+  what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
+  counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
+  the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
+  these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div></div></body></html>